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VOL. CCCXL.

HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

X.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint in scripturam; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiani prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. *lib.* 21.

VOL. X.

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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

EUROPE IN ARMS AGAINST FRANCE.—NOV. 1813, JAN. 1814.

ARGUMENT.

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Prodigious results of the campaign of 1813. THE astonishing results of the campaign of 1813 appeared more fully when the crash of arms was over, and the alternations of hope and fear no longer distracted the mind from the contemplation of the revolution which it had effected. When the campaign had terminated—when the remains of the grand army, mournful and defeated, had wended

their way across the Rhine, and the once triumphant Peninsular armies, re-fluent through the passes of the Pyrenees, had finally abandoned the fields of Spain—the magnitude of the change was such, that it seemed beyond the power of any earthly forces, how great soever, to have effected. Little more than three months had elapsed, since four hundred thousand French, flushed with recent victory, were grouped round the fortresses of the Elbe; while two hundred thousand, proud of their expulsion of the British from the plains of Castile, were prepared to maintain on the Tormes or the Ehro the dominion of the Peninsula. Of this immense host, not more than eighty thousand had regained the left bank of the Rhine, and hardly as many remained to arrest the invader on the Adour and the Pyrenees; the remainder had sunk under the sword of the enemy, or wasted away under the horrors of the bivouac and the hospital, or were shut up, without a hope of escape, in the German fortresses. The few who had regained their native land bore with them the seeds of contagion, and a sadness of feeling, which rendered their presence a source of weakness rather than strength to their suffering countrymen. The vast and splendid fabric of the French empire had disappeared like a dream: its external influence, its foreign alliances, had vanished; the liberated nations of Europe, amidst shouts of triumph and songs of gratulation, were crowding in arms to overwhelm its remains; and the mighty victor, reft of all his conquests, was left with no greater resources than the old monarchy of Louis, now nearly drained of its military defenders, to make head against so many iron bands, whom former wrongs had roused to resistance, and recent heroism led to victory.

Approaching trial of the Revolution-ary forces by misfortune. The forces of the Revolution had hitherto basked only in the sunshine of prosperity—so feeble and ill-concerted had been the assault of the European powers in 1795, that even the tumultuary arrays which the fervour of the Convention had called forth, and the guillotine of the Committee of Public Safety had retained at their standards, were sufficient to repel them; and the hydra, which might with ease have been crushed in its cradle, was permitted to grow up till it had encircled every monarchy of Europe in its folds. But the period had now arrived when this long career of prosperous, was to be succeeded by a still more striking train of adverse, fortune: when the forces of Europe, instead of being arrayed with France against England, were to be arrayed with England against France; when disaster, long continued and universal, was to break in pieces the vast supremacy of former times; and when the iron was to enter into the soul, not merely of the sinking nation, but of every family and individual of which it was composed. This, then, was the real test of the strength and constancy of the Revolution: the period had arrived when the passions of success were no longer to animate, the blaze of victory no longer to allure; but when the stern approach of adversity could be met only by the inherent strength of heroism, or the willing sacrifices of duty. The moment is interesting beyond any other which had occurred in the progress of the contest: for the touchstone was now to be applied to the power, resting on the passions of the World, which had so fearfully shaken those which were based on the fervour of Heaven; and France was to go through the ordeal from whence had issued the spirit which defended the ramparts of Saragossa, and the devotion which fired the torches of Moscow.

Return of Napoleon to Paris, and his first measures there.
Nov. 9.

Napoléon set out for Paris from Mayence early in November, and arrived at St. Cloud on the 9th of that month. For the second time within the year, he had reached his capital defeated and forlorn, with his army lost, his power shaken, and his glory dimmed. How

disastrous soever the circumstances of his empire were, the energy of the Emperor was equal to the emergency. His first care was to convoke the Council of State; and to them he made a candid and true statement of the magnitude of his losses, and the necessity of vigorous measures to avert the dangers by which they were threatened. To them also he communicated the terms—which will be immediately mentioned—on which the allied Sovereigns at Frankfort had declared their willingness to treat for peace. The Council, consisting of the Secretaries of State, Talleyrand and Molé, implicitly adopted the views of the Emperor—which were in themselves obviously well-founded—that, in the emergency which had arisen, it was indispensable to have recourse to a dictatorship, and that vast sacrifices must be demanded of France. The Emperor gave the first example of such a sacrifice, by ordering thirty millions of francs (L.1,200,000) to be taken from his vaults in the Tuileries for the public service; and he speedily gave earnest of what he expected of his subjects, and of the dictatorial power he was about to assume, by issuing of his own authority, and without any legislative sanction, a decree by which thirty additional centimes, that is, nearly a third, was added to the land, window, and door tax—the personal tax on movables was doubled, and three-fifths added to the excise duties and the salt tax. Although these additions to the taxes were plainly illegal, as wanting any legislative sanction, even according to the shadow of constitutional freedom which remained to France under the imperial regime, they were the only means which remained of replenishing the public treasury, which, from the cessation of all external requisitions, and the enormous expenses of the late campaign, was totally exhausted: the confiscation of the funds of the communities and the hospitals of the poor, decreed at the beginning of the year (1), had not produced half the sum expected, as few purchasers could be found—and even it was altogether drained away; public credit was ruined; the three per cents were at forty-five; the bank actions of one thousand at three hundred and four (2); and no capitalist could be found in France who would advance the government five pounds.

But however indispensable these illegal stretches might be to provide funds for the immediate necessities of the state, they were by no means equally acceptable to the nation; and the time had now come when the unparalleled disasters of the last two years, and the continual drain which the taxes and conscription had occasioned on the wealth and population of the empire, had produced a general feeling of discontent, which neither the influence of the imperial government could stifle, nor its terrors overawe. The feelings of natural affection had been subdued, and the woful destiny of the young conscripts concealed, so long as “conquest’s crimson wings mocked the air with idle state:” but when the victories of the empire were at an end, and the armies, instead of advancing continually to fresh conquests, were thrown back with terrific slaughter on their own frontiers; when no marshal’s baton in distant prospect could allure the young conscript, but the gloom of the hospital, or the starvation of the bivouac, rose up in grim array to terminate his career in a few months; when relief from domestic taxation, and the means of foreign aggrandizement, were no longer to be attained by the advance of their conquering arms to hitherto untouched fields of plunder, but increase of burdens, and the prospect of themselves suffering from pillage, were imminent from the

(1) *Ante* ix. 50.

(2) Decree, Nov. 11, 1813, in *Cap. x.* 298. *Fain*, MS. de 1814, p. 1.

threatening hosts which were ready to pour into their territory; the minds of the people were of necessity turned into a new direction, and they became sensible of the real tendency and necessary effects of the imperial government. A general feeling of horror, accordingly, especially at the conscription and the excise tax, now became general in the community: the opinion spread widely that the war was endless, and its exhaustion insupportable; the unbending character and known ambition of the Emperor, seemed to preclude all hope of a termination being put to it, save by the destruction of France itself; wishes in secret were formed for a change of government, as the only means of escaping from such a multitude of evils; several pieces containing lines which might be applied to existing circumstances, were prohibited, in consequence, from being represented at the public theatres; defamatory couplets (1) circulated, and were eagerly received in society—and one in particular, found affixed in the Place Vendôme to the pedestal of the column of Austerlitz, which then, as now, had the statue of the Emperor on its summit, had an inscription terribly characteristic of the feeling of the time; for it bore, that “if the blood which he had shed were collected together in that square, it would reach his lips, so that he might drink it without stooping his head (2).”

Deplorable
state of the
army on
the Rhine.

It was not surprising that this feeling of horror should have pervaded the community of France; for the calamities which had now fallen upon the army, in consequence of the disastrous issue of the late campaign, were extreme. On returning to Paris, Napoléon had inserted a statement in the *Moniteur*, that the reorganization of the army was rapidly advancing; that the Marshals had received reinforcements to enable them to maintain impregnable the barrier of the Rhine; that the artillery had repaired its losses; the National Guards were crowding into its fortresses; and that all the efforts of the Allies would be shattered against that bulwark of art and nature. But in the midst of all this seeming confidence, the real state of the army on the frontier was very different; and disaster, wide-spread and unparalleled, had overtaken the shattered remains of the host which had wended its way back from the Elbe. Though the country through which that retreat had been conducted was rich and cultivated, the season temperate, and the marches not in general of unusual length; yet the deplorable effects of Napoléon's system of carrying on war without magazines, or provision of any kind for a retreat, had reduced the troops to the most woful state of destitution. The first corps which passed along the road consumed every thing on its line, and within reach of the stragglers on either side, to the distance of several miles; and those which came after, as on the Moscow retreat, could find nothing whatever whereon to subsist. Magazines there were none between the Elbe and the Rhine, a distance of above two hundred miles, except at Erfurth; and the supplies there only maintained the troops during the two days that they rested within its walls. During the fifteen days that the retreat lasted, the men were left to search for subsistence as they best could, along an already wasted and exhausted line, and the consequence was, that they straggled from necessity

(1) Such as, “Napoléon est mauvais jardinier; car il a laissé geler ses grenadiers et flétrir ses lauriers.” The “Tableau Parlant” was prohibited at the theatres for fear of the application of the line, “Il avait autrefois fait des conquêtes, ce qu'aujourd'hui il ne peut pas.”—See CAPEFIGUE.

(2) Cap. x. 2, 4. Lab. ii. 3, 5.

“Tyrant! juché sur cette chaise,
Si le sang que tu fis verser
Pouvait tenir en cette place,
Tu le boirais sans te baisser.”

Another inscription, in huge letters, was found in the morning affixed to the Tuileries—“Fonds à vendre.—Pas cher—Fabrique des Sifs.”—CAPEFIGUE, x. 4

over the whole country, and arrived on the Rhine half starved, in the deepest dejection, and bearing with them the seeds of a frightful epidemic, which soon proved more fatal even than the sword of the enemy (1).

Terrible
epidemic
which broke
out among
them.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine, who had hitherto known war only by its excitement and its glories, when they beheld this woful crowd, resfluent by the bridge of Mayence into the French territory, and spreading like a flood over the whole country. But their number was so considerable, that even the zeal and charity of the inhabitants, which were taxed to the utmost, were unable to provide any effectual remedy for their distresses. In the fortified towns, where the great mass of the fugitives, armed and unarmed, found a refuge, their situation, though at first superior, was ere long still more deplorable. The dreadful typhus fever which they brought with them from the scenes of their suffering in the German plains, soon spread to such a degree among the exhausted crowds who sought shelter within their walls, that in a few days not only the greater part of the military, but a large proportion of the citizens, were prostrate on the bed of sickness. The churches, the hospitals, the halls of justice, the private houses, were soon filled with a ghastly and dying multitude, among whom the worst species of fever spread its ravages, and dysentery wore down extenuated forms to the lowest stage of weakness. Such was the mortality, that for several weeks at Mayence it reached five hundred a-day. The exhalations arising from so great a multitude of dead bodies, which all the efforts of the inhabitants could not succeed in burying, were such, that they ere long poisoned the atmosphere, and spread an insupportable and pestilential odour through the whole city. The churchyards and ordinary places of sepulture being soon overcharged, and interment in coffins out of the question, from the multitude of dead bodies which abounded on all sides, they were thrown promiscuously into vast trenches dug in the public cemeteries, which were rapidly heaped up to a height exceeding that of the walls which enclosed them; and, when this resource failed, they were consigned to the Rhine, the stream of which wafted them down, as from a vast field of carnage, to the German Ocean; while the shores of the Baltic were polluted by the corpses, which, borne by the waters of the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, from the vast charnel-houses which the fortresses on their banks had become, bespoke the last remains and final punishment of the external government of the Revolution (2).

The internal government of Marie Louise, as Regent, after the departure of the Emperor for the German campaign, had been Great levies of conscripts in the autumn of 1813 in France. sombre and monotonous, little calculated either to distract the attention, or dispel the increasing anxieties, of the people. She went through, with docility, all the external forms which were required by her elevated situation; and, alike incapable of apprehending either the duties or the perils with which it was attended, submitted with the same impassible temper to the unbounded flatteries with which she was surrounded, and the fearful demands she was compelled to make on the blood of her subjects. In August she obtained a temporary respite from the formal duties which oppressed her in the capital, by a journey to Cherbourg, where she had the gratification of beholding the last stone put to that vast construction, partly built, partly excavated from the solid granite, which, commenced by the patriotic spirit of Louis XVI, and continued by the unwearied perseverance of Napoléon, was

(1) Lab. ii. 3-5. Cap. x. 237, 239.

(2) Lab ii. 6-7. Cap. x. 297.

See *Tableau des Hôpitaux pendant la dernière cam-*

pagne de Napoléon. Par J. B. A. HAREDE, ex directeur des Hôpitaux militaires, Paris, 1815.

destined to rival the noble harbours on the opposite coast, from whence the
Aug. 19. fleets of the proud Albion issued forth to give law to the waves. The
 fleet of the Empress were the last which pressed the solid granite of the basin
Sept. 7. before the new element was let in. But sterner duties soon awaited
 her. Immediately after her return to Paris, she was made the organ by which the
 Emperor demanded a conscription of thirty thousand men from the Southern
Oct. 10. departments, and, a month after, another of two hundred and
 eighty thousand from the whole empire, which were immediately voted by the
 Senate—in all three hundred and ten thousand. They were ordered to be
 taken in the following proportions; viz. one hundred and twenty thousand
 from the class attaining the legal age in 1814, and preceding years, and
 the remainder from those reaching that age in 1815—in other words, who
 were now *two years* under the legal age of nineteen to twenty-one. So vast
 had been the consumption of life in the French army, even anterior to the
 overthrow of Leipsic, in this disastrous campaign on the Elbe and in the
 Pyrenees, and so fearful the inroads which the insatiable ambition of the
 Revolution had now made upon the blood and strength of the empire, that
 the military population of the proper age was exhausted, and additional
 troops could be raised only by seizing upon youths of seventeen and eighteen
 years old (1), hardly capable of bearing arms, and altogether unfit to with-
 stand the fatigues of a campaign.

Napoléon's
 speech in
 the Council
 of State.

These ample supplies of men, however, were wholly insufficient
 to meet the wants of the empire, after the disasters of Leipsic had
 thrown them back behind the Rhine, and the invasion of Welling-
 ton had laid bare the defenceless condition of the Southern frontier. In the
Nov. 10. Council of State, the day after his arrival, Napoléon unfolded the
 danger of his situation with manly sincerity, and enforced his demands with
 nervous eloquence. "Why," said he, "should we fear to speak the truth?
 Has not Wellington invaded the South? Do not the Russians menace the
 North? What shame! and the nation does not rise in a mass to chase them
 away. All my allies have abandoned me: the Saxons betrayed me on the field
 of battle; the Bavarians endeavoured to cut off my retreat. Never talk of
 peace till I have burned Munich. The same triumvirate which partitioned
 Poland has arrayed itself against France: we can have no truce till it is de-
 feated. I demand three hundred thousand men: with what remains of my
 armies, I shall then have a million of soldiers. Councillors, what we require
 is energy: every one should march: you are the chiefs of the nation; it is
 for you to give an example of courage. Every one speaks of peace; that
 word alone strikes my ear, while every thing around us should resound with
 the cry of war (2)!"

Decree
 ordering a
 levy of
 300,000 men.
Nov. 15.

On the day following the senate was assembled, and the demand
 on the Emperor's part of three hundred thousand men brought
 forward by the orator of government, Fontanes, whose brilliant
 elocution and sounding periods were well calculated to throw a deceitful veil
 over the devouring requisitions of the Revolution. Napoléon's own words
 breathed a nobler spirit—"A year ago," said he, "all Europe marched with
 us; at present, it all marches against us: that is, because the opinion of the
 world is formed by France or England. We should, then, have every thing
 to fear, but for the power and energy of the nation—posterity will admit,
 that if great and critical circumstances were presented, they were not above

(1) Decrees, Sept. 7 and Oct. 10, 1813. *Moniteur*,
 and Goldsmith's *Recueil*, vi. 517 and 386. Cap. x.
 248, 249.

(2) Lab. ii. 8, 9.

France and me." The levy required was decreed as soon as the project was presented : it was ordered to be taken, not, as in former cases, by anticipation from the young men who would arrive at the age liable to the conscription in the succeeding years, but by *retrospect* from the classes who had undergone the ordeal of the conscription in former years, from 1805 downwards. Thus, within little more than two months, successive levies were demanded from the French people, now reduced almost to their ancient limits, of more than six hundred thousand men : an awful proof of the consumption of human life occasioned in their last stages by the wars of the Revolution. The change in the classes declared liable to the conscription is very remarkable; it indicates the consciousness of government of the arrival of the period when the dreadful destruction of life by the campaigns of 1793 and 1794, had rendered it impossible to draw additional supplies from the young men born in these or the succeeding years, and when it had become indispensable to recur to those who had come into being before the revolutionary scythe had begun to sweep away at once the strength of one generation and the hopes of the next (1).

Napoléon resolves to abandon the line of the Rhine. Preparations to resist the dreaded invasion, were immediately ordered by Napoléon : engineers were dispatched to the principal fortresses on the northern frontiers, with instructions to repair the walls, arm the ramparts, fortify the bridges and passes, and make every possible preparation for a vigorous defence. But when they arrived there, and became acquainted, by ocular inspection, with the deplorable state and reduced numbers of the army, as well as the total want of any preparation, either in the way of magazines, provisions, or artillery, for putting the frontier fortresses in a state of defence, they were soon convinced that it was altogether impossible to think of defending the line of the Rhine. That great frontier stream, above five hundred miles in length, extending from the foot of the Alps to the sands of Holland, presented indeed a most formidable line of defence, if guarded by three or four hundred thousand men; but it was altogether impossible to maintain it with sixty or seventy thousand soldiers, worn out with fatigue, depressed by defeat, with a frightful contagion thinning their ranks, and no magazines to replenish their military stores. It was resolved, therefore, to make no attempt to defend the Rhine, but to fall back at all points across the Vosges mountains. But the Allies were not aware of this resolution; they were ignorant of the weakness and losses of the French army, and paused before the majestic stream which had so long been the frontier of their empire, when they had only to have crossed it to have wrested from the enemy, without firing a shot, nearly a third of France (2).

Alarming fermentation and discontent in the interior of France. Serious, however, as were the external dangers which menaced the empire, they were neither the only ones, nor the most pressing, which awakened the anxiety of the Emperor. The fermentation in the interior was still more alarming; and it had now become painfully evident that the Revolutionary Government, deprived of the stimulus of external success, was tottering to its fall. The correspondences of the prefects over all France at that period were very remarkable, and clearly bespoke the agitation and uncertainty of the public mind : the conscription in particular excited universal alarm, extending, as it now did, not only to those who arrived at the legal age in the course of the year, but to those who

(1) Decree, Nov. 15, 1813. *Moniteur* and Goldsmith's *Recueil*, vi. 544.

Vide *Ante* ix, 46, *et seq.*, where the effect of the conscription on the male population of France—a

most curious and interesting subject—is fully discussed.

(2) Fain, *Camp. de 1814*, 2, 3, *Lab. ii.* 10, 11.

had attained that age during the ten preceding years, and who had hitherto deemed themselves secure from further molestation; while the enormous increase of the excise and assessed taxes, which practically amounted to more than a half, diffused universal consternation—the more so, that it was levied by the sole authority of the Emperor. Already the price of a substitute for the army had risen to four or five hundred pounds; the last conscription at once doubled it, and in some instances as much as twelve hundred were given. Families of respectability spent their whole property, the savings of a long lifetime, to save their sons from destruction: it was universally understood, what in truth was the fact, that the purchasing of a substitute for the conscription, was bribing one man to sacrifice his life for another. In proportion as the dangers of military service increased, desertion from the ranks of the conscripts became more frequent, and its punishment more severe; the prefects were incessantly occupied in enforcing the laws with the utmost rigour against refractory conscripts—long files of them were every where to be seen marching along the roads to their places of punishment, with haggard visages, downcast eyes, and a four-and-twenty pound shot chained to their ankles; while great numbers, especially in the mountain districts, driven to desperation by the alternative of such a punishment, or death in the field or in the hospitals, fled to the hills and formed roving bands, which subsisted by plunder, and already bade defiance to the gendarmes and local authorities. Alarmed at the accounts he received from all quarters of this growing disaffection, the Emperor adjourned the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies, which by a decree, dated from Gotha during the retreat from Leipsic, stood summoned for the 1st December, to the 19th of that month, in the hope that in the interim the negotiations which had commenced with the Allies at Frankfort might have taken a favourable turn, and that he might be able to present some prospect at least to satisfy the universal desire which was felt for peace; while, to prevent the growing disaffection from affecting the voice of the deputies, a decree was passed by the senate, vesting, in defiance of the constitution, the nomination of President of the Chamber in the Emperor, and prorogating the seat of such of the deputies as had expired, and required to be filled up anew, so as to prevent any new elections in the present disturbed state of the public mind (1).

Opening of
the British
Parliament
and pacific
declarations
of the Prince
Regent.

While France was thus reaping, in the utter prostration of public credit, entire exhaustion of the blood of the nation, and universal anxiety which prevailed, the natural consequence of domestic revolution and external aggression, England exhibited at the same period a memorable example of the very opposite effects, flowing from a strictly conservative system of government, and afforded a proof of the almost boundless extent of the resources, which, in a country at once orderly and free, can develop during the most protracted and arduous struggle. Parliament assembled in the beginning of November, and the speech from the Throne dwelt with marked, but not undeserved, emphasis upon the extraordinary successes which had signalized the last memorable campaign, and concluded with the important declaration, “that no disposition to require from France sacrifices of any description, inconsistent with her honour or just pretensions as a nation, will ever be, on the part of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent or his allies, an obstacle to the conclusion of peace.” The address in answer, moved by the adherents of ministers, was agreed to in

(1) Cap. x. 250, 257. Lab. ii. 10, 11. Decree, Nov. 15, 1813. Goldsmith, vi. 545; and *Moniteur*, Nov. 16.

both houses without a dissenting voice; so wonderfully had the glorious concluding successes of the war stilled, both in the legislature and the nation, the furious passions which tore both at its commencement. Lord Liverpool, the prime minister, declared, that, in considering the conditions of a general pacification, "it would be the policy of England to give full security, not only to her friends, but her enemies; and that the cabinet would not countenance any demand from them, which, in their situation, they would not be willing to concede (1)."

Though the language of government, however, was thus pacific, yet like prudent statesmen, who know that the olive branch is in vain tendered with one hand, if the sword is not at the same time unsheathed in the other, they not only admitted no relaxation in their warlike efforts, but made preparations for carrying on the contest on a still more colossal scale than in the preceding campaign. A hundred and forty thousand seamen, including thirty-one thousand marines, were voted for the sea service; the ships of the line in commission were ninety-nine; the total number of vessels of war, which in that year bore the royal flag, was one thousand and three, of which no less than two hundred and thirty-one were of the line, and six hundred and forty-four in commission. The regular land forces consisted of two hundred and thirty-seven thousand men, and the regular militia of eighty-three thousand—all of which were obtained by voluntary enrolment; besides two hundred and eighty-eight thousand of the local militia, who were raised by conscription from the population of the British islands. The land forces in India were two hundred thousand, and forty thousand militia in Canada were under arms, and actively and bravely engaged with the enemy; so that altogether England in this, the twenty-first year of the war, carried on hostilities with one million and fifty-three thousand men in arms (2). It is not the least surprising circumstance of these marvellous times, that, with the exception of the local militia, which were embodied only for a few weeks in the year, and the persons composing which never permanently left their homes, the whole of this immense force was raised by voluntary enrolment: three or four candidates were to be found applying for every vacancy in the Indian army; and the casualties of the British army in Europe, which amounted to twenty-five or thirty thousand annually, were entirely filled up by enlistment, or volunteering from the regular militia—a system which had been attended with the very best effects, and which had yielded, in the last six years, no less than a hundred thousand admirable soldiers to the troops of the line. To extend and improve upon this disposition, a bill was passed early in this session of Parliament, authorizing twenty-seven thousand men to be raised by volunteering from the militia, in one year; a measure which, with the ordinary recruiting, which was taken at sixteen thousand, would produce at least forty thousand men to meet the wants of the year. By such gentle means was the stupendous force brought together, which now carried on the war victoriously in every quarter of the globe, and with so small a consumption of life were the victories gained, which now shook to its centre the iron empire of France (3).

(1) *Parl. Deb.* xxvii. 22. 42. *Ann. Reg.* 1813, 200, 201.

(2) Sailors and Marines, 140,000
 Regular Army, 237,000
 Regular Militia, 83,000
 Yeomanry Cavalry, 65,000
 Local Militia, 288,000
 Native Indian Army, 200,000
 Militia in Canada, 40,000

Lord Castlereagh's speech, Nov. 11, *Ann. Reg.* 1813, 203; and *Parl. Deb.* xxvii, 86, 87.

(3) Lord Castlereagh's speech, Nov. 11, 1813. *Parl. Deb.* xxvii. 86, 87. *Ann. Reg.* for 1813, 202, 203.

Enormous
expense of
the year.

But this immense force could only be maintained by a proportional expenditure; and great as had been the financial efforts of Great Britain during the former year, they were yet exceeded by the colossal exertions of the present. The cost of the army alone, ordinary and extraordinary, rose to the enormous amount of thirty-three millions, besides four millions and a half for the ordnance; the navy required nearly twenty-two millions; and the interest on the national debt and Exchequer bills, with the sinking fund, was no less than forty-three millions: the loans to continental states were ten millions: eight millions were advanced to Ireland; and altogether the expenditure of the year reached the enormous amount of one hundred and seventeen millions. The necessity of carrying on the war with the utmost vigour, at once by land and sea, both in Europe and America, from the coincidence of the termination of the Continental with the commencement of the Transatlantic contest; the vast expense of the campaign in the south of France, at the same time that the war was prosecuted by British troops in the Netherlands, and all the armies of Europe were arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine, sufficiently explain the causes of this vast expenditure: and certainly no policy could have been so short-sighted, even in a financial point of view, as that which at such a crisis would have hesitated at straining every nerve to improve to the utmost the advantages already gained, and bringing the contest to an immediate and glorious termination (1).

(1) Budget for 1814. Ann. Reg, 1815, p. 342; and Parl. Deb. xxx. i. ii. App.

PUBLIC INCOME OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR THE YEAR 1814, ENDING 5TH JANUARY 1815.

Permanent Revenue.

Customs,	L. 8,689,068
Excise,	19,451,102
Stamps,	5,826,363
Land and assessed taxes,	7,889,084
Post Office,	1,799,206
Pensions, one shilling in the pound,	19,504
Salaries, sixpence in the pound,	11,992
Hackney Coaches,	24,081
Hawkers and Pedlars,	15,910
Total permanent and annual duties,	<hr/> L.43,726,210
Small branches of the Hereditary Revenue,	128,666

Extraordinary Resources.

Customs,	L. 3,345,670
Excise,	6,401,097
Property Tax,	14,814,101
Arrears of Income Duty,	1,205
Lottery Net Profit (of which one-third part is for the service of Ireland,)	334,853
Monies paid on account of the interest of loans raised for the service of Ireland,	3,534,255
On account of balance due by Ireland on Joint Expenditure of the United Kingdom,	2,770,000
On account of the Commissioners for issuing Exchequer Bills for Grenada,	60,200
On account of the interest of a loan granted to the Prince-Regent of Portugal,	57,170
Surplus fees of regulated public offices,	119,226
Imprest money repaid by sundry public accountants, and other monies paid to the public,	121,220
Total, independent of loans,	<hr/> L.75,413,873
Loans paid into Exchequer, including the amount of those raised for the service of Ireland,	36,078,047
Grand Total,	<hr/> L.111,491,920

Prodigious
sums pro-
vided for
the service
of the year.

But if it is easy to assign the causes of the vast expenses of the last year of the war, it is a very different matter to explain how the nation was able to bear it; and in truth, of all the marvels of this period, the most marvellous is the way in which funds were provided by the British empire for the gigantic expenditure of the concluding years of the war. When we recollect that the finances of France, supported as they still were by the industry of forty-two millions of persons, and aided as they had so long been by the contributions levied from one-half of Europe, were at this period utterly bankrupt, and that it was only by the aid of the great reserved

Public Expenditure.

1. For interest, etc., on the permanent debt of Great Britain unredeemed, including annuities for lives and terms of years,	L.40,776,530
2. Interest on Exchequer bills,	2,256,707
3. Civil List,	L. 1,028,000
4. Other charges on the Consolidated Fund, viz.—	
Courts of Justice,	74,437
Mint,	16,923
Allowances to Royal Family,	368,048
Salaries and allowances,	67,559
Bounties,	6,458
	<hr/>
	1,561,125
5. Civil Government of Scotland,	114,032
6. Other payments in anticipation of Exchequer receipts—	
Bounties for fisheries, manufactures, corn, etc.,	244,308
Pensions on the hereditary revenue,	27,700
Militia and deserters' warrants,	138,494
	<hr/>
	410,502
7. The Navy—	
Victualling department,	11,334,907
The transport service,	5,774,585
	<hr/>
	4,852,074
	<hr/>
	21,961,566
8. Ordnance,	4,480,729
9. The Army, viz.—	
Ordinary services,	16,532,945
Extraordinary services and subsidies,	27,287,234
	<hr/>
	43,820,179
Deduct the amount of remittances and advances to other countries,	10,024,623
	<hr/>
	33,795,556
10. Loans, etc., to other countries, viz :—	
Ireland,	8,723,985
Austria,	1,475,632
Denmark,	121,917
France,	231,931
Hanover,	739,879
Holland,	267,759
Oldenburg,	10,007
Portugal,	1,500,000
Prussia,	1,330,171
Russia,	2,555,473
Sicily,	316,666
Spain,	586,338
Sweden,	800,000
Miscellaneous,	88,845
	<hr/>
	L. 10,024,618
	<hr/>
	18,748,603
11. Miscellaneous services, viz.—	
At home,	1,937,018
Abroad,	447,573
	<hr/>
	2,384,591
	<hr/>
	126,489,941
Deduct sums which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain :—	
Loan for Ireland,	8,723,985
Interest at one per cent and management, Portuguese loan,	57,170
Sinking Fund on loan to the East India Company,	120,807
	<hr/>
	8,901,962
—ANNUAL REGISTER for 1815, page 342.	L.117,587,979

fund in the vaults of the Tuileries that the most pressing demands on the treasury could be met; we are at a loss to conceive how it was possible for the British empire, with a population, not at this period, including Ireland, of so much as eighteen millions, by any means to have raised the enormous funds which were annually poured into the public treasury; yet no difficulty whatever was experienced in this particular. The permanent revenue for the year 1814 amounted to nearly forty-four, the war taxes to thirty millions sterling; thirty-six millions were raised by loan, including that provided for Ireland; and the ways and means reached altogether the enormous sum of ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN MILLIONS, independent of above six millions, which was annually raised from the landed property of England for the support of the poor. But this marvel, great as it is, is much enhanced when it is recollected, that such was the unshaken credit and inexhaustible capital of Great Britain, that these prodigious loans were raised, in this the twenty-first year of the war, at the low rate of L. 4 : 12 : 1 of annual interest; and that even on these reduced terms, such was the competition of the lenders, and rise of the funds and scrip, at the time the bidding was going forward, that no less than a million of stock was thereby saved to the public—the lenders being inscribed for so much stock in the five and three per cents, and immense fortunes realized to the lucky contractors (1).

Causes of this extraordinary financial wealth of Great Britain. The Continental writers, struck with astonishment at this growing and expansive power in the British finances, which no demands, how great soever, were able to exhaust, have generally concurred in referring it to the effect of the war itself, which secured to the English merchants the commerce of all civilized nations, and rendered London the centre of the wealth, not only of the British empire, but of the whole globe. English writers, equally amazed at this extraordinary phenomenon, have sought an explanation of it in the great addition which at this period was made to British industry, by the introduction of the steam-engine, and the vast improvements introduced into the machinery for cotton manufacture, and have repeated again and again the striking observation, that James Watt stood forth the real conqueror of Napoléon. Without disputing, however, that these causes had a material effect in counteracting the influence of the many circumstances which, during the progress of the contest, had at various periods tended so powerfully to depress the springs of British industry, it may safely be affirmed, that the influence of this concentration of foreign commerce, and growth of manufacturing industry, has been much overrated, and that it is in other causes that the true solution of this extraordinary phenomenon is to be found. The coincidence of the American New Importation Act, passed in February 1814, with the exclusion of British commerce from almost the whole Continent by the Berlin and Milan decrees, had reduced the British exports to a most alarming degree in that year; and though the opening of the Baltic harbours by the war of 1812, and of those of Germany and the Adriatic by that of 1813, had a powerful effect in counteracting these causes of depression, yet the closing of the North American market, which took off, even at that period, manufactured goods to the amount of fourteen millions annually, had a most prejudicial effect upon every branch of industry; and neither the exports nor imports, accordingly, of 1812 or 1813, had equalled what they had previously been in 1809 and 1810. And those who are accustomed to refer the

(1) Parl. Deb. xxviii. 66, 67, and xxx. App. See note, p. 10.
2-5; and Ann. Reg. 1813, 34.

stupendous financial efforts of Great Britain at the close of the war, to the monopoly enjoyed at that period by British commerce, which has been since shared with other nations, or the vast recent growth of its cotton manufactures, will be probably surprised to learn that at that period our exports and our imports were not more than a third of what they have since become; that our tonnage little exceeded a half of what it now is; and that the population of the empire was eleven millions less than the amount which it has attained at this time (1).

The heroic spirit of the nation. The true explanation of this extraordinary and unparalleled phenomenon is to be sought for, not in any casual or accidental circumstances which at that period poured any extraordinary stream of wealth into the British Islands, but in the industrious character of their inhabitants, the long protection from foreign aggression which they had enjoyed, the free and yet tempered spirit of their internal constitution, and the heroic spirit with which they were animated in the latter years of the contest. It is not any casual or passing advantage or monopoly, enjoyed for a few years by its merchants or manufacturers, which can enable a country to maintain a war for twenty years with the most powerful nations in the world, and in its concluding years spend from a hundred and ten to a hundred and twenty millions annually, without raising the rate of interest or exhausting its national resources. Centuries of pacific exertion, the accumulations of long-protected industry, the energy of a free constitution, the security of habitual order, an industrious national character, the influence of long-established artificial wants, and unbounded natural advantages, both for agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, must combine to produce such an astonishing result.

Combination of many causes which produced this result. England had made good use of this extraordinary combination of advantages during the whole course of the contest; her industry, constantly protected alike from foreign aggression and domestic spoliation, had flourished amidst the revolutionary devastation, or military oppression, of other nations; her agriculture, keeping pace with the rapid growth of her population, had even outstripped the wants of the people, and for the first time, for nearly a century, had rendered the empire, in ordinary seasons, independent of foreign supplies for food; while her commerce and manufactures, enjoying a virtual monopoly of all the lucrative intercourse which the dreadful contest which was raging had left to mankind, though inconsiderable in amount to what they have since become, were attended in general with large profits, and occasioned a vast accumulation of wealth in a comparatively small number of hands. But though due weight is by no means to be denied to those concurring circumstances, they were not the most important causes which conspired to produce this extraordinary result; they merely brought to maturity the crop prepared by centuries of previous regulated freedom, protected industry, and natural advantages. And all these

(1) Table showing the Population, Exports, Imports, and Tonnage, of the British Empire in 1811, 1812, and 1814, and in 1836, 1837, and 1838. Records of 1813 destroyed by fire:—

Years.	Population of Great Britain and Ireland.	Exports. Official Value.	Imports. Official Value.	Tonnage, British and Foreign.
1811,	17,580,000	L. 28,799,120	L. 26,510,186	2,072,244
1812,	17,830,000	38,041,573	26,163,431	Records destroyed by fire.
1814,	18,000,000	53,573,234	33,755,264	1,889,535
1836,	26,280,000	97,621,549	57,230,968	3,556,697
1837,	26,560,000	85,781,669	54,737,301	3,583,965
1838,	27,000,000	105,170,549	61,268,320	4,099,039

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, i. 11, ii. 98, and 174, and *Finance Accounts for 1840*, and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, ix. 43, 44.

causes, powerful as they were, would have failed in producing the result, if they had not been aided at the decisive moment by a noble constancy in the government, and spirit in the people, which made them face difficulties and undertake burdens which would have been deemed unbearable in any other age or country, and poured forth the long accumulations of British wealth in the cause of mankind, with a profusion which must ever render this the most glorious and animating period of British history.

Propositions
of the Allied
Sovereigns
from Frank-
fort as to a
general
peace.

While Great Britain and France were thus severally preparing for the final struggle which was to decide the great contest between Revolutionary and Conservative principles, the allied sovereigns, assembled at Frankfort, adopted a measure which, more than any other, tended to elevate their cause in the estimation of mankind, and to sever from Napoléon the support of the French people. The baron Saint-Aignan, ambassador of France at the court of Saxe-Weimar, had been made prisoner during the advance of the Allies to the Rhine, and in the first moment of his capture he had been received with marked kindness by Metternich, who assured him, in the most emphatic terms, of the anxious wish of the allied powers, and more especially his own sovereign, for a general

Nov. 9. peace. Five days subsequent to their arrival at Frankfort, they sent for the Count, and after again reiterating in person, in the strongest terms, their pacific inclinations, dispatched him to Paris with a private letter

Nov. 9. from the Emperor Francis to his daughter, Marie-Louise; and a diplomatic note from the whole sovereigns, in which they stated the terms on which they were willing to open negotiations. The basis of these terms was, "that France was to be restricted to its natural limits between the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; that Spain should be restored to its ancient dynasty; and that the independence of Italy and Germany should be secured, under princes of their native families. If these terms were agreed to, M. de Saint-Aignan was assured that England would make great sacrifices, and would recognise every liberty of commerce and navigation to which France had any right to pretend, and that nothing hostile to the dynasty of

Nov. 16. Napoléon would be insisted on. To these propositions Maret replied on the part of the French Emperor, that "a peace concluded on the basis of the independence of all nations, as well in a continental as a maritime point of view, had been the constant object of his Majesty's solicitude," and he specified the city of Manheim on the right bank of the Rhine, which he proposed should be declared neutral, and made the seat of the negotiations. But he did not say whether or not the French Emperor would accede to the

Nov. 25. basis proposed, which omission was justly complained of by Metternich in his reply, as rendering nugatory any negotiation which might be commenced. To this Maret replied, that in admitting as the basis of the

Dec. 2. whole the independence of all nations, the French Emperor had in effect admitted all for which the Allies contended, and with this explanation

Dec. 10. Metternich professed himself entirely satisfied (1).

Noble decla-
ration of the
Allies from
Frankfort.

Hitherto every thing seemed to augur well for the opening of the negotiation; and the better to express the views with which they were animated, the allied sovereigns published a declaration, dated Frankfort, 1st December 1815, detailing the principles on which they

(1) Rapport du Baron Saint-Aignan, 9th Nov. 1813. Note de Saint-Aignan, 9th Nov. Duc de Bassano au Prince de Metternich, 16th Nov. 1813. Réponse de Metternich, 25th Nov. 1813. Lettre de M. le Duc de Vienne au Prince de Metternich, 2d

Dec. 1813. Réponse de Metternich, 10th Dec. 1813. All contained in the *suppressed Moniteur* of 20th January 1814, and given in FARN, MS. de 1814—46-57.—*Pièces justificatives*.

were willing to treat with Napoléon, and the objects for which the alliance contended; and the whole history of the world does not contain a more noble instance of justice and moderation in the moment of triumph than is exhibited in that instrument. "The allied powers," it declared, "desirous of obtaining a general peace on a solid foundation, promulgate in the face of the world the principles which are the basis and guide of their conduct, their wishes, and their determinations. The allied powers do not make war on France, but on that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France, the Emperor Napoléon has long exercised beyond the limits of France. They desire that it should be powerful and happy—that commerce should revive and the arts flourish—that its territory should preserve an extent unknown under its ancient kings: because the French power, great and strong, is in Europe one of the fundamental bases of the social edifice—because a great people can only be tranquil so long as they are happy—because a brave nation is not to be regarded as overthrown because in its turn it has experienced reverses in an obstinate and bloody struggle, in which it has combated with its accustomed valour: but the allied powers wish themselves to be happy and tranquil—they wish a state of peace, which, by a wise division of power, by a just equilibrium, may hereafter preserve their people from the calamities without number which for twenty years have oppressed Europe. The allied powers will not lay down their arms before they have attained that great and beneficent result (1); they will not lay them down till the political state of Europe is of new secured, before the immutable principles of justice have resumed their ascendant over vain pretensions, and till the sanctity of treaties has at length secured a real peace to Europe."

When sentiments so elevated and generous were promulgated openly by the allied powers, it might reasonably have been expected that the negotiations would have been immediately opened by the French government; and certainly never was defeated monarch and nation invited in such a way to concur in the general pacification of the world. Instead of this, however, Napoléon by every art protracted it as much as possible, and six weeks after M. de Saint Aignan had been dispatched with these pacific overtures, the negotiations had not even got the length of naming plenipotentiaries. The basis agreed to by Napoléon was accepted by the Allies on the 10th December, but the letter notifying their acceptance was not even answered by Caulaincourt on the part of France till the 6th January; and before that time arrived, the Rhine was crossed at all points, and the war carried into the French territory; and the negotiation, in consequence, only commenced at Chatillon at a later period of the campaign. In truth, Napoléon was desirous only to gain time to complete his defensive preparations in his own dominions; and nothing was further from his intention than to withdraw behind the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and although the other allied powers were really desirous of an accommodation, yet Alexander was strongly impressed with the idea—which experience soon proved to be well founded—that no real peace was practicable with the French Emperor, and that the wisest policy was to await the course of military events (1), and not fetter themselves by any engagements which might prove prejudicial, in the event of ulterior success, in the great measures which were in preparation. Thus the negotiation which opened under such favourable auspices came at this time to nothing; for this plain reason, that the views of the leaders on both

(1) Declaration, Dec. 1, 1813, Ann. Reg. 1813, 442; and Schoell, 442; Recueil, ii. 357, Monts., vii. 872.

(2) Metternich to Caulaincourt, Dec. 10, 1813; and Caulaincourt to Metternich, Jan. 6, 1814. Fain, 57, 58. Danilefsky, Camp. de 1814, 2, 3.

sides were so much at variance, that the difference between them could be adjusted only by the sword.

One reason why Napoléon went, in appearance at least, into this elusory negotiation, was in order to have the benefit of the statement to the Chamber of Deputies, who were summoned to meet on the 19th December, that negotiations were in progress, without being fettered by any engagement, or the acceptance of any distinct basis of peace. That assembly met accordingly at that period; but soon evinced a spirit so refractory, that he found it impossible to carry on the government until they were adjourned. The clamour was too loud, and the spirit of discontent and despair which now prevailed in almost every part of France, too deep-seated and profound, to be either stifled by the seductions, or overawed by the terrors, of the imperial authority. Napoléon opened the session in person, with great pomp. "Splendid victories," said he, "have illustrated the French armies in this campaign; defections without a parallel have rendered those victories unavailing, or turned them against us: France would now have been in danger, but for the energy and union of the French. In these momentous circumstances, my first thought has been to summon you around me: my heart has need of the presence and affection of my subjects. I have never been seduced by prosperity—adversity will find me superior to its strokes: I have often given peace to the nations when they had lost every thing: with a part of my conquests I raised up thrones for monarchs who have since abandoned me. I had conceived and executed great designs for the happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I feel that peace adds to the security of thrones as well as that of families. Nothing on my part is an obstacle to the reestablishment of peace—you are the natural organs of the throne; it is for you to give an example of energy which may dignify our generation in the eyes of posterity. Let them not say of us, they have sacrificed the first interests of their country; they have submitted to laws which England has sought in vain during four centuries to impose upon France. I am confident that, in this crisis, the French will show themselves worthy of themselves and of me (1)."

M. de Fontanes, the orator of government, answered in his wonted style of sonorous and dignified eloquence, concluding with the exhortation "to rally round the diadem, where the lustre of fifty victories shines through a passing cloud. Fortune is never long wanting to nations which are not wanting to themselves." Napoléon replied—"I will make, without regret, the sacrifices required by the basis proposed by the enemy: my life has but one object, the happiness of the French. Meanwhile, Bearn, Alsace, and Franche-Comté are invaded; the cries of that part of my family agonize my heart—I call the French to the assistance of the French! I call the Frenchmen of Paris, of Brittany, of Normandy, of Champagne, of Burgundy and of the other departments, to the assistance of their brethren! Shall we abandon them in their misfortune? Peace and the deliverance of our country should be our rallying cry. At the sight of a whole people in arms the stranger will fly, (2) or sign peace on the terms which he himself has proposed. The time has gone past when we could think of recovering our conquests."

In the senate every thing went on smoothly, and nothing indicated any distrust of, or opposition to government. But in the Chamber of Deputies mat-

(1) Discours de Nap. Dec. 19, 1813; *Moniteur*, Dec. 19; and Goldsmith's *Recueil*, vi. 558.

(2) *Ibid.* ix. 468. *Moniteur*, Dec. 22, 1813. Goldsmith, vi. 57.

Unexpected
and violent
opposition
which breaks
out in the
Chamber of
Deputies.

ters soon assumed a very different aspect. Notwithstanding the pains which had been taken by the nomination of a president, the Duke of Massa, by the Emperor, and the filling up of all the vacant seats, twenty-three in number, by the same authority instead of the legal mode of election, it soon appeared that a large party in that assembly were animated with a spirit which it was impossible to control. The first serious business which was committed to the senate and the chamber was the nomination by each of a committee, to whom the documents connected with the negotiations which had been opened with the allied powers should be submitted. That appointed by the senate, consisting of Talleyrand, Lacépède, Fontanes, and others, entirely in the interest of government, gave no umbrage to Napoléon. But the list circulated by authority for the adoption of the deputies, met with a very different reception. It was rejected by a considerable majority; and a committee instead appointed, consisting of persons heretofore, with the exception of one, Lainé, unknown, and over whom the court possessed little influence. It was easy to foresee from this commencement, that in the present excited state of the public mind, a contest of a very serious kind awaited the Emperor with his own legislature (1).

Lainé's
Report in
the Chamber
of Deputies,
Dec. 28.

In effect, it broke out sooner than could have been anticipated. The committee appointed to consider the diplomatic instruments communicated to them, immediately commenced their labours; and their report, drawn by Lainé, was communicated to the chamber, in a secret meeting held on the 28th. This report bore, "that to prevent the country from becoming the prey of foreigners, it was indispensable to nationalize the war; and this could not be done unless the nation and its monarch were united by closer bonds. It has become indispensable to give a satisfactory answer to our enemies' accusations of aggrandizement: there would be real magnanimity in a formal declaration, that the independence of the French people, and the integrity of its territory, is all that we contend for. It is for the government to propose measures which may at once repel the enemy, and secure peace on a durable basis. These measures would be at once efficacious, if the French nation were persuaded that the government, in good faith, aspired only to the glory of peace, and that their blood would no longer be shed but to defend our country and secure the protection of the laws. But these words of 'peace' and 'country' will resound in vain, if the institutions are not guaranteed which secure these blessings. It appears, therefore, to the commission to be indispensable, that at the same time that the government proposes the most prompt and efficacious measures for the security of the country, his Majesty should be supplicated to maintain entire the execution of the laws, which guarantee to the French the rights of liberty and security; and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights (2)."

Remarkable
statements
which it
contained.

"The confederation of the Rhine is an alliance useful only to the Germans: a powerful hand secured them independence. If they prefer the chains of Austria, why not abandon them to their desires? As to Holland, since the Allies insist on the conditions of Lunéville, we may withdraw without regret from provinces difficult to preserve, in which the English interest exclusively prevails, and to which the English commerce is the price of existence. Have these countries not been so impoverished by the war, that we have seen patrician families withdraw from them, as if pursued by a devastating scourge, to carry elsewhere their industry and

(1) Thib. vi. 468, 469. Monts., vii, 292.

(2) Thib. ix 468, 469. Bucher et Roux, Hist. Parl. xxxix. 458.

their riches? We have need, without doubt, of courage to make the truth known to our Emperor; but with whatever perils the attempt is attended, we will incur them rather than betray his confidence: we would rather endanger our own lives than the existence of the nation.

"Let us attempt no dissimulation: our evils are at their height; the country is menaced on the frontiers at all points; commerce is annihilated, agriculture languishes, industry is expiring; there is no Frenchman who has not in his family or his fortune some cruel wound to heal. The facts are notorious, and can never be sufficiently enforced. Agriculture for the last five years has gained nothing; it barely exists, and the fruit of its toil is annually dissipated by the Treasury, which unceasingly devours every thing to satisfy the cravings of ruined and famished armies. The conscription has become, for all France, a frightful scourge, because it has always been driven to extremities in execution. For the three last years the harvest of death has been reaped three times a year! a barbarous war without an object swallows up the youth, torn from their education, from agriculture, commerce, and the arts. Have the tears of mothers and the blood of generations thus become the patrimony of kings? It is fit that nations should have a moment's breathing-time; the period has arrived when they should cease to tear out each other's entrails (1): it is time that thrones should be consolidated, and that our enemies should be deprived of the plea, that we are for ever striving to carry into the whole world the torch of revolution."

Napoléon resolves to dissolve the Chambers, and his speech to the Council of State.

The reading of this report conjured up a perfect storm in the Chamber. It was so long since the words liberty and political rights had been heard within its walls, that the courtiers started as if high treason had been spoken in their presence. The president Regnier interrupted the report. "Orator," said the nominee of Napoléon, "what you say is unconstitutional." "In what?" replied he; "there is nothing unconstitutional here but your presence." The debate was adjourned to the 30th, and a majority of four-fifths voted an address to the Emperor, and that Lainé's report should be printed and distributed. Napoléon instantly ordered the printing to be stopped, the proofs already thrown off to be seized, and refused to receive the address. He summoned the Council of State, and thus broke forth—"Gentlemen, you are aware of the state of affairs, and the dangers of the country. I thought it fit, without being under any obligation so to do, to make a confidential communication to the Chamber of Deputies on the state of the negotiations, because I wished to associate them with my dearest interests. They have taken advantage of that communication, to turn an arm against me, that is, against the country. Instead of aiding me by their efforts, they restrain my own. An imposing attitude on our part can alone repel the enemy—theirs attracts him. Instead of presenting to him a front of brass, they lay bare our wounds: they demand peace with great cries, when the only possible means of obtaining it is by seconding me in war. They complain of me; they speak of their grievances: but what time, what place, have they chosen for bringing them forward? Is it not in family, and not in presence of the enemy, that they should treat of such subjects? Have I then been inaccessible to them? Have I shown myself incapable of listening to reason? Matters have come, however, to such a pass, that a decisive part must be taken. The legislative body, instead of uniting with me in saving France, does all it can to precipitate its fall: it betrays its duties. I fulfil mine: I dissolve it (2)."

(1) Bucher et Roux, *Parl. Hist. de France*, xxxix. 457, 458.

(2) *Thib.* ix. 469, 470.

His decree dissolving the Chambers. He then caused to be read a decree, which he proposed to issue, declaring that two-fifths of the legislative body had already exhausted their powers; that another fifth, on the 1st of January, would be in the same situation; and therefore, that the legislative body was prorogued till the elections were completed. "Such," resumed the Emperor, "is the decree which I propose to issue; and if I were assured that this very day the people of Paris, in a body, were to come to massacre me in the Tuileries, I would not the less persevere in it—for it is my duty. When the French people intrusted me with their destinies, I considered the laws given me to govern them; if I had deemed them insufficient, I would not have accepted the charge. They need not suppose that I am a Louis XVI. When I became Emperor, I did not cease to be a citizen. If anarchy is to be installed anew, I will abdicate, and mix in the crowd to enjoy my part in the sovereignty, rather than remain at the head of affairs, when I can only endanger all, without protecting any. My determination is conformable to the law: if all would now discharge their duty, I would be invincible behind it as in face of the enemy (1)."

His violent invective against the Chambers at the Tuileries. On the day following, being the 1st January 1814, on occasion of the public reception of the authorities in the Tuileries, Napoléon broke forth in a strain of vehement invective against the legislative body: "Gentlemen," said he, "you have it in your power to do much good, and you have done nothing but mischief. Eleven-twelfths of you are good, the rest are factious. What do you hope for by putting yourselves in opposition? To gain possession of power? But what are your means for doing so? Are you the representatives of the people? I am so: four times I have been invoked by the nation; and four times I have had the votes of four millions of men for me. I have a title to supreme authority which you have not. You are nothing but the representatives of the departments of the nation. Your commission has been guided by the spirit of the Gironde—M. Lainé is a conspirator, an agent of England, with which he is in correspondence by means of the advocate De Sèze; the others are actuated by factious motives. I will keep my eye on M. Lainé; he is a bad man. Your report is drawn up with an astute and perfidious spirit, of the effects of which you are well aware. Two battles lost in Champagne would not have done me so much mischief.

"I have immolated my passions, my pride, my ambition, to the good of France. I was in expectation that you would appreciate my motives, and not urge me to sacrifices inconsistent with the honour of the nation. Far from that, in your report you mingle irony with reproach: you tell me that adversity has given me salutary counsels—how can you reproach me with my misfortunes? I have supported them with honour, because I have received from nature a strong and fierce character; and if I had not possessed that ardent temperament of mind, I would never have raised myself to the first throne in the universe. Nevertheless, I have need of consolation, and I expected it from you: so far from giving it, you have endeavoured to cover me with mud; but I am one of those men whom you may kill, but cannot dishonour. Is it by such reproaches that you expect to restore the lustre of the throne? What is the throne? Four pieces of gilded wood covered with a piece of velvet. The real throne has its seat in the nation: you cannot separate the two without mutual injury; for the nation has more need of me than I have of the nation. What could it do without a chief and without a

(1) *Thib. ix.* 470, 471.

guide? When the question was, how we could repel the enemy, you demand institutions, as if we had them not! Are you not content with the constitution? If you are not so, you should have told me so four years ago, or postponed your demand to two years after a general peace. Is this the moment to insist on such a demand? You wish to imitate the Constituent Assembly, and commence a revolution? Be it so. You will find I will not imitate Louis XVI: I would rather abandon the throne: I would prefer making part of the sovereign people to being an enslaved king. I am sprung from the people: I know the obligations I contracted when I ascended the throne. You have done me much mischief: you would have done me still more, if I had allowed your report to be printed. You speak of abuses, of vexations—I know as well as you that such have existed: they arose from circumstances and the misfortunes of the times. But was it necessary to let all Europe into our secrets? Is it fitting to wash our dirty linen in public instead of the privacy of our families? In what you say there is part truth and part falsehood. What then was your obvious duty? To have confidentially made known your grounds of complaint to me, by whom they would have been thankfully received: I do not love those who have oppressed you more than you do yourselves. In three months we shall have peace: the enemy will be chased from our territory, or I shall be dead. We have greater resources than you imagine: our enemies have never conquered us—never will. They will be chased across the frontier quicker than they have entered it (1).”

Measures of
Napoléon
for the dé-
fence of
France.

The dissolution of the Chambers immediately followed this violent apostrophe, which paints the character of Napoléon better than volumes of ordinary history. Although, however, he had been so vehement in his menaces, and had denounced M. Lainé, in particular, as sold to England and a traitor to his country, yet no arrests or measures of severity followed. The deputies retired without molestation to their departments; and the Emperor, engrossed in military preparations, forgot this transient ebullition of resistance in the legislature, or prudently dissembled his resentment, lest he should extend still further a flame which he could not extinguish. Vast preparations were made for resisting the enemy—commissioners were sent down to all the departments to hasten the levies of men, accelerate their equipment and arming, take measures for the equipment and provisioning of the fortresses, and, where invasion was threatened, effect a levy *en masse*. A decree of 4th January fixed the budget at 1,176,800,000 francs, or L.47,000,000 sterling; and in order to provide for this immense sum, fifty *per cent* was ordered to be added to the land tax; and the duties on doors and windows, as well as the personal and assessed taxes, were doubled by the sole authority of the Emperor. The commissioners sent down to the provinces on these momentous missions, however, though invested with very ample powers, were men little calculated to move the masses; being in general old generals, or worn-out functionaries of the Imperial Court, who had no feeling in common with the great bulk of the community: but even if they had been endowed with the energy of Danton, or the fire of Mirabeau, the passions were extinct in the nation, the time was past when it was possible again to revive the revolutionary fever; a sombre feeling pervaded all classes that the wars of Napoléon were endless, and that a change of government or dynasty could alone put a stop to the ceaseless effusion of human blood. And soon the rapid advance of the Allies rendered all these defensive preparations of little avail; and the occupation

Jan 4, 1814.
Jan. 9.

(1) Bucher et Roux, Hist. Parl. de France, xxxix, 160, 161.

of a third of France by their victorious armies, reduced the resources and weakened the influence of the Emperor, as much as it augmented the physical means, and swelled the moral strength of his antagonists (1).

The presence of external danger at this period extorted from Napoléon two important concessions in foreign diplomacy, which, of themselves, were calculated to have effected an entire alteration in the relations of the European states to each other, and implied a total abandonment on his part of the principal objects of his continental policy.

Treaty of Valençay, by which Ferdinand is restored to the Spanish crown. The first of these was the treaty of Valençay, by which he agreed to the liberation of Ferdinand VII from his confinement in France, and his restoration to the throne of Spain. The coincidence of the invasion of the south of the empire by Wellington, with the climax of discontent which the democratic leaders at Cadiz had raised against their English allies, from the glorious successes of their arms, and the entire liberation of the Peninsula from the invader's yoke, naturally suggested to the French Emperor the hope, that by relinquishing all thoughts of retaining Joseph on the throne of Spain, and restoring the imprisoned monarch to his dominions, he might not only break the sword of Wellington in his hands, but convert the exasperated Jacobins of Cadiz into useful allies. The sacrifice required was equal to nothing; for Joseph was already bereft of his dominions, and had recently arrived at Paris, accompanied only by a few baggage waggons, laden with the riches of the Escorial, the poor remains of a lost crown, dishonoured throne, and plundered realm. By the advice of Talleyrand, Napoléon immediately abandoned his disconsolate brother to his fate, and opened a negotiation with Ferdinand, the object of which was to restore him to his dominions, and re-establish peace with Spain on such terms as might be most likely to embroil that power with its English allies. The negotiation was not long of being brought to a conclusion. Ferdinand, wearied of his long detention at Valençay, was overjoyed at the prospect of regaining his liberty and his dominions on any terms; and he had little scruple in agreeing to any terms which were exacted of him, conscious that they would at all events procure for him his liberation; and that, if any of them should prove burdensome, he could avail himself of the plea that the treaty was concluded under the coercion of captivity, and was no longer binding on him or the nation after he had regained his independence (2).

Terms of the treaty of Valençay. It was in the middle of November, immediately after the return of Napoléon from Leipsic, that this negotiation was commenced under the direction of Maret, and by the intervention of M. Lafoust, an able diplomatist who had long been ambassador of France at the court of Joseph, and had there acquired an accurate knowledge of the secret springs of influence in the Spanish councils. The Emperor wrote to Ferdinand in conciliatory and flattering terms; representing that the affairs of his empire had inspired him with the desire to terminate at once the affairs of the Peninsula, to put an end to the anarchy which had so long desolated its provinces, and terminate that fatal ascendancy which England, for its own selfish purposes, had converted into the means of diffusing universal ruin over its kingdoms. Ferdinand replied, in cautious terms, that he could not treat without the consent of the Spanish nation, or at least of the Regency; and that, rather than treat without its deputies, he would spend all his life at Valençay. The Duke de San Carlos, however, was sent shortly after

(1) Thib. *fix.* 476, 479. Decrees, Jan. 4, and Jan. 9, 1814, Goldsmith, vi. 584, 587, Cap. x. 330, 334.

(2) Cap. x. 310, 311. Thib. ix. 442, 443.

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to the captive monarch, who was no sooner assured of the intention of Napoléon really to liberate him from his captivity, than he agreed to every thing that was required of him. The treaty was concluded on the 11th December, and stipulated the recognition by the Emperor of Ferdinand, as King of Spain and the Indies; that the English troops should retire from the Spanish dominions; that Port-Mahon and Ceuta should never be ceded to Great Britain; that the high contracting parties should mutually guarantee each other's dominions, and maintain the rights of their respective flags, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht; and that the late monarch should receive an annuity of thirty millions of reals, (L.500,000,) and two millions of reals (L.20,000) yearly to the Queen-Dowager in case of her survivance. The treaty provided for its ratification by the regency established at Madrid. Thus had Napoléon and Talleyrand the address, at the conclusion of a long and bloody war in which their arms had been utterly and irretrievably overthrown, to procure from the monarch, whom they had retained so long in captivity, terms as favourable as they could possibly have expected from a long series of victories; and thus did the sovereign, who had regained his liberty and his crown by the profuse shedding of English blood, make the first use of his promised freedom to banish from his dominions the Allies whose swords had liberated him from prison, and placed him on the throne (1).

It is not ratified by the Regency and Cortes.

The result, however, both disappointed the hopes of the French diplomatists, and saved the honour of the Spanish nation. The spirit of the Peninsular revolution, as Wellington often remarked, was essentially anti-Gallican; and though the democrats of Cadiz, in the ardour of their pursuit of absolute power, had evinced the most inveterate hostility against the English general and his gallant army, and even gone so far as to open secret negotiations with Joseph for the recognition of his title to the crown, provided he subscribed the republican constitution of 1812 (2); yet they recoiled from actual submission to France, and refused their ratification to a treaty, extorted from their sovereign while in a state of captivity, which was calculated to arrest their arms in the moment of victory, and stain the honour of a contest which already resounded through the world. The regency and the Cortes, accordingly, had the virtue to refuse their ratification of the treaty; and although Napoléon hoping to distract or paralyse the Spanish armies, sent Ferdinand back into Spain, where he arrived by March 19. the route of Catalonia on the 19th March, yet the treaty, as it remained without ratification, made no change on the military operations, and Spain took an honourable part in the war, down to the final overthrow of the power of Napoléon (3).

Napoléon consents to liberate the Pope, but does not in fact release him.

A similar feeling of necessity induced Napoléon shortly after to recede from another favourite object of his ambition, and consent to the liberation of the Pope from his long and painful confinement at Fontainebleau. The whole of Christendom had long been scandalized at the prolonged imprisonment of the supreme Pontiff, and the French Emperor had felt the consequence of the profound indignation which it had excited, in the inveterate hostility of the Peninsular nations, as well as the readiness with which Austria had united her forces to those of the alliance. With the double view, accordingly, of depriving his enemies of this envenomed weapon of hostility, and propitiating Austria—from the diplomacy of which he never ceased to expect secret favour, in consequence

(1) Cap. x. 310, 311. Thib. ix, 442, 443. Napoléon to Ferdinand, Nov. 11, 1813. See the Treaty in Martens, i. 654. N. R.

(2) See *Ante* ix. 360.

(3) Nap. vi. 511. Wellington to General Clinton, Jan. 27, 1814, Gurw. xi. 489.

of the matrimonial alliance—he made secret overtures to the Pope at Fontainebleau early in January; and, what was not a little extraordinary, the person first charged with the delicate mission was a lady of rank belonging

Nov. 15. to the court of Marie Louise,—the Marquise Anne Brignole of Sienna. She had several interviews with his Holiness in November; but the Pope was firm in declining to come to any accommodation till he was restored to Rome; and he persisted in the same refusal when the

Jan. 18. Archbishop of Bourges formally offered, two months afterwards, on the Emperor's part, to restore the Holy See as far as Perugia. He replied, that the restitution of his dominions was an act of justice which Providence would work out for itself, and which could not be the fit subject of a treaty while the Pope was detained, to the scandal of Christendom, in a state of captivity. He added—"Possibly our faults render us unworthy to behold again the Eternal City; but our successors will recover the dominions which appertain to them. You may assure the Emperor that we feel no hostility towards him—religion does not permit it; and, when we are at Rome, he will see we shall do what is suitable." The necessities of the Emperor rendered it indispensable for him to disembarass himself of the presence of the Pope, even although he could not extort from him any concessions of territory to prop up his falling empire; and accordingly,

Jan. 22. four days afterwards, on the 22d January, Pius VII was conveyed away from Fontainebleau towards the south of France, by Montauban and Castelnau. Yet even in this act of concession the grasping disposition of the Emperor was rendered apparent: he delayed, on various pretexts, the passage of the supreme Pontiff through the south of France, hopeful that a return of fortune to his arms might enable him to retain so precious a prisoner in his power;—when Paris was taken by the allied armies, he was still detained at Tarascon, near the mouth of the Rhone; and the final order for his deliverance proceeded from the provisional government which succeeded upon the fall of Napoléon (1).

Negotiations of an important character at the same time were going on, between both Napoléon and the allied powers, with Murat, king of Naples. That brave but irresolute prince, seeing clearly the approaching downfall of the Emperor, and actuated as well by his own inclinations as the ambition of his queen, Caroline, who, after having tasted of the sweets of royalty, had little inclination to share in the ruin of her brother and benefactor, was desirous above all things, by one means or other, to secure, and if possible strengthen, in the coming catastrophe, his own throne. With this view, after the overthrow of Leipsic, when the external fortunes of the Emperor were evidently sealed, while he still kept up a confidential correspondence with Napoléon, he advanced a column of troops to Ancona, which he occupied, proclaiming loudly his resolution to establish the independence of Italy. At the same time he secretly opened a negotiation with Prince Metternich, and it was evident that he would join his arms to whichever party bid highest for his alliance. To Napoléon he held out,

Dec. 25. that matters had now arrived at that pass when it was necessary to take a decisive part; that the menacing position of the English in Sicily, rendered it wholly impossible for him to hazard the bulk of his forces to the north of the Po; but that, if the Emperor would guarantee to him the whole Italian provinces to the south of that river, and unite

(1) Artaud, Vie de Pie VII, ii. 362, 371. Cap. x. 312, 313.

them all into one monarchy, he would rekindle the flame of independence in Italy, and raise such a spirit in the peninsula, that Austria would never cross the Adige (1). To Metternich he at the same time represented, that the ambition of Napoléon was insatiable, as his infatuation was incurable, and that he would willingly enter into the coalition of the allied sovereigns, provided he were guaranteed the possession of his Neapolitan dominions. Napoléon having returned no answer to his last and urgent demand for the establishment, in his favour, of a sovereignty embracing the whole territories to the south of the Po, he soon came to terms with the allied powers, and early in January concluded a treaty, by which it was stipulated that he should be guaranteed in his Italian dominions, and join their forces on the Po with thirty thousand men (2).

Jan. 11, 1814.

Jan. 19.
He joins the
latter, and
invades the
Roman ter-
ritories.

No sooner was this treaty signed than Murat prepared to act in conformity to it, and on the 19th January entered Rome at the head of twenty thousand men. The slender French garrison retired into the castle of St.-Angelo, and thus was the second city in Napoléon's empire wrested from him by the arms not of his enemies, but his brother-in-law and lieutenant, the old comrade and friend, whom he had raised from a private station to the throne of Naples! Murat accompanied this invasion by an energetic proclamation, in which he outstripped the most inveterate enemies of France in his denunciation of the perfidy and violence of the Revolutionary government. "Soldiers! as long as I could believe that the Emperor Napoléon combated for peace and the happiness of France, I fought by his side; but now it is no longer possible to give credit to that illusion. The Emperor breathes nothing but war. I would betray the interest of my native country, of my present dominions, and yourselves, if I did not at once separate my arms from his, to join them to those of the powerful allies, whose magnanimous intentions are to re-establish the independence of nations and the dignity of thrones. Soldiers! there are but two banners in Europe—on the one are inscribed Religion, Morality, Justice, Law, Peace, and Happiness—on the other, Persecution, Artifice, Violence, Tyranny, War, and Mourning to all nations." A caustic though just expression, but which sounds strangely coming from a child of the Revolution (3)!

Jan. 16, 1814.

Incipient de-
fection of Eu-
gene Beau-
harnais.

In the general fever of anxiety to preserve the dignities and possessions they had acquired, hardly any member of Napoléon's family escaped unsullied. Even Eugène Beauharnais, though both a more exalted and blameless character than Murat, was not uninfected by the contagion; although he wrote publicly that "he would not separate himself from his benefactor," yet he in secret received overtures from the

(1) "Your Majesty need not indulge the hopes you have formed of seeing me pass the Po; for if I put that river between my army and my own dominions, I should have no means of resisting the fermentation which now prevails in Romagna, Tuscany, and my own states. Be assured, Sire! the proclamation of the independence of Italy, forming one single power of all its states to the south of the Po, would save that country; without such a measure it is lost beyond redemption: it will be partitioned anew, and your sublime design of emancipating the Italian peninsula, after having covered it with glory, is for ever lost. Put at this moment the provinces beyond the Po at my disposal, and I will engage that the Austrians shall never cross the Adige. The enemy at present shake the Italians by speaking to them of independence; the hope which they have in their armies has hitherto obviated

the effect of these propositions; but will they continue proof against such seductions, if the King of Naples does nothing to realize their hopes, and continues, on the contrary, to maintain the yoke of the stranger? It is mere delusion to suppose they will. Will your Majesty explain yourself on this vital point? Time presses; the enemy is daily reinforced. I am constrained to silence, and the season approaches when I in my turn will be driven to make a choice, and forced to join the enemy. Sire! In the name of all you have dearest in the world—in the name of your glory—delay no longer. Make peace!—make it on my terms!"—MURAT to NAPOLEON, 25th December 1813. CAPEFIGUE, x. 544, 545. *Note*.

(2) See the treaty in Martens, N. R. i. 660. Cap. x. 343, 344.

(3) Thib. ix, 496. Cap. x. 343, 344.

Allies, and subsequently sent a plenipotentiary to Chatillon, to attend to his separate interests. What ultimately prevented this negotiation from coming to maturity, was not any disinclination on his part to come to an accommodation, but the impossibility of reconciling his pretensions to his Italian dominions with the ambitious views of Austria over that part of the peninsula. All heads were swept away by the torrent; every former obligation, how great soever, was forgotten. Among the rest, the Princess Eliza, Napoléon's sister, endeavoured to save her fortune in the general wreck: her uneasiness at the prospect of a downfall was extreme, and she lent a ready ear to the suggestion of Fouché when he passed through Florence, on his way back from the honourable exile which the Emperor had assigned him at Rome and Naples—"Once Napoléon is dead, every thing will fall into its natural place, and they will leave you your beautiful palazzo Pitti (1)."

Treaty between Denmark and the Allied Powers.

In the north of Europe a more honourable constancy in misfortune was exhibited; but the march of events was irresistible, and even the warmest allies of the French were at last compelled to abandon their fortunes, and range themselves on the side of the European confederacy. The Danes, whom jealousy of Russia, not less than the bitter recollection of their capital twice taken by the English, had inspired with a strong predilection for the French alliance, and who had exhibited, like the King of Saxony, an honourable fidelity to their engagements during the general defection of 1813, were unable any longer to continue the contest. Entirely severed from the armies of Napoléon by the evacuation of Germany after the battle of Leipsic; unable either to succour or derive assistance from the corps of Davoust, shut up in Hamburg; pressed by the army of the Crown Prince of Sweden on the south, and the fleets of England on the north—the Danish monarchy was menaced with immediate destruction, and the Cabinet of Copenhagen had no alternative but to submit, even on the hard Jan. 14, 1814. terms of submitting to the cession of Norway. After a short negotiation, accordingly, a treaty was concluded between Denmark and the allied powers, by which it was stipulated that the former should join the coalition against France, and bring to its support a corps, the strength of which was to be afterwards determined, to operate in the north of Germany. The King of Denmark agreed to the cession of Norway to Sweden, the King of Sweden, on his part, engaging to maintain the rights and privileges of its inhabitants inviolate; and, in exchange for this painful sacrifice, the duchy of Pomerania, with the island of Rugen, were ceded by Sweden to the Danish crown. Thus was accomplished the first permanent cession of a kingdom in the north of Europe, consequent upon the wars of the French Revolution; and although history cannot contemplate without regret the violent transference of a brave and ancient people from the government of their fathers to a stranger rule; yet the mournful impression is much alleviated by the reflection, that Denmark obtained, to a certain extent at least, an equivalent, adjacent to its own territories; that the Scandinavian Peninsula was thus for the first time united under one dominion, and a power all but insular established in the Baltic, which, with the support of the British navy, may possibly be able to maintain its independence in future times, even beside the colossal power which overshadows the north of Europe (2).

Important military confederation of Germany.

While the grand confederacy was thus strengthening itself by fresh alliances on the shores of the Baltic and the Mediterranean, and the last allies of the French domination were breaking off from

(1) Cap. x. 344. Fouché, Mem. ii. 254, 255.

(2) See the Treaty in Martens, Sup. i. 66; and in Schoell, iv. 227.

its sinking empire, the great central power of Germany was rising with portentous energy at the call of patriotism; and the military strength of its inhabitants, roused to the highest pitch by the trumpet of victory, was directed with consummate talent to the prosecution of the last and greatest object of the war—the final subjugation of the power of Napoléon, and the extrication of Europe from the thralldom of the Revolution. The accession of Bavaria to the coalition on the eve of the battle of Leipsic, had already been followed by that of all the lesser powers which formed part of the Rhenish Confederation; and the great outwork which had been erected with so much effort by Napoléon, to form the advanced post of France against Europe, had already become the outwork of Europe against France. The whole population welcomed the allied troops as deliverers, transports beat in every bosom, joy beamed from every eye; and before even the energy of the allied cabinets could arrange the different governments in their confederacy, the people had every where made common cause with their armies. A few of the princes, particularly the Grand Duke Charles of Dalberg, Prince Isenberg, and the Prince of La Layen, held out for the French, and their dominions were in consequence occupied by the allied troops; but all the others gladly ranged themselves under the banners of the victorious powers. Already on

Oct. 21. the 21st October, before the sovereigns separated from Leipsic, a convention had been entered into, for the organization of the whole forces of Germany against the common enemy, and the best developement of these resources for the purposes of the war; and a central administration formed, to direct the efforts and regulate the contributions of the states (1). At the head of it was placed Baron Stein, whose energy and wisdom had so early prepared in Prussia the means of resistance to the French domination.

Accession of
the princes
of the Confe-
deration of
the Rhine to
the new
league.

Oct. 22. The formal accession of the leading princes of the Confederacy of the Rhine was soon obtained to the new league. On the very day after the convention was signed at Leipsic, the King of Wirtemberg concluded a treaty with the Allies, and his contingent was fixed at twelve thousand men : the Duke of Saxe-Weimar signed his acces-
Nov. 1 and 2. sion on the 1st, the Duke of Darmstadt on the 2d of November; and the whole lesser princes, with the exceptions above mentioned, followed their example. The Elector of Hesse stood in a somewhat different situation, as he was not a member of the Rhenish Confederacy, as his states had been swal-
Dec. 2. lowed up in the rickety kingdom of Westphalia; and he was accord-

ingly admitted into the grand alliance by a separate treaty in the beginning of December, which immediately restored him to the possession of all his ancient dominions, with the exception of the bailiwicks of Dorheim, which had been assigned to the Grand Duke of Darmstadt. The contingent of the Elector of Hesse was fixed at twelve thousand men. The respectable but unfortunate King of Saxony had been treated with unwonted severity by the Allied Sovereigns after the battle of Leipsic : none of them, excepting the Crown Prince of Sweden, had visited him in his misfortunes : and he had been conveyed away, a prisoner, to Berlin, where he remained uncertain of the fate which awaited him. But the whole civil and military resources of Saxony were at the disposal of the grand alliance; and its soldiers, borne away by the torrent, marched as cheerfully in the ranks of the Fatherland as those of the states which had gained most by the crusade for its deliverance (2).

(1) Schoell, x. 334, 337. Hard, xii. 257, 261.

(2) Schoell, x. 533, 343. Martens, xii. 644, and 649.

Treaties at
Frankfort in
November
for regulat-
ing the Ger-
man Confed-
eracy against
France.

It was both a delicate and complicated work to arrange into one organized whole the various members of the Rhenish Confederacy, and, after adjusting the pretensions, determining on the reclamations, and smoothing down the jealousies of its numerous princes, to combine the whole into one effective league for the prosecution of the war. The general enthusiasm, however, which prevailed, rendered these difficulties much less formidable than they would have been at any other time; and the previous organization of Napoléon presented a machine ready made, and of most skilful construction, which was now applied with fatal effect against himself. By two treaties concluded at Frankfort on the 18th and 24th November, the important objects of providing for the maintenance of the grand army, and regulating the contingents to be furnished by all the German princes who had joined the confederacy, were accomplished. To effect the first object, each of the princes of the old Confederacy of the Rhine engaged to provide at once, on his own credit, a sum equal to the gross revenue of his dominions; and the payments were to be made in instalments every three months, till the whole was paid up. The sum total thus raised at once on credit, was 17,116,500 florins, equal to 44,252,000 francs, or about L. 1,750,000 sterling. In addition to those ample payments in money, the most effective measures were taken to draw forth the military power of the whole states forming the Germanic Confederacy. The contingent of each state was taken at the double of that which it had furnished to the Confederation of the Rhine; the one half to be provided in troops of the line, the other half in landwehr; and in addition to this, corps of volunteers were permitted, and the landsturm or levy *en masse* organized and made ready for action, in all the countries which seemed to require such extraordinary precautions. The troops thus raised, amounted, independent of the forces of Bavaria, which were thirty-five thousand strong, to upwards of a hundred thousand, besides an equal amount of landwehr, and they were divided into six corps. Of these Saxony furnished twenty thousand—Hanover and Hesse, twelve thousand—Wirtemberg, twelve thousand—and Baden eight thousand (1). The most minute regulations were laid down for providing the requisite supplies, hospitals,

(1) TROOPS FURNISHED BY THE CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE TO THE ALLIES.

<i>Second Corps.</i>		<i>Fifth Corps.</i>	
Oldenbourg,	1,500	Wurzburg,	2,000
Hanover,	20,000	Darmstadt,	4,000
Brunswick,	6,000	Frankfort and Isenburg,	2,800
Bremen,	8,000	Reuss,	450
	<hr/>	Nassau,	1,680
	35,500		<hr/>
			10,930
<i>Third Corps.</i>		<i>Sixth Corps.</i>	
Kingdom of Saxony,	20,000	Wirtemberg,	12,000
Duke of Saxe-Weimar,	2,800		
Schwartzburg,	650	<i>Seventh Corps.</i>	
Anhalt,	800	Baden,	8,000
	<hr/>	Hohenzollern,	250
	24,250	Lichtenstein,	40
<i>Fourth Corps.</i>			<hr/>
Hesse-Cassel,	12,000		8,290
Berg,	5,000		
Waldeck,	400		
Lippe,	650		
	<hr/>		
	18,050		

—Koch, *Abbrégé de Traités de Paix*, x. 357, 358.

and provisions for this vast aggregation of men. So universal and wide spread was the organization which had now arisen for arraying Europe in a defensive league against France; and so unanimous the concord which the oppressions of the Revolution had established among nations so various, interests so opposite, and animosities so inveterate (1).

Negotiations
with Swit-
zerland.

Nothing remained now but to detach Switzerland from the French alliance, and from the great salient bastion of the Alps threaten France on the side where its defences were weakest, and the least precautions had been taken by preceding sovereigns to guard against foreign invasion. The Helvetic Confederacy, like all weak states, without being either strongly attached to, or exasperated against France, were desirous to preserve their neutrality, and anxiously sought to prevent their country from becoming the theatre of war. Aware of the great importance of securing the frontier of the Jura from insult, if not by the attachment, at least by the interests of his mountain neighbours, Napoléon had studiously avoided both insult and injury to them, and forbore to draw those resources from their territory which the proximity of its situation and warlike character of its inhabitants placed within his reach. They had neither been plundered and insulted like the Prussians, nor denationalized like the Tyrolese: the conscription of men had been far from oppressive, and the cantons had felt the war rather in the obstruction it occasioned to foreign commerce, than any peculiar exertions with which it had been attended. An extraordinary diet,

Nov. 18.

assembled at Zurich, had already, in the middle of November, proclaimed the neutrality of the republic, and sent a body of troops to the frontiers to cause them to be respected. The French Emperor readily acceded to a neutrality which promised to secure France from invasion on the side where it was most vulnerable, and immediately withdrew his troops from the canton of Tuino, which they had occupied. But the allied sovereigns were not disposed to be equally forbearing, for it was as much their interest to make their attack from the side of the Alps, as it was that of their adversary to avoid it; and accordingly, having resolved to occupy part of the Swiss territory with their troops, they dispatched M. Libzettern and Count Capo d'Istrias to the Helvetic diet, to endeavour to obtain their consent to such a proceeding (2).

The Allies
notify their
intention to
enter the
Swiss terri-
tory to the
Diet, dec. 8.

But Austria had taken the initiative in this important negotiation. On the 8th December, M. de Schrant, the envoy of the cabinet of Vienna at the Helvetic Confederacy, presented a note to the diet, in which he declared the allied sovereigns were resolved to extricate them from their degrading state of dependence, which had now reached such a height, that their orators were obliged to pronounce an annual eulogium on their oppressors. On the 20th December, M. Libzettern and De Schrant, the Austrian envoy, presented to the diet a note, in which they declared that the intention of the Allied Sovereigns was to deliver Switzerland from that state of dependence, which, under the specious name of protection, had so long kept them in a state of thralldom: that in carrying these intentions into execution, they must of necessity enter the Helvetic territories; that they could not recognise a neutrality which existed only in name; but that they would interfere in no respect in their internal government, and that, from the moment that their independence was really established, they would rigidly observe their neutrality. To this note

(1) Schoell, x. 353, 358. Martens, xii. 619 and 626; and Schoell. Recueil, ii. 58.

(2) Schoell, x. 359, 361, Journ. iv. 521.

Dec. 21. was annexed the order of the day, which, on the following day, Prince Schwartzberg was to issue on entering the Swiss territory (1). This decisive step at once destroyed the influence which, under the name of mediation, the French Emperor had so long exercised in the states of the Helvetic Confederacy; and as it was followed next day by the entrance of the allied forces in great strength into their territories; it produced an imme-

Dec. 29. diate effect in the Swiss councils. Eight days afterwards, a majority of the deputies of the old cantons, viz. Uri, Schwytz, Lucerne, Zurich, Glarus, Zug, Fribourg, Bale, Schaffhausen, and Appenzel, declared the constitution introduced by Napoléon by his act of mediation, annulled (2); and promulgated the important principle, that no one canton should be subjected to the government of another canton—a declaration which, by virtually raising the hitherto dependent cantons of St.-Gal, Thurgovia, Argovia, and the Pays de Vaud, to the rank of independent members of the confederacy, laid the foundation of a more extended and equal confederacy in future

Dec. 31. times. On the 31st December, the allied sovereigns issued a declaration, in which they called on the Swiss to take up arms to aid in the recovery of their independence; and at the same time come under a solemn engagement, not to lay down their arms till the independence of the Swiss Confederacy was secured, and placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and till the portions of it, especially the Valais, which had been seized by the French Emperor, were restored to their rightful owners. In these changes, although the aristocratic cantons, especially that of Berne, went cordially along with the allied powers, yet the Swiss as a whole were rather passive submitters to, than active auxiliaries of, their arms; but so equitable was the constitution which they ultimately established, and so complete the independence they have since enjoyed under it, that the Helvetic States have no cause to regret the transient evils which the passage of the allied forces through their territory occasioned (3).

Completion of the Grand Alliance against France. Thus was at length accomplished that great confederacy which the prophetic mind of Pitt had long foreseen could alone extricate Europe from the fetters of the French revolutionary power, but which the selfish ambition and blind jealousies of the European states had hitherto prevented them from forming. From the rock of Gibraltar to the shores of Archangel—from the banks of the Scheldt to the margin of the Bosphorus—all Europe was now arrayed in one vast league against France, which was reduced entirely to its own resources. From the kingdom of Italy it could not

(1) "The irresistible march of events in a war, which just and enlightened men cannot view in a different manner, and the necessity of consolidating and securing the happy results which have hitherto flowed from it, have led the allied armies to the frontiers of Switzerland, and forced them, to continue their operations, to traverse a part of its territory. The necessity of this step, and the vast results dependent on it, will probably furnish a sufficient vindication of it to all reasonable men; but that necessity, great as it is, would not have appeared a sufficient justification in the eyes of the allied powers, if Switzerland had been really in a situation to maintain a true and real neutrality; but it is so little in that situation, that all the principles of the law of nations authorize them to regard as null the neutrality they have proclaimed. The allied sovereigns recognise, as the most sacred principle of the law of nations, the right of every state, how inconsiderable soever, to assert and maintain its independence: they are so far from contesting that principle, that it is the basis of all their pro-

ceedings; but no state can pretend to neutrality which is not in a condition to assert, and has in fact asserted, its independence. The pretended neutrality of a state which is habitually governed by external influence, is but a name; and while it secures to one belligerent the advantages of a substantial alliance, it exposes the other to the evils of a real hostility. When, therefore, in a war, the object of which is to impose limits to a menacing and preponderating power, such a neutrality serves as a shield to injustice, and a barrier to those who strive for a better order of things, it must disappear with the evils which have created it. No one can contest that such is the actual position of Switzerland towards the allied powers on the one hand, and France, whose south-eastern frontier it covers, on the other."—*Declaration of the Allied Powers to the Swiss Diet, 21st Dec. 1813.* SCHOELL, *Recueil*, ii, 8, 12.

(2) See *Ante V.*, 43, 44.

(3) See Schoell, *Hist. des Trait.*, x, 362, 364; and *Recueil*, iv, 41-42; ii, 1-5, 20.

expect succour, but might rather anticipate demands for assistance : all its other allies were now arrayed against it; and the power which only eighteen months before had headed a crusade of all the western states of the continent against the independence of Russia, was now reduced to combat with its own unaided forces the combined military strength of all Europe ! An astonishing change to be produced in so short a time, and strikingly characteristic of the oppression of that military tyranny which could thus, in so brief a space, reconcile interests so discordant, still jealousies so inveterate, and combine forces so far severed by language, race, and political institutions !

Immense
forces accu-
mulated by
the Allied
powers.

But the efforts of the allied cabinets, and the enthusiastic spirit which universally prevailed among their people, had now accumulated forces so prodigious for the invasion of France, that nothing in ancient or modern times had ever approached to their magnitude. By the universal arming of the people, and establishment of the landwehr in all the German states, an enormous military force had been collected, which enabled the Allies, without materially weakening their military force on the Rhine, to blockade all the fortresses on that river and the Elbe which were still in the hands of the French, and thus irrevocably severed from the French empire the numerous garrisons, still mustering above a hundred thousand combatants, which were shut up within their walls. The absurdity of Napoléon clinging with such tenacity to these advanced posts of conquest, isolated in the midst of insurgent nations, when he was contending for his very existence in his own dominions, became now strikingly apparent ; they at once detached from his standards a vast army, which, if collected together, might have enabled him still to make head against his enemies, but which, in the foreign fortresses, served as so many beacons scattered through the enemy's territory, which at once recalled the recollection of past oppression, and indicated the undiminished resolution to resume it. This extraordinary resolution on the part of the French Emperor to abandon, even in his last extremity, none of the strongholds which he held in any part of Europe, and which cost him, from first to last, a hundred and eighty thousand of his best troops, whom it compelled to surrender to bodies, little superior in number, of ill-disciplined landwehr and militia, which beleaguered their walls, was, beyond all doubt, one of the greatest causes of his fall ; and it affords a memorable example of the manner in which revolutionary ambition overleaps itself, and throws its votaries down on the other side.

Grand Army
under
Prince
Schwart-
zenberg.

The forces which the allied powers had collected by the end of December to co-operate in the projected invasion of France and Italy, were thus disposed. The Grand Army, still under the immediate direction, as in the former campaign, of Prince Schwartzberg, numbered two hundred and sixty thousand combatants ; and, even after deducting the usual number of sick and non-effective, might be expected to bring two hundred thousand sabres and bayonets into the field. Its composition, however, was heterogeneous, and though it boasted the imperial guards of Russia, Prussia, and Austria within its ranks, and had the *élite* of the forces of those great military monarchies around it standards, yet it was far from being powerful and efficient, as a whole, in proportion to its gigantic numerical amount. It comprised the Austrian corps of Bubna, Lichtenstein, and Giulay ; the Wirtemburghers under the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg ; the Bavarians and German confederates under Marshal Wrede ; the Austrian guards and reserves commanded by Prince Hesse-Homberg ; and the confederates under Prince Philippe of Hesse-Homberg and Count Hochberg. But though these German troops were little short of two hundred thousand strong,

and some of them were a noble array, yet the main strength of the army consisted in the Russian and Prussian guards, and the Russian reserves under the Grand Duke Constantine and Count Milaradowitsch. These noble troops, nearly forty thousand strong, the very flower and pride of the allied host, with the Russian corps of Wittgenstein, twenty thousand more, all bronzed veterans who had gone through the war of 1812, formed a reserve in itself a powerful army, which in the end operated with decisive effect upon the fate of the campaign. This army was destined to act on the side of Switzerland and Franche-Comté, where there were no fortresses, excepting Besançon, Huningen, and Sarre Louis, to arrest the progress of an invading army. But though the line of its invasion was thus comparatively smooth, and it was so formidable from its numerical strength and the quality of a part of its force, this huge array was seriously paralysed by the presence of the allied sovereigns at its head-quarters, by the consequent subordination of military movements to diplomatic negotiation, and by the known cautious and circumspect character of its commander-in-chief (1).

Strength
and compo-
sition of
the army
of Silesia.

The second army, still called the army of Silesia, under the orders of the celebrated Blücher, was composed of four veteran corps, of which two were Prussian under the command of D'York and Kleist, and two Russian under the direction of Langeron and Sacken. To these had recently been added two corps of German confederates, one commanded by the Electoral Prince of Hesse-Cassel, and the other by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg. The total amount of this army was one hundred and thirty-seven thousand, of which upwards of fifty thousand were Russians inured to war, and flushed with victory, and nearly forty thousand Prussian conscripts burning with the ardour of the war of deliverance. This army was stationed on the north-eastern frontier of France, between Mayence and Coblenz, and threatened it on the side of the Vosges mountains and Champagne; in which, though a double line of formidable fortresses guarded the frontier, yet if they were blockaded, no natural barrier of any strength was interposed, after the Rhine was passed, between that river and Paris; and a vigorous invasion might with certainty be anticipated from the admirable quality of the troops of which it was composed, and the enterprising character of its chief (2).

Army of
the Crown
Prince of
Sweden.

The third army, which was destined to co-operate in the invasion of France, was under the command of the Prince-Royal of Sweden. It comprised the Russian corps of Winzingerode, and the Prussian of Bulow, each of which was thirty thousand strong; the corps of German confederates under the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, that of the confederates commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, each of which was thirty thousand; fifteen thousand of Walmoden's men; the Swedish auxiliaries, twenty thousand; and nine thousand English, who took a part in the campaign on the banks of the Scheldt. This army mustered in all one hundred and seventy-four thousand combatants, of whom a hundred and twenty thousand, after deducting the sick, and troops blockading the garrisons, might be relied on for operations in the field. But although this army was thus formidable in point of numerical amount, and the Russian and Prussian corps which it comprised were second to none in experience and valour, yet the positions of the troops, the variety of nations of which they were composed, and the peculiar political situation of their commander-in-chief, rendered it doubtful whether they would render any very efficient services in the course of the campaign. They lay on the Lower Rhine, between Cologne and Dussel-

(1) Schoell, x. 378, 379, Plotho, iii. Beil, 1.

(2) Plotho, iii. Beil, ii. Schoell, x. 380, 381.

dorf, with the iron barrier of the Netherlands, still in the enemy's hands, right in their front; and though a large proportion of the fortresses of which it was composed were unarmed or ill provisioned, yet others, particularly Antwerp, might be expected to make a formidable defence, and would require to be besieged by considerable forces; and though the abilities of Bernadotte were unquestionable, and he had, on more than one occasion, rendered important services in the course of the preceding campaign, yet his disinclination, in itself natural and unavoidable, to push matters to extremity against his old country and comrades, was very apparent; and the hopes, which he in secret nourished, of being called, on the fall of the present dynasty, to the throne of France, rendered him in the last degree unwilling to be associated in the minds of its people with the days of their national humiliation or disaster (1).

The Allied Independent of these immense armies, the allied powers had collected, or were collecting, a variety of reserves, which in themselves constituted a mighty host. They consisted of the Austrian reserve, twenty thousand strong, under the Archduke Ferdinand of Wirtemberg; the Russians who were before Hamburg, to the number of fifty thousand, under Benningsen; the Russian reserve, commanded by Labanoff, of fifty thousand, who were collecting in Poland; the Prussian landwehr, engaged in the blockade of the fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder, to the number of fifty thousand men; the Prussian reserve, twenty thousand strong, who were collecting in Westphalia, under Prince Louis of Hesse-Homburg; and the Russian and Prussian force blockading Glogau, in number about fifteen thousand—in all two hundred and thirty-five thousand; which, with the three grand armies of Schwartzemberg, Blucher, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, already assembled on the frontier of the Rhine; eighty thousand Austrians, who, under Marshal Bellegarde, were destined to act in the north of Italy; and a hundred and forty thousand British, Portuguese, and Spaniards, who, under the guidance of Wellington, were assailing the south in Bearn and Catalonia, formed a mass of A MILLION AND TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND MEN, which was prepared to act against the French empire (2). A stupendous force such

(1) Plotko, iii. Beil, iii. Schoell x. 381, 382.

(2) Schoell, x. 381, 382. Plotko, iii. Beil, iv.

Viz. Grand Army under Schwartzemberg,	261,650
Army of Silesia under Blucher,	137,391
Army of the North under Bernadotte,	174,000
Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Reserves	235,000
Austrians in Italy under Bellegarde,	80,000
British and Portuguese in France,	78,000
Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies in Catalonia,	62,000

Total acting against France, 1,023,041

Composition and Strength of the Allied Armies who invaded France.

GRAND ARMY OF SCHWARTZENBERG.

1. *Austrians.*

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cossack Regiments.	Canon.
1. The 1st Light Division of Count Bubna,	5	30	3		24
2. The 2d Light Division of Lichtenstein,	5	18	2		16
3. The 1st Corps of Colloredo,	27	12	8		64
4. The 2d Corps of Lichtenstein,	21	12	8		64
5. The 3d Corps of Giulay,	25	13	7		56
6. The Corps of Frimont,	11	26	6		48
7. The Corps de Reserve of Prince Hesse-Homburg,	26	40	26		100
8.	8				
Total, &c.	128	151	60		372

as had never before been directed against any power in the annals of human warfare; formidable alike from its discipline, its experience, and the immense train of military munitions with which it was furnished; animated

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cossack Regiments.	Cannon.
Brought forward,	128	151	60		372
II. <i>Russians and other Allies.</i>					
9. The first Allied Corps, or the fifth Corps d'Armée of Wrede,	30	30	12		76
10. The seventh Allied Corps, or the fourth Corps d'Armée of Prince of Wurtemberg,	15	12	4		24
11. The Russian, or sixth Corps d'Armée of Wittgenstein,	23	20	7	5	72
12. The Russian Reserve of the Arch-Duke Constantine,	35	72	15	21	116
13. The Prussian Guard,	8	8	3		24
Total,	239	293	101	26	684

—PLOTNO, iii. *Appendix*, p. 13, 14, 15.

Force of the above.

	Men.
Austrians,	130,000
Bavarians,	25,000
Wurtemburghers,	14,000
Russians, { Wittgenstein's corps,	19,350
Reserve,	32,200
Prussian Guard,	7,100
Guards of the Grand Duke of Baden,	1,000
The sixth Allied Corps,	13,000
The eighth Allied Corps,	10,000
Wurtemberg's reserve,	10,000
Total of the Grand Army,	261,650

II. THE ARMY OF THE NORTH.

Under the Command of the Crown Prince of Sweden.

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.	Men.
1. The 3d Prussian Corps of Bulow,	45	50	12	96	2		30,000
2. The Russian Corps of Winzingerode,	35	30	14	162		19	30,000
3. The 3d German Corps d'Armée,	32	15		56		2	30,000
4. Walmoden's Corps,							15,000
5. The Swedish Army,	28	32	9	62			20,000
6. The 2d German Allied Corps,	32	16	4				30,000
Total of the Army of the North,							155,000
7. Dutch troops,							10,000
8. English troops under Graham,							9,000
9. Danish infantry,							10,000
							184,000

—PLOTNO, iii. *Appendix*, pp. 29, 40.

III. THE ARMY OF SILESIA.

	Men.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.
1. The first Prussian Corps d'Armée of York,	18,931	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	44	13	104	2	
2. The second Prussian Corps d'Armée of Kleist,	20,000	37	44	14	112	2	
3. The Russian Corps d'Armée of Langeron,	33,310	43	28	12	136	5	7
4. The Russian Corps d'Armée of Sacken,	21,150	26	24	7	84	1	8
Total,	93,391	137 $\frac{1}{2}$	140	46	436	10	15
5. The fourth German or Hessian Corps d'Armée,	20,000	25	12	4	32		
6. The fifth German or Duke of Coburg's Corps,	24,000	20	11	5	40		3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Grand Total,	137,391	182 $\frac{1}{2}$	163	55	508	10	18 $\frac{1}{2}$

by the highest spirit, united by the strongest bonds; stimulated alike by past suffering and present victory; and guided by sovereigns and generals, who, trained in the school of misfortune, were at length cordially united in the

Prussian troops,	Men.
Russian troops	38,931
German Allied troops	54,460
	44,000

Total, 137,391

—PLOTNO, iii. *Appendix*, p. 26.

IV. THE ARMY OF RESERVE.

	Men.	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Batteries.	Cannon.	Pioneer Companies.	Cossack Regiments.
1. Russian reserves under Benningsen,	50,000	63	74	131 ¹ ₂	156	5	10
2. The fourth Prussian Corps d'Armée under Tauenzien,	50,000	64	58	171 ¹ ₂	100		
3. Prussian reserve corps in Westphalia, under Prince Hess- Himberg,	20,000	21	12	2		1	
4. The Russian army of reserve under Prince Labanow,	80,000						
5. Blockading corps before Glogau,	15,000						
6. Austrian reserve under the Grand Duke of Wurtemberg,	20,000						

Total of the Army of Reserve, 235,000 148 144 33 256 6 10

—PLOTNO, iii. *Appendix*, p. 41-50.

Summary of the whole Allied Armies.

	Men.
1. The grand army under Marshal Schwartzberg,	261,000
2. The army of Silesia under Marshal Blucher,	137,000
3. The army of the North under the Crown Prince of Sweden,	174,000
4. The Italian army under Marshal Bellegarde,	80,000
5. The army of reserve,	235,000
Grand Total,	887,000
Of which there were,—	
230,000 Germans, { In the first line,	210,000
{ In the second line,	20,000
278,000 Russians, { In the first line,	136,000
{ In the second line,	92,000
{ In the third line,	80,000
162,000 Prussians, { In the first line,	76,000
{ In reserve,	86,000
197,000 German allied troops.	
20,000 Swedes.	
Total,	887,000

This does not include the Danish infantry, 10,000 strong.

—PLOTNO, iii. *Appendix*, p. 50.

Composition and Strength of the French Army.

	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
I. Guard under Marshal Mortier—			
1. Old guard—			
One division of infantry under General Frenant,		6,000	
One division of cavalry under General Desnouettes,			2,400
2. Young guard—			
Infantry—Division, Christiani,		3,500	
— — — — — Division, Rothenburg,		6,000	
— — — — — Division, Boildieu,		6,000	
Cavalry — — — — — Division, Segur,			1,600
— — — — — Division, Colbert,			1,600
— — — — — Division, Nansouty,			1,600
II. Infantry—			
The second corps, Victor,		8,000	
The third corps, Ney,		8,000	
The sixth corps, Marmont,		7,000	
The seventh corps, Oudinot,		12,000	
The eleventh corps, Macdonald,		7,000	
The first reserve division, Charpentier,		3,000	
The second reserve division, Laval (from Spain,)		3,000	
The third reserve division, Amey,		3,000	
The fourth reserve division, Pajol, (National Guard,)		3,000	
Carry forward,		75,500	7,200

resolution, at all hazards, to terminate the fatal military preponderance of the French empire (1).

	Brought forward,	Artillery.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
III. Cavalry—			75,500	7,200
The first corps, Grouchy,				3,000
The second corps, Sébastiani,				3,000
The fifth corps, Milhaud,				3,000
The eleventh corps, Exelmans,				3,000
Dragoon division, Briche, (from Spain,)				3,000
IV. Artillery under Drouot,		8,000		
	Grand total,	8,000	75,500	22,200

SUMMARY.

1. Guard—28,700 men,			21,500	7,200
2. Infantry,			54,000	
3. Cavalry,				15,000
4. Artillery,		8,000		
	Total,	8,000	75,500	22,200

Grand total, 105,700 men, with 300 cannon.

Detached.

1. The first Corps under Maison in Belgium,	20,000
2. The army of the South under Marshal Augereau at Lyons,	20,000
3. The thirteenth Corps under Marshal Davoust in Hamburg,	20,000
4. The army of Italy on the Adige, under Beauharnais,	50,000
5. The army of the Pyrenees and of Aragon, under Soult and Suchet,	90,000

I. Garrisons in France.

Men.

1. Garrison of Besançon,	4,000
2. — of Auxonne,	3,500
3. — of Auxerre,	3,000
4. — of Mayenne,	20,000
5. — of Strasburg,	10,000
6. — of Feltzberg,	1,500
7. — of Landau,	2,000
8. — of Befort,	3,000
9. — of Huningen,	4,000
10. — of Brissac,	1,500
11. — of Schelestadt,	2,000
12. — of Metz,	10,000
13. — of Thionville,	4,000
14. — of Luxembourg,	5,000
15. — of Saarlouis,	1,500
16. — of Toul,	3,000
17. — of Verdun,	2,000

Total, 80,000

II. Garrisons in Holland and the Netherlands.

Men.

1. Garrison of Antwerp,	8,000
2. — of Gorcum,	4,000
3. — of Bergen-op-zoom,	5,000
4. — of Maestricht,	3,000
5. — of Flushing,	3,000
6. — of Naerden,	2,000
7. — of Luxembourgh,	10,000
8. — in Namur, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, Lille, and others,	15,000

Total, 50,000

III. Garrisons in Germany.

1. Garrison of Wesel,	10,000
2. — of Marienburg,	1,500
3. — of Petersberg,	2,000
4. — of Custring,	4,000
5. — of Glogau,	10,000
6. — of Wittenberg,	3,000
7. — of Magdeburg,	20,000

Total, 50,500

GENERAL SUMMARY.

I. In France—

Men.

The Grand Army under Napoléon,	105,700
The Army of the South under Augereau,	30,000
The Army of the Pyrenees and of Aragon, under Soult and Suchet,	90,000
Garrisons in France,	80,000

II. In Holland and the Netherlands—

The first corps under Maison,	20,000
Garrisons in Holland and the Netherlands,	50,500

III. In Germany—

The thirteenth corps under Davoust,	20,000
Garrisons in Germany,	50,500

IV. In Italy—

The Army of Italy under Beauharnais,	50,000
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Grand Total, of French forces, 496,200

—Plorno, iii. Appendix, 65, 68.

(1) Ploto, iii. App. 1 Schoel, x. 331. 332.

Napoléon's
forces to
oppose the
invasion.

To oppose this crusade Napoléon had a most inadequate force at his disposal; not that he had not used the utmost exertions, and made use of the most rigorous means, to recruit his armies; or that his conscriptions on paper did not exhibit a most formidable array of combatants; but the physical strength and moral constancy of his empire were alike exhausted, and his vast levies now brought but a trifling accession of men to his standards. Since the first of September 1812, that is, during a period of sixteen months, he had obtained from the senate successive conscriptions to the amount of twelve hundred and sixty thousand men, in addition to at least eight hundred thousand who were enrolled around his banners at the commencement of that period; but of this immense force, embracing on paper at least above *two millions* of combatants, hardly two hundred and fifty thousand could now be assembled for the defence of the empire; and of these not more than two hundred thousand could by any possibility be brought forward in the field. Five hundred thousand had perished or been made prisoners in the Russian campaign; three hundred thousand in the war in Saxony; two hundred and fifty thousand had disappeared in the two last Peninsular campaigns; nearly a hundred thousand were shut up in the fortresses on the Elbe or the Oder; a still greater number had sunk under the horrors of the military hospitals in the interior; and the great levy of five hundred and eighty thousand in October and November 1813, had, from the failure of the class to which it applied, in consequence of the conscription having now reached the *sons* of the generation who had been cut off by the dreadful campaigns of 1793 and 1794, proved so unproductive, that the Emperor could not (1), with the utmost exertion, reckon upon the support of more than three hundred and fifty thousand men in the field, to defend the frontiers of his wide-spread dominions, and make head on the Rhine, on the Jura, and on the Garonne, against such a multitude of enemies.

Distribu-
tion of Na-
poléon's
forces.

Such as they were, these forces were thus distributed. Sixty thousand men were blockaded in Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Torgau; and forty thousand in the fortresses on the Oder, the Vistula, in Holland, and Italy; fifty thousand under Eugène in Italy, maintained a painful defensive against the Austrians under Marshal Hiller, while a hundred thousand under Soult and Suchet in Bearn and Catalonia, struggled against the superior armies of Wellington and Bentinck. The real army, however, which the Emperor had at his disposal to resist the invasion of the Allies on the Rhine, did not exceed a hundred and ten thousand men, and this force was scattered over an immense line, above five hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the frontiers of Holland, so that at no period of the campaign could he collect above sixty thousand combatants at a single point. Agreeably to his usual system, of never acknowledging in his actions the reality of his resources, and possibly in the hope of deceiving his enemies by the imposing array of his force, this comparatively diminutive host was divided into eight corps; but they were but the skeleton of the Grand Army, and many of its regiments could not muster two hundred bayonets. Victor, with nine thousand infantry, and three thousand five hundred horse, guarded the line of the Rhine from Bale to Strasbourg; Marmont, with ten thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, was stationed along the same river from Strasbourg to Mayence. That important fortress itself, with the observation of the Rhine from thence to Coblenz, was entrusted to Count

(1) *Fain, Camp. de 1814*, 28, 31. Schoell, x.

Morand, with eighteen thousand combatants; from thence to Nimeguen the frontier was guarded by Macdonald, with eighteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; while Mortier, with the imperial guard and reserve cavalry, still mustering eleven thousand infantry and seven thousand horse, lay on the Yonne. Ney, with his five divisions, hardly amounting to ten thousand foot soldiers, occupied the defiles of the Vosges mountains; and Augereau, with twelve thousand, was stationed at Lyons. Thus, not more than seventy-five thousand infantry and fifteen thousand horse could be relied on, to withstand the shock of above three hundred and fifty thousand Allies, who could immediately be brought into action; and even after taking into view the reserves forming in the interior, and the dépôts at Metz, Verdun, Paris, Troyes, and other places, to which every disposable sabre and bayonet was directed, not more than a hundred and twenty thousand men could possibly be mustered to withstand the threatened invasion (1), and of those not more than one-half could ever be assembled in a single field of battle (2).

Hesitation of the Allied generals at the idea of invading France. Notwithstanding their great superiority of force, the Allied sovereigns hesitated before they undertook the serious step of crossing the Rhine; and opinions were much divided as to the proper place to be adopted when the enterprize was resolved on. The physical weakness of the French empire, the exhausting effects of the long-continued drain upon its military population, the despair which had seized upon the minds of a large portion of its people, from the entire failure of the large efforts they had made to maintain their external dominions, were in a great measure unknown to the Allied generals; and they still regarded its frontiers as they had been accustomed to do, when Napoléon led forth his conquering bands to humble or subjugate every adjoining state. The catastrophes of two campaigns, how great soever, could not at once obliterate the recollection of twenty years of triumphs; and France, in its weakness, was now protected by the recollection of its departed greatness, as the Grand Army, at the close of the Moscow retreat, had been saved from destruction by the halo which played round the names of its marshals; or as the Lower Empire had so long been sheltered by the venerable letters on its standards, which, amidst the servility of Asiatic despotism, recalled the glorious recollections of the senate and people of Rome. Such was the influence of these feelings, that it required all the enthusiasm excited by the triumph of Leipsic, and all the personal influence and vigour in council of Alexander, to overcome the scruples of the allied cabinets, and lead to the adoption of a campaign

(1) Vaud. i. 116, 117. Koch, *Camp. de 1814*, i. 47, 49, 131, 132. Cap. x. 331. Plötho, iii. Beil. v.

(2) The aggregate of these forces was as follows:—

Blockaded in the fortresses on the Elbe,	60,000
— — — — — in Holland, Italy, and on the Oder.	40,000
In Italy, under Eugène,	50,000
In Bearn, under Soult,	70,000
In Catalonia, under Suchet,	30,000
At Lyons, under Augereau,	12,000
Grand Army under Napoléon, viz.:—	
Victor,	12,500
Marmont,	10,200
Morand,	18,000
Macdonald,	21,000
Mortier,	18,000
Ney,	10,000
<hr/>	
Reserves in the Interior,	89,700
	30,000
	<hr/>
	381,700

based upon an immediate invasion of France with the whole forces of the coalition (1).

Plan of invasion proposed by Alexander, and agreed to by the Allied sovereigns. It was at first proposed that Schwartzemberg's army should cross the Rhine, enter Switzerland near Bale, and enter Italy, to co-operate with the Austrian army in Lombardy under Bellegarde, while Blucher was to enter near Mayence; and the army of the north, under Bernadotte, threatened the northern frontier on the side of Flanders. But, though this plan was warmly approved by the cabinet of Vienna, which was more intent on effecting or securing the important acquisitions which seemed to lie open to its grasp in Italy, than on pushing matters to extremities against Napoléon and the grandson of the Emperor Francis; yet it by no means coincided with the views of Alexander, who was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of striking home at the centre of the enemy's power, and had in secret become convinced, that no lasting accommodation could be looked for as long as that great warrior remained on the throne of France. He not only, therefore, strongly urged at Frankfort the immediate resumption of offensive measures on the most extended scale, before France had recovered from its consternation, or Napoléon had gained time to recruit his shattered forces, but proposed the plan of invasion, of all others the best calculated to concentrate the whole forces of the Alliance against the centre of the enemy's power, and bring the war to an immediate and decisive issue. This plan consisted in moving the grand army, under Schwartzemberg, into Switzerland, and causing it to enter France by the side of Bale and the Jura, while Blucher moved direct from the neighbourhood of Mayence on Paris, and the Prince-Royal of Sweden penetrated through the fortresses of Flanders, into Picardy and Artois. In this way, not only would France be assailed by the most powerful of the Allied armies on the Swiss frontier, where very few fortresses existed to check its advance; but each of the vast invading hosts would act on its own line of operations, had a ready retreat in case of disaster, and yet would be constantly converging towards a common centre, where the last and decisive blow was to be struck. It was a repetition on a still greater scale of the plans laid down for the preceding campaign in the conferences of Trachenberg; Switzerland being now the salient bastion which Bohemia had formerly been; and Blucher and Schwartzemberg having nearly the same posts assigned to them in Champagne and Flanders, as on the banks of the Elbe and the sands of Prussia (2).

(1) Danilefsky, *Camp. of 1814*, 10, 14. Lond. 215, 216.

(2) Dan. 14, 17. Alexander to Bernadotte, Oct. 29, 1813. *Ibid.*

"Here," said Alexander, "is the plan proposed by me, and entirely approved by the Austrian and Prussian commanders-in-chief:—Offensive operations on the part of the Grand Army between Mayence and Strasbourg offer many difficulties, as we cannot leave the fortresses behind us without observation. By entering France on the side of Switzerland, we meet with incomparably fewer difficulties, that frontier not being so strongly fortified. Another advantage attending this movement is the possibility of turning the Viceroy's left wing, and thereby forcing him to a precipitate retreat. In that case, the Austrian army of Italy may advance on Lyons, so as to form a prolongation of our line, and by means of its left wing, connect our operations with those of the Duke of Wellington, whose headquarters are now at Oleron. In the mean time, Blucher, with one hundred thousand

men, may form an army of observation on the Rhine; and without confining himself to observation, may cross that river near Mannheim, and manoeuvre against the enemy till the Grand Army reach the field of action. All the four armies—viz. the Grand Army, that of Italy, Blucher, and Wellington, will stand on one line in the most fertile part of France, forming the segment of a circle. The four armies will push forward, and diminishing the arc, will thus draw near its centre—that is Paris, or the headquarters of Napoléon. Mean time your Royal Highness may advance on Cologne and Dusseldorf, and thence in the direction of Antwerp, by which you will separate Holland from France, and oblige Napoléon either to abandon that important fortress, or, if he endeavour to retain it, materially to diminish, by the numerous garrison which it will require, the effective strength of his armies. The grand object is not to lose a moment, that we may not allow Napoléon time to form and discipline an army, and furnish it with supplies, our business being to take advantage of the

Line of invasion for Schwartz-
enberg's
army.

The advantages of this plan were so obvious, that it at once commanded the assent of the Allied generals; and, in the middle of December, the troops over the whole line were put in motion in order to carry it into effect. The Grand Army of Schwartzenberg lay close to Switzerland: that of Silesia extended along the line of the Rhine, from Manheim to Coblentz. The former was intended to enter France by the road through the Jura from Bale, by Vesoul, to Langres; a city of the highest importance in a stratagetical point of view, as being the place where several roads from the south-east and eastern frontier intersect each other. But the prodigious mass of this army, which, after every deduction, was above two hundred thousand strong, could not advance by a single road, and required to effect its ingress by all the routes leading across the Jura from Switzerland into France. It was divided, accordingly, into five columns, which were directed to move by different roads toward Paris and the interior. The first under Count Bubna, after entering Switzerland by Bale, was to advance by Berne and Neufchatel to Geneva, and thence descend the course of the Rhone to threaten Augereau, who occupied Lyons with twelve thousand men. The second, commanded by Count Giulay, was to move direct on the great road, through Montbeliard and Vesoul, to Langres. The third, under Lichtenstein, was entrusted with the blockade of Besançon, the only fortress of importance which required to be observed on the Jura and Swiss frontier. The fourth, under Colloredo, was to march on Langres, by Giulay's left, at the same time that it detached two divisions, or half its force, to blockade Auxonne, and advance by Dijon to Auxerre. The fifth, led by Hesse-Homberg, consisting of the Austrian reserves, followed on the same road through Dijon to Chatillon; while the sixth and seventh, under the Prince of Wirtemberg and Marshal Wrede, who had now entirely recovered of his wound received at Hanau, were to cross the Rhine below Huningen, and at Bale; and after leaving detachments to blockade the fortresses at Huningen, Befort, and New Brisach, move on by Colmar towards Nancy and Langres. Lastly, the eighth, under Barclay de Tolly, with the splendid Russian guards and reserves, was to take the direction from Bale to Langres, as a reserve to Giulay and Wrede; and the ninth, under Wittgenstein, was to cross the Rhine at Fort Louis, below Strasbourg, and, after leaving detachments to observe Strasbourg and Landau, advance towards the Vosges mountains, and, after crossing them, take the direction of Nancy. Thus this great army was to be spread over an immense line nearly three hundred miles in breadth, from Strasbourg to Lyons, occupying the whole country between the Rhine and the Rhone; and how vast soever its forces might be, there was reason to fear, that, from their great dispersion, no very powerful body could be collected on any one point, and that possibly it might be outnumbered by the comparatively diminutive, but more concentrated troops of the French Emperor (1).

Plan of
Blucher's
invasion.

Blucher's army, at the same time, received orders to prepare for active operations, and it was accordingly brought, about Christmas 1813, to the close vicinity of the Rhine, between Coblentz and Darmstadt. Unbounded had been the impatience of the ardent veteran at the delay of two months which had succeeded the advance of the Allies to the Rhine; and he never ceased to urge upon the allied sovereigns that they should not give

disorganized state of his forces. I entreat your Royal Highness not to lose a moment in putting your army in motion, in furtherance of the general plan of operations."—ALEXANDER to BERNADOTTE, 29th Oct. 1813. DANILEFSKY, *Camp. de* 1814, 17, 18. A grand design! very nearly what

was ultimately carried into effect, and a memorable proof of the foresight and ability of the Russian Emperor, especially when it is recollected it was written only ten days after the battle of Leipsic.

(1) Dan. 21, 23. Vaud. i. 122, 123.

Napoléon time to recover from his defeats, but move with the utmost expedition across the Rhine to Paris. At the same time, however, with a caution which could hardly have been expected from his impetuous character, he dissembled his wishes, and, in the hope of throwing the enemy off their guard, spread abroad the report that the invasion of France was to take place on the side of Switzerland, and that he, much to his regret, was merely to maintain a defensive position on the right bank of the Rhine; and, with that view, busily employed himself in purveying for the wants of his troops, as in winter quarters. At length, on the 26th December, the long wished for orders arrived, and the Prussian general immediately made preparations for concentrating his troops and crossing the Rhine. His instructions were of the simplest description (1)—to cross the river, form the blockade of Mayence, and without heeding the other fortresses on the Moselle and the Meuse, to push forward, without halting, across France into Champagne, so as to be in readiness, by the 26th January, to join Prince Schwartzenberg between Arcis and Troyes.

Plan of
operations
assigned to
Bernadotte.

These were the armies which were destined to commence immediate operations for the invasion of France; but the force of the Prince-Royal of Sweden was also concentrated on the Lower Rhine, and was intrusted with a subordinate, but very important part in the general plan of operations. It was well known that this ambitious prince, distracted between his obligations to the Allies, and hopes of being advanced by them, upon Napoléon's fall, to the throne of France, was very much at a loss how to proceed, and felt great reluctance at engaging in any invasion which might embitter the feelings of the French people in regard to him, and endanger the brilliant prospects which he flattered himself were opening on his career. Aware of these peculiarities in his situation, the Allied sovereigns assigned to Bernadotte and his powerful army the less obtrusive, but still important part of completing the conquest of Holland, delivering Flanders, besieging Antwerp, and, in general, pressing Napoléon on his north-eastern frontier. To co-operate in these important operations, so interesting to England, and involving the very matters connected with the Scheldt which had originally led to the war (2), Sir Thomas Graham, who had returned to England from ill health after the passage of the Bidassoa, was despatched with nine thousand British troops to Holland, and landed at Rotterdam in the end of December. The movements of the Prince-Royal, however, were to the last degree tardy; it was long before his operations against the Danes on the north of Germany were concluded; and all the ardour of the generals under his command could not bring forward his numerous columns to co-operate in the general attack upon France, until, fortunately for the common cause, the firmness of Lord Castlereagh overcame his repugnance, and two of his corps were brought up at the decisive moment to reinforce Marshal Blücher, and rendered the most important service to the cause of Europe (3).

Feelings of
the Allied
armies at
this period.

The whole troops which were assembled for the final operations of the war were animated with the highest spirit, and buoyant with the most sanguine expectations. More even than the awful catastrophe of the Moscow campaign, the result of the German contest had roused an enthusiasm, and spread a confidence among the Allied troops, which, under adequate guidance, rendered them invincible. The disasters

(1) Vand. i. 118, 119. Dan. 23, 24. Koch, i. 405, 106.

(2) See *Ante*, i. 324.

(3) Lond. 27. Dan. 19. Alexander to Bernadotte, Oct. 29, 1813. Dan. 18.

of the French could no longer be ascribed to the cold. Inequality of numbers could not palliate repeated defeats on equal fields; unconquerable spirit in the patriot ranks, irresistible ardour in the commencement of the campaign, had evidently supplied the want of military experience, and overwhelming force prostrated consummate talents at its close. Confidence, therefore, was now founded on solid grounds; the long military *prestige* of the imperial armies had passed over to the other side; it is by the last events that the opinion of the great bulk of men is always determined. To the ardent passion for liberation which had characterized the war of independence, had succeeded, now that the deliverance had been effected, another desire scarcely less general, and to warriors, perhaps, still more exciting; that of obliterating the recollection of former defeats by the magnitude of present triumphs, and making the enemy drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation they had so long held to their own lips. Indescribable was the ardour which this desire awakened in the Allied ranks; all had wrongs to avenge, insults to retaliate, disgraces to efface; and all pressed on with equal eagerness to effect the hoped for consummations. The Russians were resolute to return at Paris the visit paid to them at Moscow—the Austrians to retaliate on the French the destruction of the ramparts of Vienna—the Prussians to replace the sword of the Great Frederick at Sans Souci by the sabre of Napoléon from the Tuileries. In fine, the common feeling in the Allied armies at this period cannot be better expressed than in the words of Marshal Blucher, in a letter written on 31st December 1813:—"At daybreak to-morrow morning I shall cross the Rhine; but before doing so, I intend, together with my fellow-soldiers, to wash off in the waters of that proud river every trace of slavery. Then, like free Germans, we shall set foot on the frontiers of the great nation which is now so humble. We shall return as victors, not as vanquished, and our country will hail our arrival with gratitude. O! how soothing to us will be the moment when our kinsmen shall meet us with tears of joy (1)!"

Incipient divisions among the Allied chiefs. But although the forces of the alliance were thus vast, and the spirit of its armies elevated, no small anxiety pervaded the mind of its chiefs; and the great objects of the confederacy, when on the point of accomplishment, never were nearer being frustrated. Success was already beginning to spread its usual seeds of discord among the sovereigns; separate interests were arising with the prospect of common spoil; ancient animosities reviving with the cessation of common danger. The Emperor of Austria, naturally solicitous for the continuance in the hands of his daughter and her descendants of the sceptre of France, had communicated to his cabinet an anxious desire to postpone, by all means in their power, the adoption of extreme measures against Napoléon; and the whole address of Metternich was employed to attain the object of humbling the once-dreaded conqueror sufficiently, to render him no longer formidable to his neighbours, and tractable to their wishes, without actually precipitating him from the throne. The Emperor of Russia, on the other hand, actuated by no such interest, more intimately acquainted with the character of the French Emperor, and smarting under the recollection of severe wrongs, both personal and national, which he had experienced at his hands, was strongly impressed with the necessity, at all hazards, of prosecuting the war with the utmost vigour against him; and never ceased to maintain, that it was by such means only that the peace of Europe could be secured, and the

(1) Blucher to his son, Dec. 31, 1813. Dan 24.

independence of the adjoining states placed on a solid foundation. In this opinion, the King of Prussia, who, when he drew the sword, had thrown away the scabbard, and whose dominions lay immediately exposed to the first burst of returning vengeance on the part of Napoléon, entirely acquiesced; but still the weight of Austria, the talents of Metternich, and the necessity of not hazarding any thing which might break up the confederacy, rendered the adoption of the bolder game a matter of great difficulty; and more than once in the course of the short campaign which followed, had wellnigh frustrated the principal objects of the alliance. The danger was the more imminent, that serious jealousies were already breaking out among the lesser powers in Germany, as to the manner in which their separate interests were to be arranged after the great debate of the revolution had subsided: that the pretensions of Russia to Poland, of Prussia to Saxony, and of Austria to Italy, were already exciting no small disquietude among far-seeing statesmen; and that even among the diplomatists of England, at the allied headquarters, a considerable difference of opinion existed as to the course to be pursued in future, Lord Aberdeen deferring to the views of Metternich, that, to preserve a due equipoise in Europe, peace on reasonable terms should be concluded with the French Emperor; and Sir Charles Stewart, with Lord Cathcart, being inclined to the bolder councils of Lord Castlereagh, which tended to the entire dethronement of Napoléon, and held, that no lasting peace could be looked for in Europe without "the ancient race and the ancient territory" for the French nation (4).

But whatever germs of future division might be arising in the allied councils, there was no stay in the moral torrent which now rolled with impetuous violence towards the French frontier, and no change in the noble sentiments with which their chiefs strove to animate their warriors. It was in these words that, on the eve of crossing the Rhine, Alexander thus addressed his troops, :—"Warriors! Your valour and perseverance have brought you from the Oka to the Rhine. We are about to cross that great river, and enter that proud country with which you have already waged so cruel and bloody a war. Already have we saved our native country, covered it with glory, and restored freedom and independence to Europe. It remains but to crown these mighty achievements by the long wished for peace. May tranquillity be restored to the whole world! May every country enjoy happiness under its own independent laws and government! May religion, arts, science, and commerce, flourish in every land for the general welfare of nations! This, and not the continuance of war and destruction, is our object. Our enemies, by pouring to the heart of our dominions, wrought us much evil; but dreadful was the retribution: the Divine wrath crushed them. Let us not take example from them: inhumanity and ferocity cannot be pleasing in the eyes of a merciful God. Let us forget what they have done against us. Instead of animosity and revenge, let us approach them with the words of kindness, with the outstretched hand of

(4) Lond. 241, 253. Dan. 3-10. Cap. x. 335, 336, 366.

"If Napoléon were forced from the throne of France, much difference of opinion might exist on the great question of a successor. I was clearly of opinion, that the re-establishment of the Bourbons would be more acceptable in England than any other arrangement which could possibly be made. Others maintained that it might be policy to keep Buonaparte on the throne, with his wings clipped to the utmost, in preference to restoring

the hereditary princes, who might again assume a sway similar to the times of Louis XIV, and become formidable alike to England and the powers on the continent. The difficulty at this crisis consisted in fixing upon the fundamental principles to be adopted, and the points to be obtained; and it seemed indispensable that the government of England should send their minister of foreign affairs to the theatre of action, as no one could act with the same advantages."—LORD LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany*, 244.

reconciliation. Such is the lesson taught by our holy faith : Divine lips have pronounced the command, ‘ Love your enemies ; do good to them that hate you.’ Warriors ! I trust that, by your moderation in the enemy’s country, you will conquer as much by generosity as by arms, and that, uniting the valour of the soldier against the armed with the charity of the Christian towards the unarmed, you will crown your exploits by keeping stainless your well-earned reputation of a brave and moral people (1).”

Reflections on the moral character of the war. Memorable words ! not merely as breathing the noble feelings of the sovereign, who thus, in the moment of victory, stayed the uplifted hand of conquest, and sought to avenge the desolation of Russia by the salvation of France ; but as indicating the spirit by which the contest itself was animated on the part of the Allies, and the strength of that moral reaction, which, based on the principles of religion, had now surmounted all the interests of time, and communicated its blessed spirit even to the stern warriors whose valour had delivered the world. When Napoléon crossed the Niemen, he addressed his followers in the words of worldly glory ; he struck the chord which could alone vibrate in the hearts of the children of the Revolution : he said of Russia, “ Fate drags her on ; let her destinies be fulfilled (2).” When Alexander approached the Rhine, he spoke to his soldiers in the language of the Gospel ; he strove only to moderate the ferocity of war : he ascribed his victory to the arm of Omnipotence. Such was the spirit which conquered the Revolution ; this, and not the power of Intellect, it was which delivered the world ; and when Providence deemed the time arrived for crushing the reign of infidelity, the instruments of its will were not the forces of civilization, but the fervour of the desert.

(1) Dan. 15, 16.

(2) See *Ante*, viii, 333.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

LAST STRUGGLE OF NAPOLÉON, IN FRANCE.

JANUARY—APRIL, 1814.

ARGUMENT.

Remarkable coincidence of the passage of the Rhine in the fall of the Roman and the French Empire—Different characters of the two Invasions—Passage of the Rhine and invasion of France—Entrance of Schwartzberg into Switzerland and the Jura—Line of march of the different Columns—Operations of the Army of Silesia—General result of these Movements—Operations of the Army of Bernadotte—General result of the whole Invasion—Preparations of Napoléon to meet the Invasion—His final dispositions before setting out for the Armies—His touching speech to the National Guard at Paris—Arrival of the Emperor at Chalons, and his first Measures—He assumes the Offensive, and marches against Blücher—Preparatory movements on both Sides—Napoléon drives the Russians into Brienne—Successful attack on the Town and Castle of Brienne—Imminent danger of Blücher on this occasion—Result of the Battle, and imminent danger of Napoléon—Concentration of the Grand Army and the Army of Silesia—Order of Battle on either side—Battle of Brienne—Great success of the Russians on the right and centre—Napoléon's last Attack and final Defeat—Results of the Battle, and desperate condition of Napoléon—Great exultation in the Allied Army at their success—Desperate condition of the French Army in their Retreat—Dilatory movement of the Allies in pursuit—Imprudent dislocation of their Forces—Retreat of the French from Troyes, and its Occupation by the Allies—Extreme depression in the French Army—Fresh organization of their Cavalry—Napoléon resolves to attack Blücher on his advance to Paris—Movements of Blücher in Champagne—Extraordinary difficulties in the Passage across the Country—Combat of Champaubert—Total defeat of the Russian Division—Great effects of this Victory, and measures of Napoléon to follow it up—His movements in consequence—Perilous situation of Sacken—Battle of Montmirail—Actions on the day following the Battle—Heroic devotion of Sacken to his orders—Kleist joins Blücher, who advances towards Sacken—Battle of Vanchamps—Glorious retreat of Blücher—His imminent Danger—Disastrous termination of the Battle—Results of the action—Napoléon crosses over to the Valley of the Seine—Occupation of Troyes by the Allied Armies—Commencement of a movement in favour of the Bourbons—Extraordinary oblivion of the Royal Family of France during the Revolution—Royalist organizations still existing in the Country—Fortunes of Louis XVIII., and the Count d'Artois during this time—Subsequent migrations of the Royal Family—Reception and establishment of Louis the XVIII. in Great Britain—He lands and remains in England—General movement of the Royalists in France—Interview of the Royalist Leaders with Alexander—Operations of the Allied Grand Army on the Seine—Their advance to Montereau—Junction of the Army of Napoléon with Victor and Oudinot—Advance of Napoléon and combat of Naugis—Defeat of Pahlen—Pursuit of the Bavarians to the Bridge of Montereau—The Allies propose an Armistice—Napoléon rises in his demands at the Congress, and tries to Negotiate separately with Austria—Description of Montereau—Battle of Montereau—Defeat of the Allies, who are driven beyond the Seine—Results of the Battle, and general Retreat of the Grand Allied Army—Discontent of the Emperor Napoléon at his Generals—Disgrace of Marshal Victor—Napoléon's steps for following up his Successes—Advance of the Crown Prince of Sweden to the Rhine—Advance of Winzingerode, and description of Soissons—Storming of Soissons, which is afterwards evacuated by the Russians, and reoccupied by the French—Concentration of the Allied Armies in front of Troyes—Napoléon offers Battle to Schwartzberg, who declines it, and retreats from Troyes—Armistice of Lusigny—Reoccupation of Troyes by Napoléon, and Execution of M. Goult—General result of these successes on the part of Napoléon—Errors of the Allied Generals—Lord Castlereagh at the Council at Bar-sur-Aube—Plan of the Campaign agreed to there—Decisive effect of Lord Castlereagh's interposition—Second separation of the Grand Army and the Army of Silesia—Opening of the congress of Chatillon—The British government send Lord Castlereagh—Views of Great Britain in this negotiation—Instructions to Lord Castlereagh from the British Cabinet—Nothing said concerning the restoration of the Bourbons, or restoration of Poland—Views of the English and Russian governments concerning the Bourbons—Division of opinion regarding Poland—Napoléon's instructions to Caulaincourt—Commencement of the Congress—Napoléon gives Caulaincourt full power after his defeat at La Rothière—Conditions proposed by the Allied Powers—The full powers are recalled by

Napoléon, who rises in his demands with his subsequent successes—He orders Eugene to evacuate Italy, and then retracts the orders—General feeling of despondency at Paris—Treaty of Chaumont—Its terms, and great effect on the Congress—Advance of Blueher to Meaux—Combat of Bar-sur-Aube—Victory of the Allies there—Wound and Character of Wittgenstein—Schwarzenberg at length advances—His plan of Attack—Defeat of the French at La Guillotiere—Extraordinary inactivity of the Grand Army after these successes—Retreat of Blueher to Soissons—Perilous situation of his Army from that town holding out—Its capitulation extricates him from his difficulties—Junction of Blueher with Winzingerode and Bulow—Napoléon's decrees calling on the French people to rise *en masse*—He crosses the Aisne, and follows Blueher to Craon—Description of the field of Battle—Blueher's dispositions—Unsuccessful Assault on Soissons—Napoléon's dispositions for the Battle—Commencement of the Action—Desperate struggle on the Plateau, which at length ends in the Russians retreating—Their glorious retreat—Impregnable position which they at length take up—Results of the Battle—Reflections on it, and the extraordinary gallantry displayed—Napoléon on the night after the Battle—Both parties take post at and around Laon—Description of the position of Laon, and of the Allied Army—Sublime spectacle witnessed from the ramparts of the Town—Combats on the first day until Marmont comes up—Arrival of that Marshal, and Blueher's measures to overwhelm him—Nocturnal surprise and defeat of his Corps—Napoléon prepares to retreat—Reflections on this Battle—Napoléon halts at Soissons, and Blueher remains at Laon—Capture of Rheims by St Preist—Advance of Napoléon to retake it—Its recapture by the Emperor—Defeat of the Allies, and his entrance into the Town—His residence there—And last review of his Troops.

Remarkable coincidence of the passage of the Rhine in the fall of the Roman and French empires. "ON the 31st December 406," says Gibbon, "the united and victorious army of the Suevi, the Vandals, and the Burgundians, crossed the Rhine, when its waters were most probably frozen, and entered without opposition the defenceless provinces of Gaul. This memorable passage of the Northern nations, who never afterwards retreated, may be considered as the fall of the Roman empire in the countries beyond the Alps; and the barriers which had so long separated the savage and civilized nations of the earth, were from that fatal moment levelled with the ground (1)." On that day fourteen hundred and seven years—at midnight, on the 31st December 1813—the united and victorious army of the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, at the same place crossed the same river; and that memorable passage may justly be regarded as the fall of the French empire beyond the Rhine! History has not preserved a more striking example of the influence of physical and lasting causes on the fortunes of the human species, or of that permanent attraction which, amidst all the varieties of religion, civilization, language, and institutions, impels the brood of winter to the regions of the sun.

Different characters of the two invasions. But if this extraordinary coincidence demonstrates the lasting influence of general causes on the migration and settlements of the species, the different character and effects of the two invasions, show the vast step which mankind had made in the interval of fourteen hundred years which separated them. "The banks of the Rhine," says Gibbon, "before the barbarians appeared, were crowned, like those of the Tiber, with elegant houses and well-cultivated farms; and if a poet descended the river, he might express his doubt on which side was situated the territory of the Romans. This scene of peace and plenty was suddenly changed into a desert, and the prospect of the smoking ruins could alone distinguish the solitude of nature from the desolation of man. The flourishing city of Mentz was surprised and destroyed, and many thousand Christians were inhumanly massacred in the church; Worms perished after a long and obstinate siege; Strasbourg, Spire, Rheims, Tournay, Arras, Amiens, experienced the cruel oppression of the German yoke; and the consuming flames of war spread

(1) Gibbon, ch. 30.

from the banks of the Rhine over the greater part of the seventeen provinces of Gaul. That rich and extensive country, as far as the ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, was delivered to the barbarians, who drove before them, in a promiscuous crowd, the bishop, the senator, and the virgin, laden with the spoils of their houses and altars (1).” The same provinces were invaded fourteen hundred years after by the confederated Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, the descendants of those whose track had been marked by such frightful devastation; but how different the inroad of the civilized and Christian from the rude and barbarian host! No sacked cities marked the progress of Alexander’s march—no slaughter of unarmed multitudes bespoke the triumph of the Allied arms; the plough and the anvil plied their busy trade in the midst even of contending multitudes; and but for the occasional ruin of houses, or wasting of roads, on the theatre of actual conflict, the traveller would have been at a loss to tell where the once fiery track of invasion had passed (2). The changes of time make no alteration on the durable causes which direct the progress of conquest, or determine the ultimate fate of empires, but they modify in the most important manner their spirit and effects; they have not averted the sword of northern valour, but tempered its blade, and mitigated its devastation.

Passage of
the Rhine,
and inva-
sion of
France,
Dec. 31,
1813.

On the 26th December, orders were secretly dispatched to the different corps of Blücher, communicating the time and place of crossing the Rhine; and the troops were brought up in the succeeding day to their respective points of destination. Sacken was to effect his passage near Mannheim, by means of a flotilla which had been collected at the confluence of the Neckar; D’York and Langeron, on a bridge of boats at Caubé, near Bacharach; while St.-Preist was to force his way across opposite to Coblenz, by means of the boats on the Lahn, and by the aid of the island of Niederworth, opposite to that town. During the night of the 31st, Sacken’s corps, which had the King of Prussia at its headquarters, assembled at the spot where the Neckar falls into the Rhine. On the opposite bank was a redoubt, which commanded the mouth of that river and the town of Mannheim, and which it was necessary to carry before a bridge of boats could be established. At four on the following morning, a party of Russian light infantry was embarked in boats and rafts, and, favoured by the thick darkness, succeeded in crossing to within a few yards of the opposite bank before they were discovered. The French immediately opened a vigorous fire of cannon and musketry, and successive detachments of the Russians required to be brought over before the work could be carried; while the bright flashes of the guns illuminated the opposite bank, and displayed the dense masses of the invaders on the German shore, crowding down to the water’s edge, burning with ardour, but in silent suspense awaiting the issue of the enterprise. At length the redoubt was carried at the fourth assault, and its garrison, consisting of three hundred men, made prisoners; and the rising sun showed the Russians established on French ground, and in possession of the redoubt. Strains of martial music, resounding from all the regiments, now filled the air; and the King of Prussia, coming up to the victors, was greeted with loud cheers, and the passage proceeded without interruption. By six o’clock in the evening the pontoon

(1) Gibbon, ch. 30.

(2) A few weeks after hostilities had ceased, the author visited the theatre of war at Paris, and in Champagne, especially in the vicinity of Soissons, Craon, and Labenstein, the scene of such obstinate

and repeated conflicts in March 1814. No traces of devastation were to be seen, except a few burned houses and loopholed walls in the place where severe fighting had actually occurred.

bridge was completed, and the whole corps passed over; while at the same time Blücher in person, with Langeron and D'York, crossed the Rhine without opposition at Caubé, and St.-Preist effected his passage at Coblenz with very little fighting. In one of the squares of the city, the Perfect, on the occupation of Moscow by the French, had erected a monument, with the inscription, "To the Great Napoléon, in honour of the Immortal Campaign of 1812." Colonel Mardenke, who had been appointed Russian commander of Coblenz, left the monument untouched, but under the inscription caused the following words to be written,—“Seen and approved by the Russian Commander of Coblenz in 1815 (1).”

Entrance
of Schwartz-
enberg
into Swit-
zerland and
the Jura,
Dec. 21.

The Grand Army under Schwartzenberg had entered the French territory at a still earlier period. On the night of the 20th December, six Austrian columns passed the Rhine, between Schaffhausen and Bâle, and immediately inundated the adjacent districts of Switzerland and France. This immense body, above two hundred thousand strong, shortly after pursued, under their different leaders, their respective destinations: Bubna, with his corps, which was the left wing, marched by the flat country of Switzerland towards Geneva; Hesse-Homburg, Colloredo, Prince Louis of Lichtenstein, with Giulay and Bianchi, forming the centre, took the great road by Vesoul towards Langres; while Wrede, the Prince-Royal of Württemberg, and Wittgenstein, with their respective corps, which composed the right wing of the army, crossed below Bâle, and between that town and Strasbourg, and moved across Lorraine and Franche-Comté, until they arrived abreast of the centre on the road to Langres. None of these corps met with any opposition. Victor, who had not above ten thousand combatants at his disposal, after providing for the garrisons of the fortresses on the Upper Rhine, was unable to oppose any resistance to such a prodigious inundation; it spread almost without resistance over the whole level country of Switzerland, and, surmounting the passes of the Jura, poured, with irresistible violence, into the plains of Lorraine (2).

March of
the different
columns.
Dec. 30.

The march of the different columns met with hardly any interruption. Count Bubna arrived in ten days before Geneva, which capitulated without resistance, the garrison being permitted to retire into France; and after occupying that city, he sent out detachments, which made themselves masters, with as much ease, of the passes of the

Jan. 3. Simplon and the Great St.-Bernard, thus interposing entirely between France and Italy, and cutting off the communication between Napo-

Jan. 17. léon's forces and those of the Viceroy on the plains of Lombardy. The French garrison retired to Lyons, whither they were followed, early in January, by the Austrian commander, who, however, did not deem himself in sufficient strength to attack Augereau, who was now at the head of fifteen thousand men in that important city—and contented himself with observing it at a little distance, and occupying the whole course of the Aisne from the Lake of Geneva to its walls. Meanwhile the centre, in great strength, pressed forward on the high-road from Bâle to Paris, by Montbeliard, Vesoul, and

Jan. 7, 9, 11, and 13. Langres. Vesoul was entered early in January; Besançon, Belfort,

Huningen, were invested a few days afterwards; while Victor, wholly unable to withstand the concentrated masses of five corps of the enemy, numbering eighty thousand sabres and bayonets in their ranks, and finding himself inadequate to the task assigned him by Napoléon, of defending the

(1) Dan. 25, 26. Koch, i. 106, 107. Vaud. i. 129. Fain, 24.

(2) Koch, i. 74, 82. Dan. 20, 21. Vaud. i. 120, 124.

passes of the Vosges mountains, fell back, after some inconsiderable skirmishes, towards the plains of Champagne. In vain Mortier was ordered up by the Emperor to support him on the road to Paris by Troyes : even their united forces were inadequate to make head against the enemy ; and on the Jan. 17. 16th, the important town of Langres, the most valuable, in a strategical point of view, in the whole east of France, from the number of roads of which it commands the intersection, was abandoned by the two marshals, and immediately taken possession of by the allied forces (1).

Operations of the army of Silesia. While the south-eastern provinces of France were thus overrun by the Allies under Schwartzemberg, the progress of the army of Silesia, led by the impetuous Blücher on the side of Mayence, was not less alarming. The cordon of troops opposed to them, in no condition to withstand such formidable masses, fell back at all points towards the Vosges mountains. Marmont, who had the chief command in that quarter, retired on the Jan. 3. 5d of January to Kayserlautern, so often the theatre of sanguinary conflict in the earlier periods of the war ; and, unable to maintain himself

there, retreated behind the Sarre, the bridges of which were blown Jan. 7. up, and shortly after took a defensive position between Sarre-Louis and Sarreguemines. But the two corps of D'York and Sacken having concentrated in his front, he did not feel himself in sufficient strength to withstand an attack, and resumed his retreat towards the Moselle. Blücher, upon this, divided his army into two parts, D'York being entrusted with the pursuit of Marmont, and the observation of the powerful fortresses of Metz, Thionville, and Luxembourg, while he himself, with Sacken's corps, marched to and occupied the opulent and beautiful city of Nancy, the keys of which he sent, with a warm letter of congratulation, to the Emperor Alexander. Meanwhile Langeron, with his numerous corps, forming not the least important part of the army of Silesia, having crossed the Rhine at Bingen on the 5d, had completed the investment of Mayence and Cassel, detaching only one of his divisions, that of Olsooief, to support his veteran commander. But Blücher himself, burning with ardour, advanced with indefatigable activity, though the force under his immediate command was reduced, by the numerous detachments and fortresses to be blockaded in his rear, to less Jan. 25. than thirty thousand men. With this inconsiderable body, wholly composed, however, of Russian veterans, he not only opened up a communication by his left with the grand army at Langres, but himself pushed on to Brienne, which he occupied in force (2), his advanced column being even moved forward to St. Dizier, which was taken after a sharp conflict with Marmont's rearguard.

General result of these movements. Thus, in twenty-five days after the invasion of the French territory had commenced, the Allied armies had succeeded, almost without firing a shot, in wresting a third of it from the grasp of Napoléon. The army of Silesia had conquered the whole country from the Rhine to the Marne, crossed the former frontier stream, as well as the Sarre, the Moselle, and the Meuse ; passed the formidable defiles of the Vosges and Hunsrück mountains, and finally descended into the open and boundless plains of Champagne : Schwartzemberg's forces had in a month crossed the upper Rhine, and traversed part of Switzerland, surmounted the broad and lofty ridge of the Jura, and wound in safety through its devious and intricate valleys ; overrun the whole of Franche-Comté, Lorraine, and Alsace, des-

(1) Fain, 23, 25, Koch, i. 80, 87, Vaud. i. 151, 153. Dan. 21, 22.

(2) Dan. 27, 28. Vaud. i. 148, 151. Koch, i. 107, 125.

cended into the plains of Burgundy, and entered into communication, by means of its right wing, with the army of Silesia, along the valley of the Meuse, while its left had occupied Geneva and the defiles of the Aisne, and threatened Lyons on the banks of the Rhone. Thus their united forces stretched in an immense line, three hundred miles in length, in a diagonal direction across France, from the frontiers of Flanders to the banks of the Rhone : all the intermediate country in their rear, embracing a third of the old monarchy, and comprehending its most warlike provinces, was occupied, its fortresses blockaded, and its resources lost ; and the vast masses of the Allies were converging from the south-east and north to the plains of Champagne, and the vicinity of Chalons, already immortalized by the dreadful battle decisive of the fate of Europe, which had taken place there, fourteen hundred years before, between Attila and the forces of the Roman Empire under Ætius—a striking proof of the permanent operation of those general causes which, amidst every variety of civilization, military skill, and era of the world, bring the contending hosts which are to determine its destinies to the same theatre of conflict (1).

Movements
of the
army of
Bernadotte.

The army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, which threatened France on the side of Flanders, though not so far advanced as the hosts of Blucher and Schwartzemberg, was still making some progress, and caused sensible disquiet to the French Emperor. Of that army only three corps were ready to take a part in the war ; the remainder, with the Crown Prince himself, who was in no hurry to approach the theatre of final conflict, being still in Holstein, or the neighbourhood of that duchy. These three corps, however, were slowly advancing to the theatre of action : the first, commanded by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, had crossed at Arnheim, and was moving through Flanders ; another, under Bulow, was before Antwerp, where it was supported by a body of nine thousand British troops under Sir Thomas Graham ; and part of a third, under Winzingerode, was at Dusseldorf, on the Rhine ; but the remainder did not reach France till the middle of February. Chernicheff, who commanded Winzingerode's advanced guard, was burning with anxiety to cross the river ; and at length, though with no small difficulty, extracted a reluctant consent from his more circumspect commander to attempt the passage at the confluence of the Roer. It was effected with little

Jan. 12. difficulty on the 12th January : the French, astonished with the boldness of the enterprize—undertaken in open day, of crossing a broad river surcharged with masses of ice, in the front of armed redoubts—opposing hardly any resistance. Winzingerode's corps now slowly advanced towards

Jan. 15. Brussels : and Macdonald, who commanded the French forces in that quarter, fell back in all directions. Juliers was speedily evacuated ;

Jan. 18. Liege soon after blockaded, and in a few days taken by the Cossacks ; while Macdonald abandoned all the country between Brussels and the Rhine, and concentrated his forces at Namur. A division of three thousand foot and six hundred horse, dispatched by General Maison from Antwerp, to endea-

Jan. 24. your to drive the Cossacks out of Liege, was defeated after an obstinate engagement at Saint Tron, near the gates of that city, by Benkendorf and Chernicheff ; a success which not only secured the possession of the town, but, what was of still more importance, gave the Allies the command of the passage of the Meuse. Discouraged by this check, General Maison made no further attempt to retard the advance of the enemy : Macdonald retired, in obedience to the commands of Napoléon, towards Laon, abandoning all the

(1) Koch, i. 125. Dan. 29, 34. Vaud. i. 147, 155.

open country of Flanders to the enemy, and leaving Antwerp to its own resources. Jan. 26. Namur was immediately occupied by Winzingerode, but he was compelled to halt there some days, in consequence of the small amount of force, now reduced to thirteen thousand men, which the necessity of blockading so many places in his rear left at his disposal. Bulow meanwhile formed the blockade of Antwerp, and Macdonald was rapidly falling back towards Laon and Chalons: so that the whole forces of the Allies occupied a vast line, above five hundred miles in length, from Antwerp by Namur, Brienne (1), Langres, and Auxonne, to Lyons, extending from the banks of the Scheldt to those of the Rhone.

General result of these operations. Thus, within a month after they had commenced the invasion of the French territory, the Allies had gained in appearance, and in one sense in reality, very great advantages, without either sustaining loss or experiencing resistance. Above a third of France had been conquered; the resources of that large portion of his dominions in men and money, not only lost to Napoléon, but in part at least gained to the invaders; and the *prestige* of his invincibility seriously shattered by so wide an inroad upon the territory of the great nation. But, on the other hand, to a commander possessed of the military talent and discerning eye of the French Emperor, his situation, though full of peril, was not without its advantages, and he might with reason hope to strike, upon the plains of Champagne, strokes equal to the redoubtable blows which first laid the foundation of his fame on the Italian plains. The force at his disposal, though little more than a third of that which was at the command of the Allies, was incomparably more concentrated: his troops were all stationed within the limits of a narrow triangle, of which Paris, Laon, and Troyes, formed the angles; while the vast armies of his opponents, stretching across France from the Scheldt to the Rhone, were alike unable either to combine their movements with accuracy, or succour each other in case of disaster. The views of the cabinets which directed them were by no means in union; Austria, leaning on the matrimonial alliance, was reluctant to push matters to extremities, if it could by possibility be avoided; Russia and Prussia, influenced by no such connexion, were resolute to push on, at all hazards, to Paris; and the councils of England, which in this diversity held the balance, were divided between the expedience of taking advantage of the present commanding position of the Allied armies to secure a glorious peace, and the chance, by pursuing a more decided policy, of precipitating the revolutionary dynasty from the throne. Thus it might reasonably be expected that the military councils of the Allied cabinets would be as ruinous as their diplomatic divisions; and Napoléon entertained sanguine hopes that, while the Austrians, in pursuance of the temporizing system of Metternich, hung back, the Russians and Prussians, led by the bolder views of Alexander and Blucher, might be exposed to attack with equal chances, and possibly at an advantage (2).

Preparations of Napoléon to mar the invasion. An attentive observer of the prodigious flood of enemies which was inundating his territories, Napoléon was, during the first three weeks of January 1814, indefatigable in his efforts to prepare the means of arresting it. He was first informed of the invasion of his territories when coming out of his cabinet on his way to the meeting of the legislative body, which has been already described (3). Preserving his usual firmness,

(1) Koch, i. 127, 135. Dan. 29, 33.

(2) Dan. 33, 34. Koch, i. 135, 136.

(3) *Ante*, x. 24.

he said : " If I could have gained two months, the enemy would not have crossed the Rhine. This may lead to bad consequences; but alone I can do nothing : if unaided, I must fall; then it will be seen that the war is not directed against me alone." His exertions were mainly employed in organizing and dispatching to the different armies the conscripts who were daily forwarded to Paris from the southern and western provinces of the empire, and replacing the garrisons in the interior, from which they were drawn, by National Guards, or levies who had not yet acquired any degree of military consistency. These troops, as they successively arrived, were reviewed with great pomp in the Place du Carrousel; but their number fell miserably short of expectation, and evinced in the clearest manner that the military strength of the empire was all but exhausted. The better to conceal his real weakness, and in the hope of imposing at once on his own subjects and his enemies, the most pompous account of these reviews was uniformly published next day in the *Moniteur*; and the numbers who had defiled before the Emperor announced at four or five times their real amount; insomuch, in a single month, more than two hundred thousand men were enumerated, and it would have been supposed the Emperor was about to take the field with a force as great as that with which he had combated the preceding year on the Elbe. But no one knew better than the Emperor the real amount of the troops at his disposal; and the moment they had defiled before the windows of the Tuileries, every sabre and bayonet were straightway hurried off to the armies in front of the Allies, which, according to old usage, were divided into eight corps, though they did not in all muster above a hundred thousand effective combatants in the field. Yet so great was his dread, even in this extremity, of democratic excitement, that it was only on the 8th of January—a fortnight before he set out to take the command of the army—that, by a decree, he again organized a National Guard in Paris; and, when he did so, especial care was taken, by the nomination of Marshal Moncey to the command, and by the selection made both of officers and privates to fill its ranks, to show that it was established rather to guard against internal agitation than foreign aggression, and that the real enemy it was intended to combat was to be found, not in the bayonets of the Allies, but the pikes of the Faubourg St. Antoine (1).

Napoléon's
final dispo-
sitions be-
fore setting
out for the
army.
Jan. 20.

Previous to setting out to take the command of his troops, Napoléon made his final dispositions for the government during his absence from the capital. To announce his immediate arrival with the army, he sent forward Berthier some days before he himself set out, and meanwhile he organized with Savary and the Council of State the means of maintaining tranquillity in the capital, and insuring the direction of affairs. The regency was conferred by letters patent on the Empress Marie Louise; but with her was conjoined on the day following his brother Joseph, under the title of lieutenant-general of the empire. On the 23d he prepared a military solemnity, calculated to rouse the national feelings in the highest degree. It was Sunday—and, after hearing mass, the Emperor received the principal officers of the National Guard in the apartments of the Tuileries. The Empress preceded him on entering the apartments; she was followed by Madame de Montesquieu, who carried in her arms the King of Rome, then a lovely infant of three years of age. His blue eyes and light hair bespoke his German descent; but the keen look and thoughtful turn of countenance betrayed the mingled Italian blood. He wore

(1) Fain, 26, 27, Thib, ix. 481. Cap. x, 331, 332.

the uniform of the National Guard, his golden locks fell in luxuriant ringlets over his rounded shoulders, and his little eyes beamed with delight at the military garb in which he was now for the first time arrayed (1).

His touching speech to the National Guard at Paris.

Napoléon took the child by the hand, and advancing into the middle of the circle, with his head uncovered and a solemn air, he thus addressed them : — “ Gentlemen, I am about to set out for the army : I entrust to you what I hold dearest in the world—my wife and my son. Let there be no political divisions : let the respect for property, the maintenance of order, and, above all, the love of France, animate every bosom. I do not disguise, that, in the course of the military operations which are to ensue, the enemy may approach in force to Paris : it will only be an affair of a few days; before they are passed I will be on their flanks and rear, and annihilate those who have dared to violate our country.” Then, taking the noble child in his arms, he went through the ranks of the officers, and presented him to them as their future sovereign. Cries of enthusiasm rent the apartments : many tears were shed; a sense of the solemnity of the moment penetrated every bosom, and cold indeed must have been that heart which did not then thrill with patriotic ardour. The apartment where this memorable scene occurred was the same which, twenty years before, had witnessed the degradation of Louis XVI, when that unhappy monarch had been compelled to put on the red cap of liberty, and Napoléon, then a boy at college, had witnessed with such indignation the tumultuous assemblage which thronged the gardens of the Tuileries (2). Revolution had run its course; in the very spot where its excesses commenced, its chief was doomed to drink the bitterest draught in the waters of affliction. On the following day Napoléon made all the necessary preparations for his departure, burned his most secret papers, and gave his final instructions to Joseph and the Council of State (3). At three in the morning of the 23th, he embraced the Empress and his son FOR THE LAST TIME, and set out for the army : he never saw them again.

Arrival of the Emperor at Châlons, and his first measures there.

Count Bertrand, in the absence of Berthier, accompanied Napoléon in his carriage; they breakfasted at Chateau-Thierry, and arrived in the afternoon at Châlons-sur-Marne, where the headquarters of the army were established. The presence of the Emperor, as usual, restored confidence both to the troops and the inhabitants, which the long-continued retreat and near approach of the enemy to the capital had much impaired. Cries of “ Vive l'Empereur ” broke from the crowds which assembled to witness his passage through any of the towns which he traversed; with them were mingled the exclamation, “ A bas les droits réunis; ” they did not cry “ A bas la conscription ”—a deplorable proof of the selfishness of human nature; they strove rather to save their own money than the blood of their children. Napoléon spent the evening in receiving accounts from his officers of the position of the troops and the progress of the enemy. They were sufficiently alarming. The grand army of Prince Schwartzemberg, descending by several roads from the Vosges mountains, was pressing in vast numbers through the plains of Burgundy, and already threatened Troyes, the ancient capital of Champagne; Blucher had passed Lorraine, reached St.-Dizier, and was rapidly stretching, in communication with the grand army, across to the Aube. The French troops, falling back on all sides, were converging towards Chalons; Victor and Ney, after having eva-

(1) Fain, 44. Cap. x. 534.

(2) *Aule*, i. 197.

(3) Fain, 44, 45. Cap. x. 534, 535. *Moniteur*, Jan. 25, 1814.

cuated Naney, had already reached Vitry-le-Français; while Marmont was between Saint Michel and Vitry behind the Meuse. Twenty days of continued retreat had brought those scattered bands, which lately had lain along the line of the Rhine, from Huningen to Bâle, to within a few leagues of each other, in the plains of Champagne. Disorder and confusion, as usual in such cases, were rapidly accumulating in the rear. Crowds of fugitives, which preceded the march of the columns, crossed, and spread consternation among the advancing bodies of conscripts which were hastening up from Paris; and already that dejection was visible among all ranks, which is at once the forerunner and the cause of national disaster (1).

Napoléon assumes the offensive, and marches against Blücher.

By the concentration of the retiring columns, however, Napoléon had collected about seventy thousand effective combatants, of whom fifteen thousand were admirable cavalry; and, although part of these were still at a considerable distance from the centre of action, yet he wisely resolved at once to assume the offensive. Twelve hours only were devoted to rest and preparation at Chalons, and on the 26th headquarters were advanced to Vitry. Early on the following morning the march was resumed; and at daybreak the advanced guards met the leading Cossacks of Blücher's army, which were moving from St.-Dizier, where they had passed the night, towards Vitry. The Russians, wholly unprepared for any such encounter, were taken at a disadvantage, and worsted, and the victorious French re-entered St.-Dizier, which had been some days in the hands of the Allies, where they were received with the most lively enthusiasm. The Allied generals, meanwhile, inspired with undue confidence by the long-continued retreat of the French troops, and ignorant of the arrival of the Emperor at Chalons, were in a very unprepared state to receive an encounter. Blücher, with characteristic impatience and recklessness to consequences, had divided his army into two divisions; he himself with twenty-six thousand men having advanced to Brienne, where headquarters were established; while D'York, with twenty thousand Prussians, was at St.-Michel on the Meuse, and Sacken was at Lesmont, fifteen miles distant. Thus Napoléon, by his advance to St.-Dizier, had cut the army of Silesia in two, and he had it in his power either to fall on one of these detached corps with an overwhelming force, or to de file towards Chaumont and Langres, to repel Schwartzenberg and the grand army. He resolved to adopt the former plan, justly deeming Blücher the most resolute as well as formidable of his opponents, and the one, therefore, whom it was both most probable he might take at a disadvantage, and the most important that he should disable by an early disaster. He continued, therefore, his march against the Prussian general without interruption, plunged without hesitation into the forest of Der, which could only be crossed in that direction by deep country roads; on the 28th he reached Monteriender, and on the day following, by daybreak, the army was advancing in great spirits against Blücher, who lay within half a day's march, at Brienne, wholly unconscious of the approaching danger (2).

Preparatory movements on both sides.

Had Napoléon reached the Prussian general before he had received any intimation of his approach, it is certain that a great disaster would have befallen him; for he had only under his immediate command two divisions of Olsooief's corps, that of Sacken being at Lesmont, at a considerable distance. About noon, however, an officer was

(1) Fain, '61, 66. Vaud. i. 176, 179. Jom. iv. 524, 525.

(2) Jom. iv. 526. Fain, 70, 71. Dan. 51, 52. Vaud. i. 186, 187.

brought in prisoner with despatches, which proved to be of the highest importance, as they contained an order from Napoléon to Mortier to draw near and co-operate in a general attack on Blucher at Brienne. This at once revealed the presence of the Emperor, and the imminence of the danger. The Prussian general instantly sent off orders to Sacken to advance to his support with all possible expedition; and prepared himself to retire towards the Aube if he was attacked by superior forces, as his whole cavalry was already across that river, and the open plains of Champagne exposed the infantry to great risk if combating without that arm. At this critical moment, when he was every instant expecting to be attacked, Count Pahlen's cavalry of Wittgenstein's corps, belonging to the grand army, appeared in rear, and, on Blucher's request, immediately marched forward to the front of Brienne, and forming on the road by which the enemy was expected, covered Sacken's movement from Lesmont. Intelligence of Napoléon's advance at the same time reached Schwartzemberg at Chaumont; and Alexander, who had arrived there that very day from Langres, immediately gave instructions to Barclay, with the Russian guards and reserves, to come up with all possible expedition from the rear, and sent out orders in all directions for the concentration of the grand army. But before the orders could be received the blow had been delivered, and Blucher had been exposed to a rude encounter in the chateau of Brienne (1).

Napoléon drives the Russians into Brienne, Jan. 29. The French troops encountered the most serious obstacles, and underwent dreadful fatigue all the 28th, in forcing their way through the deep and miry alleys of the forest of Der. The frost, which it was expected would have removed every difficulty, had given way, and the thaw which succeeded had rendered the execrable cross roads all but impassable. It was only by the greatest efforts that the guns and artillery waggons could be dragged through; but by the zeal and ardour of the peasants of the forest, who harnessed themselves to the guns, and toiled night and day without intermission, the difficulties were at length overcome, and on the morning of the 29th, the troops were extricated from the wood, and on their march across the open country to Brienne. The curate of Mézières acted as their guide; he had escaped from the hussars of the Prussians, and threw himself before Napoléon, who recognised in him an old college companion at Brienne, whom he had not seen since they studied together, equal in rank and prospects, twenty-five years before! Soon the troops approached the town, and discovered the Prussians drawn up in successive lines in front of its buildings, and strongly occupying with their artillery the beautiful terraces which lie along its higher parts. Brienne stands on a hill sloping upwards to the castle, which stands on an eminence adjoining its summit; and its streets, after the manner of those in Genoa and Naples, rise in successive tiers above each other to the highest point. Olsooief's guns, with Pahlen's dragoons, occupied, as an advanced guard, the great road between it and Mézières; and it was absolutely necessary at all hazards to keep possession of that line, as it commanded the only access by which Sacken could effect his junction with the commander-in-chief. This duty was most gallantly performed by these brave officers, and the ground allotted to them strenuously maintained, from two in the afternoon, when the action commenced, till the whole of Sacken's corps had defiled through the streets (2), and effected its junction with the infantry of Olsooief in rear, when they gradually retired towards the lower part of the town.

(1) *Jom. iv. 526, 527. Dan 54, 52. Fain, 70, 71. Vaud. i. 184, 185.*

(2) *Dan. 54, 55. Fain, 72, 73. Vaud. i. 185, 187. Jom. iv. 526, 527. Personal observation.*

Successful
attack on
the town
and castle
of Brienne.
Jan. 29.

Encouraged by the retreat of the enemy's rearguard, Napoléon now pressed vigorously on with all the forces he could command; and from the successive arrival of fresh troops, while the action was going on in front of the town, they were very considerable. His numerous guns were hurried forward to the front, and, opening a concentric fire on the town, discharged a shower of bombs and shells which speedily set it on fire, and reduced to ashes a considerable part of its buildings, including the college where Napoléon had been educated—where he had passed the happy and as yet unambitious days of childhood, and where he had learned the art of war, which he now let loose with such devastating fury on the scenes of his infancy. A column of infantry, amidst the flaming tempest, burst into the town, and charging, amidst the spreading conflagration, through the streets, took twelve Russian guns. A battery, however, which Sacken established, commanding the French left, checked the advance of the troops destined to support this vigorous onset; and Pahlen and Wassilchikow's dragoons, charging the assailants in flank, they not only lost the guns they had taken, but were driven out of the town with the loss of eight pieces of their own. The fire continued with great vigour on both sides till nightfall, but the town remained in the hands of the Russians; gradually it slackened as darkness overspread the horizon; and Blücher, deeming the battle over, retired to the chateau to rest a few hours after his fatigues (1), and survey from its elevated summit the position of the vast semicircle of watch-fires, which marked the position of the enemy to the west of the town.

Imminent
danger of
Blücher on
this occa-
sion.

He was still on the top of the building, when loud cries were heard in the avenues which led to it, immediately succeeded by the discharge of musketry, and vehement shouts at the foot of the castle itself. The old marshal had barely time to hasten down stairs, accompanied by a few of his suite, when it was carried by a body of French grenadiers, who, during the darkness, had stole unperceived into the grounds of the chateau. In his way to the town, he was told by a Cossack, who came riding up at full speed with the accounts, that the French had again burst into the town; and, by the light of the burning houses, he distinctly perceived a large body of the enemy coming rapidly towards him at a trot. Even in this extremity, however, the indignant marshal would only consent to turn aside into a cross lane, where he was leisurely proceeding off at a walk, when Gneisenau, seeing that the enemy were rapidly gaining upon him, said, "Can it be your wish to be carried in triumph to Paris?" The field-marshal, upon this, put spurs to his horse, and with difficulty regained his troops. About the same time, several French squadrons charged along the street, with loud hurrahs, where Sacken was issuing orders. There was neither time nor avenue to escape, and with great presence of mind he backed his horse into the shadow of a house in the street, which was the darker from the glare of the flames behind it, while the furious whirlwind drove past: the dragoons in their haste taking no thought of, nor even observing him, who two months afterwards was governor of Paris! Blücher upon this ordered the town to be cleared of the enemy, which was immediately done; but though Olsooief advanced to the attack of the castle, he was always repulsed with loss: the assailants, from the light of the burning houses, being distinctly seen, while the defenders were shrouded in darkness. At two in the morning, the Prussian field-marshal drew off his whole force to the strong position of Trannes,

(1) Dan. 54, 55. Vaud. i. 188, 189. Fain, 72. Beauchamps, i. 185, 186.

on the road to Bar-sur-Aube, where the Grand Army was; and the smoking and half-burned ruins of Brienne remained entirely in the possession of the French (1).

Results of
the battle,
and immi-
nent dan-
ger of
Napoléon.

In this bloody affair the Russians only were engaged: both parties fought with the most determined resolution, and each sustained a loss of about three thousand men—a great proportion, considering the numbers who fought on either side. It is a remarkable circumstance, characteristic of the desperate chances of the death-struggle which was commencing, that at the very time when Blücher and Sacken so narrowly escaped being made prisoners, Napoléon himself was still nearer destruction; and a Cossack's lance had all but terminated the life which still kept a million of armed men at bay. The bulk of the French army was bivouacking in the plain between Mézières and Brienne, and the Emperor, after having inspected their positions, was riding back, accompanied by his suite, to the former town, in earnest conversation with General Gourgaud, when General Dejean, who commanded the patrol in front, suddenly turned, and cried aloud, "The Cossacks!" Hardly were the words spoken, when a party of these enterprising marauders dashed across the road: Dejean seized the foremost, and strove to plunge his sabre in his throat. The Cossack, however, disengaged himself, parried the blow, and continuing his career, made with his lance in rest at the horseman, with the cocked-hat and grey riding coat, who rode in front. A cry of horror arose in the emperor's suite: Corbineau threw himself across the lancer's path, while Gourgaud drew his pistol and shot him dead, so near Napoleon that he fell at his feet! The suite now rapidly came up, and the Cossacks, ignorant of the inestimable prize almost within their grasp, and seeing the first surprise had failed, dispersed and

Jan. 30.

fled. On the day following, the Emperor perceiving that the enemy had entirely evacuated Brienne, transferred his headquarters to its castle. The sight of the scenes of his youth, and of the sports of his boyhood, recalled a thousand emotions, to which they had long been strangers, in his breast; the past, the present, and the future, flitted in dark array before him; and he strove to allay the melancholy of his reflections by magnificent projects for the future restoration of Brienne, and the establishment of a palace or a military school, or both, in the much-loved cradle of his eventful career (2).

Concen-
tration of
the Grand
Army and
the army of
Silesia,
Jan. 31.

Meanwhile the Allied generals, now thoroughly alarmed, made the most vigorous efforts to concentrate their forces. Early on the morning of the 30th, the whole Grand Army marched to Trannes, with the exception of Wittgenstein and Wrede's corps, which were ordered to Passy and St.-Dizier to cover the right, and open up a communication with D'York's corps, which was approaching from that direction. At the same time, Blücher's troops were drawn together from all quarters; and the Allies, having now drawn together an overwhelming force in the two armies, resolved to give battle. Above a hundred thousand men were assembled under the immediate command of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, without counting Colloredo's men, twenty-five thousand more, who were at Vandœuvres during the action; and Wittgenstein's detached corps. The 31st passed over without any offensive movement on either side, while the Allied troops were rapidly coming into line—an inactivity on the part of Napoléon so inexplicable, considering that he was inferior in force, upon the whole, to his antagonists, and therefore was certain to lose by giving them

(1) Fain, 73, 74. Dan. 55, 56. Jom. iv. 526, 527.
Vaud. i. 189, 191. Lab. ii. 156, 157.

(2) Fain, 74, 76.

time to concentrate, that Alexander, more than once, was led to doubt whether he was really with the opposite armies. Mean time the Allies, in admirable order, took up their ground, and their generals, from the heights of Trannes, which overlooked the whole adjacent country, anxiously surveyed the theatre of the approaching battle. The centre, consisting chiefly of Blucher's Russians, was posted on the elevated ridge of Trannes, with Barclay de Tolly's reserve behind it; the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg's corps composed the right wing, which stood at Getanie; Giulay's Austrians formed the left, with Colloredo in reserve. With great delicacy, Schwartzberg entrusted the general command of the whole to Blucher, who had commenced the conflict with such spirit on the preceding day. Meanwhile Napoléon, finding himself overmatched, and that the Allied army, instead of being surprised in detail, was perfectly prepared and hourly increasing in strength, made dispositions for a retreat; but previous to this it was necessary to restore the bridge of Lesmont, the only issue by which his columns could recross the Aube. The French line was drawn up directly opposite to that of the Allies, and extended from Dionville on the right (1), through La Rothière and La Giberie in the centre, to Chaumenil on the extreme left; forming the two sides of a right-angled triangle, facing outwards, of which La Giberie was the turning point.

Order of battle on either side. Perceiving that, contrary to his previous custom, Napoléon remained motionless awaiting an attack—a striking indication of the altered state of his fortunes—Schwartzberg gave orders to Blucher to commence the battle, and it took place on the 1st of February. The weather was dark and gloomy: a cold wind, swelling at intervals into fitful gusts, driving heavy snow showers before it, rendered every thing invisible till one o'clock in the afternoon, when the sky cleared, and the receding mist discovered the French army, about fifty thousand strong, drawn up in order of battle. Gerard commanded the right, Marmont the left, and Napoléon himself directed the centre, having Mortier, Ney, and Oudinot, in reserve, immediately behind it. To distinguish the Allied troops, who belonged to six different sovereigns, and were in every variety of uniform, from the enemy, orders were given that they should all, from the general to the private soldier, wear a white band on the left arm. The adoption of this badge made General Jomini suggest to Alexander, that it might give rise to surmises as to the intentions of the allied sovereigns regarding the Bourbons. "What have I to do with them?" replied the Czar: a striking proof how much even those who are entrusted with the supreme direction of affairs, are themselves impelled in the most important events by a power of which they are the unconscious and unforeseeing instruments (2).

Battle of Brienne, Feb. 1. The monarchs now gave the orders to attack; and Prince Schwartzberg having sent a confidential officer to enquire of Blucher what plan of attack he would recommend, instead of specifying movements, he replied—"We must march to Paris; Napoléon has been in all the capitals of Europe: we must make him descend from a throne which it would have been well for us all that he had never mounted. We shall have no repose till we pull him down." Meanwhile Giulay advanced on Dionville, the Prince of Wirtemberg on La Giberie, Sacken on La Rothière, Wrede on Morvilliers. So heavy was the ground, that Niketin, who commanded Sacken's artillery, was obliged to leave half his guns in position on the

(1) Dan. 62, 63. Vaud. i. 196, 197. Fain, 76, 77. Burgh, iii. 111.

(2) Dan. 64, 65. Vaud. i. 196, 197. Burgh. 112, 113. Kausler, 476.

ridge of Trannes, and harness the horses belonging to them to the other half, thirty-six in number, with which he advanced to the attack. Ten horses were in this way got for each of the heavy guns, six to the light, and five to the caissons; and with this additional strength the cannon were dragged through the deep clay, and formed in line under a heavy discharge from the French artillery. The infantry destined for their protection, being still far in the rear toiling through the miry fields, Napoléon caused a large body of horse to charge the guns; but the Russian cannoniers, with admirable coolness, placed the charges under cover of their cloaks close beside the guns, to save time in carrying them; and having done so, ceased firing till the horse were within six hundred yards, when they opened so tremendous a discharge that the assailants quickly were obliged to retreat. Snow then fell with such thickness that the nearest objects were no longer visible, and during the darkness (1), the additional men and horses were sent back for the thirty-six pieces left behind at Trannes, which were brought to the front before the darkness cleared away.

Great success of the Russians on the right centre. While this was going on in front, the infantry and cavalry of Sacken's corps approached, and the action commenced at all points. The Prince of Wirtemberg drove the enemy from a wood which they occupied in front of La Giberie, and threading his devious way through a narrow path between fishponds, at last reached the open country, and immediately commenced an attack on the villages of La Giberie and Chaumenil, which were carried after a bloody struggle. Napoléon upon this directed a portion of his guards and reserves to regain these important posts, which formed, as it were, the salient angle of his position, and supported their attack by the concentric fire of a large part of his artillery. The efforts of these brave men proved successful, and the villages were regained; but the Prince returned to the charge in front, supported by Wrede, who assailed them in flank, and by their united efforts the villages were regained and permanently held by the Allies. Meanwhile Sacken in the centre led his troops in beautiful array against La Rothière and the French batteries adjacent; so steady was their advance, that the infantry were in many places headed by their regimental vanguard. Count Lieven, with the vanguard, pushed the attack with such vigour that he reached the church of La Rothière, around which a bloody conflict arose, although the snow fell so thick that the combatants were frequently obliged to suspend their fire, from being unable to see each other. At this critical moment the Russian dragoons, under Lanskoï and Pantchenlidzeff, advanced, broke the French cavalry, and following up their success, charged and captured a battery of twenty-eight guns in the enemy's centre. At the same time, the Prince of Wirtemberg made himself master of a battery of nine guns between La Giberie and La Rothière, turned sharp to his left, attacked the latter village in flank, and expelled the French from every part of it, while Wrede carried Chaumenil and twelve guns on the extreme left of the line. Thus the French centre and left were entirely broken through and beaten; and although their right still stood firm at Dionville, and had repulsed all the attacks of Giulay's Austrians, yet the battle before six o'clock seemed to be clearly decided in favour of the Allies (2).

Napoléon, however, had been too long a victorious general to despair

(1) Dan. 66, 67. Burgh. 112, 113. Vand. i. 248, 250. Beauch. i. 196, 197. (2) Dan. 67, 68. Lab. ii. 161, 162. Koch, i. 250, 252. Burgh. 114, 118.

Napoléon's last attack, and final defeat.

as yet of the contest. Oudinot came up opportunely from the neighbourhood of Lesmont with two fresh divisions; and the Emperor putting himself at the head of the dragoons of Colbert and Piri, and bringing up every disposable gun he had left, directed a general attack on La Rothière. Perceiving the concentration of the French forces on this decisive point, Blucher put himself at the head of his reserves, and advanced to sustain the encounter. It was late in the evening when these two redoubtable antagonists met in arms, the shades of night already overspread the field, which was only partially illuminated by the feeble rays of the moon. The first attack of the French was irresistible, the village was carried amidst loud cheers; but the Emperor of Russia immediately brought up the grenadier regiments of Little Russia and Astrakan, which again drove the enemy out at the point of the bayonet, the whole grenadier corps and cuirassiers of the guard being brought up to support the assault. In the struggle which ensued the division Duhesme was almost entirely destroyed; both parties fought with the most invincible resolution. Napoléon and Blucher in person directed the attacks; but at length the French were overpowered and driven out of the village; while at the same time, Giulay on the extreme right, at midnight, after a sixth assault carried Dionville. The whole villages and ground held by the French in the commencement of the battle were now in the hands of the Allies; and Napoléon, seeing the day irrecoverably lost, gave orders to burn La Rothière, and drew off his shattered troops to Brienne, under cover of the thick darkness of a winter's night (1).

Results of the battle, and desperate condition of Napoléon.

The cause of Napoléon appeared now altogether desperate. He had suddenly collected his troops and made a desperate irruption into the heart of the enemies' armies; but instead of striking any of his former terrible blows, he had met only with the most obstinate resistance: his onset had served as the signal for the concentration of their vast armies, and he had finally been defeated in a pitched battle on the ground which he himself had chosen. In the last action he had lost six thousand men, including a thousand prisoners, and seventy-three pieces of cannon, wrested from him in fair fight; while the Allies were only weakened by two-thirds of that number: the *prestige* of a first victory was not only lost by him, but gained by his opponents; nine thousand of his best soldiers had fallen, or been made prisoners, since hostilities had recommenced; discouragement, almost despair, was general in his ranks, and it was difficult to see how the future advance of a host of enemies was to be arrested, when less than a half of their armies had defeated so well-conceived and daring an enterprise by his whole disposable force. Nor did subsequent events weaken the force of this impression: on the contrary, they strongly confirmed it, and seemed to presage the immediate dissolution of the French power. Napoléon returned at midnight to Brienne, and such was his anxiety lest the enemy should take advantage of the confusion of his retiring columns to make a nocturnal attack, and complete his ruin, that not content with incessantly asking if there was any thing new, he himself stood for some hours at the windows of the chateau of Brienne, which overlooked the field, anxiously watching to see if any unusual movement around the watch-fires indicated the commencement of an irruption. Nothing, however, prognosticated such an event; the flames were steady, and gradually declined as

(1) Dan. 68, 69. Lab. ii. 162, 164. Vaud. i. 252, 253. Koch, i. 183, 186. Burgh, 117, 118.

night advanced; and at four on the following morning, the Emperor, satisfied he was not pursued, gave orders for a retreat by Lesmont to Troyes (1).

Great ex-
ultation in
the Allied
army at
this suc-
cess.

This first and most important victory gained on the soil of France over the arms of Napoléon, produced the most unbounded transports in the Allied armies. During the progress of the action,

Alexander and Frederick William were spectators from the heights of Trannes of the success of their arms, and testified the most lively sense of their gratitude to the victorious generals and chiefs by whom it had been effected. "Tell the field-marshal," said the former to Blucher's aide-de-camp, "that he has crowned all his former victories by this glorious triumph." The day after the battle, the sovereigns, ambassadors, and principal generals, supped together; and Blucher, striking off, in his eagerness, the necks of the bottles of champagne with his knife, quaffed off copious and repeated libations to the toast, drank with enthusiasm by all present, "Nach Paris." Yet, although such were the anticipations which universally prevailed, and not without reason, of an immediate march to Paris, it may be doubted whether Blucher made as much of the superiority of force as he might have done; and whether Napoléon in his place would not have converted the success at La Rothière into a total and irrecoverable defeat. Certainly if the position of the French army, forming the two sides of a right-angled triangle facing outwards, with the Aube, traversed only by a single bridge at Lesmont, in its rear, and that of the Allies, pressing them with superior forces on both sides up against the impassable river, be taken into consideration, it might have been expected that more decisive results would have been obtained; and in fact they would have been secured, if, instead of directing the weight of his attacks against La Rothière and La Giberie in front, the Prussian marshal had more strongly supported the assault, which in the end proved decisive, of Wrede on Chaumenil and Morvilliers in flank (2).

Desperate
condition
of the
French
army in
their re-
treat.
Feb. 2.

In truth, however, such was the discouragement and disaster which resulted to the French army from this calamitous action, that it brought Napoléon to the very brink of ruin. On the day after the battle, the army defiled in great confusion over the bridge of Lesmont; and Marmont, who was left with twelve thousand men to cover the retreat, soon found himself beset, as Victor had been at the Berezina, by Wrede's corps, above twenty thousand strong. It was only by the most vigorous exertions, seconded by the heroic devotion of his followers, that the brave marshal succeeded in repelling the repeated attacks of the Bavarians, urged on to the charge by the personal direction of the Emperor Alexander, who exposed himself in the thickest of the fight. In the afternoon a thick snow storm suspended the combat, and Marmont took advantage of it to withdraw his troops across the river, and the Russians, disconcerted by this bloody encounter, gave no further molestation to their retreat. Nevertheless it proved to the last degree disastrous to the French. On the day following, Napoléon with all his forces fell back to Troyes, the capital of Champagne, where Mortier with his corps was already established, erecting barricades, running up palisades, establishing batteries, breaking out loopholes in the houses of the suburbs, and making every preparation for a vigorous defence (3).

The situation of the town of Troyes, containing twenty-two thousand inha-

(1) Fain, 78, 79. Jom. iv. 527, 528. Dan. 70, 71.

(2) Koch, i. 186, 187. Dan. 73, 74.

(3) Koch, i. 196, 197. Dan. 73, 75. Jom. iv. 528.

Dilatory movements of the Allies in pursuit. bitants, in the midst of an immense plain at the confluence of the Barce and the Seine, was such as to render it little capable of standing a siege, while at the same time it afforded opportunities, on the right bank of the latter river, of keeping even a superior enemy several days at bay. Napoléon resolved to make use of it for this latter temporary purpose, to gain time for the further concentration of his troops; and in this endeavour he was much aided by the dilatory conduct of Schwartzemberg in continuing the pursuit. The Austrians, Bavarians, and Wirtemburghers, who, from the direction which the retiring French army had taken, found themselves foremost in following it, were so tardy in their movements, that they literally lost sight of the enemy, and for two days it was unknown at headquarters whether the main body of the French army had retreated in the direction of Arcis, Chalons, or Troyes. Already the secret reluctance of the Austrian cabinet to push matters to extremity against Napoléon, which exercised so powerful an influence on the fortunes of the campaign, was becoming very apparent; yet, notwithstanding this slackness in the pursuit, such was the effect of a retrograde movement upon the spirits of the French soldiers, more susceptible than any in Europe of vivid impressions, and such the effect produced on the minds of the young conscripts, by the hardships they had undergone since they took the field in that rigorous weather, that six thousand deserted their colours, and disappeared during the retreat to Troyes; and the army reached that town fifteen thousand weaker than when Napoléon, a week before, had given the signal of advance from Chalons (1).

Imprudent dislocation of the Allied armies. Feb. 2. The future plan of operations resolved on by the Allied sovereigns on the 2d February at the castle of Brienne, and which proved so disastrous in its consequences as to have wellnigh rendered abortive all the vast efforts which had been made for the invasion of France, was, that the grand army and army of Silesia, instead of acting together, or in concert, when their mass was irresistible, *should separate*, and act on different lines of operation; Blucher, with the army of Silesia, moving upon Chalons, and thence following the course of the Marne to Paris, through Chateau-Thierry and Meaux, while Prince Schwartzemberg was to move on to Troyes, and descend the valley of the Seine by Montereau to the same capital. Want of provisions and of forage, which already began to be severely felt, if such an enormous multitude of men and horses was kept united, was the reason assigned for this most imprudent dislocation; as if any reason, short of absolute necessity, could justify the division of the two armies to such a distance that they could not render aid to each other, in the presence of such a general as Napoléon, still at the head of seventy thousand men, in a central position between them. It would seem as if, forgetting that the concentration of the two armies the autumn before had wrought out the deliverance of Germany, and that their recent union had all but secured the conquest of France, they were determined to give every facility to a prolongation of the war, and to afford to the French Emperor an opportunity for dealing out, on the right and left, those redoubtable blows, by which, fourteen years before, he had prostrated Wurmser and Alvinzi on the banks of the Adige (2).

Retreat of the French from Troyes, and its occupation by the Allies. The disastrous consequences of this separation of force were speedily apparent. It was not that Schwartzemberg had not ample troops at his disposal in his own army to crush Napoléon; but that, separated from Blucher and the army of Silesia, the daring resolu-

(1) Koch, i. 197, 199. Dan. 74, 75. Fain, 81, 83. Burgh. 119, 120.

(2) Pan. 74, 75. Burgh. 120, 124. Koch, i. 191. Jom. iv. 533.

tion was wanting in all but Alexander, which could alone lead to decisive results. Austrian diplomacy, anxious to save the French Emperor from a total fall, now, as on so many former occasions, became predominant over military councils; and Napoléon, relieved from all disquietude on the side of the grand army, was able to turn his undivided attention to the strokes which he meditated against the army of Silesia. No sooner, therefore, did he receive intelligence of the separation of the two armies, and that Blucher, in obedience to his instructions, was moving towards Chalons-sur-Marne, while Schwartzberg's huge masses were slowly drawing around Troyes, than he resolved to descend the course of the Seine towards Paris, and facilitate his junction with the reinforcements of veteran troops which were approaching, drawn from the army of Soult; in the hopes that, when he had in this manner repaired his losses, he would be enabled to strike a blow with effect against the flank of the army of Silesia, when advancing towards the capital. With this view, he allowed his troops to repose during three days at Troyes;

Feb. 5. and so imposed upon the enemy by the good countenance which he maintained in front of that town, and by a vigorous sortie which he made beyond the Barce, that the Austrian general deemed it necessary to draw back his headquarters to Bar-sur-Aube, and throw two corps across the Seine, in order to make a general attack at once on both banks. Napoléon had no intention of risking a general engagement where he stood; and his troops having somewhat recovered from their fatigues, he broke up with his whole

Feb. 6. army early on the morning of the 6th, and reached Nogent on the road to Paris on the following evening. The headquarters of the Allied army were immediately advanced, and on the 7th were established in Troyes, which they took the most anxious precautions to preserve from pillage or disorder of any sort (1).

Extreme depression in the French army. Though the retreat of the French army down the Seine to Nogent was a prudent measure, profoundly calculated, and which speedily led to the most brilliant results, yet it produced at first the most ruinous effects upon the army. The hopes of the soldiers were entirely dissipated by this long-continued retreat; it was seriously feared that Paris itself would ere long be abandoned: the cause of Napoléon, and of the Revolution, seemed at an end. They felt the same despair as the Russians had done in retiring from Smolensko towards Moscow. The troops marched in sullen and gloomy silence over the wet and dreary roads: the ominous question, "where are we to halt?" was in every mouth. Nor were the spirits of the troops revived when they reached Nogent, and the army, receiving orders to halt, made preparations by mining the bridge, loopholing the houses, and barricading the streets, for disputing the passage of the Seine. Moreover, the most disquieting intelligence was received from all quarters: the defection of Murat was announced from Italy; Antwerp was blockaded by the Anglo-Prussian army; Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle were occupied; Brussels had been evacuated; Flanders was lost; General Maison was rapidly falling back to the old frontiers of the monarchy; while the unresisted march of Blucher to Chalons, which he had occupied on the 5th, clearly indicated a resolution to march on Paris by a route by which it was most assailable, and where scarcely any force existed to arrest his progress. The troops, profoundly affected at having so long to retire before the enemy, were now deserting by crowds; the sides of the road were covered with arms, cloaks, and haversacks, thrown down in despair: twelve thousand

(1) Fain, 84, 85. Dan. 77, 78. Burgh, 122, 123. Koch, i. 201, 203.

conscrip̄ts had soon left their standards, making the total loss since hostilities recommenced not less than twenty thousand : and the despatches from Caulaincourt, who was engaged in the conferences which had been opened at Châtillon, announced that the demands of the Allied sovereigns, rising with the successes of their arms, were no longer limited, as at Frankfort, to the recognition of the frontier of the Rhine, but pointed to the reduction of France within the ancient limits of the monarchy (1).

Such was the magnitude of the losses which the French army had sustained since the opening of the campaign, especially in cavalry, that a fresh organization of that arm, to conceal the frightful chasms in its ranks, had become necessary. It took place at Nogent, and continued unchanged till the conclusion of the war. The cavalry had been divided into six corps; but such had been the enormous amount of its losses, that even with the aid of successive remounts, sent from the depots in the interior, it could only now make out four, of which two were composed only of three divisions each; Grouchy obtained the general command of the whole, and the corps under him were entrusted to Count Bordesouille, Count St.-Germain, Count Milhaud, and the Count de Valmy. In addition to this there was the cavalry of the guard, consisting of five divisions, under Laferrière, Desnouettes, Colbert, Guyot, and Defrance; and such was the activity displayed in pushing reinforcements into this service, that it soon numbered in its ranks fifteen thousand admirable cavaliers. The skeleton of a new corps of infantry was also formed, under Oudinot, on the Seine below Nogent, and at Bray, composed of the divisions Leval and Boyer de Rebeval, which were now coming up from the army of the Pyrenees, and various bodies of conscrip̄ts hurried forward from the depots in the interior (2).

Napoléon resolves to attack Blücher on his advance to Paris. It was in these disastrous and all but desperate circumstances, that Napoléon conceived and executed one of those hardy, yet prudent measures, which have justly rendered his name immortal. Rightly judging that he need not disquiet himself about the Austrians, whose slow and methodical movements, ever kept subordinate to the mysteries of diplomacy, were now more than ever circumspect, from the peculiar position of their emperor making war on his own son-in-law, he cast his eyes on Blücher, whose bolder movements, since the separation of the armies, were both more fitted to excite solicitude and afford opportunity. The progress of the Prussian marshal, since he had been left at liberty to act for himself, had been so rapid as to have excited the most lively apprehensions in the breasts of the Parisians. Hardly an hour elapsed that the most alarming intelligence was not received from the seat of government. The Russians and Prussians, with their ardent chief at their head, were advancing by forced marches towards the capital, and driving before them a confused and trembling crowd of peasants, women, and children, who fled at the approach of these northern barbarians. In this extremity, with disaster pressing him on every side, and the enemy's advanced posts within a few marches of the capital, Maret and all his councillors earnestly besought the Emperor to accept even the rigorous conditions proposed by the Allies, and make peace. But after a night passed in reflection, he replied, "No, no! we must think of other things just now. I am on the eve of beating Blücher. He is advancing on the road to Montmirail. I am about to set off. I will beat him to-morrow—I will beat him the day after to-morrow :

(1) Fain, 84, 86. Dan. 76, 78. Koch, i. 202, 203. Burch. 123, 124. Lab. ii. 172.

(2) Koch, i. 208. Vaud. i. 294, 295.

if that movement is attended with the success it deserves, the face of affairs will be entirely changed, and then we shall see what is to be done" (1).

Movements
of Blücher in
Champagne.
Feb. 3.

The positions occupied by the army of Silesia at this juncture, were singularly favourable to such an enterprize. Blücher, with the corps of Sacken and Olsoofief, which fought at La Rothière, had, in obedience to the instructions he had received, moved on the 3d through St.-Ouen on the road to Chalons. Meanwhile D'York attacked that town, which was garrisoned by a detachment of Macdonald's corps, and after a sharp conflict made himself master of it. Macdonald, who was encumbered with the grand park of Napoléon's army, consisting of a hundred guns dragged by peasants' horses, upon this retired to Epernay, towards Paris; and Blücher no sooner heard of the direction of his march, than he resolved to cut him off, and for this purpose directed his troops to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where the two great roads from Châlons to Paris meet. The better

Feb. 4. to compass this design, which seemed to promise entire success, he ordered D'York to follow the French marshal by the highway through Château-Thierry and Epernay; Sacken was directed through Bergères on

Feb. 5. MONTMIRAIL; and he was to be followed at the distance of a day's march by Olsoofief, who was commanded to remain at CHAMPAUBERT till further orders. The field-marshal himself halted at Virtus, almost without

Feb. 6. troops, to await the coming up of Kleist's corps, which was hourly expected at Châlons. With the three corps united he proposed to fall on Macdonald's troops, and having destroyed them and taken the convoy of guns, push direct on the capital, where the utmost consternation already prevailed. Sacken's advanced guard had reached La Ferté-sous-Jouarre: the crowd of fugitives was pouring in wild disorder into Meaux; already the litters of the wounded, and the disbanded conscripts, were beginning to be seen in Paris, where the public streets were almost deserted in the apprehension of an impending calamity (2). No uneasiness filled the field-marshal's breast, during this rapid advance, as to his left flank, though Napoléon lay in that direction, as he deemed him sufficiently occupied with watching the motions of the grand army; as Nogent, where the headquarters of the French were established, was thirty miles distant; and as the only approach to it was through deep cross-roads, by the marshy bank of the Petit Morin, apparently impassable at that inclement season of the year.

Extraordi-
nary diffi-
culties of
the passage
across the
country.

Having taken his resolution, the Emperor instantly gave orders for carrying it into execution; and leaving Victor at Nogent with fourteen thousand men, to keep the Austrians in check, and Oudinot at Bray-sur-Seine at the head of ten thousand, with orders to delay them as long as possible at the passage of that river, he resolved himself to set out with the *élite* of his army, about forty-five thousand strong, for Sezanne, with the intention of falling perpendicularly on the line of Blücher's march, and destroying his scattered columns. On the 9th he broke up with this design from Nogent, and slept at Sezanne, halfway across, with the imperial guard, and on the following day moved on towards Champaubert. But the difficulties of the passage proved greater even than had been anticipated, and it required all the vigour and authority of the Emperor to overcome the insubordination of his troops, and conquer the difficulties of the enterprize. The spirits of the soldiers, already severely

(1) Fain, 90, 94. Dan. 96. Lib. ii. 181, 182.

(2) Dan. 95, 97. Lab. ii. 180, 182. Fain, 90, 94. Vaud. i. 280, 283, 292, 293.

depressed when they arrived at Nogent, were sunk to the lowest degree by the hardships and difficulties of this cross march, for which no object was apparent, and which seemed to have been undertaken for no other purpose but to lay open to the Austrian grand army the undefended road to the capital. Murmurs were universal; insubordination bordered on mutiny; it was openly said, both by officers and men, that the Emperor had lost his head, and that he was fast hurrying the empire to destruction. Marmont, who headed the advance with his corps, found the roads so dreadful, that the artillery drivers all reported that it was impossible to get the guns through; and notwithstanding all the efforts of the officers, the cannon and waggons stuck fast in the deep clay forest of Traconne, and Marmont, despairing of success, was remeasuring his steps. When this was reported to the Emperor, he replied, "You must still advance, even if you leave the whole
Feb. 9. cannon behind you." The marshal was instantly ordered to face about and resume his march, and push through at all hazards; couriers were dispatched in all directions to the mayors of the adjacent communes to procure horses, that they might aid in extricating the artillery; and such was the patriotic ardour with which the assistance was furnished, that the guns and caissons were at length got through. The disorders and discouragement of the troops, however, had now reached their acme from this accumulation of difficulties; pillage became universal, and being exercised without mercy on the people of the country, gave rise to the most violent exasperation; and the Emperor, after long shutting his eyes to these excesses, had at length his attention forcibly drawn to them by the destruction of a chateau, in the neighbourhood of Nogent, belonging to his own mother. Napoléon, justly incensed, issued a severe proclamation, in which he declared he would hold the generals and officers responsible for the conduct of their troops (1); but the evil still continued with very little abatement, and, by preventing any cordial assistance from the peasantry to the soldiers, was one main cause of the fall of Napoléon. It arose from a deeper source than any regulation of discipline could rectify—the habits of systematic extortion to which the armies of the Revolution had been trained; and was, in fact, the reaction of Napoléon's favourite maxim, that war should maintain war, upon himself and his own subjects (2).

Combat of
Champaubert.
Early on the morning of the 10th, Marmont passed the defiles of St.-Gond under the eyes of the Emperor, and immediately directed his march against the village of Baye, which was occupied by a detachment of Olsoofief's corps. That general, with his gallant Russians, was lying at Champaubert in perfect security, and dreaming of nothing less than being assailed on his left flank, in which direction, from the position of Schwartzenberg's army, and the difficult nature of the intervening country, no danger appeared to be apprehended. Meanwhile Marmont reached the summit of the height which overlooks the valley of Petit-Morin, and beheld the Russians, about five thousand strong, with twenty-four guns, busy in preparing their breakfasts, wholly unconscious of their approaching peril. Napoléon immediately rode up to the front, and, overjoyed at his success, ordered a general attack. The Russian general, though astonished beyond measure

(1) "The Emperor has to express his displeasure to the army at the excesses to which it abandons itself. Such disorders are always hurtful: but they become criminal when committed in our native country. From this day forward, the chiefs of corps and the generals shall be held entirely re-

sponsible for them. The inhabitants are flying on every side, and the troops, instead of being their country's defenders, are becoming its scourge."—*Proclamation, 8th Feb. 1814.* DANILEFSKY, 95.

(2) Dan. 95, 97. Koch, i. 208, 209. Fain, 92, 93. Vaud, i. 294, 303.

at this unexpected apparition on his flank, drew up his men with great steadiness to resist. Some prisoners, however, taken in the skirmish near Baye, having mentioned that the Emperor was with the troops, he despatched repeated couriers to Blucher to demand assistance, and know whether he should retreat; but the field-marshal directed him to maintain himself where he was, and that succour was unnecessary, as it was impossible that he could be assailed by more than a flying detachment of two thousand men. Thus left to his own resources, the brave Russian, though well aware he had to deal with an overwhelming force, led on by the Emperor in person, prepared himself, like a good soldier, to maintain his post to the last extremity (1).

Total defeat of the Russian division.

Napoléon, seeing that the enemy stood firm, made dispositions for attacking him at once in front and both flanks. Lagrange with his division, followed by that of Ricard, crossed the marshes of St.-Gond, carried the bridge of St.-Prix, and drove the Russian advanced posts close into Champaubert, where they rallied, under protection of their main body and artillery, which opened a most vigorous fire. Meanwhile, the French cavalry at a greater distance passed the marsh, and having gained the high-road leading from Champaubert to Montmirail, turned and attacked the Russians on their right flank, while Lagrange's division menaced their left. Despairing of maintaining his position against such an accumulation of enemies, Olsoofief sent half his guns to the rear, and, forming his men in column, marched in person to force the passage towards Etoges and Montmirail, while Poltoratsky, with a brigade, was left to defend Champaubert to the last extremity. This little band defended itself with desperate resolution till its ammunition began to fail, when they were obliged to retreat out of the village and retire across a plain, with the view of reaching the shelter of a wood at a little distance. As he drew near to this cover, Poltoratsky perceived that it was already in the hands of the enemy; and he was received by them with a volley of musketry. Meanwhile, the horse artillery of the French made fearful chasms in the Russian ranks, their cavalry charged in at the openings, and the wearied square dragged its toilsome way along, moistening every step with its blood. At length, having exhausted its last cartridge, the whole of this devoted band was overpowered and made prisoners. Meanwhile, Olsoofief himself, finding the road to Etoges occupied by the French with superior forces, struck off to the left, and endeavoured to make his way across the fields towards Montmirail; but his guns stuck fast in the deep mud, so that the enemy had time to surround the detachment, which, having wholly exhausted its ammunition, was in great part made prisoners, with the commander himself. General Corneloff, however, with General Udom, disdained even in this extremity to surrender; but collecting the remains of the corps, about two thousand strong, with twelve guns, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy, and at midnight reached Portabincón with their colours and honour unsullied (2).

Great effects of this victory, and measures of Napoléon to follow it up.

In this disastrous affair the Russians lost three thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides twelve guns and seventeen caissons, while the French were only weakened by six hundred men. But the moral effect of the triumph was much more considerable, and it was such, that it had wellnigh neutralized the whole effect of the previous success, and rendered problematical the final result of the in-

(1) Dan. 100, 102, Kech, i. 234, 235. Vaud, i. 304, 305. Fain, 93.

(2) Dan. 102, 104. Lab, ii. 187, 189. Fain, 93. Kech, i. 235, 239. Plottho, iii. 176.

vasion. The French troops, who had been reduced to the lowest point of depression by the long-continued retreat, were elevated beyond measure by this brilliant success, which, achieved with so little loss, seemed to recall, in the midst of disaster, the brilliant days of Arcola and Rivoli. By this daring and felicitous cross march, the initiative had been regained by the French Emperor; he had achieved the greatest feat in strategy—that, with a force inferior upon the whole to his adversaries, of being greatly superior at the point of attack; he had broken in upon the line of advance of the army of Silesia, and could at pleasure turn with a concentrated array upon any of its scattered columns. The French soldiers, intelligent beyond any other in Europe, immediately perceived the immense advantages which this brilliant cross march had secured for them; the depression of the retreat, the disaster of La Rothière, the fatigues of the preceding days, were forgotten. Napoléon no longer appeared the insane ruler, hurrying blindfold on destruction, but the consummate commander, who prepared amidst adversity the means of regaining prosperous fortune; and that general confidence was felt which, more either than numbers or experience, in general contributes to military success (1).

Napoléon's
measures
in conse-
quence.

Napoléon felt the whole impulse of the returning tide of victory, which had now set in to his arms. Poltoratsky, the Russian general, who had been made prisoner, having been brought before him, he exclaimed, "I now tell you, that as I have routed you to-day, I will annihilate Sacken to-morrow; on Thursday, the whole of Wittgenstein's advanced guard will be disposed of; on Friday, I will give Blucher a blow from which he will never recover, and I then hope to dictate peace to Alexander on the Vistula. Your old fox Kutusoff deceived me, by his march on our flank: the burning of Moscow was a barbarous act—it was the work of the Russians. I took Berlin, Madrid, and Vienna, and no such thing happened."—"The Russians," replied Poltoratsky, "don't repent of that sacrifice, and are delighted with its results."—"Leave the room, sir," replied the Emperor, stamping with his foot. On that very night he dispatched orders to his plenipotentiary Caulaincourt, at the congress which was sitting, to gain time and *sign nothing*, as he was on the eve of the most important events.

Feb. 11. Next morning he announced his success to Macdonald, with orders to him to discontinue his retreat; and himself set off by daybreak to attack Sacken at Montmirail, leaving the corps of Marmont before Etoges to watch Blucher, who lay at Virtus anxiously awaiting the arrival of Kleist's corps to enable him to resume the offensive. By this blow, Napoléon had cut the Silesian army into two parts, and interposed with fifty thousand men, to which his own army was now augmented, between its severed wings (2).

Perilous
situation
of Sacken.

Sacken's situation was now very critical.—He had received an order from Blucher, late the night before, to remeasure his steps through Montmirail, and rejoin him in the plains of Virtus; and the field-marshal had ordered D'York to join him: but the rapidity of the Emperor's movements anticipated the execution of either of these orders. At the very time that Napoléon moved from Champaubert to Montmirail, Sacken was on his way to it, marching back from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where he had reached on his advance to Paris; but the French were before hand, and Montmirail was occupied by their advanced guard before the Russians approached

(1) Lab. ii. 189. Fain, 93. Koch, i. 239, 240.

(2) Dan. 106, 108. Lab. ii. 189, 190. Koch, i. 239. Plötho, iii. 178, 179.

it. Thus anticipated and intercepted in his attempted movement to rejoin his commander-in-chief, the Russian general had no alternative but to prepare for the combat. This he did the more willingly, as he relied on the approach and co-operation of D'York, who was near Chateau-Thierry, and who, he was aware, had received orders to join him without loss of time. Trusting with too great confidence to this assistance, Sacken, instead of inclining to his left, as he might have done, to facilitate his junction with D'York, resolved to push straight on, and endeavour to force his passage through the opposing columns, by the valley of Petit Morin. He formed his troops, in consequence, in order of battle; the centre on the great road from La Ferté-sous-Jouarre to Montmirail; the right on the village of Marché, near the river of the Petit Morin; and the left in the open ground towards the village of Fontenelle, where it was hoped they would speedily be joined by D'York's corps coming up from Chateau-Thierry (1).

Battle of
Montmirail,
Feb. 11.

In proportion as the French troops came up to Montmirail, they marched out of the town, and forming on the opposite side, commenced the action with the Russian troops. The fire began at eleven o'clock, and soon became extremely warm on both sides; forty pieces of cannon arrayed along the Allied front long kept the French at bay, and the village of Marché, where Scherbatof commanded the Russian right, was three times taken and retaken at the point of the bayonet. Meanwhile D'York himself arrived, but reported that his troops could not appear on the ground till three o'clock, and that his whole artillery had been left at Chateau-Thierry, from the experienced impossibility of dragging it forward in the wretched state of the roads. At the very time that this depressing intelligence was received by the Allies, Mortier came up with the Old Guard, the Cuirassiers, and the Guards of Honour, to the aid of the French; and Napoléon having now got his reserves in hand, and seeing the decisive moment arrived, ordered a general attack on the whole of Sacken's line, but taking care to direct the weight of his force against the Russian left near Fontenelle, in order to throw it back on the centre, and cut off the enemy from the line of their junction with D'York, or approach to Blücher. If the attack was vigorous, however, the defence was not less obstinate; ranged behind hedges and in farm-offices, the Russian tirailleurs long retarded the advance of the enemy, and when at length they were forced back, the mutual fury of the combatants led them, with loud cries on both sides, to the decisive shock of the bayonet. Success was varied in this dreadful encounter—in some places the French were forced back, in others they penetrated the Russian line; but at this decisive moment Napoléon ordered up the Cuirassiers and Guard of Honour to charge the half-broken masses of the enemy. As these gallant cavaliers defiled past the Emperor, he said to them, "Brave young men! there is the enemy! Will you allow him to march to Paris?"—"We will not allow him!" exclaimed the horsemen, shaking their sabres aloft, and rending the air with their cries; and instantly breaking into a charge, fell upon the enemy with such fury that the victory in that quarter was speedily decided. In vain D'York now came up with several brigades of Prussians, though without artillery, which could not be dragged through the deep clay; they, too, were broken by the French cavalry, and shared the general ruin. Ney and Mortier carried the farm of Greneaux amidst vehement cheers, and drove the Russian left back upon the centre, which, with the right, retired across the fields towards Chateau-Thierry, covered by Vassiltchikoff's dra-

(1) Dau. 109, 110. Koch, i. 240, 241. Plötho, iii. 179, 180. Lab. ii. 189, 190.

goons, which, with the utmost gallantry, repulsed the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers (1).

Actions on
the day
following
the battle.
Feb. 12.

In this bloody combat the Allies lost three thousand men killed and wounded, and a thousand prisoners, besides nine guns, which stuck fast in the mud, and could not be drawn off when the corps retreated.

The French loss did not exceed one thousand. It was only by the utmost exertions, and harnessing fifty hussars and hulans with long ropes to each gun, that the remainder were got away during the darkness and confusion, while torches were displayed every hundred yards to illuminate the gloom. Napoléon passed the night at the farm-house of Greneaux, sleeping on the straw from which the enemy's dead had just been removed, in the midst of smoking ruins, yet weltering in their blood, and next morning by daybreak he was on horseback, at the head of his guards, to pursue the Allies. The Prussian general, Horn, was stationed to keep the enemy in check with twenty-four squadrons, which had not hitherto suffered in the conflict. He arranged these troops in two lines, the first of which charged the enemy. They were received, however, with such vigour by Ney, at the head of the French dragoons, that the first line was at once routed and driven back upon the second, which was also thrown into confusion and fled. Immediately the French cavalry pushed on, and swept round the squares of Russian infantry, which had barely time to form in rear of the horse; but two of them were broken in the tumult, and the pieces of cannon taken, besides a thousand prisoners. Meanwhile, however, the main body of the Russians and Prussians succeeded in crossing the Marne, and breaking down its bridges, which prevented the further pursuit of the enemy, and placed them, for the moment at least, in a situation of security (1); but in this day's combat they had lost two thousand more of their best soldiers, besides several guns abandoned in the retreat, making their total loss in the two days seventeen guns, five standards, and six thousand men.

Heroic devotion of
Sacken to
his orders.

By directing his course to the left, and marching on the first day straight to Château-Thierry, without seeking to encounter Napoléon at all, there can be no doubt that Sacken might have avoided this serious disaster, and joined Blucher with his forces untouched; but his orders from the field-marshal were precise, to march to join him by Montmirail; and, like a good soldier, he obeyed his instructions, though to the evident destruction of himself and his troops. Well, therefore, did he merit the encomium of the biographer of Blucher—"Sacken may have committed an error of judgment on this occasion, but it was the error of a hero too confident in his own strength: we had few generals equal to him; only such as he might hope to vanquish Napoléon (2)."

Kleist joins
Blucher,
who advances to-
wards
Sacken.
Feb. 12.

While the Emperor in person was gaining these splendid successes against the corps of Olsooef and Sacken, Blucher was remaining at Virtus, with hardly any troops at his disposal, anxiously waiting the arrival of Kleist and Kaptsevitch's corps. It may be conceived with what impatience the impetuous veteran remained in this state of forced inaction, when fresh accounts of Napoléon's successes were every hour received; when the fugitives from Champaubert were coming straggling in, and the distant roar of the cannon at Montmirail announced Sacken's danger. But notwithstanding his ardent desire to join his comrades,

(1) Dan. 111, 112. Koch, i. 240, 241. Fain, 94, 95. Lab. ii. 192, 193. Vaud. i. 312, 322. Plotho, iii. 180, 182.

(2) Plotho, iii. 183, 184. Dan. 113, 114. Koch, i. 252, 253. Vaud. i. 325, 327.

(3) Varnhagen von Ense, Feldzug von Blucher, 274.

and, if he could not avert their calamities, to share their fate, he was unable to move a single step in advance, from his total want of cavalry, and the presence of Marmont with a corps of fifteen, which report had magnified to thirty thousand men, at Étoges, directly between him and his lieutenants. At length, however, Kleist and Kaptsevitch having arrived, and the remains of Olsoofief's corps and two regiments of cuirassiers having joined, he advanced to Étoges at the head of twenty thousand combatants, which Marmont evacuated at his approach, retiring towards Château-Thierry, where Napoléon lay with the main body of his forces. An interesting scene had occurred in that town on the preceding day. The inhabitants, on the night of the action in front of the town, after the combat of Montmirail, had been overwhelmed by a mass of fugitives in disorder, who vented their rage and vexation at their defeat by every species of pillage and rapine, which all the efforts of the Russian and Prussian officers had been unable to restrain. Proportionally vivid was their joy on the following morning, when the town was evacuated by the enemy, and the indignant inhabitants, yet smarting under the brutality to which they had been subjected, went out in crowds along the banks of the Marne to meet their deliverers. Men, women, and children laboured assiduously to restore the bridges which the Russians had destroyed in their retreat, and to reconstruct a passage to their own soldiers; and when at length the boats were collected, the planks laid, and the troops began to defile across, loud shouts rent the air, and a confuse multitude of all ages and both sexes, rushing forward, embraced with tears of joy the gallant warriors whose valour had delivered them from their oppressors (1).

Battle of
Vauchamps.
Feb. 14. Napoléon was no sooner informed of the advance of Blücher to Étoges, and thence towards Montmirail, than he set out from Château-Thierry on the evening of the 13th with his guards, and the greater part of his forces, and arrived at the latter town at eight on the morning of the 14th. Marmont had just evacuated, after considerable fighting, the village of VAUCHAMPS, and was retreating along the road to Montmirail, when the well-known ensigns of the guard were seen on the highway, and a powerful body of cuirassiers announced the presence of the Emperor! Instantaneous was the effect of this intelligence upon the spirit of the troops: it seemed as if the wand of a mighty enchanter had given an electric shock to every soldier on the field. Immediately the retreat was suspended: the cavalry, hurrying to the front, charged with boldness and rapidity; the skirmishers fell back, and gave place to deep columns of infantry, boldly advancing to the attack; the batteries were reinforced and fired with increased vivacity; aides-de-camp were seen galloping in all directions; and the air resounded with cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* It was now the Prussian general's turn to halt, and make his dispositions for defence. Zeithen, who headed the vanguard, was soon forced back in disorder upon the main body, which had barely time to form square when a numerous body of cavalry thundered upon it. The Prussian cuirassiers were speedily overthrown, and the dazzling line of horsemen, headed by Grouchy, swept round the squares on two sides: one was broken and made prisoners, but the others received them with a sustained rolling fire, and the charge was repulsed. As the increasing numbers, however, and augmented boldness of the enemy, left no doubt of the presence of the Emperor with an overwhelming superiority of force, Blücher felt the necessity of a retreat, and commenced it in squares (2), the artillery being placed in the intervals, with Kleist on the right and Kaptsevitch on the left.

(1) Lab. ii. 196, 197. Koch, i. 235, 236. Dan. (2) Dan. 116, 117. Lab. ii. 200, 201. Fain, 98, 115. Fain, 97. Plötho, iii. 185, 186. 99. Plötho, iii. 187, 188.

Glorious
retreat of
Blücher.
Feb. 14.

And now commenced a combat, which has shed as immortal a lustre on the steadiness of the Russian and Prussian troops, as the previous brilliant successes had secured for the French Emperor and army. The retreat was conducted along the high-road, which traverses a flat and open country, running in a straight line, as is usual in that part of France, between rows of lofty elms (1). On this *chaussée* the artillery retired, firing incessantly as it receded on the pursuers, while the squares of infantry marched abreast of it in the fields on either side. Slowly, and in perfect order, the Russian squares fell back without either hurry or disorder, as on a field-day at St.-Petersburg, and truly then appeared in their highest lustre the marvels of military discipline. In vain the French cuirassiers with devoted gallantry, and animated by the presence of the Emperor, swept round the steady walls of steel, and, approaching to the very edge of the bayonets, strove to force their way in, wherever the discharge of their cannon tore up a chasm, or the fall of the wounded presented an opening. Instantly closing to the centre, these noble veterans still preserved their array unbroken, and the squares, though sorely diminished, and leaving a stream of blood, flowing from the dead and the wounded, along their path, yet presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Entranced with the spectacle, Blücher, forgetting his own danger, gazed on the scene, and halting his horse, exclaimed, "See how my brave Russians fight!" Thus combating, they reached Champaubert; but after passing through that town, the danger thickened (2); and such were the perils with which they were beset, that the bravest almost gave themselves up to despair.

While the Russian troops were delayed by defiling through the narrow causeway of Champaubert, Napoléon, who had a body of seven thousand admirable horse at his command, had dispatched General Grouchy at the head of three thousand of the swiftest among them, by a circuit round the village; and, by great exertions, that indefatigable officer had so far outstripped the slower march of the Allied column, encumbered as it was by artillery and caissons, that he had gained the high-road two miles in advance, and was established in force on it before the Allies had extricated themselves from the houses. Meanwhile Generals Bordesoulle and St.-Germain closely followed the rear of the retreating column; and turning it on both flanks as it emerged into the meadows on the other side of the town, charged repeatedly, though without success, on three faces at once the now wearied and almost exhausted body. By a continued fire of cannon and musketry, however, the Allies succeeded in clearing the way through their constantly increasing enemies; and they had got to within half a mile of Etoges, where the danger would cease from the country being no longer practicable for cavalry, when all at once, on surmounting an eminence just as the sun set, they beheld Grouchy's horsemen drawn up in battle array before them, and his last rays glanced on the long line of cuirasses which, stretching far across the road on either side, seemed to present an impassable barrier to their further advance. At this appalling sight, the boldest held his breath in the Allied ranks—total defeat appeared to be inevitable—the mighty heart of Blücher shuddered at the thought, that not himself only, but the whole corps, with Prince Augustus of Prussia, were on the point of being made prisoners. "Let us die rather!" said that gallant prince, drawing his sword, and preparing to charge headlong upon the enemy. With mournful

(1) Personal observation.

(2) Dan. 116, 117. Varnhagen von Ense, 362. Vaud. i. 333. Koch, i. 260, 261.

resolution Blucher stood in the front of the squares, in hopes of falling before he witnessed the disgrace of his country. "If you should be killed here," said his aide-de-camp Nostitz, "do you really think history will praise you for it?" Struck with these words, the field-marshal turned his horse's head, and said to Gneisenau—"If I do not perish to-day, then am I destined to live long, and I still hope to repair all (1)."

That there was no hope, except in forcing their way through at the point of the bayonet, was evident to all, from the commander-in-chief to the meanest private; and worthy indeed of a hero were the means which Blucher took to effect it. He commanded the drums to beat, the colours to be displayed, and, with all the pomp and circumstance of war, the troops to bear down in a solid mass upon the enemy. Cheered by the martial sound, fresh vigour was inspired into the soldiers' breasts; the artillery and infantry opened such a fire in front, that the *chaussée* was cleared, and the weighty column, preceded by its guns, marched into the forest of sabres. Had the horse-artillery, which Grouchy had ordered to follow him, been able to keep pace with the cavalry, the whole column, with the commander-in-chief, must have been made prisoners, but it had stuck fast in the mud; the cavalry alone, without infantry or guns, was unable to withstand the shock, and the main body got through, with the commander-in-chief, Prince Augustus, and their whole staff. Enraged, however, at seeing their prey thus escaping them, Grouchy's horsemen closed on either side with such fury on the last squares, which had exhausted their ammunition, that several were broken, two Russian battalions cut to pieces, and two Prussian regiments made prisoners. The Russian horse-artillery were in the most imminent danger; but their commander, Colonel Shusherin, formed the cannoniers in line, and, headed by Blucher, charged, sword in hand, right through the French cavalry, and got clear off. At length the wearied and bleeding column reached Etoges, where it was hoped rest and safety would be found; but there fresh combats awaited it. At ten at night, after it was quite dark, Marmont, at the head of his corps, which was comparatively fresh, suddenly commenced an attack on General Udom's brigade, which was reposing near the entrance of the town, broke it during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, and took several guns. Following up his success, the French marshal pushed on amidst frightful confusion, and a second time the Allies found the line of their retreat to Bergères interrupted. But despair gave them almost supernatural strength. Firing and manœuvring were out of the question. In deep masses, and with loud hurrahs, they rushed upon the enemy, trampled them under foot, and, marching over their bodies, arrived at midnight at Bergères. The pursuit was now at end: order was in some degree restored to the regiments; and, after a few hours' rest, the retreat was continued to Châlons, where the remains of this once splendid array arrived on the evening of the 15th, and at length found repose under cover of the Marne (2).

Results of the action. In this terrible combat, Blucher, whose force at the commencement of the action did not exceed twenty thousand soldiers, lost seven thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, or above a third of the troops engaged, fifteen guns, and eight standards. The prisoners, in number about two thousand five hundred, were almost entirely Prussians; for though several Russian squares were pierced through, and a dreadful

(1) Dan. 117, 118. Lab. ii. 200, 202. Plotoh, iii. 188, 190. Koch, i. 260, 262. Beauch. i. 280, 282. (2) Dan. 118, 119. Koch, i. 261, 265. Beauch. i. 282, 284. Plotoh, iii. 188, 190. Lab. ii. 202, 204.

loss sustained by them under the French sabres, hardly a man was taken; the Muscovites sternly combating to the very last, even when their ranks were broken, and further resistance in a military point of view was unavail-

ing. The French loss did not exceed twelve hundred men. After the battle the remains of the army of Silesia converged together from Châlons and Château-Thierry, behind the shelter of the Marne, and collected their shattered bands in cantonments on the north-east of that river, but weakened by the loss of full twenty thousand men since Napoléon's fatal irruption had commenced, six days before, from the side of Sezanne (1).

Napoléon
crosses
over to the
valley of
the Seine.

The night after the battle of Vauchamps, Napoléon returned to Montmirail, where he slept; and deeming nothing done while any thing remained to do, instead of giving repose to his wearied troops, which had now marched and fought for six days incessantly, he sent advices to Victor and Oudinot, that he would debouche on the following day in the valley of the Seine in their rear, by Guignes. The extreme badness of the cross roads, from the valley of the Marne to that of the Seine, having rendered this impossible by the direct line, he left his other troops in the neighbourhood of Château-Thierry and Montmirail, to watch the broken remains of the army of Silesia; and he himself, with his faithful guards and

cuirassiers, whom nothing could exhaust, took the route of Meaux, from whence on the following morning he turned to the left, and moved on

Guignes, through the forest of Brie, by the *chaussée* of Fontenay. Meanwhile all Paris was thrown into transports of joy, by the successive arrival of couriers, who brought intelligence of the victories of Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps; the bulletins, which exaggerated these glorious successes, diffused an universal enehantment; the genius of the Emperor seemed to have restored the days of Arcola and Rivoli; while a long column of seven thousand prisoners, taken in these combats, who were conducted along the Boulevards, preceded by military music and almost triumphal pomp, gave confirmation strong of the reality of the Emperor's achievements (2).

Occupation
of Troyes
by the Al-
lied arms.
Feb. 7.

While these memorable events were in progress on the banks of the Marne, changes, attended in the end with still more important consequences, were taking place on the shores of the Seine. The Allied sovereigns had made their entry into Troyes on the 7th of February, without resistance, a few hours after Napoléon with his troops had left it. Although the ancient capital of Champagne had much declined, under the government of Napoléon, from its former splendour, when it had forty thousand souls within its walls, and could not now boast of above twenty thousand inhabitants; yet its occupation was of the highest importance, both for the physical necessities and moral influence of the Allied arms. Not only had the town itself considerable resources, especially for the sick and wounded, whose number was now very considerable in their army; but being the centre where all the roads and communications of the province met, or intersected each other, it afforded the most valuable facilities for the procuring of provisions, which the concourse of such prodigious bodies of men and horses had now rendered a matter of very considerable difficulty, even in the heart of France. While the advanced guard of this army, consisting chiefly of the Wirtemburghers and Bavarians under Wrede, defiled along the road to Paris, on the traces of Napoléon, the bulk of their army, which was now concentrated together, passed through the town for twelve hours together, exhibit-

(1) Ploto, iii. 190. Dan 119. Koch, i. 264.

(2) Koch, i. 267, 270 Fain, 100, 104. Dan. 120, 121.

ing a stupendous proof of the strength of the Allied forces; for at the end of that time, independent of two corps which were pursuing the French, a hundred thousand men were encamped around the walls of Troyes (1).

Commence- But the entrance of the Allied armies into this city was followed
ment of a
movement
in favour
of the
Bourbons. by a political movement of still higher importance, and which, in the end, exercised a most important influence on the fortunes of the Revolution, and the ultimate fate of Napoléon. It was here that the first movement in favour of the RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS took place.

Extraordi- Twenty-one years had now elapsed since the blood of Louis XVI
nary obli- had flowed on the Place Louis XV, and England, amidst the storm
vion of a
movement
in favour
of the
Bourbons. of indignation excited by his fate, had been drawn unwillingly into the contest; and such had been the whirl of events which had immediately succeeded, and such the pressing interest of the glories and catastrophes which had since occurred, that the recollection of that illustrious race had almost been lost in France, and their name had disappeared from the page of European history. The ancient loyalty of the monarchy, indeed, still burned in the bosoms of a few highly-descended nobles in other parts of the empire, and in many generous breasts in all classes in la Vendée; and the clergy in great part still nursed in secret a predilection for the ancient race, as for the ancient faith; but the young and active part of the population, almost all who could influence thought or determine action, had been whirled, willingly or unwillingly, into the vortex of the Revolution. An entire generation of the ancient nobles had expired under the edge of the guillotine, perished amidst the horrors of the revolutionary prisons, or melted away, amidst poverty and oblivion, in foreign lands. Warm as had been the sympathy, generous the hospitality, with which the emigrants had been at first received in every part of Europe, and especially in England, the rapidity of subsequent events, the intensity of subsequent interests, had been such that they were now in a great measure forgotten. Numbers of them had taken advantage of the amnesty of Napoléon to return to their beloved country, not a few had yielded to the seductions of his antechambers, and settled down in the Tuileries under the shadow of the imperial, as they had done under the royal, *régime*. Above all, the total destruction of their properties had deprived them of almost all influence both at home and abroad; for although the sufferings of those who have been the victims of spoliation may at first excite a warm feeling of indignation, yet it insensibly gives way in process of time to the experienced inconvenience of relieving their necessities. It is rare to see a feeling of pity which can long survive repeated demands for money. The general irreligion and consequent selfishness of all the more elevated or influential classes in France, both before and since the Revolution, had deprived the cause of ancient loyalty of its only source of lasting support—a sense of duty springing from obligations superior to this world. Thus, though there were still many Royalists, especially in the provincial towns of France, they were wholly powerless as a political party; they were regarded by the active and energetic portion of the people, rather as a respectable relic of the olden time, than as a body which could ever again rise to power in the state; and it may safely be affirmed, that without external aid the cause of the Restoration was hopeless in France, unless possibly from the suffering produced by a long course of disastrous revolutions.

Notwithstanding all this, however, a certain organization in favour of the

(1) Lab. ii. 170, 172. Beauch. i. 228, 230. Cap. x. 382, 383.

Royalist organization existing in France. exiled family had throughout all the Revolution existed in the country, and it had recently acquired greater vigour and efficiency from the unexampled disasters which seemed to threaten the imperial dynasty with ruin. The principal ramifications of this quiescent conspiracy, as might naturally have been expected, were to be found in la Vendée, Brittany, and in the south of France; but it was not without its leaders and adherents in the capital. There some of the principal partizans of the Revolution, true to the polar star of worldly ambition, were anxiously watching the progress of events; and without as yet engaging in any overt act against the reigning dynasty, were secretly preparing to abandon their principles and their benefactor, and range themselves on the side of whatever party might appear likely to gain the ascendancy in the crisis which was approaching. The vast fabric of Napoléon's power, based on the selfish passions, and strengthened by the gales of worldly success, was already beginning to break up, even in its centre, on the approach of adversity. But independent of these discreditable, though powerful allies, a noble band of elevated and generous spirits, alike untainted by the crimes and unseduced by the allurements of the Revolution, were bound together by the secret bond of fidelity to misfortune. Their number, indeed, as might be expected in a selfish and irreligious age, was small; but their courage was great, their constancy respectable, and their power in a crisis might be expected to be far beyond what their physical strength or political influence would have prognosticated. The proceedings of this Royalist association at Bordeaux were under the direction of M. Taffard de S.-Germain, and included the heads of many of the noblest families in the south and west of France, especially the Duke de Duras, M. Adrien de Montmorency, M. de la Rochejaquelein, and M. de la Ville de Beaugé; while the committee in Paris embraced the Dukes de Fitzjames and De la Tremouille, M. Polignac, and M. Sosthène de la Rochefoucault. Though this Royalist confederacy subsisted in secret throughout all the changes of the Revolution, the consulate, and the Empire, yet its proceedings had never assumed an active character till the misfortunes of Napoléon, and the retreat of the imperial armies across the Rhine, afforded a prospect of a speedy political revolution. Then active conferences commenced in profound secret at the Chateau d'Ussé in Touraine, a seat of the Duke de Duras; while the Duke de Fitzjames, and other leaders at Paris, entered the National Guard of that capital, which the Emperor had recently called out, to be in a situation to take advantage of any crisis that might be approaching (1).

Fortunes of Louis XVIII and Count d'Artois during this time. While the Royalist party, during the long and dreary years of revolutionary ascendancy, were thus in silence adhering to their principles, and waiting the return of more prosperous fortune, the exiled prince, afterwards Louis XVIII, retired from one place of asylum to another as the French power advanced, till at length he was entirely driven from the continent of Europe, and forced to take refuge on the British shores. He had, in the first instance, after dwelling a few months at Hamm, established himself with his court of emigrants at Verona, where he assumed the title of Regent of France; and his proceedings were mainly under the direction of a zealous and indefatigable royalist, the Count d'Entraigues. Meanwhile the Count d'Artois was at St.-Petersburg, where his credit was so high with the Empress Catharine, that the regency was recognised, and he received a splendid sword from her majesty, with the hope "that it might open him the gates of France, as it had done to his ancestor Henry IV."

(1) Beauch. ii. 44, 47. Cap. i. 262. Hist. de la Restauration, i. 262, 264.

1793. The Count d'Artois, however, was a generous man, but not a soldier or the leader of an army; he showed so little zeal in the cause, that a project, which at one period had been agitated, of entrusting to him the command of thirty thousand Russians, to act on the coast of la Vendée, was abandoned; and he returned to London, where he sold the sword for L. 4000, and distributed the price among the most necessitous of his companions in misfortune. Subsequently, the reluctance which that prince evinced to put himself at the head of the expedition to Quiberon Bay, and his return from Isle-Dieu, without landing, to England, contributed powerfully to the disasters of that ill-fated enterprise, and called forth the loudest complaints from the gallant Chouan chiefs (1).

Subsequent migrations of the Royal Family. Meanwhile, Louis XVIII, under the name of the Count de Lille, lived frugally and in retirement at Verona, until the near approach of Napoléon's victorious arms, in 1796, obliged him to quit the territories of the republic, which he did after having in vain solicited the suit of armour which Henry IV, had presented to the Senate of Venice. He afterwards established himself at Blanckenbourg, where various efforts were made, which have already been mentioned, without success, to induce Buonaparte to play the part of General Monk, and facilitate the restoration of the royal family to the throne of France. The implication of the royalists, however, in the conspiracy of the club of Clichy, in 1797 (2), rendered it necessary for Louis XVIII to retire further from the wrath of the enraged republicans; and he withdrew to Mittau in Livonia, where he enjoyed a pension of 200,000 roubles, or L. 25,000, a-year, from the Emperor Paul, which sufficed for the expenses of the exiled court. He was here joined by the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, the former of whom had served with credit in the royalist corps of the prince of Condé, while the latter brought to that distant solitude the recollection of the Temple, and the sympathy and commiseration of all Europe. The sudden and unlooked-for conversion, however, of the sickle Paul to the alliance of the First Consul, immediately brought about a rigorous order to the august exiles to quit the Russian dominions in the depth of winter. They sought refuge in Prussia, where they were only admitted as private individuals; while, during the whole time, the Count d'Artois remained in the asylum he had obtained from the British government, in the palace of Holyrood-house, at Edinburgh. Louis XVIII subsequently passed into Sweden, where he issued from Calmar, on the shores of the Baltic, a solemn protest, which has been already given, against the assumption of the imperial dignity by Napoléon (3). He returned, on the breaking out of the war between Russia and France in 1805, to his former residence at Mittau; but the peace of Tilsit, and subjection of Russia to the influence of France, having rendered that asylum no longer secure, he resolved to seek a last refuge on the British shores, and for that purpose embarked, with the whole royal family except the Count d'Artois, who was already at Holyrood, on board the Swedish frigate Fraya, and reached Yarmouth in the middle of August 1807 (4).

His reception and establishment in Great Britain.

The arrival of the illustrious exiles threw the British cabinet into some perplexity. Not that they had the slightest hesitation as to giving them that refuge in misfortune which it is at once the first

(1) Cap. Hist. de la Restauration, i. 63, 71.

"Sire! The cowardice of your brother has ruined all. He could not appear on this coast but to lose or save every thing. His return to England has decided our fate. Nothing remains for us now but to die in vain for your majesty."—CHABRETTE to

LOUIS XVIII, 14th July 1795. CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, i. 89.

(2) *Ante*, iii. 178.

(3) *Ante*, iv. 353.

(4) Cap. i. 172, 195.

duty and noblest privilege of an independent state to extend to suffering innocence; but that the *character* in which they were to be received involved an important question, which had never been fairly mooted since the commencement of the war, and the decision of which might exercise an important influence upon its ultimate issue, as well as the unanimity with which it was now prosecuted by the British nation. This was nothing less than the question—whether the object of the war was to effect the restoration of the Bourbons to the French throne, or simply to provide security and maintain independence for the British nation? If the Count de Lille was recognised and treated as Louis XVIII, king of France, it would involve the British government either in an interminable war with Napoléon, or the abandonment of a sovereign whose title they had expressly and solemnly recognised; and it would afford the opposition a pretext, of which they would gladly avail themselves, for representing the war, not as one of defence and necessity on the part of England, but of aggression and injustice, to force upon France a dynasty, of which the majority of the nation disapproved. There appeared also not a little inconsistency in a nation which had itself assumed the right of choosing its rulers, now denying that right to another; and in the descendants of the house of Brunswick proclaiming to the world their recognition of the indefeasible right of that of Bourbon. Above all, it was of importance not to change the object of the war, which never had been to force a government upon an unwilling people, but solely to prevent that people from forcing one upon its neighbours; not to create a crusade for legitimacy, but to stop one for revolution. Influenced by these considerations, the majority of the British cabinet, after an anxious deliberation which lasted three days, ranged themselves on the side of Mr. Canning, who resisted the recognition of the illustrious stranger as king; and by a cabinet minute he was informed, that he should receive a secure and honourable asylum in Great Britain, but that he must not expect an express acknowledgment of his title to the throne (4).

Louis XVIII lands, and remains in England. Louis XVIII accordingly resided in England till the fall of Napoléon as a private but illustrious individual, and largely participated in the hospitality which its nobles and people have ever bestowed upon greatness in misfortune. He at first dwelt in Gosfield Hall, a seat of the Duke of Buckingham, where he was soon after joined by the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, and the Duke de Berry: but, in 1810, he quitted that residence for Hartwell, another seat of the same noble family, where he remained till the restoration. The Count d'Artois, meanwhile, continued to sojourn with a small suite at the ancient palace of Holyrood-house, Edinburgh. By a singular coincidence, but strongly descriptive of the vicissitudes of time, the heir-apparent to the French throne, and who afterwards mounted it only to feel the bitterness of royalty, spent the long and dreary years of exile in the ancient seat of the Stuart family, in the towers which had witnessed the distresses of Mary, the most beautiful queen of France, and the most unfortunate of the queens in Britain; and in the halls where fortune for a brief period had cast upon Charles Edward, when contending

(1) Cap. i 194, 195. Ann. Reg. 1808, 274.

"If the chief of the Bourbon family consents to live amongst us in a manner suitable to his actual situation, he will find a secure and honourable asylum; but we are too well aware of the necessity of securing for the war in which we are engaged, the unanimous support of the English people, to do any thing that might endanger the popularity

which has hitherto attended the war. By recognising Louis XVIII as king, we should only offer a favourable occasion to the enemies of the government, to accuse it of introducing foreign interests into a war, of which the object is purely British security."—*Cabinet Minute*, August 27, 1808. Given in CAPEFIGUE, i. 195.

on the principle of legitimacy, with the aid of a gallant people, for the throne of his fathers, the splendours of royal elevation and the sunbeam of chivalrous devotion (1).

General
movement
of the
Royalists
in France.

But how unwarlike soever the dispositions of the Bourbon princes might be, and seriously as they might prefer the pacific retreats of Hartwell and Holyrood to the cares and the honours of royalty, the time at length arrived when it was no longer possible for them to remain in privacy; and when, willing or unwilling, they were of necessity forced into action. The approach of the Allied armies to the Rhine—the passage of that river, and successful invasion of the eastern departments—the establishment of Wellington in the southern states of France, both roused into activity the dormant flame of loyalty in the provinces, and loudly called for the appearance of one or more princes of the royal blood on the soil of the monarchy, to combine the scattered efforts of its adherents, and assert the pretensions of the exiled family to the throne. Moreau had been looked to by them as a second Pichegru: proclamations were prepared to be addressed by him on the Rhine to Napoléon's soldiers: his death was regarded at Hartwell as the greatest calamity which had been sustained by them since the execution of Louis XVI. At the moment when the Allied armies crossed the Rhine, Louis XVIII addressed a proclamation to the senate, calling on them to co-operate with him in overturning the tyranny of Napoléon; and circulated widely a secret address among all persons in authority whose dispositions were thought to be favourable—a letter, in which, like a man who knew the character of the persons with whom he had to deal, he spoke little of honour or loyalty, but much of titles, dignities, and offices to be preserved, and injuries forgot (2). Application was at the same time made to the British government for the Bourbon princes to be permitted to join the different armies on the French territory; and the Cabinet of St.-James's, after much deliberation, proceeding from a desire to do nothing which might indicate a disposition to coerce the wishes of the French people in the choice of their government, granted them permission to go, but as simple volunteers only. The current of events, however, ran too strongly to be arrested by these prudential measures, how judicious soever they may have been; the princes set out under this permission, restricted as it was: the Comte d'Artois left Holyrood-house, and landed at Rotterdam on the 2d of February; from whence he proceeded towards the headquarters of the Allied armies, by Bâle, Vesoul, and Langres: the Duke d'Angoulême embarked for Spain, to join the headquarters of Wellington in the south of France, to be in readiness to take advantage of any royalist movements that might occur in that quarter; while the Duke de Berry set sail for Jersey, to be at hand, in case of the outbreak of a royalist insurrection, which was thought to be in preparation in Brittany and la Vendée (3).

It was at this critical moment that the Allied monarchs entered Troyes, and for the first time were brought in contact with the Royalists of France.

(1) Cap. i. 180. 196.

(2) "The king, availing himself of every opportunity of making known to his subjects the sentiments with which he is animated, has charged me to give in his name to ——— all the assurances which he can desire. His majesty is well aware how much ——— has in his power, not only in endeavouring to shake off the yoke which oppresses him, but in seconding one day, by his intelligence, the authority destined to repair such a multitude of evils. The promises of the king are nothing but

the consequences of the engagements he has undertaken in the face of Europe, which are—to forget the errors of his subjects, to recompense services, still the resentments, legitimize rank, consolidate fortunes; to bring about, in short, nothing but an easy transition from present calamities and alarms, to future tranquillity and happiness." LE COMTE BLACAS. Hartwell, 1st Dec. 1813.—See CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de la Restauration*, i. 250.

(3) Cap. Hist. de la Restauration, i. 249, 253. Beauch. i. 40-54,

Interview
of the
Royalist
leaders at
Troyes with
Alexander.

In common with all its other provinces, the few remaining adherents of the ancient *régime* had received a great impulse in that city, which was the residence of the principal Royalist families of the east of France, from the rapid progress of the Allied arms. The retreat of Napoléon towards Paris after the disastrous battle of La Rothière, seemed to presage, by universal consent, his approaching fall. Several Royalist gentlemen, resolved to commence the movement, accordingly assumed the white cockade after the Allies entered Troyes, and earnestly solicited an interview Feb. 11. with the Emperor Alexander, which was at length granted. The Marquis of Widranges and M. Goualt were the persons who spoke on the occasion; they had suspended on their breasts the cross of St.-Louis and white cockade, the wearing of which was forbidden in the empire under pain of death. "We entreat your Majesty," said they, "in the name of all the respectable inhabitants of Troyes, to accept with favour the wish which we form for the re-establishment of the royal house of Bourbon on the throne of France." "Gentlemen," replied Alexander, "I receive you with pleasure; I wish well to your cause, but I fear your proceedings are rather premature. The chances of war are uncertain, and I should be grieved to see brave men like you compromised or sacrificed. We do not come ourselves to give a king to France; we desire to know its wishes, and to leave it to declare itself." "But it will never declare itself as long as it is under the knife," replied the Marquis,—“never as long as Buonaparte shall be in authority in France will Europe be tranquil.” “It is for that very reason,” replied the Czar, “that the first thing we must think of is to beat him—to beat him—to beat him.” Alexander’s humane prudence would appear to have been inspired by the spirit of foresight on this occasion; for the day on which this conversation occurred at Troyes was the very one which was marked by the catastrophe at Champaubert. The Marquis Widranges, disappointed in his hopes of obtaining a declaration in favour of the Bourbons from the Allied sovereigns, went on to Bâle, where he joined the Count d’Artois, while M. Goualt, unhappily for himself, remained at Troyes. At the same time a person styling himself St.-Vincent, but who in reality was the Marquis de Vitrolles, one of the most devoted adherents of the ancient dynasty, arrived at the Allied headquarters, bearing credentials, setting forth that he was entirely worthy of confidence, from persons high in authority in Paris, and entreating the monarchs to advance rapidly to the capital. But the issue was still too doubtful in the theatre of arms, and the divisions of the diplomatists too wide in the cabinet, to permit of any decided step being yet taken by the Allied sovereigns in favour of the Royalist cause (1).

Operations
of the Allied
Grand
Army on
the Seine.

While the cause of the restoration in France was thus rather adjourned than damped, by the prudent ambiguity of the monarchs at Troyes, operations of a tardy and indecisive character, but still attended with important effects, had taken place on the side of the grand army, on the banks of the Seine. Instead of pushing military operations with vigour, and following closely the army of Napoléon down the Seine, Schwartzemberg, acting under the directions of his cabinet, which was desirous, above all things, to gain time and avoid precipitating matters against Napoléon till the throne was at all events secured for his descendants, put the main body of his army into cantonments, contenting

(1) Cap. i. 256, 259. Dan. 78. Beauch. i. 240, 246. Köch, i. 205.

himself with sending forward the corps of Wittgenstein and Wrede to follow on the traces of the retreating French. From Troyes to Paris, one road goes by Sens, Montargis, Nemours, and Fontainebleau, by the left bank of the Seine the whole way. But Napoléon having retired by the right bank, or eastern side of that river, it was necessary for the pursuing army, if it proposed to keep its wings abreast on both banks, and keep on the trace of the retreating army, to force the passage of the Seine at Nogent, Bray, or Montereau, the only points below Troyes on the road towards Paris where there are stone bridges capable of affording a secure passage to artillery: all these bridges were in possession of the French, and strongly guarded; Oudinot and Victor lay on the opposite bank, after the departure of Napoléon, with twenty-two thousand men, a body which was, however, fast increasing by conscripts hurried up from Paris. But such was the superiority of the Allied forces, that these inconsiderable bodies of men could not have stood a day before them, if they had pressed on in good earnest for the French capital (1).

Advance of
the Allies to
Montereau
and Fon-
tainebleau,
Feb. 11.

At length, having allowed his troops to repose four days around Troyes, to the infinite annoyance of Alexander, who burned with anxiety to push the war with vigour, Schwartzberg, on the 11th, gathered up his gigantic limbs, and put his columns in motion to follow up the enemy. The Prince of Wirtemberg took Sens by assault after a sharp conflict; and, on the same day, General Hardegg, with the vanguard of Wrede's corps, attacked the rear of the enemy near Romilly, and drove him into Nogent, which was stormed, after a most gallant resistance, by General Bourmont, and evacuated next day, after the bridge

over the Seine had been destroyed. The prisoners made in these conflicts having given the important information that Napoléon, with the main body of his forces, had diverged towards Sezanne, in the direction of Blucher's army, and that an inconsiderable cordon of troops alone remained in his front, Schwartzberg resolved to act with more vigour. He accor-

dingly, next day, crossed the corps of the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg and General Bianchi (who had succeeded Prince Colloredo in the command of his corps in consequence of the prince having been disabled on the 6th by a wound) over the Seine at Bray and Pont-sur-Seine, and moved them upon Provins and Montereau. The establishment of these powerful corps in that quarter, where there was no force of any magnitude to oppose them, led to the most important results, and showed how speedily the war, at this period, might have been terminated by a vigorous

Feb. 14
and 15.

and concerted movement of the whole Allied forces. Moret was occupied next day: Nemours was taken by Platoff, with a whole battalion: Seslavin, with his light horse, made himself master of Montargis, and pushed on his advanced post to the gates of Orleans: the palace and forest of Fontainebleau fell into the hands of the Cossacks: Auxerre was taken by assault, and its garrison, which endeavoured to cut its way through the attacking force, put to the sword. The whole plain between the Seine and the Loire was inundated with the enemy's light troops, which already showed themselves beyond Fontainebleau on the road to the capital. Montereau was strongly occupied by the Austrians, while Schwartzberg's headquarters were advanced to Nogent, between which and Bray the immense reserves of the Allied grand army were placed. Paris was in consternation: already the reserve parks and heavy baggage of Victor had

(1) Dan. 94, 95. Koch. i. 279, 282. Burgh, 123, 124. Jom. iv. 538, 539.

reached Charenton, within a few miles of its gates; the peasants of the vast plain of La Brie, flying to the capital, reported that uncouth hordes with long beards, armed with lances, cut down trees on the sides of the highways, and roasted oxen and sheep whole, over fires kindled with their wood, which they devoured half raw; and fame, magnifying the approaching danger, already announced that two hundred thousand Tartars and Calmucks were approaching to sack and lay waste the metropolis of science and the arts (1).

Junction of the army of Napoléon with Victor and Oudinot. Feb. 16. Such was the alarming state of affairs to the south of the capital, when Napoléon, at the head of his indefatigable guards and cuirassiers, came across to the valley of the Seine, by Guignes, through the forest of Brie. The advanced guard of this array found the roads covered with waggons converging from all quarters towards the capital, filled with the trembling inhabitants, who were flying before the Cossacks. Instantly the living loads were disburdened; the waggons filled with the soldiers, or laid aside, and their horses harnessed to the guns; and every horse and man that could be pressed from the adjacent villages, attached to the vehicles to hurry them forward. It was full time. The plain of La Brie was covered with fire and smoke; the retiring columns under Victor and Oudinot, severely pressed by the enemy, were straining every nerve to preserve the cross road to Châlons, by which Napoléon had promised to arrive; but so great was the superiority of the enemy, that it was doubtful whether they could maintain their ground for another hour, in which event the junction of the two armies would have been rendered impossible. No sooner were the well-known standards of the cuirassiers seen, than a loud shout announced the arrival of the Emperor; cries of *Vive l'Empereur* ran, like an electric shock, along the line; the retreat was stopped at all points; already the retiring columns were preparing to turn on their pursuers; while the Allies, sensible, from the change, of the presence of Napoléon, instantly became as cautious and circumspect as they had recently before been confident and audacious. Wearied with their unexampled exertions, the troops were halted where they had thus checked the advance of the enemy; soon the soldiers sunk into sleep on the very ground where they stood, and the headquarters of the Emperor were established in the village of Guignes, where he passed the night (2).

Advance of Napoléon, and combat of Nangis. Feb. 17. In the course of the night, and early on the following morning, large reinforcements joined the French headquarters from the army of Spain. The arrival of these bronzed veterans, upon whose steadiness perfect reliance could be placed, and the successive coming up of the corps which had inflicted such wounds on the army of Silesia, enabled the Emperor, on the following morning, to resume the offensive at the head of fifty-five thousand men. Orders were given to the troops to collect bread for three days' march; the knowledge that they were about to resume the offensive under the direction of Napoléon, coupled with their marvellous successes over the army of Silesia, had restored all their wonted enthusiasm to the soldiers; they marched as to assured victory. By daybreak, the forward movement commenced at all points. Oudinot, supported by Kellerman's dragoons, pressed on the retiring columns of Wittgenstein, in the direction of Nogent; Macdonald advanced towards Bray; Gérard pushed the Bavarians with the utmost vigour back on Villeneuve,

(1) Koch, i. 286, 291. Beauch. i. 294, 308. Burgh. 138, 139. Dan. 134, 135.

(2) Fain, 102, 103. Dan. 148. Lab. ii. 217, 218. Koch. i. 300, 305.

le Comte, and *Donne Marie*; while Victor was dispatched towards *Montereau*, with orders to make himself master of its important bridge over the *Seine* that very night. Count *Pahlen*, who was at *Mormant*, with *Wittgenstein's* advanced guard, consisting of three thousand infantry and eighteen hundred horse, was now in a most hazardous situation; for he was well aware he would be the first victim of the French Emperor's furious attack, and yet his orders were to remain where he was, as the arrival of *Napoléon* on the *Seine* had never been contemplated. In this extremity he remained all night under arms, resolved to give battle to the last extremity. Shortly after daybreak the tempest was upon him, and he began slowly, and in the best order, to retreat towards *Nangis*, the infantry in squares, with the horse and some weak regiments of *Cossacks* and a few guns to protect the flanks and rear (1).

For two hours the retreat was conducted with perfect regularity, notwithstanding the incessant fire of the French horse artillery, and attacks of their cavalry; but at length the assaults became more frequent, and the veteran cuirassiers under *Millaud*, who had just come up from *Spain*, burning with desire to restore the lustre of their arms, charged on three sides at once with such vehemence, that the cavalry were entirely routed, the guns taken, and the infantry broken. The defeat was now irretrievable; so complete was the disorder, that *Wittgenstein* himself, who came up with reinforcements, was swept away by the torrent, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Eleven guns and forty caissons were captured, and two thousand one hundred men were made prisoners, besides nine hundred who fell on the field of battle. So complete was the destruction of some of the Russian regiments, that that of *Silenguinsk*, which was not broken till after it had gallantly repulsed repeated charges of cavalry, alone lost one thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men; and it, with that of *Revel*, which suffered nearly as much, ceased to exist, and were marked in the muster rolls as "sent to *Plotsk* to be recruited." Yet though deeply affected by such a chasm in his devoted followers, *Alexander* retained no rancour towards *Pahlen*; and seeing him for the first time at the barrier of *Paris* after the combat, said to him—"You think I am angry with you; but I know you were not in fault." The field of battle presented a striking proof of the profound and wide-spread excitement which this terrible contest had awakened throughout the world; for it showed the bodies of the hardy steeds of *Tartary*, and the fiery coursers of *Andalusia*, which had fallen in combat almost under the walls of *Paris* (2).

Pursuit of
the Bava-
rians to the
bridge of
Montereau.
Feb. 17.

While this bloody combat was occurring under the eye of *Napoléon* on the left, the *Bavarians* in the centre rapidly retreated from their position at *Villeneuve-le-Comte*; and such was the fatigue of the cavalry of the imperial guard, which was intrusted with their pursuit, that they were unable to follow them. *Oudinot*, however and *Macdonald*, pressed vigorously on *Hardegg's* corps, which also fell back, and took many prisoners and a large quantity of baggage. Victor, following up the *Bavarians*, came upon the division posted on the heights of *Valjouan*. They were immediately attacked in the most vigorous manner in front by General *Gérard*, and in rear by *Bordesoulle*, and soon broken. Nothing but the failure of General *Lhéritier*, who neglected to charge the fugitives, as he might have done, when first thrown into disorder, preserved

(1) *Dau.* 150, 151. *Koch.* i. 310, 313. *Lab.* i. 218, 219. *Fain.* 104. *Vaud.* i. 377, 379.

(2) *Vaud.* i. 377, 379. *Koch.* i. 311, 313. *Lab.* i. 218, 219. *Dau.* 152, 153.

the Bavarian division from total ruin—as it was, they only made their escape in the greatest disorder, and after sustaining a very considerable loss. Such, however, was the exhaustion of Victor's troops from the excessive fatigue which they had lately undergone, that he was unable to follow out his directions, by making himself master of the town and bridge of Montereau; in consequence of which, the Bavarians, who had rallied under the protection of some squadrons of Schwartzberg's hulans, effected their retreat across the Seine at that place, though weakened by the loss of two thousand five hundred men. The enemy occupied in force the town of MONTEREAU, and the castle of Surville, which commanded the bridge. Their troops consisted of two Austrian divisions under Bianchi, and the Wirtemburghers, in all about eighteen thousand men (1).

The Allies propose an armistice. When Schwartzberg was made acquainted, which he was on the evening of the 17th, with these disasters which had befallen the two corps of Wittgenstein and Wrede, which had been pushed across the Seine, he immediately summoned a council of war, which was attended by the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia. It was evident to all that the misfortunes had been owing to the separation of the army of Silesia from the grand army; it was resolved therefore, as soon as possible, to reunite them in the direction of Troyes, and give battle in front of that town. For this purpose orders were given to fall back at all points, while Blucher was directed, as soon as his troops were in a condition to resume offensive operations, to incline to his left, so as to facilitate the proposed junction. At the period, principally to gain time, a flag of truce was dispatched from the Allied headquarters to Napoléon (2), to say that they were surprised at the offensive movement made by the French army, as they had agreed to the terms of peace proposed by Caulaincourt at Châtillon, and had given orders to their plenipotentiaries to sign the preliminaries accordingly, and they proposed in consequence an immediate suspension of hostilities.

Napoléon rises in his demands at the Congress, and tries to negotiate separately with Austria. Colonel Parr, who bore the flag of truce from the Allied headquarters, arrived at those of Napoléon late on the night of the 17th. The circumstance of the Allies proposing terms of accommodation after these defeats, coupled with the fact of a letter having been written by the Empress Marie-Louise to her father, determined him to seize the opportunity of opening a communication direct with the Emperor Francis. The Council of State, which had assembled at Paris to deliberate on the terms offered at Châtillon, which will immediately be considered, had been, with the exception of one voice, unanimously of opinion that they should be accepted. Napoléon, however, had always determined in his own mind to make the negotiation entirely dependent on the progress of military events, and he, accordingly, gave the strongest injunctions to Caulaincourt, however near he might come to the point, to avoid committing himself to any treaty without his special authority. The successes at Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, had entirely confirmed him in these ideas; and the very night the first advantage was gained, he had written to Caulaincourt to try and gain time, and, above all things, to *sign nothing*. His recent successes still further elevated his hopes, and he wrote from Nangis to the Emperor of Austria on the same night, that he was extremely anxious to enter into a negotiation; but that, after the brilliant advantages he had gained, he now looked for more favourable terms than

(1) Vaud. i. 315, 318. Koch, i. 315, 318. Flo-
tho, iii. 212, 214. Burgh. 141, 142.

(2) Burgh, 143. Dan. 154. Koch, i. 319. Fain,
105.

had been proposed at Châtillon; while to Caulaincourt he at the same time wrote that the *carte blanche* he had formerly received was merely to save Paris, which appeared to be endangered after the battle of La Rothière; but that extraordinary successes had since been gained; that the necessity no longer existed; and, in consequence, his extraordinary powers were recalled, and henceforth the negotiation would pursue its ordinary course. Having done this, he resolved to delay for some days closing with the Allied advances towards an armistice, and to follow up with the utmost vigour the tide of success which was now setting in in his favour (1).

Description of Montereau. Situated twenty leagues to the south of Paris, at the confluence of the Seine and the Yonne, the town of Montereau presents one of the most agreeable objects in France to the gaze of the traveller. The part which lies on the left bank of the Yonne, which is the most considerable, is joined to the right bank by a bridge of stone. Another bridge, famous for having been the theatre of the murder of the Duke of Burgundy in 1419, unites the opposite banks of the Seine. These two rivers, which unite at Montereau, with the numerous barks which carry on their active navigation, give the town a gay and joyous aspect, which is increased by the smiling appearance of the vineyards and meadows which adjoin it on the south and east, and the country houses and villas which glitter around it in the sun. The traveller who approaches from the side of Paris involuntarily halts on the summit of the heights of Surville, which overhang the town on the northern bank, to gaze on the lovely scene which lies spread out, like a map, beneath his feet; he would do well to remember, that there, beside the little cross adjacent to the chateau, stood Napoléon during the LAST, and not the least brilliant of his many victories. On the evening of the 18th, the French troops assembled in imposing masses on these heights, which completely commanded the bridges and town beneath; the artillery of the guard was placed on either side of the road near the cross, and the Emperor took his station in person amidst the guns, to direct their fire, for the enemy still held the town. He had strongly barricaded the bridges, and every thing presaged a bloody conflict (2).

Battle of Montereau, Feb. 18. It was not, however, till late in the day, and after a severe conflict, that these important heights fell into the hands of the French troops. Bianchi, fully sensible of their importance, had, during the night, occupied them in force with the troops of Wirtemberg, strongly supported by artillery; and Victor, who in the morning commenced the attack on the position, was repulsed, and his son-in-law, the brave General Chateau, killed, when in person leading on the grenadiers to the assault. Gérard, who was now directed to supersede Victor in the command of his corps, next advanced to the attack; and, undismayed by the fire of forty pieces of artillery which the German batteries vomited upon him from the heights of Surville, bravely and repeatedly led his troops to the very mouth of the guns. But it was in vain: still the undaunted cannoniers made good the post assigned to them, and noon was far past, and evening at that inclement season was fast approaching, while yet the heights were in the hands of the enemy. Then Napoléon came up with the artillery and cavalry of the guard, at the gallop, and, desirous of profiting by the few hours of daylight which still remained, he instantly brought forward forty pieces of the reserve artillery, and disposed his redoubtable old guard and cuirassiers to aid the renewed attack of

(1) Fain, 105, 106, and 94. Burgh. 144.

Cap. Hist. de l'Empire, x. 390, 391. Koch, i. 320,

(2) Personal observation. Beauch. i. 304, 305, 321.

Gérard with all their forces. Thirty thousand men, supported by eighty pieces of cannon, now marched fiercely forward, under the very eye of the Emperor, amidst cries of *Vive l'Empereur*. Despairing of maintaining his post, which was only defended by twelve thousand men, against such an accumulation of forces, the Prince of Wirtemberg drew his men off towards the bridge in his rear; yet at first in good order, and presenting an undaunted front to the imperial cavalry, which now thundered in close pursuit. But by degrees, as they descended the southern and steeper face of the heights towards the bridges, and got entangled in the hollow way, through which the road passes to them, they fell into confusion; and infantry, cavalry, and artillery, breaking their array, rushed headlong to the only issue by which they could hope for escape from the bloody sabres of the cuirassiers (1).

Defeat of the Allies, who are driven beyond the Seine. The Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg, however, at this dreadful moment, exerted himself with equal skill and resolution to stem the torrent; he was at one time nearly enveloped by the French cavalry on the bridge, fighting with his own hand, to gain time for the troops to cross over; and by the vigour which he displayed, and noble example which he set, succeeded in enabling the greater part of them to get in safety to the other side, where they were received by Bianchi with his hitherto untouched Austrian divisions. Meanwhile, Napoléon had established himself with the artillery of the guard on the now abandoned heights of Surville, and soon sixty pieces of cannon opened a close and concentric discharge on the dense masses which were crowding over the bridge. Such was the eagerness of the Emperor to direct their fire, that he resumed, after twenty years cessation, his old occupation as a gunner; and, as at the siege of Toulon in 1793, himself levelled and pointed a cannon. Meanwhile, the Austrian batteries below, on the opposite bank, replied with vigour to the fire of the French pieces; and the old cannoniers of the imperial guard, hearing the whistle of the bullets above their heads, besought the Emperor to retire from the front; to a situation of less danger. "Courage, my friends," he replied: "the bullet which is to kill me is not yet cast." Protected by the fire of such a powerful artillery on the heights above them, the mere discharges of which shivered every pane in the windows in the neighbouring chateau of Surville to pieces, the French chasseurs pressed so rapidly on the last columns of the Wirtembergers, that there was no time to fire the trains with which the bridge was undermined; the pursuing horsemen crossed over pell-mell with the fugitives, the division of Duhesme rapidly passed after them, and, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, drove the enemy entirely out of Montereau: the Allies retiring after having destroyed the bridge over the Yonne, which stopped the pursuit, in the direction of Sens (2).

Results of the battle, and general retreat of the grand Allied army. This bloody combat, which was one of the most obstinately contested of the campaign, and inferior to none ever directed by Napoléon in brilliancy and valour, cost the French three thousand men killed and wounded, principally in consequence of the destructive fire of grape, so long kept up by the Wirtemberg artillery from the heights of Surville; but the loss of the enemy was as great in killed and wounded, and they had to lament in addition above two thousand prisoners, six guns, and four standards. "My heart is relieved," said Napoléon, on beholding the flight of the Allies across the bridge: "I have saved the ca-

(1) Koch. i. 321, 324. Beauch. i. 314, 316, Ploto. iii. 216, 217. Burgh. 145.

(2) Burgh. 147. Fain, 107, 108. Ploto. iii. 216, Koch. i. 323, 324. Beauch. i. 317, 317.

pital of my empire." Great indeed was the moral effect of these repeated successes of the Emperor, both upon his own and the Allied armies. It restored the *prestige* of his name, the magic of his renown, which the long-continued disasters in Russia and Germany had sensibly dimmed; the young conscripts deemed themselves invincible under his direction; the veterans began to recount the glories of Austerlitz and Jena. Confounded by such a succession of disasters as had befallen their arms in so many different quarters, within so short a period, the Allied generals began seriously to fear that the star of Napoléon was again in the ascendant, and to resume, in the Austrian councils at least, their former dread of his arms. Orders were immediately issued to the whole army to retreat to a concentrated position in front of Troyes, where it was proposed to join Blücher and give battle; the Seine was repassed at all points; Fontainebleau, Nemours, and Montargis, were evacuated; and the Allied host, retiring before the enemy, was soon assembled, still above a hundred thousand strong, between Nogent, Bray, and Troyes (1).

Discontent
of the
Emperor
Napoléon
at his
generals.

Wonderful as these successes were, they by no means came up to the expectations of the Emperor. His discontent was visible; his disappointment broke out on all occasions, and he was in an especial manner misled in his ideas of what might have been effected, by the achievements of the troops who fought under his own eyes. When in presence of Napoléon no fatigues could exhaust, no dangers appal, no difficulties impede them; they made, without murmuring, almost superhuman exertions; but they were by no means either equally confident, or equally energetic, under the direction of his lieutenants; and they not unfrequently sunk under the exhaustion of the unparalleled activity by which he was now striving to make genius supply the want of numbers. He never could be brought, however, to comprehend this difference; he expected the troops to achieve, under all circumstances, as much as he saw they did when animated by his own presence; and never failed to ascribe to the weakness or indecision of the officers in command, the failure of any enterprise on which he had calculated as likely to produce brilliant results. His affairs were now so critical, that he could not afford to gain only half success; nothing short of continued victory could extricate him from the host of enemies by whom he was encircled; and he was well aware that even an inconsiderable failure in any serious combat might be attended by the most calamitous results. A sense of this both inflamed his expectation and increased his violence; the most vehement ebullitions of wrath frequently took place against officers at the head of their troops; and even his oldest and most esteemed marshals were rendered the victims of a disappointment, which was entirely owing to his expecting from them more than it was in the power of human strength to achieve (2).

Disgrace
of Victor and
Montbrun.

Victor was the first victim of these unbounded expectations and irritable mood of the Emperor. That marshal, as already noticed, had been ordered to push on to Montereau on the evening of the 17th, and doubtless great results might have been expected from the seizure of that important post and bridge over the Seine, at a time when two corps of the Allies, receding before Napoléon's columns, were still on the right bank of the river. In truth, however, Victor's men were so completely worn out with fatigue, that they were unequal to the task of carrying the position on the

(1) Fain, 107, 108. Burgh. 146, 147. Dan. 157. (2) Fain, 108, 109. Koch. i. 315. Koch. i. 326, 327.

night when they arrived before it. Such, however, was the Emperor's wrath at the attack not having been made, that he that very night deprived Victor of the command of his corps, which he conferred on Gérard. Next evening, after the combat at Montereau was over, the unhappy marshal presented himself before Napoléon to reclaim against his dismissal; but he was received with such a storm of invective, directed not only against himself but the duchess, his wife, whom he accused of keeping aloof from the Empress, and leaguely with the enemies of the court, that it was only by recalling to his recollection the Italian campaigns, where they had begun the career of arms together, that he succeeded so far in appeasing his wrath as to obtain in lieu of his corps, which had been conferred upon Gérard, the command of two divisions of the guard (1). Nor were inferior officers spared by the wrath which thus prostrated the marshals of the empire. L'Héritier was publicly reproached for having failed to charge at the decisive moment at the combat of Nangis, Guyot for having allowed some pieces of the artillery of the guard to be surprised in bivouac the night before; General Dejean, one of the most distinguished officers of artillery, for having permitted the cannon ammunition to run short in the hottest of the fire at the heights of Surville; even the heroic Montbrun suffered the most cutting taunts for having, without resistance, abandoned the ridges and forest of Fontainebleau to the Cossacks. There can be no doubt that part of these reproaches were, in some degree, well founded, though others were altogether unjust; but the necessity of making any of them public at this critical juncture was not equally apparent; and it was evident to all, both that the Emperor's fatigue and anxiety had fearfully augmented the natural violence of his temper, and that the necessities of his situation had made him expect and calculate on achievements, both from his officers and soldiers, which it was beyond human strength to effect (2).

Napoléon's steps for following up his successes. The day after the battle Napoléon remained at Surville, while his advanced guards in all directions followed the Allied grand army up the valley of the Seine, towards Sens, Bray, and Nogent. Conceiving that Schwartzberg's retreat was now decidedly pronounced, and being well aware of the nervousness of the Austrian generals about their lines of communication, he at the same time wrote to Marshal Augereau to resume the offensive at Lyons, and threaten the rear of the grand army from the side of Macon. That marshal's force, which originally, as already mentioned, consisted of twelve thousand men, had been considerably augmented by two divisions of iron veterans, drawn from Suchet's army in Catalonia, and the levies in Dauphiny and Savoy, which were commanded by Generals Marchand and Serras; and these reinforcements had enabled him to assume so threatening an attitude at Lyons, that General Bubna, who commanded the extreme Austrian left in that quarter, which did not muster above fifteen thousand

(1) "At the conclusion of the conference, in which he had made no impression on the Emperor, Victor said, that if he had committed a military fault, he had expiated it dearly by the stroke which had cut off his son-in-law, General Chateau. At that name Napoléon evinced the warmest emotion; he heard only the grief of the marshal, and strongly sympathized with it. Victor, then resuming confidence, protested anew that he would not leave the army. 'I will shoulder a musket,' said he; 'Victor has not forgot his old occupation; I will take my place in the guard.' These words at length disarmed the Emperor. 'Well, Victor,' said he, stretching out his hand, 'remain with us. I cannot restore to you your corps, which I have bestowed on Gérard; but I give you two divisions of

the guard; go now, take the command of them, and let there be no question betwixt us.' . . . Yet he so far was embued with his feelings of resentment, that in the bulletin, dated that day, giving an account of the combat of Montereau, he said, 'General Chateau will die: but he will die at least accompanied by the regrets of the whole army—a fate far preferable to that of a soldier who has only purchased the prolongation of his existence by surviving his reputation, and extinguishing the sentiments which French honour inspires in the circumstances in which we are placed.'"—FAIN, *Campagne de 1814*, 111-113, and *Moniteur*, 20th Feb. 1814.

(2) Fain, 109, 110. *Moniteur*, Feb. 20, 1814.

sabres and bayonets, had been under the necessity of evacuating the valley of the Rhône below the Jura, and concentrating his forces in the neighbourhood of Geneva. The communication over Mont Cenis with the viceroy's army in the Italian plains, had been re-established, and the course of the Saône to Macon was entirely cleared of the enemy. Napoléon, therefore, indulged sanguine hopes, and not without reason, that he would be able, by means of this auxiliary force, to straiten the rear, and cut up the communications of the grand army, that their further stay in France would be rendered impossible: already he dreamed of fresh conquests beyond the Rhine; and in his exultation more than once said—"I am nearer Munich than the Allies are to Paris (1)."

Advance of
the Crown
Prince of
Sweden to
the Rhine.

But while Napoléon was, not altogether without reason, calculating upon these vast results from his successes, and looking to the incursions of his lieutenants to threaten the flanks and rear of the weightiest of his opponents, his own rear was menaced, and a new enemy was descending from the north, who in the end came to tell with decisive effect upon the fortunes of the campaign. Notwithstanding the reluctance of Bernadotte to prosecute in person the invasion, and the long time which he had consumed in the separate contest with Denmark in the south of Jutland, the time had now arrived when it was no longer possible for him to avoid appearing, if not in person, at least by means of his generals, on the great theatre of action (2). The most urgent requisition had been made to him by the Emperor Alexander, to bring his forces into action; and as the peace with Sweden, and blockade of Davoust in Hamburg, by Benningsen's powerful army of reserve, forty-five thousand strong, which had been directed there after the battle of Leipsic, left him no longer an excuse, he was obliged, however reluctant, to advance towards the Rhine. On the 10th of February

Feb. 12.

he arrived at Cologne, from whence two days afterwards, he published a proclamation to the French people, in which he vindicated his invasion of his native country, by the anxious desire which he felt that it should no longer continue, as it had been, the scourge of the earth; and on the solemn assurance which, he declared, he had received from the Allied sovereigns, that they made war on France only to secure the independence of other states. Meanwhile Bulow, who commanded his advanced guard, had hitherto been unable to make any impression on Antwerp, even though aided by Sir Thomas Graham and eight thousand English troops; but he had been more successful at Bois-le-Duc, which was delivered up to him, with a hundred and fifty heavy cannon on its ramparts, by the inhabitants of the place. And Winzingerode, having received considerable reinforcements at Namur, the siege of Antwerp was converted into a blockade; Bulow united the best part of his forces to those of the Russian commander, and both together took the road by Avesnes for Laon (3).

Advance of
Winzingerode to
Laon, and
description
of Soissons.

To reach the latter town, it was indispensable, in the first instance, to gain possession of the former, as it covered the road by which Laon was to be approached; but Chernicheff, with the Russian advanced guard, appeared before Avesnes at daybreak on the 9th February, and it surrendered without resistance, with its weak garrison of two hundred men. By this capture four hundred English and Spanish prisoners, taken during the Peninsular war, were set at liberty. Napoléon had never expected that the Allies would have entered France on this side,

(1) Fain. 113, 115. Lab. ii. 224, 225. Vaud. i. 391, 395.

(3) Lab. ii. 106, 108. Dan. 121, 122. Koch, i. 275.

(2) *Ante*, ix. 316.

and the frontier fortresses were wholly unprovided with the means of making
 Feb. 11. any resistance. Rheims opened its gates the very next day; and the whole country between the Sarre and the Meuse, in the rear, disgusted with the intolerable exactions of the French armies, received the Allies with open arms. But these easy successes led to another of a more difficult and important character. Soissons, commanding as it does the only bridge in that quarter over the Aisne, and lying on the great road from Laon to Paris, as well as several other roads which intersect each other in its centre, is a fortress which, in a strategical point of view, is of the very highest importance. It is an old town, adorned by a massy Gothic church, and surrounded by antiquated walls, which, however, had been armed and repaired, and put in a respectable posture of defence. Green and level meadows immediately adjoin it on all sides; but they are confined to the vicinity of the river, and at the distance of half a mile on either side the road ascends the slopes of the more elevated plateau, on the summit of which it generally runs, and from the brows of which plunging shot may be sent by artillery into the town beneath, to which the cannon on its ramparts, pointed upwards, were little calculated to make an effectual reply. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, however, the capture of the place was not likely to be an easy enterprize, as Napoléon, sensible of its importance, had entrusted its defence to the brave General Rusca, one of his old companions in arms in the Italian campaigns, who had under his command the depot of six regiments of the line, a thousand national guards, and a hundred gendarmes; in all about four thousand five hundred men (1).

Storming Notwithstanding the resistance which might be expected from so
 of Soissons. determined a character as General Rusca, at the head of so respectable a force, General Chernicheff offered to carry it by a *coup-de-main*, and, for this purpose, only demanded the advanced guard, consisting of four thousand five hundred men, with eighteen pieces of cannon. Though by no means sanguine of success, Winzingerode permitted the attempt to be made, throwing on Chernicheff the whole responsibility in case of failure—the usual resource of weak men who have to act with resolute. Chernicheff accordingly set out with his small but gallant band, and on the descent of the plateau from the side of Laon towards the valley of the Aisne, fell in with the French
 Feb. 12. advanced guard, two thousand strong, consisting chiefly of National Guards, which was speedily put to the rout, and driven down the slope across the meadows into Soissons, with the loss of five hundred men. The Russians advanced, after this success, to within cannon-shot of the place, but purposely delayed the attack till next day, in order to throw the enemy off their guard, by leading them to suppose that there were nothing but Cossacks and light troops, incapable of attempting an assault before the place. Early on the following morning, preparations for storming were made, and Chernicheff resolved to direct his principal attack against the *tête-*
 Feb. 13. *de-pont*, and from thence force his way into the town. The infantry was directed to advance by the highway from Laon, while a detachment of light troops was dispatched to take possession of a public-house, about ninety yards from the walls, to the right of the great road; and the Cossack regiments, each preceded by six pieces of artillery, advanced in a semicircle towards the walls, so as to distract the enemy as to the real point where an attack was to be made. These dispositions, executed with remarkable precision, proved entirely successful. The light infantry speedily made them-

(1) Personal observation, Dan. 124, 125. Koch, i. 276, 277. Lab. ii. 208, 209.

selves masters of the public-house, and from its roof and windows kept up such a fire on the bridge head, that it was abandoned, and the columns of infantry, advancing rapidly in pursuit, attempted to carry the gate, but was repulsed with loss. While re-forming his men for a second assault, signs of sudden disorder were observed on the rampart; and the Russians, though as yet ignorant of the cause, immediately took advantage of it to run two petards up to the gates, which blew them partially off their hinges, and the light infantry, quickly running up, completed their destruction. The whole body of the assailants then rushed in, and pushed on with such vigour, that very little further resistance was attempted; three battalions succeeded in making their escape by the gates, on the opposite side towards Compiègne, which were not invested; but fourteen guns and three thousand six hundred men fell into the hands of the victors (1). The confusion on the rampart had been occasioned by the death of General Rusca, who was killed by a cannon-ball while bravely encouraging his men; and with him, all presence of mind, on the part of the garrison, seemed to have been extinguished.

Which is evacuated by the Russians, and reoccupied by the French.

The capture of this important stratagetical point, which Napoléon regarded of such value that he had commenced the tracing out of a great entrenched camp, capable of containing his whole army, in its vicinity, was a severe blow to him, and would have been immediately attended by the most important consequences, were it not for the succession of disasters which at this very time were befalling the army of Silesia, which rendered it extremely hazardous for the Russian general to pursue his success any further on the road from Laon to Paris. The capture of Soissons made Chernicheff acquainted with these important events; and, at the same time, Winzingerode received orders from Blucher to march to Rheims, in order to be at hand to form a reserve for his forces, grievously weakened by the bloody campaign of the last three weeks. Chernicheff therefore wisely concluded, that to retain Soissons would be to expose its garrison to certain destruction from the victorious French armies, now at no great distance; and, at the same time, weaken his detachment to such a degree as to endanger the whole. He therefore, though with bitter regret, abandoned his brilliant conquest the very day he had made it, and marched in the direction of Rheims, where he joined Winzingerode. Meanwhile a detachment of Mortier's troops re-occupied Soissons, which was again put in a posture of defence, and Sacken, D'York, and Langeron joined Blucher at Chalons, where the veteran marshal was indefatigably engaged in reorganizing and concentrating his army (2). With such success were his efforts attended, and such was the magnitude of the resources still at his disposal, that by the 18th February he had collected forty-five thousand infantry and fourteen thousand cavalry, with which he was ready to renew active operations.

Concentration of the Allied armies in front of Troyes.

Napoléon, on the second day after the conflict of Montereau, put his army in motion, and ascended the course of the Seine to Bray and Nogent. Every where the Allied columns retired before him. At the latter town he found the most deplorable traces of the ravages of war, and decisive marks of the desperate stand which Bourmont, with his devoted rearguard, had made ten days before against the attacks of the allies. The walls were pierced with cannon-balls: many streets in ruins: every where the traces of conflagration and destruction. In the midst of these

(1) Dan. 127, 129. Koch, i. 277, 278. Lab. ii. 208, 209. Vaud. ii. 24, 27.

(2) Dan. 128, 130. Koch, i. 275, 277. Lab. ii. 208, 209. Vaud. i. 399, 400.

disasters, the Sisters of Charity had remained at their post, tending alike, with heroic devotion in the public hospital, the wounded and suffering among their friends and their enemies. During this day's march good order was preserved in the Allied columns, and the artillery and chariots, favoured by a clear bright frost, which made the fields every where passable, even for the heaviest carriages, were all brought off in safety. But

Feb. 20.

Feb. 21.

on the succeeding days, the usual symptoms of disorder and confusion appeared in the retreating host. The converging of so many different columns and such innumerable carriages towards one highway, necessarily produced great difficulty; and the Allied troops, long accustomed to victory, loudly murmured at a retreat before a force little more than half of their own. The resolution, however, of the Allied sovereigns to concentrate their forces, and accept battle in front of Troyes, had been definitively taken; Blücher was already in full march across from the banks of the Marne to the valley of the Seine to join them; the retreat was continued on the 21st towards Troyes, and on the evening of that day a hundred and forty thousand men were assembled between Mery, Arcis-sur-Aube, and Sommesous, covering all the approaches to Troyes. Such was the vigour with which Blücher reorganized his beaten army, that he appeared at the rendezvous at Mery with fifty thousand men and three hundred pieces of cannon (1).

Napoléon offers battle to Schwartz-zenberg, who declines it, and retreats from Troyes. Feb. 22.

Napoléon made no attempt to prevent the junction of the grand Allied and Silesian armies. He remained several days at Nogent, employed in making a new distribution of his troops; and in sending orders to Augereau at Lyons, by whom he hoped the decisive blow against the rear of Schwartzzenberg would be struck. That general, surprised at the inactivity of the French Emperor, made a grand reconnaissance with ten thousand horse on the 22d, which brought on a heavy cannonade, but it led to nothing decisive: and the French, without being seriously molested, took up their line of battle between Pony and Le Goez, in sight of the grand army, which stood in front of Troyes, stretching on both sides of the Seine, from Mongue on the right to Villacerf on the left. A great battle was expected on both sides, and each made preparations to receive it. But the spirit of the two armies was widely different. The recent extraordinary success of the French had restored all their former confidence to the soldiers: their trust in the star of the Emperor had returned; and, though well aware of the numerical superiority of their opponents, they had witnessed the confusion and precipitance of their retreat, and felt assured of victory. On the other hand, the Allies were depressed by the little fruit which they had derived from so many successes: they were mortified at the defeats they had recently sustained from an army not half their number, and felt no confidence in the ability or firmness of the Austrian commander-in-chief, at the head of so multifarious an array, to withstand the sudden and weighty strokes of Napoléon. Above all, despondency and vacillation had possessed itself of the generals at headquarters: they were dismayed at the prospect of a long retreat through a hostile population to the Rhine; and the Austrian officers, in particular, felt all their wonted apprehensions at the army of Augereau, which report had magnified to forty thousand men, falling on their long line of communication towards the Jura. "The grand army," said they, "has lost half its numbers by the sword, disease, and wet weather; the country we are now in is ruined; the sources of our supplies are dried up; and all around us, the

(1) Burgh, 148, 149. Fain, 116, 117. Dan. 157, 161, 162. Koch, i, 330, 333.

inhabitants are ready to raise the standard of insurrection. The loss of a battle, in such circumstances, would draw after it a retreat to the Rhine, where, in all probability, we should be met by the corps of Marshal Augereau, who has forty thousand men under his command. It has become indispensable to secure a retreat to Germany, and wait for reinforcements from thence, as well as arrest the progress of the enemy in the south, before we

Feb. 23. think of resuming offensive operations." In the council of war held at Troyes on the 25d, these opinions prevailed with the majority, as is invariably the case where a serious decision is devolved upon a body, the *smallness* of whose numbers throws upon each individual a sense of responsibility, without the credit of decision; and the bolder councils of the Emperor Alexander, who strongly urged that they should fight a great battle and resume the offensive, were overruled. The retreat was accordingly continued all night through Troyes, which was abandoned next day; and, as confusion and disorder soon spread to an alarming extent in the retiring columns, it was deemed advisable to offer Napoléon an armistice, for which purpose, Prince Wentzel Lichtenstein, one of Schwartzenberg's officers, was dispatched to his headquarters (1).

Armistice of Lusigny, Feb. 24. Napoléon received the aide-de-camp in the hamlet of Chatres, where he had passed the night. He brought, along with the proposal for an armistice, an answer from the Emperor Francis to the private letter which he had written to him six days before from Nangis—a sure proof that the separate interests of Austria were beginning to disjoint the alliance. This letter contained the most conciliatory expressions; admitted that the plans of the Allies had been seriously deranged; and concluded with stating, that in the rapidity and force of his strokes, the Emperor recognized the former great character of his son-in-law. As usual with him, on such occasions, Napoléon entered into a long and confidential conversation with Prince Lichtenstein; and after it had continued a considerable time, asked him, whether the reports were well founded which were in circulation, as to the intention of the Allied sovereigns to dethrone him, and replace the Bourbon family on the throne of France. Prince Lichtenstein warmly repelled the idea, and assured the Emperor that the reports were altogether destitute of foundation; Napoléon, however, professed himself by no means satisfied with these explanations, and protested that the presence of the Duke d'Angoulême at Wellington's headquarters, and, above all, of the Count d'Artois in Switzerland, in the rear of the grand army, were little calculated to allay his apprehensions on this head. Towards evening the officer was sent back with a haughty letter from Berthier to Schwartzenberg, in which he stated, that "the assurances given to your Highness of its being the wish of Austria to bring about a general pacification, had induced the Emperor to accede to the proposal." The plenipotentiaries appointed to conclude the armistice, were Count Shuvaloff on the part of Russia, Duca on that of Austria, and Rauch for Prussia; and Lusigny was the place fixed on for the conference. The principal conditions were, that the passes of the Vosges mountains were to remain in the hands of the Allies; and that the line of demarcation between the two armies was to be the line of the Marne, as far as Châlons, for the grand army, and thence along the course of the Vele till it joins the Aisne, for that of Silesia. But so confident was Napoléon in the returning good fortune of his arms, that, contrary to the wishes of the Austrians, he would not consent to a suspension of hostilities while the con-

(1) Dan. 162, 165. Burgh. 148, 150. Fain, 117, 119.

ferences for an armistice were going on; and Alexander, who was strongly averse to the armistice, took advantage of this circumstance, to direct Winzingerode to pay no attention to any intimation he might receive of a suspension of hostilities, till he received a special order from the Emperor himself (1).

Re-occupation of Troyes by Napoléon, and execution of M. Goualt. A lamentable catastrophe attended the return of good fortune to the cause of Napoléon, and stained, if it did not disgrace his arms. On the evening of the 25d, the French advanced posts appeared before the gates of Troyes, and notwithstanding the sort of truce which existed, some skirmishing took place between the videttes on either side. During the night, however, the town was entirely evacuated by the Allied troops, and at daybreak on the following morning, Napoléon entered it without opposition, in the midst of his guards. The middle and poorer classes, who were unanimous in favour of his government, received the Emperor with unbounded enthusiasm, although the higher classes, who were for the most part attached to the exiled dynasty, remained aloof. As he passed through the streets, crowds surrounded him, striving to kiss his hand or touch his horse, and, with loud acclamations, saluted him as the saviour of his country. The first thing he did was to order the arrest of the Marquis de Widranges and M. Goualt. The former had set out some time before for Bâle, and so escaped; but the latter, in spite of all the entreaties of his friends, had persisted in remaining in Troyes, being unwilling to leave his wife, who could not be moved, and to whom he was tenderly attached. He was immediately arrested, and brought before a military commission, and condemned to death. M. Duchatel, with whom the Emperor was lodged, threw himself at his feet, and, with M. Goualt's family, implored pardon, reminding him how much a deed of clemency would add to the lustre of his victory. But the Emperor, though often inclined to mercy when the first fit of passion was over, on this occasion was inexorable, and the unfortunate nobleman was left to his fate. At eleven at night he was led out, by torchlight, surrounded by gendarmes, to the place appointed for public executions; on his back and his breast were affixed a placard, with the words, written in large characters, "Traitor to his country;" and he died with heroic firmness, without permitting his eyes to be bandaged, and protesting with his last breath his devotion to his king and country (2).

General result of these successes on the part of Napoléon. Napoléon had now performed the most extraordinary and brilliant military achievements in his long and eventful career. Recovering his army, by the force of his resolution and the energy of his character, from the lowest point of depression, he had at

(1) Dan. 166, 167. Fain, 122, 123. Burgh. 155, 157.

It was not without the most vigorous remonstrances on the part both of Blücher and Alexander, that this perilous resolution to retreat was at this period taken by the Allied council. On being informed of the intention of the Austrian generalissimo to retreat from before Troyes, the old marshal became literally furious: openly charged him with bribery and treachery, and declared he would on no account retreat with him, but would separate and march direct on Paris, in order to compel Napoléon to give up the pursuit of the grand army, and turn his forces against that of Silesia. Alexander, on being informed of these intentions, approved of them, but directed the field-marshal previously to give the details of his plan. Blücher immediately, with his own hand, wrote out on a torn sheet of paper the following note:—1. The retreat of the grand army will cause the whole

French nation to take up arms; and the French who have declared for the good cause will suffer. 2. Our victorious armies will lose heart. 3. We shall retreat into a country where there are no supplies; and where the inhabitants, being forced to give up their last morsel, will be reduced to despair. 4. The Emperor of the French will recover from the consternation into which he has been thrown by our successes, and will, as before, recover the confidence of the nation. Most heartily do I thank your Majesty for the permission you have given me to resume the offensive. I flatter myself with the hopes of success, if your Majesty will give positive orders to General Winzingerode and Blücher to place themselves under my command. Joined by them, I will march on Paris, fearing neither Napoléon nor his Marshals, if they should come to meet me."—DANIELSKY, 171, 172.

(2) Fain, 129, 131. Lab. ii. 247, 249. Beauch. ii. 23, 25.

once arrested the course of disaster, after an apparently decisive defeat, and struck the most terrible blows against the armies of his adversaries. Suddenly stopping his retreat, crossing the country, and falling perpendicularly on the line of march of the army of Silesia, he had surprised the Prussian marshal in a straggling and unguarded situation, where his scattered corps fell an easy prey to the superior force which he directed against them. At Champaubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamps, he had inflicted a loss of full twenty thousand men on that iron band of veterans, without being weakened on his own side by more than a fourth part of the number; while at Nangis and Montereau he had stopped the advance of the grand army, weakened them by fully twelve thousand men, and thrown back their victorious standards across the Seine. Such was the terror produced by his arms, that irresolution and circumspection had succeeded to boldness and decision in the Allied councils: the intrepid advice of Alexander and Blucher was disregarded; and a hundred and forty thousand of the bravest troops in Europe abandoned the capital of Champagne, retreated ignominiously before sixty thousand, and concluded by soliciting an armistice from them. When it is recollected that these marvellous results were gained by a force which never could bring above seventy thousand sabres and bayonets into the field, against a host of more than double that number, composed of the veteran soldiers who had saved Russia and delivered Germany, and that though thus inferior upon the whole, he was always superior at the point of attack, it must be admitted that a more brilliant series of military movements is not recorded in history, and that if none other existed to signalize his capacity, they alone would be sufficient to render the name of Napoléon immortal.

Errors of
the Allied
Generals.

It must at the same time be observed, that the genius of the French Emperor was seconded to a wish by the opposite and contradictory qualities of the two commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies. Blucher, daring, impetuous, and confident, was hastening on to Paris, with his columns so far dissevered, and so incapable of supporting each other in case of danger, that they seemed at once to invite a flank attack, and defy mutual co-operation; while Schwartzemberg, slow, methodical, and circumspect, was alike disqualified to lend him any assistance in case of need, or relieve him from the pressure of the enemy by the vigour of his own operations. Thus the former was as likely to run headlong into hazard, as the latter was, by never daring, never to win; the extreme anxiety of the one for a vigorous advance, exposed him as much to danger, as the strong disposition of the other for the favourite Austrian manœuvre of a retreat, disable him from obviating it. The great merit of the French Emperor, and, situated as he was, it was a merit of the very highest kind, consisted in his clear appreciation of the opposite qualities of these two commanders; in the genius which made him perceive, that the hardihood of the one would expose him to perils, while the circumspection of the other would admit of his being almost entirely neglected; and in the moral courage, which, refusing to be subdued even by the most serious disasters, saw in them only the germ of false confidence to his antagonists, and the opportunity of recalling victory to the imperial standards for himself.

Lord Castlereagh at last Council at Bar-sur-Aube.

Matters, however, had now arrived at that point, from the moral effect of these successes on the councils of the majority of the Allies, that the success of the invasion of France, and with it, the holding together of the grand alliance, hung by a thread; and the influence of Alexander, great as it was, was unable singly to stem the torrent of despondency, or retain the Allied army in that intrepid course, from which alone

ultimate salvation to the cause of Europe could be hoped. At this crisis, however, he received the most vigorous cooperation from the moral courage of LORD CASTLEREAGH; and it was to the combined firmness of these two great men, that the triumph of the alliance is beyond all question to be ascribed.

Plan of the
campaign
agreed to
at Bar-sur-
Aube.

On the 25th February the Allied sovereigns assembled at the house of General Knesebeck, at Bar-sur-Aube, as from illness he was unable to leave his apartment, or attend the council elsewhere.

Besides the sovereigns, the following persons were present, Prince Volkonsky, Baron Diebitch, Count Nesselrode, Princes Schwartzenberg and Metternich, Count Radetsky, Lord Castlereagh, and Prince Hardenberg. At this council Alexander strongly supported, as he had always done, the policy of vigorous operations, and openly announced that he would authorize Blucher to recommence the offensive, notwithstanding the armistice of Lusigny, which did not extend beyond the grand army, if he could be reinforced by the corps of Bulow and Winzingerode, the former of which was still in Flanders, though on the French frontier, while the latter was in the neighbourhood of Laon. But here a very great, and what appeared to the majority of the council an insurmountable difficulty, presented itself. These corps belonged to the army of Bernadotte, and took their orders only from him; that prince had not yet passed Liege: a long and tedious negotiation appeared unavoidable before he could be brought to consent to such a dislocation of the troops hitherto under his direct command; his evident and well-known backwardness at co-operating in the invasion of France, rendered it certain that he would do every thing in his power to prevent the transference of the largest and most efficient part of his army to so inveterate an enemy of his country as Marshal Blucher; while at the same time the precarious situation of the alliance, and the evident hesitation of Austria, rendered it a matter of extreme hazard to take any steps which might afford him a pretext for breaking off from it—yet a decision required to be come to without an instant's delay; for Napoléon had not consented to any suspension of military operations during the conferences. Alexander strongly urged the expedience of withdrawing the corps of Winzingerode, Bulow, and Woronzow, from Bernadotte's command; but he concurred with Schwartzenberg in holding, that this was *impossible* without his previous consent; and the majority of the council inclined to this opinion. Upon this Lord Castlereagh enquired of the most experienced officers present, whether, in a military point of view, this change was indispensable to the success of the proposed operation? They answered that it was: upon this he immediately stated, that in that case the plan must be adopted, and the necessary orders given immediately: that England had a right to expect that her Allies would not be deterred from a decisive course by any such difficulties as had been urged: that, if necessary, he would withhold the monthly subsidies from the Crown Prince till he consented to the arrangement: and that he took upon himself the whole responsibility of any consequences that might arise, so far as regarded that prince. Such was the weight of England as the universal paymaster, at that period, in the alliance, as well as the deserved influence of her representative from his personal character; and such the effect of this manly course, adopted at the decisive moment, that it prevailed with the assembly. The requisite orders were given that very day, that "the grand army should retreat to Langres, and there, uniting with the Austrian reserves, accept battle; and that the army of Silesia should forthwith march to the Marne, where it was to be joined by the corps of Winzingerode, Bulow, and Woronzow, and immediately advance to Paris." It is not going too far to assert, that to this resolution, and

the moral courage of the minister who brought it about, the downfall of Napoleon is immediately to be ascribed (1).

It was not, however, without the utmost difficulty that this decisive resolution was adopted by the Allied sovereigns. The majority of the council maintained that it would be most advantageous for both armies to retreat. Alexander decidedly opposed this opinion; adding, that rather than do so, he would separate from the grand army, with the guards, grenadiers, and Wittgenstein's corps, and march with Blucher on Paris. "I hope," added he, turning to the king of Prussia, "that your majesty, like a faithful ally, of whose friendship I have had so many proofs, will not refuse to accompany me." "I will do so with pleasure," answered that brave prince; "I have long ago placed my troops at your majesty's disposal." "But why should you leave me behind you?" added the Emperor Francis. But these protestations of the Allied sovereigns, how honourable soever to themselves, determined nothing: the necessity of the grand army retreating was universally admitted; the separation of Wittgenstein and the Russians would have sent it headlong across the Jura, and probably dissolved the alliance. It was Lord Castlereagh's interposition, by providing the means of adequately reinforcing Blucher *without weakening or dislocating the grand army*, which really determined the campaign; and so satisfied was Alexander of this, that the moment the plan was agreed to, he wrote a note to Blucher with his own hand, in pencil, informing him, that the corps of Winzingerode and Bulow were now placed under his orders, and authorizing him to act according to his discretion, on the sole condition of observing certain rules of military prudence. At the same council, it was determined to form out of the German and Austrian reserves, which were about to cross the Jura, combined with the corps of Bianchi, a fresh army, to be called the army of the south, fifty thousand strong, which was to be placed under the direction of Prince Hesse-Homburg, and was to march on Macon, drive back Augereau, and secure the flank and rear of the grand army from insult: while Bernadotte and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar

(1) Earl of Ripon to Lord Londonderry, July 6, 1839. Dan. 173. Schwartzberg's General Orders, Feb. 26, 1814, given in Burgh. 169, 171.

As this is a point of the very highest importance, the following extract from a very interesting letter from the Earl of Ripon, who was confidentially engaged with Lord Castlereagh at that period, to his brother, the present Marquis of Londonderry, is subjoined:—"From Napoleon's central position, between the armies of Blucher and Schwartzberg, he was enabled to fall, with his main strength, upon each of them singly; and experience had proved that neither of them was separately adequate to withstand his concentrated efforts. Blucher's army was much inferior in number to Schwartzberg's, and the thing to be done, therefore, was to reinforce Blucher to such an extent as might insure the success of his movements. But where were these reinforcements to be found? There was nothing immediately at hand but a body of Russians under St.-Preist, who were on their march to Rheims, to join the corps to which they belonged in Blucher's army; and they were manifestly insufficient for the purpose. But there were two other strong corps, one of Prussians under General Bulow, and one of Russians under Winzingerode, who were on their march into France from Flanders, and might be brought forward with decisive effect. They belonged, however, to the army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who had not at that period, I think, crossed the Rhine; they were

under his orders, and he was very tenacious of his authority over them; and when it was suggested that the only mode of adequately reinforcing Blucher, was by placing these corps at his disposal without a moment's delay, the difficulty of withdrawing them from Bernadotte's command, without a previous and probably tedious discussion with him, was represented by a great authority as *insurmountable*. Lord Castlereagh was present when this matter was discussed at the council; and the moment he understood that, militarily speaking, the proposed plan was indispensable to success, he took his line. He stated, that in that case the plan *must* be adopted, and the necessary orders *immediately* given; that England had a right to expect that her allies would not be deterred from a decisive course by any such difficulties as had been urged, and he boldly took upon himself the *whole responsibility* of any consequences that might arise, as far as regarded the Crown Prince of Sweden. His advice prevailed: the battle of Laon was fought successfully, and no further efforts of Buonaparte could oppose the march of the Allies to Paris, and their triumphant occupation of that city. It is not then too much to say, that the vigour and energy displayed by Lord Castlereagh at this crisis, decided the fate of the campaign."—Lord Ripon to Marquis Londonderry, July, 6, 1839, given in an Appendix to the Marquis's Letter to Lord Brougham, in answer to his Strictures on Lord Castlereagh, p. 57, 58.

were to remain in the Low Countries, and complete the reduction of Antwerp, and the few other strong places which held out for the Emperor in Flanders (1).

Separation of the Grand Army, and the Army of Silesia. No sooner had this council broken up, than messengers were dispatched in all directions with the orders which had been agreed on at that memorable conference. The two armies, so recently united, again separated, the huge masses of the grand army slowly retired towards Langres; and Blucher, overjoyed at being liberated from the paralyzing command of Schwartzemberg, joyfully resumed his way towards Chalons and the Marne, followed by the great body of the French army: the corps of Oudinot and Macdonald alone being dispatched on the traces of the grand army. As soon as Blucher perceived that the weight of Napoléon's force was directed against him, he dispatched a messenger to inform Schwartzemberg of the fact; and the retrograde movement of the Feb. 26. grand army, the leading columns of which had passed Chaumont, and were rapidly approaching Langres, was stopped, and preparations made for again resuming the offensive, in order to relieve the army of Silesia from the dangers which threatened it. Meanwhile that gallant host, unwearied in combat, and burning with desire to efface the disgrace it had lately received, rapidly descended both banks of the Marne. Marmont, obliged to evacuate Sezanne, was driven by La-Ferté-Gaucher on La-Ferté-sous-Jouarre, whither Mortier also had retired before the advancing corps of Winzingerode. Already the fugitives were appearing at Meaux; Paris was in consternation; and Napoléon, alarmed at the danger of the capital, set out suddenly from Troyes on the morning of the 27th, with his guards and cuirassiers, to accumulate his forces against his veteran but unconquerable antagonist (2).

While these military movements, every one of which seemed to bear the fate of Europe on the sword's point, were in progress, negotiations of the most important kind were going on between the Allied powers and the French Emperor; and a treaty of alliance had been formed, which again cemented and placed on a secure basis their recently somewhat disjointed alliance.

Opening of the Congress of Chatillon. It has been already mentioned, that in answer to the Allied declaration from Frankfort, and the proposals for an accommodation, of which M. De St.-Aignan was the bearer, Napoléon had signified his readiness to treat; and after some delays on both sides, CHATILLON was fixed on as the place for the conferences, which was declared neutral ground, and the congress opened there on the 4th February. The great influence of England at this period in the alliance, might be seen from the number of plenipotentiaries assigned to her in this memorable assembly: they were Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart (1), on the part of Great Britain; Count Razumoffsky on the part of Russia; Count Stadion for Austria; and Baron Humboldt on that of Prussia. Caulaincourt singly sustained the onerous duty of upholding, against such an array of talent and energy, the declining fortunes of Napoléon. But though both parties professed an anxious desire to come to an accommodation, yet their views were so various that it was not difficult to foresee, that, as in the preceding year at Prague, the congress would be little more than a form, and the sword must in reality determine the points in dispute between them. Both proceeded on the principle of making the terms which they demanded dependent

(1) Dan. 174, 175. Koch, i. 348, 349.

(3) Now Marquis Londonderry.

(2) Fain, 138, 139. Koch, i. 350, 357. Dan. 176, 178.

on the aspect of military affairs; and both in consequence readily agreed to the congress continuing its labours in the midst of the din of the surrounding conflict. Alexander from the outset upheld this principle, 'and strenuously maintained that the terms proposed at Frankfort should not be adhered to after the great successes of the campaign, and the conquest of a third of France, by the Allied forces, had opened to them new prospects, which they could not have entertained before they crossed the Rhine. Napoléon, during the first alarm consequent on the battle of La Rothière, had given Caulaincourt full powers to sign any thing which might prevent the occupation of Paris by the victorious Allies (1); but no sooner had victory returned to his standards at Montmirail and Champaubert, than he retracted these concessions, enjoined his plenipotentiary to strive for delay, as his prospects were daily brightening, and directed him, above every thing, to "sign nothing without his special authority."

The British Government send Lord Castlereagh. The vast importance of the congress which was about to open, had early impressed upon both the Continental and British cabinets the necessity of sending a minister to take the principal direction of the negotiations, who might wield unfettered the whole powers of the government. General Pozzo di Borgo was accordingly sent to London in the close of 1813; and the British government at once acquiesced in the propriety of the plan. Lord Harrowby was at first talked of; but the risks of delay in his case, from the necessity of corresponding with the foreign office in London, were such, that it was deemed indispensable to send the minister for foreign affairs himself. No one could have been found in any rank better qualified than Lord Castlereagh for the task. His high-bred manners, conciliatory disposition, and suavity of temper, were as much fitted to give him influence in the Allied cabinets, as his clearness of intellectual vision, firmness of character, and indomitable moral courage, were calculated to add vigour and resolution to their councils. He received his instructions as to the terms to which he was to agree from a cabinet council, before leaving the British shores; and they exhibit, when compared with the principles which England had maintained throughout the contest, a memorable instance of constancy in adverse, and moderation in prosperous fortune (2).

Views of Great Britain in this negotiation. England had no demands either to recede from or augment since the war commenced. Her object throughout had been, not to force an unpopular dynasty on an unwilling people; not to wrest provinces or cities from France, in return for those which she had so liberally exacted from all the adjoining states; not even to make her indemnify Great Britain for any part of the enormous expenses to which she had been put during the war: but simply to provide *security for the future*; to establish a barrier alike against the revolutionary propagandism and military violence of her people; to compel her rulers and armies, whether republican or imperial, to withdraw within their own territories, and neither seek to disturb foreign nations by their principles nor subdue them by their power. For the attainment of these objects, she had uniformly maintained that no security was so desirable, because none was so likely to be effectual, as the restoration of the former line of princes, with whom repose was practicable, and to whom "conquest" was not, according to Napoléon's maxim, "essential to existence;" but she had never regarded that as an indispensable preliminary to an accommodation, nor even put it forward on any occasion, from first to last, as the basis of a treaty with the existing rulers of France. In a word, England

(1) Dan. 2, 14, 82. Lond. 276, Fain, 93, 94.

(2) Lond. 273, 274. Cap. x, 365, 366. Burgh. 61.

had nothing to do but to revert to and enforce those principles which she had submitted to the cabinet of St.-Petersburg before the contest began (1), which she had announced to Napoléon when first seated, flushed with the triumph of Marengo, on the consular throne (2); and which had formed the basis of the grand alliance projected by Mr. Pitt in 1805, shortly before the dreadful catastrophe of the Austerlitz campaign (3). She did so accordingly; she demanded neither more nor less. So memorable an instance of constancy in adverse, and moderation in prosperous fortune, does not occur in the whole annals of mankind. We admire the magnanimity of the Romans, who refused to treat with Hannibal when encamped within sight of the capitol, till he had first evacuated the territories of the republic; we pay a just tribute to the heroism of Alexander, who surrendered the ancient capital of his empire to the flames, rather than permit it to be sullied by the presence of the spoiler; we acknowledge the glory which is shed over Spain, by the undaunted resolution of her Cortes never to negotiate with Napoléon, even when the remnant of her armies was shut up within the walls of Cadiz. But these were instances of constancy in adverse, not moderation in prosperous fortune. To have maintained for twenty years a contest, often unaided, with an enemy possessing more than double her own resources; to have neither arrogated to, nor receded from, her principles during that long period; to have advanced no pretensions in victory which she had not maintained in defeat; to have concluded peace with her inveterate enemy when her capital was in her power, and her emperor dethroned, and exacted no conditions from the vanquished on which she had not offered to maintain peace before the contest commenced (4)—this is the glory of England, and of England alone.

(1) "The terms offered to France should be, the withdrawing her arms within the limits of the French territory, the abandoning her conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of her intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against foreign governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe who should be parties to this measure, might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in her internal affairs, and to maintain a correspondence and intercourse of amity with the existing powers of that country, with whom such a treaty may be concluded."—LORD GRENVILLE, *Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the British Ambassador at Saint-Petersburg*. 29th Dec. 1792.—*Ante*, i. 299.

(2) "The best and most natural pledge of the abandonment by France of those gigantic schemes of ambition, by which the very existence of society in the adjoining states has so long been menaced, would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home, and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would alone have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm in France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations of Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claims to prescribe to France what should be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conduct-

ing the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the position of the country from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of a general pacification."—LORD GRENVILLE to M. TALLEYRAND, *January 5, 1800.*—*Parl. History*, xxxiv. 1199, 1201, and *Ante* iv. 96.

(3) "The views of his Britannic Majesty and of the Emperor of Russia, in bringing about this alliance, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object, in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France is to establish as much as possible their *ancient rights*, and to secure the well-being of their inhabitants; but in pursuing that object they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which indeed that well-being is mainly dependent." Then follows a specification of the disposal to be made of the *conquests* of France, in the event of the alliance succeeding in wresting them from that power; without a syllable either as to despoiling her of any of the ancient provinces of the monarchy, or interfering in the remotest degree with its internal government.—MR. PITT'S *Note to the Emperor of Russia*, *January 11, 1805.*—SCHÖELL, *Histoire des Traités de Paix*, vii. 59, and *Ante*, v. 257.

(4) "England will never consent that France should arrogate to herself the power of annulling at pleasure, under cover of a pretended natural right of which she makes herself the sole judge, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent of all the powers. She will never see with indifference France make

Instructions to Lord Castlereagh from the British cabinet contained no projects for the partition of any part of France as that monarchy existed in 1789, prior to the commencement of the Revolution, but the most ample provision for the establishment of barriers against its future irruption into Europe. The reduction of France to its ancient limits; the formation of a federative union in Germany, which might secure to the meanest of its states the protection of the whole; the re-establishment of the Swiss confederacy under the guarantee of the great powers; the restoration of the lesser states of Italy, intermediate between France and Austria, to a state of independence; the restoration of Spain and Portugal under their ancient sovereigns, and in their former extent; in fine, the restitution of Holland to separate sovereignty, under the family of the Stadtholders, with such an addition of territory as might give it the means of maintaining that blessing. Such were the instructions of the English cabinet, in regard to the general restoration of the balance of power in Europe, in so far as France was concerned; and in these propositions all the Allied powers concurred. With a view, however, to the especial security of England, two additional provisions were insisted upon, upon which the British cabinet was inflexible. The first of these was, that no discussion even, derogatory to the British maritime rights, as settled by existing treaties, or the general maritime law of Europe, should be admitted; the second, that in the event of any new arrangements being deemed advisable for the future frontiers of France, they should not embrace Antwerp, Genoa, or Piedmont: the first of which was justly considered essential to the maritime security of England; the second, to the independence of the Italian states, on which side, as no general confederacy was contemplated, the greatest danger might in future be apprehended (1).

Restoration of the Bourbons, and arrangement concerning Poland. In these instructions, however, two important points were purposely left undecided; not because they were overlooked, or their importance not fully appreciated, but because their solution was involved in such difficulty, and was so dependent on future contingencies, that no directions previously given could possibly prove applicable to the subsequent march of events. These were the restoration of the Bourbons, and the future destiny of Poland.

Views of the English and Russian Governments regarding the Bourbons. On the first of these points the instructions contained no specific directions, because it was the intention of England, not less than of the other Allied powers, not to interfere with the wishes and intentions of the French people. Lord Castlereagh, indeed, in conformity with the declared purpose of British diplomacy ever since the commencement of the war, made no concealment of his opinion, either in or out of Parliament (2), that the best security for the peace of Europe would be found in the restoration of the dispossessed race of princes to the French throne; and "the ancient race and the ancient territory" was often referred

herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining peace and friendship with England, let her renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement, and confine herself within her own territory, without insulting other governments, disturbing their tranquillity, or violating their rights."—LORD GRENVILLE to M. CHATELAIN, the French Envoy, Feb. 5, 1793.—*State Papers*, No. 1. *Ann. Reg.* 1793, and *Ante*, i. 298, 299. (1) *Ibid.* xii. 318. 320. *Cap.* x. 366.

(2) "Every pacification would be incomplete, if you did not re-establish on the throne of France

the ancient family of the Bourbons: any peace with the man who had placed himself at the head of the French nation, could have no other final result but to give to Europe fresh subjects of divisions and alarms—it could be neither secure nor durable; nevertheless, it was impossible to refuse to negotiate with him, when invested with power, without doing violence to the opinion of Europe, and incurring the whole responsibility of the continuance of the war."—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Speech in Parliament*, 29th June 1814.—*Parl. Debates*, xxviii. 458.

to by him in private conversation as offering the only combination which was likely to give lasting repose to the world; but it was as little his design, as it was that of the British cabinet, to advance these views as a preliminary to any, even the most lasting, accommodation. Such a reaction, to have any likelihood of being durable, and to avoid exciting the immediate jealousy of Austria for the succession of Napoléon's son, could only be founded upon a movement in France itself, and such a manifestation of opinions within its limits, as might render it evident that no chance remained of a continuance of the crown in the Buonaparte family. The views of Alexander were entirely the same at this period, so far as regarded the government of France; and his able diplomatist, General Pozzo di Borgo, when sent to London to induce the British government to send Lord Castlereagh to the Allied headquarters, thus expressed himself to the Count d'Artois, who pressed him to explain the ideas of the Czar on the subject of the Bourbon family—"My lord, every thing has its time; let us not perplex matters—To sovereigns you should never present complicated questions. It is with no small difficulty that they have been kept united in the grand object of overthrowing Buonaparte: as soon as that is done, and the imperial rule destroyed, the question of dynasty will present itself; and then your illustrious house will spontaneously occur to the thoughts of all (1)."

Division
of opinion
regarding
Poland.

But though entirely in unison on this momentous subject, the cabinets of England and Russia were far from being equally agreed as to another subject, which, it was foreseen, would speedily present itself for discussion on the overthrow of Napoléon—and that was the future destiny of Poland. That the old anarchical democracy of that country, with its stormy comitia, *liberum veto*, internal feuds, and external weakness, could not be restored, if the slightest regard was felt either for the general balance of power in Europe, or the welfare of that gallant but distracted people, was evident to all. But what to do with Poland, in the powerful and now victorious monarchies by which it was surrounded, all of whom, it might be foreseen, would be anxious to share its spoils, was not so apparent. In a private conversation with Sir Charles Stewart at this period, the Emperor Alexander openly announced those views, in regard to the annexation of the grand duchy of Warsaw to his dominions, which subsequently occasioned such difficulty at the congress of Vienna. He stated that his moral feelings, and every principle of justice and right, called upon him to use his power to restore such a constitution to Poland as would secure the happiness of so noble and great a people; that the abandonment of seven millions of his Lithuanian subjects for the attainment of such an object, if he had no guarantee for the advantage he was thence to derive for Russia, would be more than his imperial crown was worth; and that the only way of reconciling these objects was, by uniting the Lithuanian provinces with the grand duchy of Warsaw, under such a constitutional administration as Russia might appoint. He communicated at the same time the same project to Prince Metternich. Thus early did the habitual ambition of that great power show itself in the European congress; and so clearly, according to the usual course of human affairs (2), were future difficulty and embarrassment arising out of the very magnitude of present successes.

Napoléon's
instructions
to Caulain-
court.

The instructions of Napoléon to his plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, were of a very different tenor, and such as sufficiently evinced the unlikelihood that the congress would terminate in

(1) Cap. x. 367. Hard. xii. 318, 322. Private information.
(2) Lond. 275, 276.

any permanent accommodation:—"It appears doubtful," said he, "whether the Allies really wish a peace; I desire it; but it must be solid and honourable. France, without its natural limits, without Ostend, without Antwerp, would be no longer on a level with the other powers of Europe. England, and all the other Allied powers, have recognised at Frankfort the principle of giving France her natural boundaries. The conquests of France within the Rhine and the Alps can never compensate what Austria, Russia, and Prussia have acquired in Finland, in Poland, or what England has seized in India. The policy of England, the hatred of the Emperor of Russia, will carry away Austria. I have accepted the basis announced at Frankfort; but it is probable by this time the Allies have other ideas. Their negotiations are but a mask. The moment that they declared the negotiations subject to the influence of military events, it became impossible to foresee their probable issue. You must hear and observe every thing. You must endeavour to discover the views of the Allies, and make me acquainted with them, day by day, in order that I may be in a situation to give you more precise instructions than I can give at present. To reduce France to its ancient limits is to degrade it. They are deceived if they suppose that the misfortunes of war will make the nation desire such a peace: there is not a French heart which would not feel its disgrace before the end of six months, and which would not make it an eternal subject of opprobrium to the government which should be base enough to sign it. Italy is untouched, the Viceroy has a fine army: in a few days I shall have assembled a force adequate to fight several battles, even before the arrival of the troops from Spain. If the nation seconds me, the enemy is marching to his ruin; if fortune betrays me, my part is taken: I will not retain the throne. I will neither degrade the nation nor myself, by subscribing degrading conditions. Try and discover what are Metternich's ideas. It is not the interest of Austria to push matters to extremity: yet a step, and the lead will escape her. In this state of affairs, there is nothing to prescribe to you. Limit yourself, in the first instance, to hear every thing, and inform me of what goes on. I am on the eve of joining the army; we shall be so near, that scarce any delay will occur in making me acquainted with the state of the negotiations (1)."

Commence-
ment of
the Con-
gress.

When the views of the opposite parties were so widely at variance, it was not likely that the negotiations could lead to any result, or serve as more than a pretext to both parties for regulating the terms insisted on, according to the aspect of military affairs; yet were the conferences nearer leading to the conclusion of a peace, at their outset, than could possibly have been anticipated. The congress opened on the 5d of February at Chatillon; and from the great weight of Lord Castlereagh at the Allied headquarters, the utmost union was soon brought to prevail between the leading ministers of the great powers. In the outset Napoléon, by means of Caulaincourt, endeavoured to open a private communication with Prince Metternich; but the answer of that able statesman damped the hopes he had hitherto so confidently entertained of detaching Austria from the alliance (2), while, at the same time, it sufficiently proved that the

(1) Napoléon to Caulaincourt, Jan. 4, 1814. Cap. x. 369, 370.

(2) "I received yesterday evening the confidential letter of the 23d, which your excellency has addressed to me. I have submitted it to the Emperor my master, and his imperial majesty has resolved to make no use of its contents—it will remain for ever unknown: and I pray your excel-

lency to believe, that in the existing state of matters, any confidence reposed in our cabinet is beyond the reach of any abuse. I have a pleasure in making known to you this assurance, in a moment of such immense importance for Austria, France, and Europe. The conduct of my sovereign has been uniform and consistent. He has engaged in this war without hatred; he pursues it without re-

cabinet of Vienna was anxious to retain him on the throne, if it could be done consistently with the liberties and security of the other states in Europe. Caulaincourt replied in terms dignified and melancholy, lamenting that Count Stadion, instead of Prince Metternich, was not the minister entrusted with the interests of Austria at the congress, to counterbalance the influence which Lord Castlereagh might exercise in its deliberations; and conjuring him, if he would avert the last calamities on the beloved daughter of his Emperor, to exert his efforts to bring about a fair and equitable peace (1). Metternich replied: "M. Caulaincourt has conceived erroneous ideas concerning Lord Castlereagh. He is a man of a cool and just mind, without passions, who will never permit himself to be governed by coteries. It would be unfortunate if, in the outset of the congress, prejudices should be entertained against the individuals engaged in it. If Napoléon really wishes for peace, he will obtain it on reasonable terms." This separate and confidential correspondence between Metternich and Caulaincourt, unknown to the other members of the congress, but yet without disturbing the unanimity of its resolutions, continued the whole time it sat: a singular circumstance, indicating at once the strength of the separate interests which had led Austria into such a proceeding, the extremely delicate nature of the negotiations which were in dependence, and the exalted honour which, in spite of such prepossessions, prevented her from swerving, in the final result, from her pledged faith and the general interests of Europe (2).

Napoléon gives Caulaincourt full powers after the defeat of La Rothière.

The battle of La Rothière, and retreat of the French army from Troyes, produced a most important effect upon the views of Napoléon at the congress which had recently been opened. Justly alarmed for his capital, which seemed now to be menaced by an overwhelming force, and aware of the perfect unanimity which prevailed between the plenipotentiaries of the Allied sovereigns (3), he at length gave Caulaincourt those full powers which he had so anxiously solicited; and authorized him to sign any thing that might appear necessary to avoid the risk

sentiment. The day that he gave his daughter to the prince who then governed Europe, he ceased to behold in him a personal enemy. The fate of war has since changed the attitude of all. If the Emperor Napoléon will listen in these moments to the voice of reason; if he will consent to seek his glory in the happiness of a great people, in renouncing his former ambitious policy—the Emperor will with pleasure revert to the feelings he entertained when he gave him the daughter of his heart; but if a fatal blindness shall render the Emperor Napoléon deaf to the unanimous voice of his people and of Europe, he will deplore the fate of his daughter, but not arrest his course."—*Confidential Letter, METTERNICH to CAULAINCOURT, 29th Jan. 1814. Given in CAPEFIGUE, Hist. de l'Empire de Napoléon, x. 372, 373.*

(1) "The arrival of the Allied troops at Paris would be the commencement of a series of changes which Austria assuredly would not be the last to regret. If the war is to terminate by our overthrow, has Austria nothing to regret in such a catastrophe? What profit is she to acquire, what glory to win, if we are overwhelmed by all the armies of Europe? You, my prince, have a boundless harvest of glory to reap; but it is to be gained only by your remaining the arbiter of events, and the only way in which you can do so is by an immediate peace."—*CAULAINCOURT to METTERNICH, 8th February 1814.—CAPEFIGUE, x. 372.*

(2) Cap. x. 373, 374. See the whole in Fain, 279, 309.

(3) "Sir! I am here at Chatillon, opposed to

four diplomatists, counting the three English for one. They have all the same instructions, prepared by the secretaries of state of their respective courts. Their language has been dictated to them in advance: the declarations which they tender are all ready made. They do not take a step, nor utter a word, which has not been preconcerted. They are desirous of a protocol, and I am not disinclined to it; so precious are the moments, and yet so great the hazard by a false step of ruining all. I set out with my hands bound: I have just received a letter full of alarms: and I now find myself invested with full powers. I am at once reined in and spurred on: I know not the cause of this extraordinary change."

—*CAULAINCOURT to NAPOLEON, Feb. 6, 1814; FAIN, 289; CAPEFIGUE, x. 375, 376.* It is not surprising that Caulaincourt was at a loss to conceive the cause of this sudden change; for so inveterate was the habit of Napoléon to conceal the truth, and deal in falsehoods, even with his most confidential servants, that only two days before, in his letter to Caulaincourt, detailing the battle of La Rothière, he had said—"Schwarzenberg's report is a piece of folly: there was no battle: the old guard was not there: the young guard did not charge: a few pieces of cannon have been captured by a charge of horse; but the army was in march for the bridge of Lesmont when that event arrived; and had he been two hours later, the enemy would not have forced us."—*NAPOLEON to CAULAINCOURT, Feb. 4, 1814—in HARDENBERG, xii. 332.* The words in italics are omitted in Fain's quotation of that letter. See FAIN, 285. *Pièces Just.*

of a battle, and save Paris from being taken (1). It was not, however, without the utmost difficulty that this great concession was extorted from the Emperor; and the manner in which it occurred is singularly characteristic of the mingled firmness and exaltation of his mind:—Caulaincourt had represented to him, by letter on 31st January, the absolute necessity of his receiving precise and positive instructions at the opening of the congress: “The fate of France,” said he, “may depend on a peace or an armistice, which must be concluded in four days. In such circumstances I demand precise instructions, which may leave me at liberty to act.” When this letter was received, Maret, with tears in his eyes, entreated the Emperor to yield to necessity, and give the full powers which were so urgently demanded. Instead of answering, Napoléon opened a volume of Montesquieu’s works, containing the grandeur and fall of the Romans, which lay in his cabinet, and read the following passage—“I know nothing more magnanimous than the resolution which a monarch took who has reigned in our times, (Louis XIV.) to bury himself under the ruins of his throne rather than accept conditions unworthy of a king. He had a mind too lofty to descend lower than his fortunes had sunk him; he knew well that courage may strengthen a crown, but infamy never.” Maret with earnestness represented, “that nothing could be more magnanimous than to sacrifice even his glory to the safety of the state, which would fall with him.” “Well, be it so,” replied the Emperor after a pause: “let Caulaincourt sign whatever is necessary to procure peace; I will bear the shame of it, but I will not dictate my own disgrace.” In two hours after, the full powers were dispatched (2).

Conditions proposed by the Allied Powers, Feb. 7. The Allied powers were unanimous in the terms which they proposed to France; and, after the preliminary formalities had been gone through, they were fully developed in a note lodged in their joint names, on the 7th February. They were to this effect:—“Considering the situation of Europe in respect to France, at the close of the successes obtained by their arms, the Allied plenipotentiaries have orders to demand that France should be restricted to *her limits before the Revolution*, with the exception of subordinate arrangements for mutual convenience, and the restitution which England is ready to make for such concession: as a natural consequence of this, France must renounce all direct influence beyond the future limits of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland.” Such was the consternation produced by the battle of La Rothière, that Caulaincourt, two days afterwards, wrote in reply: “I wish to know, whether, by consenting to the terms which the Allies have proposed, that France shall be restricted to her ancient limits, I will immediately obtain an armistice: If by such a sacrifice an armistice can immediately be obtained, I am ready to make it: nay, I shall be ready, on that supposition, to surrender immediately a portion of the fortified places which that sacrifice must make us ultimately relinquish (3).”

To all appearance, therefore, the congress at this period was on the eve of producing a general peace; and an armistice, as the first step to-

(1) “I am authorized, duke, to make known to you, that the intention of the Emperor is, that you should consider yourself as invested with all the powers necessary, in these important circumstances, to take the part which you shall deem advisable to arrest the progress of the enemy. I have sent you a letter with the needful powers which you have solicited. At the moment when his Majesty is about to quit this city, he has enjoined me to dispatch to you a second; and to make you aware, in express

terms, that his Majesty gives you *carte blanche* to conduct the negotiations to a happy issue—to save the capital, and avoid a battle, on which depend the last hopes of the nation.”—MARET TO CAULAINCOURT, Troyes, 5th February 1814; FAIN, 283, 287; *Pièces Jusi.*

(2) HARD. xii. 833, 334. CAP. x. 375.

(3) CAULAINCOURT TO METTERNICH, Feb. 9, 1814. FAIN, 293. HARD. xii. 337.

They are
departed
from by
Napoléon.

wards it, might hourly be expected. At this critical juncture, however, a letter was forwarded to the plenipotentiaries from the Emperor of Russia, requesting a suspension of these sittings for a few days, till he had an opportunity of concerting with his Allies upon the terms to be demanded; and they were accordingly adjourned to the 17th. The fate of the world depended on this delay; for, when the conferences were resumed, events had occurred which rendered all accommodation impossible between the parties, and irrecoverably threw them back upon the decision of the sword. Napoléon, who had with great difficulty been brought to give full powers to Caulaincourt to treat after the disaster of La Rothière, no sooner saw the advantages which the ill-judged separation of the grand army from that of Silesia would give him, than he resolved to retract his concessions, and again trust all to the hazard of arms. He received intelligence of the terms demanded on the 9th at Nogent, when he was just on the eve of setting out on his expedition to Sezanne, which terminated in so disastrous a manner for Blucher. Perceiving the advantage which this movement was likely to afford, he broke out in the most vehement manner to Maret and Berthier, against the disgraceful nature of the terms which were demanded. "What!" said he, with indescribable energy, "do you urge me to sign such a treaty, and trample under foot my coronation oath, to preserve inviolate the territory of the republic? Disasters unheard of might compel me to relinquish the conquests I myself have made: but to abandon those also made before me; to betray the trust made over to me with such confidence; to leave France, after so much blood has been shed and victories gained, smaller than ever! Could I do it without treachery, without disgrace? You are fearful of a continuation of the war; and I am still more afraid of dangers, yet more certain, which you do not perceive. If we renounce the frontier of the Rhine, it is not merely France which recedes, but Austria and Prussia which advance. France has need of peace; but such a one as they seek to impose upon it, would be more dangerous than the most inveterate war. What would I be to the French, if I had signed their humiliation? What could I answer to the republicans of the senate, when they came to ask me for the frontiers of the Rhine? God preserve me from such affronts! (1) Write to Caulaincourt, since you will have it so, but tell him that I reject the treaty. I prefer to run the greatest risks of war."

He rises in
his de-
mands
with his
subsequent
successes.
Feb. 10.

When such were the feelings of Napoléon on setting out upon his expedition against Blucher, it was not to be expected that his disposition would be rendered more pacific by his unexpected and brilliant successes over that commander. No sooner, accordingly, was the first of these victories, that at Champaubert, gained, than Napoléon wrote to Caulaincourt that a brilliant change had taken place in his affairs, that new advantages were in preparation; and that the plenipotentiary of France was now entitled to assume a less humiliated attitude. Meanwhile, the privy council at Paris, to whom the propositions of the Allies at Chatillon had been referred, unanimously reported that they should be agreed to. The Emperor, however, dazzled by the brilliancy of his victories over Blucher, wrote to the Emperor of Austria on the 17th, from Nangis, that he was as anxious as ever for an accommodation; but that the advantages which he had now gained entitled him to demand less unfavourable terms; while to Caulaincourt he wrote, on the same day, that

(1) Fain, 87, 89.

the extraordinary powers he had received, were only intended to avoid a battle and save the capital; that now that danger no longer existed, and, consequently, the negotiation would resume its ordinary course of proceeding, and he was to sign nothing without the express authority of the Emperor (1).

Napoléon orders Eugene to evacuate Italy, and then countermands the order. This brilliant change in his fortunes, not only induced Napoléon to resume the powers to treat which he had conferred on Caulaincourt, but led to another step on his part, in the end attended with not less fatal effect upon his fortunes. During the first moment of alarm consequent on the battle of La Rothière and retreat from Troyes, he had written to Eugène Beauharnais to the effect, that the

Feb. 5. crisis had now become so violent in France that it was plain the contest would be decided there; that all subordinate considerations had now become of no importance; and therefore, that, after leaving garrisons in a few strongholds, he should immediately withdraw his whole forces across the Alps, and hasten to the decisive point on the banks of the Seine. This order, worthy of Napoleon's genius, and in strict conformity with his system of war, would have brought forty thousand experienced veterans on the rear of the Austrian grand army at the most critical period of the campaign, and, in all probability, prevented the advance to Paris and dethronement of the Emperor. But the successes over Blueher restored to such a degree his confidence in his good fortune, that he wrote to Eugène, the very night after the battle of Montmirail, forbidding him to retire, and assuring him that he was singly adequate to the defence of France. Nay, so far was he transported by the sanguine views which he now entertained of his affairs, that he resumed his ideas of German conquest, and openly said to those around him, "I am nearer Vienna than the Allies are to Paris." Thus, the only effect of these successes was to restore the naturally rigid and unbending tone of his character, to revive his projects of universal dominion, cause him to reject the throne of old France offered him by the Allies, and induce him to hazard all on the still doubtful issue of military operations (2).

General feeling of despondency at Paris. But whatever confidence Napoléon himself might feel in the continued appeal to arms, the same feeling was far from being shared by the authorities, or more enlightened part of the inhabitants of Paris. When the couriers, indeed—succeeding one another, adorned with laurel, and announcing with tenfold exaggeration the really marvellous victories of the Emperor—entered the courts of the Tuileries; and, still more, when the long files of Russian and Prussian prisoners were conducted with all the pomp of war, and amidst the strains of triumphal music, along the Boulevards—the multitude loudly cheered the Emperor, and hope in the

(1) Fain, 84, 206. Napoléon to Caulaincourt, Feb. 17, 1814. Fain, 297.

"I gave you *carte blanche* only to save Paris, and avoid a battle, which was then the only hope of the nation. The battle has taken place; Providence has blessed our arms. I have made 30,000 or 40,000 prisoners, taken two hundred pieces of cannon, a great number of generals, and all this without almost a serious encounter. Yesterday I cut up the army of Prince Schwartzberg, and I hope to destroy it before it has repassed the frontiers. Your attitude should continue the same: you should do every thing to procure peace; but my intention now is, that you should sign nothing without my authority, because I alone know my own position. Generally speaking, I will only consent to an ho-

nourable peace, such as on the basis proposed at Frankfort. My position is certainly better now than it was at that time. They could then set me at defiance; I had gained no advantages over them, and they were on the verge of my territories. Now I have gained immense advantages over them; so great indeed that a military career of twenty years, and no small celebrity, can exhibit no parallel to it; still I am ready to cease hostilities, and to allow the enemy to retire peaceably, if they will conclude peace on the basis of Frankfort." At the end of this letter, these words were added in the handwriting of Napoléon—"Ne signez rien, ne signez rien."—NAPOLÉON to CAULAINCOURT, February 17th, 1814.—FAIN, 297, 298.—*Pièces Just.*

(2) Koch. i. 269. Beauch. i. 328.

revival of his star was again awakened in many breasts. But amidst all this seeming congratulation, no return of real confidence was generally felt. Experience soon showed that victory attended only the arms of the Emperor in person; that while he was successful in one quarter, the enemy was pressing on in another; and it seemed next to impossible in the end, that the gallant band of veterans whom he commanded should not be worn out by the forces, always twice, often three times more numerous, by which they were surrounded. By the more intelligent and far-seeing of the community, even his victories were more dreaded than his defeats; the latter led to humiliation and peace, but the former tended to confidence and war; and it was already felt that a continuance of the contest, in the present exhausted state of France, was a greater evil than any possible calamities by which it might be terminated. In the senate, in particular, these ideas were violently fermenting; every one distrusted his neighbour, because he was conscious of vacillation in himself; all confidence in the stability of the imperial throne was at an end; even the most prudent were beginning to speak aloud as to the Emperor being the sole obstacle to peace. Strange rumours were in circulation, as to Joseph and the Empress proposing to make peace independent of the Emperor; and the selfish and ambitious, anticipating an approaching convulsion, were looking about for the safest harbour in the storm (1).

Treaty of
Chaumont.
March 1. But upon the Allied powers the change in the diplomatic language of Caulaincourt, in obedience to the instructions he had received, coupled with the evident danger to the liberties of Europe from the returning fortune and increasing audacity of Napoléon, produced effects of the very highest importance. They now saw clearly that they had no chance, not merely of success, but of existence, but in perfect unanimity and the most vigorous warfare. The exulting expressions of Napoléon, that he was nearer Vienna than the Allies were to Paris, had not been lost upon the assembled ministers; and Lord Castlereagh, in particular, had been indefatigable in his efforts to convince the Austrian ministers, that they would infallibly be the first object of the French Emperor's wrath if his victorious legions should again cross the Rhine. In these views he was strongly supported by the Emperor Alexander, who, in a memoir submitted by him to the Allied sovereigns on the 15th February, both manfully combated the desponding views then so general at the Allied headquarters as to the critical nature of their situation, and developed the noblest and most luminous views as to the moral nature of the contest in which they were engaged, which had yet been uttered since the commencement of the war. Metternich cordially supported the same ideas; the successes of Napoléon against Blücher had awakened all his former apprehensions of his power: he now feared more for Vienna than for the fall of Marie-Louise, and was desirous to prove the sincerity of his imperial master in the great objects of the alliance (2).

(1) Savary, iii. 237. Cap. x. 406, 407.

(2) Cap. x. 397, 400. Hard. xii. 351. Dan. 189, 191.

Alexander's opinions, recorded in this memorable State Paper, are deserving of the most profound attention, as demonstrating both the admirable views which he entertained on the nature of the contest, and the high moral courage by which they were sustained:—"Victory having brought us to Frankfort, the Allies offered to France conditions of peace, which were then considered proportionate to the successes which they had obtained; at that period, these conditions might have been

called the object of the war. I strongly opposed the proposals to negotiate then; not because I did not desire peace, but because I thought that time would offer us more favourable opportunities, when we had proved to the enemy our superiority over him. All are now convinced of the justice of my arguments; for to it we are indebted for all the incalculable difference between the terms offered at Frankfort and at Chatillon—that is, the restoration by France of territories without which Germany and Italy would be lost on the first offensive movement.

"The destruction of the enemy's political power

The result of their united efforts was the TREATY OF CHAUMONT: one of the most remarkable diplomatic acts of modern times, and which presented an impassable barrier to the ambition and efforts of France (1).

Terms of the Treaty.
March 1. By this treaty it was stipulated, that in the event of Napoléon refusing the terms which had been offered him—viz. the reduction of France to the limits of the old monarchy, as they stood prior to the Revolution—the four Allied powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, should each maintain one hundred and fifty thousand men in the field; that to provide for their maintenance, Great Britain should pay an annual subsidy of five millions sterling, to be equally divided between the three continental powers, besides maintaining her own contingent complete from her own resources. It was provided also that each power should have a commissary at the headquarters of the different armies; that if any of the Allied powers was attacked, each of the others should forthwith send to its assistance an army of sixty thousand men, including ten thousand horse, besides forwarding additional troops, if required; that if England chose to furnish her contingent, or any part of it, in foreign troops, she should pay annually twenty pounds sterling for every foot soldier, and thirty for every horseman; that the trophies should be divided equally, and no peace made but by common consent; that none of the contracting parties should enter into engagements with other states but to the same end: in fine, that this treaty should be in force for twenty years, and might be renewed before the expiration of the same period (1).

Secret articles of the Treaty. In addition to these public stipulations, several secret articles were inserted in this treaty, which eventually proved of the highest importance to the future reconstruction of the states of Europe, after the deluge of the French Revolution had subsided. It was agreed, 1st, That Germany should be restored in the form of a federal union, comprising all the powers of which it was composed; that Switzerland should be independent, under the guarantee of the Allied powers; Italy divided into independent states; Spain restored to Ferdinand VII, with its ancient limits; Holland enlarged in territory, and formed into a kingdom for the Prince of Orange. 2d, Power was reserved to Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and the Prince of Orange, to accede to the present treaty. 3d, That considering the necessity which might

does not constitute the grand aim of the efforts which it remains for us to make; but it may become so, if the fortune of war, the example of Paris, and the evident inclination of the inhabitants of the provinces of France, shall give the Allies the possibly of openly proclaiming it. I do not share the opinion of the Allies on the greater or less degree of importance attached by them in the *dethronement of Napoléon*, if that measure can be justified on grounds of wisdom. On the contrary, I should consider that event as the completion of the deliverance of Europe; as the brightest example of justice and morality it is possible to display to the universe; finally, as the happiest event for France itself, whose internal condition can never be without influence on the tranquillity of her neighbours. Nobody is more convinced than I am of the inconstancy of fortune in war; yet I do not reckon a partial failure, or even the loss of a battle, as a misfortune which should in one day deprive us of the fruit of our victories; and I am convinced that the skill of our generals, the valour of our troops, our superiority in cavalry, the reinforcements which are following us, and the force of public opinion, would never allow us to fall so low as some seem to apprehend. I am by no means adverse to continu-

ing the negotiations at Chatillon, or giving Caulaincourt the explanations he desires regarding the future destiny of Europe, provided France would return to her old frontiers. As to the armistice which is requested in the letter to Prince Metternich, I conceive this proceeding of the French plenipotentiary to be contrary to the existing usages of negotiations, and the proposal to be advantageous only to the enemy. I am as much convinced as ever, that all probability is in favour of a successful issue, if the Allies keep to the views and obligations by which they have been hitherto guided with reference to their grand object, *the destruction of the enemy's armies*. With a good understanding among themselves, their success will be complete, and checks will be easily borne. I do not think that the time has yet arrived for us to stop short; and I trust that, as in former conjunctures, new events will show us when that time shall have arrived."—*Memoir to the Allied Sovereigns by the Emperor Alexander, 15th Feb. 1814.*—DANILEFSKY, p. 88, 90.

(1) See the Treaty in Martens, N. R. i. 683; and Hard. xii. 352. Schoell, *Hist. des Trait. de Paix*, x. 417.

exist, even after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace, to keep in the field, during a certain time, forces adequate to carry into effect the arrangements which the Allied powers might agree upon for confirming the peace of Europe, the high contracting parties agree to concert among themselves the requisite provisions, not only regarding the necessity, but the importance and distribution of the forces requisite for this purpose; but under this limitation, that none of the powers should be obliged to keep such forces for this end on foot for more than a year, without their express consent (1).

Great effects of this Treaty on the Congress. The conclusion of this treaty was a virtual dissolution of the congress of Chatillon; for it established so wide a difference between the views of Napoléon and the Allied powers, and confirmed the latter so strongly in their determination to contend to the uttermost for the reduction of France to its ancient limits, that, opposed as these views were to the firm resolution of Napoléon to hold out for the frontier of the Rhine, all prospect of an accommodation was at an end. The congress continued to sit for three weeks after: the Allied powers firmly insisting on the relinquishment by France of all its conquests since the Revolution: and Caulaincourt, under Napoléon's direction, constantly shifting his ground, and endeavouring to elude such rigorous conditions. It was not with his own good-will, however, that the French plenipotentiary insisted on these terms; for he saw, as clearly as possible, the immense risks which the Emperor was running by holding out for the frontier of the Rhine, and throwing all on the hazard of arms to obtain it, and represented in the most urgent, though respectful, terms, the necessity of bending to the force of circumstances, and accepting the monarchy of Louis XIV as the price of pacifying Europe (2). Napoléon, however, was inexorable; all the efforts of his diplomatist, after the plenary powers he had granted during the alarm after the battle of La Rothière had been recalled on the 17th of February, not only failed in convincing him of the necessity of descending from his ideas of the empire, but even of extracting from him any definite statement of the terms on which he himself was willing to come to an accommodation; he was evidently determined to cast all on the decision of the sword, and impressed with the belief that his genius, or his star, would extricate him from his present, as they had done from so many other perilous circumstances (3). War, in consequence, recommenced

(1) Hard. xii. 353. Schnell, x.

(2) "The question about to be decided is so important; it may have at the instant consequences so fatal, that I regard it as a paramount duty to recur again, even at the risk of displeasing your majesty, to what I have already so frequently insisted on. There is no weakness, sire, in my opinion; but I see the dangers which menace France and the throne of your majesty, and I conjure you to prevent them. We must make sacrifices; we must do so immediately:—as at Prague, if we do not take care, the opportunity of doing so will escape us; the circumstances of this moment bear a closer resemblance to those which there occurred than your majesty may be aware. At Prague, peace was not concluded, and Austria declared against us, because we would not believe that the term fixed for the closing of the congress would be rigorously adhered to. Here the negotiations are on the eve of being broken off, because you cannot believe that a question of such immense importance may depend on such or such an answer which we may make before a certain day. The more I consider what has passed, the more I am convinced, that if we do not go into the *contre-projets* demanded, and insist upon modifications on the basis of Frankfort, all is closed.

I venture to say, because I feel, that neither the glory of your majesty nor the power of France depend on the possession of Antwerp, or any other point of our new frontiers."—CAULAINCOURT to NAPOLEON. *Chatillon*, 6th March 1814.—FAIN, 301, 302.—*Pièces Just.*

(3) Pendant ces négociations (à Châtillon) je ne conçois pas comment je ne suis pas devenu fou. Le temps des illusions était passé. L'actualité était dévorante; et à mes lettres je ne recevais que des réponses évanescentes, alors qu'il eût fallu traiter à tout prix. L'avenir nous restait: à présent il ne nous reste qu'un tombeau. Mes lettres n'étaient qu'une pâle copie de ce que je disais à l'Empereur dans nos entretiens particuliers. J'insistai pour qu'il me donnât son ultimatum sincère, afin que je fusse en mesure de terminer invariablement avec les plenipotentiaires Alliés, qui avaient reçu certainement des instructions positives. Il me faut être vrai, car ceci est devenu de l'histoire: *L'Empereur ne répondait jamais catégoriquement à cette demande*. Il éludait, avec une merveilleuse adresse, de livrer le secret de sa pensée intime; cette manière est un des traits saillants de son genre d'esprit."—*Souvenirs de CAULAINCOURT*, i. 302, 329, 330.

with more activity than ever : the armistice of Lusigny, even in its application to the operations of the grand army, to which it was expressly confined, proved little more than a shadow ; while by a singular contrast, characteristic of the manners of modern Europe, the most polished forms of courtesy were observed at the congress of Chatillon, the choicest wines of the Rhone and Champagne, the most delicate viands of Paris, passed, as if by enchantment, through the French lines, to enrich the diplomatic dinners, which succeeded each other without the interruption of a day ; the Allied plenipotentiaries strove, by the most delicate attentions to M. Caulaincourt, to assuage, for a few moments at least, the overwhelming anxiety with which he was oppressed ; and French ladies of rank and beauty added the charm of female fascination to the assembly of hostile diplomatists, intent on the overthrow of their country (1).

Advance
of Blücher
to Meaux.
Feb. 27.

While this important negotiation was going on at Chatillon, military operations of the most active kind had been resumed between Napoléon in person and the army of Silesia, which had now, under the direction of Blücher, advanced beyond la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and almost to Meaux, in the direction of Paris. Napoléon was no sooner informed of the danger which menaced the capital, than he set out, as already mentioned (2), at daybreak on the morning of the 27th February, from Troyes, for Arcis-sur-Aube and Sezanne, to follow on the traces of the Prussian marshal. Blücher had some days before marched in the same direction, having on the 25th crossed the Aube at Anglure, and on the two following days advanced, driving Marmont before him, to la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, where the French marshal effected his junction with Mortier, who had retired from the neighbourhood of Soissons before the approaching corps of Winzingerode and Woronzoff, which were now moving forward to co-operate with the army of Silesia, in conformity with the plan agreed on at Bar-sur-Aube on the 25d (3). The light troops of the Russians were directed by Blücher to make an attack on Meaux, while, to deceive the enemy as to his real intentions, the Prussians were ordered to repair the bridges over the Marne, which had been burned by the French at la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and crossing over, menace the French marshal on that side. In pursuance of these orders, Sacken's light troops took possession, with little resistance, of that part of Meaux which is situated on the left bank of the Marne ; but at the very time that he was making preparations to force his passage across to that part of the town which is on the right bank, Marmont and Mortier, who were too experienced to be diverted from the decisive point of the Paris road by the feint at la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, arrived in breathless haste, and instantly manning the old walls, which had been deserted by the national guard who formed the garrison of the town, made every preparation for a vigorous defence. Their opportune arrival obliged Sacken to defer his attack till the following morning ; and in the course of the night Blücher received intelligence from Tettenborn that the French Emperor, in person, was marching on his rear by Sezanne. He immediately drew off his troops, and moved next day in the direction of Soissons, with a view to unite with Winzingerode and Woronzoff, and give battle to Napoléon. It was full time he should be interrupted in his career, for three days more would have brought him to the gates of the capital, where the roar of Sacken's cannon, during the attack on Meaux, was distinctly heard, and startled the multitude at the

(1) Lond. 277, 278. Bergh. 155, 192. Hard. xii. 356, 359. Fain, 302, 303.

(2) *Ante*, x, 97.

(3) *Ib.*, x, 97.

very moment that the cannon of the Invalides were announcing the victories over the grand army at Nangis and Montereau (1).

Combat at Bar-sur-Aube. Feb. 27. The departure of Napoléon from Troyes was soon made known to the outposts of the grand Allied army, by the languor and inactivity with which their rearguard was pursued. This, coupled with the intelligence which Schwartzemberg received at the same time, of the advance of Blucher towards the Marne, induced him, at the earnest request of the king of Prussia, who was justly alarmed for Blucher when the whole weight of Napoléon was directed against him, to resume the offensive on the great road from Troyes to Chaumont. With this view, early on the morning of the 27th, the corps of Wrede and Wittgenstein, mustering about thirty-five thousand sabres and bayonets, were drawn up opposite to Bar-sur-Aube, on the road leading to Chaumont. Oudinot commanded the French in that quarter, who, though consisting nominally of two corps of infantry and two of cavalry, could not bring above seventeen thousand men into the field; so that the Allies were more than two to one. The French, nevertheless, made a gallant defence. They were skilfully posted across several ravines, which descend from Bar towards the Aube, in such a manner, that they could be reached only along the plateaus which lay between them, where the ground being narrow, the superiority of the attacking force was not likely to be so severely felt. Wittgenstein's plan was to attack the enemy in front with Gorchakoff's corps, while Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg, supported by Pahlen's horse, menaced their flank. The French, however, commenced the action by storming the height in front of Ailleville, which formed the connecting point between their front and flank attack. Upon this, Wittgenstein ordered up Gorchakoff's corps, supported by Pahlen's cuirassiers, to retake that important point. The cavalry were repulsed; but after a severe struggle, the Russian infantry succeeded in regaining the height. Upon this turning point being gained, a general attack along the whole Allied line, the one half of which was perpendicular to the other, took place. Meanwhile, Pahlen's cuirassiers had been detached towards Sevigny, in order to threaten the enemy's communications, and thus Gorchakoff's men were exposed without adequate support to the furious charge of Kellerman's dragoons. These splendid troops, just arrived from Spain, speedily routed the Russian hussars, and threw their whole centre into such disorder, that Wittgenstein could only avert total defeat by concentrating his artillery at the menaced point; and he in haste sent orders to Pahlen to remeasure his steps, and bring up his heavy squadrons to the support of the wavering part of the line (2).

Victory of the Allies. Highly excited by this brilliant success, the veteran peninsular squadron threw themselves, with the utmost gallantry, on the Russian batteries in the centre; but the experienced Russian gunners allowed them to approach within a hundred steps, and then opened such a tremendous point-blank discharge of grape, that four hundred horsemen were in a few minutes stretched on the plain, and the remainder recoiled in disorder. At the same time, Schwartzemberg, who had come up in person, ordered two brigades of cavalry and one of infantry from Wrede's corps, to support the centre; and conceiving that part of the line now adequately secured, sent orders to Pahlen to wheel about a second time and resume his original march to Sevigny and Dolancourt, to threaten the enemy's left flank.

(1) Dan, 201, 202. Koch, i. 358, 360. Fain, 141, 142. Plötho, iii. 265, 271.

(2) Koch, ii. 1, 8. Burgh, 165, 166. Dan, 179, 180. Fain, 143. Plötho, iii. 240, 243.

At the same time, Wrede, who had now come into action, commenced a vigorous attack on Bar-sur-Aube itself, on the French right; so that both their flanks were menaced. These movements of necessity compelled Oudinot to retreat; but in order to gain time to effect it in order, his troops made the most vigorous resistance at all points, especially at Bar, which was the theatre of a most sanguinary conflict. Pahlen's brilliant dragoons, kept marching and countermarching all day without taking any part in the combat, did not arrive in time to molest their passage of the Aube at Dolancourt; and thus the French effected their retreat before nightfall, without being deprived of either guns or standards; but they sustained a loss of three thousand men, of whom five hundred were prisoners. The Allied loss was about two thousand; but they gained Bar-sur-Aube; and, what was of far more consequence, restored the credit and spirit of the grand army (1), and arrested a retreat to the Vosges mountains, or possibly to the Rhine.

Wound and
character
of Wittgen-
stein.

Count Wittgenstein was severely, Prince Schwartzemberg slightly wounded in this action; and the former being obliged to retire for a season from active operations, was succeeded in the command of his corps by General Raefskoi. But for his loss the Russian service would have had no cause to lament any circumstance which brought the indomitable hero of Smolensko (2) more prominently forward; but the wound which compelled Wittgenstein to withdraw, was a serious injury to the Allied cause, and a great misfortune to himself; for it occurred at the most critical period of the contest, and four weeks more would have shown the saviour of St.-Petersburg the dome of the Invalides. Though the jealousy of the Russian troops at a foreigner holding the supreme command, and the ill success which attended his arms when acting as generalissimo at Lutzen, prevented his being prominently brought forward in the latter stages of the war, he throughout bore a distinguished part in its achievements, and contributed much by the boldness of his advice to sustain, when it was much required, the vigour of the Allied councils. Daring, impetuous, often inconsiderate, he was the Marcellus, if Barclay de Tolly was the Fabius, of the Russian army; like Blucher, he was ever desirous to advance, and uniformly supported the most daring measures; in action, his buoyant courage never failed to bring him into the foremost ranks, and his frequent wounds attest how fearlessly he shared the dangers of the meanest soldiers. He could not be said to be a great master of strategy, and his want of circumspection in adequately supporting his advanced columns, frequently exposed his troops to serious reverses, of which the combat at Nangis had recently afforded an example (3); yet was this very peculiarity of his temperament, directing, as he did, troops so firm and resolute as the Russians, often of the most essential service to his country and the general cause of Europe. His obstinate resistance and unconquerable vigour on the Dwina, unquestionably saved St.-Petersburg during the first part of the campaign of 1812: his daring advance against Napoléon's right at Lutzen, all but exposed that great conqueror to total defeat; and his able retreat at Bautzen snatched victory from his grasp when it was all but already seized. The alacrity and fidelity with which, in subordinate situations, he subsequently conducted his own corps, both in 1813 and 1814, proved that his patriotism was superior to all unworthy considerations of jealousy; while his last achievement in the campaign at Bar-sur-Aube, for which he was made a field-marshal, had the

(1) Vaud. ii. 75, 80. Koch, i. 8, 11. Burg, 160, 161. Dan. 179, 180. Plötho, iii. 241, 244.

(2) *Ante*, viii. 345.

(3) *Ante*, x. 83.

most important effect in reviving the spirit of the grand army, and restoring vigour and unanimity to the Allied councils (1).

Schwartz-
berg at length
advances. Although, however, the successful result of this battle sufficiently proved that Napoléon, with the main body of his army, was absent, and that a thin curtain of troops alone stood in front of the grand army, yet it was impossible at first to infuse an adequate degree of resolution into their direction. The retiring columns of Oudinot were hardly at all pursued, Prince Schwartzberg assigned as a reason, that he could not advance till he was informed of the direction and tendency of Macdonald's corps, which was advancing near Vandœuvres. This corps, however, proved so weak, that it was met and repulsed by the cavalry alone of Count Pahlen and prince Eugène of Wirtemberg; and intelligence having been received on the 1st March, that Napoléon, with the main body of his forces, was at Arcis-sur-Aube on the preceding day, following fast on Blucher's traces, it became evident that the plan of the campaign agreed on at Bar-sur-Aube, on the 25th February, could no longer be adhered to, and he was

March 1. in a manner forced into more vigorous operations. On the same day that this information was received from the army of Silesia, a general reconnoissance with the cavalry took place towards Vandœuvres, and it was ascertained that the enemy were in force in no direction. Orders were at

March 2. length given for a general advance. Headquarters were on the day following advanced to Bar-sur-Aube; the retreat was stopped at all points, and preparations were made for attacking the enemy immediately, in the position which he occupied along the Barce, and, if possible, drive him from Troyes. Oudinot and Macdonald had now collected all their forces in that position, and did not appear disposed to relinquish it without a combat (2).

Plan for
the combat.
March 3. The attack took place on the 3d, and was maintained with great vigour at all points. The French united corps, which were all under the command of Marshal Macdonald, mustered thirty-five thousand combatants; of which nearly nine thousand were cavalry. The great preponderance of this arm, and the desperate use the French generals had made of it at Bar-sur-Aube, rendered the Allies cautious in their movements; but their great superiority of number rendered success a matter of certainty, for they had already sixty thousand men in the field, without bringing up the imperial guards or reserves from the neighbourood of Chaumont. The position which the French marshal had chosen, strong, and on the elevated plateau of Laubrisel, was inaccessible in front and flank in ordinary times, by reason of the morasses with which it was surrounded; but it was by no means equally defensible during the hard frost which had for nearly two months prevailed over all Europe at that time, and rendered the deepest marshes as easy of crossing as the smoothest plain. Taking advantage of this circumstance, Schwartzberg directed Wrede to attack the position in front by the great road to Vandœuvres, which passed through it, while Wittgenstein's corps now under Gortchakoff assailed it on the right, and the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg and Count Giulay menaced it on the left, by the road from Bar-sur-Seine to Troyes (3).

Defeat of
the French
at La
Guillotière.
Feb. 3. At three o'clock the signal was given by the discharge of two guns from Wrede's corps, and the troops all advanced to the attack. Hardly were the first rounds of artillery fired, when, seeing that Prince Eugène's movement was rapidly turning them, the French on the

(1) Dan. 181, 182.

(3) Koch, ii. 20, 23. Dan. 187. Burgh. 174.

(2) Burgh. 173, 174. Dan. 185, 187. Koch, ii. 13, 21. Plotho, iii. 246, 247. Vaud. ii. 87, 90.

extreme left began to retreat. The Russian cuirassiers under Pahlen instantly dashed forward, and broke two battalions which had not time to form square; and, passing on, attacked a park of artillery which was just entering Troyes, dispersed the drivers, and took the greater part of the guns. General Gérard, who lay sick among the carriages, was only saved from being made prisoner by the intrepidity of a few sappers, who came up to his rescue. Upon this, Count St.-Germain's dragoons were brought up, and these admirable troops, charging home, not only checked Pahlen's men, already blown by their success, but retook several of the guns. Soon, however, the deep and heavy masses of the Allied infantry came up, each column preceded by a formidable array of artillery. Gérard, who commanded the centre, seeing he was certain of being turned by both flanks if he remained where he was, soon gave orders for a retreat, and the plateau of Laubrisse, the key of the position, was abandoned. Schwartzberg, perceiving that the retreat was commencing, ordered Wrede with his Bavarians to storm the bridge of La Guillotière over the Barce, which was done in the most brilliant

March 4. style, and rendered the position accessible in front at all points. The French now retreated on all sides, and after sustaining, with various success, repeated charges of the Allied horse, withdrew wholly into Troyes, which they abandoned next day by capitulation, having in this action suffered a loss of nine pieces of cannon, and two thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred were made prisoners; while the Allies had not to lament the loss, in all, of more than eight hundred (1).

Extraordinary inactivity of the grand army after these successes.

Every thing now conspired to recommend vigorous operations to the grand army; its credit was restored, and its spirit revived by the successful issue of the two last actions; its retreat had been arrested, and turned into a victorious advance; the ancient capital of Champagne had again fallen into its hands; Napoléon was absent, and the troops opposed to it, dejected and downcast, were hardly a third of its own numerical amount. By simply advancing against an enemy in no condition to oppose any resistance to such an operation, Paris would be menaced, the pressure on Blücher removed, the circle of operations narrowed, and the Emperor at length compelled to fight for his dominions and crown, against the united force of both armies, under the very walls of his capital.

March 4. To complete the reasons for vigorous hostilities, the negotiations for an armistice at Lusigny were broken off on the very day on which Troyes was retaken, Count Flahaut's propositions on that subject being deemed wholly inadmissible by the Allied powers. The Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh were indefatigable in their efforts, after this period, to rouse the Austrian commander-in-chief to more active operations, so loudly called for, not more by the obvious advantage to be gained, than by the not less obvious danger to the army of Silesia to be averted by immediately commencing them (2). But all their efforts were in vain; for the next fortnight, big, as we shall immediately see, with the most important events between the

(1) Plötho, iii. 249, 251. Koch, ii. 26, 29. Vaud. ii. 91, 95. Dan. 187, 188. Burgh 175, 176.

(2) The Emperor considers, that the advance of the grand army to Sens is drawing us away from the enemy, and that it is therefore indispensable to direct all our forces to the right towards Arcis, between that town and Vitry; and, at all events, to reinforce them with the reserves, which should be ordered to move forward." ALEXANDER to SCHWARTZBERG, 8th March 1814.—"In consequence of intelligence received from Field-Marshal Blücher, the Emperor considers it indispensable to begin to

move by the right, between Arcis-sur-Aube and Vitry." ALEXANDER to SCHWARTZBERG, 11th March 1814—"I hasten to communicate to your highness the reports received from Count St.-Preist. His majesty has charged me to inform you, that according to his opinion, it is now more necessary than ever to act on the offensive. Henceforth your hands will be completely unbound, and you may act according to military calculation." VOLKONSKY, Alexander's Aide-de-camp, to SCHWARTZBERG, 12th March 1814. DANILEWSKY, 194, 195.

Aisne and the Marne, the grand army—full eighty thousand strong, even after the two corps sent to Lyons had been deducted, flushed with victory, within six days' march of the capital, with only thirty thousand enemies in its front—remained in a state of almost total inaction, leaving the destinies of Europe to hang on the swords, comparatively equally balanced, of Napoléon and Marshal Blucher! On the 5th, indeed, headquarters were advanced to Troyes; the French marshals retired, as Napoléon had done a month before, behind the Seine, and were posted at Bray, Nogent, and Montereau, with the headquarters at Provins; the victorious corps of Wrede, Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg, and Wittgenstein, now under Raefskoi, were advanced to Sens, Nangis, and Pont-sur-Yonne; and the Prussian reserves were brought up from Chaumont to the neighbourhood of Montierender. But in these positions they were kept wholly inactive till the 15th, when, in consequence of the great successes of the army of Silesia, a forward movement, though with the usual caution of Schwartzemberg, was attempted. But the Austrian generalissimo is not responsible for this, on military principles, inexplicable delay; diplomacy here, as so often during the war, restrained the soldiers' arms; and the cabinet of Vienna, distracted between its desire to reduce France to the frontiers of 1792, and yet preserve the throne for the grandson of the Emperor Francis, still clung to the hope, that, by delaying bringing matters to extremities, Napoléon might be brought to see his situation in its true light, and conclude a peace on such terms as might still leave his dynasty on the throne (1).

Retreat of
Blucher to
Soissons.

Very different, however, was the system of warfare which was pursued on the banks of the Aisne, where Blucher, with the iron bands of the army of Silesia, singly bore the whole weight of Napoléon's power. No sooner did the veteran marshal receive intelligence of the Emperor's approach, than, with all imaginable expedition, he gathered together his forces, and forthwith commenced his march across the Marne, the bridges of which he broke down, in the direction of Soissons. Napoléon, counting the moments in his impatience, urged on the advance of his troops from la Ferté-Gaucher; the soldiers, in high spirits and burning with ardour, gallantly seconded his efforts, and forty thousand men, pressing on with ceaseless march, promised soon to bring on a fearful collision with the enemy. But it was too late. As the leading columns reached the heights above la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and the valley of the Marne lay at their feet, they beheld the rearguard of the army of Silesia vanishing in the distance on the other side of the Marne, the whole bridges of which were broken down. It was necessary to restore them before the pursuit could be renewed, and this required four-and-twenty hours. Headquarters, therefore, were established at la Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and Napoléon in person repaired the following morning

March 2. to the spot to hasten the reconstruction of the bridges, at which the engineers laboured with such assiduity, that the troops began to cross over on the evening of the same day. Meanwhile couriers were dispatched to Paris to tranquillize the inhabitants, whom the cannonade at Meaux had thrown into the utmost consternation, with the joyful intelligence of the retreat of the Allies; while Blucher, who proposed to fight at Dietzby, on the left bank of the Aisne, and had given orders to Winzingerode and Bulow to meet him there for that purpose, toiled on amidst dreadful rains, and by deep cross-roads, rendered almost impassable by the sudden breaking up of the frost, to gain the appointed place of rendezvous (2).

(1) Burgh. 176, 179. Koch, ii. 34, 39. Plötho, iii. 251, 258. Dau, 190, 194.

(2) Dan. 203, 204. Fain, 144, 147. Koch, i. 368, 370. Plötho, iii. 275, 281.

Perilous
situation
of Blücher
from Sois-
sons hold-
ing out.

It was not so easy a matter as the Prussian general supposed, for Bulow and Winzingerode to get across to Dietchy; for the only bridge over the Aisne at this time, flooded by the thaw, was at Soissons, and it was a fortified town, held by a considerable French garrison. The justice of the *coup-d'œil* which had made Chernicheff some weeks before select it as the scene of his brilliant assault, was now manifest; but the whole fruits of that success had been lost, and the town regained to the enemy, from the retreat consequent on the disasters of Blücher's army. Bulow and Winzingerode, in obedience to the orders sent them from Bar-sur-Aube on the 23th, had united on the 2d near Soissons, on the opposite side of the river: their forces amounted to fifty thousand veterans, so that they would double the numerical strength of the army of Silesia. But Soissons held out, notwithstanding repeated summonses to surrender; the strength of its works, which had been considerably increased since Chernicheff's extraordinary *coup-de-main*, seemed to defy an immediate assault; and yet the situation of Blücher—on the opposite bank with Marmont, with whom his rearguard had that day a severe encounter, which cost him five hundred men, and Mortier pressing on his rear, and Napoléon threatening his flank—was extremely perilous. In this emergency the Prussian marshal sent forward the pontoon train to Busancy on the Aisne, with the most experienced engineers in his army, to select points for throwing bridges across; but to attempt such an operation during the darkness of a winter night, with sixty thousand French, led by Napoléon, thundering in pursuit, was obviously attended with no common hazard (1).

Capitula-
tion of
Soissons
extricates
him from
his diffi-
culties.

In this dilemma, the Prussian marshal was delivered from his difficulties in a way so remarkable, that it almost savoured of the marvellous. There were fifteen hundred Poles in Soissons, the brave but now inconsiderable remnant of the followers of Poniatowski, under the command of General Moreau (2). They had received special orders from Napoléon to defend the place to the last drop of their blood, as the blocking up that issue to the army of Silesia out of the country between the Marne and the Aisne, formed a part of the able plan which he had conceived for its destruction. The Allied generals had resolved to attempt to storm the place on the following morning; but during the night, under the pretence of purchasing some wine for the use of the generals, they sent an officer into the town to propose a capitulation. This skilful diplomatist, Colonel Lowernstown, having with some difficulty, and not without sustaining great danger from the sentries, who repeatedly fired upon him, contrived to make his way into the town, so worked upon the fears of the governor, by representing that two strong corps were prepared to assault the place on the following morning, and would infallibly put the whole garrison to the sword, that he prevailed on the governor and council of war, whom he found assembled, to capitulate. Moreau proposed that the garrison should be allowed to take the guns, six in number, with them; and, after some feigned opposition on the part of Lowernstown, this was admitted. Winzingerode gladly acceded to the proposed terms; and it having been observed by some one present, that it was unusual to give an enemy, voluntarily evacuating a fortress, more than two guns, Woronzoff justly remarked—"that in the present circumstances, the surrender of Soissons was of such importance (3), that it would

(1) Dan. 204, 205. Fain. 147, 140. Koch, i. 573, 374. Plotho, iii. 280, 283.

(2) Not of course the great general of the same name who fell at Dresden.

(3) Dan. 207, 209. Plotho, iii. 283, 284. Koch, i. 374, 376. Vaud. ii. 15, 16.

be even allowable to make the French commandant a present of some of our own guns, on the single condition of his evacuating the fortress on the instant." The capitulation was accordingly agreed to, and Woronzoff in person led his troops immediately after, at noon on the 3d, to take possession of the city gates.

Junction of
Blucher's
army with
Winzingerode
and
Bulow.

Napoléon expressed, as well he might, the utmost indignation at this disgraceful capitulation; the moment he received intelligence of it, he directed the governor, Moreau, to be forthwith delivered over to a military commission. The importance of the advantage

thus gained to the Allies was soon apparent; for hardly were the city gates in the possession of the Russians, when the sound of Marmont and Mortier's cannon was heard thundering on Blucher's rearguard, and, soon after, the heads of his columns, weary and jaded, and in great confusion, began to arrive, and they defiled without intermission through the fortress all night. It may fairly be concluded, therefore, that the opportune surrender of Soissons saved the Prussian marshal, if not from total defeat, which the distance at which the great body of Napoléon's forces still were rendered

improbable, at least from most serious embarrassment and loss in crossing the river. On the day following, the whole army passed over in safety, and effected their junction with Bulow and Winzingerode's men, on the summit of the plateau overlooking Soissons, on the road to Laon. The veterans of the Silesian army, almost worn out with two months' incessant marching and six weeks of active hostilities, with hardly any shoes on their feet, tattered greatcoats on their backs, and almost empty caissons, presented a striking contrast to the splendid array, untarnished uniforms, and well-replenished artillery and baggage-waggons of Bernadotte's corps. This important junction raised the strength of the united army to a hundred thousand men, of whom twenty-four thousand were admirable horse; and infantry and cavalry alike were tried veteran troops, well known in the preceding campaign on the Elbe. Blucher resolved no longer to retreat, but give battle on the summit of the elevated plateaus which lie between the Aisne and the Marne, adjacent to the highway from Soissons to Laon (1).

Napoléon's
decrees
calling on
the French
people to rise
en masse.

And now an event occurred, which throws an important light on the moral government of the world, and illustrates the inexpedience, even for present interests, of those deviations from the

rules of justice and humanity, which it is the highest glory of civilization to have introduced into the ruthless code of war. Irritated at the escape of the army of Silesia from the well-laid scheme which he had devised for its destruction, and anxious to engage the masses of the people, hitherto passive and inert in the midst of the hostile armies, in a guerilla warfare on the flanks and rear of the invaders, Napoléon issued two proclamations from Fismès, by the first of which he not only authorized, but enjoined, every Frenchman to take up arms, and fall on the flanks and rear of the invading armies; while, by the second, the penalties of treason were denounced against every mayor or public functionary who should not stimulate, to the utmost of his power, the prescribed insurrectionary movements on the part of the people (2). Thus was Napoléon himself driven, by

(1) Vaud. ii. 17, 25. Koch, i. 376, 379. Dan. 210, 211.

(2) "All the French citizens are not only authorized to take up arms, but required to do so; to sound the tocsin as soon as they hear the cannon of our troops approaching them; to assemble together, scour the woods, break down the bridges,

intercept the roads, and fall on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Every French citizen taken by the enemy, who shall be put to death, shall be forthwith avenged, by the shooting of a prisoner from the enemy.—NAPOLÉON." "All the mayors, public functionaries, and inhabitants, who, instead of stimulating the patriotic ardour of the people, shall

a just retribution, and the consequences of the atrocious system of universal invasion and systematic oppression which the Revolutionary armies had so long pursued, to adopt the very same measures of defence which he had so often denounced in his enemies, and for obeying which he had, in sullen revenge, shed so much noble and heroic blood. The guerilla warfare to which he now called the French, and which of course led to severe and sanguinary proclamations, in reprisal, by the Allied generals, was no other than the very system for pursuing which he had, in the outset of his career, shot the magistrates and principal citizens of Pavia in cold blood, and gave up that beautiful city to pillage (1); and to repress which he had sanctioned the bloody proclamations of Soult (2) and Augereau (3), denouncing the punishment of death against every Spanish peasant found in arms in defence of his country; and the still more infamous decree of Bessières, affixing the same penalty not only to the people, not soldiers, taken in arms, but “against the *fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews*, of all individuals who have quitted their domiciles, and do not inhabit the villages occupied by the French (4). Impelled by stern necessity, the mighty conqueror was now obliged to sign with his own hand the condemnation of his previous cruelty; to canonize the memory of the many brave men whom he had doomed to death for doing what he now enjoined; to expose to similar suffering the people who had been the instruments and sharers in his oppression. Providence has a clear mode of dealing with the sins of men, which is, to leave them to the consequence of their own iniquities.

Napoléon crosses the Aisne, and follows Blücher to Craon.

Determined to come to blows with the army of Silesia, notwithstanding the great accession of strength which it had just received, in the hopes that he might disable it for a time, at least, from resuming the offensive, while he turned his strength against the vast but unwieldy masses of the grand army, Napoléon gave orders for a general advance. With this view, General Corbineau, with a considerable body, was detached in the night of the 4th from Fismès to Reims, of which he took possession without resistance on the day following; and, on the same day, the advanced guard was moved to Berry-au-Bac, where the cross-road from Reims to Laon passes the Aisne, by a bridge recently constructed. The whole army was immediately moved in that direction; and Nansouty, having fallen in with the rearguard of the enemy, drove it back to Corbeny with some loss. As soon as the passage of the Aisne was fully effected, couriers were dispatched to Mézières, Verdun, and Metz, with instructions to stimulate the authorities to rouse the peasantry; but though the latter in many places showed a disposition to rise in obedience to the Emperor's proclamations, and not unfrequently fell upon the detached parties of the Allies with hardly any leaders, yet the former, foreseeing his approaching end, hardly ever made the slightest attempt either to direct or encourage their efforts. Meanwhile, the army approached Laon (5), by the road from Berry-au-Bac, to the ground where Marshal Blücher had taken post on the plateau of Craon, on the narrow neck of land which extends from the road from Soissons to Laon, to which the enemy were now advancing from Berry-au-Bac to the same town.

strive to cool them, and dissuade them from all the measures of a legitimate defence, shall be considered as traitors, and treated as such.”—NAPOLÉON, 5th March 1814. *Moniteur*, March 6, 1814, and *GOLDSMITH'S Recueil*, vi. 645,

(1) *Ante*, iii. p. 26.

(2) Aug. 13, 1810.

(3) Dec. 28, 809.

(4) June 6, 1811.

Ante, viii. p. 143.

(5) Koch. i. 388, 391. Dan, 217. Fain, 154, 155.

Description
of the field
of battle.

The position thus chosen was a plateau nearly a mile and a half long, but not half a mile broad, bounded on either flank by steep slopes leading down to the ravines of Foulon and D'Ailes, the sides of which, difficult of ascent to infantry, were wholly impracticable for cavalry or artillery. The river Lette flowed nearly in a straight line, in the bottom of the ravine to the north : at the distance of a mile from the southern edge of the plateau, the Aisne ran in a deep and nearly parallel channel from east to west; but the immediate declivities of the position were drained by a multitude of feeders, which flowed rapidly down at right angles to the central bed of these two streams. A cross gully of no great depth, but a most formidable obstacle on a field of battle, extended at right angles to the ravines, along the front of that part of the plateau which Woronzoff chose for his first stand; and two others of irregular forms running each halfway across it, afforded, like so many bastions and ditches, positions of considerable strength in rear. The upper part of the hollows on either side were filled with woods; that of Vauder lying to the north, and the Bois-de-Blanc Sablon to the south, neither of which were pervious to cavalry or artillery. The neck of the plateau, and strength of the position, was across it from D'Ailes to Paissy, and at that point it was little more than five hundred yards broad : a narrow space for a battle to be fought, on which the fate of France, and perhaps of Europe, would depend (1).

Blucher's
dispositions. It was far from being his whole army, however, which Blucher had assembled in this strong position. His situation was full of difficulty, especially considering the sudden and desperate strokes which his antagonist was wont to deliver, the admirable quality of the troops at his command, and the variety of points he himself was called on to defend. It was necessary, in case of disaster, and for the sake of his communications, to cover Laon, the bulwark of the roads to the Netherlands; to defend the central position at Craon, and, at the same time, to keep possession of the important fortress of Soissons, commanding the principal passage of the Aisne, and the great road to Paris, the object of all his efforts. This last stronghold, forming the extreme right of his line, was now threatened with instant assault by Marmont and Mortier, to whom Napoléon had given peremptory orders instantly to carry it at all hazards. To provide at once for these different objects, and, at the same time, carry into effect his intention of giving battle to the French Emperor, the following dispositions were made by Marshal Blucher—Bulow, with his whole corps, was sent off to defend Laon : the infantry of Winzingerode, under Woronzoff and Strogonoff, were charged with the defence of the plateau of Craon; while Winzingerode, at the head of ten thousand horse, and sixty pieces of horse-artillery, followed by Kleist and Langeron, was to pass the Lette, and by cross-roads fall on the right wing or rear of the French. D'York was posted on the highway between Soissons and Laon, to afford succour to any point which might require it; and the defence of Soissons was entrusted to Rudzewitch, with six thousand men of Langeron's corps (2).

Unsuccessful
assault on
Soissons.
March 5.

The first attack was made on this important fortress, the loss of which had been the subject of such unbounded mortification to the Emperor. At daylight on the morning of the 5th, the enemy's troops were seen approaching, in deep columns, by the road of Château-Thierry. Rudzewitch immediately made his preparations, and rode round

(1) Personal observation. Koch, i. 389, 390. Vaud. ii, 1, 332. Plotho, iii, 288, 289. Beauch. i. 395.

(2) Koch, i. 386, 387. Dan. 248. Plotho, iii. 290.

the ranks, reminding his men of what they owed to their sovereign and the honour of the Russian arms. At seven, the enemy commenced the attack on the faubourgs, but they were repulsed with loss. Returning, however, to the charge, they made themselves master of a considerable part of the houses beyond the walls, and a desperate action, within pistol-shot, ensued in the streets, near to the foot of the ramparts, which was maintained with the greatest resolution on both sides. Transported with ardour, the French, in many places, unroofed the houses of which they had made themselves masters, hoisted up their guns, with ropes, on the outside, to the topmost story, and from thence, as from the moving towers of antiquity, battered the summit of the walls, nearly on an equal footing. But it was all in vain. The invincible Russian grenadiers, with heroic resolution, made good their post against their gallant antagonists, threefold more numerous than themselves; the guns on the bastions maintained their superiority over those of the enemy, somewhat below them, in the suburbs; and after the whole day had been consumed, and fifteen hundred men lost to either side in this furious assault, the French marshal drew off, leaving Rudzewitch in possession of his bloodstained ramparts (1).

Napoléon's Disappointed in his hopes of turning the Allied position by car-
dispositions. rying Soissons on its right flank, Napoléon now resolved to hazard a direct attack upon the plateau in its front. Had his army been composed of the soldiers of Arcola or Rivoli, he would have formed his troops into a dense column, and assaulted the Russians on the neck of the narrow tongue of land, as his grenadiers had forced the dykes in the swampy plains of Verona. But with the exception of the divisions Friant and Christiani's of the old guard, with the cuirassiers, they were of a very different description, being, in great part, conscripts and young troops, almost worn out with the incredible efforts they had already made in the campaign; and who were not always to be relied on except in the presence of the Emperor. In consequence of this, Napoléon felt the necessity of supplying by combination what was wanting in strength; and with this view he made the following dispositions—Ney was charged with the principal attack, which was to be directed against the enemy's right flank, upwards from the slope descending to the valley of the Lette, and he had under his command part of Victor's corps and the dragoons of the guard; while Nansouty, with the Polish dragoons and Excelman's division, was to climb the steep on the left of the enemy, from the side of Oulche and the feeders of the Aisne. The main attack along the neck of the plateau, led by Victor, at the head of the infantry of the guard, was under the direction of Napoléon in person; and by bringing up column after column on that narrow plain, he hoped to force the position, despite its natural advantages, when the heads of his columns showed themselves on either flank. His force actually on the field, and engaged with the enemy, amounted to forty thousand men; the Russians were only twenty-seven thousand; but they had the advantage of a very strong position, had not been exhausted by previous combats in the campaign, and were the very flower of the Russian army (2). By a singular chance, the result of the previous movements which had taken place, both parties had passed each other, and now wheeled about to fight: the Russians with their faces to the Rhine, the French with theirs towards Paris.

Commence- Soon after nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, two of the
ment of the battle. enemy's columns appeared on the front of the plateau towards

(1) Dan. 215, 216. Beauch, i. 391, 392. Vaud. i. 27. Plotko, iii. 286.

(2) Dan. 219, 222. Koch, i. 389, 391. Vaud, i. 31, 34. Plotko, iii. 299. Kausler, 398, 399.

Craon, while a third, without guns, entered the ravine on the left. Blucher at the same time received intelligence that Winzingerode's corps of horse-artillery and cannon, which was destined to turn the French flank, and execute the decisive attack, so far from having yet reached Fétieux, their place of destination, were still far in the rear, from having been impeded by the excessive badness of the roads. He instantly ordered Kleist's men to take the start of Winzingerode, and press on direct for that place; while he himself set out in person after Winzingerode, to endeavour to overcome the difficulties which impeded him, leaving Sacken on the neck of land to combat Napoléon. The French forces, preceded by a hundred guns, soon approached in dense masses along the plateau. Shortly the fire of artillery became extremely violent on both sides; for the Russian cannon, consisting of sixty pieces, was admirably posted, and kept up a dreadful discharge, with unerring precision, both in front and flank, on the deep French columns advancing along the neck of the plateau. The French cannon, greatly superior in number, but by no means so advantageously placed, replied with the greatest vigour; their shot, admirably directed, ploughed through the Russian masses, which, drawn up in three lines, almost close together, presented an infallible mark to their gunners, and not a piece was fired without producing a corresponding chasm in the opposite ranks. But nothing could shake the firmness of Woronzow's troops; whole files were mowed down, but the men never wavered, and with the steadiness which discipline superadded to native courage alone can give, calmly fronted the tempest of death in obedience to their Czar and their oaths. At length the attacking columns recoiled in this fearful strife, and Victor's troops, after sustaining a dreadful loss, withdrew beyond reach of the fire (1).

Desperate action on the plateau, which at length ends in the Russians retreating. Meanwhile Ney, on the Russian left, no sooner heard the cannon-shot on the crest of the plateau, than, transported with ardour, he redoubled the vigour of his attack. The hamlet of D'Ailes was carried after hard fighting, and his tirailleurs, driving the Russian light troops before them, were seen climbing the steep on the left of the plateau. At the same time an attempt was made by Nansouty, with six battalions of infantry, to mount the summit on the right from the side of Oulche. The depth, however, of the ravine on that flank, the badness of the roads, and the well-directed fire of six guns planted on the edge of the plateau, at the top of the declivity, rendered the attack abortive. No sooner, however, did the Emperor perceive Ney's vanguard appearing on the summit, than he ordered Victor to advance again in a heavy close column along the neck of the position. With such vigour did this column rush forward, supported by Ney's men on their right, in spite of the fire of forty-eight guns on their front and flank, that one of the Russian batteries on the left was carried; but it was only a few minutes in the enemy's possession, for the 19th light infantry, and regiment of Shirvan, rushed forward and retook it with the bayonet, hurling the French with loud shouts down the steep. But the extreme rapidity and violence of the fire now caused, after four hours' fighting, a want of ammunition to be felt in the Russian lines; and Sacken, alarmed by the increasing masses of the French, especially in the valley on his left, and the non-appearance of Blucher or Winzingerode in their rear, as had been expected, twice sent orders to Woronzow to retreat. The brave Russian, however, finding he could still make good his post, and wisely judging that he ran less danger by standing still in his strong position and continuing the

(1) Kausler, 400. Dan. 223, 224. Koch, i, 391, 392. Vaud. ii. 32, 33.

contest, than retreating in face of such a force as Napoléon commanded, still maintained his ground. But at length Sacken having received instructions from Blücher to fall back with all his forces to the central position at Laon, gave Woronzow positive orders to retreat (1).

Glorious retreat of the Russians. It was at two o'clock in the afternoon that this hazardous movement commenced. Woronzow formed his men with admirable steadiness, even under the fire of a hundred French guns, in squares, and ordered the retreat in ordinary time by alternate squares; the artillery in the openings, and the dismounted guns, two-and-twenty in number, with such of the wounded as could be removed, in front of the retreating column. As soon as Napoléon perceived the retreat commencing, he hurried forward all his guns, to his own front, redoubled his fire upon the retiring column, and ordered up the whole dragoons and cuirassiers along the neck of the plateau to charge. So vehement was their onset, so loud the cries and clatter of the rushing horsemen, that it was at first thought all was lost on the right; but when the smoke cleared away, the steady squares were seen pursuing their march unbroken; and Benkendorff, with the hussars and Cossacks, bravely charged the French horse, and checked the pursuit. As the retreat continued, however, and the Russians came past the neck to a wider part of the plateau, the danger became greater, because the more extended surface of the level ground enabled the French cavalry to turn the Russian flanks. At this critical moment, however, Vassiltchikoff came up with Lanskoj's hussars and Dochiakoff's dragoons of Sacken's corps. These incomparable troops instantly charged the pursuing horse, and drove them back in their turn. So narrow was the ground in some places, that the horse were obliged to halt, and open out, in order to let the infantry and guns get through; and instantly closing when they had passed, faced about against the pursuers. Several of the Russian regiments of cavalry charged in this manner, in less than an hour, eight different times (2).

Impregnable position taken up by the Russians in the rear. Meanwhile the Russian troops were approaching the second neck of the plateau, in the rear both of the former and of the wider space between them; and while the cavalry retarded the advance of the enemy, the whole guns of Sacken and Woronzow's corps which were not dismounted, sixty-four in number, were placed upon it. The ground was singularly calculated to give efficiency to their fire; for it was at once flanked on either side by perpendicular rocks which could not be scaled, and rose by a steep slope in the narrow isthmus between them, so as to afford the means of placing the cannon in a double row, one behind and the other above, in such a manner, that, like the upper and under decks of a ship at sea, they could both fire at the same time. On this slope the guns were placed; thirty-six in the first line, twenty-eight in the second opposite to the intervals between the first, and about twenty feet above them. When every thing was in readiness, the infantry were marching back slowly, and with perfect regularity, abreast of the first line of guns, when they faced about and dressed in a line with the mouths of the pieces; while the cavalry, now almost worn out, rapidly withdrew to the right and left, and retired behind the artillery. Great was the astonishment of the French when the screen of horsemen cleared away, and they beheld this close mass of enemies ready to receive them. They were nothing daunted, however, by the sight. Drouot formed the terrible artillery of the guard in front of this second position, and calmly moved

(1) Dan. 223, 224. Koch, i. 393, 396. Krausler, 400. Plötho, iii. 290. Vaud. ii. 33, 35.

(2) Dan. 225, 226. Krausler, 400. Vaud. i. 35, 37. Koch, i. 394, 396.

on in the midst of the guns, on foot as he was wont, against the double tier of cannon; and immediately behind him the lofty grenadier caps of the imperial guard were seen in dense and formidable array. But all their efforts were in vain. With dauntless intrepidity, indeed, the old guard continued to press on along the narrow ridge; but the thicker their columns became, the greater was the havoc, until their advance was literally impeded by heaps of the dead and the dying. The Russian artillery, worked with extraordinary rapidity, fired, by alternate guns, round shot and grape from the first line, and round shot and grenades from the second; and such was the precision of their aim, that the assailants never succeeded, notwithstanding the most heroic efforts, in passing the dreadful strait. This awful cannonade lasted only twenty minutes; when Drouot, finding the position unassailable, drew off his guns, and the fire ceased (1). Soon after, Woronzow, having by this stand gained time for his cavalry, wounded, and carriages, to reach the great road from Soissons, himself followed with the rearguard; to which the garrison of the former town was joined, and the whole fell back to the environs of Laon.

Results of
the battle.

Such was the terrible battle of Craon, the most obstinately contested, if we except Albuera and Culm, of the whole Revolutionary war, and in which it is hard to say to which side of the heroic antagonists the palm of victory is to be awarded. The French were greatly superior in number, for, as Sacken's infantry was never engaged, nor even in sight, the whole troops who fought on the Russian side did not exceed twenty thousand; while Napoléon had nearly forty thousand actually under fire. But this disproportion, great as it was, appears to have been counterbalanced in the result by the incomparable strength of Woronzow's position, which rendered numerical superiority of little avail, and the admirable disposition of his guns, which, both at the commencement and close of the action, gave the Russian artillery, though inferior in number, a decided advantage over that of the French. Trophies of victory there were none to boast of by either party; the French won the field of battle, but it was covered only with the dead or the dying: no prisoners, cannon, or standards were made on either side; and the field itself was yielded, not to the attacks, impetuous as they were, of Napoleon's grenadiers, but to the general policy of the campaign, which, after Winzingerode's circular march against the French rear had failed, induced the Prussian field-marshal to direct a general concentration of his forces in the noble position of Laon. The loss on both sides was enormous; and, save at Albuera, unprecedented in proportion to the number of troops engaged in the whole war: the Russians were weakened by six thousand killed and wounded; but, on the side of the French, no less than eight thousand brave men, being nearly a fifth of the troops engaged, had fallen. Woronzow deservedly had the order of St.-George, of the second class, immediately conferred upon him by a grateful sovereign: wounds and death were the only returns which now remained for French deeds of heroism. Victor was severely lacerated by a cannon-ball in the thigh; Grouchy, Nansouty, Boyer, and two others, more slightly (2).

Reflections
on this
battle, and
the extra-
ordinary
gallantry
displayed.

Had Winzingerode's attack, supported by Kleist, in the rear, not been prevented from taking place by the extraordinary difficulties which impeded his march, Napoléon's career would, in all probability, have been terminated at Craon, as it afterwards was at Wa-

(1) Dan. 226, 228. Kausler, 401. Plottho, iii. 290, 291. Koch, i. 399, 401. Vaud. i. 35, 37.

(2) Koch, i. 401, 402. Kausler, 401. Dan. 229. Fain, 158. Vaud. ii. 37.

terloo. His last reserves had been engaged on the plateau : he had no troops in hand to oppose to any fresh attack : and the apparition of ten thousand horse followed by Kleist and Langeron's corps, in his rear, would have proved fatal. It cannot be denied that Blucher erred egregiously in dispersing his army so much before the battle; and that, considering that his forces, upon the whole, were double those of his antagonist, it afforded the most decisive proof of his having been out-generaled, or singularly ill used by fortune, that, at the decisive point, the French outnumbered his troops engaged in the same ratio. Proportionally greater was the credit due to the heroism of Woronzow and his unconquerable soldiers, who overcame all these obstacles, and contended on equal terms, during the whole day, against Napoléon, at the head of double their forces, including his redoubtable guards and cuirassiers. Innumerable were the deeds of heroism performed by officers and men on both sides : Ney, Mortier, and Victor, combated on foot at the head of their troops, and were always to be seen in the thickest of the fire, animating the troops by their voice and their example : Woronzow repeatedly, during the retreat, threw himself into the squares, and in person gave the word of command to fire, when the French had come within fifty paces : Major-General Poncet, severely wounded, stood before his brigade on crutches, and positively refused to retire till the line was directed to fall back : the regiment of Shirvan, having exhausted its cartridges, and being surrounded by the French cavalry, thrice forced their way through with fixed bayonets, bringing with them their dead colonel, and all the officers who had been either killed or wounded : Dochakoff, on being mortally wounded, exclaimed to his regiment, "Halt, Courlanders!" and breathed his last (1).

Napoléon on the night succeeding the battle. While the cavalry were on the road to Laon, Napoléon traversed in the gloom of the evening the bloodstained summit of the plateau, and then descended into the valley of the Aisne, to seek a hamlet wherein to pass the night, and found it in the village of Bray. His spirit was unusually depressed, as well by the bloody and unsatisfactory issue of the action, as the intelligence which he received the same evening from Chatillon, announcing the firm determination of the Allies to break up the conference, unless the fundamental principle of reducing France to its ancient limits was agreed to. The Emperor was not prepared for such unanimity on the part of the Allied plenipotentiaries; he still clung to the hope that Austria would break off. He refused, however, to yield to those terms, and a messenger was dispatched with instructions to Caulaincourt to present a counter project, and strive to gain time. "I see clearly," said he, "that this war is an abyss, but I will be the last to bury myself in it. If we must wear the fetters, it is not I who will stretch out my hands to receive them." He was deeply depressed, however, by the issue of the action, and wrote that night to Joseph at Paris—"The Old Guard alone stood firm: the rest melted like snow." So strongly was Napoléon irritated by the desperate state of his affairs, that he gave orders, in one of his fits of fury, to shoot some Russian prisoners, probably in retaliation for some peasants slain, which, before he relented, was unhappily carried into execution at the village of Vaurain (2).

Both parties take post at and around Laon. On the following day, Blucher collected all his six corps round the splendid position of Laon. So exhausted were the French by their efforts during the battle, that they did not move from their ground till ten next day; and, as the Russians marched the whole night, they got the start of the enemy, and reached the neighbourhood of that

(1) Dan. 229, 232. Koch, i. 304, 302.

(2) Fain, 159, 161. Koch, i. 401, 403. Dan. 235.

town in safety. Napoléon also on his side collected his whole forces, which now amounted to about forty-eight thousand men. Marmont, who was ordered up from Soissons, crossed the Aisne at Bery-au-Bac, and, after sleeping at Corbeny, approached Laon by the road of Reims; while the bulk of the army, consisting of the corps of Ney and Mortier, with the cuirassiers and reserve cavalry, after having joined the great road from Soissons to Laon at Chavignon and Vaurain, approached on the *chaussée* from Paris. Notwithstanding all his losses, Blucher had still above ninety thousand men grouped around the hill of Laon; and the approach to the position was by a defile two miles in length, where the road crosses a marsh that runs up to the foot of the hill. Chernicheff was posted at Etouville, which lay at the entrance of this defile, with four regiments of infantry and twenty-four guns; and he defended himself so vigorously against the impetuous attacks of Marshal Ney, who commanded the French advanced guard, that at night-fall he was still unable to make any impression. After it was dark, however, the peasants conducted the Old Guard through by-paths across the marshes, so that at daybreak on the 9th, he found his post at the entrance of the defile no longer tenable, and withdrew with all his forces to the position of Laon. There, soon after, Rudzewitch arrived with the garrison of Soissons, having by forced marches and extraordinary vigilance eluded all the efforts of the enemy to intercept him. The accession of these forces, and the general concentration of his troops, raised Blucher's army to one hundred and nine thousand men, including twenty-four thousand horse, all concentrated and supporting each other: while Napoléon, including Marmont, had only fifty-two thousand, of whom not more than fourteen thousand were cavalry (1).

Description of the position of Laon, and of the Allied army. The town of LAON, of great antiquity, containing seven thousand souls, so well known to travellers in that part of France, like that of Cassel on the borders of Flanders, stands upon the flat summit of a conical hill about three quarters of a mile in breadth, and elevated nearly two hundred and fifty feet above the adjacent plain. It is surrounded with irregular ancient walls and towers, standing on the edge of the lofty plateau as it sinks into the declivity, and following its varied sinuosities. Gardens, orchards, and grass fields, lie on the slopes of this huge truncated cone: the roads leading to the town ascend by a gentle slope up the long acclivity: the houses at the foot, fronting the highways and villages adjacent, were all loopholed, and filled with musketeers; a hundred pieces of cannon crowded the ramparts on the summit, while numerous other batteries crowned every commanding eminence in the adjoining slopes. On these slopes, and in the neighbouring villages, lay the immense host of the Allied army, having the town for a vast redoubt in its centre, and extending with its wings far into the plain on either side. On the right lay Winzingerode's men, drawn up in two lines near Aven: in the centre, Bulow's corps occupied the hill of Laon, the villages of Sermilly and Ardon, with the abbey of St.-Vincent at its foot, and formed the numerous batteries disposed around its slopes. On the left, Kleist and D'York extended from Laon to Chambry, opposite to Athies, and stretched far into the plain on the road leading to Rheims. Sacken and Langeron's troops, which had suffered so severely in the preceding combats, were in reserve behind Laon. The positions of the French, being fewer in number, were much more concentrated: Marmont was expected on the right, being ordered to come up by

(1) Dan, 236, 238. Kausler, 402. Fain, 161, 162. Koch, i. 408, 411. Plötho, iii. 292, 293. Vaud, i. 43, 44.

the road from Reims to a spot assigned between Chambry and Athies in the level plain : Mortier, with the guards, and the whole reserve cavalry under Grouchy and Nansouty, were in the centre; opposite Laon, in front of them, half way to Sermilly and Ardon, was Ney with his indefatigable corps, yet reeking with the blood of Craon (1).

Sublime
spectacle
from the
ramparts
of Laon.
March 9.

It was a sublime and yet animating spectacle, when, on the evening of the 8th March, the Allied army withdrew on all sides into the vicinity of this ancient and celebrated city. To the anxious and trembling crowds of citizens, and peasants driven in from the adjacent country which had been the theatre of hostilities, the horizon to the south and west appeared covered by innumerable fires; loud discharges of cannon rolled on all sides, and sensibly approached the town; long lines of light, proceeding from the fire of the infantry of the Allies as they retired, or the French as they advanced, were distinctly seen as the shades of evening set in. When night approached, and darkness overspread the plain, a still more extraordinary spectacle presented itself; the continued fire in the midst of the thickets and woods with which the country abounded, produced a strange optical delusion, which converted the trees into so many electrical tubes, from the summits of which sparks and dazzling light, as from so many fireworks, appeared to rush upwards into the heavens. In the midst of this lurid illumination, long lines of infantry, dark masses of cavalry, and endless files of artillery, were seen covering the plain in all directions, till they were lost in the obscurity of the distance (2).

Combat
on the
first day
until Mar-
mont.
March 9.

The succeeding day, being the 9th, was passed without any serious action on either side. Approached to the villages of Classy, Sermilly, and Ardon, at the foot of the hill of Laon, the centre and left, composed of the troops under Napoléon in person, were perfectly prepared for an attack; but he was justly unwilling to hazard a general engagement, until his right wing, under Marmont, came up to its ground from the side of Reims; and repeatedly in the course of the day he dispatched messengers in that direction, to learn where the marshal was, and how soon he might be expected in the field. Meanwhile, in order to feel the strength of the enemy's position, Ney was ordered to advance right against Laon by the great road from Soissons. Favoured by a thick fog, which entirely enveloped the hill of Laon, and concealed his advance from the enemy, he succeeded, by a sudden attack, in making himself master of the villages of Sermilly and Ardon at the foot of the hill, and was only prevented from pushing up its slopes by the concentric fire of the batteries, which commanded every approach to the town. At eleven the mist cleared away, and the whole field of battle became visible from the ramparts. Blucher, perceiving how inconsiderable were the forces opposed to him in the centre, resolved to resume the offensive, and drive the enemy from the villages he had won at the foot of the hill. With this view, while Woronzow's infantry were ordered to attack Sermilly in front, and Bulow's at Ardon, a division of infantry, supported by all Winzingerode's cavalry, were directed to make a sweep in the plain, and turn their left. This double attack entirely succeeded; and Ney's corps were driven back across the *chaussée* and marshes towards Etouville, in such disorder, that it was only by charging with the imperial guard and reserve cavalry, that Ney and Beliard succeeded in arresting the pursuit of the Allies, and driving them back to the bottom of

(1) Personal observation. Kausler, 403, 404.
Koch, i. 407, 408. Beauch. i. 404, 405.

(2) Temoin oculaire, in Beauch. i. 405.

the hill. At four in the afternoon, Napoléon having learned that Marmont had come up to his ground on the right, towards Athies on the road to Rheims, brought forward his guards and cuirassiers, and by a vigorous advance again expelled the Allies from Ardon, and carried, after a bloody struggle, the village of Classy and the abbey of St.-Vincent from the Russians on their right(1).

Neither party, however, were intent on these attacks; both fought only to gain time. Napoléon was counting the minutes till the announcement of the approach of Marmont warned him that he might with safety commence a real attack upon the enemy at once in front and flank; while Blucher, having received intelligence of the French marshal being expected on the road to Reims from Laon, when he was totally unsupported by the remainder of the army, was taking measures to fall upon and crush him. Meanwhile Marmont, who had commenced his march early in the morning from Bery-au-Bac, issued at one in the afternoon from the defile of Feticux, and, driving the Prussian videttes before him, commenced an attack at four o'clock on a division of D'York's infantry, which was stationed at Athies, and after a fierce combat the Prussians were driven out of the village, which became a prey to the flames. Blucher now clearly perceived, from the vivacity of this assault, that the principal effort of the enemy was to be made in that direction; and that Napoléon's design was to amuse him by false attacks in front on the Soissons road, and, meanwhile, turn his flank, cut him off from all communication with the grand army, and throw him back on a separate field of operations on the side of Flanders. He immediately took measures to defeat this project, and convert it to the enemy's ruin; and for this object this central position at Laon, midway as it were between the two wings of the French army, presented extraordinary advantages. Langeron and Saeken were moved up behind Laon to the left, so as to be in a condition to support D'York: Kleist was ordered up to the front, close in his rear: the horse-artillery of the army of Silesia was moved to the extreme left, so as to be ready to commence the attack: the infantry were all arranged in close columns, the cavalry in dense array of squadrons (2), and the whole received orders, as soon as it was dark to advance in double quick time, and without firing a shot or uttering a word, against the enemy.

Meanwhile Marmont's troops, worn out with fatigue, and wholly unconscious of their danger, had sunk to sleep in their frigid bivouacs. At the dead of night, and in perfect silence, the Prussians advanced to the attack; Prince William of Prussia led the infantry, which were headed by the brigades of Horn and Klux, and moved by the high-road right on Athies; the fields on either side were filled with the remainder of Kleist's corps, all in close column, so as to occupy very little room; while Zeithen's turned the right flank of the enemy, and drove them back on the infantry. Both attacks proved entirely successful. So complete was the surprise, so universal the consternation, that the French merely fired one round of grape on the approach of Prince William, and then dispersed, every one flying in the profound darkness where chance or his fears directed. Zeithen's horse at the same instant falling on the right, increased the confusion: the fugitives from these two attacks, flying at right angles to each other, soon got intermingled, and poured headlong out in frightful disorder on the road to

(1) Kausler, 405, 406. Koch, i. 409, 411. Dan. 239, 240. Vaud. ii. 45, 46. Plotho, iii. 494, 495.

(2) Dan. 240, 241. Koch, i. 414. Vaud. ii. 48, 50. Plotho, iii. 294, 295.

Bery-au-Bac; while the Prussian infantry, pressing on through the throng with loud shouts, soon arrived at the grand park and reserve caissons, all of which, with the exception of a few pieces, were taken. The Prussian husars, highly elated with their success, continued the pursuit without intermission, and the darkness of the night alone prevented the whole corps being made prisoners. In wild confusion, horse, foot, and the few cannon, hurried through the defile of Fétieux, six miles off, at the entrance of which Colonel Fabvier contrived to rally a few hundred men, who, from the smallness of their number not being perceived in the darkness of the night, contrived to stop the pursuit. As it was, however, Marmont lost forty pieces of cannon, a hundred and thirty-one caissons, and two thousand five hundred prisoners: the number of killed and wounded, from the rapidity of the flight, was not considerable; but his corps was totally dispersed, and disabled from taking any part, till re-organised, in any military operation, while the whole loss of the Allies was not three hundred men (1).

Napoléon
prepares
to retreat.
March 10. Napoléon, anticipating a general battle, was drawing on his boots at four o'clock in the morning of the 10th, with his horse already at the door, when two dragoons, who had just arrived on foot, in great consternation were brought to him. They stated that they had escaped by a miracle from a nocturnal hurrah, which the enemy had made on the bivouacs of Marmont; that the marshal himself was killed or taken, and that all was lost on that side. He immediately gave orders to suspend the preparations for a general attack, which were already commencing; and soon after, more authentic intelligence of the disaster arrived, to the effect that the marshal was neither killed nor taken, but that his corps was entirely dispersed, its artillery lost, and the fugitives, in disorder, only beginning to rally in the neighbourhood of Fismès. The Emperor at once saw, that to persist in his attack on Laon, defended by an enemy double in amount to his own force, and with his right wing, for the time at least, *hors de combat*, was a vain attempt. But how to retreat in the face of a victorious enemy was the question; for already Blücher, elated by his victory, had given orders to Langeron, Saeken, D'York, and Kleist, to pursue Marmont with the utmost vigour; and he himself was only waiting on the ramparts of Laon, from whence he saw every movement in the French army, for the commencement of the retreat of the main body, to pursue on the road to Soissons. In this dilemma he adopted the wisest course he could have pursued, which was, to remain where he was, and impose upon the Prussian general by the display of a formidable force in front, so as at once to prevent pursuit of his own corps and relieve the pressure on that of Marmont. So completely did this plan succeed, that Blücher, who in the first instance had given orders to Bülow and Winzingerode to issue forth from Laon in pursuit of the French main body, not only countermanded the directions upon seeing they stood firm, and seemed rather preparing for an attack, but dispatched orders to the generals in pursuit of Marmont to return with their infantry, and follow him up only with their cavalry. Chernicheff in consequence, who at daybreak had made a successful attack with Winzingerode's advanced guard on the French division at Classy, on the Allied right, finding himself unsupported, was obliged to return in haste to the foot of the hill of Laon; and shortly after nine o'clock Napoléon ordered a general advance against that formidable position. The action soon became extremely warm, and when the French approached

(1) Flotbo, iii. 296, 297. Dan, 240, 241. Koch, i. 415, 417. Vaud. ii. 42, 51.

the hill, they were received by such tremendous discharges of artillery from the heights around its foot, as well as musketry from the loopholed villages, that after sustaining a severe loss they were obliged to retire. At four o'clock the grand park and equipages began to defile on the road to Soissons, and the French troops withdrew at all points; but the cannonade continued till nightfall, and from the summit of the ramparts of Laon, the march of the retiring columns could be traced by the sight of villages in flames, and the awful prospect of granaries, farmyards, and churches consuming under the reckless fury of the devastating bands, which, like a stream of lava, overspread even their own territory with conflagration and ruin (1).

Reflections
on this
battle.

Thus terminated the combats around Laon, which, though scarcely worthy of being dignified by the name of a battle, from the desultory manner in which they were conducted, and the great space over which they extended, were inferior to no pitched battle fought during the whole war in interest and importance. For the first time during the campaign, the whole disposable forces of the Emperor Napoléon, under his own immediate orders, had been brought to a stand: their assault upon a position found to be impregnable, had been defeated: the object of the expedition beyond the Marne had been frustrated, and the grand army left at liberty to pursue, during ten days, active operations on the side of Troyes and Fontainebleau, which, if vigorously followed up, might have led to the capture of Paris. The combats round Laon, including the losses sustained by Marmont, had cost the French Emperor six thousand men and forty-six pieces of cannon, while the Allies were not weakened by more than four thousand; his total loss since he left Troyes on the 1st March, amounted to sixteen thousand men (2). His situation now appeared altogether desperate: obliged to retire towards his capital, followed by a victorious army double his own strength, only to fall there into the jaws of a still larger army, driving before it two beaten corps not mustering between them twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets. In this expedition against Blücher, the Emperor was far from having shown proofs of his wonted skill: his bloody attack on the plateau of Craon had savoured rather of the obstinacy of a victorious, than the caution of a defensive commander; and his plan of attack at Laon, operating by his two wings, separated six miles from each other and incapable of mutual support, upon an enemy twice his strength, and occupying a central position of uncommon strength between them, was precisely such an error as he had turned to such admirable account, when committed by his adversaries at Castiglione in 1796 (3), and at Dresden in 1815 (4).

But it soon appeared, that the genius of Napoléon had been obscured for a moment, though it was not extinguished; and when all thought his for-

(1) Beauch. i. 412, 414. Dan. 242, 243. Kausler, 408, 409. Koch. i. 419, 423. Fain, 164, 165.

(2) Viz.—At Craon,	8,000
Assault of Soissons,	1,500
Around Laon,	6,000
Lesser affairs,	500
	<hr/>
	16,000

Such were the chasms in the ranks during these sanguinary struggles, that an entire re-organization of great part of the army took place at Soissons, by the incorporation of the divisions which had principally suffered; and the divisions of young guard of Ney and Victor, as well as the division of infantry of General Poret de Morveau, entirely disappeared. —See Koch, i. 429.

(3) This is accordingly admitted by the ablest of the French military historians, and the most zealous partisans of Napoléon. "It does not appear that the Emperor acted according to the rules of art, or the prudence which the disproportion of his means required, in engaging the Duke of Ragusa, (Marmont,) at the same time he attacked himself. He was as yet uncertain of the line of the enemy's operations, and his army was not a quarter of theirs in number. That quarter might have conquered if they had been massed together; but it was impossible to separate one corps without exposing it to destruction from a force tenfold its own."—Vau-
DONCOURT, ii. 63.

(4) *Ante* iii. 36, ix. 226, 227.

Napoléon
rests at
Soissons,
and Blücher
at Laon.
March 11.

tunes desperate, he struck such a blow, in a quarter where it was least expected, as had wellnigh re-established his affairs, by the renewed timidity which it infused into the Austrian counsels. On the night of the 10th the Emperor slept at Chavignon, on the road to Soissons; and on the 11th, the army continued its retreat to the defiles in front of that town. This fortress, which had again fallen into the hands of the French after Rudzewitch's retreat to Laon, ever of primary importance during the campaign in this quarter, now offered the same secure passage across the Aisne to the retreating French, which it formerly had done to the retiring Allied army. The whole of the 12th was spent there also: the Emperor being busied with Mortier, and the officers of engineers, in providing for the defence of the place; and while giving a brief repose to the wearied soldiers of his army, he himself rode out on horseback to survey the environs, and choose the positions which might appear most defensible. During all this time, and, in fact, for nine days after the battle of Laon, Blücher remained in a state of complete inactivity with his vast army in that impregnable position—a delay, after such an advantage as he had recently gained, which would appear altogether inexplicable, if we did not know that, at that period, the Allied army was almost starving from the total exhaustion of the country in which it had so long carried on the war; that the troops, worn out with six weeks' incessant marching and fighting in the most inclement weather, stood urgently in need of repose; that the veteran field-marshal himself was so ill, from ague and inflammation in the eyes, that he was unable to sit on horseback during the remainder of the campaign (1): and that Gneisenau and the officers of his staff felt, that, having amply performed the part allotted to them in it, the time had arrived when it behoved the Grand Army to do something worthy of its gigantic strength and long-continued repose (2).

Capture of
Reims by
St.-Preist.

On the night of the 12th, however, Napoléon received information which induced him to alter the line of his operations, by presenting him with a new enemy accessible to his strokes, and capable of being destroyed. General St.-Preist, with his corps of Russians, forming part of the reserves of the army of Silesia, had been left at Châlons, in order to keep up the communication between Blücher and Schwartzemberg; and having learned, during the concentration of all the French troops around Laon, that the garrison left by them in Reims was very weak, particularly in cavalry, he resolved to attempt to carry the place. Like all the towns in that quarter it was fortified, though not strongly, and the walls were in disrepair in several places, and but imperfectly armed; and St.-Preist, having been reinforced by the Prussian brigade of General Jagon, who had marched on after the surrender of Erfurth, determined to hazard an attack. The garrison, about two thousand strong, with only twelve pieces of cannon, were little in a condition to defend a town containing thirty thousand inhabitants, against a corps of fifteen thousand men. They met, accordingly, with very little resistance: the garrison, after discharging a few rounds, endeavoured to escape out of the place by a gate which had not been blockaded, and six hundred of them, with ten guns, were made prisoners in making the attempt. The town itself was taken, with hardly any of the outrages or disorders consequent on a place carried by assault; some property which had been

(1) Dan. 243, 245. Fain, 165, 166. Koch, i. 420, 422. Plotho, iii. 299, 302.

(2) "The true object of our stay here is not a military one. The only object I have in view is to

give repose to a harassed army, and, as far as possible, to provide it with bread."—BLÜCHER to WINZINGERODE, 14th March 1814; DARLÉSKY, 244, 245.

plundered was immediately restored, and the marauders punished; St.-Preist himself went to the cathedral to return thanks for his victory, and the troops, for the sake of recreation, were in great part allowed to amuse themselves in the surrounding hamlets (1).

Advance of
Napoléon
to Reims. The capture of this important town at once reestablished the communications of Blucher with the grand army, and threatened Napoléon's right flank. He had no sooner heard of it, accordingly, than he gave orders for the whole army, with the exception of Mortier's corps, which was left for the defence of Soissons, to defile to the right on the road for March 13. Reims. With such expedition did they march, that on the evening of the same day on which they set out from Soissons, the advanced guard appeared before the walls of Reims. The Prussian videttes could hardly believe their own eyes when the increasing numbers of the enemy showed that a serious attack was intended; and, notwithstanding repeated warnings sent to St.-Preist, he persisted in declaring it was only a few light troops that were appearing, and could not be brought to credit that the army so recently defeated at Laon was already in a condition to resume offensive operations. At length, at four o'clock, the cries of the troops and well-known grenadier caps of the old guard, announced that the Emperor himself was on the field; and then, as well he might, the Russian general hastily began to take measures for his defence. The nearest regiments, without orders or any regular array, hurried off to the threatened point; the French, skilfully feigning to be outnumbered, ceased firing and fell back, and for a short time all was quiet. St.-Preist was confirmed, by this circumstance, in the belief that it was only a partizan division which was before him, or, at most, the beaten corps of Marmont, for which he conceived himself fully a match; and even on being assured by a prisoner that Napoléon was with the troops, he said, "He will not step over fourteen thousand men; you need not ask which way to retire, there will be no retreat."

Recapture of
Reims by
Napoléon. Shortly after Napoléon arrived, and after looking on the town for a short time, dryly observed—"The ladies of Reims will soon have a bad quarter of an hour"—and gave orders for an immediate attack. The Allies by this time had almost entirely assembled in front of the town, and occupied a position in two lines, guarding the approaches to it; the right resting on the river Vele, the left extending to the Basse-Muire; the reserves on the plateau of St.-Geneviève in the suburbs, where twenty-four pieces of cannon were planted. These preparations seemed to prognosticate a vigorous defence; but the promptitude and force of Napoléon's attack rendered them of very little avail. Eight thousand horse, supported by thirty pieces of horse artillery, were directed at once against the Russian left, to which St.-Preist had hardly any cavalry to oppose; in a few minutes three Prussian battalions were surrounded and made prisoners. At the same time Marmont, supported by the guards of honour and cavalry of the guard, advanced by the high-road, direct upon the enemy's centre. The Russian general, upon this, perceiving that he was immensely overmatched, gave orders for the first line to fall back on the second; and, at the same time, the battery of twenty-four guns withdrew towards the rear. Hardly were these movements commenced, when he himself was wounded in the shoulder by a ball: this event discouraged the troops; and the retiring columns, aware of their danger from the great masses which were every where pressing after them, fell into disorder, and hastened with more speed than was consistent with discipline

(1) Dan. 248, 250. Burgh. 262. Koch, i. 429, 434. Fain, 166.

into the town. Owing to the narrowness of the bridge and streets, the columns got entangled at every step, and in less than a quarter of an hour became a mere mob, while the French infantry and cavalry, with loud shouts, were pressing on their rear. Such was the scene of horror and confusion which soon ensued, that it appeared impossible for any part of the corps to escape; and none in all probability would have done so but for the steadiness of the regiment of Riazan, which, under its heroic colonel, Count Scobelof, formed square on the field of battle, and not only repulsed the repeated attacks of an enormous mass of cavalry at the entrance of the town, and gave time for a large part of the corps to defile in the rear, but itself pierced through the forest of sabres with the bayonet, bearing their bleeding and dying general in their arms (1).

Defeat of
the Allies,
and en-
trance of
Napoleon
into the
town.

General Emmanuel now took the command; and the most vigorous efforts were made at the entrance of the town, by disposing the troops in the houses which adjoined it; and so obstinate was the resistance which they presented, that for above three hours the French were kept at bay. Towards midnight, however, it was discovered that the enemy, by fording the Vele, had got round the town, and therefore the whole troops in it were withdrawn, some on the road to Chalons, others on that to Laon, while the defence of the gate was entrusted to a non-commissioned officer of the 55d light infantry, with two hundred men. This little band of heroes kept their ground to the last, and were found by the officer sent to withdraw them, dividing their few remaining cartridges, and encouraging each other to hold out even till death. When they received orders to retire, they did so in perfect order, as the evacuation was completed; and they fortunately effected their retreat in the darkness, without being made prisoners. Napoléon then made his entry into the town at one o'clock in the morning by torchlight, amidst the acclamations of his troops, and enthusiastic cheers of the inhabitants, who gave vent to the general transport in a spontaneous illumination. In this brilliant affair, the French took two thousand five hundred prisoners, eleven guns, and a hundred caissons, and the total loss of the Allies was three thousand five hundred, while the Emperor Napoléon was only weakened by eight hundred men—a wonderful achievement to have been effected by a worn-out army, after nearly two months' incessant marching and fighting, and two days after a disastrous defeat; but more memorable still, by one circumstance which gives it a peculiar interest—it was the LAST TOWN NAPOLEON EVER TOOK (2).

Residence of
Napoleon at
Reims,
March 14
to 18.

On the same day General Janson arrived at the French headquarters, bringing with him a reinforcement of six thousand men, which he had brought up by the road of Rhelet from the garrisons in the neighbourhood of the Ardennes forest, in obedience to the orders dispatched from Fismès twelve days before. This reinforcement was of incalculable importance at that period, when the Emperor was so severely weakened by the losses of the dreadful campaign in which he had been engaged; and it illustrates the extreme imprudence, of which he had now become himself sensible, of that obstinate tenacity of disposition, which had prompted him so long to retain fifty thousand veterans in useless inactivity in the German fortresses, and as many more in the places on the Rhine, while he himself with no greater force was driven to his last shifts on the plains of Champagne. To repair if possible the error he had committed,

(1) Dan. 252, 253. Koch, i. 439, 440. Burgh. 203. Vaud. ii. 112, 114. Piotho, iii. 353, 354.

(2) Koch, i. 439, 404. Piotho, iii. 355. Vaud. ii. 114, 115. Burgh, 203. Dan. 253, 254.

he dispatched Ney to Chalons, and General Vincent to Epernay, who expelled the enemy from these towns; while the great body of Napoléon's forces were cantoned in Reims and the villages in its vicinity. During all this time Blucher remained inactive at Laon, and on the 17th a grand review of all his forces took place, when it was ascertained that, with the additions received since the battle there, from St.-Preist's corps and other sources, they still numbered a hundred and nine thousand combatants, of whom twenty-nine thousand were horse, with two hundred and sixty-five guns. From Chalons Ney dispatched, in profusion, officers and secret emissaries, with instructions to all the garrisons on the Rhine, and between that and the theatre of war, to hold themselves in readiness to break through the blockading forces with which they were environed, and join the Emperor as soon as they should receive intimations that the proper moment was arrived (4); with similar directions to the peasantry in all the rural districts, the moment the Allies began to retreat, to fall on their flanks and communications, and do them all the mischief in their power.

Last review of Napoléon at Reims. March 15. Meanwhile a review took place at Reims of all the troops under the immediate command of the Emperor; but how different from the splendid military spectacles of the Tuileries or Chamartin, which had so often dazzled his sight with the pomp of apparently irreversible power! Wasted away to half the numbers which they possessed when they crossed the Marne a fortnight before, the greater part of the regiments exhibited only the skeletons of military force: in several, more officers than privates were to be seen in the ranks; in all, the appearance of the troops, the haggard air of the men, their worn-out dresses, and the strange motley of which they were composed, bespoke the total exhaustion of the empire. It was evident to all that Napoléon was spending his last resources. Beside the veterans of the guard—the iron men whom nothing could daunt, but whose tattered garments and soiled accoutrements bespoke the dreadful fatigues to which they had been subjected—were to be seen young conscripts, but recently torn from the embraces of maternal love, and whose wan visages and faltering steps told but too clearly that they were unequal to the weight of the arms which they bore. The gaunt figures and woful aspect of the horses, the broken carriages and blackened mouths of the guns, the crazy and fractured artillery-waggon which defiled past, the general confusion of arms, battalions, and uniforms, even in the best appointed corps, marked the melted down remains of the vast military array which had so long stood triumphant against the world in arms. The soldiers exhibited none of their ancient enthusiasm as they defiled past the Emperor; silent and sad they took their way before him; the stern realities of war had chased away its enthusiastic ardour; all felt that in this dreadful contest they themselves would perish, happy if they had not previously witnessed the degradation of France (2).

(1) Fain, 167, 168. Koch, i, 442, 444. Vaud, ii. 208, 209.

(2) Koch, i, 442, 444. Fain, 167, 168.

CHAPTER LXXV.

FALL OF NAPOLEON.

ARGUMENT.

Labours of Napoléon in the Cabinet at this period—Affairs of the Low Countries—Combat of Mershem, and French driven into Antwerp—Investment of that Fortress, of which Carnot takes the command—Progress of the War in Flanders—Description of Bergen-op-Zoom—Plan of the attack on that Fortress—The French rally, and defeat the Assault—Reflections on this event—Concluding movements of the Campaign in Flanders—Affairs of Italy, and retreat of Eugène to the Mincio—Reasons which led him to give battle—Battle of the Mincio—Evacuation of Tuscany by the French—Operations of Lord William Bentinck on the coast of Tuscany—Successes of Eugène on the Po—Affairs at Lyons—Combats in Savoy—Augereau resumes the offensive in Savoy and on the Jura—Displeasure of Napoléon at the direction of these attacks—His operations on the Jura—Battle of Limonet, and fall of Lyons—Great effects of this victory—Concluding operations of Wellington in the south of France—His difficulties there—Plan of the English Government of employing him and his army in Flanders, and his reasons against it—Difficulties of Soult—Reduction of his Army and increase of Wellington's—Rejection of the Treaty of Valençay by the Cortes, and arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême at Wellington's head-quarters—Wellington's proclamation against the insurrection in Baygorry—Position of Soult around Bayonne—Wellington forces the passage of the Upper Adour—Passage of the Gave de Mauléon—and of the Lower Adour—Entrance of the Flotilla into that river, and investment of Bayonne—Description of the French positions and force at Orthès—Wellington's order of March, and Attack—Battle of Orthès—Preparatory movements—Beresford carries St.-Boes, but is arrested on the Ridge beyond it—Wellington regains the Battle—Soult orders a general Retreat—Great effects of this Victory—Soult retires towards Tarbes and Toulouse—Proceedings of the Royalists at Bordeaux—The English arrive there, and Louis XVIII is proclaimed—Arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême there, and his proclamation—Soult's counter proclamation, and resumption of hostilities—He finally retreats to Toulouse—Combat of Tarbes—General results of the Campaign—Progress of events in Catalonia—Stratagem by which Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, are recovered by the Spaniards—Arrival of Ferdinand, and termination of the war in Catalonia—Siege of Santona, and close of the war in the Peninsula—Description of Toulouse, and the French position there—Ineffectual attempt to attack it by crossing above the river—Beresford, with the left wing, is thrown across below Toulouse—His danger, and supineness of Soult—Advantages of the French position—Wellington's plan of Attack—Position of the French, and forces on both sides—Battle of Toulouse—Defeat of the Spaniards on the British right—Picton also is repulsed at the bridge of Jumeau—Soult attacks Beresford, who carries the Redoubts on the French right—Soult's dispositions to restore the Battle—Beresford storms the Redoubt in the centre—Retreat of Soult behind the Canal—Soult evacuates Toulouse—Wellington's triumphant entry into that Town, and proclamation of Louis XVIII—Convention which terminated the War in the south of France—Sally from Bayonne—Sir John Hope is made prisoner—but the sally is finally repulsed—Concluding operations at Bordeaux—Errors of Wellington—Lord William Bentinck's operations against Genoa—Concluding operations of the Allies in Italy—State and final surrender of the Fortresses in Germany still held by the French—Operations of Benningsen against Davoust in Hamburg—Napoléon's last survey of his Empire—Final terms proposed to him at Châtillon by the Allies—Counter projects of Napoléon—Answers of the Allies to the ultimatum of France—Reflections on the dissolution of the Congress—Alarming situation of Paris—Napoléon marches against Schwartzberg, and towards the Aube—And falls unawares on the Grand Army—Napoléon moves to the side—Schwartzberg resumes the offensive—Both march at the same time on Arcis-sur-Aube—Effect of these movements on both sides—First battle of Arcis-sur-Aube—Order of battle for the following day—The French at length retreat—Their rearguard is attacked—Napoléon's reasons for the march to St.-Dizier—He moves on that Town—The Allies follow, and receive information of his designs—Important council of War held at their headquarters—Volkonsky's advice to march on Paris, which is adopted by Alexander, and acquiesced in by Schwartzberg and the King of Prussia—Orders given for the march of the Troops—Enthusiasm of the Allied soldiers on receiving these orders—Judicious measures of Ertel in the rear of the Grand Army—Movements of Marmont and Mortier—Approach of both armies to Fère-Champenoise—Battle of Fère-Champenoise—Second

combat there—Heroic resistance, and destruction of the French—Results of these combats—Retreat and narrow escape of Marmont and Mortier to Paris—Splendid appearance of the Allied army on the march to that Capital—Attack on Winzingerode by Napoléon—His defeats—Passage of the Marne by the Allies—Alexander's efforts to preserve discipline in his Army—First sight of Paris by the Allied troops—Extreme agitation in that Capital during this period—Deliberation in the Council of State, as to whether the Empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris—Mournful scene at their departure—Description of Paris as a military station—Its historic interest and splendid edifices—Force of the French on the line of defence—Schwartzenberg's proclamation to the Allied army—Commencement of the action, and Allied dispositions of attack—Repulse of the Russians in the centre—Alexander brings up his Guards, who restore the battle there—Appearance of the army of Silesia on the right—And of the Prince of Wirtemberg on the left—Storming of the heights which command Paris—A suspension of arms is agreed to on both sides—General occupation of the heights, and storming of Montmartre—Results of the Battle—Rapid return of Napoléon towards Paris—His arrival in its Neighbourhood—and remarkable conversation on hearing of its Fall—Preparations of the Allies for entering Paris—Final conclusion of the Capitulation—Interview of Alexander with the Magistrates of Paris—State of public feeling there during this period—First movements of the Royalists—Entrance of the Allied Sovereigns into Paris—Extraordinary transports of the people in the Place Louis XV—Important meeting of the Allied Sovereigns at Talleyrand's—Its deliberations—Declaration of the Allies, that they would no longer treat with Napoléon or any of his family—Establishment of a provisional government by the Senate—Generous conduct of the Emperor Alexander, who liberates all the French prisoners in Russia—The Senate dethrone Napoléon—General adhesion to the new Government—Defection of Marmont—Caulaincourt's fruitless mission to Alexander—Napoléon agrees to abdicate in favour of his Son—His proclamation against Marmont and the Senate—Caulaincourt's mission to establish a Regency fails—The cause of the Restoration had become irresistible at Paris—Increasing fervour in favour of the Bourbons—Napoléon's final and unconditional Resignation—General and base defection of the Emperor by his followers—Treaty between Napoléon and the Allied Powers—Abortive attempt of Napoléon to destroy himself—Universal desertion of the Empress, and dispersion of Napoléon's family—Honourable fidelity of Maedonald and a few Generals at Fontainebleau—The Emperor's last speech to his Guard at Fontainebleau—His journey to Fréjus—Narrow escape from being murdered at Orgon and Saint Cannat—Death of Joséphine—Character of the Emperor Alexander—And of Talleyrand—His early History—Great abilities and profound dissimulation—Solemn Thanksgiving in the Place Louis XV—Louis XVIII is called to the Throne—Entry of the Count d'Artois into Paris—And of Louis XVIII into London—His landing in France, and entry into Paris—Convention of the 23d April for the French abandonment of all their conquests—Prodigious extent of the Conquests thus ceded by France—Treaty of 30th May, between the Allies and France, signed at Paris—Its secret articles—Reflections on this Treaty—Return of the Pope to Rome—Extraordinary spectacle which Paris exhibited at this period—Universal religious feelings of the Allied troops—Grand Review of their forces in Paris—Visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England—Remarkable circumstance which led to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg coming to London—Reflections on the decisive movement of Napoléon on St. Dizier—Difference in the final struggle of France and the other European powers—Causes of this difference—It is that individual advancement was the mainspring of the Revolution—Wide difference between the present baseness of France and the fidelity of the Monarchy—Misfortunes alone rendered Napoléon and the system of the Revolution unpopular—Any restoration of the Revolutionary system was impossible at this period—A pacific career was impracticable to Napoléon—His view of the compulsion under which he acted—View of the progressive phases of the Revolution—Agency by which the Divine government of nations is carried on—Universal and downward progress of Sin in nations as well as individuals—And ascending career of Virtue—How alone can this downward progress be arrested?—Is a free government possible in France?—Concluding reflections.

BUT though Napoléon allowed a few days' repose to his wearied troops, he gave none to his own indefatigable mind; though he witnessed around him the wreck of a world, he stood undaunted amidst its ruins.

“Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum *seriunt* ruinæ.”

During these days of physical repose, he was indefatigable in the cabinet; the varied concerns of his still vast empire passed before his view; despatches from all quarters were received; and his final resolution to reject the terms offered by the Allies at Chatillon was taken. This brief intermission in

military operations, both at the headquarters of the Emperor Napoléon, of Marshal Blücher, and of the Grand Army, affords a favourable opportunity for reviewing with the now straitened conqueror the varied condition of the remoter parts of his empire, preparatory to the grand catastrophe which occasioned his fall (1).

Affairs of the Low Countries. From Antwerp and Flanders the accounts were on the whole satisfactory. After the expulsion of the French from Holland, in the middle of the preceding December, the tricolor flag waved only on Bergen-op-Zoom, Bois-le-Duc, Gorcum, and one or two lesser forts, the main strength of the French forces in that quarter being concentrated in Antwerp, which Napoléon justly classed with Mayence and Alessandria in Piedmont, as the principal bulwarks of his empire. To impose upon the Allies, by the sound at least of military preparations, the Emperor, by a decree in the end of December, ordered the formation of an army of fifty-five battalions, the Dec. 21, 1813. command of which was bestowed on Count Maison. This respectable force, however, like most of the others of which Napoléon had the direction at this period, existed in great part only on paper; and when Maison arrived at Antwerp in the end of December, he found that he could not reckon on twenty thousand men for the defence of the whole Low Countries; and that, so far from thinking of the reconquest of Holland, it would be all he could do to provide for the defence of Flanders, now threatened on its maritime quarter by the English, and on the side of the Meuse by the Russians and Prussians. He therefore strengthened the garrisons of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and made every possible provision for the victualling, Combat of Merxhem. arming, and providing of these fortresses. Meanwhile, an English division six thousand strong, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, who had resigned his command in Spain the day after his victorious passage of the Bidassoa, on the 7th October preceding (2), landed in South Beveland, and having concerted measures with Bulow, who had crossed the canal and advanced towards Antwerp, a general forward movement commenced on the 10th January, which, after a variety of minor actions, brought on a warm Jan. 13. contest on the 15th, when a combined attack was made on the village of Merxhem, near Antwerp, by the British under General Mackenzie in front, and the Prussians under Thümen in flank. The 78th Highlanders headed the assault, led by their brave colonel, McLeod, and the French were driven out and back into Antwerp in the most gallant style, with the loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The Allies, however, suffered nearly as much from the heavy fire which the French kept up at the entrance of the village; and as they were ignorant of the strength of the garrison, and not prepared at that period to commence the investment of the place, they withdrew at night to their former positions, although they had approached so near to Antwerp that their bombs already fell in the suburbs and docks of the fortress (3).

Investment of Antwerp. On the night of the 25th, aided by the inhabitants, Bulow made a successful attack on Bois-le-Duc, which was taken by escalade, with its garrison of six hundred men. This enabled the Prussian general to turn his whole force against Maison; and the latter not feeling himself in sufficient strength to keep the field against the superior forces of the Allies, left Antwerp to its own resources, threw a garrison of a thousand men into Malines, and took post himself at Louvain, as a central point from

(1) Fain, 169.

(2) *Ante* ix. 422.

(3) Graham's Official Despatch, Jan. 14, 1814.

Ann. Reg. 153. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 39, 40. *Koch.* i. 115, 127.

which he might be able to observe the numerous enemies who now inundated the Low Countries; for, in addition to Bulow and Graham on the side of Antwerp, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of Russians, was exciting the utmost alarm, as already mentioned, by his unresisted march from the Jan. 27. Rhine, by Liege, towards the old French frontier. No sooner was Antwerp left to its own resources, than Bulow approached its walls and completed their investment; and three thousand additional troops having arrived from England, and a small battering train been obtained from Holland, operations of a vigorous character were commenced against the place. The great object was not to breach and carry its ramparts, for which the battering train as yet at the disposal of the Allies was wholly inadequate, but to bombard the town, and burn the great fleet constructed there by Napoléon; and with which he had so long flattered himself he would effect the subjugation of Great Britain. Extraordinary precautions had, however, been taken by Admiral Missiessy, who commanded the squadrons, to render nugatory the effects of a bombardment, by blinding the ships in the docks with turf, wet blankets, and a variety of other articles, which rendered them impervious to the heaviest shells, as had been done at Malta in the year 1799.

Feb. 1. On the 1st of February a general attack was made on the French advanced posts beyond the works, by the combined Prussian and British forces; and although the former experienced a bloody repulse near the village of Duerne, the British drove in the enemy from Braschart to Merxhem, and next day carried the latter village by assault, driving the French, with severe Feb. 2. loss, entirely into the works of the place on that side. They immediately commenced the construction of mortar batteries behind the dikes of St.-Ferdinand; and with such vigour were the approaches pushed forward during the night, that next morning a heavy fire was commenced upon the shipping (1).

Of which Carnot takes the command. It was at this moment that Carnot took the command at Antwerp. This stern republican—who had lived in retirement since the fall of Robespierre, resisted all the offers of Napoléon during the zenith of his power to lure him from his retreat, and almost singly voted against his being made First Consul and Emperor (2),—now came forward, with true patriotic devotion, to offer him, in his adversity, what remained of strength at sixty-four years of age, for the defence of the country (3). Napoléon knew how to appreciate grandeur of character, even in the most decided political opponent. He immediately said upon receiving the letter, “Since Carnot offers me his services, I know he will be faithful to the post which I assign to him: I appoint him governor of Antwerp.” The sturdy veteran Feb. 2. arrived at the fortress, and entered by one of the southern gates the very day before the bombardment commenced. He found the garrison fifteen thousand strong; but nevertheless, anticipating a long siege, and deeming it necessary to husband his resources, he immediately withdrew all his outposts within the outworks, so that the Prussians approached, without resistance, so near the place as to be able to take a part in the bombardment. It produced, however, very little effect. By the admirable precautions of Carnot and Missiessy, the fire, which was repeatedly raised in

(1) Koch, ii. 132, 136. Graham's Desp. Feb. 6. 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, p. 156. App. to Chron.

(2) *Ante*, iv. 385.

(3) “The offer is little, without doubt, of an arm sixty years old; but I thought that the example of a soldier whose patriotic sentiments are

known, might have the effect of rallying to your eagles a number of persons hesitating as to the part which they should take, and who might possibly think that the only way to serve their country was to abandon it.”—CARNOT to NAPOLEON, 24th Jan. 1814; *Mémoires sur CARNOT*, p. 135.

different quarters of the city and harbour, was immediately extinguished; the vessels of war in the docks were so protected as to be, for the most part, impervious to shells: the mortars which the English made use of, brought from Holland, though admirably served, soon became for the most part unserviceable, from too frequent discharges; and, after the bombardment had been kept up three days, it was discontinued from failure of ammunition. At the same time, Bulow received orders to raise the siege of the place, and advance with his corps into France, to take part in the great operations in

Feb. 6. contemplation against Napoléon, in which, as already mentioned, he rendered the most essential service. The British, not now half the strength of the garrison of the place, were in no condition to maintain their ground before it; and accordingly Sir Thomas Graham retired to his former cantonments, between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom; and Carnot, in conformity with his principles of reserving the strength of the garrison for ulterior operations, made no attempt to disquiet them in their retreat (1).

Progress of the war in Flanders. Though Bulow, however, had passed on into France, and the English had retired to the frontiers of Holland, yet there was no intermission in the deluge of Allied troops which rolled over Flanders. Wave after wave succeeded, as in those days when the long-restrained might of the northern nations found vent in the decaying provinces of the Roman empire. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, reinforced by Borstell's brigade of Prussians, at

Feb. 3. the head of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse kept the field: Brussels was soon evacuated; and Maison, who retired to Tournay,

Feb. 4. was watched by the Allies, whose headquarters were at Ath. Gorcum, however, having surrendered, and the blockading force, under the Prussian general Zielenksi, having reinforced the Prince of Saxe-Weimar,

Feb. 17. he advanced against the French general, who retired towards Quesnoy and Maubeuge. Nothing of moment occurred in this quarter till

March 8. the 8th of March, when the prince made an attack on Maison's troops with twelve thousand men, and drove them from the positions they occupied in front of Courtray, under the cannon of Lille; so that, with the exception of Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Ypres, Condé, and Maubeuge, which were still in the hands of the French, the whole of Austrian Flanders was wrested from the arms of Napoléon (2).

But an important event occurred at this period in Holland, which deserves to be more particularly noticed, both from the admirable skill with which it was projected by the English general, and the combined gallantry on the part of the French, and remissness on the part of the British, which rendered a successful attack ultimately abortive. This was the assault of BERGEN-OP-ZOOM by Sir Thomas Graham.

Description of Bergen-op-Zoom. This celebrated fortress, well known in the wars of the Low Countries, and strengthened by the successive labour of many centuries, was justly regarded by the Dutch as their principal bulwark on the side of the Netherlands, and as in every respect the worthy antagonist of Antwerp, to which it was directly opposed at the distance only of fifteen miles. On its works the famous Cohorn had exhausted all the resources of his art; and though the town is inconsiderable, containing not more than six thousand souls, the works were so extensive that they could only be adequately manned by a garrison of twelve thousand men, and an immense system of mines and subterraneous works rendered all approach by an enemy to the

(1) Graham's Desp. Feb. 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, p. 156. App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 42, 43. (2) Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 44, 48. Koch, ii. 237. Mém. sur Carnot, 136, 149.

ramparts hazardous in the extreme. The place is divided into two parts : the town, properly so called, and the port, which are separated from each other by internal walls, but both included in the external ramparts. The town has three gates, that of Steenberg, Breda, and Antwerp : the port but one, called the Water gate. The garrison, nominally four thousand five hundred strong, but of whom not more than two thousand seven hundred were effective, under General Bizanet, was inadequate to the manning of the extensive outworks, some of which were negligently guarded ; some of the scarps were out of repair, and the hard frost which had so long prevailed, had entirely frozen over the wet ditches to its mines and ramparts (1).

Plan of the
attack. Encouraged by these circumstances, which seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for surprising the place, Graham, who had secret intelligences with several of the inhabitants, who were almost all sea-faring people heartily desirous to be delivered from the French yoke, in covert made his preparations for a general attack, and fixed the execution of the attempt for the 8th of March, being the day before the Prince of Orange's birthday. The troops, three thousand three hundred strong, were divided into four columns ; the first, under General Lord Proby, mustering about a thousand bayonets, was ordered to attempt to force an entrance by escalade between the Antwerp and Water gates ; the second, under Colonel Morrice, twelve hundred strong, was to attack to the right of the Water gate ; the third, led by Colonel Honey, six hundred men, to distract the enemy by a false attack at the Steenberg gate ; and the fourth, headed by Skerret and Gore, consisting of eleven hundred men, to attack the mouth of the harbour, which was fordable at low water, for which reason the attack was fixed for half-past ten o'clock at night. General Cooke commanded the whole. The troops employed in the four columns amounted in all to three thousand three hundred men in the assault, and six hundred in the feint. The instructions to Generals Cooke and Gore, upon whom the weight of the assault would depend, were, as soon as they got to the top of the rampart, to incline towards each other, if possible unite, and immediately force open the Antwerp gate. Scaling ladders of adequate height were provided for the men ; the utmost secrecy was enjoined on the assaulting columns : no light was allowed among them ; while that entrusted with the false attack on the Steenberg gate was instructed to raise as much noise, and keep up as sharp a rattle of musketry as possible (2).

Commence-
ment and
early suc-
cess of the
assault. Shortly before ten o'clock, a loud fire of musketry was heard at the Steenberg gate. It proceeded from the third column, which, having surprised the advanced guard and outworks, were arrested at the drawbridge of the chief moat and gate of the rampart by a discharge of small arms ; thither the garrison reserves were immediately directed, and the assailants repulsed with great loss. Meanwhile the fourth column successfully made its way into the harbour mouth unobserved in the dark, and, after winding its painful course among the numerous iron crow's-feet scattered in the bottom of the channel, at a quarter before eleven reached the top of the rampart without the loss of a man, seized and forced open the Water gate, while detachments, under Colonel Carleton and General Skerret, were sent to the ramparts on the right and left, which were almost wholly undefended. As soon as the alarming progress of the assailants in this quarter was known, the remaining reserves of the garrison were directed to

(1) Personal observation. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 49, 50. *Koch*, ii. 151, 152.

Reg. 1814, p. 170. *App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 49, 50. *Koch*, 153, 154.

(2) Sir T. Graham's *Desp.* March 10, 1814. *Ann.*

the bastions adjoining the Water gate; and after a sharp conflict Colonel Carleton, who commanded the detachment which moved to the right along the ramparts, was repulsed and driven back towards that entrance. At the same time, however, Colonel Morrice, with his column, made his way across the ice, and reached the counterscarp undiscovered, near the Breda gate; but the garrison there being well prepared, a severe fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the rampart prevented them from crossing the ditch, or getting into the body of the place. Hardly was the danger arrested in this quarter, when a still more formidable attack was made between the Antwerp and Water gates. This was the guards under Lord Proby, which, after being diverted from their original point of attack by the ice, which, weakened by the tide, gave way under their weight, had turned aside, and following the foot of the wall to a place where the passage was practicable, had at length reached the summit of the rampart on the left of the Antwerp gate. The guards were there formed under the immediate direction of General Cooke, and a detachment was sent on the one side to the Antwerp gate, and on the other to gain intelligence of Skerret and Gore at the Water gate and harbour. The strength of the Antwerp gate, however, was such as to defy all their efforts to force it open; and though Gore's detachment, in the first instance, defeated a column of the garrison which advanced against it, yet the French reserves came up, and in the end overpowered it. At this moment, however, Morrice's column, which had been repulsed at its own point of attack, came round by the foot of the glacis, and mounted the walls by Lord Proby's ladders and formed on the ramparts to the left of the guards (1).

The French
rally, and
defeat the
assault.

To all appearance Bergen-op-Zoom was now taken; and with an ordinary garrison and governor it would have been so. Seven hundred and fifty men were in battle array on the ramparts adjoining the Water gate, and had possession of that gate, and fifteen hundred on those between it and the Antwerp gate: in all, they occupied fourteen of the sixteen fronts of the place. The fortress was considered as so completely carried, that the detachment which had made the false attack on the Steenberg gate retired to their cantonments, and a brigade of Germans, which had advanced from Tholen at the first firing, countermarched and returned home. The French troops, of no greater strength than the assailants, withdrew for the most part to the market-place, in the centre of the town, fully expecting to surrender at daybreak. But as the night wore on, matters essentially changed. The excessive cold benumbed the British troops, and chilled the first ardour of success; some of them broke into spirit shops adjoining their position, and became intoxicated; no reinforcements were forwarded to them from without, and the French, as day dawned, discovered the small number of their antagonists, and that one-third of them at the Water gate were separated from the remaining two-thirds on the bastions of the Antwerp gate. The governor, accordingly, directed his whole efforts, in the first instance, against Skerret's detachment on the bastions near the Water gate, and having driven them into a low situation, where they were exposed to a raking fire from two faces of the rampart, compelled them to lay down their arms, but not before Gore and Skerret had both fallen, bravely combating at the head of their troops. He then formed his whole force for an attack on the British, fifteen hundred strong, on the summit of the Antwerp bastions. The contest here was long and bloody; but at length

(1) Jones's Sieges, ii. 307. 317. Ko'h, ii. 153, 155. Burgh. 283, 284. Vaud. ii. 140.

General Cooke, having learned the destruction of Skerret and Gore's detachments, and finding his men wasting away without any chance of success, was compelled to surrender. In this brilliant, though disastrous affair, the British lost above nine hundred killed and wounded, and eighteen hundred men laid down their arms, though they were next day exchanged by convention with the French governor (1).

Reflections
on this
assault.

Such was the termination of this extraordinary assault; doubly memorable, both from the circumstance that one of the strongest fortresses in the world had its ramparts carried by storm, when the governor was aware of the enemy's intention and prepared to repel it, without any approaches, or attempt to breach the walls, by an assaulting force of no greater strength than the garrison; and from the still more marvellous result, that this assaulting column, victorious on the ramparts, was in the end obliged to lay down its arms to an equal force of the enemy, but in possession of the guns of the place. It excited, accordingly, a vivid interest in the mind of Napoléon, who frequently recurred to it, both at Elba and St.-Helena. He admitted that Graham's plan was both daring and well conceived; and imputed the failure of the enterprize to the energy of the French governor, the courage of his troops, and the want of due support to the attacking columns (2). In truth, the slightest consideration must be sufficient to show, that it is to the last circumstance that the failure of this nobly-conceived and gallant enterprize is to be ascribed. The English general had at his command nine thousand British or German troops, of whom not more than four thousand at the utmost were engaged in the assault (3). If a reserve of two thousand had been stationed near the walls, and advanced rapidly to the support of their comrades the moment the ramparts of the Antwerp gate were taken, not a doubt can exist that the town must have fallen. Nay, if the troops who retired from the feigned attack on the Steenberg gate had been sent round to the support of Skerret and Gore by the Water gate, of which the latter had possession, it is probable the enterprize would have been crowned with success. Of the ease with which fresh troops from without might have effected an entrance, even without blowing open that gate, we have decisive evidence in the fact, that Morrice's whole division, at one in the morning, ascended by Lord Proby's ladders, and formed on the summit without the loss of a man. But why was not a petard or a field-piece brought up, when the British were in possession of that gate, to blow it open, as has so often been done with such success in India? These considerations show, that the hero of Barossa, the gallant veteran who had first planted the British standards on the soil of France, inured to a long course of triumphs, was on this occasion inspired with an undue contempt for his enemies, and forgot the first rule of tactics, that of having a reserve at hand, and vigorously advancing it to support the columns which had gained decisive success. On the other hand, the highest praise is due to the resolution and skill of the French governor, and to the intrepidity of his troops, who, undismayed by reverses which in general crush a garrison, found in their own energy the means of obviating them, and converting incipient disaster into ultimate victory. The conduct of both to the prisoners taken, and the readiness with which they agreed to and observed an armistice for burying the dead, proves that in this, as in all other cases, humanity is closely allied to the warlike virtues. From the whole events of

(1) Jones's Sieges, ii. 317, 324. Graham's official Account, March 10, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 171. App. to Chron. Koch, ii 155, 156. Le Grand, 32, 37.

(2) O'Meara.

(3) Jones's Sieges, ii. 305.

this extraordinary assault, the young soldier may take a model of the highest daring and skill in designing an enterprize; of the most undaunted resolution and energy in repelling it; and impress the momentous truth on his mind, that the best-conceived attacks may often in the end miscarry, by want of prudence and foresight in executing them, or an undue contempt of the enemy against whom they are directed; and that, even in circumstances apparently hopeless, vigour and resolution will sometimes retrieve the most formidable disasters.

Concluding
movements
of the cam-
paign in
Flanders.

This bloody check paralyzed the operations of the British in the Low Countries, whose efforts were thenceforward limited, with the assistance of an inconsiderable body of Prussians, to the blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Carnot continued to exert his great talents in the preparation for the defence of Antwerp, and made more than one excursion with part of the garrison from its walls; but as the siege was not resumed, there was no opportunity of putting his system to the test. In the middle of March, however, General Thielman brought up a powerful reinforcement of fifteen thousand Saxons to the support of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. This raised the forces of the latter to thirty-seven thousand men, of whom twenty-seven thousand were disposable, with forty-one pieces of cannon. The opposing armies were now no longer equal; Maison was unable to keep the field, and retired under the cannon of Maubeuge and Lille, whither he was speedily followed by the Saxons under Thielman; upon which he threw a thousand men into the latter fortress, and retired into an intrenched camp under the cannon of the former. A *coup-de-main*, attempted by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar on the 21st on Maubeuge, was repulsed after three

March 21. days' fighting by the combined efforts of the little garrison and the brave inhabitants; while an incursion of Thielman to push his parties up to the gates of Lille, was repulsed by Maison himself, two days afterwards. In

March 23. fine, Flanders was lost to Napoléon; but the vigour and activity of the French general supplied the deficiencies of numbers, and promised a tedious succession of sieges before the iron frontier of old France was finally broken through (1).

Affairs of
Italy.
Retreat of
Eugène to
the Mincio.

From Italy the accounts which Napoléon received at Reims were less encouraging. It has already been mentioned, that in the end of December Eugène Beauharnais had retired to the line of the Adige, which he occupied with thirty-six thousand combatants, of whom three thousand were horse; while the Austrian troops opposed to them under Bellegarde were above fifty thousand, besides the detached corps of Marshall, which observed Venice and Palma-Nuova in the rear (2). This disproportion of force was the more alarming that the forces of the Viceroy were for the most part new levies in the plain of Lombardy, on whom very little reliance could be placed to meet the shock of the Transalpine bayonets; while a considerable part of the Austrians were old troops, and they were all animated, from the recent successes in Germany, with the very highest spirit. Eugène in consequence was already taking measures for a retreat, when the proclamation of Murat against Napoléon, already mentioned, on the 19th January, and his consequent occupation of the Roman states, by exposing his right flank and communications, rendered an immediate retrograde movement a

Feb. 3. ~~the~~ matter of necessity. He commenced his retreat accordingly from the Adige, and fell back to the Mincio, where he took post behind that classic

(1) Vict. et Conf. xxiii. 50, 53. Koch, ii. 157, 163. Plötho, iii. 472, 475.

(2) *Ante*, ix. 329, 330.

stream, with the right resting on Mantua, and left on Peschiera; while the Austrians, following him, took post in a corresponding line opposite, from Rivoli to the neighbourhood of Mantua (1).

Reasons which led Eugène to give battle. No position could be more advantageous than the defensive one thus assumed by the Viceroy to resist the incursions of the Imperialists in his front; but it was by no means equally well protected against the army of Murat on his flank, which was now approaching so near as to give serious cause for uneasiness. This celebrated monarch, preferring the chance of a throne to duty and honour, had concerted his measures with the Austrian and English commanders, and after entering the Ecclesiastical States, in the beginning of December, with twenty-three thousand men, was to operate on the Po, in conjunction with a British expedition under Lord William Bentinck, which, embarking from Sicily, received orders to make for Leghorn, and threaten Genoa and the maritime coasts of Napoléon's Italian dominions. Desirous of ridding himself of one enemy before he encountered another, Eugène took the bold, but yet, in his circumstances, prudent resolution of marching forward, with a view to give battle to Belgarde, and if possible throw him across the Adige before Murat's troops Feb. 8. could reach the theatre of action. His resolution was just taken in time; for at that very moment a convention had been signed with Murat, who had advanced to Bologna and declared war against France, fixing on combined operations on both banks of the Po. Thus both parties at the same time were preparing offensive movements against each other; and their mutual execution of their designs at the same time, brought on one of the most singular actions that ever was fought (2).

Battle of the Mincio. Feb. 8. The two armies, assuming the offensive at the same moment, mutually passed each other, and the advanced guard of the one, from the way in which they were marching, came first in contact with the rearguard of the other. The Austrian right, early in the morning, crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and drove back Grenier's division, which formed the French left in the direction of Marengo. Eugène was advancing with his right to cross the same river at Valeggio, his right wing already over, when the cannonade on the left was heard. The moment that he received intelligence of what was there going forward, he conceived the bold idea of suddenly changing his front on both sides of the river and assailing the enemy in flank when half across the same river, and in the course of their march little prepared for a battle. It was an exact repetition of Napoléon's perpendicular attack at Austerlitz, or Wellington's at Salamanca. An irregular action, in consequence, ensued, the French army advancing with great resolution in two lines, with their cavalry on the two flanks; the Austrians, surprized in their march, suddenly wheeling about and fronting the enemy wherever they came upon them. The hottest fighting was around Valeggio, where several desperate charges of cavalry and bloody combats of infantry took place, which occasioned severe loss on both sides; but at the close of the day both parties maintained nearly the ground on which they had commenced the action, though upon the whole the advantage was rather on the side of the French, who accumulated a preponderating force on the decisive point at Valeggio, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. Three thousand Feb. 9. were killed or wounded on both sides. On the day following, the Viceroy retreated across the Mincio at Goito, and Bellegarde immediately

(1) *Vict. et Conq.* xxviii. 191, 196. Koch, ii. 163, 179. *Plötho*, iii. 384

(2) Koch, ii. 172, 181. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 193, 195. *Botta*, iv. 478.

pushed over some divisions in pursuit; but they were so rudely handled, after some success in the outset at Borghetto, Solo, and Gardone Feb. 10 and 14. that the Austrian general, after a few days' skirmishing, withdrew his troops entirely across the Mincio, alleging as an excuse, that the King of Naples was not as yet in a condition to take his part in the proposed operations (1).

But although success was thus balanced on the Mincio, affairs were rapidly going to wreck in other quarters; and every thing presaged the speedy expulsion of the French from the Italian peninsula. The castle of Verona surrendered to the Austrians on the 14th : Feb. 14. Ancona, after a siege of twenty-five days, and a bombardment of Feb. 16. forty-eight hours, capitulated to Murat's troops on the 16th : and the Italian troops in Eugène's service, despairing of the cause of Napoléon, and unable to endure the fatigues and hardships of a winter campaign, deserted in such numbers that it was found indispensable to station the few that remained in the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua. The arrival of nearly all the French in the service of the King of Naples at Eugène's headquarters, after his declaration of war against Napoléon, was far from counterbalancing this great defalcation; and the Viceroy, unable to maintain his extended position on the Mincio, drew nearer to the Po, and brought up his whole reserves from the Milanese states. Meanwhile, Pisa was threatened by Pignatelli's division, forming part of Murat's army, which, being now disengaged from Ancona, was able to invade in force the Tuscan provinces; its governor, Pouchain, upon that, summoned seven hundred of the garrison of Leghorn to his support; and as this entirely denuded the maritime districts, Fouché, who held a general commission from the emperor, in his quality of governor of Rome, to arrange the affairs of central Italy, concluded Feb. 20. a convention with the Neapolitan general, in virtue of which the citadels of Pisa, Leghorn, and Lucca, in the Tuscan territories, were delivered up to the Allies; and the garrisons of Volterra, Civita-Vecchia, Florence, and the castle of St.-Angelo, were to be withdrawn, and transported by sea to the south of France. The old revolutionist, the author of the *mitrailleurs* at Lyons, the arch-director of Napoléon's police, had his views in this convention; it led to a secret conference between him and Murat, a few days after, at Modena, in which he congratulated the Neapolitan monarch upon having extricated himself so adroitly, by joining the coalition, from the wreck of his imperial brother-in-law's fortune, and Feb. 24. persuaded him to issue his celebrated proclamation against Napoléon. He also contrived to extract from him, before the meeting broke up, 170,000 of francs of arrears of pay due to him as governor of Rome, and 300,000 of francs (L.12,000) in bills of exchange, for the cession of his rights on the duchy of Otranto. Having accomplished this object, the wary statesman next proceeded, with all possible expedition, across the Alps into the south of France; and thence cautiously drew near to Paris, anxious to have a hand in the convulsion in that capital which he foresaw was approaching; hastening, like the vulture, to the spot where Revolutionary cupidity was to feast on the carcass of Imperial greatness (2).

(1) Botta, iv. 478, 479. Koch, ii. 181, 193. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 195, 199.

(2) Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 202, 203, Koch, ii. 194, 195. Fouché, ii. 262, 275.

"I had a secret conference with Murat at Modena. There I made him sensible, since he had a decisive part to take, that he ought to declare himself.—' If

you,' said I, 'had as much firmness in your character as you have noble sentiments in your heart, you would be more powerful in Italy than the coalition.' He still hesitated; I then communicated to him my most recent news from Paris. Determined by their import, he entrusted to me the proclamation which he soon afterwards issued against Napo-

Operations
of Lord
W. Bentinck
on the
coast of
Tuscany.
March 8.

Meanwhile Lord William Bentinck, at the head of a considerable expedition from Sicily, amounting to seven thousand men, of whom, however, only one-half were British soldiers, set sail from Palermo on the last day of February, and arrived off Leghorn on the 8th of March. The troops were immediately landed, the French garrison having been previously transported to the south of France, in virtue of the convention concluded with Murat; and the English general immediately issued a proclamation, in which he called on the Tuscans to rise and join his troops in liberating Italy from the oppressors. At the same time, the hereditary prince of Sicily, who accompanied the expedition, issued of his own

March 8.

authority a proclamation, in which he openly brought forward his claims to the throne of Naples, and announced to the Sicilian troops in the expedition that he was about to assert them by force of arms. This injudicious and ill-timed effusion immediately gave umbrage to Murat, who had declared for the Allies only in order to preserve that throne; and it not only had the effect of making him suspend his operations on the Po against the Viceroy, and concentrate his troops in order to be ready for any contingency, but produced such ill humour in his mind, as had wellnigh thrown him again into the arms of Napoléon. Bentinck had an interview with him, and insisted upon the evacuation of Tuscany by the Neapolitan troops; but he failed in appeasing his wrath or gaining that object, and a rupture seemed inevitable, when it was fortunately prevented by the seasonable interposition of the British government, who disavowed the hereditary prince's pro-

March 23.

clamation, and relinquished the demand for the evacuation of Tuscany. Meanwhile the English general, finding combined operations with the king of Naples in his present temper impossible, moved his troops from Pisa to Lucca, in order to co-operate with the second division of the expedition, which had landed in the gulf of La Spezia, in a general attack on Genoa. It did not take place, however, till after the fall of Napoléon, and though entirely successful, as will afterwards appear, was accompanied with declarations on the part of Lord William, which proved in no small degree embarrassing in the final settlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna (1).

Successes
of Eugène
on the Po.

The concentration of troops which took place, however, in consequence of Murat's jealousy of the hereditary prince's proclamation, relieved Eugène from part of the weight which had hitherto oppressed him, and demonstrated again for the hundredth time the inability of the Neapolitan soldiers to withstand the shock of the Transalpine bayonets. Murat, having pushed forward a division under Colonel Metzko to Casal-Mag-

Feb. 24.

giore on the Po, commenced the construction of a bridge there; but Metzko was surprized three days afterwards by Bonnernain, with a divi-

Feb. 27.

sion of Eugène's men, driven from the place, and the whole boats which had been collected were taken. Murat upon this retired; and Eugène

léon. . . . Soon after, I had a secret interview with Eugène, at the time when he received the intelligence of the Emperor's recent success over Blücher at Champagne. 'Return to Eugène,' said the Emperor to the aide-de-camp who brought the intelligence; 'tell him how I have settled with these gentlemen here; they are a set of rascals, whom I will put to flight with strokes of the whip.' All the world at the Viceroy's headquarters were in transports at this intelligence: I took Eugène aside, and told him suchrodomontade could impose on none but enthusiastic fools: that all reasonable persons saw the imminent danger in which the imperial throne was placed; and that it was not the nation which was wanting to Napoléon, but Napoléon, by his

despotism, who had destroyed the spirit of the nation. I gave some good counsel to Eugène, and set out for Lyons: and there, as I saw the spirit of resistance was alive only in the public functionaries, I announced that a million of men were pouring into France, the defection of the king of Naples, and that it was impossible to reinstate affairs but by a great political change. I soon saw that the authorities had secret instructions regarding me, and in effect I was soon after obliged to set out for Valence and Dauphiny instead of Paris, the only destination to which I was at that juncture inclined."

—*Mémoires de Fouché*; ii. 263, 275.

(1) Botta, iv. 480, 481. Ann. Reg. 32, 33. Koch ii. 208, 210.

March 1. having pushed General Grenier, with his division, entirely French, across the river at Borgoforte, chased the Neapolitans with great loss from

March 2. Guastalla, and next day the victors appeared before Parma, and routed the Allied troops which occupied it. In this affair, Metzko's Neapolitan brigade was entirely dispersed; sixteen hundred men, chiefly Austrians,

March 3. were taken in the town of Parma, and Grenier, following up his success before the enemy could recover from their consternation, made himself master of Reggio, and threw the Neapolitans back to the foot of the Apennines. Murat, however, discovering some days afterwards that this town was only occupied by three thousand men, pushed forward his advanced

March 6. guard, composed entirely of Austrians, and carried Rubiera, where a detachment was placed, by assault, driving the garrison back to Reggio. Encouraged by this success, he advanced to the attack of the latter town; and Severoli, who commanded the troops which occupied it, had the imprudence to deliver a pitched battle before its walls, against a German force

March 7. nearly three times superior, in which, after a gallant resistance, he was worsted; and having been obliged to leave the field severely wounded, his successor in the command, Rambourg, withdrew into the town, and soon

March 8. after entered into a convention with Murat for its evacuation. The king of Naples, in consequence, entered Reggio on the following day, and pushed his vanguard on to Parma; but there the advance of the Neapolitans was arrested, by the proclamation of the hereditary prince of Sicily already mentioned. The concentration of the Neapolitan troops in Tuscany enabled Eugène again to assume a menacing aspect on the Mincio against Bellegarde; and the whole remainder of March passed away, without any enterprize of note taking place on the part of any of the three armies which now contended for the empire of Italy (1).

Affairs at
Lyons.

Jan. 1.

Events of no ordinary importance had also at this period occurred at Lyons and its vicinity, where Augereau had been left, as already mentioned, to make head against the Austrian corps of Count Bubna. It has been noticed also, that Geneva was occupied by the Austrian commander in the beginning of January without resistance; and such was the state of destitution in which the military force and fortresses of France at that period were, that if they had pushed on, they might with ease have made themselves masters of Lyons and the whole course of the Upper Rhone, before the middle of that month. The progress of the Austrians, however, was so slow,

Jan. 14.

that it was not till the 14th of January that their advanced posts even appeared before Lyons; and on that very day Augereau arrived from Paris to take the command. At that period there were only seventeen hundred regular troops in the garrison, inadequately supported by some thousand national guards. Despairing of arresting the attack of the enemy with such feeble means, Augereau proceeded on to the south to Valence, in order to hasten the armaments, and organize troops in that direction; leaving General Musnier in command of the slender garrison at Lyons, with instructions to retard the enemy as much as possible, but not expose the city to the horrors of an assault (2).

Combats in
Savoy.

The imminent danger that Lyons, the second city in the empire, would speedily fall before the Austrian general, who had twenty thousand men around its walls, joined to the urgent representations of Augereau as to the total inadequacy of the means at his disposal for its defence,

(1) Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 205, 207. Koch, ii. 195, 206. Bot. ii. 479.

(2) Koch, ii. 241, 219. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 207, 210. Plötho, iii. 452.

induced Napoléon to take the most vigorous measures for its relief. Augereau sent a thousand men in post carriages from Valence, who arrived during the night of the 18th; and reinforcements having come in from other quarters soon after, the Austrians, who were ignorant of the real weakness of the garrison, and had not heavy artillery to undertake a siege, retired to Montluel on the road to Geneva, where they remained inactive till the end of January. This retrograde movement, coupled with the daily arrival of some hundred conscripts from the depots in the south and west within their walls, revived the spirit of the Lyonese, who, in the first instance, had despaired altogether of the possibility of resistance; and the national guard soon raised the effective force in the garrison to ten thousand men. The Austrians now gave over all thoughts of an immediate attack on Lyons; and extending themselves from Geneva towards the valleys of Savoy, entered Chamberri after some successful combats, and got possession of the well-known romantic defile of Echelles, the only direct though steep and rugged entrance from the plain of the Rhone into the Alpine heights. At the same time Bubna pushed a considerable body of troops towards Chalons, made himself master of that town, and the whole country between the Aisne and the Saone; and every where disarmed the inhabitants, and applied the resources of the country to the supply of the Allied forces (1).

The efforts of Napoléon, however, to reinforce the army at Lyons, at length produced the desired effect. A considerable body of troops was drawn from Suchet's army in Catalonia, transported by post to Nismes, and thence forwarded, with every sabre and bayonet which could be collected in Languedoc, to Lyons. These great reinforcements raised the troops under Augereau, who had now re-established his headquarters in Lyons, to twenty-one thousand men, who were divided into two corps, one of which, twelve thousand strong, under the command of the marshal in person, acted on the right bank of the Rhone, while the other, of nine thousand, led by Marchand, operated on the left bank. This force was much greater than any which Bubna could bring against him; and as this accumulation on the side of Lyons occurred at the very time when Napoléon enjoined a vigorous offensive to Augereau, after his own defeat of Blucher, and resumption of operations against the Grand Army at Montereau, in order to threaten its flanks and rear, he immediately commenced active hostilities on both sides of the Rhône. Gradually the Austrians were forced back on the road from Lyons to Geneva; Bourg and Nantua were recovered; Marchand forced the steep pass of Echelles after a bloody conflict, and drove the enemy in confusion to Chamberri, where, nearly surrounded, they were glad to escape to Aix on the lake of Bourget, between that town and Geneva, where they took up a strong position, with the lake on one flank, the precipitous mountains on the other, and a morass in front. There, however, they were soon attacked by the French, now flushed with victory; the position was carried, Aix taken, and the Austrians, after several unsuccessful combats, thrown back to the heights in front of Geneva (2).

Considerable as these successes were, they were very far from either answering the expectations, or coming up to the views of the French Emperor. It was on the banks of the Seine, and not either in Savoy or the banks of the Rhône, that the contest was to be

(1) Plotko, iii. 453, 457. Koch, ii. 211, 225. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 211, 215.

(2) Vict. et Conq. xviii. 214, 220. Koch, ii. 226, 232, Plotko, iii. 454, 455.

decided; Napoléon intended Augereau to threaten the flanks and rear of the Grand Army at the very time that he assailed it in front; and every movement on that marshal's part was therefore eccentric, and to be deprecated, which did not bring him close upon Schwartzberg's rear. He was no sooner informed, therefore, of the direction of the French forces from Lyons into Savoy, than he wrote to him that it was towards Geneva and the Pays de Vaud that his march should be turned, as they lay on the communications of the Grand Army; that it was by massing his troops together, and acting at one point, that great things were to be done; and that he should forget he was fifty-six years old, and think only of his brilliant days at Castiglione (1). Augereau, however, was fearful of engaging his troops, of whom not more than one-half were thoroughly disciplined and experienced, in a distant warfare in the defiles of the Jura; and he remained almost inactive till the end of February, content with the successes he had already gained on the side of Savoy—a degree of torpor, considering the vital interests which were then at stake in the headquarters of Schwartzberg's army, and the terror which his movement from Lyons had already excited amongst the Austrian generals, which the French military historians may well denominate fatal. Meanwhile the Allied sovereigns, as already mentioned (2), directed the reserves of the Grand Army towards Chalons and Macon, in the direction of Lyons, and the formation of an army, to be called the army of the south, forty thousand strong, on the banks of the Saone; and Napoléon, to counterbalance this great detachment, ordered Suchet to reinforce Augereau with ten thousand additional veterans from the army of Catalonia, and Prince Borghese to send eight thousand, with all possible expedition, across Mont-Cenis to Lyons, so that, by the beginning of April, the contending armies on the Rhone would each amount to nearly fifty thousand men (5).

Augereau's
operations
in the Jura.
Feb. 27
and 28.

Roused at length from his ruinous inactivity at Lyons by the repeated exhortations of the Emperor, Augereau, in the beginning of March, put himself in motion in the direction evidently pointed out by the strategical operations going forward on the banks of the Seine. Dessaix and Marchand made a combined attack on the Austrian positions in front of Geneva; and, after a series of obstinate engagements, drove them back into that town, with the loss of a thousand men.

(1) *Ante*, iii. p. 36.

"Count Buhna has not ten thousand men under his command to oppose to you—miserable troops, who will disappear like a mist before the sun at the aspect of your old bands from Catalonia. France and Switzerland have their eyes upon you; the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud and Argovia have sixteen battalions of militia ready to range themselves on your side; the cantons of St.-Gall, Soleure, and a part of Zurich, only await your standards to declare themselves in favour of the French. Forget that you are fifty-six years old, and think only of your brilliant days at Castiglione." And a few days after he wrote, "The Emperor is not satisfied with your dispositions, in pushing detachments in this manner wherever the enemy has forces, instead of striking at his heart. He directs me in consequence to reiterate the orders you have already three times received. You are to *unite all your forces into one column*, and march either into the Pays de Vaud or the Jura, according as the enemy is in most force in the one or the other. It is by concentrating forces in masses that great successes are obtained. I have the best reasons for assuring you that the enemy is seriously alarmed at the movements he supposes you are to

make, and which he was bound to expect; he would be too happy if he could assure himself that you would merely send out detachments in different directions, all the while remaining yourself quiet at Lyons. It is by putting yourself at the head of your troops, as the Emperor wishes, and acting vigorously, that you can alone effect a great and useful diversion. The Emperor conceives it to be altogether immaterial that the battalions of reserve from Nismes are ill-clothed and equipped, since they have muskets and bayonets. He desires me to tell you that the corps of Gérard, which has done such great things under his eyes, is composed of conscripts half naked. He has at this moment four thousand national guards in his army, with round hats, with peasant's coats and waistcoats, and without knapsacks, armed with all sorts of muskets, on whom he puts the greatest value; he only wishes he had thirty thousand of them."—DUC DE FELTRE (CLARKE) à M. LE DUC DE CASTIGLIONE, Feb. 22 and 23, 1814.—*Fictitious and Conquests*, xxiii. 219, 220.

(2) *Ante* x. p. 97.

(3) *Fain*, 116. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 249, 221, Koch, ii. 237, 239, Vaud. ii. 143, 144; and i. 431, 438.

March 2. Fort Ecluse was captured next day; and the victorious French,
 March 3. instead of following up their successes by the capture of Geneva, or extending themselves along the margin of the Lemau lake, were directed by Jourdan to attack the corps of Lichtenstein, which lay in the neighbourhood of Besançon. This diversion of force saved Geneva, and extricated Bubna from great difficulties. Meanwhile, the powerful reserves which the Allies were directing towards the Saône, under Bianchi, from the rear of the
 March 7. grand army, compelled Augereau to concentrate his forces, and direct them to the right bank of the Rhone, in order to make head against them and cover Lyons. With this view, he collected the bulk of his forces
 March 9. from both banks of the river at Lons-le-Saulnier, and gradually fell back towards Lyons, which he re-entered on the 9th March. The exposed situation of an Austrian detachment at Macon, induced him,
 March 11. two days afterwards, to order an attack by Musnier on that town; but Bianchi, advancing in person to its support, opened a warm fire from thirty pieces of artillery on the attacking column, and they were defeated with the loss of seven hundred men and two cannon. Disconcerted by this check, the French forces fell back towards Lyons, closely followed by the Allied troops, as well in the Jura as in the valley of the Saone; and on the 18th, the Austrians, under Prince Hesse-Homburg, thirty thousand strong, made a general
 March 18. attack on the French line. Bianchi and Wimpffen assailed their right, while the Prince of Wied-Runket turned their left by the road of Beaugiu. The French combated with great bravery, and in some points, particularly Lage-Longsart, gained, in the first instance, considerable advantages; but Wimpffen restored the combat, and Wied-Runket having threatened their left, Augereau retreated to Limonet, on the road to Lyons, with hardly any hope of preserving that city from the enemy (1).

Determined, however, to retard the Allies as much as possible, in order to give time for the arrival of the great reinforcements, eighteen thousand strong, ordered in the beginning of March, from Catalonia and Turin, above two thousand of which had already come up, Augereau took post across the great road near Limonet, barring all access to
 March 20. Lyons on that side. Musnier's division was established near Limonet, on the heights between the Saone and the Lyons road, and from thence the line extended by the plateau to Dardilly. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg made the following dispositions: Bianchi, after passing the defile of Dorieux, was to form between Dommartin and Salvagny, and push on direct for Lyons; Wimpffen was to support Bianchi, as soon as sufficient room was made for him to deploy; while Mumb, at the head of a brigade, was to follow the crest of the ridge which extends towards Lyons from Chasselay, and threaten the rear of the enemy. All these attacks proved successful. At noon, Musnier, seeing Mumb's brigade rapidly gaining the ridge in his rear, conceived himself cut off, and fell back towards Lyons; while Bianchi, without much difficulty, made himself master of the plateau of Dardilly, and, extending his lines along its summit, soon gained room for Wimpffen to pass the defile in his rear, and form on his right. The battle seemed already gained, as the French right and centre had abandoned their position, and were falling back towards Lyons, when the aspect of affairs was unexpectedly changed by two thousand foot, and three hundred horse, who made so vigorous an attack on Wied-Runket, near the road to Moulins, that they not only arrested his advance, but gave time for Augereau to rally his other divisions, in full re-

(1) Kneb, ii. 240, 254. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 226, 229. Plötho, iii. 459, 460. Vand. ii. 151, 157.

treat towards Lyons, and bring them back to the charge. A furious combat now took place along the whole line, and continued with various success till nightfall; but, at the close of the action, the progress of the Austrians, though not decisive, was distinctly marked on all sides; and Augereau, despairing of being able any longer to defend Lyons, evacuated the city at midnight, taking the road to Valence, in order to gain the line of the Isère. Next day, the Austrians entered, and the second city in the empire saw the Allied colours waving on its walls (1).

Great
effects of
this victory.

In these actions, from the 16th to the 20th inclusive, the Allies lost two thousand nine hundred men, killed, wounded, and prisoners: the French loss, as they were defending positions, did not exceed two thousand; but they left behind them twenty-two pieces of cannon, and large military stores of all kinds, including twenty-four thousand rounds of cannon-ball, in Lyons. The effects of this conquest were immense. It immediately liberated Bubna, who had for three weeks been nearly besieged by the French in Geneva; Marchand, so recently victorious, was obliged to retire in haste to Grenoble, closely followed by the Austrians, who retaliated upon him all that they had recently suffered in their own retreat; and, to complete their misfortunes, the united French force, now reduced to twenty thousand combatants, had hardly taken post behind the Isère, thus abandoning entirely the passes of the Simplon and Mont-Cenis, the great gates from France into Italy, when the crushing intelligence reached Augereau of the capture of Bordeaux by the British, accompanied by a pressing order from Napoléon, that six of the ten thousand men who had been promised him from Suchet's army, should be directed to the reinforcement of Soult. This last blow broke the spirit of the veteran marshal; and deeming the cause of Napoléon now all but hopeless, he wrote to Eugène, informing him of the full extent of the Emperor's disasters, and conjuring him, in the name of their common country, to hasten with his yet unbroken army across the Alps, and if he could not avert its misfortunes, at least share its fate. Meanwhile he stationed his troops in *echelon* down the line of the Rhone, from Valence to the Pont St.-Esprit, in order to establish an interior line of communication with Marshal Soult, and be in a situation to join him before the Prince of Hesse-Hombourg could stretch across the south of France to unite with the victorious standards of Wellington on the banks of the Garonne (2).

Concluding
operations
of Wellington
in the
south of
France.

While the empire of Napoléon was thus crumbling away in Flanders, Italy, and on the Rhone, disasters attended with still more serious consequences, as leading directly to his dethronement, had occurred in the south of France.

Wellington's
difficulties
in the south
of France.

The concluding and bloody operations of Wellington and Soult on the Nive, already mentioned (3), were succeeded by a considerable rest to both armies. This, however, was far from being a period of repose to Wellington himself; on the contrary, his difficulties seemed to multiply even in the midst of his triumphs; and he never had more obstacles to encounter than now, when they seemed to be all vanishing before him. The noble and heroic system of protection to others and self-denial to himself, by which, in the eloquent words of an eye-witness, "order and tranquillity profound, on the edge of the very battle-field, attended the march of the civilized army which passed the Bidassoa (4)," necessarily, when

(1) Ploto, iii. 460. 461. Koch, ii. 256, 263.
Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 227, 232.

(2) Koch, ii. 293, 297. Ploto, iii. 491, 493.
Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 232, 234.

(3) *Ante*, ix. 435, 446.

(4) Napier, vi. 456.

a hundred thousand men were to be provided for, occasioned an extraordinary strain on the British finances. Such were the demands on the English treasury at this period, from having come under an engagement to give L.41,000,000 sterling in subsidies to the Allied powers during a single year, beside arming nearly the whole of their vast warlike arrays, maintaining the contest at once in the south of France, Flanders, and Italy, and supporting a most expensive war by sea and land against America, that it was with the utmost difficulty that government could find the means of answering them, even out of the boundless resources and now exalted spirit of England. Above all, the difficulty of furnishing *specie* in sufficient quantity for an army of such magnitude, which paid every thing in ready money, and levied no contributions on the conquered territory, especially at a time when the prodigious armies on the Rhine had absorbed nearly the whole circulating medium of the continent, had become excessive. The utmost that government could furnish was a hundred thousand pounds in specie a-month; but though this steady drain was felt as so severe at home, that the under-secretary of state, Colonel Bunbury, was sent out to endeavour to reduce it, yet it was very far indeed from answering Wellington's necessities. Some of his muleteers were two years in arrear; the soldiers, in general, had been seven months without pay; the debt owing by the English authorities in every part of the country was immense, although in the last year L.2,572,000 had passed in specie through the military chest; the creditors, long kept out of their money, were becoming importunate; sixteen thousand of the peninsular troops could not be brought into France, because there was no money either to feed or pay them; extraordinary obstacles were opposed by the democratic Spanish authorities to the establishment of hospitals in the rear, even when thirty thousand men, wounded during the campaign in their service, required attendance; and, although great benefits had been experienced by declaring St.-Jean de Luz a free port, yet the French too were constantly receiving supplies at Bayonne by sea, and, strange to say, the mistress of the ocean was unable to prevent the coasting trade of a contemptible naval force of the enemy (1).

Plan of employing Wellington in Flanders, and his reasons against it. So forcibly were the British government impressed at this period with the enormous expense at which the contest in the south of France was carried on, that deeming the independence of the Peninsula now secured, and conceiving that the decisive point in the struggle which remained was to be found nearer Paris than the banks of the Adour or the Garonne, they seriously entertained, and transmitted to Wellington a proposal, first suggested by the Emperor of Russia, for transporting his army by sea to the Netherlands, and causing it to form the right wing of the vast army which, from the Alps to the ocean, was now invading France. It must be admitted that this project presented at first sight several advantages. The independence of the Peninsula appeared to be secured, and the black ingratitude of its democratic rulers held out no inducement towards making any further efforts in its behalf; the vicinity of Flanders to the British shores would enable government to augment at pleasure the army to almost any amount; an act of parliament had recently passed, authorizing three-fourths of the militia to volunteer for foreign service, and there could be little doubt they would crowd round Wellington's standards on the Scheldt; while the defenceless condition of the French barrier towns, and total absence of any considerable military force on the frontiers of Picardy, seemed to promise to the Peninsular hero, as the reward of his toils, a

(1) Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Jan. 8, 1814. Gurw. xi. 425, 427. Nap. vi. 470, 472; and Gurw. xi. 387.

triumphant and almost unresisted march to Paris. But while Wellington, with his usual patriotic spirit, professed his willingness to serve his king and country wherever government might direct, he justly observed in reply, that with a British force never exceeding thirty thousand men in the field, he had maintained his ground in the Peninsula against two hundred thousand French, and finally driven them over the Pyrenees; that the frontier now invaded by him was the most vulnerable, perhaps the only vulnerable quarter, in which France could be assailed: that if he could put twenty thousand Spaniards into the field, he would take Bayonne; if forty thousand, he would have his posts on the Garonne: that the latter event would shake Napoléon incomparably more than if forty thousand British troops were besieging the Dutch fortresses; and that the consequence of withdrawing the British army would be, that a hundred thousand veteran troops of a quality superior to any the Allies had yet had to deal with, would be at once put at Napoléon's disposal to act against their armies on the Seine and the Rhone, besides an equal force of reserves now forming in the southern provinces, and who, possessing an interior line of communication, could be brought into action long before the British could be brought up, after their shipment and landing on the other side; and that their army, by such a changing of the scene of action, would, for the next four months, big with the fate of the world, be put entirely *hors-de-combat*. These considerations prevailed with the English government, and they resolved to follow their general's advice as to continuing the war in the south of France; though a considerable part of the reinforcements destined for his army were turned aside into Holland, and formed the gallant though ill-fated corps which was wrecked on the ramparts of Bergen-op-Zoom (1).

But if Wellington's difficulties were great, those of his antagonist were still greater: for he had to contend with a falling cause and a tottering empire; to restrain treachery, and yet avoid severity; to enforce requisitions, and not exasperate selfishness; to inspire military spirit, and avoid exciting civil indignation. To do these things had now become impossible. The hour of punishment and retribution had struck, and no human power could avert its bitterness. In vain he exerted himself to the utmost to collect resources, and assemble a respectable military force to resist the further advance of the English general; all his efforts were like rolling the stone of Sisyphus to the summit. The urban cohorts indeed were readily formed, as the means of creating a police force, and the conscripts obeyed the imperial authorities, and repaired to the points assigned for their organization; but the people were sullen and apathetic: the whole class of proprietors were openly opposed to the war, to which they saw no end, and from the continuance of which they could not derive any visible advantage: the Royalist committees were already active in the rear, and preparing to take advantage of the crisis which all foresaw was approaching, to re-establish the exiled family; and, above all, the forced requisitions excited universal indignation, and inclined the peasantry, at all hazards, to desire the termination of so abominable a system. France now felt what it was to make war maintain war: her people experienced the practical working of that system, which, when applied to others, had so long been the object, to her inhabitants, of pride and exultation. The people of Bearn learned what it was, as so many provinces of Spain had so long done, to feed, clothe, lodge, and pay, an army of eighty thousand of Napoléon's soldiers. Such was the magnitude of the requisitions, and so unbounded the exasperation produced by them,

1) Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Dec. 21, 1813. Gurw. xi. 384, 385.

especially when placed in bright contrast to the strict discipline of the English army, and the invariable payment for every article taken by them, that numbers of the peasantry passed with their horses, carts, and implements of husbandry into the British lines, to obtain an enemy's protection from the rapine of their own government; and one of the commissioners at the moment wrote from Bayonne—"The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains, does us more harm than ten battles. *Every peasant wishes to be under his protection* (1)."

Soult employed the two months of respite to warlike operations which was afforded by the excessive rigour of the season, after the battle of the Nive, in the middle of December, in diligently instructing his conscripts in the military art; and, under the shelter of the ramparts of Bayonne, he was able to effect it without molestation. But the necessities of the Emperor, after the battle of La Rothière, compelled him to Feb. 4. make a large draft from the army of the south; and, in the beginning of February, the French general had the mortification to receive an order, which compelled him to send off two divisions of infantry, two thousand detached veterans, and six regiments of dragoons, to reinforce the host which was combating on the banks of the Seine. About the same time, reinforcements to the amount of five thousand men, including twelve hundred horse, arrived at Wellington's headquarters from England, and the whole cavalry of the army, which had been sent back, from want of forage, to the banks of the Ebro, was now, with the returning spring, brought up again to those of the Adour. By this means Soult's effective troops in the field, after deducting the garrison of Bayonne and other forts which he was obliged to defend, did not exceed forty thousand men; and a considerable part of this force was composed of conscripts, who, though disciplined, were not yet inured to war, and could not be relied upon, either to withstand the fatigues or confront the dangers of serious warfare in the campaign. On the other hand, the Anglo-Portuguese force, by the *Morning State* on February 15th, when the advance commenced, amounted to seventy thousand men, of whom ten thousand were cavalry, and the Spaniards were thirty thousand more: in all a hundred thousand with a hundred and forty pieces of cannon—a prodigious force to be collected at one point, under the command of a single general; and, considering the discipline and spirit of the troops, and the talents and experience of their chief, the most formidable army which had ever been put forth by the power of England (2).

(1) Nap. vi. 505, 507. Pellot, *Guerre des Pyrénées*, 54.

(2) See *Morning State*, Feb. 13, 1814. Nap. v. 706; and v. 506, 507, 525. Koch, ii. 268, 275. Vaud. ii. 160, 162.

State of the French Army of Spain, Sept. 16, 1813.

Right wing—		Effective and Non-effective.		Effective and Non-effective	
Foy,		5,022		Cavalry—Pierre Soult,	4,456
Maucune,		4,166		— — Trielhard,	2,368
Menou,		5,707		— — Gens d'Armes (mounted,) .	291
Centre—				— — — (dismounted,)	1,210
D'Armagnac,		4,353		Total cavalry,	8,325
Abbé,		5,903			
Maransin,		4,842		Artillery,	895
Couroux,		4,736		Engineers,	504
Left wing—					
Roguet,		5,982		<i>Grand Total.</i>	
Taupin,		5,071		Infantry,	54,038
Reserve—				Cavalry,	8,325
Villatte,		8,256		Artillery,	895
Total infantry,		54,038		Engineers,	504

Total, 63,762

Rejection of the Treaty of Valençay by the Cortes, and arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême at Wellington's head quarters.

The security which the English general felt in commencing his military operations, was much augmented by the rejection at the same time, by the Cortes at Madrid, of the treaty of Valençay, insidiously extorted at this period from the weak and captive Ferdinand. This resolution gave, as well it might, the highest satisfaction to Wellington; demonstrating in the clearest manner, that with whatever republican ambition the government of Spain, elected under the impulse of universal suffrage, might be infected, they had not yet forgotten their patriotic resistance to Gallic aggression, nor were prepared to accept a despot from the prisons of a desolating conqueror. He was not a little embarrassed, however, shortly after, by an event as unforeseen as it was perplexing, and which at once involved him in those difficult questions concerning the future government of France, which the Allied sovereigns even felt themselves unable to determine, and which, by common consent, they left to time and the course of events to resolve. The partizans of the Bourbons in la Vendée and the western provinces, had for some time past been in secret communication with the English general; although he took the utmost pains to guard them against committing themselves prematurely, not merely from the total uncertainty in which he was as to the intentions of the Allied sovereigns with respect to the future government of France, but from the advice which he had given the British cabinet, to accede to any peace with Napoléon which might afford reasonable security against aggression to the rest of Europe (1). Matters, however, were at length brought to a crisis, by the Duke d'Angoulême suddenly arriving at headquarters; but in the critical circumstances which ensued, Wellington acted with his wonted

Feb. 25. judgment and delicacy. While manifesting the most marked attention towards the illustrious prince, he insisted upon his remaining incognito till the intentions of the Allied sovereigns were distinctly pronounced; advised him, for the interests of his royal house, "neither to anticipate public opinion nor precipitate matters;" and would not allow him to leave St.-Jean-de-Luz to accompany the army in active operations. At the same time, when he perceived, after the advance of the British to Orthes, that the spirit of the country was more openly manifesting itself, he made no scruple in informing the British government of the change, and apprising them, that "any decided declaration from them against Napoléon would spread such a flame through the country, as would infallibly overturn him (2)."

Wellington's proclamation against the insurrection in Baygorry.

Previous to commencing active operations, there was one festering wound in his rear which it was the peculiar care of Wellington to close; and which his mingled firmness and humanity succeeded in healing. The mountainous districts of Baygorry and Bidarry, at the foot of the Pyrenees, had suffered severely from the rapine

(1) "The people here all agree in one opinion; viz, that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here—an earnest desire to get rid of Buonaparte and his government, from a conviction that, as long as he governs, they will have no peace. The language common to all is, that although the grievous hardships and oppression under which they suffer are intolerable, they dare not have the satisfaction even of complaining; that, on the contrary, they are obliged to pretend to rejoice, and that they are allowed only to lament in secret and in silence their hard fate. They say that the Bourbons are as unknown in France as the princes of any other sovereign house in Europe. I am convinced, more than ever, that Napoléon's power stands upon corruption, and that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his

army, and the *employés civils* of his government, with some of the new proprietors. Notwithstanding this, I recommend your lordship to make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers require peace even more than France; and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual, on what he sees and hears in a corner of France. If Buonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall probably have another war in a few years."—WELLINGTON TO LORD BATHURST, 21st Nov. 1813; GURWOOD, xi. 304, 305.

(2) Wellington to Lord Liverpool, March 4, 1814. and to Duc d'Angoulême, Feb. 25, 1814. Gurw. xi; 547, 549. Beauch. 40, 44.

of Mina's troops before they were sent back into Spain; and several able French generals, especially General Harispe, who was a native of that district, had in consequence succeeded in rousing a national war among the peasants of those valleys, which did very serious injury to the Allied army. To crush this dangerous example, which it had been the grand object of the English general to prevent, he issued a proclamation to the people in the French and Basque languages, which happily, on this painful and delicate subject, steered the middle course between savage cruelty and ruinous lenity. Without forbidding the peasants to take up arms to defend their country—as Napoléon had so often done in Spain, Italy, and the Tyrol—and denouncing the penalty of death in case of disobedience, he contented himself with declaring, that, if they wanted to be soldiers, they must leave their homes and join the regular armies; in which case they should, if taken, be treated as prisoners of war, and their dwellings and families protected; but that he would not permit them with impunity to play the part alternately of a peaceable inhabitant and of a soldier (1). In this proclamation, there was nothing in the slightest degree unjust; it trenched on none of the natural rights of man to defend his country; it merely denounced as pirates and robbers those who, claiming and enjoying the benefits of hostile discipline, insidiously turned their arms against those to whom they owed these blessings, and neither yielded the submission which is the condition of protection to the citizen, nor assumed the profession which gives the privileges of the soldier. Perhaps it was impossible on this difficult subject, fraught with such dreadful consequences on either side, to steer the middle course more happily; and the effect corresponded to such intentions, for the insurrection was speedily appeased; and though Wellington desired his officers to inform the people, that if any further outrages continued he would treat them as the French had done the villages in Spain and Portugal—that is, he would destroy the houses and hang the inhabitants; yet it was not necessary to carry any of these menaces into effect (2).

Position of
Soult around
Bayonne. Although Soult's regular force in the field was little more than half of what his adversary could bring to bear against him, yet his situation, with the advantage of the now powerful and fully-armed fortress of Bayonne, at the confluence of the Nive and Adour, to protect his right, was such as in a great degree to counterbalance the inequality of numbers. The fortress itself, which could be rendered in great part inaccessible by inundations of the Lower Adour, could only be besieged in form by crossing that river, and breaking ground on the right bank; and this was no easy matter to accomplish in the face of a powerful flotilla of gun-boats collected to obstruct the passage, and the efforts of an army of forty thousand men, sheltered by the guns of the place. Deeming his right sufficiently secured by this strong *point d'appui*, Soult, during the course of January, drafted off the bulk of his forces to his left, in the mountains towards St.-Jean-Pied-de-

(1) "The conduct of the people of Bidarray and Baygorry has given me the greatest pain: it has been different from that of all the other inhabitants of the country, and they have no right to act as they have done. If they wish to make war, let them join the ranks of the enemy; but I will not permit them to play the part alternately of peaceable inhabitants and soldiers. If they remain quietly at home, no one will molest them; they shall be, on the contrary, protected, like all the other inhabitants of this country which my armies occupy. They ought to know, that I have done every thing in my power to fulfil the engagements which I have undertaken

towards the country; but, I give them warning, that, if they persist in making war, they must join the enemy's ranks and become soldiers; they must not remain in their villages."—*Proclamation by Wellington, 28th January 1814*; GURWOOD, xi. 485. What a contrast to the savage proclamations of Soult, Augereau, Bessières, and Napoléon, in similar circumstances!—See *Ante*, iii. 26, for NAPOLEON at Pavia; viii. 143, for AUGEREAU and BESSIÈRES; and viii. 248, for SOULT; all combined and referred to in x. 118.

(2) Wellington to Sir W. Beresford, Jan. 28, 1814. GURW. xi. 483, 484.

Port and strengthened his position there by field-works; but he had no confidence in his ability to maintain his ground under the cannon of the fortress when the Upper Adour should be gained, as he foresaw it speedily would, by the enemy; and therefore he wrote to Napoléon, strongly counselling him to abandon all lesser objects, and concentrate his whole disposable forces from all quarters in a great army on the Seine, to prevent Paris from falling into the hands of the Allies. For this purpose, he proposed that Bayonne should be left to its own resources, with a garrison of fourteen thousand men; that Clauzel, with two divisions, should be left in the Pyrenees to act on the rear of the invading force; and that the whole remainder of the army should march under his own command to Paris. Perhaps this was the only plan which, in the desperate state of the Emperor's fortunes, promised a chance of success; but such as it was, it was disapproved of by him as contravening his favourite political system of giving nothing up; and he commanded Soult to maintain himself as long as he could, in any defensive position he could find, on the banks of the Adour (1).

Wellington
forces the
passage of
the Upper
Adour.

Having completed his preparations, Wellington determined to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and for this purpose he collected at the mouth of the river forty large sailing boats of thirty or forty tons burden each, professedly for the commissariat, but in truth laden with planks and other materials for the purpose of building a bridge between that point and the fortress. The better to conceal his real designs from the enemy, he determined at the same time to threaten the French left with Hill's corps, and turn it by the sources of the rivers at the foot of the mountains, while Beresford, with the main body, menaced their centre. By this means, if his left, which was under the direction of Hope, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river, he hoped to cut Soult off entirely from Bordeaux, and drive him from under the cannon of Bayonne towards the upper Garonne. A hard frost having at length rendered the deep clayey roads of Bearn practicable, the troops were all put in motion at day-break on the 14th of February. Hill marched with twenty thousand men against Harispe, who lay at Hellette with five thousand men, while another column moved towards the Joyeuse streamlet. After a slight combat, the French general, wholly unable to resist such a superiority of force, fell back, and the fortress of St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port was immediately invested by Mina's battalions. Meanwhile the Allied centre, under Beresford, advanced against the French centre, under Clauzel, who, in obedience to his orders, fell back successively across the Joyeuse, the Bidouse, and the Gave de Mauléon, behind which he at length took up a position. Meanwhile Jaca, commanding the pass from that quarter into Arragon, being left to its own resources by this retreat of the French left, capitulated. At the same time, Harispe having

Feb. 17. taken post in a strong position on the Garris mountain, Wellington, who had rode up late in the evening to the spot, struck with the necessity of driving the enemy from such a post before Soult had time to reinforce the troops who occupied it from his centre, gave orders to attack, observing to the 28th and 50th regiments, which headed the assaulting column, "you must take the hill before dark." With loud shouts these gallant regiments rushed forward into the dark and woody ravine at its foot, and clambering up the opposite side carried the height almost immediately; but the enemy, seeing they were unsupported, returned twice to the charge, striving to regain the hill with the bayonet; but they were beat off with the

(1) Soult to Napoléon, Feb. 5, 1814. Nap. vi. 511. 514.

loss of three hundred killed and wounded, and two hundred prisoners, while the British were only weakened by a hundred and sixty (1).

Passage of
the Gave de
Mauleon.

Soult upon this drew back his troops across the Bidouse river by the bridge of St.-Palais, which he destroyed; but Hill immediately repaired it: and on the 17th the French on the left were driven across the Gave de Mauleon, without having time to destroy the bridge of Arrivereta, from the 92d—ever foremost where glory was to be won—having discovered a ford above the bridge, and dislodged two battalions of French infantry posted to guard it. In the night of the 17th, the French retired across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position near Sauveterre, and Hill pushed forward his advanced post, and was next morning on that river; but as the bridges were all broken down, it could not be passed till the pontoon train arrived, which occasioned, as the roads had become impassable from snow, a delay of several days. These decided movements on the right, however, had the desired effect of withdrawing Soult's attention from the Lower Adour, and inducing him to concentrate the bulk of his forces on the ridge of Sauveterre on his left, to defend the passage of the Gave d'Oleron. The time, therefore, having arrived for the attempt to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, Hope, on the night of the 22d, cautiously moved the first division, rocket brigade, and six heavy guns, to the sandhills near the mouth of the river; and at daybreak on the following morning, although the stormy contrary winds and violent surf on the coast prevented the arrival of the gun-boats and *chasse-marées*, which were intended to have co-operated in the passage, he gallantly resolved to force the passage alone (2).

Feb. 22.

And of the
Lower
Adour.

The French, however, were aware of what was going forward. No sooner were the scarlet uniforms seen emerging from the shelter of the sandhills, than the French flotilla, which, from the British gun-boats not having got up, had the undisputed command of the river, opened a tremendous fire upon them. The British heavy guns and rocket brigade, which, on this occasion, was for the first time introduced in the Peninsular war (3), replied with so quick and sustained a discharge, that a sloop and three gun-boats were speedily sunk, and the rest of the flotilla, in consternation at the awful aspect and rush of the rockets, drew off out of the reach of fire, further up the river. Upon this, sixty of the guards were rowed across in a pontoon, in face of a French detachment, which was so terrified by the rockets whizzing through their ranks, that they also took to flight. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the pontoons, and a hawser having been stretched across, six hundred of the guards and the 66th regiment, with part of the rocket brigade, were passed over. They were immediately attacked by a French brigade under Macomble; but the assailants were struck with such consternation at the unwonted sight and sound of the rockets, that they too fled at the first discharge. The British continued to pass troops and artillery over the whole night; and by noon next day they were solidly established on the right bank, in such force as to render any attack hopeless (4).

To complete their security, the British flotilla, under Admiral Penrose, at this time appeared off the mouth of the river; and the boats of the men-of-war, with characteristic gallantry, instantly dashed into the raging surf to

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Feb. 26, 1814. Gurw. xi. 522. Nap. ii. 527, 533. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 237, 239. Koch, ii. 276, 279.

(2) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 538. Nap. vi. 534, 538. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 240. Koch, ii. 296, 297.

(3) Rockets had been used, for the first time in war, by the British brigade at Leipsie, on October 18, 1813.—Vide *Ante*, ix. 294.

(4) Nap. vi. 536, 541. Beamish, ii. 276, 281. Koch, ii. 296, 297.

Entrance of
the flotilla
into the
Adour and
investment
of Bayonne.

join in the dangers of their comrades ashore. O'Reilly, who led the whole, was thrown by the waves on the beach, with his whole crew, and only saved by the soldiers picking them up, when stretched senseless on the sand. The whole flotilla, when the tide rose, advanced in close order; but the long swell of the bay of Biscay, impelled by a furious west wind, broke with such terrific violence on the shore, that several of the boats were swallowed up, with their gallant crews. Another and another, however, came on, rowing bravely forward to what seemed certain destruction; and at length Lieutenant Cheyne of the Woodlark caught the right line, and safely passed the bar. Captain Elliot of the Martial, who came next, with his launch and crew, were wrecked and all lost, and three other vessels stranded and lost part of their men, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the troops to save them. At length, however, the greater part of the flotilla was safely anchored inside the bar. Next morning a bridge was constructed by the indefatigable efforts of Major Todd, the troops and artillery were safely passed over (1), and Hope, two days afterwards, commenced the investment of Bayonne, which, after some sharp fighting, which cost the Allies five hundred killed and wounded, was effected chiefly by the admirable steadiness of the King's German Legion, upon whom the weight of the contest fell (2).

Description
of the
French
position
and force
at Orthes.

While the left wing of the army was thus establishing the investment of Bayonne, the centre and right, under the command of Wellington in person, were pursuing the career of victory on the Gave d'Oleron. The pontoons having arrived on the evening of the 25d, preparations were immediately made for the passage of that river, behind which a formidable French force, thirty-five thousand strong, was now assembled on the ridge of Sauveterre. Early on the 24th, Hill effected his passage at the head of three divisions at Villnave, while Beresford passed near Montfort with the whole centre. Soult, not deeming the position of Sauveterre tenable against the superior forces which by these movements threatened it in front, drew back his whole force, leaving Bayonne, garrisoned by six thousand men, to its own resources, and took post a little way further back at ORTHES, behind the Gave-de-Pau, and upon the last cluster of heights which presented a defensible position before the hills shooting off to the northward from the Pyrenees sank altogether into the plain of the Garonne. The army was here assembled on the summit of a ridge of a concave form facing the south-west, stretching from the neighbourhood of Orthes on the left, to the summit of the heights of St.-Boes, between it and Dax, on the right. D'Erlon, with the divisions of Foy and D'Armagnac, and the division Villatte in reserve, formed the centre: Clauzel, with the divisions Taupin and Marausin, occupied St.-Boes and its neighbouring summits on the extreme right; while Clauzel, with the divisions Daricau, Harispe, and Paris, stretched out on the left to the town of Orthes, guarding the noble bridge over the Gave-de-Pau at that place, the strength of which had defied all attempts, even by the able French engineers, for its destruction. The whole cavalry, with the exception of some small detach-

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 26, 1814. Gurw. xi. 538. Nap. vi. 539, 545. Koch, ii. 297. Beamish, ii. 278, 287.

(2) A curious circumstance occurred at the construction of this bridge, characteristic of the extraordinary intelligence and quickness which the long habit of campaigning had given to the British soldiers. Major Todd, who constructed the bridge,

assured Colonel Napier, the Peninsular historian, that in the labours connected with it, though great part of the work was of a nautical kind, he found the soldiers, whose minds were quickened by extended experience, more ready of resource and of greater service than the seamen.—See NAPIER, vi. 542.

ments, was collected in the low grounds in front of Orthes, where alone it could act with advantage, under the orders of General Pierre Soult. Thus the French marshal had now assembled in one battle-field eight divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, which, according to their former strength in the palmy days of the empire, would have presented at least sixty thousand combatants; but in the present wasted condition of the Emperor's forces, they hardly mustered forty thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty guns (1).

Wellington's
order of
march, and
attack.

Wellington approached this formidable position in three columns. He had thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, of whom four thousand were horse, all Anglo-Portuguese, and veteran troops, and forty-eight guns; the Spaniards being in the rear under Mina and Murillo, investing St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, and two divisions under Hope before Bayonne. Clinton and Hill, with the right wing and right centre advanced by the great road from Sauveterre to Orthes; Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, crossed the Gave-de-Pau by the fords of Caunelle and La Honton; Picton, with the left centre, was near Bereux; Beresford, with the left in the field, though forming the centre of the whole army, crossed the same river on the road from Peyrchorade, by means partly of fords and partly of pontoons. This approach to an enterprising and powerful enemy, lying in a strong and concentrated position, in three columns, extending in a mountainous country over an extent of twenty miles, presented no ordinary dangers; but the admirable quality of the troops he commanded, as well as the enfeebled spirit of the French army, made the English general hazard it without reluctance. He was in great anxiety, however, lest, against his army thus dispersed an insurrectionary movement should spring up in the rear; and therefore, not content with reiterating his former orders against plundering or disorders of any kind, he issued a proclamation, authorizing the people of the country, under their respective mayors, to arm themselves for the preservation of order, and arrest all stragglers or marauders. Nor did his proclamation remain a dead letter; for on the night of the 25th, the inhabitants of a village on the high-road leading from Sauveterre, having shot one British soldier who had been plundering, and wounded another, he caused the wounded man to be hung, and sent home an English colonel who had permitted his men to destroy the municipal archives of a small town on the line of march. "Maintain the strictest discipline; without that we are lost," said he to General Freyre. By these means tranquillity was preserved in his rear during this critical movement; and the English general now reaped the fruits of the admirable discipline and forbearance he had maintained in the enemy's country, by being enabled to bring up all his reserves, and hurl his undivided force upon the hostile army. Having collected his troops in front of the enemy on the evening of the 26th, he gave orders for an attack on the line along its whole extent on the following morning, from the heights of St.-Boes to the bridge of Orthes (2).

Battle of
Orthes.
Preparatory
movements.

At daybreak on the 27th, Beresford with the left wing, consisting of the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry, commenced the action, by turning the enemy's extreme right near

(1) Nap. vi. 545, 546. Koch, ii. 283, 284. Vaud. ii. 160. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 240, 241.

See Napier vi. 569, who quotes the numbers given above from Soult's official correspondence with the war office at Paris. The French writers, VAUDENCOURT, ii. 160, and *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 236, make the numbers which fought on their side

30,500 infantry, and 2,900 horse. But Soult's correspondence shows that this was independent of 7,000 conscripts who took part in the action; and five thousand of them were good troops.

(2) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 535. Nap. vi. 545, 555, 570. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 239, 240. Koch, ii. 285, 286.

St.-Boes, and gaining the road to Dax beyond it; while, at the same time, Picton—moving along the great road from Peyrehorade to Orthes, with the third and sixth divisions under Clinton, supported by Cotton and Somerset's cavalry—assaulted the enemy's centre. Hill, with the second British and Le Cor's Portuguese brigade, was to endeavour to force the passage at Orthes, and attack the enemy's left. There was an alarming interval of a mile and a half between Beresford's and Picton's men; but in it was a conical hill, nearly as high as the summit of Soult's position opposite, upon the top of which, on the mouldering ramparts of an old Roman camp, Wellington with his staff took his station, having the whole battle spread out like a map before him. Soon the fire of musketry was heard, and volumes of smoke were seen issuing from the ravines below, as Beresford and Picton's columns, driving the enemy's picquets before them, wound their devious and intricate way through hollows, which a few men only could pass abreast, up towards the enemy's position. The moment was critical; and Picton, who was unsupported on either flank, felt for a time not a little anxious. They got through, however, without being seriously disquieted; and Wellington, who had eagerly watched their movement, as soon as they emerged into the open country, reinforced Picton by the sixth division, and drew the light division into the rear of the Roman camp, so as to form a connecting link between Beresford and Picton's columns, and a reserve to either in case of need (1).

Beresford carries St.-Boes, but is arrested on the ridge beyond it.

Beresford having gained and overlapped the extreme French right, commenced a vigorous attack in front and flank on the village of St.-Boes. The combat at this point was very violent: Reille's men, all tried veterans, stood firm: St.-Boes was strongly occupied, and the musketry rang loud and long on the summit of the ridge without any sensible ground being won by the assailants. At length, when he got all his troops up, the English general made so vehement an onset with Cole's division in flank, and Walker's in front, that the village was carried; and the victors, pursuing the beaten columns of the enemy, began to move along the narrow elevated ridge, which extended from that point to the centre of their position. Here, however, all their efforts failed. The French troops, slowly retiring along the narrow neck of land, kept up an incessant rolling fire upon the pursuers; while Reille's batteries, skilfully disposed so as to rake on either flank the pursuing column, occasioned so dreadful a carnage that its advance was unavoidably checked. It was the counterpart of the terrific slaughter on the plateau of Craon. The fourth division, however, long inured to victory, and accustomed to see almost insuperable obstacles yield to their enthusiastic valour, returned to the charge, and pressed on with stern resolution; and the long train of killed and wounded which marked their advance, proved the heroic valour with which they were animated. But a Portuguese brigade, torn in pieces by the terrible discharges of the cannon, every shot of which ploughed with terrible effect through their flank, at length gave way, and commenced a disorderly retreat along the narrow summit. The French, with loud shouts, and all the triumph of returning victory, pressed upon their rear; the fourth division, overwhelmed by the mass of fugitives which rushed into its ranks, reeled beneath the storm, and nothing but the subsequent timely charge of part of the light division on Reille's flank, prevented a serious disaster on that part of the line. At the same time, a detachment which Picton sent forward to endeavour to gain a footing

(1) Nap. vi. 559, 560. Picton's, Mem. ii. 272, 273. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 534. Koch, ii. 287, 288.

on a tongue of land, jutting out from the lofty ridge on which the enemy's centre was posted, was repulsed with loss; and Soult, seeing his troops victorious at both extremities of his line that was engaged, smote his thigh in exultation, exclaiming, "At last I have him (1)."

Wellington
regains the
battle.

But the eagle eye of Wellington was fixed on the decisive point. No sooner did he perceive, from the pause in the advance of the British along the ridge, and the continued and stationary fire which was going on, that a desperate conflict had taken place on the summit, than he made the requisite dispositions to facilitate the progress of that part of the line. The third and sixth divisions were instantly ordered to advance with all possible expedition up the hill, to attack the right of the centre; while Barnard's brigade of the light division was moved up to assail the left of their right wing, and interpose between it and the centre. The 52d, under Colonel Colborne (2), led the way, and quickly reached the marsh which separated the enemy's ridge from the hill on which Wellington stood. Soon that gallant corps crossed the swamp, with the water up to the soldiers' knees, and mounting the hill unobserved amidst the smoke and din on the summit, with a loud shout and crushing fire rushed forward into the opening between Taupin and Foy's divisions, at the very moment that the former, following up their success against Beresford, were driving violently through St.-Boes, pushing the fourth division before them. At the same moment, Picton, at the head of his two divisions, mounted the ridge where the enemy's right centre was placed, and resolutely assailed Foy and D'Armagnac on their almost impregnable position. The effect of these simultaneous attacks, skilfully directed and gallantly executed, against two-thirds of the enemy's line, was decisive. It was a repetition of the fatal flank attacks of Austerlitz and Salamanca. Foy and D'Armagnac, hard pressed themselves, were unable to send any succours to Reille's wing—which, thus cut off by Colborne's happy irruption, and assailed on one flank by his victorious troops, and on the other by Beresford's men, who, hearing the turmoil in the enemy's rear, returned with the discipline of veterans to the charge—fell into confusion, and were driven headlong down the hill, with the loss of part of their cannon. Cole's men now rushed with loud shouts along the narrow strait, strewn with so many of their dead, and joined with Barnard's brigade, so as completely to make themselves masters of that important part of the enemy's position. At the same time Foy fell, badly wounded, in the centre, and his division, falling into confusion, retreated down the hill on the opposite side, and, of necessity, drew after it D'Armagnac and Maransin's. Wellington immediately pushed forward the seventh division, hitherto held in reserve, and two batteries of artillery, which ascended to the narrow ridge now occupied by the fourth division and Barnard's brigade. At the same time, Picton, with the third and sixth divisions, reached the summit of the ridge in the middle, driving D'Armagnac before them down the other side; and his guns, established on a commanding knoll in the centre, ploughed through the enemy's masses from one end of his position to the other (3).

Soult orders
a general
retreat.

The victory was now secure; and it was rendered more decisive by the simultaneous success of Hill on the extreme right, who had forced the passage of the Gave by the ford of Souars near Orthes, seized the heights above, won the great road from thence to Pau, and thus not only cut

(1) Picton, ii. 279, 280. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 536. Nap. vi. 556, 559. Koch, ii. 287, 288.

(2) Now Lord Seaton.

(3) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 536, 537. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 241, 243. Picton, ii. 280, 281. Nap. vi. 559, 561. Koch, ii. 288.

off his best and only direct line of retreat, but prevented Harispe, on the extreme French left, from sending any succours to their hard-pressed right and centre. Soult, seeing this, ordered a general retreat, and the wild heathy hills which stretched out in their rear both afforded abundant room for his retiring columns, and presented several strong positions, of which he skilfully availed himself, for retarding the advance of the pursuing army. With admirable discipline, the French, having regained their order at the foot of the ridge on which they had been posted during the battle, retired in the finest array, the rearguard constantly facing about and obstinately resisting, whenever the intervention of a ridge afforded a favourable opportunity for making a stand. But the wild and rocky hills, as they retired, gradually melted into the plain; and five miles from the field of battle they required to cross the stream of the Luy de Bearn, only to be reached by a single road, and traversed by a single arch at the bridge of Sault de Navailles; the English infantry was pressing on in close pursuit, with a deafening roll of musketry and cannon; Hill, on their left, was rapidly making for the only bridge in their rear; and Sir Stapleton Cotton and Lord Edward Somerset's dragoons, closely following in the low grounds on their flank, were preparing to charge the moment they descended into the plain. In these circumstances, although Paris with his division at first with heroic constancy sustained the onset of the pursuers, and gained time for the army to retire; yet after some miles were passed, the soldiers became sensible of their danger, and, at first quickening their pace as they saw Hill moving parallel and threatening to anticipate them at the bridge, at length began to run violently. Hill's men set off at full speed also, each party striving which should first reach the bridge; and although the French gained the race, and so secured the passage of their army, yet great part of their troops fell into irretrievable confusion in the disorderly rush, and the fields were covered with scattered bands. Cotton charged, on the only occasion which presented itself, at the head of Somerset's dragoons and the 7th hussars, three battalions of the enemy, which he broke, and made three hundred prisoners (1); but although two thousand more threw down their arms in an enclosed field, the greater part contrived to escape across the river, which was not far distant. At length the scattered bands, after wading the stream, re-assembled on the opposite bank, with that readiness for which the French troops have ever been distinguished; and the wearied British soldiers formed their bivouacs on the southern shore of its limpid waters.

Great effects
of this vic-
tory.

Though the battle of Orthes was not graced by the same military trophies taken on the field as those of Salamanca or Vittoria, it was inferior to none of Wellington's great victories in the moral consequences with which it was attended. The enemy lost three thousand nine hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the field, and six guns; the Allies two thousand three hundred; but the discouragement and demoralization introduced into the French army by its consequences were extreme. The conscripts, in great part ill affected, and all desponding in the cause, threw away their arms and deserted by thousands: disorganization and confusion prevailed in their retreat, insomuch that, a month afterwards, the stragglers and missing were found, by an official statement, to be still three thousand. Thus Soult was weakened by this victory, and its effects, to the extent of fully seven thousand men; a grievous and irreparable loss, when he was

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. ii. 289, 290. Nap. vi. 562, 564. Picton, ii. 284, Gurw. xi. 537. Vict. et Conq. xi. 242, 243. Koch, 282.

already painfully contending against superior numbers and growing despondency. But its moral effects upon the south of France were still more important, and in the critical state of the Emperor's fortunes proved decisive. By the line of Soult's retreat, which was in the direction of Toulouse, the great road to BORDEAUX was left open: Bayonne and St Jean Pied-de-Port were already closely invested; (1) no force capable either of withstanding the invaders or controlling public opinion, existed from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; and the royalists in the southern provinces, relieved from the fetters which for twenty years had restrained them, were left at liberty to give expression to their inclination, which soon found vent in a general revolt.

Soult retires towards Tarbes and Toulouse. Soult, after refreshing his army with a few hours' sleep at Sault de Navailles, on the right bank of the Luy de Bearn, continued his retreat towards Agen, by Condom, breaking down the whole bridges over the numerous mountain torrents which he crossed, as soon as he had passed them. Their great number sensibly retarded the pursuit of the victors, although Wellington, regardless of a slight wound he had received on the preceding day, was on horseback at daylight on the 28th, and continued to follow the enemy with the utmost vigour. The French marshal retired towards Tarbes by both banks of the Adour, a bold, but yet judicious movement, which, albeit abandoning Bordeaux to the enemy, yet secured for his beaten and dejected army, on one flank at least, the support of the mountains, and preserved for him, in case of need, a secure junction with the forces of Suchet from Catalonia. There was not the slightest reason to fear that Wellington would advance far into the interior of France, while such a force remained on his flank to menace his rear and communications: Frederick the Great saved his own states from invasion after the raising of the siege of Olmutz, by marching into Bohemia. The British army, accordingly, instead of moving in a body upon Bordeaux, wisely followed the retiring footsteps of their antagonists; and after taking possession of the magazines at Mont Marsan, which were abandoned by the enemy; and crossing over the bulk of his forces to the right bank of the Adour, by the bridge of St.-Sever, which he repaired; he detached Hill to the left bank to make himself master of the great magazines at Aire. Villatte and Harispe's divisions were drawn up

March 1. on a strong ridge in front of that town, and made so vigorous a resistance to General Stewart's attack, that the Portuguese were driven back, and the action was wellnigh lost; but Stewart, with the British left, having meanwhile won the heights on the French right, immediately detached Barnes, with the 50th and 92d, to the aid of the Portuguese. Their vigorous charge soon altered the state of affairs; the French reeled in their turn; Byng's brigade gradually came up, and ultimately, after a severe combat, in which great bravery was displayed on both sides, the French were driven entirely out of Aire, the whole magazines of which fell into the hands of the British (2).

The pursuit was not continued at this time further in this direction, for great events had occurred in another; and an opportunity presented itself for striking a decisive blow against the power of Napoléon in the third city of the empire, which was not neglected by the English general.

Proceedings of the Royalists at Bordeaux. Bordeaux, which, through the whole Revolution, had been distinguished by its moderate or royalist feelings, had been in the greatest state of excitement since the advance of the English army

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1813. Gurw. xi. 540. Koch, ii. 290. Belm. i. 277. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 242. Nap. vi. 564, 565.

(2) Nap. vi. 564, 568. Hill's Report, March 3, 1814. Gurw. xi. 548. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 243, 244. Koch, ii. 293, 296.

into the south of France promised to relieve its inhabitants at no distant period from the iron yoke of the Revolution; and those feelings rose to a perfect climax, when the battle of Orthes opened the road to Bordeaux to the victorious British arms, and threw Soult back to an eccentric retreat in the direction of Toulouse. The Royalist committee, which, since March 1815, had secretly existed in that city, and comprised a large portion of the most respectable and influential citizens, were indefatigable in their endeavours to take advantage of this favourable state of things, and bring about a public declaration from its inhabitants in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. Cautiously they revealed their designs to M. Lynch, the mayor of the city, who instantly and warmly entered into their views, and declared his earnest desire to be the first to proclaim Louis XVIII. By their united efforts, matters were so far arranged, that immediately after the battle of Orthes, the Marquis de Larochejaquelein was dispatched to Wellington's headquarters to request the assistance of three thousand men to support their cause. Wisely judging that a small British force was not to be lightly hazarded on so momentous and distant an enterprize, and appreciating the importance of the movement which was now ready to take place, Wellington, instead of three thousand, sent them twelve thousand men, under the command of Lord Beresford. But as he was aware that the Allied powers were still negotiating with Napoléon at Chatillon, and that peace might be any day concluded, he was careful to inform the deputation of the chances of such an event occurring, distinctly warning them at the same time, that in the event of a declaration in favour of Louis XVIII taking place, and peace following with Napoléon, it would be beyond his power to afford them any protection. Beresford's instructions were, to take no part in any political movement which might occur, and neither to support nor repress it; to say the British wished well to Louis XVIII, but were negotiating with Napoléon (1); and if a revolt occurred, to supply the people with arms and ammunition from the magazines at Dax.

The English arrive at Bordeaux and Louis XVIII is proclaimed. Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions, set out from the main army on the 8th, and after crossing the wild and heathy *landes* without opposition, arrived on the 12th before Bordeaux. He had been preceded, two days before, by the Marquis de Larochejaquelein, who had announced the speedy arrival of the English divisions, and urged the Royalist committee to declare at once in favour of the descendant of Henry IV. Great hesitation, as is usual in such a decisive moment, prevailed among the leaders; and many were anxious to recede from their professions, now that the time for action had arrived. But equal apprehensions were felt by the imperial military authorities, who, unable to make head against the coming storm, secretly withdrew, one by one, to the opposite side of the Garonne, leaving the slender garrison without any leaders. Part of the troops in this emergency followed the example, and crossed over to the other side, after burning a few ships of war on the stocks; and a battalion of conscripts which remained, voluntarily laid down their arms. At half-past twelve, the English standards approached the town, long the capital of the Plantagenet sovereigns in France, and the favourite residence of the Black Prince, but where they had not been seen for five hundred years. The mayor and civic authorities, in the costume of their respective offices, came out to meet them at a short distance from the suburbs; and the former delivered an address, in which he professed the joy which the people felt at

(1) Nap. xi. 592, 593. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 246. Wellington to Beresford, March. 7, 1814. Gurw. xi. 247. Beauch. ii. 52, 57. Koch, ii. 300, 301. Wel- 557.

being delivered from their slavery, and at the arrival of their liberators. His speech was frequently interrupted with cries of, “*A bas les Aigles!*” — “*Vivent les Bourbons!*” and at its close he took off his tricolored scarf, as well as the order of the legion of honour, and the imperial eagles, and mounted the white cockade. His whole attendants immediately did the same; enthusiastic cheers rent the sky; and the British troops, surrounded by an ever-increasing multitude of the people, entered the ancient capital of their Plantagenet ancestors, hailed as deliverers and friends, to re-establish the throne of the royal race, with whom they had for so many centuries been engaged in almost ceaseless hostility. Thus had England the glory of, first of all the Allied powers, obtaining an open declaration from a great city in France in favour of their ancient but exiled monarch — just twenty years and one month after the contest had begun, from the murder of the best and most blameless of their line (1).

Arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême at Bordeaux, and his proclamation. The Duke d'Angoulême soon after arrived, and was received with unbounded enthusiasm: a prodigious crowd assembled to greet his entrance; white handkerchiefs waved from every window: the white flag was to be seen on every steeple; all classes felicitated each other on the change; the day was passed as a brilliant fete; and a revolution, the most important in its consequences which had occurred in Europe since the breaking out of the bloody drama of 1789, passed over without one tear falling in sorrow, or one drop of blood being shed. But amidst all these transports, arising rather from the prospect of cessation to immediate and pressing evils, than any distinct hopes or anticipations for the future, there were not wanting many far-seeing men, even amongst those unconnected with the imperial government, who, without denying the intolerable evils to which it had given rise, felt profoundly mortified at this fresh proof of the instability of their countrymen, and who anticipated little eventual benefit to France from a restoration which was ushered in by the victorious bayonets of foreign powers. Meanwhile, however, the Duke d'Angoulême and Beresford remained in peaceable possession of Bordeaux: the threatening incursions of the imperial troops on the other side of the river, were repressed by three thousand British soldiers who crossed over; and although Wellington was at first not a little annoyed by a proclamation issued by the mayor of Bordeaux, in which he declared, that “the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese were united in the south, as the Allied sovereigns were in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations, and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people (2);” yet events succeeded each other with such rapidity, that this source of disquietude was soon removed, and the words of M. Lynch seemed to have been prophetic of the approaching fall of Napoléon (3).

(1) Beresford to Lord Wellington, March 12, 1814. Gurw. xi. 577. Beauch. ii. 92, 96. Koch, ii. 301, 303.

(2) “It is not to subject our country to the yoke of strangers, that the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese have approached our walls. They have united in the south, as the other people have in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations, and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people; it is by him alone that we can appease the wrath of a neighbouring nation, whom we have oppressed with the most perfidious despotism. The hands of the Bourbons are unstained by French blood—with the testament of Louis XVI in their hand, they forget all resentment: every where they proclaim and prove that tolerance is the first principle by

which they are actuated. It is in deploring the terrible ravages of the tyranny which license induced, that they forget errors caused by the illusions of liberty. The short and consoling expressions addressed to you by the husband of the daughter of Louis XVI., ‘No more tyrants; no more war; no more conscription; no vexatious imposts,’ have already proved a balm to every heart. Possibly it is reserved for the great captain who has already merited the glorious title of the *liberator of nations*, to give his name to the glorious epoch of such a happy prodigy. — *Proclamation, 12th March 1814, by M. LYNCH, Mayor of Bordeaux*; BEAUCHAMPS, ii. 101.

(3) Beauch. ii. 96, 102. Wellington to Duc d'Angoulême, March 16, 1814. Gurw. xi. 584, 585. Nap. vi. 595, 602.

Soult's
counter-
proclama-
tion, and
resumption
of hostili-
ties.

Soult and Wellington during this period remained in a state of inactivity, each supposing that the other was stronger than himself; for the detachment of twelve thousand men to Bayonne, as many to Bordeaux, besides the blockade of St.-Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarrens, had now reduced the opposite armies as nearly as possible to an equality. The forces at the command of the French general was reduced, by the desertion and disorganization consequent on the battle of Orthes, to twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. On the side of the English, twenty-seven thousand combatants were in line, with forty-two guns; but the quality and spirit of the troops was decidedly superior to that of the French army. The astounding intelligence of the defection of Bordeaux, however, and proclamation of Louis XVIII there, made Soult sensible that some great effort was necessary to counteract the growing disaffection of the southern provinces, and prevent his army from melting away, as it had recently done, from the despondency and discontent of the newly embodied conscripts. This was the more necessary, as the admirable discipline and prompt payment for supplies of all sorts which obtained in the British camp, contrasted so fearfully with the forced requisitions to which he was obliged to have recourse from the capture of all his magazines, and the general license in which his troops indulged after the retreat from Orthes, that he wrote to the minister of war at Paris, that "he wanted officers who knew how to respect property; and that the people seemed more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the French army." Influenced by these considerations the French marshal no sooner learned the events at Bordeaux, and the proclamation of the Duke d'Angoulême, than he issued a counter address, couched in energetic language and strains of no measured invective against the English policy and government. While a calm retrospect of the past has now demonstrated, even to the French themselves, that great part of his reproaches were unfounded, and may make us smile at the vehemence of some of his expressions; yet candour must recollect the critical and unparalleled circumstances in which Soult was placed when this proclamation was issued, and do justice to the firmness which, amidst the general wreck of the imperial fortunes, remained unshaken, and the fidelity which, surrounded by defection, nailed its colours to the mast (1).

(1) Nap. vi. 580, 581, 587. Beauch. ii. 430, 431. Soult to War Minister, March 14, 1814. Nap. vi. 580.

"Soldiers! At the battle of Orthes you did your duty; the enemy's losses surpassed yours, and his blood moistened the ground he gained. He has had the indecency since to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition. He speaks of peace, but firebrands of sedition follow him. Thanks to him for making known his intentions; our forces are thereby multiplied a hundred-fold; he has rallied round our standards all those who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make an honourable war. No peace with that disloyal and perfidious nation! No peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! They have dared to insult the national honour; they have had the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the Emperor. Revenge the offence in blood—To arms! Let this cry resound through the south of France; the Frenchman that now hesitates, abjures his country and belongs to its enemies. Yet a few days, and those who believe in English honour and sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are

made to abate their preparations, and subjugate them. They will learn to their cost, that if the English pay and are generous to-day, to-morrow they will retake, and with interest, in contributions, what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country, recollect that the English have in view to reduce the French to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Sicilians. History shows the English at the head of all conspiracies, all odious plots and assassinations; arming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all great commercial establishments, to satisfy their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist, upon the face of the globe, a point known to the English, where they have not destroyed, by seditions and violence, all manufactures which could rival their own? Thus will they do to the French if they prevail. Be obedient, and yield to discipline, and reserve your implacable hatred for the traitors and enemies to the French peace. War to the death against those who would divide to destroy us, and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner!"—See GURWOOD, xi. 594; NAPIER, vi. 587, 589. This proclamation is one of the most curious and instructive

Soult resumes the offensive, and finally retreats to Toulouse.

This proclamation produced a considerable impression, at least upon the old soldiers in his army; and Soult, anxious to take advantage of the excitement, and of the absence of so large a portion of the English troops at Bordeaux, determined to resume offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th March he put his troops in motion; and as Wellington's main body was concentrated round Aire and Barcelone, yet divided in two by the Adour, he concentrated his forces on the side of Maubourguet, on the high table-land between Pau and Aire, designing to strike a blow at the English divisions on the left bank of that river. On the 13th he made a stroke at Pau, intending to arrest the nobles who had assembled to welcome the Duke d'Angoulême, but was stopped by Fane, who anticipated him, and the blow failed. Some lesser actions of cavalry took place in front of Aire, in which the Portuguese horse sustained a trifling loss; but Wellington, as soon as he heard of this inursion, brought over the third and sixth divisions across the Adour to support Hill, and at the same time gave orders to Freyre's Galicians and Giron's Andalusians, to issue from the valley of the Bastan, where they had been hitherto kept to prevent plundering, and come up to his support. By this means he collected thirty-six thousand men, including the troops on the other side of the Adour, to withstand the irruption; and Soult, fearing to attack such a force, and hearing of the fall of Bordeaux, determined to retire. He sent forward, accordingly, his conscripts at once to TOULOUSE, being resolved to try once more the fortune of arms in the strong position which was presented in the environs of that city, and commenced a rapid retreat. The British army as swiftly followed in pursuit, on both banks of the Adour, but the great bulk of their force was always on the left bank. A sharp combat took place at Vie-Bigorre on the 19th, when D'Armagnac and Paris were only compelled at length to fall back, after each side had sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men. Unhappily that on the side of the British, included the able and accomplished Colonel Sturgeon of the Engineers, whose efforts and genius had been so signally evinced through the whole course of the Peninsular war (1).

Combat of Tarbes.

A more serious action took place when the army approached Tarbes. The light division and hussars were still on the right bank of the Adour; but when they approached that town, which stands on the upper part of that stream, a simultaneous movement was made by Hill with the right wing, and Clinton on the left, to envelope and cut off Harispe and Villatte's divisions, which formed the French rearguard in occupation of it. The combat began at twelve o'clock, by a violent fire from Hill's artillery on the right, which was immediately re-echoed in still louder tones by Clinton on the left; while Alten, with the light division, assailed the centre. The French fought stoutly, and, mistaking the British rifle battalions from their dark uniform for Portuguese, let them come up to the very muzzles of their guns. But the rifles were hardy veterans, inured to victory; and at length Harispe's men, unable to stand their deadly point-blank fire, broke and fled. If Clinton's men on the left had been up at this moment, the French

monuments of the Revolution. The magnanimous policy of Wellington, which, aiming at moving the moral affections, coerced so effectually the disorders of his troops; the generous forbearance of England, which, an enemy only to the Revolution and its spoils, proposed to leave France untouched, could not be conceived by the French general. He thought it was the homage which vice in

hypocrisy pays to virtue. It is interesting to contrast this furious tirade with Soult's unbounded praises of England, at the London dinner, on occasion of the coronation of Queen Victoria in 1839; yet both were probably sincere at the time.

(1) Nap. vi. 606, 617, Koch. ii. 304, 307. Viet. et Conq. xxii. 250, 251.

would have been totally destroyed; for Hill had at the same moment driven back Villatte on the right, and the plain beyond Tarbes was covered with a confused mass of fugitives, closely followed by the shouting and victorious British. But Clinton's troops, notwithstanding the utmost efforts had not been able to get up; the numerous ditches and hedges which intersected the plain, rendered all pursuit by the cavalry impossible; and thus the French, though utterly broken, succeeded, with very little loss, in reaching a ridge three miles distant, where Clauzel, who, with four divisions, was drawn up to receive them, immediately opened a heavy fire from all his batteries upon the Allies. This at once checked the pursuit; and in the night Soult retired in two columns, one on the high-road, the other on the right, guided by watch-fires on the hills. Such was the rapidity of his retreat—as he was now making by rapid strides for Toulouse, where his great depots were placed, and on which all his future combinations were based—that he reached that town in four days, and arranged his army in position before it on the 25th. Wellington, encumbered with a great artillery and pontoon train, and obliged to keep his men well in hand, from the uncertainty when Suchet's great reinforcement from Catalonia (1), which was known to be approaching, might join the enemy, did not arrive on the Touch, facing the French in front of Toulouse, till the 27th.

General result of the campaign.

Thus, within six weeks after the campaign opened Wellington had driven the French from the neighbourhood of Bayonne to Toulouse, a distance of two hundred miles; had conquered the whole country between the Pyrenees and the Garonne, had passed six large and several smaller rivers, driven the enemy's forces from two fortified *têtes-du-pont*, and several minor field-works; defeated them in one pitched battle, and several lesser combats; crossed the raging flood of the Adour in the face of the garrison of Bayonne, below that fortress, and laid siege to it as well as St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port and Navarreins; and finally brought about a revolution at Bordeaux, and a declaration in favour of the Bourbon dynasty from the third city in the empire. These great successes, too, had been gained by an army composed of so many and such discordant nations, that the French themselves were astonished how it was held together: nearly a third of which, from the fierce passions with which it was animated, and the marauding habits which it had acquired, had not yet been brought across the frontier; which, though considerably superior when the campaign commenced, was so wasted down by the necessity of investing so many fortresses, and occupying such an extensive tract of country, that the active force in the field was from the very first little if at all superior to that of the enemy; and against an army in great part composed of the iron peninsular veterans, the best troops now in the French service, and a general second only to Napoléon in the vigour and ability with which he maintained a defensive warfare. It must be confessed that there are few periods in the military annals of the British empire fraught with brighter glory to its army or its chief. But the brows of Wellington and his followers, loaded with military laurels, are yet encircled with a purer wreath, when it is recollected that these advantages had been gained without the slightest deviation from the strict principles of justice on which they had throughout maintained the contest; that no wasting contributions, scarce any individual plunder, had disgraced their footsteps; that to avoid the pillage of their own troops, the requisitions of their own generals, the peasants

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 20, 1814. *Gurw.* 599, *Nap.* vi, 616, 619. *Koch.* ii. 307, 309. *Vict. et Conq.* xviii. 251, 252

of France sought refuge within the sanctuary of the British lines; and that this admirable discipline was enforced by the commander, and obeyed by his soldiers, when heading a vast military array of the Peninsular forces, hastily levied, imperfectly disciplined, burning with resentment for the six years' wasting and desolation of their own country, and whose services it was frequently necessary to forego, to avoid the retaliation which they so naturally endeavoured to inflict on their oppressors (1).

Progress of events in Catalonia. While these decisive blows were paralysing the imperial strength in the south of France, the progress of events in Catalonia, though of far inferior importance, was also tending to the same general result. Since the junction of the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, and the retreat of the Allied force under Lord William Bentinck to Taragona, in September 1813, already noticed (2), the opposite hosts had remained in a state of total inactivity; Clinton, who had succeeded Lord William in the command, with the British and German division from Sicily, ten thousand strong, with nine thousand of Sarsfield's Spaniards, lay on the right bank of the Llobregat, from its mouth to the mountains; Elio, with sixteen thousand ill-disciplined Spanish troops, observed Gerona from Vecqui; while Copons' men, about twelve thousand more, besieged Peniscola, and blockaded Lerida, Mequinenza, and the lesser forts still occupied by the enemy in the rear. On the other hand, Suchet had still sixty-five thousand admirable troops, the best in Spain, under his command, and, without drawing a man from the fortresses, he could bring thirty thousand sabres and bayonets into the field. Offensive operations upon an extended scale, with ten thousand British troops, and such a disjointed rabble of Spaniards, without discipline or magazines, and generally starving, under generals acting almost independent of each other, were of course out of the question; and the English general found, that even for lesser enterprizes which offered a fair prospect of success, no reliance whatever could be placed on their co-operation. From a failure on Copons' part to take the share assigned him, a well-conceived attack of Clinton, with six thousand men, on the French posts at Molino del Rey, failed of obtaining complete success. At this very time, however, Napoléon, Jan. 16. alarmed by the formidable invasion of the Allies, recalled ten thousand men and eighty guns from the army of Catalonia: upon which Suchet increased the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men; prepared to retire himself to the line of the Fluvia, near the foot of the Pyrenees; sent secret instructions to the garrisons in his rear to make their escape the best way they could, and join him near Figueras (2); and strongly recommended to Napoléon to send Ferdinand VII, under the treaty of Valençay, as speedily as possible into Catalonia, in order to give him a decent pretext for evacuating all the fortresses, except Figueras, in that province, and thereby enable him to march with twenty-five thousand additional veterans to the succour of the Emperor.

Stratagem by which Lerida, Mequinenza, and Mouzon are recovered by the Spaniards. The return of some of these garrisons, however, was accelerated by a fraudulent stratagem, unworthy of the military honour, by which the Spaniards now recovered some of the fortresses, in much the same way as the French had, six years before, got possession of them. There was, at this time, in the French service, a Spaniard of Flemish descent, Van Halen, who, during his employment in the staff of Suchet, had contrived to make himself master, not only of the power of

(1) Nap. vi. 568, 569.

(2) *Ante*, ix. 418.

(1) Suchet, ii. 364, 368. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 252, 253. Nap. vi. 475, 487. Koch, ii. 309, 312.

exactly imitating his writing, but of his private seal and the cipher which he made use of in his most confidential despatches. He had even dived so deep into his mysteries, as to have discovered the private mark by which Suchet had desired all his chief officers to distinguish his genuine from forged despatches, viz. the inserting a slender light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper. Having possessed himself of this secret information, he entered into communication with the Baron d'Erolles, and they concocted orders addressed to the governors of the whole towns held by the French in the rear of the Allied army, directing them to evacuate the fortresses and march to join him, with a view to joining the Emperor in the heart of France. History has little interest in recording the means by which fraud and artifice overreach valour and sincerity. Suffice it to say, that the orders fabricated by Van Halen were so precise and articulate, the forgeries so well executed, and the preventions taken against discovery so complete, that they deceived the governors of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Mouzon, which thus fell into the hands of the Spaniards; though their garrisons rejoined Suchet in safety, in consequence of Clinton, from an honourable dislike to or distrust in the attempt, having done nothing to intercept their return. The stratagem, however, failed at Tortosa, in consequence of the Spanish general Sans, to whom the French governor Robert, feigning to fall into the snare, had written to come with two battalions to take possession of the place, not having courage to do so. Suchet thus was rather benefited than injured by Van Halen's treachery, for he thereby got back the garrisons of the towns thus fraudulently won, which were otherwise beyond his reach: but having received orders from Napoléon to send off a second draft of ten thousand men to Lyons, he surrendered Gerona to the Spaniards, and drew back all his troops in the field to the neighbourhood of Figueras, there to await the issue of the crisis which was approaching (1).

Arrival of
Ferdinand,
and termina-
tion of
the war in
Catalonia,
March 20.

Meanwhile Barcelona continued closely blockaded; and a sailly which Habert made on the 25d February, was repulsed with great loss by Sarsfield, who commanded the blockading force. The place continued closely invested till the 20th March, when Ferdinand VII arrived on the frontier from Perpignan, accompanied by his brother Don Carlos, and Don Antonio, his uncle. He was received on the banks of the Fluvia with great pomp, and in presence of both the French and Spanish armies, who made a convention for a suspension of arms on this interesting occasion. Indeed, hostilities every where ceased in Catalonia; both parties regarding with reason the war as terminated by the treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand continued his journey in perfect tranquillity towards Madrid, the honours of war being rendered to him equally by the French as the Spanish garrisons; and Clinton, in obedience to orders received from Wellington, broke up his army; part being embarked at Taragona to join Lord William Bentinck, who was engaged in operations against Genoa, and part marched across Aragon, to join Wellington on the Garonne. The treaty of Valençay, however, not having been ratified by the Cortes, the blockade of the fortresses still held by the French continued; and, so late as the 18th April, long after peace had been concluded at Paris, Habert, in ignorance of that event, made a vigorous effort to cut his way out of Barcelona; and though repulsed and driven in again, the encounter was very bloody, and cost the Spaniards eight hundred men. Intelligence of the pacification at Paris arrived four days afterwards, and terminated the contest in

April 20.

(1) Suchet, ii. 370, 376. Nap. vi. 487, 493. Vict. et Cong. xxiii. 254, 255. Koch, ii. 814. 315.

that quarter; and then appeared, in the clearest colours, both the strength of the hold which the Emperor had taken of Spain, and the disastrous effect of the grasping system which made him even in the last extremity persist in retaining what he had once acquired. When the French soldiers in Spain hoisted the white flag, the symbol of universal peace, they still held Barcelona, Figueras, Tortosa, Morellas, Peniscola, Saguntum, and Denia; and in these fortresses were shut up no less than sixteen thousand veteran soldiers, which, with the like force under Suchet's immediate command on the Fluvia, would have given Napoléon, when the scales hung all but even on the banks of the Seine, a decisive superiority over the whole force of the allied sovereigns (1).

Siege of Santona, and close of the war in the Peninsula. The war terminated somewhat sooner on the western coast of Spain. The only stronghold still held by the French there, after the storming of St.-Sebastian, was Santona, which, situated on the rocky extremity of a long sandy promontory on the coast of Biscay, had long been an object of violent contest between the contending parties; and still, on the edge of a recovered monarchy, hoisted the tricolor flag. After the battle of Vittoria, it was invested by the Galicians by land and the British cruizers by sea; but the latter blockade was maintained so negligently, and the Spanish land troops were so inefficient, that Wellington at first gave orders to Lord Aylmer's brigade to proceed thither; and though this intention was not carried into effect, yet Captain Wells, with some British sappers and miners, was sent to accelerate their operations. As usual, however, the Spaniards were so dilatory and ill prepared, that nothing Feb. 13. effectual was done till the middle of February, when the Fort of Puertal, outside the place, was carried. On the night of the 21st, the out- Feb. 21. works were stormed; and the direction of the approaches being now entrusted to Captain Wells, he pushed his operations so vigorously, that the Fort Laredo, which commanded the harbour, was taken. Lameth, the French governor, upon this offered to capitulate in April, on condition of being sent back to France. Wellington refused to agree to these terms; but hardly had his declination arrived, when intelligence was received of the pacification at Paris, which closed hostilities, and the place, with the tricolor flag still waving on it, was in terms of the treaty given over to the Spaniards (2).

To conclude the whole operations of the Peninsular war, it only remains to notice the last and bloody struggles on the Garonne and Adour, which, though not occurring in chronological order till after the capitulation of Paris, shall be here detailed, in order not to break the narrative of the decisive events which led to that catastrophe.

Description of Toulouse, and the position there. TOULOUSE, in which the French army, under Soult, was now concentrated, and before which the British army lay, on the left bank of the Garonne, fronting the Touch, was well known to Marshal Soult, as he had been born and bred in its vicinity, and he had long fixed upon it as the post where his final stand for the south of France was to be made. That ancient capital of the southern provinces of the monarchy, so celebrated in poetry and romance, though much declined from its former greatness, still numbered fifty thousand inhabitants within its walls; and being situated on both banks of the Garonne, of which it commanded the principal passage, and the centre of all the roads in that part of the country,

(1) Suchet, ii. 376, 387. Koch, ii. 317, 319.
Vict. et Conq. xxiii, 255, 256. Nap. vi. 495, 498.

(2) Nap. vi. 499, 504. Belm. iv. 290.

it was a stratagetical point of the very highest importance, both with a view to obtaining facilities for his own, and keeping them from the enemy's army. Posted there, the French general was master either of his retreat upon Suchet by Carcassone, or on Augereau by Alby; while the ample stream of the Garonne wafted supplies of all sorts to his army, and the walls of the city itself afforded a protection of no ordinary importance to his soldiers. The Garonne, flowing on the west of the city, properly so called, presented to the Allies a deep curve, at the bottom of which the town is placed, connected, by a massy stone bridge of ancient architecture, with the suburb of St.-Cyprien, situated on the westmost of its banks. This suburb, which first presented itself to the attack of an enemy coming from the side of Bayonne, was defended by an old brick wall, flanked by massy towers; and beyond this rampart Soult had erected outer field-works. The city itself, on the other bank, was also surrounded by a thick brick wall, strengthened with towers of such dimensions as to bear four-and-twenty pounders. The great canal of Languedoc, which unites the Garonne to the Mediterranean sea, wound round the town to the east and north, and joined the river a few miles below it; forming in this manner, with the Garonne itself, a vast wet ditch, which, on every side except a small opening to the south-east, encircled its walls at the distance of three quarters of a mile. The suburbs of St.-Etienne and Guillemeri, which stretched out across the canal to the eastward from the walls, were strengthened with field-works at the points where they crossed the canal; and beyond them, on the other side of the canal, rose the steep ridge of Mont Rave, the outer face of which, whereby alone it could be assailed by the enemy, being exceedingly rugged and difficult of access (1).

Ineffectual attempt to attack Toulouse by passing above the town. From this description of Soult's position, it was clear that an attack on the town from the west, and through the suburb of St.-Cyprien, was out of the question. The suburb itself, flanked on either side by a deep and impassable river, defended by a wall and external redoubt, could only be forced at an enormous loss of blood; and even if taken, the town could only be reached by a long bridge, easily susceptible of defence. The passage above the town presented difficulties apparently formidable; for it would bring the Allies into the deep and heavy country around the Arrière, the cross-roads of which, from the recent rains, had become all but impassable; but nevertheless Wellington resolved to attempt it, because, if successful, it would detach Soult from the succours he expected from Suchet, throw back the latter general into the Pyrenees, by enabling the British to cut off his retreat by Narbonne, open up the communication with Bubna at Lyons, and compel Soult to abandon the line of the Garonne. He commenced the formation of a bridge at Poitet, six miles above Toulouse, which appeared the most advantageous site that could be selected; but the stream was found to be too broad for the pontoons, and no means of obviating the defect existed. This delayed the passage for some days; but a length Hill discovered a more favourable point near Pensaguel, about seven miles above Toulouse, where a bridge was speedily laid; and he immediately crossed over with two British divisions and Morillo's Spaniards, in all thirteen thousand men and eighteen guns. This detachment advanced towards Toulouse on the right bank of the Garonne, while Wellington, with the main body, threatened the faubourg St.-Cyprien on the left; and Soult, not knowing on which side he at first was to be assailed, kept the bulk of his forces in hand within the walls of the town, only

(1) Choumara. Bat. de Toulouse, 176, 177. Vlet. et Conq. xxiii. 348. Nap. vi. 624, 626.

observing Hill with light troops. But the roads on either side of the Arrière were found to be altogether impassable, and as every thing depended on rapidity of movement, Hill wisely renounced the project of an attack on that side, and recrossing the Garonne on the night of the 4th April, took up his pontoon bridge, and returned to the headquarters on the left bank of the river (1).

Beresford
with the
left wing is
thrown
across
below
Toulouse.

Wellington now determined to make the attempt below the town; but this change in the line of attack, though unavoidable in the circumstances, proved of the most essential service to the French general; for, foreseeing that the passage would be made on that side, he set his whole army, and all the male population of Toulouse, to work at fortifications on the Mont Rave, by which alone the town could be approached in that quarter; and with such diligence did they work during the nine days' respite afforded them before the Allied army could finally effect their passage, that a most formidable series of field-works was erected on the summit of that rugged ridge, as well as at all the bridges over the canal and entrances of the suburbs of the town. Though, however, every hour was precious, yet such was the flooded state of the Garonne, from the torrents of rain which fell, and the melting of the snows in the Pyrenees, that the English general was compelled, much against his will, to remain inactive in front of St.-Cyprien till the evening of the 5d. Then, as the river had

April 4.

somewhat fallen, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse; and the bridge having been quickly thrown over, a battery of thirty guns was established to protect it, and three divisions of infantry and three of cavalry immediately passed over, which captured a large herd of oxen intended for the French army. But meanwhile a catastrophe, threatening the most terrible consequences, ensued. The river rose again in raging torrents; the light division and Spaniards, intended to follow the leading divisions, could not be got across; the grappling irons and supports were swept away; and, to avoid total destruction, it became necessary to take up the pontoons and dismantle the bridge, leaving Beresford, with fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, alone exposed to the whole weight of the French army of at least double their strength (2).

His danger,
and impene-
trability of Soult.

Soult was immediately made acquainted with this passage, but he was not at first aware of the small amount of force which was got across; and when he did learn it, he deemed it more advisable to await the enemy in the position he had fortified with such care at Toulouse, than to incur the chance of a combat, even with such superior forces, on the banks of the Garonne. He remained, accordingly, from the 4th to the 8th without moving from his intrenched position, and thereby lost the fairest opportunity of striking a serious, if not decisive, blow against the British army, which had occurred since the beginning of the war. Wellington, during this terrible interval, remained calm on the other side, ready to cross over in person by boat the moment Beresford was attacked: he was confident in his troops, even against twofold odds; and having done his utmost to avert danger, calmly awaited the result: and he has since been heard to say that he felt no disquietude, and never slept sounder in his life than on those three nights. At length on the morning of the 8th, the river having subsided, the bridge was again laid down; Freyre's Spaniards, the Portuguese artillery, were crossed over; and Wellington, taking the command in person, advanced

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 1, 1814. Gurw. xi. 620. Nap. vi. 627, 631. Vaud. iii. 100, 103. Belm. i. 280.

(2) Belm. i. 281. Nap. vi. 631, 632. Vaud. iii. 104, 105. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 250. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. Gurw. xi. 632.

to Fenoulhiet, within five miles of Toulouse. Hill with two divisions was left to menace the suburb of St.-Cyprien on the left bank of the river, and the pontoon bridge brought higher up, so as to facilitate the communication between him and the main body of the army. In the course of the advance towards the town, a sharp cavalry action took place at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, over the Ers, where Vial's dragoons were overthrown by the 48th hussars, led by Major Hughes, the bridge carried, and a hundred prisoners taken, with hardly any loss to the British troops (1).

Advantages of the French position.

From the heights to which Wellington had now advanced, he had a distinct view of the French position, which he carefully studied, and the whole of the next day was spent in bringing up the troops, which was not completely effected till the evening of the 9th, and preparing for the battle. It must be admitted that Soult's measures had been conducted with great ability, and that his judicious selection of Toulouse as his battle-field, had almost restored the chances of success in his favour. He had gained seventeen days of perfect rest for his troops, during which they had been sheltered from the weather, and both their physical strength and spirit essentially improved. He had brought the enemy to fight with an equality of force; for one-third of the British army was on the opposite bank before St.-Cyprien, a fortress so strong in front, and secure in flank, that a small body of conscripts might be there securely left to combat them. The main body, under Soult's immediate command, was posted on the rugged summit of Mont Rave, called the Calvinet platform, in an elevated position about two miles long, and strengthened on either flank by strong field-works. This formidable position could be reached only by crossing first a marshy plain, in some places impassable from the artificial inundations of the Ers, and then a long and steep hill, exposed to the fire of the artillery and redoubts on the summit. All the bridges of the Ers, except the Croix d'Orade, were mined; and it was therefore necessary for the British army to make a flank march under fire, so as to gain the south-eastern slope of the Mont Rave, and ascend the hill from that side. If the summit of the ridge should be carried, there remained the interior line, formed by the canal, with its fortified bridge, houses, and suburbs, and within it again a third line, formed of the walls of the ancient city, planted with cannon (2), which it was scarcely possible to carry without regular approaches or an enormous slaughter.

Wellington's plan of attack.

Having carefully examined the enemy's ground, Wellington adopted the following plan of attack. Hill, on the left bank, was to menace St.-Cyprien, so as to distract the enemy's attention in that quarter, and prevent their sending any succours to the right bank of the river; Picton and Alten, with the third and light divisions, Freyre's Spaniards, and Bock's heavy dragoons, were to advance against the northern extremity of the enemy's line, and if possible carry the hill of Pugade, so as to restrain the enemy in that quarter; but they were not to endeavour to carry the summit. Meanwhile Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, with Ponsonby's dragoons, and three batteries of cannon, after crossing the Ers at the Croix d'Orade, and skirting the base of the Mont Rave, was to defile along the low ground between it and the marshy banks of the Ers, and having gained the extreme French right, wheel into line, and ascend the hill there, and assault the redoubts of St.-Cyprien on the summit. This plan of operations was perhaps unavoidable, and it certainly promised to distract the enemy by

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. Gurw. xi. 633. Nap. vi. 632, 633. Vaud. iii. 104, 105.

(2) Nap. vi. 636, 637. Vaud. ii. 107, 109. Koch' iii. 641, 643. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April, 12, 1814. Gurw. xi. 633.

three attacks—at St.-Cyprien, the hill of Pugade, and St.-Sypierre at once—but it was open to the serious disadvantage of dividing the main body of the army into two different bodies, separated by above two miles from each other; while the enemy, in concentrated masses, lay on the hill above them, and might crush either separately before the other could come to its assistance. It was exactly a repetition of the Allied cross march, on the flank of which Soult had fallen with such decisive effect at Austerlitz (1); or of Marmont's undue extension to his left, towards Ciudad Rodrigo, of which Wellington himself had so promptly availed himself, to the ruin of the French, at Salamanca (2). Singular coincidence! that in the very last battle of the war, the one commander should have repeated the hazardous movements which, when committed by his adversary, had proved fatal to the French cause in the Peninsula; and the other failed to take that advantage of it, by which he himself had formerly, under Napoléon's direction, decided the contest in Germany (5).

Position of the French, and forces on both sides. Secure under cover of his numerous intrenchments on the long summit of the Mont Rave, and in the suburb of St.-Cyprien, Soult calmly awaited the attack. Reille, with the division Maransin, was in St.-Cyprien, opposed to Hill in the external defences of that suburb on the other side of the river; D'Erlon occupied the line on the right bank, from the mouth of the canal to the plateau of Calvinet, Daricau being at the bridge of Matabiau, and D'Armagnac thence to the northern extremity of the Mont Rave; Villatte was on the summit of the hill of Pugade, at the northern corner of the plateau; Harispe's men occupied the works in the centre; from thence to the extreme right Taupin's division was placed, a little in advance, with the summit of St.-Sypierre strongly occupied. Berton's cavalry were in the low grounds near the Ers, to observe the movements of the enemy; Travot's division, composed chiefly of conscripts, occupied the fortified suburb of St.-Michel to the bridge of Matabiau; and the national guard of Toulouse lined the ramparts, and performed the service of the interior of the town. The forces on the opposite sides were unequal in point of numerical strength, but nearly matched in military strength: the Anglo-Portuguese around Toulouse being fifty-two thousand, including seven thousand horse and sixty-four pieces of cannon; but of these twelve thousand were Spaniards, who could not be relied on for a serious shock. The French had nearly forty thousand, of whom thirty-eight thousand were brought into the field, including Travot's reserve, but exclusive of the national guard of Toulouse; and they had eighty pieces of cannon, some of them of very heavy calibre. The superiority in respect of numbers was clearly on the side of the Allies; but this might be considered as compensated in point of effective force by the great strength of the French position, their local advantage, as lying in the centre of a vast circle of which the Allies formed the circumference, the triple line of intrenchments on which they had to fall back in case of disaster, the heavy artillery which crowned their fieldworks, and the homogeneous quality of their troops, all French, and containing that intermixture of young and veteran soldiers which forms perhaps the best foundation for military prowess (4). Both sides were animated with the most heroic resolution: for they

(1) *Ante*, v. 229, 230.

(2) *Ante*, viii. 218.

(3) Soult's Official Despatch, April 11, 1814. *Reclm.* 714. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. *Gurw.* vi. 633.

(4) The battle of Toulouse being the last in the Peninsular contest, and a pitched battle of no or-

dinary interest and importance, has given rise to much discussion between the military historians of France and England: the former have laboured hard to diminish the effective French force in the field, while they magnified the British; and one of them, Choumura, has even gone so far as to claim for Marshal Soult and his countrymen the merit of

were alike aware that their long struggle was drawing to a termination, and that victory or defeat now would crown the glories of the one, or obliterate the humiliation of the other (1).

Battle of
Toulouse,
April 10.

Wellington gave the signal for the commencement of the battle at seven o'clock in the morning. Picton and Alten, on the right of the main battle on the right bank of the Garonne, drove the French advanced posts between the river and the hill of Pugade back to their fortified posts on the canal; Hill drove them in to their exterior line at St.-Cyprien; while Clinton and Cole, at the head of the 4th and 5th divisions, rapidly defiled over the bridge of Croix d'Orade, and after driving the enemy out of the village of Mont-Blanc, continued their march along the margin of the Ers, sheltered by Freyre's Spaniards, who established themselves on the summit of the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns opened a heavy fire on the more elevated fortified heights of the Calvinet. The way having been thus cleared on the right, Beresford, with Cole and Clinton's divisions, preceded by the hussars, continued their march at as swift a pace as they could, along the level ground between the foot of the ridge and the Ers. But the plain was found to be extremely marshy, and in many places intersected by water-courses, which retarded the troops not a little; while Berton's cavalry vigorously skirmished with the British horse in front, and a thundering fire from the summit of Mont Rave in flank incessantly tore their ranks at every discharge. Nothing could be more critical than this flank march, with less than thirteen thousand men, in such a hollow way, with a superior force strongly posted on the ridge on their right, and an impassable morass and river on their left. Fortune seemed to have thrown her choicest favours in the way of the French marshal; and to complete the danger of Beresford's situation, a disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, soon occurred on the left, which seemed to render nearly the whole force on the summit of the Calvinet disposable to crush the column painfully toiling beneath its guns at its foot (2).

a victory on the occasion. The British numbers in the field are exactly known, as the *Morning State* of the whole army on April 10, is extant, and has been published by Colonel Napier, vol. vi. 710. The French numbers cannot be so accurately ascer-

tained, as no imperial muster-rolls are extant subsequent to Dec. 1813. The statement given in the text is founded on the detail of their able and impartial military historian, Koch; with the amount of Travot's reserve from Vaudoncourt, iii. 107.

I. ALLIED FORCE.

	Present, Effective.
4th Division, Cole,	4,613
6th Division, Clinton,	4,877
3d Division, Picton,	3,924
Light Division, Alten,	3,709
2d Division, Stewart,	5,950
Le Cor's Portuguese,	3,307
Rank and File, bayonets,	26,420
Officers, Sergeants, etc.	2,872
Infantry,	29,292
Artillery,	6,832
Cavalry,	3,800
British and Portuguese,	39,720
Spaniards,	12,004
	51,724

II. FRENCH FORCE.

	Present, Effective.
Infantry,	30,000
Cavalry,	3,000
Travot's reserve,	4,000
	37,000
Artillery and drivers,	1,480
Total,	38,480

—*Morning State*, 10th April 1814; NAPIER, vi. 1814; KOCH, iii. 639; and Tableau xiv. for the details.

(2) Nap. vi. 670. Koch, iii. Vaud. ii. 107. Jones, ii. 372.

(3) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. Gurw. xi. 634. Soult to Duc de Feltre, April 11, 1814. Belu. i. 714. Nap. vi. 940, 942. Vaud. iii. 114, 116.

Defeat of the Spaniards on the right of the British. While Arenschelt's guns were replying by a distant cannonade from the lower summit of the Pugade to the elevated works on the Calvint, Freyre's Spaniards advanced in good order to assault the northern angle of the redoubts on the latter heights. They were about nine thousand strong, and mounted the hill at first with great resolution, driving before them a French brigade, which retired skirmishing up to the works in their rear: but when the Spaniards came within range of grape-shot, the heavy artillery on the summit, sweeping down a level sloping glacis, which enabled every shot to take effect, produced such a frightful carnage in front, while the great guns from the redoubt at Matabiau tore their flank, that the front rank, instead of recoiling, rushed wildly forward, with the instinct of brave men, to gain the shelter of a hollow road which ran like a dry ditch in front of the works. In great confusion they reached this covered way; but the second line, seeing the disorder in front, turned about and fled; upon which the French, leaping with loud shouts out of their works, ran down to the upper edge of the hollow, and plied the unhappy men who had sought refuge there with such a deadly fire of musketry, that it was soon little more than a quivering mass of wounded or dying. Freyre, and the superior officers, with extraordinary gallantry, strove to rally the fugitives, and actually brought back the second line in tolerable order to the edge of the fatal hollow; but there they suddenly found themselves torn in flank by the discharge of a French brigade, which they had not hitherto seen: the fire from above was so violent, and the spectacle beneath them so horrid, that, after hesitating a moment, they broke and fled in wild confusion down the slope towards the bridge of Croix d'Orade, closely followed by the French, plying them with an incessant fire of musketry (1). Such was the panic, that the fugitives poured in wild disorder to the bridge, and the French would have made themselves masters of it (2), thus entirely isolating Beresford from the rest of the army, had not Wellington, who was there, checked the pursuit by the reserve artillery and Ponsonby's horse; while a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, threw in its fire so opportunely on the flank of the pursuers, that they were constrained to return to their intrenchments on the summit of the hill.

Picton also is repulsed at the bridge of Jumeaux. This bloody repulse, which cost the Spaniards fully fifteen hundred men, was not the only disaster on the right. Picton, with the third division, had been instructed merely to engage the enemy's attention by a false attack; but when he beheld the rout on the hill to his left, and the rush of the French troops down the slope after the Spaniards, he conceived the design of converting his feigned into a real attack, supposing that that was the only way of drawing back the enemy, and avoiding total ruin in that quarter of the field. Accordingly he advanced vigorously, converting his false attack into a real one, and pushed on to the edge of the counterscarp of the redoubt which defended the bridge of Jumeaux over the canal. There, however, all further progress was found to be impracticable, by reason of the extraordinary height of the opposite scarp; but nevertheless Picton's men ran forward, descended into the fosse, and tried, by mounting on each other's shoulders, to reach the top of the opposite wall. All their efforts, however, were fruitless; the troops, being below the range of

(1) One Spanish regiment, the Tiradores de Cantabria, in the midst of this terrific carnage retained their post in the hollow way, under the redoubts, when their comrades were routed, till Wellington ordered them to retire.—WELLINGTON TO LORD

BATHURST, 12th April 1814; GURWOOD, xi. 635; and TORENO, v. 463.

(2) Nap. vi. 640, 641. Jones, ii. 270, 271. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. GURW. xi. 634. VARD, iii. 116, 117.

the guns on the rampart, were overwhelmed with a shower of large stones, arranged for that express purpose along the parapet, and at last driven entirely back, with the loss of five hundred killed and wounded. Thus, all along its northern front, the French position had been found, by dear-bought experience, to be impregnable; and although Hill had, by a vigorous attack, made himself master of the exterior line of fortifications of St.-Cyprien, and though the Portuguese guns on the hill of Pugade, and Beresford's pieces, which it had been found impossible to drag through the miry ground on the edge of the Ers, with the guns of the light division near Matabiau, kept up a prodigious concentric fire on the redoubts of Calvinet, yet the French cannon on the works above, of heavier calibre, and firing down, replied with superior effect, and the strength of the position on the two sides yet assailed was unshaken (1).

Soult at-
tacks
Beresford.

Every thing now depended on the success of Beresford on the extreme British left; yet he was so situated, that it was hard to say whether his divisions were not in greater danger than any other part of the army. Separated now by more than two miles from the remainder of their allies, with their artillery, of necessity, left behind at Mont Blanc, out of cannon-shot, from the impossibility of dragging it forward, with their rear to an impassable morass and river, and a line of formidable intrenchments in their front, they had to ascend a sloping hill, above a mile in length, exposed all the way to the raking fire of a powerful army and an array of artillery on the summit. But the danger soon became still more pressing, and these two divisions were brought into such straits, that they must either conquer or die. Soult, relieved by the repulse of the Spaniards from the pressure on his left, and seeing distinctly his advantage, concentrated his troops in hand for a desperate attack on Beresford, whom he hoped by a sudden irruption down the hill, to cut in two, and sever altogether from the remainder of the army (2). It was precisely a repetition of Napoléon's perpendicular attack on the flank of the Allies in march at Austerlitz, or Wellington on Thomière's division at Salamanca. He had fifteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred horse to make the attack, which promised decisive success. The orders were speedily given. Taupin's division on the summit of the Mont Rave, and one of Maransin's brigades from St.-Cyprien, were brought forward, supported by Vial's and Berton's dragoons on either flank of the enemy, and directed to fall with the utmost fury on Beresford's men, now entirely destitute of artillery, while D'Armagnac's division supported them as a reserve, and the guns on the summit thundered on the devoted mass below (3).

Beresford
carries the
redoubts on
the French
right.

Taupin's division speedily appeared pouring down from the summit of the hill, flanked by clouds of cavalry, and half concealed by the volumes of smoke which issued from the redoubts above,

1) Picton's Mem. ii. 310, 311. Vaud. iii. 115, 118. Nap. vi. 641, 642. Jones, ii. 271. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 353, 354. Koeh, iii. 641, 643.

(2) Beresford's divisions marched in three lines, with their flank to us; they presented, in consequence, an extended body. The moment appeared favourable to destroy them; with that view I ordered Taupin, whose division was formed on the plateau, to advance at the *pas de charge* against the enemy, to pierce through his line, and cut off all who were thus imprudently advanced. His division was supported by the division D'Armagnac; it was aided by the fire of the works on the right of the line, in which General

Danton was posted with the 9th light infantry; while General Soult (*) received orders to move down with a regiment of cavalry, to cut off the communication on his right between the enemy's column and the remainder of his army, and two other regiments of horse assailed his left flank. These dispositions promised the happiest result; seven or eight thousand English and Portuguese could hardly fail to be taken or destroyed."—Soult to Duc De Feltre, 11th April 1814; BELMAS, i. 715.

(3) Soult to Duc de Feltre, April 11, 1814. Belm. i. 715. Nap. vi. 642, 643. Vaud. iii. 118, 120. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 353, 354.

(*) The son of the Marshal.

which now redoubled their fire. Their generals and field-officers were seen in front of the line on horseback, waving their hats, amidst shouts of the multitude, which, mingled with the thunder of the cannon above, resembled the roar of the ocean breaking on an iron-bound shore. Impressed, but not panic-struck, with the sight, the British troops halted in their advance, and deployed; the 79th and 40th Highlanders, who were directly in front, waved their bonnets in the air, and returned the shouts with three cheers; their light company, by a well-directed fire, brought down several of the gallant officers in front, and the French column halted. They immediately fired a volley into the British lines, and advanced amidst a deafening roar of musketry and cannon. The French, in column, as usual, found themselves unable to withstand the British in line, being unable, from a few companies alone in front, to make any adequate resistance to the deadly fire of musketry by which they were assailed. The British returned the fire, and advanced to the charge. Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, with Anson's of the fourth, dashed forward with a terrible shout, and the opposite lines seemed madly rushing at each other in the midst of smoke, which on both sides obscured the view. But in that dreadful moment the native superiority of the British courage was apparent; the French quailed before the shock, the lines never met, and when the clouds of smoke cleared away, they were seen wildly flying over the summit of the ridge, closely followed by the British, the 42d and 79th in front, who, with loud shouts, carried in the confusion the redoubts of St.-Sypierre. Taupin was killed while bravely endeavouring to rally his men; Berton's horsemen, after being repulsed by the 79th, whom they furiously charged, were swept away in the general rout (1); while Cole's division, stoutly ascending the hill on Clinton's left, completed the defeat of the enemy in that quarter, and not only solidly established the two divisions on the summit of the ridge at its extreme right, but threatened the enemy's communication by the bridge of Demoiselles with the town of Toulouse.

Soult's
dispositions
to restore
the battle.

Thus, by the undaunted resolution of Beresford, seconded by the heroic valour of his troops, not only had he extricated himself from a situation of uncommon embarrassment and danger, but established his divisions in force on the right of the enemy's position, and threatened to take all their defences in flank. It was now Soult's turn to feel alarmed, and he instantly made fresh dispositions to guard against the danger. His whole defeated right wing was re-formed; D'Armagnac's brigade brought up with Harispe's division, and a new line of defence taken up, facing outwards, stretching from the heights of Calvignet on the left to the intrenchments at the bridge of Demoiselles on the right; while the remaining portion of the line still retained its old ground, facing the Spaniards and light division, on the northern extremity of the position. It was the same sort of line forming the two sides of a square, both facing outwards, which the Russians at Eylau, after having repulsed Augereau's attack on their right, found themselves compelled to adopt when suddenly turned, by Davoust's successful irruption on their left (2). Some hours, however, elapsed before the combat could be renewed: for Beresford, being now firmly planted on the heights, waited till he got up his guns from Mont Blanc before he again commenced his attack, which he at length effected. Meanwhile Wellington made all the dispositions in his power to take advantage of his

(1) *Reminiscences of Camp, in Pyrenees* 293, in *Mem. of late War*, vol. ii. Napier, vi. 648, 644. Jones, ii. 272. Vaud. iii. 120, 121. *Vict. et Conq.*

xxiii. 254, 255. Behn. i. 284. Koch, iii. 640, 642.

(2) *Ante*, vi. p. 38.

success (1); but he had no reserve in hand but the light division and Ponsonby's dragoons, as the Spaniards could not be relied on for fresh operations, so that the weight of the remaining contest still fell on Beresford's wing.

Beresford
storms the
redoubts
in the
centre.

About three o'clock, the artillery having joined Clinton and Cole's division, Beresford gave orders to advance along the level summit, towards the redoubts in the centre of the Calvinet. Cole was on the top of the ridge, Clinton on the slope down towards Toulouse; while, at the same time, the Spaniards under Freyre, now re-formed, advanced again to assault the northern end of the Calvinet, and Picton resumed his attack on the bridge of Jumeaux. Pack had obtained from Clinton, for the 42d, the perilous honour of heading the assault, and soon the whole advanced in column to the charge. No sooner, however, were the Highland feathers seen rising above the brow of the hill, than so terrible a fire of grape and musketry opened from the works above, that the men involuntarily wheeled by the right into line, and rushed impetuously forward towards the redoubts. They were defended by bastions fronted with ditches full of water; but so vehement was the rush of the Highland brigade, that the enemy abandoned them before the British got up, and the 42d entered the redoubt by its gorge. The French, however, rallied bravely; Harispe's men, led by their gallant commander, headed the attack, and soon the taken redoubt was surrounded by a surging multitude, which broke into the work, put a large part of the 42d to the sword, and again got possession of that stronghold. The remains driven out, however, rallied on the 71st, 79th, and 92d (2); and these four Highland regiments, charging to the brow of the hill, fought, shoulder to shoulder, with such desperate resolution, though sorely reduced in number, that Harispe's men were never able to push them down the slope. Meanwhile the other brigades of Cole and Clinton came up to their assistance; the French, still furiously fighting, were forced back; Harispe and Baurot both fell, badly wounded; the bloody redoubt was retaken by the 79th, and the whole French right, like a vast mass of burning lava, amidst volumes of smoke and fire, hurled down the hill towards Toulouse.

Retreat of
Soult
behind the
canal.

The battle was now gained; for although the Spaniards were repulsed in their fresh attack on the northern angle of the Calvinet, and Picton also failed in his renewed assault on the bridge of Jumeaux, yet three-fourths of the Mont Rave was won; its central and southern works were in the hands of the enemy, and his guns commanded the whole suburb of St.-Etienne, as far as the old walls of the city. In these circumstances, at four o'clock, Soult abandoned the whole remaining works of the Calvinet, and withdrew his troops at all points within the second line of defence, formed by the canal of Languedoc, with its fortified bridge and intrenched suburbs. The Spaniards, seeing the heights abandoned, pressed up the slope which had been the theatre of such sanguinary contention in the earlier part of the day, and the whole Allied forces, crossing the ridge, fell on the retiring columns of the enemy; but they were arrested by the fire of the *têtes-du-pont*, and at seven o'clock the whole French army were ranged behind the canal, which formed the line of demarcation between the two armies. At the same time, Hill drove the enemy from their second line of intrenchments, within the old city wall, on the other side of the Ga-

(1) Jones, ii. 273. Nap. vi. 646: Beamish, ii. 295, 296. Soult to Duc de Feltra, April 14, 1814, i. 716.

(2) Journal of 42d, Mem. of late War, ii. 297, 298. Nap. vi. 646, 648. Jones, ii. 273, 274. Vaud. iii. 123, 124. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 355.

ronne (4); and Picton pushed the third division up close to the bridge-head of the canal next the Garonne; while Wellington, having thus cooped the enemy up within the city, and established his army in proud array on the blood-stained summits of the Mont Rave, dispatched his cavalry along the banks of the Ers, so as to occupy the Montpellier road, the only remaining issue which was still in the hands of the enemy.

Results of
the battle.

Such was the bloody battle of Toulouse, in which, although the victory unquestionably was on the side of the British (2), it is hard to say to which of the two gallant armies the prize of valour and devotion is to be awarded. Situated as the French army was, assailed by superior force and depressed by a long course of defeats, the heroic stand they made on the Calvignet was among the most honourable of their long and glorious career. It is with a feeling of pride, not for England alone, but the human race, that the historian has now to take leave of the renowned antagonists of his country in the Peninsula. Nor was the conduct of the British and their Allies less worthy of the highest admiration, assailing a force inferior in number, but in a concentrated intrenched position, and strengthened with the greatest possible advantages of nature and art. The loss on both sides was very severe, and heavier on that of the Allies than the French, as might naturally be expected in the attack of intrenchments of such strength and so defended. The former lost four thousand five hundred and fifty-eight men, of whom one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight were Spaniards, six hundred and seven Portuguese, and two thousand one hundred and fourteen British; the French loss was three thousand two hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the field, and one thousand five hundred men were taken prisoners on the 12th, in Toulouse, including Generals Harispe, Burot, and St.-Hilaire, who were severely wounded (5).

Soult eva-
cuates
Toulouse.

Soult, four days before the battle, was aware of the taking of Paris on the 29th March preceding (4); but, like a good soldier and faithful servant, he was only confirmed by that disaster in his resolution to defend Toulouse to the last extremity, hoping thus to preserve for the Emperor the capital of the south; and, at the same time, he wrote to Suchet, urging him to combine measures for ulterior operations in Languedoc. On the day after the battle he expected to be attacked, and his troops were posted at all points along the canal to resist an assault. But Wellington wisely determined not to trust to chance what was certain by combination. The strength of the enemy's defensive fortifications at the bridge-heads of the canal had been fatally proved on the preceding day: ammunition for the cannon was wanting for a protracted struggle, till supplies were got up from the other side of the river; and the whole of the 11th was occupied in bringing it across. The attack was fixed for daylight on the 12th; and meanwhile the troops and guns were brought up to the front, and the cavalry pushed on to the heights of St.-Martin, menacing Soult's line of retreat to Carcas-

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. *Gurw.* xi. 636, 637. *Jones*, ii. 275, 276. *Nap.* vi. 648, 649. *Vaud.* iii. 125, 127. *Vict. et Conq.* xxiii. 355, 356. *Kausler* 665, 666.

(2) "The battle of Toulouse, in which the Duke of Dalmatia and the Duke of Wellington both claim the honour, was, beyond all question, lost by the former. But it was so dearly bought, that the English general was in no condition to follow up his success, and might have been brought into a critical situation, if the French general had known how to avail himself of the advantages he still possessed."—*VAUDONCOURT*, iii. 128, 129.

(3) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. *Gurw.* xi. 638. *Vaud.* iii. 128. *Kausler*, 666.

(4) "M. Ricard was with me when I received the distressing intelligence of the entry of the Allies into Paris. That great disaster confirms me in my resolution to defend Toulouse, happen what may. The maintenance of that place, which contains establishments of all kinds, is of the last importance. But if unfortunately I should be obliged to quit it, I will naturally draw towards you."—*SOULT* to *SUCHET*, 7th April 1814; *BELMAS*, i. 712, 713.

sonne. How unwilling soever to relinquish the great and important city of Toulouse, containing his hospitals, magazines, and depots of all sorts, Soult felt that it was no longer tenable, and that, by persisting to retain it, he would run the hazard of ruining his whole army (1). Wherefore, making his arrangements with great ability, he left sixteen hundred wounded, including the gallant Harispe and two other generals, to the humanity of the British general, besides eight heavy guns; and defiling silently out at night-fall, managed his retreat so expeditiously, that before daybreak he was at Villefranche, two-and-twenty miles off, on the road to Carcassonne (2).

Wellington's triumphant entry into Toulouse, and proclamation of Louis XVIII. Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph at noon on the 12th, and met with the most brilliant reception. A large proportion of the inhabitants, including the whole better classes, had already mounted the white cockade, though intelligence of the capitulation of Paris, and dethronement of Napoléon, had not yet been received; and the people, who the day before had been under mortal apprehensions at being subjected to the terrors of an assault, suddenly found themselves delivered at once from their alarm and their oppression, and the reign of a pacific monarch proclaimed amidst the combined shouts of their enemies and their defenders. Wellington, however, who had hitherto only heard of the capture of Paris, but not of the dethronement of Napoléon and restoration of the Bourbons, expressed no small uneasiness at the declaration thus made in favour of the exiled prince, when, so far as he knew, the Allied powers were still negotiating with Napoléon. "The royal cockade," replied Count Hargicourt, "is in my hat : it shall not fall from it but with my head." Loud applause followed this intrepid declaration—white scarfs immediately waved from every hand—tears glistened in many eyes—and the tricolor flag was supplanted on the city hall by the fleur-de-lis and the white flag. Wellington still trembled for the devoted zeal of the people; but, at five o'clock, despatches arrived from Paris, announcing the dethronement of Napoléon by the conservative senate, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII. All restraint was now at an end, and the English general could scarcely give open vent to the feelings which he had long privately entertained : he assumed the white cockade amidst thunders of applause—all his officers did the same; the news circulated in a few moments through the town; the British soldiers were every where decorated with the Royalist colours by fair hands trembling with agitation; and in the close of one of the longest and bloodiest wars recorded in history, was exhibited the marvellous spectacle of the white flag, the emblem at once of loyalty and peace, uniting in common transports the victors and the vanquished (3).

Convention which terminates the war in the south of France, April 18. These astonishing events, which in effect terminated the war in the south of France, were immediately followed by a formal convention for the termination of hostilities between the rival commanders. Wellington lost no time in making Soult acquainted with the changes at Paris : but the French marshal, faithful to his trust, declined to come to an accommodation till he received official intelligence that the Emperor had really abdicated the throne. Having at length obtained

(1) "I am under the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and, I fear, I shall be obliged to fight at Baziège, whither the enemy has directed a column to cut off my communication. To-morrow I shall take position at Villefranche, for I hope nothing will prevent me from getting through the day after to-morrow at Castelnaudary."—*SOULT to SHERIDAN*, 11th April 1814; *BELMAS*, i. 721.

(2) *Nap.* vi. 650, 651. *Vaud.* iii. 127, 128. *Wellington to Lord Bathurst*, April 12, 1814. *Gurw.* xi. 638, 639.

(3) *Beauch.* ii. 460, 471. *Lab.* ii. 431, 434. *Gurw.* xi. 630. *Wellington to Sir J. Hope*, April 16, 1814. *Gurw.* xi. 648.

that information, in a way which left no doubt of its authority, he concluded on the 18th a convention with Wellington, by which hostilities were immediately to cease, and the limits of the department of the Haute-Garonne, with the departments of the Arriège, Aude, and Tarn were to separate the two armies. The convention stipulated also the cessation of hostilities both at Bayonne, Navarreins, and Bordeaux, as well as on the Catalonian frontier, in which last quarter the boundaries of France and Spain were to be the separating line between the two armies; and the immediate evacuation of all the fortresses yet held by the French in Spain. Suchet, who had entirely withdrawn from Spain immediately before the battle of Toulouse, had already hoisted the white flag before he received intelligence of the convention concluded by Soult on his behalf. Twenty thousand veterans, in the best possible state, and of the utmost experience, were drawn from the fortresses held by the French in Catalonia and Valencia alone, after the conclusion of the convention : a surprising proof of the tenacity with which Napoléon, even in his last extremity, clung to those distant, and to him pernicious strongholds. But before the intelligence could be communicated to Bayonne, a deplorable event had taken place, which threw a gloom over the glorious termination of the Peninsular war (1).

Sally from Bayonne. April 14. After the departure of Wellington and the main army for the Upper Garonne, and the successful passage of the Adour, which has already been mentioned, Hope exerted himself with the utmost zeal and diligence to forward the siege of Bayonne; the works before which were in such forwardness, that he was ready to attack the citadel, when rumours of the events at Paris reached him on the 7th April; but as he had not yet received any official communication on the subject, he of course continued his operations. Official accounts from Paris, however, had reached the British camp, and were by Hope forwarded to Thouvenot, the governor of the fortress, who returned for answer, "that we should hear from him on the subject before long." It would appear he had resolved on finishing the war with a brilliant exploit, which was the more likely to succeed, as the British, considering the contest as virtually at an end, might be supposed to be somewhat off their guard. Accordingly, at three o'clock in the morning of the 14th, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, suddenly poured out of the citadel to the number of three thousand men, broke through the line of piquets, and with a violent rush and loud shouts carried the whole village of St.-Étienne, with the exception of a house occupied by a piquet of the 58th under Captain Forster, which with heroic valour maintained its ground till General Hinuber came up with some of the German Legion; and a battalion of Portuguese arrived, who retook the village, after a tremendous struggle at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy back towards the works. Meanwhile the guns of the citadel, guided by the flashes of musketry, fired incessantly on the scene of combat; the gun-boats, which had dropped down the stream, opened upon the flanks of the fighting columns, without being able to distinguish friend from foe (2); and amidst the incessant clang of small arms, and alternate cheers of the combatants, the deep booming of a hundred guns added to the horrors of this awful nocturnal combat.

(1) Convention, April 18, 1814. Gurw. xi. 653. 654. Nap. vi. 651, 652. Suchet, ii. 395, 396; and Report to Minister of War, June 11, 1814. Ib. ii. 547.

(2) Howard's Official Accounts, April 15, 1814. Gurw. xi. 667. Note, Nap. vi. 653, 655. Subaltern, chap. 24. Beauvish, ii. 301, 303. Vaud. iii. 132, 133.

Sir J. Hope is made prisoner, but the sally is repulsed. On the right the conflict was still more terrible; the piquets and reserves were broken through by the vehement fury of the onset; the troops on both sides, broken into small bodies by the enclosures, and unable to recover their companies or even their regiments during the darkness, fought bayonet to bayonet, sword to sword, man to man, with the most determined resolution. Never had such fury been exhibited on both sides during the whole course of the war; never were wounds of so desperate a character inflicted on the warriors engaged. In the midst of this scene of horror Sir John Hope, ever foremost where danger was to be met or heroism displayed, was hurrying to the front in a hollow way, when he met a British piquet retiring before a large body of French, "Why do you retreat?" cried he. "The enemy are yonder," was the answer. "Well, then, we must drive them back," he replied, and spurring his noble charger, himself led them again to the attack. The French immediately gave a point-blank discharge, the general fell, wounded in two, his horse in eight, places, and he was made prisoner. But now the day was beginning to dawn; the troops rallied in all directions; and the reserve brigade of the guards, being led by General Howard, rushed forward in the finest order with the bayonet, and drove the broken and almost frantic mass, with terrible slaughter, back into the works. In this melancholy combat, fought after the peace had been concluded, the British lost eight hundred and thirty men, including the gallant General Hay, who fell early in the fight; but the French loss was nine hundred and ten (1), — a catastrophe which, if the war had continued, must speedily have led to the fall of the place.

Concluding operations at Bordeaux. The Convention prevented serious hostilities being renewed on the lower Garonne. Napoléon had collected a considerable force on the other side of that river; and Lord Dalhousie, who had succeeded to the command of the British force at Bordeaux, crossed it on the 4th of April to attack them. The combat was soon decided: the enemy, about two thousand strong, fled on the first onset, and the British cavalry, charging, made three hundred prisoners; at the same time Admiral Penrose, ascending the river in spite of the batteries at its mouth, burned the whole flotilla at Castillon; so that the whole line of the Garonne, from Toulouse to the sea, with the intermediate country from thence to the Pyrenees, had before the war ceased, with the exception of the fortress of Bayonne, been wrested from the French. Decaen, who had collected eight thousand men in la Vendée and the western provinces, could not have made head against Dalhousie, who commanded above twelve thousand. The whole infantry of the British army embarked at Bordeaux, some to America, some for Great Britain, loaded with honours, immortal in fame: Wellington and his staff soon after proceeded to Paris, to take part in the momentous negotiations there going forward, and the British cavalry, in number above seven thousand, marched in triumph by Orléans across France, and embarked for their own country from the harbour of Calais (2).

Reflections on this campaign. Though both the rival commanders displayed the most consummate ability in the short but active campaign which preceded the battle of Toulouse, it may yet be doubted whether the conduct of either, at or shortly before the battle, is not open to serious criticism. On occasion of the three divisions of the British army, not more than sixteen thousand strong, even including cavalry and artillery, being left for three days close

(1) Vaud. iii. 133. Nap. vi. 655, 656. Beamish, ii. 302, 303. Subaltern, chap. 24, p. 350, 353. Gurw. xi.

(2) Nap. vi. 656. Jones, ii. 279.

to Soult, who had thirty thousand disposable troops wherewith to assail them—on the opposite side of the Garonne from the remainder of the army, without the possibility of sending over succours to them from the flooded state of the river—the French marshal lost an opportunity of striking a decisive blow, such as is rarely presented to the most fortunate commander. Picton, who commanded one of the divisions which had crossed, always said that the French general evinced, on that occasion, a degree of vacillation which he could not have expected from his well-known abilities (1). On the field of battle itself, he neither acted with the vigour or decision which was requisite to obtain the proper advantage, from the extraordinary facilities of his situation. When Beresford moved with his two divisions so far to the left, and separated by two miles from the rest of the army, if Soult had thrown his whole disposable forces at once upon him, he must have achieved as decisive a success as Wellington did, when, in a similar situation, by a flank attack he cut off Thomière's division at Salamanca (2); and when he did make the attack, he sent forward only Taupin's division, and one of D'Armagnac's brigades, a force inadequate to the encounter in the open field of twelve thousand British troops, and by their defeat he lost the battle. Half measures here, as well as every where else, ruined every thing; by sending this limited force, hardly half of what at the moment he had at his disposal, out of his redoubts, he paralyzed the fire of their guns, lest they should destroy their own men, while he brought no sufficient body to crush the enemy in the open field.

Wellington's measures appear on the field at least to have been not less inconsiderate. To push Beresford forward with thirteen thousand men, by a long flank march, immediately under the eye of Soult, posted on the heights above with double that amount of disposable troops, seems at least a very questionable proceeding; and of which the English general's own success at Salamanca must have taught him the danger. If Soult in person, with the iron gauntlet of Napoléon, had struck at this detached corps when two miles off, at the head of twenty thousand men, where would the British army have been? The policy is not very apparent of entrusting the attack of the redoubts of Mount Calvint, the key of the whole position, to the brave but unsteady Spanish troops; while Picton with his heroic third division, and Hill with another British division, were engaged the one in a false attack on the bridge of Jumeaux, the other in a distant and immaterial operation on the suburb of St.-Cyprien. The truth appears to have been, that Soult, by a long train of disaster, had become timorous and distrustful of his troops, in all but the defence of fortified positions; and Wellington, from an uninterrupted career of victory, had almost forgot that his men could ever be put to the hazard of defeat: and perhaps this circumstance affords the best vindication of both; for experience had too sorely impressed upon the one his apprehensions, and success almost justified any anticipations of triumphant extrication from difficulties to the other (3).

(1) Picton's Memoirs, ii. 299.

(2) *Ante*, viii. 220.

(3) The attempt, however, which is made by an ingenious French writer, to convert the battle of Toulouse into a victory for the arms of his country, is altogether hopeless. It is amusing to see such an attempt made in the face of Soult's written admission the day before the battle, already quoted, that the preservation of Toulouse was of such incalculable importance to him, as containing his magazines and establishments of all sorts; and of his admission in his letter to Suchet, the day after

the battle, that he could no longer maintain it, followed by his evacuation of the town, and forced march of twenty-two miles, that very night. The ridge of the Mont Rave was the elevated ground for which both parties fought; when it was carried by the British, Toulouse was as indefensible as Paris was when Montmartre and Belleville had fallen. The case of Wellington retiring from the ridge of Busaco, the day after the battle at that place (*), to which Choumara (p. 202, *Cons. Mil. sur la Bataille*

(*) *Ante*, vii. 522.

Lord W.
Bentinck's
operations
against
Genoa.

All that remains to narrate, before describing the final catastrophe at Paris, is the concluding operations of Lord William Bentinck and the Anglo-Sicilian army on the coast of Italy. The second detachment of the expedition having arrived from Catalonia, Bentinck, being now at the head of twelve thousand men, moved forward by the coast of

March 29.

the Mediterranean to La Spezia, which was occupied on the 29th March. Thence he advanced by the coast road, through the romantic defiles of the Apennines, so well known to travellers, to Sestri, where the enemy's forces, about six thousand strong, were posted. From this strong position, however, the French were driven with great loss on the 8th; and from thence

April 8.

the Allies advanced, fighting at every step, and gradually forcing their way through the ravines in the mountains till the 13th, when

April 13.

General Montresor established himself in an advanced position near the town; and on the 16th the whole army was concentrated in front of Genoa. The enemy were there very strongly posted on the almost inaccessible ridges, supported by forts and external works, which surround that noble city; their left resting on the castles of Richelieu and Tecla; their centre in the village of San Martino, and their right on the sea; the whole line passing through a country thickly studded with gardens, villas, inclosures, and all the impediments of suburban scenery. Such, however, was the vigour of the attack

April 17.

on the day following, being the 17th, that the whole position was speedily carried; the second battalion of the third Italian regiment stormed Fort Tecla; another battalion of the same regiment, with a body of Calabrese, surmounted the rocky heights above Fort Richelieu, and compelled the garrison to capitulate. The French upon this retired within the town, and the

April 18.

Allies took up a position within six hundred yards of the ramparts, where preparations were immediately made for establishing breaching batteries, and carrying the place by assault. To prevent such a catastrophe, the governor proposed to capitulate; and after some difficulties about the terms, a convention was concluded, in virtue of which the French garrison was to march out with the honours of war and six pieces of cannon, and retire to Nice. The same day the British took possession (1); and thus was this noble fortress, which, under Massena in 1800, had held out so long against the Austrians, at once carried by the English forces, with immense stores of every kind, and two ships of the line and four brigs; all with the loss only of forty killed and a hundred and sixty wounded.

Concluding
operations
of the
Allies in
Italy.

In the proceedings which immediately followed this important acquisition, Bentinck, without any authority from his government, but not unnaturally in his situation, gave the inhabitants reason to believe that it was the intention of the Allies to restore them to their former state of independence and republican government, as they had existed before

de Toulouse) wishes to parallel it, is not an analogous but an opposite instance, and brings out the true distinction on the subject. The whole ridge of Busaco was maintained by the British, despite Masséna's attack, and the turning their position by the pass of Sardao, and forcing them to fall back to Coimbra, was in no shape whatever the consequence of the battle. At Toulouse, the carrying of the ridge of the Mont Rave and the redoubts of Calvi- net rendered Soult's position in that town wholly untenable; for the British guns commanded the city, and their cavalry cut off the only French communications left to them with Carcassonne and Suchet's forces. It was the possession of the heights of the Mont Rave, won by Beresford, that alone gave Wellington this advantage. If Masséna had

won the ridge of Busaco, and driven the British to a position halfway down the mountain on the other side, and thus menaced the pass of Sardao, and forced them to retreat, no British writer would have thought of claiming the victory; nor would they do so at Toulouse, if Beresford had been repulsed as Picton and the Spaniards were, and the works of Calvi- net had remained in the hands of the French, and they had evacuated them two days afterwards, only in consequence of a flank movement of Wellington threatening the French general's communication with Suchet.

(1) Bentinck's Official Account, April 20, 1814. Ann. Reg. p. 191. App. to Chron. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 345, 347. Botta, iv. 481, 482.

the French Revolution; declarations which excited unbounded joy and gratitude at the time, and gave rise to proportional dissatisfaction, when considerations of general policy, and, in fact, absolute necessity, rendered it unavoidable to incorporate them, even against their will, with the Sardinian

monarchy. Meanwhile, the Austrian general Bellegarde signed a convention with Murat, providing for the more vigorous prosecution of the war on the Po, and the final expulsion of the French from Italy. The king of Naples, however, anxious to gain time, and to see the course of events on the Seine before he adopted a decisive course on the Po, adjourned, on various pretexts, the performance of his part of the contract, and it was not till

April 13. the 13th that Bellegarde succeeded in prevailing upon him to put his troops in motion. On that day, however, he forced the Taro, after a vigorous resistance on the part of the French general Maucune; and on the day following the passage of the Stura was also effected, after a sharp conflict.

April 14. These actions, in which the French lost fifteen hundred men, were of sinister augury to the cause of the Viceroy in Italy; but the further prosecution of hostilities was prevented by the intelligence which arrived next day, of the capitulation of Paris and dethronement of Napoléon. A convention

April 17. was immediately concluded with the Austrian generals; in virtue of which Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Venice, and Legnago, were immediately surrendered to their troops. Eugène's armaments were soon after dissolved; every thing was placed on a new footing; the whole of Lombardy was occupied by the Germans; and in the first week of May the French troops FINALLY REPASSED THE ALPS, not without casting from the summit of Mont Cenis a "longing, lingering look behind" at that classic land, which they had won by their valour and lost by their oppression (1).

State and final surrender of the fortresses in Germany still held by the French. To complete the picture of the French empire, as it was submitted to the consideration of Napoléon at Reims in the middle of March, when he took his final determination as to the congress of Chatillon, it only remains to cast a last glance over the vast fortresses, once

the bulwarks of his mighty dominions, which still remained in the hands of his generals on the other side of the Rhine. Glogau, blockaded since the 17th

April 10. August 1813, capitulated from want of provisions on the 10th April, and the garrison, still three thousand three hundred strong, became prisoners of war.

March 30. Custrin fell on the 30th March, with its garrison of three thousand. Wittenburg had been more actively besieged: trenches were opened against it in the beginning of January; and it was carried by

Jan. 15. assault on the 15th, fifteen hundred men having been made prisoners. The citadel of Wurzburg fell, as did those of Erfurth, long closely blockaded—the former on the 21st March, with fifteen hundred men: the two latter, with two thousand, in the beginning of May. Magdeburg, with its garrison, now swelled by stragglers from the French army, who had sought refuge within its walls after the retreat from the Elbe, to eighteen thousand men, presented a more important object. The blockade was loosely maintained by successive bodies of Allied troops as they advanced from Russia, or were equipped in the adjoining provinces of Prussia, from the 26th of October till the final capitulation took place in the middle of May. Several sorties were made to collect provisions, particularly in the beginning of January, and on the 1st April; on which last occasion, eight thousand men were engaged in the attack, and were not repulsed without considerable difficulty. An armistice was concluded on the 14th April, as soon as the events

(1) Koch, ii. 278. Viet. et Conq. xxiii, 346, 348. Botta, v. 479.

at Paris were known; but it was not till the 19th May that the place was finally evacuated, when General Lemarrois led back to France the divisions Lanusse and Lemoine, still fourteen thousand strong, besides four thousand Italians, Spaniards, and Croats, who were dismissed to their respective homes (4).

Operations under Benningesen against Davoust in Hamburg. Davoust, in Hamburg, as already noticed, had been blockaded by Benningesen with a large part of the Russian army of reserve, immediately after the battle of Leipsic. General Strogonoff at first had the command, but he was replaced, in the end of January, by Benningesen in person, who thenceforward took the direction of that important operation. On the 20th January, a serious attack took place on the fort of Haarbours, and the island of Willemsbourg: the first proved successful, but in the latter the Russians were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred men. The hard frost which now succeeded, so well known and severely felt over all Europe, having completely frozen the Elbe, the Russian general resolved to take advantage of it to effect the reduction of the island of Willemsbourg, without the command of which he had become sensible that no operations, with any degree of certainty, could be carried on against the

Feb. 9, 17, 24 and 28. body of the fortress. Repeated attacks took place on the 9th, and

17th, and 24th of February, and the 5th and 11th March; but such was the tenacity of Marshal Davoust, and the vigour of his resistance, that, although the Russians repeatedly got footing in the island, they were always, in the end, repulsed with very severe loss. Upwards of four thousand men were lost to both sides in these bloody combats, which led to no decisive results; and at length Benningesen, despairing of dispossessing the enemy by main force, strengthened the blockade, and trusted to the slower and more certain effects of disease and scarcity. The city, already pillaged and woe-struck to an unparalleled degree by the merciless exactions of the French marshal, was now threatened with the combined horrors of plague, pestilence, and famine, when a period was fortunately put to their sufferings by the fall of Napoléon, which was followed by a suspension of arms on the 18th April;

April 18. and in the end of May the garrison, still thirteen thousand strong, besides three thousand sick and wounded in the hospitals, set out on their return to France. Wesel, with its garrison of ten thousand men, long blockaded by Borstel's Prussians, was finally evacuated on the 10th May (2).

Thus, while Napoléon at Reims, with his heroic band of followers, not forty thousand strong, was maintaining a doubtful struggle with the vast masses of the Allied forces, above seventy thousand of his veteran troops were blockaded in the fortresses still held by his lieutenants beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees (5); an extraordinary fact, and speaking volumes as to the disastrous effect which the obstinate retention of these distant strongholds had upon the fortunes of the empire. Nor is there any foundation for

(1) Ploto, iii. 502, 513. Vaud. 136, 139. Vict. et Conq. xliii. 349, 350.

(2) Ploto, iii. 515, 521. Vaud. iii. 139, 141.

(3) Viz.—

In Catalonia and Santona. Ante, x. 170,	21,500
—Hamburg,	16,000
—Wesel,	10,000
—Custrin,	3,000
—Wittenburg,	1,500
—Magdeburg,	18,000
—Wurzburg,	1,500
—Erfurth,	2,000

73,500

the obvious remark, that if the Emperor had withdrawn these garrisons to augment his forces in the interior, the blockading troops would have formed an equal or greater addition to the armies of the Allies; for these blockading corps, though very numerous, were, for the most part, composed of landwehr and new levies, wholly unfit for operations in the field, while the garrisons they held in check were the best troops at that period in the French service. The armies, too, with which the Allies invaded France, were so numerous, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could find subsistence, and an additional host of mouths would have been an incumbrance rather than an advantage; whereas seventy thousand veterans added to Napoléon's armies in the plains of Champagne, would have hurled back the Allies with disgrace to the Rhine. It was want of men—the utter exhaustion of his military resources—which in the end proved his ruin; and yet, at that very time, he had veteran soldiers in abundance, voluntarily exiled by him from their country. Perplexed and wearisome as the details of the breaking up, in all its extent, of so immense a dominion necessarily are, the pains of investigating will not be deemed lost, when it leads to such a result as this; and demonstrates the decisive influence which the necessity of nowhere receding, and maintaining to the last the principle "*tout ou rien*" had upon the ultimate fate of the Revolution. Dark and mournful as was the intelligence which on every side pressed on the Emperor at Reims, it had no effect in shaking his determination. The disasters which have been enumerated, which accumulated "round a sinking throne and falling empire," were all, with the exception of the taking of Lyons and Genoa, and the battle of Toulouse, known to him when he took his final resolution to refuse the terms proposed to him at Chatillon; but still he would not consent to abandon Antwerp and the frontier of the Rhine (1).

Napoléon's
last survey
of his
Empire.

The terms which the Allied sovereigns proposed to Napoléon in the close of the conferences at Chatillon, were the cession, by Napoléon, of the whole conquests made by France since 1792: the abandonment of the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, and King of Italy: the reconstruction of all the countries adjoining France in an independent form: in particular, the organization of Germany in a federal union; of Italy in independent states, between the Austrian possessions and the French frontier; the independence of Switzerland as a separate republic; the formation of a kingdom in Holland for the house of Orange; in fine, the restoration of the Peninsular thrones to the houses of Braganza and Bourbon. In return for these exactions, the British government consented to restore the whole French colonies conquered by them during the war, with the exception of the islands of Saintes and Tobago in the West, and the isles of Mauritius and Bourbon in the East Indies. Malta was to remain in the hands of the English; but Sweden and Portugal were to restore Guadaloupe and Cayenne. So noble and disinterested was the use which Great Britain made of the immense sacrifices and unbounded ultimate triumphs of the war, that all the exactions she required of France were for the security of her continental Allies; and peace was to bring to Napoléon only a restitution of four-fifths of the conquests which Great Britain had made of her transmarine possessions. On these terms the Allies offered to recognize Napoléon as Emperor of France, and immediately conclude peace, leaving him as great an empire as had

Final terms
proposed to
Napoléon at
Chatillon.

(1) Fain, 170, 171.

been enjoyed by Louis XIV; and to possess which, Frederick the Great said, was "the brightest dream which a sovereign could form (1)."

Counter-project of Napoléon. Napoléon having declined to accede to these conditions, Caulaincourt, after a great many delays thrown in the way, to gain time for the military successes of the Emperor to influence in the manner he desired the progress of the negotiations, at length on the 10th March gave in what he termed a counter-project; but which in effect was nothing but an able argument on the part of the French government against the terms proposed by the Allies (2). The Allied plenipotentiaries upon this declared, that this memoir was no answer to their ultimatum, and were on the point of breaking up the conferences; when Caulaincourt, overwhelmed with apprehension at the immediate and probable result of such a rupture, proposed verbally on the part of the Emperor, that he should renounce all supremacy or constitutional influence in countries beyond the limits of France; to recognize the independence of Spain in its old limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII; to admit the independence of Switzerland, under the guarantee of the Allied powers; the independence of Germany and of Holland, under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange. This was followed three days afterwards by a more detailed *contre-projet* on the part of Napoléon, of the same general tenor, but in which he still eluded any answer to the requisition of the Allies, that France should be restored to its limits as in 1792, and held out for the possession of Antwerp, Flanders, and the frontier of the Rhine. He insisted also that the Ionian Islands should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that both should be settled on Prince Eugène and his descendants, with the Adige as a boundary on the side of Austria; that Saxony should be restored entire; that the sovereignty of Lucca and Piombino should be secured to his sister the Princess Eliza; the principality of Neufchatel to Berthier; and that the whole co-

(1) Project of Allies Feb. 9. Koch, ii. 336, 343. Cap. x. 377. Fain, 327.

"I will always hold to you the same language; it should be appreciated by men of sense who really desire the good of their country. We have but one wish, that of peace; but that peace is impossible, if you will not make the sacrifices necessary to regain your possessions beyond the seas. To arrive at that peace, it is necessary to be equally prepared for the means by which it is to be obtained, and not to forget that England disposes *alone* of all the compensations possible; and that, in agreeing to denude herself in favour of France of *almost the whole of her conquests*, she is entitled to insist that France shall be replaced on a level with the other great powers on the Continent."—METTERNICH to CAULAINCOURT, March 8th, 1814; FAIN, 305, 306; *Pièces Just.*

(2) "The Allied powers declared, only three months ago, at Frankfurt, that they wished to establish a new equilibrium in Europe. They profess the same desire now. To maintain the same *relative* position which she always enjoyed, is the only real wish of France. But Europe does not at this time resemble what she was twenty years ago. At that period the kingdom of Poland, already partitioned, disappeared entirely; the immense empire of Russia received vast and rich provinces; six millions of men were added to dominions already more extensive than any sovereign in Europe enjoyed; while nine millions fell to the lot of Austria and Prussia. Soon the face of Germany was changed. The ecclesiastical states and the greater number of the free cities were divided among the secular princes! Prussia and Austria received the greater part of them. The ancient republic of Venice became a

province of Austria: two millions of subjects, with new territories and new resources, were given to Russia by the treaty of Tilsit, by that of Vienna, by that of Yassi, by that of Abo. On her own side, and during the same period, England has not only acquired the Dutch possessions of Ceylon and Trinidad, but she has doubled her territories in India, and contracted an empire there which two of the greatest monarchies in Europe would hardly equal. If the population of that empire cannot be considered as an addition to the inhabitants of Great Britain; on the other hand, she has acquired by their sovereignty and commerce an immense increase of riches, the other great element of power. Russia and England have preserved all that they have acquired; Austria and Prussia have, it is true, sustained losses; but do they abandon all thoughts of repairing them? or will they be now contented with the possessions which they enjoyed before the war? When all has thus changed around France, can it maintain the same relative power if it is reduced to its original limits? Replaced in its original state, it would be far from enjoying the same influence or security, when the power of its neighbours has so immensely increased. England can only be attacked by sea: Russia, backed by the pole and flanked on either side by inaccessible and boundless solitudes, can be attacked, since the acquisition of Finland, only on one side. France, half commercial and half territorial, is open to attack on all sides both by sea and land, on both which elements she is brought immediately in contact with valiant nations."—*Contre-projet of CAULAINCOURT, 10th March 1814; FAIN, 335; Supplément au Manuscrit de 1814.*

lonies taken during the war, except Saintes, should be restored by Great Britain (1).

Answer of the Allies to the ultimatum of France. This counter-project of Napoléon was met by the following answer on the part of the Allied powers—"Europe, allied against the French government, wishes only the re-establishment of a general peace, continental and maritime. Such a peace can alone give the world repose, of which it has so long been deprived; but that peace cannot subsist without a due partition of force among the different powers. No view of ambition has dictated the proposals made on the part of the Allies in the sitting of 17th February last. France, even when restored to her limits of 1792, is still, from the central nature of her situation, her population, the riches of her soil, the strength of her frontiers, the number and distribution of her fortified places, on a level with the greatest powers on the continent: the other powers, in consenting to their own reconstruction on a proportional scale, and to the establishment of intermediate independent secondary states, prove at once what are the principles which animate them. England restores to France her colonies, and with them her commerce and her marine; England does more—in denuding herself of nearly the whole of the conquests which she has made during so many years, she is far from advancing any pretensions to the exclusive dominion of the seas, or any right inconsistent with the free enjoyment of commerce by others. Inspired with a spirit of justice and liberality worthy of a great people, England throws into the balance of the continent acquisitions beyond seas, of which the possession would secure her for long the exclusive dominion. In restoring to France her colonies, in making great sacrifices for the restoration of Holland, which the spirit of the Dutch people renders worthy to resume its place in the European commonwealth, the British government are entitled to expect that such sacrifices on their part shall purchase a real and effectual, not a merely nominal equilibrium in Europe; that the political state of Europe shall be such as to afford her a guarantee that these concessions have not been a pure loss on her part, that they will not be turned against Europe and herself.

"The counter-project of the French plenipotentiary proceeds on entirely different principles. According to them, France will retain a territory more extensive than experience has shown to be consistent with the peace of Europe. She will retain those salient points and offensive positions, by the aid of which she has already overturned so many of the adjoining states; the cessions which she proposes to make are only apparent. The principles still announced by the actual sovereign of France, and the dear-bought experience of many years, have proved that adjoining secondary states possessed by members of his family, can be independent only in name. Were they to deviate from the principles on which their project of the 17th February rests, the Allied sovereigns would have done nothing for the peace or safety of Europe. The efforts of so many sovereigns leagued together for one end, would be lost; the weakness of their cabinets would turn at once against themselves and their subjects; Europe, and France itself, would soon become the victims of new convulsions; Europe would not conclude peace, she would only disarm. The Allied courts, therefore, considering the counter-project of France as essentially at variance, not merely with the details, but the spirit of the basis proposed by them, regard any further prolongation of the congress at Chatillon as useless and dangerous. Useless, because the proposals of France are opposed to the conditions which the Allies consider

(1) *Centre-projet* of Caulaincourt, March 10 and 13, 1814. Fain, 335, 359.

as necessary to the equilibrium of Europe, and to the reconstruction of the social edifice, to which they are determined to consecrate all the forces with which Providence has entrusted them; dangerous, because the prolongation of sterile negotiations would only inspire the people of Europe with vain expectations of peace. The Allied powers, therefore, with regret regard the negotiations at Chatillon as dissolved; and they cannot separate without declaring that *they make no war upon France*: that they regard the proper dimensions of that empire as one of the first conditions of a proper balance of power; but that they will not lay down their arms until their principles have been recognised and admitted by its government (1)."

Reflections
on the
dissolution
of the
Congress.

Thus was finally dissolved the famous congress of Chatillon; thus departed the last chance which Napoléon had of preserving his revolutionary dynasty on the throne of France. Caulaincourt next day delivered an answer to the note of the Allied sovereigns; it contained nothing but a repetition of the arguments he had formerly urged, but without abating in any degree of the pretensions which France had advanced; and the congress was declared terminated. It broke off from no verbal distinctions or diplomatic casuistry: real substantial interests were involved in the matters at issue; it was the life or death of the French supremacy in Europe which was at stake. With Flanders and the Rhenish provinces remaining part of the French empire; with the kingdom of Italy and the Elector of Saxony for external dependents; with one hand resting on Antwerp and another on Mantua, and a ready ingress at all times prepared into the heart of Germany through Mayence, the revolutionary dynasty, impelled alike by internal discontent and external ambition, would have never ceased to disturb the peace of Europe. But of all these great keys to European dominion, it was Antwerp to which the Emperor most strongly held; it was the dread of losing it which made him, with fifty thousand men, renew a contest with two hundred thousand almost at the gates of Paris. "Antwerp," says Napoléon, "was to me a province in itself: it was the principal cause of my exile to St.-Helena; for it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the terms offered at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded (2)." Strange, that within thirty years of the time when this great man had preferred risking the crown of France to the surrender of that outwork against England, and in the full knowledge of his opinion as to its importance for their overthrow, the British government, in a paroxysm of political madness, should have lent

(1) Protocole, March 18, 1814. Fain, 357, 361, Koch, ii. 360, 363.

So anxious was Metternich to induce Caulaincourt to make peace on the terms proposed, that on the very morning of the day on which the last meeting of the congress took place, he wrote to him as follows: "The day when peace may be finally concluded under the necessary sacrifices, has at length arrived: come to conclude it, but without attempting inadmissible projects. Matters have now come to such a pass, that you can no longer write romances without the greatest risks to the Emperor Napoléon. What risks, on the other hand, do the Allies run? None but being obliged to evacuate the territory of old France; and what would that avail the Emperor Napoléon? The whole left bank of the Rhine will speedily be raised against him: Savoy is in arms: attacks entirely personal will soon be made on the Emperor, without the possibility of arresting them. I speak to you with sincerity: I am ever on the same path. You know my views, my principles, my wishes. The first are

entirely European, and therefore not alien to France; the second point to retaining Austria interested in the well-being of France; the third are in favour of a dynasty so intimately united to its own. I speak to you, my dear duke, in the most entire confidence. To put an end to the dangers which menace France, it depends only on your master to make peace. Matters, if he does not do so, will ere long be beyond his reach. The throne of Louis XIV. with the additions of Louis XV. is too high a stake to put upon a single throw. I will do my utmost to retain Lord Castlereagh a few days: the moment he is gone, all hope of peace has vanished."—Caulaincourt replied on 20th "If it depended on me, your hopes would speedily be realized; I should have no doubt they would, if I was sure that yourself and Lord Castlereagh were the instruments of that work, as glorious as it is desirable."—METTERNICH TO CAULAINCOURT, 18th March 1814; and CAULAINCOURT TO METTERNICH, 20th March 1814; FAIN, 311, 313.

(2) Las Cases, vii. 43, 44; 56, 57.

the aid of their fleet to the French army to wrest this noble fortress from their natural allies the Dutch, and restore it to a revolutionary dynasty and the rule of the tricolor flag (1)!

Alarming situation of Paris. In the midst of the general wreck of his empire, it was on Paris, the seat of his power, and the centre of all his political ramifications, that the attention of the Emperor was fixed. The accounts from that capital were sufficiently alarming. Slowly indeed, but perceptibly, and at last in an alarming manner, the vast hosts of the grand army were approaching; the long diversion produced by Blücher's irruption towards Meaux, had in a manner left the road to Paris open to Schwartzemberg. Macdonald and Oudinot, since their defeat at Bar-sur-Aube, were hardly a match for a single corps of the Allied army; Troyes had been reoccupied; the passage of the Seine had been forced at Nogent; their light cavalry again appeared at Fontainebleau and Nemours; and the whole body of their forces might be at Paris on the 20th. The near approach of such formidable masses, the absence of Napoléon, the doubtful issue of the battles of Craon and Laon, the fall of Lyons, the occupation of Bordeaux, and proclamation of Louis XVIII there, had both excited unbounded consternation among the Imperial functionaries, and awakened enthusiastic hopes among the Royalist party. Their committees were in motion in all the provinces; Paris itself was no stranger to the movements; many of the strongest heads there, considered the restoration of the Bourbons as the only means of extricating France from the abyss into which it had fallen; many more of the basest hearts looked to it as the securest means of preserving, amidst the ruin of their country, their individual fortunes. Talleyrand, the Abbé de Pradt, the Duke of Dalberg, M. de Jaucourt, were in secret correspondence with the Allied headquarters; and M. de Vitrolles had conveyed to the Emperor Alexander the feeling entertained at Paris, on the necessity of a restoration. Alarmed at the dangers which were accumulating on all sides, Prince Joseph urged the Empress to write secretly to her father, but she refused to do so without the knowledge of the Emperor. Consternation or hope were painted in every visage: a restless disquietude kept the people in the streets; and that general quiver in thought was perceptible, which is the invariable precursor of revolution (2).

Napoléon marches against Schwartzemberg, and towards the Aube, March 17. Amidst so many dangers which pressed on all sides, it was against the army of Schwartzemberg that the Emperor deemed it first expedient to march; for its columns, if not arrested, might be in Paris in three days. To guard against the danger of a surprize by the light troops of Blücher, while he himself was engaged in combating the grand army, he dispatched on the 16th secret orders to Joseph, to send off the Empress and King of Rome to the other side of the Loire, in the event of Paris being threatened. Having taken this precaution, he on the day following left Marmont and Mortier with twenty thousand men, of whom five thousand were cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, to make head against

(1) Protocole, March 19, 1814. Fain, 364, 368.

So intent was Napoléon on the preservation of Antwerp, that on the 17th March, the very day before the ultimatum of the Allies was delivered, declining the proposals of France, Maret, by his orders, wrote from Reims:—"The abandonment of all their conquests by the English is a real concession which his Majesty approves, especially if it can be combined with leaving us Antwerp. If the negotiation is to be broken off, it is expedient that it should be on the cession of our strongholds, and

the evacuation of our territory. If you are obliged to abandon Antwerp, the Emperor requires that you shall insist on the restitution of all our colonies, including the Isle of France, and the adherence of the basis of Frankfort so far as regards Italy."—MARET to CAULAINCOURT, Reims, 17th March 1814; FAIN, 397, 308. This letter did not reach Caulaincourt till the congress was dissolved.

(2) Fain, 170, 172. Cap. x. 436, 437. Beauch. ii. 106, 107. Viet. et Conq. xliii. 267, 269.

Blucher on the Aisne, with instructions to retard his advance as much as possible, and fall back, always drawing nearer to him, towards Paris; and himself set out with the remainder of his army, about twenty-six thousand strong, (including seven thousand on their road from Paris under Lefebvre Desnoettes), of which seven thousand were cavalry, to join Macdonald and Oudinot, and drive back the grand army on the banks of the Seine. These marshals had thirty-five thousand under their orders, of whom ten thousand were cavalry; so that to attack Schwartzemberg, who had above a hundred thousand combatants under his orders, Napoléon had only sixty thousand men, of whom seventeen thousand were horse; while on the Aisne, the disproportion was still greater, for there Blucher, with above a hundred thousand, was opposed only by Marmont and Mortier with twenty thousand—in all, eighty thousand against two hundred thousand: a fearful disproportion, especially when the long course of previous victories, and admirable quality of the Allied troops, was considered; but yet not so decisive as to relieve the generals from serious anxiety, when the central position of Napoléon was taken into account, the devoted valour of his followers, the force and secrecy of the blows which he dealt out in all directions, the resources which he could command in his own dominions, and their own distance both from their reserves, their parks of ammunition, and supplies of provisions (1).

And falls
unawares
on the
Grand
Army.

The French troops rested the first night at Epernay: the worthy inhabitants emptied their cellars to refresh their defenders; and for a few hours the delicious wine of Champagne made the soldiers forget their fatigues, the officers their anxieties. On the 18th the march continued towards the Aube, and the army slept at Fère-Champenoise. Napoléon there received intelligence of the state of the negotiations at Chatillon; and the great probability that on that very day Caulaincourt's counter project had been rejected, and the Congress broken up. Nothing disconcerted by this intelligence, which cut off his last hope of an accommodation, the Emperor held on in his route, hoping to fall on the communications and rear of Schwartzemberg's army, which, loosely extended over a vast front nearly eighty miles in breadth, from Fère-Champenoise to Sens, promised to present some of its corps, isolated from the rest, to his strokes. Intelligence of the approach of the French Emperor was soon conveyed to the Allied generals by the admirable horsemen who formed the eyes of their army; but it was long before they would give any credit to the intelligence, deeming him fully occupied, or closely followed, by Blucher. At length, on the evening of the 18th, the accounts of the approach of large bodies having the ensigns of the imperial guard among them, were so alarming that the Emperor Alexander, accompanied by Prince Volkonsky, came up with all imaginable haste from Troyes to Arcis, where Schwartzemberg lay confined to bed by the gout. Meeting General Toll, the quartermaster-general, in the anti-chamber, Alexander said with warmth, "What are you about here: we may lose the whole army!" "It is a great blessing," replied Toll, "your Majesty has come (2): we could not persuade the generals of that; but now you will set all to rights." By Alexander's command, orders were instantly dispatched in all directions for the army to concentrate between Troyes and Pongy; Wrede's corps being left in the night to keep possession of Arcis, and the bridge over the Aube, with all his troops.

(1) Fain, 171, 174. Koch, ii. 57, 59. Vaud. ii. 208, 211. Viet. et Conq. xxiii. 174, 175. Dan. 260, 261.

(2) Dan. 261, 263. Fain, 177, 178. Vaud. ii. 211, 213. Koch, ii. 60, 61. Plötho, iii. 316, 317. Burgh. 203, 210.

Napoléon
moves
aside, and
Schwartz-
enberg resumes
the offen-
sive.

Had Napoléon been at the head of a large force, or even been aware, with the troops he actually had, of the disjointed state of the Allied army, and the panic which prevailed at headquarters, he might possibly, by pursuing his march direct on Arcis, have routed Wrede, and fallen headlong, by the great road to Troyes, into the very centre of the Allied army. In the critical state of the negotiations at Chatillon, and the known timidity of the Austrian councils, the effect of such a success might have been incalculable. Ignorant, however, of the prize almost within his grasp, or deeming himself not strong enough to snatch it, Napoléon, instead of descending the course of the Aube, and moving direct on Arcis, turned aside to his right to Plancy, in order to effect a junction with Macdonald and Oudinot, who had received orders to meet him near that place, having marched that morning from Provins. They met accordingly, and their united forces crossed the Seine at Mery, traversed the yet smouldering ruins of that town, and at Chatre regained the great road from Troyes to Paris. Napoléon was now at the head of fifty-five thousand men, and prepared, when Lefebvre Desnottes came up, with six thousand more, to give battle. But the surprize was over; his plan of attack was seen, the Allied corps were rapidly concentrating, and Schwartzberg, ably repairing his former error of undue extension, had stopped the retreat, and given orders to the troops to unite in advance, between Arcis and Plancy, and attack the enemy during his passage of the Aube. By this vigorous and well-timed change of operations, the initiative was taken from Napoléon and given to the Allied generals; the concentration of their army was effected in advance, instead of retreat; and they were put in a condition at once to bring the enemy to a general battle, with every advantage on their side arising from their decisive superiority of numbers (1).

Napoléon
and Schwartz-
enberg
both march
on Arcis.

Napoléon was not prepared for this sudden resumption of the offensive by the Austrian general. He had expected, from the information communicated by Macdonald and Oudinot, to have found the enemy at the gates of Paris; and well knowing the Austrian nervousness about being turned, he had calculated, not without reason, on arresting them by falling on their communications. Now, however, the stroke had failed: the turn to the right at Plancy had given them time to concentrate their army, and all hope of reaching their rear was postponed if not destroyed. Persuaded, however, that it was by such a manœuvre only that their enormous masses could be forced back, the Emperor still clung to the idea of turning their right; and therefore he resolved to push forward his left, remount the course of the Aube by Arcis, as far, if necessary, as Barsur-Aube; and thus threaten Chaumont and their communications with the Rhine. On the 20th, accordingly, the whole army marched by the right bank of the Aube, up the stream, till they came opposite to Arcis at ten o'clock. That town was immediately occupied; and Napoléon, coming up at one o'clock in the afternoon, held a council of war with his principal marshals and generals as to the course which should be pursued. The report of the inhabitants was unanimous that the retrograde movement of the Allies had been arrested; that Schwartzberg with the greater part of his forces was within a few miles, screened only by the intervening hills, and that before two hours had elapsed Arcis would be attacked on all sides by their columns. Napoléon, conceiving it impossible that the Austrian generalissimo could have adopted so able and vigorous a resolution, as that of

(1) Dan. 263, 264. Fain, 176, 177. Koch, ii. 62, 63. Burgh, 210, 213.

suddenly stopping his retreat and converging with all his force to the decisive point, persisted in maintaining that they were in full retreat, and that the troops before him were only a rearguard; he summoned up accordingly all his troops, crossed them over the Aube at Arcis, and gave orders to continue the pursuit with the utmost vigour on the road to Troyes; and he was only convinced of his mistake when, on the firing of three guns from a short distance in the rear of the enemy's cavalry, the head of his columns, converging on all sides towards Arcis, suddenly appeared on the summit of the swelling hills lying on the westward of the town (1)!

Effect of
these move-
ments on
both sides.

In effect, Schwartzemberg's dispositions had now brought the whole grand army upon Napoléon's forces; and the movement of the latter upon Arcis, instead of bringing him upon the flanks and rear of a retreating and disjointed host, as he expected, had brought him full tilt against the front of a superior and concentrated advancing one. The Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg, Raieffsky, and Giulay, had marched at daybreak from Troyes upon Plancy, while Wrede again occupied Arcis, and the guards and reserve came up to Onjou. At ten o'clock, Wrede's advanced guard, agreeably to orders, evacuated Arcis, and retired towards the south by the town of Troyes; and this retrograde movement it was which made Napoléon conceive that he had only a slender rearguard before him. Meanwhile, Alexander and the king of Prussia arrived on the heights of Menil-la-Comtesse, where the Russian guards were posted, and the former immediately dismounting, walked backwards and forwards with Barclay de Tolly. "These gentlemen," said the Emperor, looking to the Austrian generals, "have made the half of my head grey. Napoléon will amuse us here with insignificant movements, and meanwhile march the main body of his forces on Brienne, and fall on our communications." His anxiety the preceding two nights had been excessive, and he had rightly divined the French Emperor's intentions; but his digression to Plancy had given Schwartzemberg time to concentrate, and a vigorous offensive was about to terminate the long irresolution of the Austrian councils (2).

Battle of
Arcis-sur-
Aube.

The battle commenced by a skirmish on the outposts, between the cavalry of the Allies under Kaisaroff, and that of the French led by Sebastiani. Gradually several batteries of horse-artillery were brought up on both sides, fresh squadrons advanced to the support of either party, and, in the end, a serious cavalry action took place. The French horsemen, though inferior to none in the world in audacity and prowess, were overmatched by their opponents, and driven back in great confusion to the bridge of Arcis. Napoléon, who was on the other side, instantly rode forward to the entrance of the bridge, already all but clogged up with fugitives, and drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Let me see which of you will pass before me." These words arrested the flight; and, at the same time, the division Friant traversing the streets of Arcis in double quick time, passed the bridge, formed on either side of its other extremity, and by their heavy fire drove back the Allied horse. Meanwhile, a bloody combat had commenced on the French left, between Wrede and Ney: the former endeavouring to storm, the latter to defend the village of Torcy. An Austrian battalion, in the first instance, made itself master of that important post, which would have opened to the Allied right under Wrede the direct road to Arcis; but Ney's men speedily drove them out. Wrede again retook it with

(1) Fain, 180. 181. Dan. 265, 266. Vaud. ii. 215, 217. Burgh. 213, 214. Plötho, iii. 321, 323.

(2) Dan. 265, 266. Brauch. ii. 110, 111. Koch, ii. 67, 68. Burgh. 212, 214. Jom. iv. 566.

three battalions; but Napoléon immediately brought up a body of his guards, which a second time retook it and maintained their post until nightfall, despite the utmost efforts of the Bavarians and Austrians (1).

First battle
of Arcis-sur-
Aube. The position of the French was now extremely strong, and well calculated to counterbalance the superiority of numbers which the Allies enjoyed. Their army occupied a semicircular position facing outwards, with each flank resting on the river Aube, so as to be secure against being turned; while in their rear was the town of Arcis, which would form a secure place of defence in case of disaster. The Allies formed a much larger concave semicircle facing inwards; Wrede being on the right, the Russian reserves and guards under Barclay in the centre, Raieffsky, who had now joined, and Giulay on the left. If the whole left had been able to get up in time to take a part in the action around Arcis, the battle would have been as general, and possibly as decisive, as that of Leipsic, to which, from the respective positions of the French and Allies, it bore a very close resemblance. But the corps of the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg was absent on the side of Plancy, opposed to Mortier, where it was engaged only in an inconsiderable skirmish, which terminated in the capture on his part of a few pontoons. Thus nearly a third of the Allied army was absent till the very close of the day; Napoléon took advantage of that circumstance to maintain his position before Arcis till nightfall, and seventy guns, placed in front of his right, ploughed with fearful effect through the squadrons of the Allies. As soon, however, as the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg approached, Schwartzenberg ordered the guards and reserve to advance, the cannon were all hurried to the front, and a general attack commenced. As the Russian batteries of the guard passed the Emperor at full speed, he bade them remember Leipsic; and soon the thunder of their guns was heard above the loudest roar of the combat. The sun was now setting, darkness was stealing over the heavens, Arcis and Torcy were wrapped in flames, the Russian horse artillery on the Allied left reduced the French artillery to silence, and their long array of guns, advancing to the front of the semicircle of heights which surround the town, played with terrible effect on the dense columns of the French which encircled its walls. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia now descended from the heights of Menil-la-Comtesse, and followed the reserves into action; behind them came a brigade of the Prussian, and the red Cossacks of the Russian guards, making the air resound with their trumpets and the war-songs of the desert. On the side of the French, the scene was as mournful as on the Allied it was animating. Motionless, but undaunted, the troops stood under the terrible cannonade; with the instinct of discipline, the ranks closed to the centre as fast as chasms were made; the officers exposed themselves like the privates, the generals as the officers. Napoléon was repeatedly in imminent danger, both from the charges of cavalry and fire of artillery; nearly all his staff were killed or wounded: a bomb fell at his side, he calmly waited its explosion, which covered him with smoke and dust, and wounded his horse; he mounted another and continued his position. "Fear nothing," said he to the generals, who urged him to retire; "the bullet is not yet cast which is to kill me." He seemed to court rather than fear death; his air was resolute but sombre; and as long as the battle raged, by the light of the burning houses behind, and the flash of the enemy's guns in front, he continued with undaunted resolution to face the hostile batteries (2).

(1) Dan. 267, 268. Jom. iv. 567. Fain, 180, 181. Koch, ii. 63, 69. Burgh. 214.

(2) Dan. 269, 270. Fain, 181, 182. Beauch. ii. 121, 124. Vaud. ii. 69, 72. Plotho, iii. 327, 329.

Order of
battle for
the follow-
ing day.

This dreadful cannonade continued till ten at night, when it died away by mutual exhaustion, and a nocturnal irruption by Sébastiani on Kaisaroff, which was repulsed, terminated the day. Both parties slept on the field of battle, and neither could claim any decided advantage; for if, on the one hand, the French had been stopped in their advance, and thrown back on the defensive around the walls of Arcis; on the other, the Allies, though decidedly superior in number, had not been able to force their position there, or drive them over the Aube. On the side of the Allies, great efforts were made to bring up all their remote detachments, and concentrate their army; and a general and decisive battle, on the succeeding day, was universally anticipated. At daybreak, the whole army was in line, and stood in the following order: Count Wrede was at Chaudre, in front of the blood-stained ruins of Torcy: the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg at the hamlet of Menil, Giulay on his left, and then Raieffsky with his Russians. The grenadiers and cuirassiers were in second line, behind the centre, at Menil-la-Comtesse. On the side of Napoléon, the troops stood on the same ground, in a semicircle around Arcis, which they had occupied on the preceding day, without any addition; for though Macdonald and Oudinot had come up during the night, yet their forces, now raised to nearly thirty thousand strong, were still stationed on the opposite side of the river (1).

The French
at length
retreat.

It was an awful and yet animating sight, when the rising sun glittered on the low swelling hills which surrounded the town of Arcis. A hundred and fifty thousand men on the two sides, trained to the most perfect discipline, but animated by burning passions, were drawn up, gazing at each other, at a very short distance, without moving from the spot on which they were placed. The soldiers stood at ease, but with their muskets at their shoulders; the cavalry were for the most part dismounted, but every bridle was over the horseman's arm; the slow matches were burning at the guns in front of the lines; a word from either commander would at once have let slip the dogs of war, and lighted up a dreadful combat, yet not a sound was to be heard, scarcely a movement seen in either army. Motionless, yet ever in perfect array, the vast masses stood fronting each other; not a gun was fired, not a voice was raised; it seemed as if both hosts, impressed with the solemnity of the moment which was to decide the conflict of twenty years, were too deeply affected to disturb the stillness of the scene. But hour after hour passed away, without any movement being attempted on either side, until the long suspense had made the very eyes of the soldiers to ache, and their hearts to sink within them at danger long fronted, hope long deferred (2). At one time, a large part of Macdonald's corps was brought across, and there seemed every appearance of the action commencing: but that was only a feint; a second bridge had meanwhile been thrown over the Aube; and at one in the afternoon the equipages were seen defiling to the rear, and decided symptoms of a retreat were manifested. No movement could be conceived more hazardous, in presence of nearly a hundred thousand men, ready to fall on and crush the rearguard after half the army had passed. Such was the respect, however, inspired by the very name of Napoléon, and the imposing array which his forces made around Arcis, that it was not till three o'clock that Schwartzemberg gave the signal for attack (3).

(1) Dan. 270, 271. Fain, 181, 182. Vaud. ii. 223, 224. Plötho, iii. 330, 332.

(2) The great road from Arcis-sur-Aube to Chaumont passes through the centre of the Allied position, in the winding sweeps which it makes to surmount the heights which bound the valley of the Aube to the south-west of the town. Of the innu-

merable travellers who pass over the field, how many think of the memorable scene decisive of the fate of Napoléon, and the revolution of which it was the theatre!—*Personal Observation.*

(3) Dan. 272, 273. Fain, 181, 183. Koch, ii. 75, 77. Vaud, ii. 229, 230. Burgh. 216, 217.

The French rearguard is attacked. The troops on all sides immediately advanced, preceded by a hundred pieces of cannon, which opened their fire at the same instant. Pahlen attacked on the right, Raieffsky in the centre; and soon the advancing batteries approached so near, that their balls crossed each other in all directions over the town; bombs fell in all the streets and on both the bridges, and many houses took fire. If the Austrian general had advanced two hours earlier to the attack, it must have been a repetition of the triumph which, in a similar situation at Friedland (1), Napoléon had gained over an army of Russians of much the same strength as that he now commanded (2). But the attack had been deferred too late for decisive success: a large part of the French army had passed over before the combat became serious; and the rearguard under Macdonald maintained so gallant a resistance, that it was dark before the Allied troops approached Arcis. Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg's men, however, at length drove back Oudinot, and broke into the town close after the French rearguard, which rushed towards the bridges; their cavalry crossed at a ford; the bridge was blown up; a desperate conflict took place in the streets; and numbers were drowned in trying to swim across after the arch was cut away. During the whole night, however, the French kept up so heavy a cannonade from the opposite bank, that all attempts to restore it proved ineffectual; and before morning dawned, Napoléon was far advanced on the road to Vitry, leaving only a powerful rearguard in front of Arcis to retard the passage of the river (3).

Napoléon's reasons for the march to St. Dizier. Though the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube was not attended with any brilliant trophies taken in the field, yet it was followed by decisive effects on the fortunes of Napoléon. The loss of the French was about four thousand men, of whom eight hundred were prisoners, and six pieces of cannon; that of the Allies was as great; but its immediate result was to throw Napoléon upon the eccentric line of operations which immediately led to his fall. His meditated project of falling upon the rear and communications of the grand army had wholly failed: his cross march to Plancy had given them time to concentrate; and he had been repulsed in the attempt to penetrate by main force into the Allied lines; and it had been completely proved, that his strength was unequal to hurtling against the immense masses when drawn together. Nothing remained but still to threaten their communications; to draw near to the garrisons of the frontier, from which those supplies of veteran troops could be obtained which were no longer to be found in the heart of France; and to lend a hand to the insurgent bodies of peasantry, who, inflamed by a patriotic spirit, and irritated by the pillage of the Allied troops, were waiting only the signal of his advance to commence a murderous guerilla warfare on their flanks and rear. To do this, however, required an immense sacrifice—it was necessary to march direct towards the Rhine, and abandon the defence of Paris; for the Emperor's army was so sorely reduced in numbers, that to divide was to destroy it; and the success of the measure depended entirely on the formation, by the aid of the disengaged garrisons, of such an imposing force on the enemy's communications as would command attention, and entirely withdraw them from any movement on the capital. Impressed with these ideas,

(1) *Ante*, vi. 128.

(2) The relative strength of the French and Russians at Friedland was almost exactly the same as that of the Allies and French at Arcis; the French had eighty thousand, and the Russians fifty thousand. See *Ante*, vi. 264, 268.

(3) Fain, 182, 183. Dan. 273, 274. Koch, ii.

76, 81. Burgh. 217. Vaud. ii. 229, 233. Motho, iii. 329, 334.

On leaving Arcis, Napoléon sent two thousand francs from his private purse to the *Sœurs de la Charité*, by the Count de Turenne, to assuage the sufferings of the wounded.—Fain, 182. Note.

on which he had long meditated, and which, situated as he was, were unquestionably well founded, Napoléon, on leaving Arcis, instead of taking the road either to Chalons, from whence he had come, or Paris, by which it was expected he would retire, moved on the *chaussée* of Vitry direct towards the Rhine (1).

Napoléon's march to St.-Dizier. March 22. The Emperor's first day's march was to the environs of Vitry. Ney was sent up to the walls of the town to summon it to surrender, but after some hesitation, the governor, who was at the head of a garrison of four thousand men, and forty pieces of cannon, resolved to stand the hazard of an assault, and manfully held out. This check, which Napoléon had not anticipated, disarranged his plans; for he was in no condition either to batter its walls or attempt an escalade. Turning aside, therefore, from this unprofitable attempt, he next day continued his march, and reached St.-Dizier, where headquarters were established for the night. He March 23. was there joined by Caulaincourt, with intelligence of the dissolution of the congress of Chatillon. This portentous event, accompanied by the hopelessness of the war, and seeming extravagance of the march towards the Rhine, completed the discouragement of the generals and officers. They saw no end to the campaign, no fruit for their toils or their blood. Instead of defending Paris, they were marching towards Germany: the capital of their country, their homes, their hearths, would become the prey of the enemy; while all that was dear to them was lost, they were plunging anew into an endless warfare, to which they could neither see an issue nor an object. A revolution was openly spoken of, even at headquarters, as a possible, perhaps a probable contingency; the obstinacy which had refused the terms offered by the Allies was universally condemned; many doubted the Emperor's sanity of mind. "Where is this to end? Whither are we marching? If he falls, shall we fall with him?" was universally asked. Disregarding these murmurs and discontents, with the existence of which he was only partially acquainted, Napoléon spread out his wings on either side from March 24. St.-Dizier to Bar-sur-Aube, headquarters being established at Doulevant; and the light cavalry having got on the great road to Langres, in the rear of the Allies, and on their principal line of communication, entered Chaumont, captured a pontoon train and a considerable quantity of baggage and ammunition, and spread terror from Troyes to Vesoul (2).

The Allies follow the enemy, and receive information of this design. Great was the astonishment in the Allied army when they beheld the French columns retreating, not towards the capital, but the Rhine. A Cossack who first brought in the intelligence, was so confounded, that he said, "The enemy is retreating, not on Paris, but on Moscow." It soon, however, became evident that the French line of march was decidedly taken, and Schwartzberg, suspecting it was a feint, and desirous at all events to be near the enemy and keep his own troops together, crossed the greater part of his army over at Arcis and the adjacent fords, leaving Giulay alone, with the rearguard, to retain possession of the bridge. On the day following his troops continued to pursue the enemy's rearguard; and some squadrons of cavalry having succeeded in routing a detachment of French horse at Sommepeuy, which guarded a park of guns,

(1) Fain, 184. 185. Dan. 275. Jom. iv. 570, 571. Koch, ii. 81, 84. Vaud. ii. 234, 240.

"I marched on St.-Dizier," said Napoléon afterwards at Elba, to General Kohler, the Austrian commissioner, "because twenty experiments had convinced me that I had only to send a few hus-

sars to spread dismay amongst you. On this occasion I stood on it with my whole army, but you never troubled your heads about me; 'twas because the devil had possession of you."—DANILEFSKY, 279.

(2) Fain, 185, 187. Vaud. ii. 247. 249. Jom. iv. 573. Koch, ii. 84, 90.

the pieces, in number three-and-twenty, were taken, and four hundred prisoners; but what was of far more importance, despatches from Napoléon's headquarters were intercepted, which left no doubt of his design of moving on St.-Dizier, and falling on the communications of the grand army. On March 22, these letters being taken, they were straightway forwarded to Prince Schwartzberg, who deemed them of such importance, that he immediately had them forwarded to the Emperor Alexander at Pongy. They proved to be a secret despatch from Savary, giving the most deplorable account, both of the total exhaustion of resources and shaken state of the public mind at Paris, and a private letter from Napoléon to Marie-Louise, announcing his intended movement on St.-Dizier, and design to draw near to the strong places on the frontier (1).

Important
Council of
War at the
Allied head-
quarters.

These important letters reached Alexander at Dampierre at one o'clock in the morning. They had hardly been read over, when despatches arrived from Count Pahlen, with intelligence of his having, on the road from Arcis to Châlons, fallen in with Chernicheff at the head of Blücher's advanced guard; and that the army of Silesia had advanced from Laon to Reims and Epernay, and occupied Châlons. Thus at the very moment that Napoléon had withdrawn from the protection of Paris, and marched towards the Rhine, the heads of Schwartzberg's and Blücher's armies had effected a junction in his rear, and a hundred and eighty thousand men stood between him and the capital! Accounts at the same time arrived of the occupation of Bordeaux by the British troops, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII, with the general concurrence of the inhabitants. This extraordinary combination of important events led the Emperor Alexander, who had come on to Sommepey, musing on them all the way, to call in Prince Volkonsky, Count Barclay, and Generals Diebitch and Toll, who all took part in the memorable council which followed. Alexander, adhering to the opinion which he had all along maintained, that the real object of the war was to destroy the military power of Napoléon, at first stated that he thought the most advisable course would be to unite with Blücher at Vitry, pursue the French Emperor, and attack him wherever they should find him. "We have to choose, however, between that," he added, "and, concealing our movements from him, to march straight to Paris. What is your opinion, gentlemen?" turning to Barclay de Tolly. "We had better," said the field-marshal after looking at the map, "follow Napoléon and attack him." All agreed in this opinion, flowing as it did from the first in rank and the first in reputation, except Diebitch and Volkonsky. The former said that it would be more advisable in his opinion, while the united armies were following Napoléon, for Bulow, who was lying at Soissons, to make a dash at Paris. To this Volkonsky replied in these memorable words:—"It is well known that there are at Paris forty thousand national guards and fragments of regiments; and in addition to these, at a short distance from the capital, are the two corps of Marmont and Mortier. Their united force will be at least seventy thousand strong; consequently we cannot expect that Bulow, with his thirty thousand, could effect any thing

Volkonsky's
advice to
march to
Paris, which
is adopted
by Alexander.

(1) Dan. 275, 278. Burgh. 220, 221. Plötho, iii. 329, 342.

Napoléon's letter to the Empress Marie Louise was in these terms:—"My love! I have been for some days constantly on horseback; on the 20th I took Arcis-sur-Aube. The enemy attacked me there at eight o'clock in the evening; I beat him the same evening; I took two guns, and retook two. The next day the enemy's army put itself in battle

array to protect the march of its columns on Brienne and Bar-sur-Aube; and I resolved to approach the Marne and its environs, in order to drive them further from Paris, by approaching my own fortified places. This evening I shall be at St.-Dizier. Farewell, my love! Embrace my son! See BURGHESSE'S *Operations of the Allied Army in France*, 339, No. 14; and DANILEVSKY, 285.

(2) Dan. 286, 287. Jom. iv. 577. Burgh. 224,

of importance; on the contrary, he would expose himself to danger by attacking an enemy so greatly superior to him in numbers. On the other hand, if we follow Napoléon, we must leave a considerable rearguard to ward off the attack of these two marshals. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that it would be advisable first to unite with the Silesian army, and then to detach against Napoléon a numerous body of cavalry and some regiments of infantry, with instructions every where to prepare accommodation for the Emperor, that it may be believed we are following with the whole army. We ought then to march straight to Paris through Fère-Champenoise, and Blücher through Etoges, keeping up an uninterrupted communication between the two armies. Following this route, we must attack Marshals Marmont and Mortier wherever we meet them. But we shall beat them, because we are stronger than they; and each day will place two marches between us and Napoléon." Alexander warmly approved this advice, which coincided entirely with the spirit of the vigorous councils he had always supported. "If it is your majesty's intention," said Diebitch, "to re-establish the Bourbons, it would certainly be better to march with both armies to Paris." "We are not now talking of the Bourbons, but of pulling down Napoléon." It was then calculated how long it would take to reach Paris; and it was found it could be possible to take possession of the capital, destroy Napoléon's power there, and assemble both armies, if Napoléon should attempt to regain it, before he could get back to its relief. The plan was then unanimously agreed to by all present; but the Emperor, before finally adopting it, expressed a wish to communicate it to the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzberg (1), and for that purpose mounted his horse and rode off towards Vitry, accompanied by General Toll.

It is adopted by Schwartzberg and the King of Prussia.

It was on the high-road from Sommepeuy to Vitry, five miles from the former place, that the Emperor met the king of Prussia and Prince Schwartzberg, who were on their way to meet them. They all immediately dismounted, and ascending a knoll on the road-side, from whence Vitry and the whole adjacent plain were in view, the Emperor desired General Toll to unroll the map on the grass, and, leaning over it, explained Volkonsky's views, which he had now adopted as his own. The king and the prince at once assented to it; the former observing, that it entirely coincided with his own wishes: the latter, that he would indeed in this way lose his magazines at Chaumont, and would suffer for some time from the interruption of his communications; but that this evil, such as it was, had been already incurred, and that the proposed change of operations should meet with his cordial support. This was at eleven o'clock in the morning on the 24th of March, on a height within sight of Vitry, whither the troops were seen marching on all sides, over fields just beginning to put forth the first colours of restored nature. The sun shone with unclouded brilliancy; a balmy freshness succeeding to the long and dreary frost which had preceded it, softened the air, all nature seemed to be reviving under the breath of spring. Alexander, pointing in the direction of the capital, said aloud, "Let us all march to PARIS." These words were the DEATH-WARRANT OF THE REVOLUTION; twenty-five years after it had first begun by the convocation of the States-general, in March 1789; and exactly that day one year and nine months since, on 24th June 1812 (2), Napoléon, at the head of five hundred thousand men, had beheld, in the pride of apparently irresistible strength, his superb army cross the Niemen to invade the Russian territories (3).

(1) Dan. 287, 289.

(2) Dan. 288, 289. Burgh. 222, 225.

(3) The spot where these words were spoken, may be seen on a little knoll, on the right of the

Orders given for the march of the troops.

Although the resolution to march on Paris was thus formally adopted, it required some time before the necessary orders could be prepared, and a change of direction communicated to a hundred and eighty thousand men, who, over an extent of above seventy miles in breadth, overspread the plains of Champagne. Alexander and Schwartzenberg, with the King of Prussia, rode on to Vitry, where headquarters were established for the remainder of the day, and couriers were sent off in all directions with the requisite instructions to the commanders of corps. Shortly after the Emperor had taken up his quarters at Vitry, Chernicheff arrived with Blücher's advanced guard, and being immediately admitted to the Emperor, earnestly enforced the propriety of an immediate advance to Paris. "Ask Volkonsky," replied Alexander smiling, "what resolution we came to only half an hour ago." Meanwhile, the whole corps of the grand army were grouped around Vitry, with the exception of Giulay, who still remained in guard of the bridge of Arcis. The following orders were then issued. At daybreak on the next morning, the grand army was to march direct by the high-road through Fère-Champenoise to Meaux : while the Silesian army was to advance to the same place, from Chalons. The united armies were to advance direct from Meaux upon the capital, which it was expected they would reach by the 29th. Meanwhile a column of eight thousand horse, with forty-six pieces of horse artillery, under Winzingerode, was detached in the direction of St.-Dizier after Napoléon. His instructions were to detach Chernicheff with a large body of Cossacks to the right, towards Montierender, to observe the country between the Marne and the Aube ; and Tettenborn to the left towards Metz, to observe whether Napoléon was making any movement in the direction of that fortress. His grand object was to be to conceal the movements of the Allies from the French, and to give his own headquarters accurate information of the direction of Napoléon. The better to conceal what was going forward, Winzingerode received instructions every where to give orders for the reception of the Emperor of Russia. Flying detachments were at the same time sent out ; Kaisaroff and Sislavin to scour the country, the former to the southward, in the direction of Brienne and Montierender, the latter of Montmirail and Montereau, in order, if possible, to prevent any communication passing between Paris and the French Emperor. All the troops were directed to march in fighting order, all the battalions being in columns of attack. At three in the afternoon, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of cavalry, marched out of Vitry towards St.-Dizier ; soon all became quiet in the former town, where the Emperor Alexander's headquarters alone remained, and soon the sky was illuminated by the blaze of innumerable bivouacs along the banks of the Marne, where the rude warriors of the east reposed around their humble watch-fires (1).

Enthusiasm of the troops on advancing to Paris.

No words can convey an idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed throughout the whole Allied army, when, at daybreak on the 25th, it became evident, from the routes assigned to the different corps, that a general march on Paris had been resolved on. The joyful news spread from rank to rank, the transports of the soldiers rose to the highest pitch ; by a natural transition, their minds reverted to the days of their own humiliation ; to the disastrous days when, at the close of their long-continued retreat, they had, with bursting hearts, abandoned Moscow to the invader. The staff-officers who now wrote the march routes for the troops, were the

road from Somme-puy to Vitry.— *Personal Observation.*

(1) Dan. 291, 293. Burgh, 224, 225. Ploto, iii. 346, 349.

same as those who, in 1812, when Moscow was abandoned, had framed the same instructions for the army when it marched out by the Riazan road. The same hands which had then written Bogorodsk, Kassimoff, Serpukoff, and Podolsk, now put down Etoges, Epernay, Fère-Champenoise, and Ver-tus. An age seemed to have separated the two periods, yet were they only distant eighteen months! The Russian veterans, with the medal of 1812 on their bosoms, reverted to the dreadful war of 1812; they remembered the ghastly horrors of the field of Borodino, the circular night march round Moscow by the light of the burning capital; and mingled with the exulta-tion, shared with them by their younger comrades, a deeper spirit of thankfulness for the marvellous protection afforded by Providence to their country (1).

Judicious measures of Ertel in the rear of the Grand Army. Although serious disasters might have been expected from the irruption of Napoléon with his whole force on the communications of the grand army, yet the mischief done was by no means con-siderable. Such was the activity displayed by General Ertel, the head of the military police in the rear, that on the approach of the French he collected the wounded, regimental waggons, parks, and waggons of trea-sure, and retired to Chaumont, where the Emperor's baggage joined him. He then retreated towards Langres and Vesoul, with such regularity and expedition, that, with the exception of a pontoon train, some couriers, and twenty carts, hardly any thing was taken; while with the least hurt among the wounded he formed a corps at Altkirch, of six thousand men, which, daily augmented by the reinforcements coming up through Germany, soon became so considerable as not only to secure the depots from insult, but repressed every attempt at insurrection in the adjacent country. Nay, by the able dispositions of General Koller, the adjutant-general of the Austrian army, the capture of the magazines at Chaumont was prevented. Mean-while Winzingerode came up with Napoléon's rearguard at Tieblemont, with whom he had a skirmish, which confirmed Napoléon in the belief that the grand army was pursuing him; and conceiving now that all danger to Paris was averted, he sent orders to Marmont and Mortier, who were retiring towards the capital before the army of Silesia, to march through Vitry and join him there (2).

Movements of Marmont and Mortier. These two marshals had occupied the position assigned to them at Soissons and Reims, till the 18th March; when Blucher, having at length obtained from the Low Countries in his rear those sup-plies of provisions, from the want of which, ever since the battle of Laon, he had so grievously suffered (3), and having received intelligence of the departure of Napoléon to operate against Schwartzemberg on the Aube, made a forward movement, and crossed the Aisne, after some resistance, at Bery-au-Bac and the ford of Asfeld. Having thus accomplished the passage of the Aisne, the Prussian marshal detached his left wing, under Winzingerode, against Mortier at Reims, who, in no condition to contend with so formidable a force, evacuated it at his approach. Marmont, however, having joined him before he had got far from the town, it was resolved to reoccupy a post of such importance before it was taken possession of in strength by the enemy, and endeavour to make it good. It was held ac-cordingly that day, and Winzingerode was making preparations for an esca-

(1) Dan. 293.

(2) Dan. 293, 294. Burgh. 222.

(3) "I am struggling with the greatest want of provisions; the soldiers have been for some days

without bread; and I am cut off from Nancy, so that I have no means of procuring it."—BLUCHER to SCHWARTZENBERG, 17th March 1814; DANILEFSKY, 258.

lade; but in the night, Mortier again evacuated it, and the two marshals, retiring together, took a position, intending to accept battle at Fismès. Blücher, however, desirous of re-establishing his communications with the grand army, and of operating to the relief of Schwartzemberg, rather than the threatening of Paris, instead of advancing in pursuit of the two marshals, extended himself from Reims towards Eprenay and Vitry; while Marmont

March 20. and Mortier, abandoning Soissons to its own resources, with a garrison of three thousand men, resolved to keep the field as long as possible in

March 21. front of Compiègne. On the 21st, however, they received Napoléon's orders to join him in the environs of Vitry. Regretting then that they had so easily abandoned Reims, they had no alternative but to make the prescribed march by cross-roads to regain Château-Thierry, and endeavour to thread their devious way through the Allied columns, to join the Emperor on the banks of the Marne. They set out accordingly; but, meanwhile, General Vincent, who lay at Eprenay with seven hundred men, was attacked by Tattenborn with two regiments of Cossacks, and, after a stout resistance, driven out of the town with the loss of half his forces. Deeming, from this check, the great road by Eprenay strongly occupied, the marshals resolved to seek their way through by the other road, which passes by Etoges and Fère-Champenoise, little dreaming, that in so doing they would fall at once into the jaws of the grand army, which was advancing by that very road to the capital. Meanwhile, Blücher, despairing of being able, on his side, to prevent the junction of the two marshals with the Emperor, took the resolution of marching across from Reims, by Châlons to Vitry, to join the grand army; so that, by a singular combination of circumstances, the whole hostile armies were, by the separate resolutions of their chiefs, unknown to each other, concentrating into two masses in close proximity, and mutually crossing to effect that object; the Allies uniting from Vitry to Châlons, and marching toward Paris; the other striving for a point of rendezvous at Vitry, to carry the war towards the Rhine, but requiring, to effect that object, to pierce, with part of their force, through the heart of the Allied army (1).

Approach
of both ar-
mies to
Fère-
Champé-
noise.

The march of the two marshals met at first with no interruption; on the 22d they reached Montmirail, on the 23d Etoges, and on the 24th Vetry and Soude, where they rested for the night. Intelligence of the occupation of Châlons by the enemy, and of their converging towards Paris, here reached them; and Count Bordesoulle, with Marmont's advanced guard, even reported that at Coste he had fallen in with the advanced guard of the Bavarians belonging to Wrede's corps. The marshals gave no credit, however, to the information, being fully persuaded that the grand army was following on the trace of Napoléon; and they were not even wakened from their delusion by the vast illumination of the sky to the eastward, produced by the countless bivouacs of the now united Allied army, which was not eight miles distant. At daybreak on the 25th, both armies were in motion—the Allies marching towards Paris, the French from Paris towards Vitry—both on the same road. The common rendezvous of both Blücher and Schwartzemberg's troops was Fère-Champenoise. The two advanced guards came in sight of each other, near Soude-St.-Croix, at eight o'clock in the morning. Marmont's videttes hastily retired on seeing the masses which were approaching; and the marshal himself, now seriously alarmed, drew back to Sommesous, where he took up a position, and sent an urgent request to Mortier to come to his support. The latter marshal had

(1) Koch, ii. 93, 112. Vaud. ii. 270, 278. Burgh, 227, 228. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 187, 189.

encountered the cavalry of Doctoroff, forming the advanced guard of Blücher at Dommartin-l'Estree; and finding every avenue by which he could proceed blocked up by the enemy, he hastened to obey the summons, and, by a cross march, joined Marmont near Lenhare. Both corps then retreated, combating vigorously all the way; but the rapidly increasing numbers of the enemy, and the repeated charges of the Russian horse, threw them into a certain degree of confusion, and several guns had been lost before they reached Conantray, painfully toiling to gain the heights of FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE (1).

Battle of
Fère-Cham-
penoise.

The force of the two marshals was twenty-two thousand men, of whom nearly five thousand were horse, with eighty-four guns; of the Allied troops none but cavalry and artillery had yet got up; but they were very numerous, and embraced the flower of the Russian and Austrian army. Twenty thousand horse, including the cuirassiers and chevaliers of the guards, with a hundred and twenty-eight guns, thundered in close pursuit; and though the French cavalry gallantly struggled against the overwhelming odds by which they were assailed, and their infantry formed square and retreated at first with great regularity, yet, from the long continuance of the fight, and the necessity of constantly retiring when surrounded by the enemy's squadrons, they at last fell into confusion. Several squares were broken by the Russian chevalier guards and cuirassiers; the gallant French horse, who had just arrived from Spain, strove to disengage their comrades on foot, but they too were overthrown by a charge of the Russian and Austrian cuirassiers, headed by the Grand Duke Constantine and General Nostitz, who took twenty-four guns; Pahlen's horse, under Prince Eugène of Württemberg, captured twenty more; while another large body of cavalry appeared suddenly on their extreme left, and threatened to cut off their retreat. At the same time a violent storm of wind and rain arose, which, blowing right in the face of the French infantry, as it had done in that of the Austrians at Dresden (2), prevented great part of the muskets from going off. A sudden panic now seized the French army: horse, foot, and artillery, breaking their ranks, rushed in a tumultuous torrent towards Fère-Champenoise; vast numbers of guns and caissons were taken; and it was only the gallant countenance of a regiment of heavy cavalry, under the brave Le Clerc, which opportunely came up at the moment, and charging out of the town right through the fugitives, stopped the horse under Nostitz, which gave the two marshals time to reform their troops on the other side of its buildings, and with the approach of night saved them from total ruin (3).

Second
combat at
Fère-Cham-
penoise.

While these glorious and important successes were gained by the advanced guard, the emperor Alexander and the king of Prussia had left Vitry with Schwartzberg at nine in the morning, following the same great road by Soude-St.-Croix, Sommesous, and Conantray. They heard the distant firing as they approached Fère-Champenoise; and, hurrying forward to the front, at length reached that town just as the sun was about to set. Instead of halting there, the Emperor, accompanied by Schwartzberg and a slender suite, set out for the advanced posts, whence a dropping and receding fire was still to be heard. They had not proceeded far when they descried on the right a considerable body of troops, having in convoy a large train of artillery, who were moving for Fère-Champenoise. From the direction they were taking, and the circumstance of their advancing without hesitation towards that town when in the hands

(1) Dan. 307. 309. Burgh. 228, 229. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 270, 271. Vaud. ii. 277, 279.
(2) *Ante*, ix. p. 227.

(3) Dan. 307, 309. Koch, iii. Burgh. 229, 231. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 271, 272. Vaud. ii. 276, 281.

of the Allies, it was first thought to be part of Blücher's army; but they soon proved to be French, and were in effect General Paethod's division, in guard of a great convoy of guns and bread, which had been driven to this apparently unaccountable cross march, to avoid Blücher's advanced guard, with which, to their infinite astonishment, they had fallen in near Bierges, on the road to Vatry. Immediately forming his troops in square, with the convoy in the centre, Paethod had long and bravely resisted the impetuous charges of Generals Korff and Wassilehikoff, at the head of the best Russian horse of the army of Silesia. At length, perceiving the enemy's squadrons and artillery every moment thickening around him, he abandoned the convoy, harnessing its horses to the guns so as to double their complement (1), and was making his way by a flank movement across the fields to Fère-Champenoise, when he fell into the middle of the cavalry of the Russian and Prussian guards.

Heroic resistance,
and destruction
of the
French

As soon as Alexander was aware that this corps consisted of enemies, he took the most prompt measures to encompass them and accomplish their destruction. The Russian and Prussian cuirassiers of the guard were formed on their right: Korff's hussars, who had moved parallel to them in their cross march, in front; and Wassilehikoff's dragoons on their left and rear. Thus nine thousand chosen horse, supported by seventy guns, were ready to assail above six thousand infantry, without cavalry, and with only sixteen pieces of cannon. Having thus environed the enemy, Alexander, to prevent an useless effusion of blood, summoned the French general to surrender. Paethod, albeit sensible that escape was hopeless, nobly refused, and briefly haranguing his soldiers, exhorted them to die like brave men in defence of their country. Loud cheers followed the generous appeal, and immediately the firing began. Formed into squares, with the ammunition and carriages in the centre, they bravely began a rolling fire, still continuing to retreat towards Fère-Champenoise, and for some time repelled all the charges of the Russian horse. At length, however, the guns, one battery of which was under the immediate command of Lord Cathcart, to whom the Emperor, who was on the spot, had given its direction, were brought to bear upon them. Such was the deadly precision of their fire, that lanes were soon made in one of the squares, and the cavalry breaking in at the apertures, the whole were cut down or made prisoners. Meanwhile, the intelligence spread like wildfire through the Russian columns coming up, that the Emperor was in danger: with inconceivable ardour the troops rushed forward; hussars, light dragoons, hulans, and cuirassiers, came up at speed or full trot, and dark clouds of dust darkened the air, and at last thirteen thousand were on the field. Still the other squares of the French refused to surrender; they even fired on the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Rapatel, whom he had adopted as a legacy from Moreau, who fell dead on the spot; and Alexander, seeing there was nothing else to be done, gave the signal for a general charge. At the head of his chevalier guards, that brave prince threw himself upon the square, and dashed in at one of the openings made by the cannon; the guards, roused to the highest pitch by the presence and danger of their beloved Czar, followed with irresistible fury, and the square was penetrated on all sides. Still the French, with heroic resolution, refused to submit; some in tears, others almost frantic with indignation, kept firing till their last cartridge was exhausted; and Paethod, in the centre of the square, only

(1) Vaud. ii. 282, 284. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 273, 274. Lond. 287, 288. Dan. 313. Koch. iii. 388, 392.

surrendered his sword to the Emperor in person. Three thousand of the French, many of them national guards, fell nobly resisting on this fatal occasion: their historians justly lament that no monument is erected to their memory by their ungrateful country; let the first stone in the mausoleum of Fame be laid by their enemies (1).

Results of
these com-
bats.

The trophies of the battle of Fère-Champenoise were immense; seven thousand prisoners, two generals of division, four of brigade, eighty guns, two hundred ammunition waggons, with the whole of their convoy and baggage, fell into the hands of the Allies, whose loss did not exceed two thousand five hundred men. Mortier and Marmont were weakened in all by nearly eleven thousand men, and half their artillery; a dreadful loss to two weak corps, upon whom, in absence of the Emperor Napoléon, the defence of Paris had devolved. The captured generals were received with the most marked distinction and courtesy by the Emperor of Russia, who invited them immediately to his own table, and paid them the most deserved compliments on their valour. The action itself was remarkable for one circumstance, that it took place on a line of march, and that cavalry alone, with artillery, utterly broke and nearly annihilated two corps, consisting of as great numerical force as their assailants, and four-fifths of whom were infantry, with an adequate proportion of guns. The number of troops successively engaged on each side was about twenty-two thousand; and not a musket was fired on the part of the Allies, who, by the force of their cavalry and horse artillery alone, broke all the squares to which they were opposed, though formed in great part of veteran troops, and took or destroyed half their number. This remarkable fact is calculated to shake the confidence which military men by general consent, since the invention of fire-arms, have placed in the ability of infantry to resist the utmost efforts of cavalry in at all equal numbers, and may lead to a doubt whether the opinion of Napoléon is not the better founded—that cavalry still retains the superiority which it enjoyed in the days when the Numidian horse first gave Hannibal victory over the Romans at the Ticino and Cannæ, and afterwards at Zama gave Scipio the victory over Hannibal; that in equal numbers, and equally bravely led, it is still the most important force in war; and that the spread of the opposite opinion, since the decline of chivalry, has arisen from the circumstance of modern generals having never, from the cost with which it is attended, had the means of employing this formidable arm in adequate strength, or to an extent commensurate to the revolutions which in all other ages it has produced in the world (2).

These brilliant successes laid open to the Allied armies the road to Paris, now not more than sixty-five miles distant; and they lost no time in pressing

(1) Dan. 314, 316. Vaud. ii. 283, 285, 287. Lond. 287, 292. Burgh. 230, 231. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 273, 275. Plothe, iii. 375, 379. Koch, iii. 390, 392.

A romantic but melancholy incident occurred on this occasion, which deserves to be recorded. When Lord Londonderry, who was among the foremost in the charge, was in the midst of the *mêlée*, he perceived a young and beautiful French lady, the wife of a colonel, in a *calèche*, seized by three Bashkirs, who were proceeding to carry her off. The Englishman immediately rushed forward and rescued her from her lawless oppressors, and, delivering her in charge to his own orderly, directed her to be taken to his own quarters till a place of safety could be procured for her. The orderly accordingly

put her *en croupe*, and rode off towards Fère-Champenoise, which was in sight; but on the road he was attacked by a ferocious band of Cossacks, pierced through, and left for dead on the field; while the ruffians seized their victim, who was never more heard of, though the Emperor of Russia, who was greatly moved by the incident, made the utmost efforts to discover what had become of her.—MARQUIS LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany and France*, 288, 289.

(2) Lond. 292. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 275. Dan. 316, 317. Koch, iii. 390, 392.

"My decided opinion," said Napoléon, "is, that cavalry, supposing the men on both sides to be equal in number, equally brave, and equally well led, must always break infantry."—LAS CASES.

Retreat
and narrow
escape of
Marmont
and Mortier
to Paris.

forward to the goal. The reduced strength of Marmont and Mortier left these marshals no means of arresting the enemy; all that they could hope for was to retard his advance, to give the Emperor time to come up to their succour. Such, however, was the rapidity with which the Allied advanced guard followed upon their traces, that they had no time to take up a position, or to stop their march. The grand army marched at four in the morning, on the 26th, from Fère-Champenoise, on the direct road through Sézanne, to Paris, while Blucher advanced on two roads, from Vertus on Montmirail, and from Étoges on La Ferté-Gaucher. An attempt was made to arrive before the French at the latter point, so as to cut off their retreat; and it very nearly succeeded. The Prussians, under Kleist, had received orders to anticipate them at that important point, and their advanced guard had accomplished the task, and established themselves in so solid a manner, that all Mortier's efforts to force a passage proved ineffectual. Meanwhile the indefatigable Pahlen, who with the advanced guard of the grand army never lost sight of the enemy, was closely pursuing their rear-guard; and no sooner did he hear the firing at La Ferté-Gaucher, than foreseeing that they would endeavour to save themselves by a detour to the left, he quitted the high-road, and, crossing the fields rapidly, reached Maisonnolles, where the head of Mortier's columns had already begun to appear, who had sought this very outlet from otherwise inevitable destruction. Like Napoléon on the Berezina, the French marshals were on the eve of total destruction; and if Pahlen had been let alone they would have met it; for their troops, worn out and dejected, were in no condition to withstand the charge of the victorious Russian squadrons; and such had been their losses in artillery, the day before, that they had only seven pieces with them. From this hopeless state they were relieved by the ill-timed prudence of the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg, Pahlen's commander, who was seized with such apprehensions about his artillery being lost in the fields or cross-roads, that he ordered Pahlen to return to the highway, which the latter officer, burning with indignation at seeing the enemy thus permitted to escape, reluctantly obeyed (1). Overjoyed to see him retire, the French immediately drew off their troops from the attack on La Ferté-Gaucher, and defiling rapidly across fields to the left, reached Provins through Courtaçon. They were followed, however, by the advanced guard of Pahlen's Cossacks, and no sooner were the first spears discerned, than, rushing tumultuously out of Provins, they retired in haste to Nangis, from whence, without further loss, they reached the capital; Mortier through Guignes, and Marmont through Melun.

Splendid
appearance
of the Allied
army on the
march to
Paris.

Meanwhile, the innumerable host of the grand army, and the corps of Blucher, continued their march, without interruption, towards Paris. The Russians of Raieffsky's corps and the Wirtembergers led the van: then came the Austrians and Bavarians: behind them the guards and grenadiers, all marching along, or on either side of the highroad to Meaux. The columns of the army of Silesia were seen like a waving dark line to the right. Indescribable was the enthusiasm of the troops; magnificent the spectacle which the military pageant exhibited. The weather, which for some months before had been so severe and dreary, had now become beautiful, and the rays of the ascending sun were reflected from the glittering arms of the host. Every step was lightsome, joy beamed

(1) Dan. 320, 322. Burgh. 234, 236. Plut. iii. 284, 285. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 277, 279. Vaud. ii. 289, 297.

in every countenance, ardour glanced from every eye, and rendered this triumphant march truly magnificent. A flourish of martial music, the loud roll of the drums, and the louder cheers of the soldiers, announced the presence of the Emperor, as he rode successively up to every regiment. Several times he passed through the guards, and conversed with the generals and officers of corps, most of whom had been trained under his own eye; often he ascended an eminence on the roadside, to gaze on the interminable columns, as far as the eye could reach, which were all pressing forward to the completion of their mighty enterprize. "My children," said the Czar, "it is now but a step to Paris." "We will take it, father," they answered with loud cheers; "we remember Moscow (1)."

Attack on
Winzingerode
by
Napoléon.

Foreseeing that Napoléon would, in all probability, as soon as he received intelligence of the advance on Paris, endeavour to regain the capital by the circuitous rout of Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau, the greater part of the next night was employed by the Emperor in dispatching orders, in all directions, as well to Winzingerode as Chernicheff, and the other partizans who were to preserve the communications to the southward, to keep a vigilant look-out, and forward the earliest intelligence to headquarters of any movement on Napoléon's part of which they could receive advices. Meanwhile, however, Winzingerode himself, having borne the shock of the French Emperor's greatly superior forces, had suffered a severe defeat. Napoléon, as already mentioned, had rested on the 25th at Doulevant, extending his wings in all directions in order to spread alarm in the enemy's rear; and although Winzingerode was in sight of the rearguard, under Macdonald, yet with such diligence had the directions of Alexander been obeyed, that the reports constantly were, that they were followed by

March 25.

the whole Allied army, under the Emperor and Schwartzemberg in person. Meanwhile, the march of a body of French troops towards Chaumont, spread such terror in the rear, that the Emperor of Austria, Lord Aberdeen, Counts Razumoffsky and Stadion, and the whole *corps diplomatique* who lay there, were obliged to mount on horseback, and ride thirteen

March 26.

leagues, without drawing bridle, by cross-roads to Dijon. The alarm, swelling as it receded from the real point of danger, spread to the Rhine, where it was universally believed that the whole victorious French army was immediately to be upon them. But on the day following, Napoléon, uneasy at the account transmitted by Macdonald, that he saw only horse in the enemy's outposts, began to suspect that he was not in reality followed by the grand army, and gave orders for the troops to retrace their steps towards St.-Dizier. The reflux tide soon brought an overwhelming force on Winzingerode, who had meanwhile occupied St.-Dizier with five thousand horse: the remaining three thousand being detached to the front under Tettenborn to gain information (2).

His defeat. Tettenborn, seeing that he was about to have the whole of Napoléon's army upon his hands, sent word to Winzingerode to send him no reinforcements, as none he could send could enable him to keep his

(1) Dan. 322, 323.

"An incident occurred on this day, which was strikingly characteristic of the true magnanimity which warmed the bosom of this great man. On occasion of a deliberation the day before, he had said to Prince Volkonsky, in allusion to some apprehensions he had expressed of the amount of Napoléon's force, 'You always see the enemy double.' Musing on the displeasure of his sovereign, the prince was riding on, pensive and alone, No

sooner did the Emperor see him approach, than he called him to come near, and said publicly, in presence of the King of Prussia and a numerous suite, 'Je vous ai fait tort hier, et je vous demande publiquement pardon.' Napoléon, though greatly Alexander's superior in genius, could not have done this: he could conquer the world, but not subdue himself."—DANILEFSKY, 323.

(2) Faia, 187, 188. Vaud ii 314, 316. Dan 326, 327. Burgh. 262, 263. Koch, iii. 548, 550.

ground, and the troops coming up would only obstruct his retreat. Winzingerode, accordingly, drew up his troops in two lines, extending from St.-Dizier to the neighbourhood of Perthe, on the right bank of the Marne, hoping by this imposing array to gain time for Tettenborn's advanced guard to retire. The attack of the French, however, was so rapid, and with such overwhelming force, that there were no means whatever of either stopping or retarding it. Their troops deployed with incredible rapidity: column after column descended from the neighbouring plateau into the valley of the Marne: powerful batteries were erected on all the eminences, which sent a storm of round-shot and bombs through the Allied ranks; and under cover of this fire, the French infantry, cavalry, and artillery crossed the Marne at the fort of Hallignicourt, and forthwith fell on Tettenborn, who was speedily routed, and driven with great loss towards Vitry. Winzingerode's main body was next assailed by ten thousand French cavalry, supported by a large body of infantry; while the succeeding columns of the army, stretching far as the eye could reach, presented the appearance of an interminable host. The Russian horse were unable to resist the shock; they had time only to fire a few as round; in a few minutes cavalry and artillery were fairly routed. In utter confusion the Russian horse now made for the road to Bar-le-Duc, where Benkendorff, with a regiment of dragoons and three of Cossacks, with some guns, had taken up a good position, flanked by an impassable morass. By the firm countenance of the brave rearguard, the pursuit was checked; and Winzingerode gained time to reform his men, and continue his retreat to Bar-le-Duc without further molestation, from whence next day he retired to Châlons. The French loss in this brilliant affair did not exceed seven hundred men, while the Allies were weakened by two thousand, of whom five hundred were made prisoners, and nine pieces of cannon (1).

Napoléon learns of the Allied advance to Paris and sets out after them. This was the last gleam of sunshine which fortune bestowed upon the conqueror who had so long basked in her smiles; henceforth he was involved in one disaster after another, till he was precipitated from the throne. In the first moment of triumph, after his success at St.-Dizier, he ordered a strong body of troops to approach Vitry; and as the commandant refused to surrender, he marched there next day himself, and ordered a hundred and twenty guns to be planted against it, and threatened in a few hours to reduce the town to ashes. He soon, however, received intelligence which gave him more serious subject of meditation. From the prisoners taken on the field, he learned that Winzingerode's corps consisted only of cavalry and horse artillery, with a few battalions of light infantry, drawn from the garrison of Vitry; and immediately after some peasants came up from Fère-Champenoise with full details of the march of the Allied armies towards Paris, and the disastrous combat which had taken place there two days before, between the retreating marshals and their cavalry. The veil now dropped from before his eyes; all doubt was at end: it was all but certain that the Allies, full three days' march ahead, would be in Paris before him. "Nothing but a thunderbolt," said he, "can save us;" and immediately drawing off his whole troops and guns from before Vitry, he retired with his staff to St.-Dizier, where he shut himself up in his cabinet, and spent the whole night in intently studying the maps. He resolved, after much consideration, instead of pursuing his movement on the Rhenish and frontier fortresses, to return

(1) Dan, 32b, 330, Burgh. 263, 264. Vaud. ii. 315, 318. Koch, iii. 553.

forthwith to Paris; and to avoid the Allied army, which lay between, he chose the road by Doulevant, Vassy, Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau (1). Orders to that effect were immediately given, and by daybreak on the morning of the 28th, all the army was in motion by Doulevant for Troyes.

Passage of
the Marne
by the
Allies.

Meanwhile the Allies were not idle. No force capable of even retarding their advance to the capital existed in the field; and they met with little interruption except at the passage of the

Marne. The grand army of Silesia approached this river, which lay directly across their advance to Paris. Count Compans and General Vincent, with five thousand men, were retiring before them, and, like good soldiers, they broke down the bridges over the river, and took post on the opposite bank,

March. 27. at Trilpost and Meaux, to dispute the passage. General Emmanuel, with the advanced guard of the army of Silesia, soon came up and established a bridge of pontoons under the fire of artillery; the Cossacks crossed over, for the most part, by swimming their horses, and soon the bridge groaned under the weight of five Prussian regiments, which, with the Russian horse, instantly attacked the enemy, drove them back into Meaux, and, following close on their heels, expelled them from that town. Two bridges were immediately established at Trilpost, and one at Meaux; and the whole

March 28. of the 28th was employed in transporting the immenses masses and convoys of both armies, which, according to the plan concerted, here united, to the right bank of the river. The Emperor then reviewed Sacken's corps, and publicly thanked them for the extraordinary energy and valour they had displayed since the commencement of the campaign. Their diminished numbers, for they were now only six thousand out of twenty thousand who had crossed the Rhine, as well as the bronzed countenances and tattered garments of the men (2), told the desperate nature of the service which they had gone through. But though their clothes and equipments were worn out, their arms were clean and in good condition, and the artillery train in perfect working order, though the fracture of an enemy's ball was often supplied by the wheel of a farmer's cart.

Alexander's
efforts to
preserve
discipline
in the army.

The Allies had now entered a rich champaign country, adorned with woods, villas, orchards, smiling fields, and all the charming indications of long-established prosperity. It therefore not only abounded with resources of all kinds for the use of the troops, but offered almost irresistible temptations to the violence and marauding of conquest. This was more especially to be dreaded in a host such as that which now approached Paris, consisting of the soldiers of six different nations, extending from the Rhine to the wall of China, many of them of lawless and half savage habits, all smarting under the recollection of recent wrongs and unbearable oppression. True to the noble principles on which he had throughout maintained the contest, Alexander immediately issued a proclamation to his soldiers, enjoining the strictest discipline, and forbidding any supplies to be obtained for the troops, but through the intervention of the mayor and local authorities (3). Not satisfied with this, he addressed with his own

(1) Fain, 193, 196. Dan. 330, 332. Burgh. 265, 266. Vaud. ii. 319, 321.

(2) Dan. 335, 336. Burgh. 334, 335. Viet. et Couq. xliii. 280, 281. Vaud. ii. 296, 299.

(3) "It is the immutable will of his majesty the Emperor, that the troops under your command should observe the strictest discipline, and on no account whatever leave their bivouacs to go into the villages; and that their wants, such as fire,

wood, straw, should not be supplied otherwise than through the intervention of the mayor. You cannot but be aware how much the good conduct of our troops in the present circumstances may influence the common success; and therefore his majesty will hold you personally responsible for the execution of this order."—ALEXANDER'S *Circular Order*, 25th March 1814; DANILEVSKY, 334.

hand a circular to the commanders of corps belonging to the other nations, earnestly entreating them to take every possible means to preserve the strictest discipline among their troops (1). The effect of these measures, not less politic than humane, was immense. A vast crowd of peasantry indeed, inspired with terror, with their horses and cattle, at first fled into Paris, before the columns of the Allied army; but it was soon discovered that order was preserved by the invaders; and, ere long, they remained at home, gazing with amazement at the endless columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which, for days together, defiled past them towards the capital. After the repeated accounts which had been published of the defeat and ruin of the Allied armies, it was with unbounded astonishment that they beheld the interminable extent of their hosts; they admired the superb array of the guards, the dazzling cuirasses of the horsemen, the formidable trains of artillery; and shuddered when they gazed on the long and desultory array of Cossacks and Bashkirs sweeping by, speaking uncouth tongues, singing oriental songs, giving fearful token of that vast moral revolution which had thus brought the children of the desert into the heart of European civilization (2).

First sight of Paris by the Allied army. As the Allied troops approached Paris, the resistance of Marmont and Mortier's retiring corps, which had now completed their round-about march by Nangis and Melun, and again interposed between the invaders and the capital, was again felt. Compans' division did not evacuate the forest of Bondy till it had been turned on all sides, and after some sharp firing. Thence the sovereigns inclined to the left, and ascended an eminence on the roadside by a path through brushwood. The sun had just set; a cool breeze refreshed the air; there was not a cloud in the sky. All at once, on the right, the buildings of Montmartre appeared, and the stately edifices of PARIS burst upon the view. Indescribable was the sensation which this sight produced. From rank to rank, from mouth to mouth, the thrilling words passed; in a few seconds the electric shock was felt as far as the eye could reach in the columns; and all breaking their order, hurried forward to the front, and crowded up the ascent. The last rays of the sun were still illuminating the dome of the Invalids, the summit of the Pantheon yet reflected his beams; while they gazed, the light ceased, and darkness began to overspread the massy structures of the capital. Forgotten in an instant were the fatigues of the campaign; wounds, fallen brothers, lost friends, were as nothing; one only feeling, that of exultation, filled every bosom; one only emotion, that of gratitude, swelled every heart. After inhaling, during several minutes, the entrancing spectacle, the Allied Sovereigns, slow and pensive at the very magnitude of their triumph, descended from the height, and proceeded to Bondy, the last post station before Paris, where they passed the night (3).

Extreme agitation in Paris during this period.

And what was the state of Paris—of the great Revolutionary Capital—when the danger could no longer be concealed; when crowds of peasants, flying before the foe, beset the barriers in trembling

(1) "At the moment we are approaching Paris, it is only by the strictest subordination among the troops that we can hope to obtain the important results we have in view. You were one of the first to be convinced of the necessity of gaining over the affections of the inhabitants of Paris to the cause we are defending; but shall we be acting on this conviction, if the villages round Paris be left a prey to plunderers, instead of finding protection in our armies? I earnestly entreat of you to use every

possible means to prevent acts of violence. Every commander of a corps, or detachment, should be made personally responsible for whatever disorder may be committed. Your active exertions on this occasion will secure you the general gratitude, and double the high respect I entertain for you."—ALEXANDER to MARSHAL COUNT WREDE, *March 26, 1814*; DANILEFSKY, 334, 335.

(2) Dan. 334, 335. Lab. ii. 349. Cap. x. 440.

(3) Dan. 338, 339.

agitation; when the rattle of musketry was already heard in the plain of St.-Denis, and the resplendent illumination of the eastern sky told the affrighted inhabitants that the forces of banded Europe slept round watch-fires at their gates? Fearful indeed, for eight-and-forty hours, had been the note of preparation within its walls. In vain the agents of the police spread proclamations, assuring the people that the Allies would never venture to attack the immortal city; that its means of defence were invincible; that five hundred guns were ready to spread death among the foe; and that it would be sufficient simply to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man (1). These high-sounding expressions could not conceal the real facts which were before their eyes; they could not make the citizens blind to the endless crowd of peasants in consternation, which defiled in confusion along the Boulevards, conveying with them their wives, their children, their horses and cattle, into the last asylum of the capital. The extreme orders which the more violent of the Jacobin emissaries promulgated in the name of the Emperor, that they should arm the populace, burn the suburbs, destroy the bridges, barricade the streets, and if necessary retire to the south of the Seine, there to defend themselves to the last extremity, till the arrival of the heads of his columns, augmented the general consternation. Universal spoliation, conflagration, and massacre, were anticipated from such letting loose of the long pent-up passions of the Revolution. The banks were closed, the shops shut up; every one hid his most valuable moveables; vast quantities of plate and treasure were buried; the gaming-houses were stopped; and, what had been unknown in the bloodiest days of the Revolution, *the theatres were empty*. Preparations were at length making by the government, but they were of a kind to increase rather than diminish the terrors of the people; six thousand troops of the line, and twenty thousand national guards, were reviewed in the Place Carrousel, and marched along the quays; but the gloomy aspect of the soldiers, the long trains of artillery which traversed the streets, the distant thunder of the enemy's cannon, the ceaseless torrent of disorderly peasants flying before the invaders, which streamed over the Boulevards, and the wounded and dying who were brought in from the advanced posts, told but too plainly that war in all its horrors was fast approaching the mighty capital (2).

Deliberation in the Council of State, as to whether the Empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris. In the midst of the general consternation the Council of State was summoned to deliberate on the grave question, whether or not the Empress and the King of Rome should remain in Paris to await the fate of arms, or be withdrawn to a place of safety beyond the Loire. The minister of war, Clarke, briefly unfolded the military situation of the capital, its troops of the line, artillery, and national guards, who could be assembled for its defence. The forces of the Allies were estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand men; and in these circumstances the minister declared he could not answer for the safety of the Empress and her son. Various opinions as to what should be done

(1) "The Allies regard the pillage and destruction of the capital as the recompense and end of their invasion; they already make a boast of having entered it without resistance—of having sacked it; and they propose to send off the *élite* of its workmen, of its artisans, of its artists, to the depths of Russia, to people their deserts, and then they will set fire to all the quarters of the town. But, with what hope of success can they enter Paris? What would become of them in the midst of an immense population, armed, inflamed, and resolute to defend

itself? Paris contains twenty thousand horses, which might convey to the heights five hundred pieces of cannon. It would be easy to barricade the streets, and to offer at every point an invincible resistance. It would be enough even to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man! No! The Allies will never approach Paris!"—*Affiche, Paris, 29th March 1814*; BRAUCHAMPS, ii. 191, 192.

(2) BEAUCH. ii. 191, 194. LAB. ii. 349, 350. CAP. x. 440.

followed this exposition. Boulay de la Meurthe, an old republican, proposed that they should convey the Empress to the Hôtel-de-Ville, and show her to the people in the faubourgs, holding her infant in her arms; that now was the time to display the heroism of Maria Theresa. Savary expounded the means which he could put in motion for rousing the masses; and Molé combated this opinion by observing, "that the greatest of all errors, if resistance was determined on, would be to leave Paris without a government—that, left to themselves, they would speedily abandon the Emperor." To this opinion Talleyrand assented. Clarke insisted "that it was a mistake to consider Paris as the centre of the imperial power: that the power of the sovereign would follow him every where; and as long as a village remained in France unoccupied by the enemy, that was his capital." On the vote being taken, nineteen out of twenty-three voted for making the contest a popular one, and transporting the Empress and the seat of the government, as in the days of the League, to the Hôtel-de-Ville. When then this division was made known, Joseph produced an express order from the Emperor, dated from Reims not a fortnight before, to the effect, that in no event should they permit the Empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy; that if the Allies approached Paris with forces plainly irresistible, the Empress, with the King of Rome and the great dignitaries of the empire, should be removed to the other side of the Loire: in fine, that he would rather see his son in the Seine than in the hands of the enemy (1). This precise and definitive order, which provided for the very case which had occurred, put an end to all deliberation; and it was arranged that Joseph should remain to direct the defence of the capital but that the principal officers of state should accompany the Empress and the King of Rome beyond the Loire (2).

Mournful
scene at
the depar-
ture of the
Empress.
March, 29.

The departure of the Empress took place next day, and completed the discouragement of the inhabitants of Paris. A great crowd assembled at the Place Carrousel, when the carriages came to the door at daybreak; and though none ventured openly to arraign the orders of government, yet many were the condemnations uttered in private at the timid policy which virtually abandoned the capital to the enemy, by withdrawing those whose presence was most calculated to have preserved authority, and stimulated resistance among its inhabitants. The King of Rome, though only three years of age, cried violently when they came to take him away: he exclaimed that they were betraying his papa, and clung to the curtains of his apartment with such tenacity, that it required all the influence of his governess, Madame de Montesquieu, to induce him to quit his hold. He was still in tears when he was carried down to the carriage of the Empress. Marie Louise was calm and resigned, but deadly pale. At eleven o'clock in the morning the mournful procession set out, and, defiling by the quay of the river, took the road for Rambouillet. The long train of carriages passed slowly along, amidst the tears of a large body of people, while the thunder of the cannon was already heard from

(1) "You are in no event to permit the Empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy; I am about to manoeuvre in such a manner, that you may possibly be several days without hearing from me. Should the enemy advance upon Paris with such forces as to render all resistance impossible, send off in the direction of the Loire the Empress, the King of Rome, the great dignitaries, the ministers, the officers of the senate, the president of the council of state, the great officers

of the crown, and the treasure. Never quit my son; and keep in mind that I would rather see him in the Seine than in the hands of the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, a prisoner in the hands of the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most deplorable in history."—*NAPOLÉON to JOSEPH, Reims, 16th March 1814; CAPEFIGUE, x. 443, 444.*

(2) *Thib. ix. 617, 618. Cap. x. 442, 444. Savary, vi. 344, 345.*

the direction of St.-Denis. Terror now froze every heart; all felt that resistance was hopeless, and that nothing remained but to make the best terms that could be obtained from the victors (1).

Descrip-
tion of
Paris as a
military
station.

Paris, now almost as well known as London to every person in England, whether male or female, who has received a liberal education, may not be equally familiar in future times, or in other countries; and even to those who know it best, it is never irksome to read a description of a city in which some of the happiest days of their life have been spent. Situated on both banks of the Seine, the French metropolis is as favourably adapted for external defence as for internal ornament and salubrity. From Mount Valerian on the west, to the fortress of Vincennes on the east, it is protected by a line of hills running on the northern bank of the Seine, and presenting a natural fortification against an enemy approaching from the north or east, the quarter from which danger is principally to be apprehended. Clichy, Romainville, Belleville, the plateau of Chaumont, Montmartre, are the names which have been affixed to this ridge; and although not strengthened by field-works, yet these natural advantages constituted a very formidable line of defence. The ridge is about three miles and a half in length, and the woods, orchards, gardens, villas, and enclosures with which it is covered, rendered it in a peculiar manner susceptible of defence by a body of militia or national guards, who might be unequal to a combat with regular forces in the open field. The plain of St.-Denis, between Montmartre and Romainville, extends up to the gates of the capital; but it is enfiladed on either side by the guns from those elevated heights, the fire of batteries on which, intersecting each other, rendered all access by the great road from St.-Denis impossible, till the summits were carried. Montmartre, a conical hill which rises to a considerable height, and is nearly covered with buildings, presented, if adequately furnished with cannon, a most formidable object of attack; but the positions of Chaumont, Belleville, and Menilmontant, were less compact and more open to a flank attack. The whole defence of the capital, however depended on the possession of these heights: if they were taken, Paris was at the mercy of the conqueror. Bombs from Montmartre and Chaumont would carry as far as the Rue Montblanc, and into the very heart of the city; the old ramparts had long since been converted into shady walks, well known as the principal scene of enjoyment in the capital; and the barriers on the principal roads, connected together by a brick wall, presented the means only of preventing smuggling, or aiding the efforts of the police, but could oppose no resistance whatever to the attack of regular soldiers (2).

Descrip-
tion of the
buildings
of Paris.

What chiefly strikes a stranger on his first arrival in Paris, is the extraordinary variety and beauty of the public edifices. The long-established greatness of the French sovereigns, the taste for architecture which several of them possessed, and the durable materials of which the capital is built, have conspired, in a long succession of ages, to store it with a series of public and private edifices, which are not only for the most part exceedingly imposing in themselves, but in the highest degree interesting, from the picture they present of the successive change of manners, habits, and taste, during the long lifetime of the monarchy. From the stately remains of the baths of Julian, now devoted to the humble purpose of a cooper's warehouse in the faubourg St.-Germain, to the recent magnificent structures projected by Napoléon, and executed by the Bourbons, it exhi-

(1) Sav. vii. 1, 3. Thib. ix. 618, 619. Cap. x. 443.

(2) Personal observation. Koch, iii. 415, 429. Viet. et Conq. xxiii. 283, 284.

bits an unbroken series of buildings, still entire, erected during fifteen centuries, connecting together the ancient and modern world, and forming, like Gibbon's History of Rome, a bridge which spans over the dark gulf of the middle ages. The towers of Notre Dame, which rise amidst the austerity of Gothic taste, and are loaded with the riches of Catholic superstition; the Hôtel de Ville, the florid architecture of which recalls the civil wars of the Fronde and the League; the Marais, with its stately edifices, carrying us back to the rising splendour of the Bourbon princes; the Louvre, which witnessed the frightful massacre of Charles IX.; the Pont Neuf, which bears the image of Henry IV; the Tuileries breathing at once the splendour of Louis XIV, and the sufferings of his martyred descendant; the Place Louis XV, which beheld in succession the orgies of royalty and the horrors of the Revolution; the column of the Place Vendôme, which perpetuates the glories of Napoléon—present a series of monuments unequalled in interest by any other city of modern Europe, and which may possibly to future ages exceed even the attractions of the Eternal City itself. Every step in Paris is historical; the shadows of the dead arise on every side; the very stones breathe. The streets in the old part of the town are narrow, and consequently, perhaps, unhealthy; but their straitness only renders them the more imposing, their buildings being always seen in rapid perspective; and the old stone piles, often five stories in height, some of them contemporary with the Crusades, seem to frown with contempt on the modern passenger. It was in these narrow streets, the focus of the Revolution, that the great bulk of the inhabitants, estimated in all at that period at six hundred thousand souls, dwelt. On the banks of the river a wider space is seen—light arches span the limpid stream, and long lines of pillared scenery attest the riches and taste of a more refined age. Nor is the beauty of architectural monuments inferior to the interest of ancient associations; the colossal proportions, and yet delicate finishing, of the arch of Neuilly; the exquisite peristyle of the church of the Madeleine; the matchless façade of the Louvre; the noble portico of the Pantheon; the lofty column of Austerlitz, will ever attract the cultivated in taste from every quarter of Europe, even after the political greatness of France has declined, and its glories exist only in the records of historic fame (1).

Forees of
the French
on the line
of defence.

The troops which remained at the disposal of Joseph, for the defence of the heights of Paris, were very inconsiderable, and altogether inadequate to the defence of so extensive a position. The National Guard, indeed, was thirty thousand strong, but not more than half of this number were armed; and they were, for the most part, absorbed in the guarding of the twelve barriers of the city, or the service of the interior; so that not more than five thousand were available for service on the external defences. Marmont commanded the right, which rested on Belleville and Chaumont, with detachments on all the points susceptible of defence, as far as Vincennes; and Mortier the left, which extended between the canal of Ourcq and Montmartre, across the great road from St.-Denis, with posts as far as Neuilly. It was easy to foresee that the weight of the contest would be around the hill of Montmartre, and the *buttes* of Chaumont, and it was there, accordingly, that the main strength of the enemy was placed. The wreck of fifteen divisions stood on the line of defence, which, in former days, would

(1) Personal observation.

They may well put the architects of England to the blush, for the painful inferiority which the modern structures of London exhibit. The modern structures, observe—Nothing worthy of the nation

has been built in public edifices in London in our time. Compare St.-Paul's or Westminster Abbey with the National Gallery, and say whether we have not fallen from a race of giants to a brood of pigmies.

have contained at least ninety thousand combatants; but so wasted had they been under the dreadful campaigns of the last two years, that they could not now muster more than twenty thousand infantry and six thousand horse. In Marmont's wing, the skeletons of seventy battalions were required to make up eight thousand men. Their air was firm, but sad: they were resolved to lay down their lives for their country; but they knew the enemy they had to combat, and were aware it would be in vain. Including the National Guards who were without the barriers, and all the depots which had been brought forward, not more than thirty-five thousand men took part in the defence; but they were supported by a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, fifty-three of which were of position, some on the extreme right being manned by the young men of the Polytechnic school. Of the Allies, a hundred thousand men were in line, and ready to take part in the attack; the remainder of the force being left behind on the Marne, at Trilpost and Meaux, to guard the communications and keep an eye on the movements of Napoléon. That great commander, as already mentioned, had projected the erection of powerful fortifications on the heights now threatened by the Allies, after his return from Austerlitz in 1806 (1), and had been only prevented by the dread of awakening the Parisians from their slumber of security under the shadow of the glory of the Great Nation. Memorable warning! How often is national security endangered, or national existence shortened, by heedless pride or shortsighted economy obstructing the sagacious foresight, requiring present sacrifice in money or vanity, of prophetic wisdom (2)!

Joseph, on the 29th, issued a spirited proclamation to his troops and the inhabitants of Paris, in which he exhorted them to combat bravely to maintain their ground until the arrival of the Emperor, who might be hourly expected (3). Schwarzenberg, on his part, with the approbation of the Allied sovereigns, issued a remarkable proclamation to the inhabitants of Paris, in which the precise language was used which Louis XVI, two-and-twenty years before, had recommended to the Allied sovereigns as the only tone which was likely to vanquish the Revolution, by declaring war on it, but not on France; but which had been then and since unaccountably forgotten amidst the ambition and separate interests of the potentates who composed the alliance (4). The allusions in this procla-

(1) *Ante*, vii. 179.

(2) Vaud. ii. 310, 313, 328. Koch, iii. Burgh. 238. Dan. 347, 348. Plotoh. iii. 403, 404.

(3) "Citizens of Paris! A column of the enemy has advanced to Meaux. It approaches by the road of Germany; but the Emperor follows it closely at the head of a victorious army. The Council of the Regency has provided for the safety of the Empress and the King of Rome. I remain with you. Let us arm to defend our capital—its monuments, its riches, our wives, our children, all that is dear to us. Let this great city become a camp for a few instants; and let the enemy find his shame under those walls which he hopes to pass in triumph. The Emperor marches to our succour: second him by a brief and vigorous resistance, and we shall preserve the honour of France."—TRIBAUDEAU, ix. 619-620.

(4) *Ante*, i. 195.

"Inhabitants of Paris! The Allied Armies are under your walls. The object of their march to the capital of France is founded on the hope of a sincere and durable pacification with her. For twenty years Europe has been deluged with blood and tears. Every attempt to put an end to these calamities has proved vain; for this reason, that in the very government which oppresses you, there has been found an insurmountable obstacle to peace.

Who among you is not convinced of this truth? The Allied sovereigns desire to find in France a beneficent government, which shall strengthen her alliance with all nations; and therefore, in the present circumstances, it is the duty of Paris to hasten the general pacification. We await the expression of your opinion, with a degree of impatience proportioned to the mighty consequences which must result from your determination. Declare it; and you shall at once find defenders in the armies standing before your walls. Parisians! the state of France, the proceedings of the inhabitants of Bordeaux, the peaceable occupation of Lyons, and the real sentiments of your countrymen, are known to you. In these examples you will find the end of war and domestic discord: it is to be found nowhere else. The preservation of your city and of your tranquillity, shall be the object of the prudent measures which the Allies will not fail to take, in concert with such of your authorities as enjoy the general confidence. Troops shall not be quartered upon you. Such are the sentiments with which Europe, arrayed before your walls, now addresses you. Hasten to justify her confidence in your patriotism and prudence."—See DANILEVSKY, 345, 346, and CARRÉIGUE, x. 458.

mation to the insatiable spirit of conquest with which all the governments of France for twenty years had been animated, and to the facility with which peace might be obtained, on honourable terms, by France, and to the example of Bordeaux, where Louis XVIII had already been proclaimed, pointed, not obscurely, to a restoration of the exiled princes as the sole condition on which, since the rupture of the negotiations at Chatillon, the Allies considered it possible that a pacification could be effected. They had already erected the conquered districts into a sort of province with the direction of which the Count d'Artois, who was at Vesoul, was entrusted. The proclamation, with a proposal for the capitulation of Paris, was sent to the French advanced posts; but the French marshals, like brave men, rejected it, and resolved to maintain their post to the last extremity (1).

At two in the morning of the 30th March the *générale* beat in all the quarters of Paris, to summon the National Guard to assemble at their different points of rendezvous. One-and-twenty years had elapsed since, at the same hour, it had called them, amidst the clang of the tocsin, to muster for the defence of the throne on the 10th August 1793; they had then failed at the decisive moment—they had basely surrendered their sovereign to an infuriated rabble, and abandoned the nation to the government of the multitude (2). They now had their reward: they were to witness the degradation and punishment of their country; the iron was to enter into the soul of France. Bravely, however, they repaired to their posts, amidst the tears of their wives and children, who never expected to see them more. Hardly had the clock in the church of St.-Denis struck five in the morning, when the anxious eyes from the summit of the heights of Romainville discovered several dark masses appearing beyond Pantin, on the road to Meaux. Still not a gun was fired on either side; the level glance of the sun illuminated the peaceful slopes of Romainville, and the gilded dome of the Invalides was only beginning to lighten before his rays. Suddenly the discharge of artillery was heard on the right; the dark mass quickly became edged with fire; and soon the roar of several hundred pieces of cannon announced to the trembling inhabitants of the capital that the last day of the Revolution had arrived. Raieffsky, supported by the reserves of Barclay, was charged with the attack of the French centre, between Pantin and Vincennes, and especially the heights of Belleville; the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg, supported by Giulay's Austrians on the left, was to assail the bridges of the Marne at St.-Maur and Charenton, to clear the wood of Vincennes, blockade the castle, and threaten the Barrière du Trône. On the right the army of Silesia was to advance on Montmartre on two sides; Count Langeron from Clichy and St.-Denis; Kleist, D'York, and Woronzoff, on the Allied left, from the villages of La Villette and La Chapelle. Above a hundred thousand men were destined to co-operate in the attack, but they did not all arrive in action at the same time; the weight of the contest long fell on Raieffsky and Barclay alone in the centre, and thence the unlooked-for continuance and bloody nature of the strife (3).

At six in the morning the firing of musketry began in the centre, by Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg, with his division, issuing from the village of Pantin; while Raieffsky himself, with Gortchakoff's infantry and Pahlen's cavalry, advanced direct on Romainville. Marmont, however, convinced of the error which had been committed in not occupying

(1) Dan. 345, 346. Cap. x. 438, 439. Burgh. 234. 237, 238. Koch, iii, 451, 452. Vict. et Conq. xxiii.

(2) *Ante*, i. 204.

292, 294.

(3) Dan. 348, 349. Vaud. ii. 330, 331. Burgh.

these villages the evening before, was advancing to occupy them with Boyer's division of the Young Guard, when he met Prince Eugène's Russians on an eminence a little beyond Pantin. A furious conflict immediately commenced, which soon extended to Romainville : the numbers were equal, the resolution and skill on the opposite sides well matched ; and so bloody was the combat, that in a short time fifteen hundred of the Russians had fallen. Mortier, finding he was not attacked, sent two divisions to aid Marmont, and with their aid the Russian cuirassiers were routed, and Prince Eugène driven back, still bravely fighting, into the villages. Feeling himself unequal to such a conflict for any considerable time, he wrote to Barclay urgently requesting assistance (1) ; and shortly afterwards Raieffsky, having completed his circular march, commenced operations on the left : his infantry carried Montreuil, and his cavalry pushed on to Charron, nearly in the rear of the Young Guard at Romainville, which checked the advance of Marmont's victorious division, but still decided nothing. It was now eight o'clock, and the Emperor of Russia had just arrived on the field of battle, uncertain of the force of the enemy, or of the probable time of Napoléon's approach ; he learned with dismay that Blucher's forces had not yet reached the neighbourhood of Montmartre—that the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg and Giulay were still far behind on the left—and that Raieffsky was overmatched, and his men fast falling in the centre. Instantly perceiving the danger, the Emperor immediately ordered Barclay to bring up the grenadiers, and Russian and Prussian guards, to the support of Raieffsky ; and soon these noble troops were seen marching in double quick time on the road to Pantin (2).

The Emperor brings up the Guards, which restores the battle there. Their arrival at the scene of danger speedily changed the state of affairs. Prince Eugène, long oppressed by superior numbers, now in his turn had the advantage. General Mesenzoff advancing at the head of three Russian divisions of the guards, supported Raieffsky ; and their united force, finding that it was impossible to advance in the plain till the heights were carried, from the summit of which the French guns vomited forth death on all sides, made a general attack on the wooded hills of Romainville, which were carried after a most desperate conflict, the French who occupied them, being driven back to the heights in the rear of Menilmontant and Belleville. At the same time, as the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg had not yet come up, Count Pahlen pushed forward a body of his dragoons towards Vincennes, who, meeting with no opposition, approached the Barrière du Trône, where twenty guns, manned by the scholars of the Polytechnic school, received them with a point-blank discharge. Hardly, however, was the first round over, when the Russian hulans made a dash in flank at the guns, which were taken, with the gallant youths who served them ; and the seizure of the gate itself was only prevented by the national guard, who checked the pursuit (3). Meanwhile Barclay having, by the aid of the guards and grenadiers, at length dislodged the enemy from the heights of Pantin and Romainville, gave orders to suspend the attack in the centre, until the arrival of the army of Silesia on the right, and the corps of Giulay and the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg on the left, enabled the whole army to take the parts assigned them in the battle (4).

(1) His words were—"The second corps is ready and willing to be sacrificed : think of us, and help us." Barclay answered—"Many thanks for your resolution : the grenadiers are prepared to reinforce you."—DANILEFSKY, 352.

(2) Dan. 353, 354. Vaud. ii. 332, 334. Viet. et Conq. xxiii. 296, 297. Burgh. 240. Koch. iii. 453, 460, 471.

(3) One of these boys was overthrown into a ditch, where a Cossack had his spear uplifted to pierce him, when a Russian lancer, touched with his youth and valour, staid his arm, saying, ' Pas tuer jeune Français.' Koch, iii. 472.

(4) Dan. 355, 356. Burgh. 241. Koch, iii. 461, 464. Vaud. ii. 334, 336. Plotho, iii. 404, 406.

Appearance of the army of Silesia on the right. At eleven o'clock, standards and armed bodies of men were seen by the anxious crowds who thronged the heights of Montmartre around St.-Denis, which soon, widening and extending, moved steadily forward, till, like a huge black wave, they overspread the whole plain which stretches from thence to the capital. It was the first host of the army of Silesia, which, dividing into two columns as it approached Montmartre, streamed in endless files, the one half towards La Villette, on the great road to the barrier of St.-Denis, the other in the direction of Neuilly, as if to turn that important post by the extreme French left. D'York and Kleist were on the great road, moving direct on Paris, Langeron on the Allied right moving to turn the enemy's flank. The defence of La Villette and La Chapelle was most obstinate. For four long hours Mortier's troops, with heroic resolution, made good their post against the constantly increasing masses and reiterated attacks of the Prussians; and it was not till Woronzoff brought up his iron bands of Russian veterans, with the 15th and 14th light infantry at their head, that the batteries which commanded the village were carried, and the French driven out. Meanwhile Marmont, being reinforced, again made dispositions for an attack on Pantin. Barclay upon that ordered the Prussian and Baden guards to march out and attack the enemy; and these splendid troops, led by their gallant colonel, Alvensleben, rushed on the enemy with such impetuosity, that they were speedily broken and driven back almost to the barriers of Pré-St.-Gervais. Such was the admiration which this charge excited in the breast of Alexander, who witnessed it, that with his own hands he took the cross of St.-George off the neck of the Archduke Constantine, who stood near him, and sent it to the Prussian commander while he and his troops were in the thick of a running fire; and the flattering badge being put on his breast on the spot, the men set up a shout which was heard above all the roar of the battle (1).

And of the Prince of Wirtemberg on the left. At length, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the heads of the columns of the hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg arrived at the extreme Allied left; and although Giulay's Austrians had not yet made their appearance, he immediately commenced operations. The wood of Vincennes was occupied almost without opposition; the castle blockaded; the bridge of St.-Maur, with eight guns, carried by storm, and the French driven back with severe loss to Charenton. Both wings having thus come up at last, the Emperor ordered a general attack along the whole line. The Allies formed, as at Lcipsic and Arcis-sur-Aube, a vast semicircle, stretching from Charenton on the extreme left, to the neighbourhood of Neuilly on the right; the French a concave circle, facing outwards, and which was gradually falling back to the barriers. Langeron was ordered to carry Montmartre, cost what it might; while Raicffsky and Prince Eugène, supported by Barclay's reserves and the grenadiers, again renewed the attack on the centre. This grand assault, now made with greatly superior forces, and at all points at the same time, proved entirely successful. The conquerors rushed forward in the order followed in the desperate assault of Ismael, and with as rapid success. In vain the French generals and officers did all in their power, by standing in front of their columns, and exposing themselves to the uttermost, to animate their men and lead them back into action. Heroism and patriotism did their best to resist, but they did it in vain; an invincible spirit was roused among mankind; the Almighty fiat had gone

(1) Dan. 357, 353. Burgh. 241, 242. Plötho, iii, 406, 407, Vaud, ii, 336, 338. Koch, iii, 465, 476.

forth, its instrument was the indignation of oppressed humanity, and France was to undergo the punishment of the Revolution (1).

Storming of
the heights
which com-
mand Paris.

Flashing in the rays of a brilliant sun, the Russian and Prussian colours were carried forward from one summit to another, till every obstacle was surmounted, and Paris lay at their feet. The Prussians, under the gallant Prince William, after a desperate struggle carried the bridge over the canal of Ourcq, and expelled Mortier's men, at the point of the bayonet, out of La Villette. Charpentier's veterans of the guards retired, furious with indignation, and still even in retreat keeping up a deadly and unquenchable fire on their pursuers. Pitchnitzky's division of the Russians carried the barriers of Pré-St.-Gervais, and made themselves masters of seventeen guns which had been planted there; ten more yielded to the impetuous assault of the Prussian and Baden guards; Prince Gortchakoff forced Charron; the burying-ground at Mont-Louis with eight, the battery of Menilmontant with seven guns, were successively stormed; the inmost recesses of the wood of Romainville were the theatre of mortal conflict; the village of Bagnolet was forced at the same time by Mesenzoff; and the external defences of the French centre being thus all carried about the same time, the whole Allied centre, amidst deafening shouts, converging together, rushed simultaneously into Belleville. Following up their successes, the advanced guards, with breathless haste, toiled to the summit of the Butte de Chaumont; the level plateau was speedily covered with troops; the splendid capital of France burst on their view; the cry, "Fire on Paris, fire on Paris!" arose on all sides, and amidst cheers which were heard over the whole battle field; twenty guns were brought forward, which speedily sent their bombs as far as the Chaussée-d'Antin (2). The first shot was fired from the Russian battery of light artillery, which was the last that evacuated Moscow; and on both occasions was under the direction of General Milarado-witch. All of a sudden the troops received orders to halt at all points, and it was soon known that a capitulation had been concluded.

A suspen-
sion of arms
is agreed to
on both
sides.

Joseph no sooner perceived that the Allied armies were about to throw the French troops back upon Paris, than he authorized the marshals to enter into a capitulation. This authority was given by Joseph at a quarter past twelve; but it was not till the plateau of Chaumont was stormed, and the Russian bombs began to fall in the city, that the French marshals rightly judged that the defence could no longer be prolonged. In fact, in half an hour more, the French troops, driven headlong down the steep descent which leads from the plateau to the town, would have been irrecoverably routed, and the conquerors would have entered the gates with them. They, in concert, accordingly dispatched an officer to the Emperor Alexander, who was on the summit of the hill of Romainville, to request an armistice. The Emperor answered, with dignity, that he acceded to the proposition, but on condition only that Paris was immediately surrendered. As the officer had no power to accede to such a condition Colonel Orloff returned with him to Marshal Marmont, whom he found in the first line, with his sword drawn, encouraging his worn-out battalions. The terms were at once agreed to, and the French were immediately to evacuate all the positions without the gates, including Montmartre. Orders were soon after dispatched in all directions to stop the firing (3). So warm,

(1) Dan. 360. Burgh. 242, 143. Vaud. ii. 342, 475, 477. Vaud. ii. 362, 365. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 352. Koch. iii. 639, 646. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 302, 307. Plotho, iii. 407, 411.

342, 343.

(2) Dan. 360, 361. Burgh. 342, 343. Koch. iii. 11, 13. Burgh. 247. Load. 299, 300.

(3) Dan. 363, 365. Cap. x. 464, 465. Sav. vii.

however, was the conflict, so exasperated were the soldiers on the opposite sides, that it was with great difficulty that they could be separated; the enthusiastic cheers of the Allies made the very earth to shake over the adjacent parts of Paris; and when the firing ceased, the last sounds that were heard were from Curial's veterans of the Old Guard, who still shouted "Vive l'Empereur!"

General
occupation
of the
heights, and
storming of
Montmartre.

To the loud roar of the artillery, the incessant clang of the musketry, the cries and cheers of the combatants, now succeeded a silence yet more awful, during which the terms of the capitulation were under discussion, and the fate of six hundred thousand human beings depended on a few words from the Emperor of Russia. Meanwhile the French troops, in the deepest dejection, many of them with tears mingling with the blood on their cheeks, withdrew within the barriers. The Allied columns, who had now all come up in great strength, and exulting in their triumphs, were immediately every where brought forward to the front, and formed a sublime spectacle. From the banks of the Marne to those of the Seine, on a vast semicircle of six miles, the troops rested on their arms. The different lines were placed near each other, so as to form a continued close column; artillery bristled on all the heights, cavalry filled all the plains; a hundred thousand men, leaning on their arms, and three hundred pieces of cannon, with the matches burning, were ready to pour the vials of wrath on the devoted city. Alexander, with all his suite, rode on to the plateau of Chaumont; Paris lay spread like a map at his feet; the descending sun, which cast its rays over its vast assemblage of domes and palaces, seemed to supplicate him to imitate its beneficence, and shine alike upon the just and the unjust. He was not wanting to his glorious destiny. But ere the terms could be agreed to, loud cheers, followed by a tremendous fire, were heard on the right; Montmartre was speedily enveloped in smoke, and for some time all were in suspense watching the dreadful struggle—the last of the campaign—which was there going forward. In a quarter of an hour, however, the thunders ceased; the well-known Russian hurrah resounded through the air; Russian standards were descried on the summit of the hill; and soon the arrival of messengers announced, that before intelligence of the suspension had reached them, Count Langeron, ascending from the extreme right of the Allied line on the side of Clichy, had carried this stronghold by assault. Such was the vigour of the storm, that, of thirty guns planted on the hill, twenty-nine were taken; and, in ten minutes from the time when the attack commenced, the Russian colours waved on its summit, although the preparations for defence appeared so formidable, that the brave Rudzewitch, who led the assault, took leave of his brother officers, as advancing to certain death, before he entered the fire. No sooner was the hill carried, than Langeron chased the French back into Paris, and immediately brought up eighty-four guns, which were planted on its summit, pointed towards the capital. "So, Father Paris! you must now pay for Mother Moscow," exclaimed a Russian artilleryman, with the medal of 1812 on his bosom, as he approached his match to the touch-hole of his cannon. As soon as the suspension of arms, however, was agreed to, a white flag was displayed from the telegraph on the top of Montmartre, the soldiers piled their arms, and the bands of all the regiments, advancing to the most elevated points around, made the air resound with martial and triumphant strains (1).

The battle of Paris, the last scene in this mighty drama, was also on the

(1) Dan. 366, 368. Plutarch, iii. 414. Koch, iii. 647, 658. Vaud. ii. 369, 371.

Results of the battle. side of the Allies, and, considering the number opposed to them, one of the most bloody. They lost not less than 9095 men, of whom 135 were Wirtemburghers, 1840 Prussians, and 7100 Russians; a clear proof upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and with whom its principal glory should rest. They took eighty-six pieces of cannon on the field, two standards, and a thousand prisoners; and the guns of the national guard, seventy-two in number, were given up by capitulation. The French loss was much less severe, and did not exceed 4500 men. The reason of this great disproportion between the loss of the victorious and vanquished army, was not so much the strength of the French position, or the effect of their formidable heavy batteries on the Allied columns, as the circumstance that Blucher did not receive his orders in time to make his attack on the right simultaneous with Raieffsky's in the centre, and that the Prince-Royal of Wirtemberg did not come up till the very last attack, at two o'clock in the afternoon, after the battle had lasted eight hours. Thus, during the greater part of the day, the opposite sides were nearly equally matched in respect of number at the points engaged, though, when all their troops came up, the Allies were three to one. Nevertheless, the resistance of the French army from first to last was most heroic; they yielded their capital, in the end, only to the forces of banded Europe; and this day may justly be considered as adding another to the immortal wreath of laurels which encircles their brows (1).

Rapid return of Napoléon towards Paris. "If the Allies were encamped," said Napoléon in the senate, on the 30th March 1815, "on the heights of Montmartre, I would not surrender one village in the thirty-second military division," (the Hanse Towns.) On that day year—on the 30th March 1814—the Allies were encamped on the heights of Montmartre; but he was obliged to surrender, not a village in the north of Germany, but his crown and his empire. No sooner was the Emperor made aware, on his return to Paris, that the Allies were approaching its walls, than he dispatched on the 29th his aide-de-camp, General Dejean, from Doulencourt, to announce his immediate return to the capital; and to intimate that negotiations were renewed, through the medium of Austria and Prince Metternich, with the Allied powers. Dejean had reached Mortier, after incredible exertions, about three o'clock, as he was bravely combating the Prussians in front of La Villette. The marshal immediately dispatched a flag of truce to Schwartzemberg, with a letter written on a drum-head, intimating the resumption of the negotiations, and proposing an armistice. The Allied generals, however, were too well informed to fall into the snare; and a polite answer was returned by the generalissimo, stating, "that the intimate and indissoluble union which subsists between the Sovereign powers, affords a sure guarantee that the negotiations which you suppose are on foot separately between Austria and France, have no foundation; and that the reports which you have received on that head are entirely groundless." The attempt to avert the evil hour thus entirely failed, and it was shortly after that Marmont and Mortier jointly concluded the armistice for the evacuation of Paris (2).

Return of Napoléon to the neighbourhood of Paris.

Meanwhile Napoléon, every hour more alarmed, was straining every nerve to reach the capital. On the 29th the imperial guard and equipages arrived at Troyes late at night, having marched above forty miles in that single day. After a few hours' rest he

(1) Dan. 371. Ploto, iii. 416, 417. Vaud, ii. 372, 373. Koch, iii. 488, 506.

(2) Mortier to Schwartzemberg, March 30, 1814; and Reply, Sav. vii. 10, 11. Fain, 198, 199.

threw himself into his travelling carriage, and, as the wearied cuirassiers could no longer keep pace with him, set out alone for Paris. Courier after courier was dispatched before him, to announce his immediate return to the authorities of the capital; but as he approached it the most disastrous intelligence reached him every time he changed horses. He learned successively that the Empress and his son had quitted Paris; that the enemy were at its gates; that they were fighting on the heights. His impatience was now redoubled; he got into a little post *calèche* to accelerate his speed, and although the horses were going at the gallop, he incessantly urged the postilions to get on faster. The steeds flew like the winds; the wheels took fire in rolling over the pavement: yet nothing could satisfy the Emperor. At length by great exertions he reached Fromenteau, near the fountains of Juvisy, only five leagues from Paris, at ten at night. As his horses were there changing at the post-house called Cour de France, some straggling soldiers who were passing, announced, without knowing the Emperor, that Paris had capitulated. "These men are mad!" cried Napoléon, "the thing is impossible: bring me an officer!" At the very moment General Belliard came up and gave the whole details of the catastrophe. Large drops of sweat stood on the Emperor's forehead; he turned to Caulaincourt and said, "Do you hear that?" with a fixed gaze that made him shudder. At this moment the Seine only separated the Emperor from the enemy's advanced posts on the extreme Allied left, in the plain of Villeneuve-St.-George's (1); their innumerable watch-fires illuminated the whole north and east of the heavens; while the mighty conqueror, in the darkness, followed only by two post carriages and a few attendants, received the stroke of fate.

Napoléon's remarkable conversation on hearing of the fall of Paris. Berthier now came up, and Napoléon immediately said he must set out to Paris. "Caulaincourt, order the carriage!" Unable to restrain his anxiety to get forward, he set out on foot, accompanied by Berthier and Caulaincourt, speaking incessantly as he hurried on, without waiting for an answer, or seeming to be conscious of their presence. "I burned the pavement," said he; "my horses were as swift as the wind; but still I felt oppressed with an intolerable weight; something extraordinary was passing within me. I asked them only to hold out four-and-twenty hours. Miserable wretches that they are! Marmont, too, who had sworn that he would be hewn in pieces rather than surrender! And Joseph ran off too—my very brother! To surrender the capital to the enemy—what poltroons! They had my orders; they knew that on the 2d April I would be here at the head of seventy thousand men. My brave scholars, my national guard, who had promised to defend my son; all men with a heart in their bosoms would have joined to combat at my side. And so they have capitulated; betrayed their brother, their country, their sovereign, degraded France in the eyes of Europe! Entered into a capital of eight hundred thousand souls without firing a shot! It is too dreadful. That comes of entrusting cowards and fools. When I am not there, they do nothing but heap up blunder on blunder. What has been done with the artillery? They should have had two hundred pieces, and ammunition for a month. Every one has lost his head; and yet Joseph imagines he can lead an army, and Clarke is vain enough to think himself a minister; but I begin to think Savary is right, and that he is a traitor. Set off, Caulaincourt; fly to the Allied lines; penetrate to headquarters; you have full powers; fly, fly!" He still insisted upon following with Belliard and the cavalry, who

(1) Fain, 198, 199, 203. Caul. ii. 356, 358. Koch, iii. 561, 562.

had already evacuated Paris; but, upon the repeated assurances of that officer that the capitulation was concluded, and the capital in the hands of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, he at length agreed to return, rejoined his carriages, which he had preceded by above a mile, and, after ordering the retiring corps to take a position at Essonne, set out for Fontainebleau, which he reached at six in the morning (1).

Preparations of the Allies for entering Paris.

While these mournful scenes were passing at the solitary headquarters of the French Emperor, very different was the spectacle which the victorious camp of the Allies exhibited. It was there universally known that the troops were to enter Paris on the following morning, and orders had been issued that all those who were to accompany the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia should appear in their gala dresses, and with their arms and accoutrements in the best possible order. In great part of the troops, especially the corps of Blücher's army, the clothing was almost worn out; hardly an entire uniform was to be seen; many of the men were arrayed in a motley garb, stripped from the dead bodies of their enemies and Allies. But the case was otherwise with the household troops of the Emperor, the guards, grenadiers, and reserve cavalry. These superb corps had been kept by the Emperor throughout the whole three preceding campaigns in the highest state of discipline and equipment, and for this glorious *entrée* they decked themselves out with the utmost possible care. Incredible efforts were made by the men through the night, even after the fatigues of the preceding day, to gratify alike their sovereign's and their own wishes on this memorable occasion. From having almost invariably, during the preceding campaign, fought in their great-coats, their uniforms were in their knapsacks, quite clean and dry, and their arms were burnished up with a vigour which soon rendered them as bright as when they left the esplanade of St.-Petersburg or Berlin (2).

Final conclusion of the capitulation.

Meanwhile the terms of the capitulation were the subject of anxious discussion in the Emperor's cabinet. It was conducted on the part of the French by Colonels Fabvier and Denis, on that of the Allies by Nesselrode and Orloff. To all the demands of the French marshals that Paris should be protected, its monuments entrusted to the care of the national guard, and private property preserved sacred, the Allies gave a ready consent; but a very serious difficulty arose, when it was proposed that the marshals with their followers should capitulate. To this they positively refused to accede, declaring that they would perish first in the streets; and as the Russian officers had no power to dispense with this material article, they were obliged to refer the matter to the Emperor, who agreed to abandon it. A discussion next arose as to the route by which the marshals should retire; the Allies insisting for that of Brittany, the French for any they might choose. This too was referred to the Emperor, who also agreed to forego this condition. The terms of the capitulation were at length finally adjusted at three in the morning; it being stipulated that the marshals should evacuate Paris at seven on the same day; that the whole public arsenals and magazines should be surrendered in the same state in which they were when the capitulation was concluded; that the national guard, according to the pleasure of the Allies, should be either disbanded or employed under their direction in the service of the city, that the wounded and stragglers found after ten in the morning

(1) Caul. ii. 358, 361. Koch, iii. 562, 564.

(2) Dau. 381. Lond. 300, 254.

should be considered prisoners of war; and that Paris should be recommended to the generosity of the Allied sovereigns (1).

Interview
of Alexander
with
the Magis-
trates of
Paris.

The municipal magistrates of Paris, consisting of the two prefects of the department of the Seine, the mayor of the city, the chiefs of the national guard, and a few of its superior officers, thus abandoned to themselves, without any superior government to direct their movements, now deemed it high time to take steps for the preservation of the city. Accordingly a deputation, consisting of those elevated functionaries, set off at two in the morning for the headquarters of the Allied sovereigns. They had no need of lamps to their carriages; the immense semicircle of watchfires through which they passed on the road to Bondy threw a steady light on the road, and first revealed to them the vast force by which the capital had been assailed. Proceeding rapidly on, they soon reached the headquarters; and at four they were introduced to the Emperor Alexander. They were received by him in the most gracious manner—"Gentlemen!" said the Czar, "I am not the enemy of the French nation; I am so only of a single man, whom I once admired and *long loved*; but who, devoured by ambition and filled with bad faith, came into the heart of my dominions, and left me no alternative but to seek security for my future safety in the liberation of Europe. The Allied sovereigns have come here, neither to conquer nor to rule France, but to learn and support what France itself deems most suitable for its own welfare; and they only await, before undertaking the task, to ascertain, in the declared wish of Paris, the probable wish of France." He then promised to take under his especial protection the museums, monuments, public institutions, and establishments of all sorts in the capital. Upon the request of the magistrates that the national guard should be kept up, Alexander, turning to the chief of the staff, asked if he could rely upon that civic force. The reply was, that he might entirely rely upon their discharging every duty like men of honour. The Emperor immediately replied that he could expect nothing more, and desired no other guarantee; and that he referred the details to General Sacken, whom he had appointed governor of Paris, and whom they would find in every respect a man of delicacy and honour (2).

State of
public feel-
ing at Pa-
ris during
this period.

Paris meanwhile was in that state of combined excitement and stupor, which prepares the way for great political revolutions. The terrors of the people had been extreme during the battle; they trembled for the pillage, massacre, and conflagration which they were told, by the placards posted by the police, awaited them if the Allies were successful; and they dreaded at least as much the unchaining the cupidity of the faubourgs and passions of the Revolution, by the proposal to arm the working classes, and prepare a national defence. While the battle lasted, an immense crowd filled the boulevards, and all the streets leading in to them on the north and east, composed of at least as many women as men, who manifested the utmost anxiety for the event, and evinced the warmest sympathy with the long files of wounded who were brought in from the heights. On the approach of evening, when the passage of artillery and ammunition waggons through the streets to the southward, told but too plainly that the defence could no longer be maintained, the sentiment that Napoleon was overthrown, and that a change of government would take place, became universal: the partizans of a regency, under the direction of Marie-Louise, who otherwise might have

(1) Dan. 375, 377. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 317, 318.

(2) Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 319, 320. Burgh. 249, 250. Koch, iii. 517, 521.

been numerous, were paralysed by her departure from the capital : and the Jacobins and Republicans, long restrained under the empire, did not venture to declare themselves from terror of the Allied arms. Thus the Royalists, who had received some slight countenance at least from the Allied headquarters, were the only party which ventured to act openly ; and already some symptoms of their taking a decided part had appeared (1).

First move-
ments
of the
Royalists.

At the barrier of Monceaux, where a battalion of the National Guards was ordered by the general to issue forth and combat with the troops of the line, the Duke of Fitzjames, a known royalist leader, stepped forward from the ranks, harangued the regiment, and persuaded them to disobey the order, upon the ground that it was contrary to the fundamental conditions of their institution to be sent beyond the barriers. After it was known that a capitulation had been agreed to, the activity of the Royalist committee was redoubled : all night they were in deliberation ; in vain several of their members were arrested by the police ; the general conviction that the authority of that hated body, and their host of ten thousand spies, by whom Paris and France had so long been governed, would soon be at an end, counterbalanced all their efforts ; and it was determined to raise the Royalist standard openly in the capital on the following morning at nine o'clock. Accordingly, M. Charles de Vauvineux, on the Place Louis XV, read aloud, to a small assembly of Royalists, Schwartzberg's proclamation, issued the day before, and at its close, mounting the white cockade, exclaimed " VIVE LE ROI !" The number of his followers was only four, but they immediately rode through the neighbouring streets and boulevards, repeating the ancient rallying cry of France, and distributing white cockades to the people. A few gentlemen of the old families and the better classes joined them ; but their numbers were still very inconsiderable, and towards the Porte St.-Martin and Rue St.-Antoine the Royalist emissaries were insulted by the people and seized by the police. The great body of the inhabitants were congregated in the streets, and highly excited, but dubious and uncertain : anxious, but yet apprehensive : ready to receive an impulse, but incapable of originating it. Such is the end of revolutions (2).

Entrance of
the Allied
sovereigns
into Paris.

In this state of agitation and uncertainty, noonday arrived, and the *cortège* of the Allied sovereigns began to make its appearance in the Faubourg St.-Martin, on their way to the capital. The Prussian cavalry of the guard, preceded by some squadrons of Cossacks, came first ; then the Prussian light horse of the guards ; next the Austrian grenadiers ; then the Russian and Prussian foot-guards ; the Russian cuirassiers and artillery closed the procession. Indescribable was the enthusiasm which the matchless spectacle excited in the minds of the soldiers and officers who witnessed the march. Precisely at eight o'clock the Emperor mounted his horse, and traversing the countless army of soldiers, who were drawn up to salute him in passing, arrived at nine at the commencement of the Faubourg St.-Martin. Already various piquets of Cossacks had traversed the boulevards ; the principal military points in the capital had been occupied by the Russians ; the red Cossacks of the guard were to be seen at the corners of the principal streets ; their bizarre costume, and Asiatic physiognomy, excited general alarm. But when the superb array of the household troops commenced, when the infantry thirty, and the cavalry fifteen abreast, began to defile through the faubourg, and the forces whom they had so often been

(1) Beauch. ii. 225, 259. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 320, 321. Lab. ii. 369. Koch, iii. 521, 522. Montg. vii. 400. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 321. Koch, iii. 525, 527.

(2) Lab. ii. 378, 381. Beauch. ii. 257, 283.

told were cut to pieces or destroyed, appeared in endless succession, in the finest order and the most brilliant array, one universal feeling of enthusiasm seized upon the multitude. Every window was crowded; the roofs were covered with anxious spectators; the throng in the streets was so excessive, that it was with difficulty the troops could make their way through them. Passing from the extreme of terror to that of gratitude, the Parisians gave vent in the loudest applause to their astonishment and admiration. The proclamation of the Allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris, already given (1), had been placarded in every part of the capital that morning; its conciliatory expressions were universally known, and had diffused an unanimous entrancement. The grand object of anxiety to all, was to get a glimpse of the Emperor Alexander, to whom, it was generally felt, their deliverance had been owing. When that noble prince, with the King of Prussia on his right, and Prince Schwartzemberg and Lord Cathcart on his left, made his appearance, amidst a brilliant suite of varied uniforms (2), at the Porte St.-Martin, the enthusiasm of the multitude knew no bounds. Cries of "Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!" "Vive le roi de France!" "Vivent les Alliés!" "Vivent nos Libérateurs!" burst from all sides; and the universal transports resembled rather the incense of a grateful people to a beneficent and victorious sovereign, than the reception by the vanquished of their conqueror, after a bloody and desperate war.

Turning to the right at the Porte St.-Martin, the Allied sovereigns passed along the boulevard St.-Denis, and admired at the gate of the same name the noble triumphal arch, inscribed "Ludovico Magno." As they approached the Boulevard des Italiens, the aspect of the multitude, if possible still greater, was of a more elevated description: the magnificent hotels of that opulent quarter were crowded with elegantly dressed females, waving white handkerchiefs, and cries of "Vivent les Bourbons!" were heard in every direction. Such was the enthusiasm with which the sovereigns were received as they defiled through the Boulevard de la Madeleine, that the people kissed their boots, their sabres, and the trappings of their horses; and many young women of graceful exterior and polished manners, entreated the gentlemen in attendance to take them up before them on their horses that they might obtain a nearer sight of their deliverers (3). Alexander's manner was so gracious, his figure so noble, his answers so felicitous, his pronunciation of the French so pure, as to excite universal admiration. "We have been long expecting you," said one. "We should have been here sooner but for the bravery of your troops," was the happy answer of the Czar. "I come not," he repeatedly said, "as your enemy; regard me as your friend." The sovereigns defiled past the then unfinished pillars of the Temple of Glory, now converted into the graceful peristyle of the church of the Madeleine; their triumphant hoofs rung, in the Place

(1) *Ante*, x. 219.

(2) Cap. x. 467, 468. Dan. 384, 386. Lond. 301, 302. Burgh. 251, 252. Thib. ix. 640. Beauch. ii. 281, 284.

(3) I have been assured of this fact by both Lord Cathcart and Lord Burghersh, now the Earl of Westmoreland, who took a part in the procession, and themselves had a fair Parisian, sometimes *en croupe*, at others on the pommel of their saddles, at the place Louis XV. The English who entered Paris with the Allies were the Earl of Cathcart, Lord Stewart, Lord Burghersh, Sir Hudson Lowe, Colonel H. Cooke, the Hon. Major Frederick Cathcart, Captain Wood, Lieutenant Aubin, Lieutenant the

Hon. George Cathcart, Lieutenant Harris, who brought the despatches to England, Thomas Sydenham, Esq., John Bidwell, Esq., and Dr. Frank.—BURGHESB, 254, *Note*. Savary gives the same account of the Parisian ladies on this occasion. "There were to be seen ladies, and even ladies of rank, who so far forgot the respect due to themselves, as to give themselves up to the most shameful delirium. They threw themselves over the circle of horses which surrounded the Emperor of Russia, and testified an *empressment* more fitted to excite contempt than conciliate kindly feeling."—SAVARY, vii. 52.

Louis XV, on the spot where Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth had been executed, and halting in the entrance of the Champs-Élysées, they beheld fifty thousand of their chosen troops defile before them, amidst the applause of the multitude, and through the space formed by the bayonets of the national guard of Paris, which kept the ground for the procession. "God!" said Monort, in the church of St.-Roch during the fervour of the Revolution, "if you exist, avenge your injured name: I bid you defiance: you dare not launch your thunders; who will after this believe in your existence (1)." The thunders of Heaven had now been launched; the Revolution had been destroyed by the effect of its own principles, and the answer of God delivered by the mouths of the revolutionists themselves (2).

When the review was concluded, and the troops were dividing into small parties to reach the quarters assigned them, in the barracks and suburbs of the city, Alexander alighted at the hotel of M. Talleyrand, where the leading members of the senate, and the most distinguished characters of the capital, were assembled. The meeting was of a very various character, and exhibited a strange example of the manner in which the most opposite parties are thrown together in the latter stages of a revolution. On the side of the Royalists there were the Baron Louis and M. de Pradt, the well-known and acute archbishop of Malines, the Duc de Dalberg, Bourrienne, and the senator Beurnonville; and these, with the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzberg, Prince Lichtenstein, Count Nesselrode, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, constituted this memorable assemblage. Their proceedings are well worth recounting; the fate of the world depended upon their deliberations (5).

Important
meeting of
the Sove-
reigns at
Talleyrand's
hotel.

Account of
the delibe-
ration.

Alexander opened the discussion by stating that there were three courses to adopt: either to make peace with Napoléon, taking the necessary securities against him; to establish a regency; or to recall the House of Bourbon. Upon these momentous questions he requested the opinion of the meeting, protesting that the only wish of the Allied sovereigns was to consult the wishes of France, and secure the peace of the world. Talleyrand immediately rose, and strongly urged that the two former projects were altogether inadmissible; and that there could be no peace in Europe while Napoléon, or any of his dynasty, were on the throne. He concluded that the only course was to adopt the third, which would be generally acceptable, and which offered the only way of escaping out of the evils by which they were surrounded; and that, under the mild rule of a race of princes who had learned wisdom in misfortune, all the guarantees which could be desired would be obtained for durable freedom. To this proposition it was replied by Schwartzberg, that no indications of indifference to the Emperor had been witnessed by the army in its passage through France: that the declarations in favour of the Bourbons had been few and far between; and that the heroic resistance of the National Guards at Fère-Champenoise, many of whom had been only a few days before at the plough, gave no indications of such a disposition. Alexander then turned to Talleyrand, and asked him how he proposed to arrive at his object. Talleyrand replied, by means of the constituted authorities: that he would answer for the senate, and that their example would be speedily followed by all France. Alexander then asked the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis their opinion; and prefaced it by

(1) *Ante*, ii. 39.

(2) *Montg.* vii. 400. *Beauch.* ii. 283, 285. *Cap.* x. 467, 468. *Lond.* 302. *Dan.* 384, 386. *Burgh.* 252.

(3) *Thib.* ix. 640, 641. *Cap.* x. 469, 476. *De Pradt*, *Hist. de la Restauration*, 13, 14.

declaring, in the most energetic terms, "that he was not the author of the war; that Napoléon had, without a cause, invaded his dominions; that it was neither a thirst for conquest nor the lust of dominion which had brought him to Paris, but the necessity of self-preservation; that he had done all in his power to spare that capital, and would have been inconsolable if he had failed in that object; finally, that he was not the enemy of France, but of Napoléon, and all who were hostile to its liberties." In these sentiments the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzemberg expressed their entire concurrence; and then the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis declared that they were Royalists: "that the great majority of the French nation were of the same opinion; that it was the knowledge of negotiations going on at Chatillon with Napoléon, that alone had hitherto prevented this opinion from manifesting itself; but that, now that they were concluded, Paris would readily declare itself, and the whole of France would immediately follow its example." "Sire!" resumed Talleyrand, "there are but two courses open to us: Buonaparte or Louis XVIII. Bonaparte if you can—but you cannot; for you are not alone.—What would they give you in his place? A soldier? We want no more of them. If we wanted one, we would keep the one we already have: he is the first in the world. After him, any one that could be offered us, would not have ten votes in his favour. I repeat it, Sire! any attempt but for Buonaparte or Louis XVIII is but an intrigue." "Well, then," said Alexander, "I declare that I will no longer treat with the Emperor Napoléon;" and added, on the suggestion of the Abbé de Pradt, "nor with any member of his family (1)."

Declaration
of the Allies
that they
would no
longer treat
with Napo-
léon nor his
family.
March 30.

The die being thus cast, the next step to be taken was the announcement of the resolution of the Allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris. An address to the French nation was immediately drawn up and published, in which they declared that they would grant more favourable terms to a wise government, than when it was necessary to provide against the devouring ambition of Napoléon: that they would not treat with Napoléon nor any member of his family: that they would respect the integrity of France, such as it had been under its legitimate monarchs: that they wished that France should be great and powerful, and would respect and guarantee any constitution which it might adopt: and that they invited the senate to appoint a provisional government, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people (2). Orders were, at the same time, sent to the police to liberate all persons detained in prison for state offences, or "for having prevented the inhabitants in their communes from firing on the Allied troops, and so saved their persons and effects, or who were in detention on account of their attachment to their ancient and legitimate sovereigns." Some difficulty was anticipated in getting a printer who would have courage enough to throw off such a proclamation: but Tal-

(1) De Pradt, *Hist. de la Rest.* 18, 24. Sav. vii. 53, 55. Thib. ix. 640, 641. Cap. x. 476, 477.

(2) "The Allied powers having occupied Paris, they are ready to receive the declaration of the French nation. They declare, that if it was indispensable that the conditions of peace should contain stronger guarantees when it was necessary to enchain the ambition of Napoléon, they should become more favourable, when, by a return to a wiser government, France itself offers the assurance of repose. The Allied sovereigns declare, in consequence, that they will no longer treat with Napoléon nor with any of his family—that they respect the integrity of old France, such as it existed

among its legitimate kings: they may even go further, for they always profess the principle, that for the happiness of Europe it is necessary that France should be great and powerful. That they recognise and will guarantee such a constitution as the French nation may give itself. They invite, consequently, the senate to appoint a provisional government, which may provide for the necessities of administration, and establish such a constitution as may be fitting for the French people. The intentions which I have just expressed are common to me, with all the Allied powers."—ALEXANDER, *Paris*, 31st March 1814, *Three P. M.*; See CAPEVIGUE, x. 477; and THIEBAUDEAU, ix. 642.

leyrand had early in the morning provided against this difficulty, and was ready with a printer, who threw it off with such expedition, that before nine at night five hundred copies were placarded over every part of Paris; while Bourrienne, by means of the post-office, of which he got possession by authority of Alexander, circulated it next morning over the whole of France (1).

This declaration produced a prodigious impression. It cut short at once all intrigues for a regency, and, in fact, left the nation no alternative but to revert to the Bourbons. The senate, thus specially called upon by the Allied sovereigns to act, was not long in being put in motion: it had been secretly prepared in part for such a step by Talleyrand; and the declaration of the Allies at once brought matters to a crisis. Already the municipal council of Paris had, from the Hôtel-de-Ville, issued a vehement invective against Napoléon, and in favour of Louis XVIII; but the senators were in great part uninitiated in the secret of the approaching change, and it was with pale visages and trembling steps that they obeyed the summons which, early in the morning of the 1st April, Talleyrand, in his capacity of arch-chancellor of the empire, sent them, to assemble to deliberate in their usual hall of assembly. Only sixty-four out of one hundred and forty attended; but they comprised several men of distinction, whose names had been known on almost every extreme side through all the phases of the Revolution; many who had voted for the death of the king; and others who, by a kind of miracle only, had kept their heads on their shoulders during the Reign of Terror. To the proceedings of that day are affixed the signatures of Destutt, Tracy, Fontanes, the eloquent orator of the empire, Garat, the Abbé Grégoire, Lambrecht, Lanjuinais, the Abbé de Montesquieu, Roger Ducos, Serrurier, Soules, and the Marshal Duc de Valmy! Strange assemblage of men, of the most opposite political sentiments, now met together to pull down the last government of the Revolution! Talleyrand opened the proceedings, and after a short discussion a provisional government was unanimously established, consisting of Talleyrand, who was president, Count de Beurnonville, count Jaucourt, the Duc de Dalberg, and M. de Montesquieu. The latter had been a distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly in 1789. Nothing was said of Napoléon, though the very establishment of a provisional government was the most decided act of high treason to his authority; nor of the Bourbons, though every step they took was a nearer approach to their recognition. The principal care of the senate appeared to be the formation of a constitution, and in that view it was provided that the senate and legislative body should be a constituent part of the new government; their ranks and pensions should be preserved to the army, the public debts maintained, the sale of the national domains ratified, an amnesty declared for the past, liberty of worship and of the press established, and a constitution on these bases formed. The last act in the popular drama in France was worthy of all which had preceded it: no provision was made, excepting a word for the press, for public freedom or individual liberty; all that was thought of was the preservation of the *interests* created by the Revolution. Doubtless their preservation was an essential element in any restoration which was likely to be durable; but what a picture does the *absence* of any other stipulations give of the principles on which the struggle had been maintained (2)!

The meeting of the senate broke up at half past nine; and they proceeded to wait upon the Emperor Alexander. He received them in the most gra-

(1) Hard. xii. 394, 395. Cap. x. 476, 477. Thib. ix. 642, 643. Bour. x. 43, 45.

(2) Séances, Avril 1, 1814. Moniteur, April 2, 1814; and Cap. x. 471; and Thib. ix. 647.

Generous
conduct of
the Em-
peror
Alexander,
who libe-
rates all
the French
prisoners.

cious manner. "Gentlemen," said he, "I am charmed to find myself in the middle of you. It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has led me hither; my armies have only entered France to repel an unjust aggression. Your Emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions when I wished only for peace. I am the friend of the French people; I impute their faults to their chief alone; I am here with the most friendly intentions; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You are charged with one of the most honourable missions which generous men can discharge, that of securing the happiness of a great people, in giving France institutions at once strong and liberal, with which she cannot dispense in the state of civilization which she has attained. I set out to-morrow to resume the command of the armies, and sustain the cause which you have embraced: it is time that blood should cease to flow; too much has been shed already; my heart grieves for it. I will not lay down my arms till I have secured the peace which has been the object of all my efforts; and I shall be content if, in quitting your country, I bear with me the satisfaction of having had it in my power to be useful to you, and to contribute to the peace of the world. The provisional government has asked me this morning for the liberation of the French prisoners of war confined in Russia: I give it to the senate. Since they fell into my hands, I have done all in my power to soften their lot. I will immediately give orders for their return; may they rejoin their families in peace, and enjoy the tranquillity which the new order of things is fitted to induce!" A hundred and fifty thousand men by these words recovered their liberty, and were to be restored to their families and their country! Such was the vengeance which Alexander took for the desolation of his dominions and the flames of Moscow! When Napoléon left Vienna in 1809, he blew up the time-honoured bastions of the capital (1); when he became master of Berlin in 1806, he said, "I will make the Prussian nobility so poor that they shall beg their bread (2);" when he evacuated Moscow he gave orders for blowing up the Kremlin, the last relief of that capital which had escaped the flames (3). If ever the spirit of Heaven actuated the human breast, it was Alexander's on that occasion (4).

The Senate
dethrones
Napoléon.
April 2.

On the day following, being April 2d, the senate by a solemn decree dethroned the Emperor, and absolved the army (5) and people from their oaths of allegiance (6). This decisive step was moved in an impassioned speech by Lambrecht; the act of accusation having been prepared by Barbe-Marbois, Lanjuinais, and Fontanes. It abounded in the most severe and cutting invectives against the imperial government;

(1) *Ante*, vii. 285.

(2) *Ib.*, v. 386.

(3) *Ib.*, viii. 395.

(4) *Moniteur*, April 3, 1814. Cap. x. 478. Beauch.

ii. 326, 327.

(5) "Soldiers! France has broken the yoke beneath which she has groaned for so many years! You have never fought but for your country: you can now no longer combat but against her, under the standards of the man who has hitherto conducted you. See what you have suffered from his tyranny: you were once a million of soldiers; almost all have perished under the sword of the enemy, or, without subsistence, without hospitals, they have been doomed to perish of misery and famine. You are no longer the soldiers of Napoléon: the senate and people of entire France absolve you from your oaths."—*Moniteur*, 5th April 1814.

(6) "Frenchmen! on issuing from civil dissension, you chose for chief a man who appeared on

the theatre of the world with an air of grandeur. You reposed in him all your hopes; those hopes have been deceived: on the ruins of anarchy he has founded only despotism. He was bound at least in gratitude to have become a Frenchman with you: he has not done so. He has never ceased to undertake, without end or motive, unjust wars, like an adventurer who is impelled by the thirst for glory. In a few years he has devoured at once your riches and your population. Every family is in mourning; all France groans: he is deaf to our calamities. Possibly he still dreams of his gigantic designs, even after unheard-of reverses have punished in so signal a manner the pride and the abuse of victory. He has shown himself not even capable of reigning for the interests of his despotism. He believed in no other power but that of force: force now overwhelms him: just retribution of insensate ambition!"—*CAPEFIGUE*, x. 483; and *Moniteur*, April 5, 1814.

in the justice of which, posterity, from the evidence of facts, must almost entirely participate, and which contains the most valuable commentary which history has preserved on the inevitable tendency and final issue of revolutions. Nor is the lesson the less important, if we recollect that the body which now burst forth into this vehement strain of indignation against the Emperor, was the very senate which had so long been the passive instrument of his will; that the orators, whose eloquence was now so powerfully exerted to demonstrate the ruinous tendency of his administration, were the very men who had hitherto exalted it to the skies as the height of wisdom and magnanimity; and that the empire, whose exhaustion and miseries they now so graphically portrayed, was the powerful monarchy which had been regenerated by revolution, and conducted by the most splendid abilities to the summit of military glory. Either the statement they now made, and the picture they now drew, was true or false. If it was true, what a lesson does it read on the effect of that unrestrained indulgence of the social passions which constitutes a revolution: if it was false, what a mirror does it present of the baseness of character which such a convulsion produces, and the destiny of a state which it throws into the guidance of such hands (1)!

General adherence to the new Government. The legislative body, in a meeting consisting of seventy-seven members, adhered to the act of the senate dethroning Napoléon, and absolving the army and nation from their oaths to his government. Adhesions speedily came in on all sides: a falling cause rarely finds faithful defenders; in a revolutionary state, where success is the god of idolatry—never. All the public bodies of Paris forthwith prepared addresses, vying with one another in invectives against Napoléon, as they had formerly exhausted all the flowers of rhetoric in extolling the unparalleled blessings of his government. It was a realization of the views, and even the language, of Malet, which had so nearly proved successful when the Emperor was in Russia; but with the additional invectives drawn from boundless calamities since incurred, and irresistible military support since obtained. As fast as

(1) *Moniteur*, April 4, 1814; and *Cap. x.* 431. *Ibid.* ix. 650, 651.

"The conservative senate considering that, in a constitutional monarchy, the monarch exists only in virtue of a social compact: that Napoleon Buonaparte's administration for some time was firm and prudent, but that latterly he has violated his fundamental compact with the French people, especially by raising and levying taxes without the sanction of the law, in direct opposition to the oath which he made on ascending the throne: that he committed that infraction of the liberties of the people, when he had, without cause, prorogued the legislative, and suppressed as criminal a report of that body, thereby contesting its title and share in the national representation: that he has undertaken a series of wars, of his own authority, in violation of the law, which declared that they should be proposed, discussed, and promulgated as laws: that he has illegally issued several decrees declaring the penalty of death, especially those of 3d March last (*), tending to establish as national a war which sprung only from his immediate ambition: that he has violated the laws of the constitution by his decrees on state prisons: that he has annihilated the responsibility of monarchs, confounded all powers, and destroyed the independence of the judiciary bodies: that he has trampled under foot the liberty of the press by means of a corrupt and enslaved censorship, and made use of that powerful instrument only to deluge France with false

maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and outrages on foreign governments: that acts and reports of the senate itself have undergone alteration previous to publication: that instead of reigning conformably to the interest, happiness, and glory of the French nation, in terms of his oath, Napoléon has put the finishing stroke to the miseries of the country, by refusing to treat with the Allies on terms which the national interest required him to accept, and which did not compromise the honour of France; that by the abuse which he has made of the resources in men and money entrusted to him, he has effected the ruin of the towns, the depopulation of the country, every where induced famine and contagious pestilence: considering, in fine, that by all these causes the imperial government *has ceased to exist*, and that the wishes of the French call for a state of things, of which the first result may be the re-establishment of a general peace, and the reunion of France with all the states of the great European family, the senate declares and decrees as follows:—1. Napoléon Buonaparte is cast down from the throne, and the right of succession in his family is abolished. 2. The French people and army are absolved from their oath of fidelity to him. 3. The present decree shall be transmitted to the departments and armies, and proclaimed immediately in all the quarters of the capital."—*Moniteur*, 5th April 1814; and *CAPEFIGURE*, x. 479, 481.

the intelligence reached the provinces and provincial towns, they lost not an instant in proclaiming the downfall of the tyrant, and their cordial adhesion to the new order of things. Still not a word was said, at least by any of the constituted authorities, on the subject of a return to the Bourbon dynasty. On the contrary, the persons appointed by the provincial government to the principal offices of state, were almost all drawn from the Republican party. Dessolles, an austere democrat, was nominated to the command of the National Guard; M. Anglès to the police; Henrion de Pansey was the minister of public justice; M. Beugnot, of the interior; Malouet, of the marine; M. Louis, of the finances; M. de Laforest, of foreign affairs; Dupont de Nemours was made secretary to the government; and the general, Dupont, minister of war. This last appointment, though made because they thought they were sure of the man, was unfortunate; it recalled to the army the disaster of Baylen, the darkest blot on their scutcheon. All these persons belonged more or less to the Republican or Imperial parties: not a Royalist appeared amongst them. Therein Talleyrand showed his knowledge of human nature: the former could be gained only by their interests; of the latter he was sure from their affections (1).

Nothing, however, had yet been heard from the army; and although its force, reduced now to fifty thousand men, could not pretend to cope with the colossal mass of a hundred and sixty thousand Allies, who, having been brought up from all the detachments in the rear, were now grouped around Paris; yet it had Napoléon at its head, and it was of the highest importance, both to the domestic settlement of France and the general peace of Europe, that its sentiments should as soon as possible be expressed. The world was not long kept in suspense. In the *Moniteur* of April 7, appeared an official correspondence between Prince Schwartzberg and Marshal Marmont, commencing on the 5d, and which terminated in the adhesion of the marshal to the provisional government on the 4th, on condition that the life and personal freedom of Napoléon should be secured, and a fitting asylum provided for him in some situation designed by the Allied powers; and that the French troops, which in virtue of the present convention might pass over to the Allies, should be provided with secure quarters in Normandy, where they were to retire with their arms, cannon, and baggage. In consequence of this important step, the whole corps of Marmont, twelve thousand strong, immediately entered the Allied lines,

where they were received with respect mingled with acclamations, and, passing through their files, took up their quarters at Versailles on their route for Normandy (2). At the same time, Barclay de Tolly issued a proclamation to the Russian troops, in which he declared, that peace being now

restored between France and Russia, all enmity between them and the French inhabitants should forthwith cease, and they should reserve their hostility for the small body of unhappy warriors who still adhered to the fortunes of Napoléon (3).

(1) *Moniteur*, April 4, 1814; and *Cap.* x. 482.

(2) "Soldiers! for three months the most glorious successes had crowned your efforts; neither perils, nor fatigues, nor privations, have been able to diminish your zeal, or cool your ardour for your country. Your country esteems and thanks you by my mouth, and will never forget what you have done. But the moment has now arrived when the war which you waged has become without end or object; it is the moment when you should repose. You are the soldiers of your country; it is public opinion, therefore, which you are bound to follow,

and it desires you to tear yourselves from dangers which are now without an object; to preserve the noble blood which you will know how again to shed should your country again call for your exertions. Good cantonnements and my paternal cares, will soon, I trust, make you forget the fatigues you have experienced."—MARMONT to his Corps d'armée. 5th April 1814; *Moniteur*, 7th April 1814; and *CAFEFIGUE*, x. 500.

(3) *Moniteur*, April 4 and 7, 1814; and *Cap.* x. 497, 501.

"Soldiers! your perseverance and your valour

Caulaincourt's
fruitless
missions to
Alexander.

That body, however, was daily becoming more inconsiderable : the fidelity of the Revolution was towards the god of its idolatry—success; and it could not withstand the storms of adverse fortune.

Caulaincourt, dispatched by Napoléon from the Trois Fontaines of Juvisy to endeavour to reopen a negotiation with the Allied powers, had great difficulty in making his way into Paris, as the barriers were in the hands of the Allied soldiers, when, by accident, the carriage of the Grand Duke Constantine drove up, who, after much entreaty, agreed to put him in the way of seeing the Emperor, though without giving him the slightest reason to hope that any alteration of the determinations already taken would be expected. This was on the evening of the 31st March. He was introduced into the palace of the Élysée Bourbon at ten at night, but the Emperor could not leave the conference of the Allied sovereigns at which he assisted. The brilliant lights with which the palace was resplendent : the rapid entry and departure of carriages; the cheers of the Russian guards round the hotel; the prancing and neighing of steeds which drove up to the door; the busy concourse to and fro—reminded him of the days when, in that same palace, Napoléon had with him matured his gigantic plans for the conquest of Russia. What a contrast for the imperial plenipotentiary! Here, worn out with care, devoured with misery, steeped in grief, he awaited with breathless anxiety the approach of the Czar, who was to announce the decision of the Allied powers on his master's fate. At length, at one in the morning, the Emperor appeared, and received him in the kindest manner; but gave him no hopes of any modification of the resolution of the sovereigns. The utmost that he could get him to promise was, that on the day following, at the council, he would revert to the question of a regency; intimating, at the same time, that any further hope was inadmissible. At four the Emperor retired to rest: he reposed in the bed in which Napoléon formerly slept: Caulaincourt threw himself, in the antichamber, on a sofa on which that great man had in old times worked with his secretaries during the day. Unable to sleep, from the recollections with which he was distracted, he arose, and slept for some hours in an arm-chair: when daylight dawned in the morning, he found that it was the very chair on which Napoléon had usually sat, and bore, in all parts, the deep indentations of his penknife (1). The decision of the sovereigns was then announced by Alexander in these words:—"Return unto the Emperor Napoléon: tell him faithfully all that has passed here, and as soon as possible come back with an abdication in favour of his son. The Emperor Napoléon shall be suitably treated, I give you my word of honour (2)."

Napoléon
agrees to
abdicate in
favour of
his son.
April 4.

Caulaincourt arrived with this intelligence at Fontainebleau late on the night of the 2d April. Napoléon at once refused, in the most peremptory terms, to abdicate in favour of his son, and treated as altogether chimerical the idea of restoring the Bourbons in France; alleging that they were obnoxious to nine-tenths of the nation (3). Full of

have delivered the French nation from the yoke of a tyrant, who acted for himself alone, and forgot what he owed to an estimable and generous people. The French nation has declared for us: our cause has become theirs; and our magnanimous monarchs have promised them protection and support. From that moment the French became our friends. Let your arms destroy the inconsiderable band of unfortunate men who still adhere to the ambitious Napoléon; but let the cultivators and peaceable inhabitants of towns be treated with consideration and

friendship, like allies united by the same interests."
—*Ordre du jour, par le COMTE BARCLAY DE TOLLÉ, Paris, 4th April 1815; Moniteur, of 5th.*

(1) *Ante*, ix. 159.

(2) *Caul.* i. 363, 380; and ii. 1, 19. *Cap.* x. 491, 493. *Fain*, 218, 219.

(3) "Re-establish the Bourbons in France! The madmen! They would not be there a year: they are an object of antipathy to nine-tenths of the nation. And how would the army, whose chiefs have combated the emigrants—how would they bear the

the project of resuming hostilities, he mounted on horseback early on the morning of the 5d, and traversed the advanced posts along the whole line. The soldiers, despite their disasters, were full of enthusiasm, and demanded, with loud cries, to be led back to Paris (1); and the *young* generals who had their fortunes to make shared the general ardour. But it was not thus with the old generals, or those whose fortunes were made. They surrounded Caulaincourt, eagerly demanding what had been done at Paris; listened with undisguised complacency to the proceedings of the senate; and it was evident from their doubts and hesitations, either that they regarded the cause of the Revolution as hopeless, or that they had profited so much by its excesses, that they were disposed to risk nothing more in its defence. The marshals were nearly unanimous on the subject; Ney in particular was peculiarly vehement upon the impossibility of further maintaining the contest, and the absurdity of their sacrificing every thing for one man (2). Orders were nevertheless given over night for the troops to prepare for a forward movement; and measures were adopted for transferring the headquarters next day to Essonne, on the road to Paris. But, during the night, news arrived of the dethronement of the Emperor by the senate; it spread immediately through the army, and produced a great impression, especially on the marshals and older generals; the orders to advance to Paris were not recalled, but it was evident that they were not to be obeyed; and at noon a conference of the Emperor with Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald, Maret, Caulaincourt, and Bertrand, took place, at the close of which Napoleon signed his abdication in favour of his son, and of the Empress as regent. Macdonald and Ney were forthwith dispatched with Caulaincourt to present this conditional abdication to the Allied sovereigns (3).

While the three plenipotentiaries of Napoleon were on their way to Paris, the march of events at Fontainebleau was so rapid as almost to outstrip imagination. During the night of the 4th, intelligence arrived of the adhesion of Marmont to the provisional government, and the entrance of his *corps d'armée* within the Allied lines.

Napoleon's
proclamation
against
Marmont
and the
Senate.

change? No, no; my soldiers will never be theirs: it is the height of folly to think of founding an empire of such heterogeneous materials as theirs of necessity would be composed of. Can it ever be forgotten that they have lived twenty years on the charity of the stranger, in open war with the principles and interests of France? The Bourbons in France! It is absolute madness, and will bring down on the country a host of calamities. I was a new man, free of the blood which had stained the Revolution: I had nothing to avenge, every thing to reconstruct; but even I would never have ventured to seat myself on the vacant throne had not my forehead been crowned with laurels. The French nation had not raised me on their bucklers, but because I have executed great and glorious deeds for it. But the Bourbons, what have they done for France? What part can they claim in its conquests, its glory, its prosperity? Re-established by the stranger, they must yield every thing to their masters; they must bend the knee to them at every turn. They may take advantage of the stupor occasioned by the occupation of the capital to proscribeme and my family; but to make the Bourbon reign in France!—never!"—CAULAINCOURT, ii. 48, 50.

(1) "Soldiers!" said he, "the enemy has gained some marches upon us, and outstripped us at Paris. Some factious men, the emigrants whom I have pardoned, have mounted the white cockade, and surrounded the Emperor Alexander, and they

would compel us to wear it. Since the Revolution, France has always been mistress of herself. I offered peace to the Allies, leaving France in its ancient limits, but they would not accept it. In a few days I will attack the enemy; I will force him to quit our capital. I rely on you—am I right? (Yes, yes.) Our cockade is tricolor; before abandoning it we will all perish on the soil of France. (Hurrah! yes, yes.)"—CAPEFIGUE, x. 496.

(2) "Ney, in an especial manner, made himself remarkable by the vehemence of his expressions, as he had always done since Moscow. 'Are we,' said he, 'to sacrifice every thing to one man? Fortune, rank, honours, life itself? It is time to think a little of ourselves, our families, and our interests.' Caulaincourt warmly supported the plan of a regency, thinking it was all that could be done for Napoleon."—CAPEFIGUE, x. 492.

(3) Fain, 218, 221. Caul. ii. 28, 37. Cap. x. 492, 493.

"The Allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even life itself, for the good of the country, inseparable from the rights of his son, of the regency of the Empress, and of the maintenance of the laws of the empire."—Fontainebleau, April 4, 1814; FAIN, 221.

At this news the indignation of the Emperor knew no bounds, and its vehemence found vent in an order of the day next morning. "The Emperor," said he, "thanks the army for the attachment which it has manifested towards him, and chiefly because it has recognized the great principle that France is to be found in him, and not in the people of the capital. The soldier follows the fortune and the misfortune of his general, his honour is his religion. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his companions in arms with that sentiment : he has passed over to the Allies. The Emperor cannot approve the condition on which he has taken that step ; he cannot accept life and liberty at the mercy of a subject. The senate has allowed itself to dispose of the government of France ; it forgets that it owes to the Emperor the power which it has now abused ; that it was he who saved a part of its members from the storms of the Revolution, drew it from obscurity, and protected it against the hatred of the nation. The senate founds on the articles of the constitution to overturn it, without adverting to the fact, that, as the first branch of the state, it took part in those very acts. A sign from me was an order for the senate, which always did more than was desired of it. The senate does not blush to speak of the libels the Emperor has published against foreign nations ; it forgets that they were drawn up by itself. As long as fortune was faithful to their sovereign, these men were faithful, and not a whisper was heard against the abuses of power. If the Emperor despised them, as they now reproach him with having done, the world will see whether or not he had reasons for his opinion. He held his dignity from God and the nation ; they alone could deprive him of it. He always considered it as a burden ; and when he accepted it, it was in the conviction that he alone was able to bear its weight. The happiness of France appeared to be indissolubly wound up with the fortunes of the Emperor : now that fortune has decided against him, the will of the nation alone can persuade him to remain on the throne. If he is really the only obstacle to peace, he willingly gives himself up the last sacrifice to France (1)."

The mission of Caulaincourt to establish a regency fails.

When Caulaincourt and Macdonald arrived at Paris, however, they found that matters had proceeded too far to render the proposition of a regency admissible. In fact, though the emperor Alexander secretly inclined to that course, and Austria as might have been expected, was ready to support it ; yet the declaration against Napoléon, and the manifestations in favour of the Bourbons, had been so vehement and unanimous from all incorporated bodies and all classes of society, that to establish the family of Napoléon now on the throne, would appear to be doing a violence to the national will. Nor did it escape observation, that the recognition of Marie-Louise as regent, and the young Napoléon as heir, would in fact be a continuation of the revolutionary regime, attended with all its passions, its ambitions, and its dangers ; and that the exclusion of Napoléon personally would be but a name, as long as his family sat upon the throne, and the imperial authorities continued the government (2). Influenced by these considerations, the Allied Powers unanimously agreed that the sentence of dethronement pronounced by the senate could not be disturbed, and that they must adhere faithfully to their declaration, that

(1) Fain, 225, 227. Cap. x. 505.

(2) "A regency with the Empress and her son," said the Emperor Alexander, "sounds well, I admit ; but Napoléon remains—there is the difficulty. In vain will he promise to remain quiet in the retreat which will be assigned to him. You know even better than I his devouring activity, his ambition.

Some fine morning he will put himself at the head of the regency, or in its place : then the war will recommence, and all Europe will be on fire. The very dread of such an occurrence will oblige the Allies to keep their armies on foot, and thus frustrate all their intentions in making peace."—THIBAUDEAU, x. 15.

they would not negotiate with Napoléon or any of his family. Caulaincourt and Macdonald exerted themselves to the utmost in the Emperor's behalf (1); but it was in vain, and Alexander announced the final decision, in the mournful words—"It is too late." Ney was more flexible; feeble and irresolute in political life, as much as he was bold and undaunted in the field of battle, he was easily gained over to the party of Talleyrand; and next morning his formal adhesion to the provisional government appeared in the columns of the *Moniteur* (2).

The cause of the Restoration had become irresistible at Paris.

In truth, during the four days which had elapsed since the first declaration of the Allies that they would not treat with Napoléon or any of his family, the cause of the Bourbons had been gained. The voice in their favour, which at first had emanated merely from the enthusiastic lips of a few devoted adherents, whose fidelity had survived all the storms of the Revolution, had now swelled into a mighty shout, so as to include not only the whole influential bodies, but nearly all the population of the capital. It was neither any chivalrous feelings of loyalty, nor any abstract repentance for the crimes of the Revolution: *deliverance from evil* was the prevailing feeling of the multitude—preservation of their fortunes, the ruling passion with the great. Even on the first day of the Allies' arrival, a crowd of persons, flying with characteristic vehemence from one extreme to another, had grossly insulted the busts and monuments of the Emperor, and a rope was slung up to the very top of the pillar in the Place Vendôme, with which they strove to pull it down; but the solidity of the fabric resisted all their efforts. When they could not succeed in throwing it down, the mob next covered the statue with a white sheet, so as to withdraw it from the view. "They did well," said Napoléon, "to conceal from me the sight of their baseness." By a decree of the senate on

April 5. April 5, all the emblems and initials belonging to the imperial dynasty were ordered to be effaced from all the public edifices and monuments in Paris; workmen were immediately engaged to carry this decree into execution, and their ingenuity generally contrived to turn the N into an H, for Henri IV, as quickly as the nation turned from the imperial to the royal dynasty. So great was the violence of public feeling against the monuments of the late Emperor, that Alexander, to prevent their total destruction, was obliged to issue a decree, taking them, and in an especial manner the pillar in the Place Vendôme, under his peculiar protection (3).

Such was the rise in the public funds on the prospect of a termination of the war, that the five *per cents*, which on the 30th March were at 45, had risen in the next five days 25 *per cent*, so as to be quoted on the 5th April at 70. Universal transports, similar to those which prevailed in England at the Restoration, seized upon the public mind; it was like the joy of a shipwrecked mariner when he first beholds a friendly sail in

(1) Thib. x. 24. Fain, ii. 228, 230. Cap. x. 508, 509. Caul. ii. 51, 57. Lond. 311.

(2) Yesterday, I came to Paris with the Duke of Vicoenza and the Duke of Tarentum, furnished with full powers from the Emperor Napoléon to defend the interests of his dynasty on the throne. An unforeseen event having broken off the negotiations when they promised the happiest results, I saw that, to avoid a civil war to our beloved country, no course remained but to embrace the cause of our ancient kings; and, penetrated with that sentiment, I repaired that evening to the Emperor Napoléon to declare to him the wish of the French nation. The Emperor, aware of the critical situation to which

he has reduced France, and of the impossibility of his saving it himself, appeared to resign himself to his fate, and has consented to an absolute resignation, without any restriction."—LE MARÉCHAL NEY. Fontainebleau, 5th April 1814, half-past Eleven at Night.—*Moniteur*, April 7.

(3) *Moniteur*, April 5 and 7, 1814. Cap. x. 492.

"The monument on the Place Vendôme is under the especial safeguard of the magnanimity of the Emperor and his Allies. The statue on its summit will immediately be taken down, and give place to one of Peace."—*Proclamation 7th April 1814; Moniteur*.

the desolate main. In the midst of the general rapture, Chateaubriand's celebrated pamphlet, "*De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*," appeared, and contributed, in the most powerful manner, to give a practical direction to general feeling, by pointing out with fervent, though exaggerated eloquence, the origin of the public evils, and the only mode of escape which yet remained open to them. Whatever might be said of the violence of this production, of which thirty thousand copies were sold in a few days, no reproach could be cast upon the consistency of the author; for he had refused office under Napoléon on the death of the Duke d'Enghien, and braved his resentment in the plenitude of his power (1). When Alexander and the King of Prussia appeared at the opera on the 3d April, thunders of applause shook that splendid edifice. Every allusion to passing events was seized with avidity and encored with rapture: the splendid melodrama, the Triumph of Trajan, was brought forth with unequalled magnificence, and had a run of unprecedented success; and a couplet, the production of a very liberal writer, was sung and rapturously encored, which savoured rather of the servility of an oriental despotism, than of a nation which had so strenuously contested for liberty and equality (2).

When the plenipotentiaries of Napoléon returned to Fontainebleau with this decided refusal, he burst out into a violent explosion of passion: declared that it was too much: that he would put himself at the head of his armies, and rather run the hazard of any calamities than submit to a humiliation worse than them all. He called for his generals and maps; talked of retiring to the Loire, and spoke of the resources which still remained to him in the armies of Soult and Suchet. But, during the night, he received the most decisive proof of the universal defection of his generals. All, with the exception of a few young, generous, and ardent men, represented the continuance of the war as impossible; and in fact, during the five days which had elapsed since the battle of Paris, the Allied forces had so accumulated both on his front and flanks, that retreat even had become out of the question. Still the iron soul of Napoléon refused to yield, and it was only after several painful altercations between him and his marshals, that, with an agitated hand, and in almost illegible characters, he wrote and signed the absolute and unqualified resignation of the throne. "Observe," said he, when he affixed his signature, "it is with a conquering enemy that I treat, and not with the provisional government, in whom I see nothing but a set of factious traitors (3)."

And now commenced at Fontainebleau a scene of baseness never exceeded in any age of the world, and which forms an instructive commentary on the

(1) *Ante*, iv. 375.

(2) Cap. x. 508, 509. Personal observation. Thib. iy. 653, 655, Moutg. vii. 418, 419.

The following couplets were added to the air of Henry IV, and sung at all the theatres amidst unbounded applause:—

"Vive Alexandre,
Vive ce Roi des Rois,
Qui vient nous défendre
Sans nous donner des lois;
Ce prince auguste,
A le triple renom
De héros, de juste,
Et nous rend un Bourbon.

Vive Guillaume,
Et ses guerriers vaillants;
De ce royaume,
Il sauve les enfants,

Par sa victoire,
Il nous donne la paix,
Et comble sa gloire
Par ses nombreux bienfaits." *

(3) *Moniteur*, April 12, 1814. Cap. x. 515. Fain, 231, 232. Caul. ii. 62, 68, 95.

"The Allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoléon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of a general peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoléon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the throne of France and Italy; and that there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not willing to make for the interests of France."—*Fontainebleau*, April 6, 1814; *Moniteur*, April 12, 1814; and *CATREFIGUE*, x. 515.

Universal
and base
defection
from Napo-
léon.

principles and practice of the Revolution. Let an eyewitness of these hideous tergiversations record them; they would pass for incredible if drawn from any less unexceptionable source. "Every hour (1)," says Caulaincourt, "was after this marked by fresh voids in the Emperor's household. The universal object was how to get first to Paris. All the persons in office quitted their post without leave, or asking permission; one after another they all slipped away, totally forgetting him to whom they owed every thing, but who had no longer any thing to give. The universal complaint was, that his formal abdication was so long of appearing. 'It was high time,' it was said by every one, 'for all this to come to an end; it is absolute childishness to remain any longer in the antichambers of Fontainebleau, when favours are showering down at Paris;' and with that they all set off for the capital. Such was their anxiety to hear of his abdication, that they pursued misfortune even into its last asylum; and every time the door of the Emperor's cabinet opened, a crowd of heads were seen peeping in to gain the first hint of the much longed for news." No sooner was the abdication and the treaty with the Allies signed, than the desertion was universal; every person of note around the Emperor, with the single and honourable exceptions of Maret and Caulaincourt, abandoned him: the antichambers of the palace were literally deserted. Berthier even left his benefactor without bidding him adieu! "He was born a courtier," said Napoléon when he learned his departure: "you will see my vice-constable mendicating employment from the Bourbons. I feel mortified that men, whom I have raised so high in the eyes of Europe, should sink so low. What have they made of that halo of glory through which they have hitherto been seen by the stranger? What must the sovereigns think of such a termination to all the illustrations of my reign (2)!"

Treaty
between
Napoléon
and the
Allied
powers.

Nothing remained now but to conclude the formal treaty between Napoléon and the Allied powers; and it was signed on the 11th April. By it, Napoléon renounced the empire of France and the kingdom of Italy for himself and his descendants; but he was to retain the title of Emperor, and his mother, brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, those of princes and princesses of his family. The island of Elba having been selected by him as his place of residence, it was erected into a principality in his favour: the duchy of Parma and Placentia was secured to the Empress Marie-Louise and the prince her son in full sovereignty: two millions five hundred thousand of francs (L.100,000) a-year was provided for the annual income of the Emperor Napoléon, to be reserved from the revenue of the countries he ceded, and two millions more inscribed on the great book of France, and to descend after his decease to his heirs, the first being a provision for himself, the second for his family; the Empress Joséphine was to receive a million of francs yearly (L.40,000) from the great book of France. All the moveable estate of the princes and princesses of the Emperor's family was to remain with themselves; but the furniture of the palace and diamonds of the crown were to remain to France. Fifteen hundred of the old guard were to escort the Emperor to his place of embarkation; and he

(1) Caul. ii. 68, 69, 99, 114. Fain, 233, 235, Cap. x. 317, 318.

(2) In the general scramble, Constant, the Emperor's private valet, who had served him faithfully for fourteen years, took the opportunity to secrete one hundred thousand francs with which he had been entrusted, and which he buried in the forest of Fontainebleau. The fraud was detected the night before the Emperor set out for Elba, and the money

given up by Constant, from the place where he had secreted it. He set off immediately for Paris, accompanied by Rustan the Mameluke, who had been the Emperor's constant companion ever since he returned from Egypt. What is very remarkable, Constant details all these facts himself, giving them of course the best colouring he could.—See CONSTANT'S *Memoirs*, vi. 101, 112; and FAIN, ii. 150.

was to be at liberty to take with him four hundred soldiers to form his body guard. Finally, the Poles in the service of France were to be at liberty to return to their own country, with their arms and baggage. The treaty bore the signatures of Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode, and Hardenberg. To this treaty Lord Castlereagh, on the part of England, acceded, "but only to be binding upon his Britannic Majesty with respect to his own acts, but not with respect to the acts of third parties (1)."

Abortive
attempt of
Napoleon to
poison
himself.

A terrible catastrophe had wellnigh terminated at this period the life and the sufferings of Napoléon. His departure for Elba had been fixed for the 20th April; and in the interim, while he was totally deserted by all but a few domestics and his faithful guards, it became evident to those around him that some absorbing idea had taken possession of his mind. He recurred constantly to the last moments of departed greatness; his conversation to his intimate friends was entirely upon the illustrious men of antiquity, who, in circumstances similar to his own, had fallen by their own hand; in the close of his career, as in its outset, he dwelt on the heroes of Plutarch, and their resolution not to survive misfortune. The apprehensions of his attendants were increased when they learned that on the 12th, the day after the signature of the treaty, he had directed the Empress Marie-Louise, who was on her way from Blois to join him, to delay the execution of her design. On taking leave of Caulaincourt that night, after a mournful reverie he said, "My resolution is taken: we must end: I feel it." Caulaincourt had not been many hours in bed when he was suddenly roused by Constant, the Emperor's valet, who entreated him to come instantly, for Napoléon was in convulsions, and fast dying. He instantly ran in; Bertrand and Maret were already there; but nothing was to be heard but stifled groans from the bed of Napoléon. Soon, however, his domestic surgeon Ivan, who had so long attended him in his campaigns, appeared in the utmost consternation, and stated that he had been seen, shortly after going to bed, to rise quietly, pour a liquid into a glass, and lie down again; and Ivan had recognized in the phial, which was left on the table, a subtle poison, a preparation of opium and other deadly substances, which he had given him during the Moscow retreat, at his desire, and which, as long as the danger lasted, he had constantly worn round his neck. When Caulaincourt seized his hand, it was already cold. "Caulaincourt," said he, opening his eyes, "I am about to die. I recommend to you my wife and my son—defend my memory; I could no longer endure life. The desertion of my old companions in arms had broken my heart." The poison, however, either from having been so long kept, or some other cause, had lost its original efficacy; violent vomiting gave him relief; he was with great difficulty prevailed on to drink warm water (2); and after a mortal agony of two hours, the spasms gradually subsided, and he fell asleep. "Ivan," said he, on awaking, "the dose was not strong enough—God did not will it;" and he rose, pale and haggard, but composed, and seemed now to resign himself with equanimity to his future fate.

Meanwhile, the imperial court at Blois, where the Empress Marie-Louise and the King of Rome had been since the taking of Paris, was the scene of selfishness more marked, desertions more shameless, than even the saloons of

(1) See the Treaty in Martens, Sup. i. 696, 700; and Cap. x. 518, 519.

Lord Castlereagh's objections to the treaty were twofold. 1st, That it recognized the title of Napoléon as Emperor of France, which England had never yet done, directly or indirectly. 2d, That it assigned him a residence, in independent sovereignty,

close to the Italian coast, and within a few days' sail of France, while the fires of the revolutionary volcano were yet unextinguished in both countries. The result proved that he had judged rightly.—See BEAUCHAMP, ii. 384.

(2) Caul. ii. 85, 89. Fain, 241, 243. Constant, vi. 85, 90.

Fontainebleau. Unrestrained by the awful presence of the Emperor, the egotism and cupidty of the courtiers there appeared in hideous nakedness, and the fumes of the Revolution expired amidst the universal baseness of its followers. No sooner was the abdication of the Emperor known, than all her court deserted the Empress: it was a general race who should get first to Paris, to share in the favours of the new dynasty. Such was the desertion, that in getting into her carriage on the 9th April, at Blois, to take the road to Orleans, no one remained to hand the Empress in but her chamberlain. The Empress, the King of Rome, were forgotten: the grand object of all was to get away, and to carry with them as much as possible of the public treasure, which had been brought from Paris with the government. In a few days it had all disappeared. At Orleans, the remaining members of Napoléon's family also departed: Madame Mere and her brother, the Cardinal Fesch, set out for Rome; Prince Louis, the ex-king of Holland, for Switzerland; Joseph and Jerome soon after followed in the same direction. The Empress at first declared her resolution to join Napoléon, maintaining that there was her post, and that she would share his fortunes in adversity, as she had done in prosperity. The wretched sycophants, however, who were still about her person, spared no pains to alienate her from the Emperor: they represented that he had espoused her only from policy; that she had never possessed his affections; that during the short period they had been married he had had a dozen mistresses (1), and that she could now expect nothing but reproaches and bad usage from him. Overcome partly by these insinuations, and partly by her own facility of character and habits of submission, she too followed the general example: her French guards were dismissed, and replaced by Cossacks; she took the road from Orleans to Rambouillet, where she was visited successively by the Emperor her father, and the Emperor Alexander; and at length she yielded to their united entreaties, and agreed to abandon Napoléon. A few days after she set out for Vienna, taking the King of Rome with her, and neither ever saw Napoléon more (2).

Amidst the general and humiliating scene of baseness which disgraced the French functionaries at the fall of Napoléon, it is consolatory for the honour of human nature to have some instances of a contrary character to recount. Carnot remained faithful at his post at Antwerp till the abdication of Napoléon was officially intimated; and then he announced his adhesion to the new government, in an order of the day to the garrison, in which he concluded with the memorable words, which comprise so much of a soldier's duty: "Thé armed force is essentially obedient; it acts, but never deliberates." Soult was one of the last to give in; his adhesion is dated Castelnau, April 19, nine days after the battle of Toulouse (3), and when, in reality, there was no alternative, as the whole nation had unequivocally declared itself. Of the few who remained faithful to the Emperor at Fontainebleau, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high ad-

(1) There was too much foundation for this scandal. Though women had no lasting power over Napoléon, and never in the slightest degree influenced his conduct, he was extremely amorous in his disposition, so far as the senses were concerned; and his infidelities, though carefully conducted to avoid observation, were very frequent, both before and after his marriage with Marie-Louise. Two instances, in particular, are mentioned by Constant, which occurred at St.-Cloud recently before this period; and, what was very remarkable, both

the ladies, one of whom was of rank, came to visit him at Fontainebleau during the mournful scenes which passed, though neither saw him on that occasion. Both afterwards visited him at Elba — Constant's *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vi. 92-97.

(2) Sav. vii. 115, 119, 156, 157. Thib. x. 33, 34.

(3) "Essentially obedient, the army has nothing now to do but to conform to the will of the nation." — Soult's *Proclamation*, Castelnau, 19th April 1814; *Moniteur*, 24th April; and *BEAUCHAMP*, ii. 501.

miration. Caulaincourt, after having nobly discharged to the very last his duties to his old master, at his earnest request returned to Paris, a few days before he departed for Elba, and bore with him an autograph letter from Napoléon to Louis XVIII, in which he strongly recommended him to his service. The Emperor obviously thought, and justly, that his presence there was indispensable to watch over the performance of the treaty of Fontainebleau. General Bertrand, Generals Drouot and Cambronne, Maret, General Belliard, Baron Fain, General Gourgaud, Colonel Anatole Montesquieu, Baron De la Place, Generals Kosakowski and Vonsowitch, remained with him to the last at Fontainebleau; and Bertrand shared his exile, as well at Elba as at St.-Hélène. Macdonald, though the last of his marshals to be taken into favour, was faithful to his duty; he did not forget his word pledged on the field of Wagram (1). Napoléon was so sensible of his fidelity, that on the morning when he brought him the ratification of the treaty of Fontainebleau to sign, he publicly thanked him for his affectionate zeal, and lamented the coldness which had at one period estranged them from each other. "At least," said the Emperor, "you will not refuse one souvenir—it is the sabre of Mourad-Bey, which I have often worn in battle; keep it for my sake. Return to Paris, and serve the Bourbons as faithfully as you have served me." Amidst the general and hideous defection of the other marshals (2), it is refreshing to find one man who preserved unscathed, amidst the revolutionary furnace, the honour and fidelity of his Scottish ancestors; which had so long bound the Highlanders, more steadily even in adverse than prosperous fortune, to the house of Stuart.

The Emperor's last speech at Fontainebleau.
April 20.

The last scene of this mighty drama was not unworthy of the dignity of those which had preceded it. When the day for setting out drew nigh, Napoléon in the first instance refused to move, and even threatened to renew the war, alleging that the Allied powers had broken the compact with him, by not permitting the Empress Marie-Louise and his son to accompany him. Upon the solemn assurance of General Koller, the Austrian commissioner, that the absence of the Empress was of her own free-will, he agreed to take his leave. The preparations for the Emperor's departure having been completed, and the four commissioners, on the part of the Allied Sovereigns, who were to accompany him been appointed—viz. General Koller on the part of Austria, General Schouvaloff on that of Russia, Colonel Campbell on that of England, and Count Waldbourgh-Truchsess on behalf of Prussia—the Emperor at noonday descended the great stair of the palace of Fontainebleau, and, after passing the array of carriages which awaited him at the door, advanced into the middle of the old guard, which stood drawn up to receive him. Amidst breathless silence and tearful eyes he thus addressed them:—"Soldiers of my Old Guard, I bid you adieu! During twenty years I have ever found you in the path of honour and of glory. In the last days, as in those of our prosperity, you have never ceased to be models of bravery and fidelity. With such men as you, our cause could never be lost; but the war was interminable: it would have become a civil war, and France must daily have become more unhappy. I have therefore

(1) *Ante*, vii. 251.

(2) Augereau, at Valence, on the Rhone, thus addressed his soldiers:—"Soldiers! The Senate, the just interpreter of the national will, worn out with the despotism of Buonaparte, has pronounced, on the 2d April, the dethronement of him and his family. A new dynasty, strong and liberal, descended from our ancient kings, will replace Buonaparte and his despotism. Soldiers! you are absolved

from your oaths; you are so by the nation, in which the sovereignty resides: you are still more so, were it necessary, by the abdication of a man, who, after having sacrificed millions to his cruel ambition, has not known how to die as a soldier.—AUGEREAU, 16th April; *Moniteur*, 23d April 1814.

(3) *Mém. sur Carnot*, 280. *Thib.* x. 27, 29. *Moniteur*, April 21. *Caul*, ii. 115, 125.

sacrificed all our interests to those of our country : I depart ; but you remain to serve France. Its happiness was my only thought ; it will always be the object of my wishes. Lament not my lot : if I have consented to survive myself, it was because I might contribute to your glory. I am about to write the great deeds we have done together. Adieu, my children ! I would I could press you all to my heart ; but I will, at least, press your eagle." At these words General Petit advanced with the eagle ; Napoléon received the general in his arms, and kissed the standard. His emotion now almost overcame him ; but making a great effort, he regained his firmness, and said, " Adieu, once again, my old companions ! May this last embrace penetrate your hearts ! " With these words he tore himself from the embraces of those around him, and threw himself into his carriage, which immediately drove off amidst the sobs and tears of his faithful guard, all of whom had petitioned to be allowed to accompany him. Certainly never was a great career more nobly terminated (1).

Napoléon ere long, however, received convincing evidence, that how ardent soever might be the attachment of his soldiers, the population of all France was far from sharing the same sentiments. On the road to Lyons, indeed, he was received always with respect, generally with acclamations ; but after passing that city, which he traversed on the night of the 25d, he began to experience the fickleness of mankind, and received bitter proofs of the baseness of human nature, as well as the general indignation which his oppressive government had produced. At noon on the following day he accidentally met Augereau on the road near Valence : both alighted from their carriages, and ignorant of the atrocious proclamation, in which that marshal had so recently announced his conversion to the cause of the Bourbons (2), the Emperor embraced him, and they walked together on the road for a quarter of an hour, in the most amicable manner. It was observed, however, that Augereau kept his helmet on his head as he walked along. A few minutes after, the Emperor entered Valence, and beheld the proclamation placarded on the walls : he then saw what recollection his lieutenant had retained of the days of Castiglione (3). The troops were drawn out to receive him, and they saluted the Emperor as he passed ; but they all bore the white cockade. At Orange loud cries of " Vive le Roi " were heard, and at Avignon he found his statues overturned, and the public effervescence against his government assuming the most menacing character.

As Napoléon continued his journey to the south, the tumult became so excessive, that his life was more than once in imminent danger from the fury of the populace. At Orgon, he was with difficulty extricated, and chiefly by the firmness and intrepidity of Colonel Campbell and the other Allied commissioners, who acted with equal courage and judgment, from a violent death ; and at the inn of La Calade, near Saint-Cannat, a furious mob surrounded the house for some hours demanding his head, and it was only by getting out by a back window, and riding the next post in disguise, with the white cockade on his breast, as a courier, that he escaped. Such was the mortification which Napoléon felt at this cruel reception from the people whom he had so long governed, that when the Allied commissioners came up to the post-house, they found him in a back-room, with his elbows on his knees and his hands on his forehead, in profound

(1) Fain, 250, 252. Thib. x. 46, 47.

(2) *Ante*, x. 244.

(3) Thib. x. 45, 16. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. i. 31, 32. Bour. x. 227, 230.

affliction. Relays were provided outside the walls at Aix, to avoid the dangers of entering the city; he was clothed in the Austrian uniform, which he wore during the remainder of his journey; and the under prefet, Dupeloux, a man of courage and honour, escorted him in person on horseback as far as the limits of his department. At Luc, Napoléon met and had an affecting interview with Pauline, who, amidst all her vanities, had some elevated points of character; on the 27th, he reached Frejus; and on the 28th, at eight at night, set sail for Elba, on board the English frigate, *The Undaunted*, sent there to receive him. Thus, in its last stage, a British vessel bore Cæsar and his fortunes. He was received by Captain Usher, who commanded that vessel, agreeably to the orders of government, with the honours due to a crowned head; a royal salute was fired as he stepped on board, the yards were manned, and every possible respect was shown to him, from the captain to the humblest cabin-boy. Such was the impression produced by this reception from his enemies, so different from that of his own subjects which he had recently experienced, that he burst into tears. During the voyage he was cheerful and affable; conversed much with Captain Usher and the other officers on board, and was particularly inquisitive concerning the details of the English naval discipline, the object, he said, of his long admiration. A slight shade of melancholy was observed to pass over his countenance while the vessel was in sight of the maritime Alps, the scene of his early triumphs; but he soon regained his usual serenity, and had, with his wonderful ascendancy over mankind, made great progress in the affections of the crew, when the vessel cast anchor in Porto-Ferraio, the capital of Elba (1).

Death of Josephine. Josephine did not long survive the fall of the hero, with whose marvellous fortunes her own seemed in a mysterious manner to be linked. In her retreat at Navarre, she had wept in secret the declining fortune and tarnished glory of the husband who had elevated her to the pinnacle of worldly grandeur, and whose star had visibly become obscured from the moment that he divorced her from his side. Alexander was desirous to see and console her amidst her misfortunes, and promise his powerful protection to her children. At his request she came to Malmaison, the much-loved scene of the early and romantic attachment of Napoléon, and there the Emperor saw her frequently, and gave her those assurances in the most unreserved manner. In the midst of these cares, however, she was suddenly taken ill of a putrid sore throat, which proved fatal at the end of a few days. The Emperor Alexander was with her almost to the last, and soothed her deathbed by reiterated assurances of protection to her children. And well and faithfully did he keep his promise. When some delay took place in making out the letters-patent, erecting the forests around Saint Leu into an appanage in favour of the second son of Queen Hortense, her grandson, as had been stipulated in the treaty of Paris, he declared that his guards should not leave Paris till it was signed, which was accordingly done; and in the following year he took Prince Eugène's interests under his especial protection at the congress of Vienna, and was mainly instrumental in there putting them on a proper footing. The friendship thus contracted between the Viceroy and the Czar led to a prolongation of the intimacy in the next generation; and by a remarkable revolution in the wheel of fortune, Eugène Beauharnais' son, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, espoused in subsequent times one of the grand duchesses, a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas; so that it

(1) Thib. x. 47, 48. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. Cent Jours, i. 32, 33. Lab. ii. 452, 453. Journal du Comte Valdbourg, 17, Bourg. x. 227, 235.

is not altogether beyond the bounds of possibility, that a lineal descendant of Joséphine, and a descendant by marriage of Napoléon, may one day mount the throne of Russia (1).

Character of the Emperor Alexander. ALEXANDER, Emperor of Russia, who took so prominent a part in these memorable events, is one of the sovereigns of modern times who has left the greatest name in history, and who has impressed his signet deepest on the records of European fame. The vast extension which the Russian empire has received under his rule, the burning of Moscow, and dreadful overthrow of the French army in 1812; the deliverance of Germany, and fall of Napoléon; have conspired to give a character of awful and yet entrancing interest to his reign, to which there is perhaps nothing comparable in the whole annals of mankind. He was born in 1777, and ascended the throne on the murder of the Emperor Paul in 1800, so that he was at this period only thirty-seven years of age. His character, naturally amiable and benevolent, had been moulded by the precepts of his enlightened, though speculative and visionary, Swiss preceptor, La Harpe; but the ideas of that distinguished philanthropist were formed upon the dreams of the closet rather than a practical acquaintance with men, and this defect strongly appeared when Alexander was first called to act in the great theatre of public life. His early measures were all beneficent in their tendency, and bespoke a warm and susceptible heart; but he was not at first a match for the talent and the wickedness of the Revolution; and he yielded at Tilsit, less to the force of the French arms, than the irresistible ascendant and magic sway of the great Enchanter who wielded these powers.

He became great in misfortune. But if he was born good, he became great. He learned wisdom and gathered strength in the school of misfortune. If he had yielded at first, perhaps, too easily to the fascination of Napoléon's genius, no one ever surpassed him in the firmness with which, when again driven to arms, he resisted his aggression, or the tenacity with which he followed up the contest, till he had hurled his enemy from the throne. His early friendship for Napoléon was an affair of the heart; and he who has surrendered his heart, and been deceived, will be deceived no more. But for his firmness and resolution, the coalition would repeatedly have fallen to pieces; from the day Napoléon crossed the Niemen, he clearly saw that peace with him was impossible; with Roman magnanimity, he held the same language when his empire was reeking with the slaughter of Borodino and his star seemed to pale before the conflagration of Moscow, as when, on the heights of Chaumont, he gave law to a conquered world. And if few conquerors have surpassed him in the lustre of his victories, or the magnitude of his conquests, none have equalled him in the magnanimous use which he made of his power, and the surpassing clemency with which in the moment of triumph he restrained the uplifted arm of justice.

His private character and disposition. In private life his conduct was less irreproachable. Unhappy circumstances had early produced an estrangement between him and the Empress, who spent the later years of his reign at Rome; and this at once deprived the empire of the hope of a direct succession to the throne, and threw the Emperor into the usual temptations of female fascination. He had frequent *liaisons* accordingly, but they partook of the benevolent and tender character of his mind, and were wholly unattended by open licentiousness or indecorum. He was fond of praise, and often led into extremes by that weakness; but it was the praise only of generous or

(1) Thib. x. 115. 117. Beauch. iii. 37, 42. Bour. x. 212, 216.

noble deeds which he coveted. His figure was majestic, his countenance serene, his air mild, but such as at once bespoke the sovereign. No one possessed personal courage in a higher degree, or more passionately desired the honours of war; but still a sense of duty to Europe led him to forego the command, which he might have obtained, of the Allied armies in Germany in 1813. His manners were polished and fascinating in the highest degree, his tastes refined and elegant, and his information surprising, considering the incessant avocations which the management of such weighty concerns required. Though passionately fond of accomplished female society, he was deeply impressed with the responsibility of his situation at the head of such an empire, and ever ready to forego its charms, and abandon all the luxuries of his court, to execute justice or stimulate improvement in the remotest parts of his dominions. A profound master, like most of his nation, of dissimulation, he was yet jealous of his personal honour; and whatever he promised on his word, might with confidence be relied on, how much soever he thought himself entitled to elude the wiles of inferior diplomatists.

His ambition, and character as a sovereign.

He was ambitious; but his thirst for acquisition of territory was so blended with a desire for, and generally followed by an increase of, the happiness of mankind, that it could hardly be called a fault. Deeply impressed with religious feelings, those noble sentiments breathed forth in all his addresses to his people and army throughout the whole course of war, and influenced his conduct to the latest hour of his life. He regarded himself as an instrument in the hand of the Almighty for the destruction of the Revolution and the improvement of mankind, and acted through life sometimes with imprudent haste under that impression. His character cannot be better illustrated in this respect, than by the fact that he refused to permit his statue to be placed on the summit of the column which the gratitude of his country decreed to him at St.-Petersburg, but instead, he caused it to be surmounted by one of Religion extending her arms to bless mankind. Serenity and benevolence formed the leading features of his mind: no one more readily overlooked a fault, or forgave an injury; none was so uniformly devoted to the happiness of his people. But his empire was not ripe for the mighty projects of amelioration which he contemplated; mankind were too selfish and corrupt to follow out his wishes. He was perpetually grieved by discovering how all his philanthropic intentions had been marred by the cupidity or neglect of inferior agents, and how uniformly human wickedness had fastened on the best-conceived plans of social improvement. His very generosity at Paris, the liberal sentiments he there uttered, which entranced the world, were in advance of his people, and brought on a dark conspiracy in his own dominions, which embittered his future days, and in the end shortened his life. Inferior to Napoléon in genius, he was his superior in magnanimity: both conquered the world; but Alexander only could conquer himself. Posterity will certainly award the first place to the matchless genius of the French Emperor; but it will confirm the saying of that great man, extorted from him even in the moment of his fall: "If I were not Napoléon, I would be Alexander (1)."

Character of Talleyrand. His early history.

Never was character more opposite to that of the Russian autocrat than that of his great coadjutor in the pacification and settlement of Europe, PRINCE TALLEYRAND. This most remarkable man was born at Paris in 1754, so that in 1814 he was already sixty years of age.

He was descended of an old family, and had for his maternal aunt the celebrated Princess of Ursins, who played so important a part in the war of the succession at the court of Philippe V. Being destined for the church, he early entered the seminary of St.-Sulpice; and even there was remarkable for the delicate vein of sarcasm, nice discrimination, and keen penetration, for which he afterwards became so distinguished in life. At the age of twenty-six, he was appointed agent-general for the clergy, and, in that capacity, his administrative talents were so remarkable, that they procured for him the situation of Bishop of Autun, which he held in 1789, when the Revolution broke out. So remarkable had his talents become at this period, that Mirabeau, in his secret correspondence with Berlin, pointed him out as one of the most eminent men of the age. He was elected representative of the clergy of his diocese for the constituent assembly, and was one of the first of that rank in the church who voted on the 29th May for the junction of the ecclesiastical body with the *tiers état*. He also took the lead in all the measures, then so popular, which had for their object to spoliage the church, and apply its possessions to the service of the state—accordingly, he himself proposed the suppression of tithes, and the application of the property of the church to the public treasury. In all these measures he was deaf to the remonstrances of the clergy whom he represented, and already he had severed all the cords which bound him to the church.

His ruling principle was not any peculiar enmity to religion, but a fixed determination to adhere to the dominant party, whatever it was, whether in church or state; to watch closely the signs of the times, and throw in his lot with that section of the community which appeared likely to gain the superiority. In February 1790, he was appointed president of the Assembly; and from that time forward, down to its dissolution, he took a leading part in all its measures. He was not, however, an orator: knowledge of men and prophetic sagacity were his great qualifications. Generally silent in the hall of debate, he soon gained the lead in the council of deliberation or committee of management. He officiated as constitutional bishop, to the great scandal of the more orthodox clergy, in the great *fête* on the 14th July 1790, in the Champ-de-Mars, of which an account has already been given (1); but he had already become fearful of the excesses of the popular party, and was, perhaps, the only person to whom Mirabeau, on his deathbed, communicated his secret views and designs for the restoration of the French monarchy. Early in 1792 he set out on a secret mission to London, where he remained till the breaking out of the war in February 1793, and enjoyed much of the confidence of Mr. Pitt. He, naturally enough, became an object of jealousy to both parties; being denounced by the Jacobins as an emissary of the court, and by the Royalists as an agent of the Jacobins; and in consequence he was accused and condemned in his absence, and only escaped by withdrawing to America, where he remained till 1795 engaged in commercial pursuits. It was not the least proof of his address and sagacity, that he thus avoided equally the crimes and the dangers of the Reign of Terror; and returned to Paris at the close of that year with his head on his shoulders, and without deadly hostility to any party in his heart.

His influence and abilities soon caused themselves to be felt; the sentence of death which had been recorded against him in absence was soon recalled; he became a leading member of the Club of Salm, which in 1797,

(1) *Ante*, i, 153.

was established to counterbalance the efforts of the Royalists in the Club of Clichy; and on the triumph of the Revolutionists by the violence of Augereau in July 1797, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, aware of the imbecility of the Directoral government, he entered warmly into the views of Napoléon, upon his return from Egypt, for its overthrow. He was again made Minister of Foreign Affairs by that youthful conqueror after the 18th Brumaire, and continued, with some few interruptions, to be the soul of all foreign negotiations and the chief director of foreign policy, down to the measures directed against Spain in 1807. On that occasion, however, his wonted sagacity did not desert him: he openly disapproved of the attack on the Peninsula, and was, in consequence, dismissed from office, which he did not again hold till he was appointed chief of the provisional government on 1st April 1814. He had thus the singular address, though a leading character under both *régimes*, to extricate himself both from the crimes of the Revolution and the misfortunes of the Empire.

His great abilities. He was no ordinary man who could accomplish so great a prodigy, and yet retain such influence as to step in, as it were, by common consent, into the principal direction of affairs on the overthrow of Napoléon. His power of doing so depended not merely on his great talents; they alone, if unaccompanied by other qualifications, would inevitably have brought him to the guillotine under the first government, or the prisons of state under the last. It was his extraordinary versatility and flexibility of disposition, and the readiness with which he accommodated himself to every change of government and dynasty which he thought likely to be permanent, that mainly contributed to this extraordinary result. Such was his address, that though the most changeable character in the whole Revolution, he contrived never to lose either influence or reputation by all his tergiversations; but, on the contrary, went on constantly rising, to the close of his career, when above eighty years of age, in weight, fortune, and consideration. The very fact of his having survived, both in person and influence, so many changes of government, which had proved fatal to almost all his contemporaries, of itself constituted a colossal reputation; and when he said, with a sarcastic smile, on taking the oath of fidelity to Louis-Philippe in 1830, "*C'est le treizième*," the expression, repeated from one end of Europe to the other, produced a greater admiration for his address, than indignation at his perfidy.

And profound dissimulation. He has been well described as the person in existence who had the least hand in producing, and the greatest power of profiting, by revolutions. He was not destitute of original thought, but wholly without the generous feeling, the self-forgetfulness, which prompt the great in character as well as talent, to bring forth their conceptions in word or action, at whatever hazard to themselves or their fortunes. His object always was not to direct, but to observe and guide the current: he never opposed it when he saw it was irresistible, nor braved its dangers where it threatened to be perilous, but quietly withdrew till an opportunity occurred, by the destruction alike of its supporters and its opponents, to obtain its direction. In this respect his talents very closely resembled those of Metternich, of whom a character has already been drawn (1); but he was less consistent than the wary Austrian diplomatist; and though equalled by him in dissimulation, he was far his superior in perfidy. It cost him nothing to contradict his words and violate his oaths, whenever it suited his interest to do so; and the extra-

(1) *Ante*, ix, 201.

ordinary and almost unbroken success of his career affords, as well as that of Napoleon, the most striking confirmation of the profound saying of Johnson—that no man ever raised himself from private life to the supreme direction of affairs, in whom great abilities were not combined with certain meanesses, which would have proved altogether fatal to him in ordinary life. Yet was he without any of the great vices of the Revolution; his selfishness was constant, his cupidity unbounded, his hands often sullied by gold; but he was not cruel or unforgiving in his disposition, and few, if any, deeds of blood stain his memory. His witticisms and bon-mots were admirable, and repeated from one end of Europe to the other; yet was his reputation in this respect perhaps greater than the reality; for, by common consent, every good saying at Paris during his life-time was ascribed to the ex-bishop of Autun. But none perhaps more clearly reveals his character and explains his success in life, than the celebrated one, “That the principal object of language was to conceal the thought.”

Solemn
thanksgiving
in the Place
Louis XV.

On Easter day, being April 10, a grand and imposing ceremony was performed in the Place Louis XV. On the spot where Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, the Princess Elizabeth, and so many of the noble victims of the Revolution had perished, a great altar was erected, by command of the Emperor Alexander, in order to a general thanksgiving, by the sovereigns and armies, for the signal and complete success with which it had pleased the Almighty to bless the Allied arms. There was something to the thoughtful mind inexpressibly impressive in this august ceremony. Bare-headed, around the altar, the sovereigns, with their princes, marshals, and generals, partook in the service, which was celebrated with extraordinary pomp, according to the forms of the Greek church, by the bishops and priests of that establishment who had accompanied the Russian army. But it was, in the most emphatic sense, a *catholic* service: all Christendom was there represented; the uniforms of twenty victorious nations were to be seen round the altar: it was a thanksgiving for the triumph of Christianity over the most inveterate, the most depraved, and the most powerful of its enemies. On their knees, around the altar, the monarchs kissed the sacred emblem of the cross; when it was elevated, all assembled bowed their heads with reverent devotion; and a hundred guns, from the two banks of the Seine, announced the triumph of the Gospel by the devotion which it had inspired into the breasts of its supporters. Such was the impression produced by the scene, that not an arm was moved, nor a sound to be heard, in the vast concourse of thirty thousand soldiers who stood in close column in the square. The whole marshals of France, in full uniform, attended the ceremony. The world never beheld such an example of moral retribution, such a convincing proof of the reality of the Divine administration. The rudest Cossack who witnessed it felt the sacred influence. But no feelings of that sort were experienced, save in a few breasts, by the immense numbers of French who witnessed the ceremony: they were dead to its moral import; they felt not its awful warning; and consoled themselves for the presence of so many foreign uniforms in the heart of their capital, by the observation, that the dresses were not so well made as those of their own army (1).

Louis XVIII
is called to
the throne.

Nothing remained but to give effect to the declared will, alike of the Sovereigns and the French people, by recalling the Bourbons. Hitherto, although all believed that the old family would be restored, yet no act clearly expressive of that intention had emanated from the provisional

(1) Dan. 403, 404. Bour. x. 180, 181. Lab. ii. 435, 436. Moniteur, April 12, 1814. Thib. x. 24, 25.

government, and they had, on the contrary, carefully disclaimed several acts of individuals tending to the restoration of the Royal authority. Doubts, in consequence, began to be entertained as to what was to be done, and the Royalists were in general and undisguised uneasiness. But the resolution of the Allies having been finally taken in the sitting, which continued till seven in the morning, of the night between the 5th and 6th, not to treat with a Regency, Talleyrand threw off the mask, and the conservative senate, by a solemn decree, called Louis XVIII to the throne, and his heirs, according to the established order of succession previous to the Revolution. Various provisions were at the same time made for the establishment of the senate and legislative body, and the due limitations of the Royal authority, which were afterwards engrossed in the charter, and formed the basis of the government of the Restoration. Suffice it to say at present, that they received a constitution which gave them a hundred times more real freedom than the French had ever enjoyed since the revolt of the 10th August had overturned the throne, and incomparably more than, as the event proved, they were capable of hearing. And so completely had the people repented of their dreams of self-government, and so wofully had they suffered from its effects, that this important decree, which thus re-established, after a lapse of twenty-one years, the Royal family upon the throne, attracted very little attention, and was received by the whole multitude as a matter of course. Even the Abbé Siéyes voted for the King's return: he had now got an answer to his celebrated question, which twenty-five years before had convulsed France, "What is the Tiers Etat?"

Entry of the Count d'Artois into Paris. The Royal authority being thus re-established, the different branches of government rapidly fell into the new system. On the 9th, the National Guard assumed the white cockade, and on the 12th, the Count d'Artois, who during these great events had been drawing near to the capital, made his public entry into Paris. He was on horseback, surrounded by a brilliant *cortége* of gentlemen who had gone out to meet him, and near the barrier of Pantin was met by the Marshals of France, in full costume, with Ney at their head. "Monseigneur," said Marshal Ney, speaking for himself and his brethren in arms, "we have served with zeal a government which commanded us in the name of France: your Highness and his Majesty will see with what fidelity we will serve our legitimate king." Messieurs," replied the Count d'Artois, "you have illustrated the French arms: you have carried, even into countries the most remote, the glory of the French name: the King claims your exploits: what has ennobled France can never be strange to him." The procession, which swelled immensely as it advanced, proceeded to Notre-Dame, where the prince returned thanks for his restoration to his country. "There is nothing changed," said he; "only a Frenchman the more in Paris: this is the first day of happiness I have experienced for twenty-five years (2)."

Entry of Louis XVIII into London and Paris. April 20. Louis XVIII was not long of responding to the call made upon him by the Senate. On the 20th April, the fugitive monarch left his peaceable retreat of Hartwell to be again tossed on the stormy sea of public affairs, and made his entry amidst an extraordinary concourse of spectators into London, where he was received in state by the Prince Regent. No words can convey an adequate idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed on this occasion. It was a great national triumph, unmixed by one circumstance of alloy: it gave demonstration strong of the total over-

(1) *Moniteur*, April 7, 1814. *Beauch.* ii. 390. (2) *Beauch.* ii. 407. 415. *Burgh.* 307. *Lab.* ii. 391. *Thib.* x. 19, 21. *London.* 309, *Burgh.* 306. 437, 438.

throw of the revolutionary system : sympathy with an illustrious race, long weighed down with misfortune, was mingled with exultation at the glorious reward now obtained for a quarter of a century of toils and dangers. White cockades were universal ; the general rapture was shared alike by the rich and the poor ; the fierce divisions, the raucous faction, with which the war commenced, had disappeared in one tumultuous swell of universal exultation. "Sire," said the monarch with emotion to the Prince Regent, when he first addressed him, "I shall always consider that under God, I owe my restoration to your Royal Highness." The Prince Regent received his illustrious guest with that dignified courtesy for which he was so celebrated, accompanied the royal family to Dover, and bade them farewell at the extremity of the pier at that place. In a beautiful day, and with the utmost splendour, the royal squadron, under the command of the Duke of Clarence, accompanied the illustrious exiles to their own country ; and hardly had the thunder of artillery from the castle of Dover ceased to ring in the ears, when the chalk cliffs of France exhibited a continued blaze, and the roar of cannon on every projecting point, from Calais to Boulogne, announced the arrival of the monarch in the kingdom of his forefathers (1).

King's entry into Paris. Hitherto the progress of the sovereign had been a continued triumph ; but as he advanced through France, although the crowds which were every where assembled on the wayside to see him pass, received him always with respect, sometimes with enthusiasm, yet it was apparent that there was a mixed feeling on the part of the people. The unanimous transports which had greeted his entry into London, and passage through England, were no longer to be discerned. The feeling of loyalty, one of the noblest passions which can fill the breast, because one of the least selfish, was nearly extinct in the great mass of the people ; the return of the Royal family was accompanied with circumstances of deep national humiliation ; their principal feeling was curiosity to see the strangers. The King arrived at Compiègne on the 29th, and the preparations for his reception at Paris having been completed, he made his public entry by the gate of St.-Denis on the 3d May, in the midst of a prodigious concourse of spectators. The Duchess d'Angoulême was seated by his side : the Old Guard of Napoléon formed his escort : the National Guard of Paris kept the streets for the procession ; and innumerable officers and privates of the Allied armies added, by their gay and varied uniforms, to the splendour of the scene. The procession proceeded first to Notre-Dame, where the King and the royal family returned thanks for their restoration, and then proceeded by the quays and the Pont Neuf to the Tuileries. When the Duchess d'Angoulême reached the foot of the principal stair of that palace, which she had not seen since the 10th August 1792, when, in company with Louis XVI, and Marie Antoinette, she left it to take refuge from the insurgents in the National Assembly (2), her emotions were so overpowering, that she fell down insensible at the King's feet. But these awful recollections produced little or no effect on the Parisians ; and the principal observation made was (3), that the King's and Princess's dresses were cut in the London fashion, and that the Duchess d'Angoulême was a perfect fright with her low English bonnet (4).

(1) Cap. Cent Jours, i. 7, 10. Ann. Reg. 1814. Chronicle, 34, 36. Beauch. ii. 509, 515. Lab. ii. 473, 474.

(2) Cap. Hist. de la Restauration, 1. Beauch. ii. 517, 533. Bour. x. 239, 242. Lab. ii. 479, 480. Moniteur, May 4, 1814. Thib. x. 92.

(3) *Ante*, i. 207.

(4) At this period the English fashion for bon-

nets was exceedingly low, and the French proportionally high : so that the contrast between the Duchess d'Angoulême's haymaker's bonnet and the splendid *coiffures* and feathers with which the ladies were adorned at Paris, was sufficiently striking. When Louis crossed the Pont-neuf, the veil was taken off the statue of Henry IV, which had been placed there a week before, and which bore

Convention
of April 23d
for the
French
abandon-
ment of all
their con-
quests.

But a more serious duty awaited this restored monarch; and having now resumed the reins of government, the first care which awaited him was the difficult task of concluding a treaty of peace with the Allied powers, which should at once satisfy their just and inevitable demands, and not prove an insuperable stumbling-block in the first days of his restoration to the French people. The generous, perhaps in some degree imprudent, expressions of the Emperor Alexander, at the first taking of Paris, had produced a prodigious impression; his popularity was at the highest point, and his influence in the capital altogether irresistible. It was the idea that they would escape by his magnanimity from the consequences of defeat, and retain, even after the occupation of the capital, no inconsiderable portion of their conquests, which had reconciled them to the Restoration, and produced the general burst in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. But when the diplomatists began coolly to sit down to reduce the conditions of the treaty to writing, it was no easy matter to reconcile these expectations with the obvious necessity of curtailing France so much, that it should not again prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe (1); and it required all the address of Talleyrand and the other ministers who had been appointed by the king to overcome the difficulty.

Prodigious
extent of
the pos-
sessions
thus ceded
by France.

By a convention concluded on 23d April, it was provided that the French troops in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, should evacuate all the fortresses and countries beyond the frontiers of old France, as they stood on the 1st January 1792, which was at one blow to sweep away the whole conquests of the Revolution. The Allied troops were with as little delay as possible to evacuate the whole of the territory so defined; and all military exactions on both sides were by a secret article to cease forthwith. The principal object of this clause was to put a stop to the unbounded and scourging requisitions of Marshal Davoust, who still retained possession of Hamburg. The number of strong places, and the quantity of artillery, warlike stores, and muniments of war, which by this convention fell into the hands of the Allies, was prodigious, and altogether unexampled in the annals of military trophies. They convey alone a stupendous idea of the vast extent of the military resources which, at one period, were at the disposal of the French Emperor; and of the strange and ruinous policy which prompted him to disperse his troops over so many distant strongholds, when he was contending against greatly superior forces of the enemy for life and death on the plains of Champagne. Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Wesel, in Germany; Maestricht, Mayence, Luxemburg, and Kehl, on the Rhine and the Meuse; Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, and many others in the Low Countries; Mantua, Alexandria, Peschiera, Gavi, Turin, in Italy; Barcelona, Figueras, Rosas, Tortosa, in Spain; besides a vast number of others of lesser note, were abandoned. Fifty-three fortresses of note, twelve thousand pieces of cannon, ammunition and military stores in incalculable quantities, and garrisons of nearly a hundred thousand men (2), all beyond the frontiers of old France, were thus at one blow

the inscription—"Ludovico reduce, Henricus redi-vivus," which was the felicitous thought of M. Lally Tollendal.—*Personal Observation.*

(1) Hard. xii. 422, 423. Lab. ii. 483, 484. Sav. vi. 174, 175.

(2) The magnitude of these garrisons, even in the last moments of the empire, and when Napoleon was literally crushed at Paris for want of men, was such as almost to exceed belief. The following was the amount of a few of the principal, as they finally evacuated the fortresses they held on the conclusion of hostilities :—

	Garrisons.	Surrendered.
Hamburg, . . .	12,300	— 25th May.
Magdeburg, . . .	16,000	— 25th May.
Wesel, . . .	10,000	— 10th May.
Mayence, . . .	15,000	— 4th May.
Barcelona, , . .	6,000	— 12th May.
Antwerp, . . .	17,500	— 6th May.
Mantua, . . .	6,000	— 28th April.
Alexandria, . . .	5,500	— 30th April.
Bergen-op-Zoom, .	4,000	— 24th April.

93,300

surrendered! What a picture does this present of the astonishing strength and tenacity of the grasp which Napoléon had thus laid on Europe; of the magnitude of the military giant whose weight had so long oppressed the world, when even in his last extremity, and after such unheard-of reverses, he yet had such magnificent spoils to yield up to the victor! But what is physical strength where moral virtue is wanting; and what the external resources of an empire, when its heart is paralysed by the selfishness of a revolution (1)?

Treaty of
May 30th
at Paris. The treaty of the 30th May was signed at Paris by the plenipotentiaries of France on the one side, and Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia on the other; but after the convention of 25d April, it contained little which was not foreseen by the French. It provided that France should be reduced to its original limits, as they stood on 1st January 1792, with the exception of various cessions of small territories, some to France by the neighbouring powers, others by France to them, for the sake of defining more clearly, and for mutual advantage, its frontiers, but which, upon a balance of gains and losses, gave it an increase of four hundred and fifty thousand souls. Avignon, however, and the country of Venaisin, the first conquests of the Revolution, were secured to it. France, on the other hand, consented to abandon all pretensions to any territories beyond these limits, and to throw no obstacle in the way of fortifications being erected on any points which the new governments of those countries might deem expedient. Holland was to be an independent state, under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, but with an accession of territory; Germany was to be independent, but under the guarantee of a federal union; Switzerland independent, governed by itself; Italy divided into sovereign states. The free navigation of the Rhine was expressly stipulated. Malta, the ostensible cause of the renewal of the war after the treaty of Amiens, was ceded in perpetuity, with its dependencies, to Great Britain; and she, on her part, agreed to restore all the colonies taken from France or her allies during the war, with the exception of the islands of Tobago, St.-Lucie, and the portion of St.-Domingo formerly belonging to Spain, which was to be restored to that power, in the West, and the Isle of France in the East Indies. Guadaloupe, Martinique, and La Guyane were restored to France. France was to be permitted to form commercial establishments in the East Indies, but under the condition that no more troops were to be sent there than were necessary for the purpose of police; and she regained the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland and in the gulf of St.-Lawrence. The fleet at Antwerp, which consisted of thirty-eight ships of the line and fifteen frigates, was to be divided into three parts, of which two were to be restored to France, and one to the King of Holland. The ships, however, of France which had fallen into the hands of the Allies before the armistice of 25d April, and especially the fleet at the Texel, were to remain with the Allies; and they were immediately made over to the King of Holland. All subordinate points and matters of detail were, by common consent, referred to a congress of all the great powers, which it was agreed should assemble at Vienna in the succeeding autumn (2).

Secret
articles of
the treaty. Such were the public articles of the treaty: but, in addition to these, there was a secret treaty also signed, which contained articles of considerable importance, and which pointed in no obscure manner to the policy which was to be pursued for the reconstruction of the balance of

(1) Koch, iii. 667, 669. Schoell, x. 442, 445.
Martens, N. Recueil, i. 706.

(2) Martens, Sup. or N. R. i; and Schoell, x. 486, 496.

power in Europe. They related chiefly to the disposal of the immense territories, containing no less than 15,560,000 souls, which had been severed from Napoléon's empire, besides 16,000,000 more from its external dependencies, which were now in great part at the disposal of the Allied powers. The leading principle which regulated these distributions, was to strengthen the second-rate states which bordered upon France; and from the weakness of which, she had hitherto always been able to make successful irruptions from her own territories, before the more distant sovereigns could come to their support. To guard against this danger, it was provided that Piedmont should receive an accession of territory by the incorporation of Genoa with her dominions, the latter town being declared a free port: that the reconstruction of Switzerland, as agreed on by the Allied powers, should be ratified by France; that Flanders, between the Scheldt and the Meuse, should be annexed to Holland; and the German states on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been conquered from France, divided between Holland and Prussia (1).

Reflections
on the treaty
of Paris.

Such was the treaty of Paris, the most glorious that England had ever concluded—glorious, even more from what she abandoned than what she retained of her conquests. With her enemy absolutely at her feet—with half of France overrun by four hundred thousand victorious troops—with her capital taken, and her Emperor virtually a prisoner in exile, she gave to her no inconsiderable accession of territory in Europe, and restored three-fourths of her colonial possessions. Not a village was reft from old France: not a military contribution was levied: not a palace or a museum was rifled: not an indignity to the national honour was offered. All that was done was to restore the provinces, which, since her career of conquest began in 1794, she had wrested from the adjoining powers. The French museums, loaded with the spoils of Italy, Germany, Spain, Flanders, and Holland, were left untouched: even the sacred relics of Sans-Souci, and of the great king of Prussia, were unreclaimed: so far from following Napoléon's bad example, in seizing every article of value wherever he went, the Allies, when they had them in their power, did not even reclaim their own (2). What did Napoléon do to Prussia in similar circumstances in 1807? Why, he imposed on that limited state, with only seven millions of inhabitants, a war contribution of L.26,000,000, and severed from it the half of its dominions (3)? What did he do to Austria by the treaty of Vienna, in 1809? Why, he imposed on it a contribution of L.9,500,000, and wrested from it a fourth of the monarchy (4). If the Allies had acted in a similar spirit in 1814, how much of the territories of old France would they have left to its inhabitants? What crushing contributions would they have levied for many a long and weary year on the vanquished: what havoc would they have made in all the museums and royal palaces of France! Doubtless, their forbearance was not entirely owing to disinterestedness; doubtless, they had jealousies of their own to consider, political objects of their own to gain in reconciling France to the new dynasty; but still their policy was founded on a noble spirit—it rested on the principle of eradicating hostility by generosity, and avenging injury by forgiveness. The result proved, that in doing so they proceeded on too exalted an estimate of human nature.

(1) Cap. Cent Jours, i. 18, 19

(2) Napoléon had some of these with him, in the room in which he died at St. Helena. "Vous examinez," said he, "cette grande horloge; elle servait de réveil-matin au Grand-Frédéric. Je l'ai prise à

Pos'dam: c'était tout ce que valait la Prusse."—ANTOMARCHI. *Derniers jours de Napoléon*, i. 97.

(3) *Ante*, vi. 146.

(4) *Ante*, vii. 257.

Return of
the Pope
to Rome.

In the general settlement of Europe after the Revolutionary deluge had subsided, the fate of one of the most persevering and not the least illustrious, of Napoléon's opponents must not be overlooked. Pius the VII, after having been taken away, he knew not whither, by orders of Napoléon, from Fontainebleau on the 25d January, in virtue of the convention already mentioned (1), had been still under one pretext or another detained in the French territory, and was still in Provence when Paris was taken. One of April 2. the first cares of the provisional government, was by a decree to direct him to be instantly set at liberty, and conducted to the Italian frontiers with all the honours due to his rank. He entered Italy accordingly, and at Cesina, near Parma, had an interview with Murat, who exhibited to him the original of a memorial, a copy of which a number of the nobles and chief inhabitants of Rome had presented to the Allied powers, praying to have the Roman states incorporated with one of the secular powers of Italy. Without looking at the memoir so as to know what signatures were attached to it, the generous pontiff at once threw it into the fire. Continuing his route by slow journeys, which the feeble state of his health rendered necessary, he reached the neighbourhood of Rome on the 25d, and entered that city on the 24th May; nearly five years after he had been violently carried off at dead of night by the troops of Napoléon. Opinions had been divided previously as to the expedience of his return; and those who had signed the memorial to the Allies, justly dreaded the effects of his resentment: but the generous proceeding at Cesina overcame all hearts, and he was received with unanimous and heartfelt expressions of satisfaction. Stricken by conscience, some of the nobles who had signed the memorial came next day to request forgiveness. "Have we not some faults, too, to reproach ourselves with?" replied the generous pontiff; "let us bury our injuries in oblivion (2)."

Extraor-
dinary
spectacle
which
Paris exhi-
bited at
this period.

The world had never seen—probably the world will never again see, so marvellous a spectacle as the streets of Paris exhibited from the 31st April, when the entry of the Allies took place, till the 16th June, when, upon their finally retiring, the service of the posts was restored to the National Guard of the capital. In a state of the most profound tranquillity; with the most absolute protection of life and property, even of the most obnoxious of their former enemies, the capital of Napoléon was to be seen occupied by the troops of twenty different nations, whom the oppression of his government had roused to arms from the walls of China to the pillars of Hercules. As if by the wand of a mighty enchanter, all the angry passions, the fierce contentions, which had so long deluged the world with blood, seemed to be stilled; and victors and vanquished sank down side by side into the enjoyment of repose. Beside the veterans of Napoléon's old guard, who still retained even in the moment of defeat, and when surrounded by the might of foreign powers, their martial and undaunted aspect, were to be seen the superb household troops of Russia and Prussia; the splendid cuirassiers of Austria shone in glittering steel; the iron veterans of Blücher still eyed the troops of France with jealousy, as if their enmity was unappeased even by the conquest of their enemies. The nomad tribes of Asia and the Ukraine were to be seen in every street; groups of Cossack bivouacs lay in the Champs-Élysées; the Bashkirs and Tartars gazed with undisguised avidity, but restrained hands, on the gorgeous display of jewellery and dresses which were displayed in the shop windows to attract the notice of the numerous princes and potentates who thronged the metropolis. Every morning

(1) *Ante*, x. 23.

(2) *Artaud*, ii, 367, 381. *Pacca*, ii. 257, 261.

the noble columns of the Preobazinsky and Simonefsky guards marched out of the barracks of the École-Militaire, to exercise on the Champ-de-Mars; at noon, reviews of cavalry succeeded, and the earth shook under the thundering charge of the Russian cuirassiers. Often in the evening the Allied monarchs were to be seen at the opera, or some of the theatres; and the applause with which they were received, resembled what might have been expected if Napoléon had returned in triumph from the capture of their capitals. Early in June, Wellington, who had been appointed ambassador of England at the court of the Tuileries, appeared among them; he was received with enthusiasm, and the opera-house never shook with louder applause than when he first made his appearance there after the battle of Toulouse (1).

Universal
religious
feelings of
the Allied
troops.

One peculiarity in the Russian and Prussian armies which most excited the attention of the Parisians, was the universal and simple feeling of piety with which they were animated. To an infidel generation, who had known Christianity only in its corruption, and judged of its spirit only from the misrepresentation of its enemies, this circumstance was the subject of general astonishment and partial admiration. "We listened," says a contemporary French journalist, "to young Russian officers, on the very day of their triumphant entrance into Paris, who spoke of their exploits from Moscow to the Seine, as of deeds which had been accomplished under the immediate guidance of divine Providence; and ascribing to themselves only the glory of having been chosen as the instruments for the fulfilment of the divine decree. They spoke of their victories without exultation, and in language so simple, that it seemed to us as if they did so, by common consent, out of politeness. They showed us a silver medal, worn equally by their generals and private soldiers as a badge of distinction (2). On the one side is represented the eye of Providence, and on the other these words from Scripture, 'Not unto us, not unto us, but to thy name.' We must allow it is religion which has formed the sacred bond of their union for the benefit of mankind, the emblems of which their troops wear on their garments. No human motive could have induced them to make sacrifices unparalleled in history (3)." Such was the spirit which conquered the French Revolution; such, on the testimony of the vanquished, the principles which gave final victory to the arms of the desert in the centre of civilized infidelity. The opposite characters of the two contending powers were perfectly represented by one circumstance: Napoléon placed on his triumphant column in the Place Vendôme a statue of *himself*; Alexander, as has been already mentioned, caused the column, which the gratitude of the senate decreed for him at St.-Petersburg, to be surmounted by a statue of *Religion*, extending her arms to bless mankind (4).

Grand re-
view of the
Allied troops
at Paris.
May 20.

Before the Allied armies broke up from Paris, a grand review took place of the whole troops in and around that city, comprising the *élite* of the Allied forces then in France. Seventy thousand men, with eighty-two guns, were drawn up three deep on the road, from the barrier of Neuilly to the bridge of St.-Cloud: they occupied the whole space, and certainly a more magnificent military spectacle never was witnessed. When the Emperor Alexander, with the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia, and all the marshals and generals of their respective armies, rode along the line, the acclamations of the troops, at first loud and overpowering, then getting fainter and fainter as they died away in the distance,

(1) Personal observation, Dan. 408, 409.

(2) The Medal of 1812.

(3) Journal des Débats, April 3, 1814.

(4) Dan. 407, 408. *Ante*, ix. 26.

were inexpressibly sublime. Breaking then into open column, the whole defiled past the sovereigns, and such was the splendour of their array, that it seemed scarcely conceivable that they had so recently been engaged in a campaign of unexampled duration and hardship. The Russian guard, in particular, twenty, and the Prussians eight thousand strong, attracted, by the brilliancy of their equipments and the precision of their movements, universal admiration. The eye could scarcely bear the dazzling lines of light which, under a bright sun and a cloudless sky, were reflected from the cuirasses and sabres of the cavalry. Proudly the celebrated regiments of the Russian guards, Preobazinsky, Simonefsky, and Bonnet d'Or, marched past : every third or fourth man bore the mark, in a religiously-preserved chasm in his cap, made by the French grape-shot on the field of Culm. In noble array the vast host pressed on with an erect air : they passed through the unfinished arch of Neuilly, begun by Napoléon to the honour of the Grand Army, defiled in silence over the Place of the Revolution, treading on the spot where Louis XVI had fallen, and scarce cast an eye on the unfinished columns of the Temple of Glory, commenced after the triumph of Jena. Among the countless multitude whom the extraordinary events of the period had drawn together from every part of Europe to the French capital, and the brilliancy of this spectacle had concentrated in one spot, was one young man, who had watched with intense interest the progress of the war from his earliest years, and who, having hurried from his paternal roof in Edinburgh on the first cessation of hostilities, then conceived the first idea of narrating its events ; and amidst its wonders inhaled that ardent spirit, that deep enthusiasm, which, sustaining him through fourteen subsequent years of travelling and study, and fourteen more of composition, has at length realized itself in the present history.

Visit of the
Allied
Sovereigns
to England.

Having finally arranged matters at Paris, the Allied sovereigns, before retiring to their own dominions, paid a visit to London. It belongs to the historians of England to recount the festivities of that joyous period—that cloth of gold of modern times—when the greatest, and wisest, and bravest in Europe came to do voluntary homage to the free people whose energy and perseverance had saved themselves by their firmness, and Europe by their example. Suffice it to say, as a topic interesting to general history, that the Allied monarchs left Paris on the 5th July, and reached Deal on the 8th : that they were received with extraordinary enthusiasm by all classes in England, from the peasant to the throne : that they were feasted with more than the usual magnificence at Guildhall, and received with more than wonted splendour at the Palace : that the Emperor of Russia was invested with the Order of the Garter at Carlton-House ; and that at Oxford both he and the King of Prussia, as well as Marshal Blücher, were arrayed with all the academic honours which a grateful nation could bestow : that a splendid naval review at Portsmouth, where thirty ships of the line and frigates manœuvred together, conveyed an adequate idea of the naval power of England : and that, satiated with pomp and the cheers of admiration, they embarked for the continent on their return to their own dominions. But two circumstances connected with this visit, at the close of the longest, most costly, and bloodiest war mentioned in history, deserve to be recorded, as characteristic of the British empire at this period. When Alexander visited the arsenal at Woolwich, and saw the acres covered with cannon and shot in that stupendous emporium of military strength, he said, “ Why, this resembles rather the preparation of a great nation for the commencement of a war, than the stores still remaining to it at its termination.”

And as the same monarch surveyed the hundreds of thousands who assembled to see him in Hyde Park, he was so impressed with the universal well-being of the spectators, that he exclaimed, "This is indeed imposing; but where are the people (1)?"

Remark-
able cir-
cumstance
which led
to Prince
Leopold of
Saxe-
Cobourg
coming to
England.

One other circumstance, of domestic interest in its origin, but of vast importance in its ultimate results, deserves to be recorded of this eventful period. At Paris, during the stay of the Allied monarchs, there was Lord —, who had filled with acknowledged ability a high diplomatic situation at their head-quarters during the latter period of the war. His lady, of high rank, had joined him to partake in the festivities of that brilliant period, and with her a young relative, equally distinguished by her beauty and talents, then appearing in all the freshness of opening youth. A frequent visitor at this period in Lord —'s family was a young officer, then an aide-de-camp to the Grand Duke Constantine, a younger brother of an ancient and illustrious family in Germany, but who, like many other scions of nobility, had more blood in his veins than money in his pocket. The young aide-de-camp speedily was captivated by the graces of the English lady; and when the sovereigns were about to set out for England, whither Lord — was to accompany them, he bitterly lamented the scantiness of his finances, which prevented him from following in the train of such attraction. Lord — good-humouredly told him he should always find a place at his table when he was not otherwise engaged, and that he would put him in the way of seeing all the world in the British metropolis, which he would probably never see to such advantage again. Such an offer, especially when seconded by such influences, proved irresistible, and the young German gladly followed them to London. He was there speedily introduced to, and ere long distinguished by, the Princess Charlotte, whose projected alliance with the Prince of Orange had recently before been broken off. Though the Princess remarked him, however, it was nothing more at that time than a passing regard; for her thoughts were then more seriously occupied by another. Having received, at the same time, what he deemed some encouragement, the young soldier proposed to the Princess, and was refused, and subsequently went to Vienna during the sitting of the congress at that place, where his susceptible heart was speedily engrossed in another tender affair. Invincible obstacles, however, presented themselves to the realization of the Princess Charlotte's views, which had led to her first rejection of the gallant German: he received a friendly hint from London to make his attentions to the fair Austrian less remarkable: he returned to the English capital, again proposed to the English princess, and was accepted. It was Prince LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG; and his subsequent destiny and that of his family exceeds all that romance has figured of the marvellous. He married the heiress of England: after her lamented end he espoused a daughter of France: he was offered the throne of Greece, he accepted the crown of Belgium. In consequence of his elevation, one of his nephews has married the heiress of Portugal, another the Queen of England; and the accidental fancy of a young German officer for a beautiful English lady, has in its ultimate results given three kingdoms to his family, placed on one of his relatives the crown of the greatest empire that has existed in the world since the fall of Rome, and restored to England, in hazardous times, the inestimable blessing of a direct line of succession to the throne (2).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1814, 43, 55. Chronicle, Croly, Life of Geo. iv. ii. 67, 71.

(2) It would be indelicate, during the life of some of the persons mentioned in the preceding

Reflections
on the
decisive
movement
on St.-
Dizier.

The march upon St.-Dizier was unquestionably expedient as a measure of military policy, and as such it may be regarded as the last of those brilliant movements in that astonishing campaign, which alone would be sufficient to give immortality to the name of Napoléon. When his whole remaining resources had been fairly worn out in that marvellous struggle, he had a fair prospect by this felicitous conception of renewing the contest on fresh ground, hitherto comparatively unexhausted, and of tripling his force in the field by the addition of the garrisons drawn from the frontier fortresses. How nearly it succeeded is proved by the extreme difficulty which Alexander had to prevent the Austrian commander from commencing in consequence a ruinous retreat; and his own words, that his anxiety on that occasion made half his hair turn grey. Yet this movement, beyond all question, proved his ruin; for, by giving room for the manly counsels of Blücher and the Russian Emperor, it exposed the capital to the assault of irresistible forces, and led to the overthrow of the French Emperor's power in the very quarter where he had deemed it most securely founded. And that he fully appreciated the danger of an attack there, is decisively proved by the haste with which he at once abandoned all the military advantages of the march on St.-Dizier to avert it, and the decisive results which followed the start which the Allies had got of him at the capital by only eight-and-forty hours.

Difference
in this
respect of
the other
European
monarchies.

It was not thus with the other European monarchies when they were involved in disaster—Vienna was taken by Napoléon in 1805; but the Austrians fought the battle of Austerlitz, and had wellnigh restored affairs after that event; it was again taken in 1809, but the monarchy stood firm, and reduced the invader to the verge of ruin at Aspern and Wagram. Berlin was captured by the Russians in 1760, and by Napoléon in 1806; but that did not prevent the Great Frederick in the first instance from bringing to a glorious close the Seven Years' War, nor Frederick William in the second, from gallantly struggling with his Russian allies for existence in the furthest corner of his dominions, amidst the snows of Eylau. Madrid fell an easy prey in 1808 to the mingled fraud and violence of the French Emperor; but Spain, notwithstanding, continued to maintain a mortal struggle for six long years with the forces of Napoléon. Russia was pierced to the heart in 1812, and her ancient capital became the spoil of the invader; but Alexander continued the contest with unabated vigour, and from the flames of Moscow arose the fire which delivered the world. How then did it happen that the fall of the capital, which in all these other cases, so far from being the termination, was rather the commencement of the most desperate and protracted period of the war, should in France alone have had a totally opposite effect; and that the capture of Paris should not merely have been the conquest of a kingdom, but the overthrow of a system, the change of a dynasty, which still spread its ramifications over the half of Europe?

Causes of
this differ-
ence.

The cause of this remarkable difference is to be found in the decisive distinction in the last crisis between a Revolutionary and an Established government, and the different motives to human action which the two bring to bear upon mankind. A revolution being founded in general on the triumph of violence, robbery, and treason, over fidelity, order, and loyalty, and almost always accompanied in its progress by a hideous

curious narration, to give their names to the public. Those acquainted with the elevated circles of English society at that period, will have no difficulty

in filling them up; and the facts may be relied on, as the author had them from some of the parties immediately concerned.

effusion of blood and spoliation of property, its leaders, if successful, have no means of rousing or retaining the attachment of their followers, but by constantly appealing to the passions of the world. Equality, patriotism, liberty, glory, constitute the successive and brilliant meteors which they launch forth to dazzle and inspire mankind. They have an instinctive dread of the influences of heaven; all allusion to a Supreme Being appears to them as fanaticism; they would willingly bury all thoughts of another world in oblivion. As long as success attends their efforts, the powerful bond of worldly interest, or temporary passion, binds together the unholy alliance, and its force proves for a long period irresistible. But the very principle which constitutes its strength in prosperity, affords the measure of its weakness in adversity; its idol being worldly success, when that idol is pierced to the heart by the destroyer, "the ocean vault falls in, and all are crushed." The same motives of action, the same principles of conduct, which make them unanimously rally round the Eagles of the conqueror, necessarily lead them to abandon the standards of the unfortunate. The enthusiasm of Austerlitz, however different in its aspect, sprang from the same source as the defections of Fontainebleau; in both cases they were true to one and the same principle—self-interest.

It is that individual advancement was the main-spring of the Revolution. The existence of this motive, as the moving general principle, is quite consistent with the utmost generosity and heroism in *individual* cases, though these unhappily daily become less frequent in the late stages of the national malady. Nay, the absorbing passion for individual advancement, which in the more advanced stages of revolution comes to obliterate every other feeling, springs from the ill-regulated impulse given in the outset to the generous affections. For such is the deceitfulness of sin and the proneness to self-aggrandizement, in human nature, that the passions cannot be set violently in motion, even by the disinterested feelings, without the selfish ere long obtaining the mastery of the current: as in a town carried by storm, how sublime soever may be the heroism, how glorious the self-sacrifice, with which the troops mount the breach, the strife, if successful, is sure to terminate in the worst atrocities of pillage, rape, and conflagration. It is Religion alone, which, by opening a scene of ambition beyond the grave, can provide a counterpoise to the overwhelming torrent of worldly ambition, which can render men nobly superior to all the storms of time, and give the same fidelity to a falling which revolution secures to a rising cause.

Wide difference from the fidelity of the monarchy. That this, and not any peculiar fickleness or proneness to change, was the real cause of the universal and disgraceful desertion by France of its revolutionary chief when he became unfortunate, is decisively proved by the consideration that, in other times, even in France itself, in those parts of the country, or among those classes where the old influences still survived, the most glorious examples of constancy and fidelity had been found. In the course of the wars with England, Paris was not only taken but occupied eighteen years by the English armies: an English king was crowned king of France at Reims; and so complete was the prostration of the country, that an English corps, not ten thousand strong, marched right through the heart of France, from Calais to Bayonne, without encountering any opposition; but that did not subjugate the French people, or hinder them from gloriously rallying behind the Loire, and twice expelling the English from their territory. The League long held Paris; but that did not prevent Henry IV, at the head of the forces of the provinces, from laying siege to it, and placing himself, a protestant chief,

on the throne of France. Where, in the annals of the world, shall we find more touching examples of heroism in misfortune, constancy in adversity, than in la Vendée, under the Republican massacre, or in Lyons under the *mitrillades* of Fouché and Collot d'Herbois? Even in Paris, stripped as it had been of almost the whole of the nobility by the previous emigration, five hundred devoted gentlemen hastened to the Tuileries, on the 10th August 1792, to meet death with the Royal family; but not one went from thence to Fontainebleau to share exile with Napoléon on the eve of his overthrow.

It was misfortune alone which rendered Napoléon unpopular. It is in vain, therefore, to attempt to shelter the tergiversations of Fontainebleau under any peculiarity of national character, or to ascribe to human nature what is only true of its baseness under the vices of a revolution. It is equally vain to allege that necessity drove the French leaders to this measure; that they had no alternative; and that desertion of Napoléon, or national ruin, stared them in the face. If that were the case, what condemnation so severe could be passed on the revolutionary system, as the admission that it had brought matters, under chiefs and leaders of the nation's own appointment, to such a pass, that nothing remained but to ruin their country, or betray the hero whom they had placed upon the throne? But, in truth, it was misfortune, and the stoppage of the robbery of Europe, which alone rendered Napoléon unpopular, and undermined the colossal power which the Revolution had reared up. Not a whisper was heard against his system of government as long as it was victorious; it was at the zenith of its popularity, when after twelve years' continuance, he crossed the Niemen; it was when it became unfortunate alone that it was felt to be insupportable. If the French eagles had gone on from conquest to conquest, France would have yielded up the last drop of its blood to his ambition, and he would have lived and died surrounded by the adulation of its whole inhabitants, though it had deprived all its mothers of their sons, and all the civilized world of its possessions.

Any restoration of the Revolutionary system was impossible at this period. No position is more frequently maintained by the French writers of the liberal school, than that Napoléon perished because he departed from the principles of the Revolution: that the monarch forgot the maxims of the citizen, the emperor the simplicity of the general; that he stifled the national voice till it had become extinct, and curbed the popular energies till they had been forgotten: that he fell at last, less under the bayonets of banded Europe, than in consequence of his despotic terror at putting arms into the hands of his own people: and that, if he had revived in 1814 the revolutionary energy of 1793, he would have proved equally victorious. They might as well say, that if the old worn-out debauchee of sixty would only resume the vigour and the passions of twenty-five, he would extricate himself from all his ailments. Doubtless he would succeed in so doing by such a miracle, for a time; and he might, if so renovated, run again for twenty years the career of pleasure, licentiousness, suffering, and decay. But is such a restoration in the last stages of excitement, whether individual or national, possible? Is it desirable? Was there ever such a thing heard of, as a nation, after twenty-five years' suffering and exhaustion from the indulgence of its social or convulsive passions, again commencing the career of delusion and ruin? Never. Men are hardly ever warned by the sufferings of preceding generations, but they are never insensible to the agonies of their own.

Equally extravagant is the idea frequently started by a more amiable and philanthropic class of writers, that it was Napoléon's ambition which ruined

A pacific career was impracticable to Napoléon. the cause of the Revolution; and that if he had only turned his sword into a ploughshare and cultivated the arts of peace, after he had gained possession of supreme power, as he had done those of war to attain it, he might have successfully established in France the glorious fabric of constitutional freedom. They know little of human nature—of the deceitfulness of sin—and downward progress of the career of passion, who think such a transformation practicable. They know still less of the laws of the moral world, who deem such a result consistent with the administration of a just and beneficent Providence. Are the habits necessary for the building up constitutional freedom; the industry, self-denial, and frugality, which must constitute its bases in the great body of the people; the moderation, disinterestedness, and general sway of virtue, which must characterize the leaders of the state, to be acquired amidst the total breaking up of society, the closing of all the channels of pacific industry, the excitement and animation of war? Is the general abandonment of religion, the universal worship of the idol of worldly success, the sacrifice of every principle at the shrine of self-interest, the school in which the domestic and social virtues are to be learned? Are robbery, devastation, and murder—the sweeping away of the property of ages—the pouring out like water the blood of the innocent, the steps by which, under a just Providence, the glorious fabric of durable freedom is to be erected? We might well despair of the fortunes of the human race, if the French Revolution could have given the people engaged in it such a blessing.

Napoléon's views of the compulsion under which he acted. Napoléon knew well the fallacy of this idea. He constantly affirmed, that he was not to be accused for the wars which he undertook: that they were imposed upon him by an invincible necessity: that glory and success—in other words, perpetual conquest—were the conditions of his tenure of power: that he was but the head of a military republic, which would admit of no pause in its career: that conquest was with him essential to existence, and that the first pause in the march of victory would prove the commencement of ruin. This history has indeed been written to little purpose if it is not manifest, even to the most inconsiderate, that he was right in these ideas, and that it was not himself, but the spirit of his age, which is chargeable with his fall. The ardent and yet disappointed passions of the Revolution, the millions thrown out of pacific employment the insatiable desires awakened, the boundless anticipations formed, during the progress of that great convulsion, could by possibility find vent only in external conquest. The simple pursuits of industry, the unobtrusive path of duty, the heroic self-denial of virtue, the only sure basis of general freedom, were insupportable to men thus violently excited. If we would know where the career of conquest, once successfully commenced by a democratic state, must of necessity lead, we have only to look to the empire of Rome in ancient, or of British India in modern times. Even now the fever still burns in the veins of France: her maniac punishment is not yet terminated. Not all the blood shed by Napoléon, not her millions (1) of citizens slaughtered, have

(1) Levies of Men in France since the Revolution:—		Brought forward, . . . 2,070,000	
1793,	300,000	4th Dec. 1806,	80,000
1793,	1,200,000	7th April, 1807,	80,000
1798,	200,000	21st Jan. 1808,	80,000
1799,	200,000	10th Sept. 1808,	160,000
1801,	30,000	18th April, 1809,	30,000
17th Jan. 1805,	60,000	18th April, 1809,	10,000
24th Sept. 1805,	80,000	5th Oct. 1809,	36,000
Carried forward, . . . 2,070,000		Carried forward, . . . 2,546,000	

been able to subdue the fierce ebullition : the double conquest of her capital has been unable to tame her pride; and nothing but the consummate talents and courage of Louis-Philippe, joined to the philosophic wisdom of M. Guizot, have been able to prevent her from rushing again into the career of glory, of suffering, and of punishment.

View of the progressive phases of the Revolution. The French Revolution, therefore, is to be regarded as a great whole, of which the enthusiasm and fervour of 1789 was the commencement; the rebellion against government and massacre of the king, the second stage; the Reign of Terror and charnel-house of la Vendée, the third; the conquests and glory of Napoléon, the fourth; the subjugation of France and treachery of Fontainebleau, the consummation. Its external degradation and internal infamy at the latter period, were as necessary a part of its progress, as inevitable a result of its principles, as the harvest reaped in autumn is of the seed sown in spring. The connexion—the necessary connexion between the two, now stands revealed in colours of imperishable light; they are stamped in characters of fire on the adamantine tablets of history. Therefore it is that any narrative of the Revolution, which does not follow it out to its fall, must necessarily be imperfect, both in the fidelity of its picture and the truth of its moral. To stop at the accession of the Directory, or the seizure of supreme power by Napoléon, as many have done, is to halt in our account of a fever at the ninth or thirteenth day, when the crisis did not come on till the twenty-first. And he who, after reflecting on the events of this marvellous progress, in which the efforts of ages, and the punishment of generations, were all concentrated into one quarter of a century, does not believe in the divine superintendence of human affairs, and the reward of virtuous and punishment of guilty nations in this world, would not be converted though one rose from the dead.

Agency by which the Divine government of nations is carried on. An author in whom simplicity or beauty of expression often conceals depth and justice of thought, has thus explained the mode of the divine administration, and the manner in which it works out its decrees by the instrumentality of free agents—"The beauty and magnificence," says Blair, "of the universe are much heightened, by its being an extensive and complicated system, in which a variety of springs are made to play, and a multitude of different movements are with admirable art regulated and kept in order. Interfering interests and jarring passions are in such manner balanced against one another; such proper checks are placed on the violence of human pursuits, and the wrath of man is made so to hold its course, that how opposite soever the several motions at first appear to be, yet they all concur at last in one result. While among the multitudes that dwell on the face of the earth, some are submissive to the divine authority, some rise up in rebellion against it; others, absorbed in their pleasures and pursuits, are totally inattentive to it; they are all so moved by an imperceptible influence from above, that the zeal of the dutiful, the wrath of the rebellious, and the indifference of the careless, contribute finally to the glory of God. All are governed in such a manner as suits their powers, and is con-

Brought forward, . . .	2,546,000
13th Dec. 1810,	120,000
13th Dec. 1810,	40,000
20th Dec. 1811,	120,000
13th March 1812,	100 000
1st Sept. 1812,	137,000

Carried forward, . . . 3,063,000

Brought forward, . . .	3,063,000
11th Jan. 1813,	250,000
3d April 1813,	180,000
24th Aug. 1813,	30,000
9th Oct. 1813,	280,000
15th Nov. 1813,	300,000

Total, . . . 4,103,000

sistent with their moral freedom : yet the various acts of these free agents all conspire to work out the eternal purpose of heaven. The system upon which the divine government plainly proceeds, is, that men's own wickedness should be appointed to correct them, that they should be snared in the work of their own hands. When the vices of men require punishment to be inflicted, the Almighty is at no loss for the ministers of justice. No special interpositions of power are requisite. He has no occasion to step from his throne and interrupt the majestic order of nature. With the solemnity which befits Omnipotence, he pronounces, 'Ephraim is joined to his idols : let him alone.' He leaves transgressors to their own guilt, and punishment follows of course. *Their own sins do the work of justice.* They lift the scourge; and with every stroke they inflict on the criminal, they mix the severe admonition that he is reaping only the fruit of his own deeds, and deserves all that he suffers (1)."

Universal
downward
progress of
sin.

Without pretending to explain the various modes by which this awful and mysterious system of divine administration, in which ourselves are at once the agents and the objects of reward and punishment, is carried on, it is impossible not to be struck with the powerful operation of two moral laws of our being, with the reality of which every one, from the experience of his own breast, as well as the observation of those around him, must be familiar. The first is, that every irregular passion or illicit desire acquires strength from every gratification which it receives, and becomes the more uncontrollable the more it is indulged. The second, that the power of self-denial and the energy of virtue increases with every occasion on which it is called forth, until at length it becomes a formed habit, and requires hardly any effort for its accomplishment. In the first instance, whether with nations or individuals, "*c'est le dernier*"—in the second, "*c'est le premier pas qui coûte.*" On the counteracting force of these two laws, the whole moral administration of the universe hinges; as its physical equilibrium is dependent on the opposite influences of the centripetal and centrifugal forces.

Gradual
and deceit-
ful progress
of vice.

It is by gradual and latent steps that the destruction of virtue, whether in the individual or in the community, begins. The first advances of sin are clothed in the garb of liberality and philanthropy: the colours it then assumes are the homage which vice pays to virtue. If the evil unveiled itself at the beginning; if the storm which is to uproot society discovered as it rose all its horrors, there are few who would not shrink from its contact. But its first appearance is so attractive that few are sensible of its real nature : and, strange to say, the most hardened egotism in the end derives its chief strength in the outset from the generous affections. By degrees, "*habit gives the passions strength, while the absence of glaring guilt seemingly justifies them; and, unawakened by remorse, the sinner proceeds in his course till he waxes bold in guilt and becomes ripe for ruin. We are imperceptibly betrayed; from one licentious attachment, one criminal passion, led on to another, till all self-government is lost, and we are hurried to destruction. In this manner, every criminal passion in its progress swells and blackens, till what was at first a small cloud, no bigger than a man's hand rising from the sea, is found to carry the tempest in its womb (2).*" What is the career of the drunkard, the gamester, or the sensualist, but an exemplification of the truth of this picture? Reader! if you have any doubt of the reality of this moral law, search your own hearts, call to mind your

(1) Blair, iv. Sermon. 14 ; and ii. Sermon. 14.

(2) Blair, i. 177.

own ways; exactly the same principle applies to nations. What is the history of the French Revolution, in all its stages, but an exemplification of this truth when applied to social passions? And how did the vast confederacy of earthly passion, which had so long bestrode the world, ultimately break up? Despite the bright and glowing colours with which its Aurora arose, despite the great and glorious deeds by which its noontide was emblazoned, it sunk in the end amidst the basest and most degrading selfishness. It perished precisely as a gang of robbers does, in which, when the stroke of adversity is at last felt, each, true to the god of his idolatry, strives to save himself by betraying his leader. The same law which makes an apple fall to the ground, regulates the planets in their courses.

And ascending career of virtue. The second moral principle, not less universal alike in individuals and nations than the first, is open to the daily observation of every one, equally in his own breast and the conduct of others. Every one has felt in his own experience, however little he may have practised it—every teacher of youth has ascertained by observation—every moralist from the beginning of time has enforced the remark as the last conclusion of wisdom—that the path of virtue is rough and thorny at the outset; that habits of industry and self-denial are to be gained only by exertion; that the ascent is rugged, the path steep, but that the difficulty diminishes as the effort is continued; and that, when the “summit is reached, the heaven is above your head, and at your feet the kingdom of Cachemere.” And such is the effect of effort strenuously made in the cause of virtue, that it purifies itself as it advances, and progressively casts off the intermixture of worldly passion, which often sullied the purity of its motives in the outset. Hence the constant elevation often observed in the character of good men as they advance in life, till at its close they almost seem to have lost every stain of human corruption, and to be translated rather than raised, by death to immortality. It is in this moral law that the antagonist principle of social as well as individual evil is to be found, and it was by its operation upon successive nations that the dreadful nightmare of the French Revolution was thrown off the world. Many selfish desires, much corrupt ambition, great moral weakness, numerous political sins, stained the first efforts of the coalition, and in them at that period England had her full share. For these sins they suffered and are suffering; and the punishment of Great Britain will continue as long as the national debt endures (1); of Russia and Prussia, as long as Poland festers, a thorn of weakness, in their sides. But how unworthy soever its champions at first may have been, the cause for which they contended was a noble one—it was that of religion, fidelity, and freedom; and as the contest rolled on they were purified in the only school of real amelioration—the school of suffering. Gradually the baser elements were washed out of the confederacy; the nations, after long agony, came comparatively pure out of the furnace; and at last, instead of the selfishness and rapacity of 1794, were exhibited the constancy of Saragossa, the devotion of Aspern, the heroism of the Tyrol, the resurrection of Prussia; and the war, which had commenced with the partition of Poland and the attempted partition of France, terminated with the flames of Moscow and the pardon of Paris.

How alone can this downward progress be averted? Is, then, the cause of freedom utterly hopeless; does agitation necessarily lead to rebellion, rebellion to revolution; and must the prophetic eye of wisdom ever anticipate in the infant struggles

(1) If England had acted in the outset of the war as she did at the close, the contest would have been terminated in 1793, and L.600,000,000 saved from the national debt.

of liberty the blood of Robespierre, the carnage of Napoléon, the treachery of Fontainebleau? No. It is not the career of freedom, it is the career of sin which leads and ever will lead to such results. It is in the disregard of moral obligation when done with beneficent intentions; in the fatal maxim, that the end will justify the means; in the oblivion of the divine precept, that "*evil is not to be done that good may come of it;*" and not in any fatality connected with revolutions, that the real cause of this deplorable downward progress is to be found. And if the supporters of freedom would avoid this otherwise inevitable retribution; if they would escape being led on from desire to desire, from acquisition to acquisition, from passion to passion, from crime to crime, till a Moscow retreat drowns their hopes in blood, or a treachery of Fontainebleau for ever disgraces them in the eyes of mankind—they must resolutely in the outset withstand the tempter, and avoid all measures, whatever their apparent expedience may be, which are not evidently based on immutable justice. If this, the only compass in the dark night of revolution, is not steadily observed; if property is ever taken without compensation being given; or blood shed without the commission of crimes to which that penalty is by law attached; or institutions uprooted, sanctioned by the experience of ages, when their modification was practicable: if, in short, the principle is acted on, that the end will justify the means, unbounded national calamities are at hand, and the very objects for which these sins are committed will be for ever lost.

Is a free
government
possible in
France?

What are the difficulties which now beset the philosophic statesman in the attempt to construct the fabric of constitutional freedom in France? They are, that the national morality has been destroyed in the citizens of towns, in whose hands alone political power is vested: that there is no moral strength or political energy in the country: that no great proprietors exist to steady or direct general opinion, or counterbalance either the encroachments of the executive or the madness of the people: that France has fallen under a subjection to Paris, to which there is nothing comparable in European history: that the Prætorian guards of the capital rule the state: that ten millions of separate proprietors, the great majority at the plough, can achieve no more in the cause of freedom than an army of privates without officers: that commercial opulence and habits of sober judgment have been destroyed, never to revive: that a thirst for excitement every where prevails, and general selfishness disgraces the nation: that religion has never resumed its sway over the influential classes: that rank has ceased to be hereditary, and, having become the appanage of office only, is a virtual addition to the power of the sovereign; and that the general depravity renders indispensable a powerful centralized and military government. In what respect does this state of things differ from the institutions of China or the Byzantine empire? "*The Romans,*" says Gibbon, "*aspired to be equal: they were levelled by the equality of Asiatic servitude.*"

Reasons
which
must pre-
vent it.

And yet, what are all these fatal peculiarities in the present political and social condition of France, but the effects of the very revolutionary measures which were the object of such unanimous support and enthusiasm at its commencement? This was the expedience for which the crimes of the Revolution were committed! For this it was that they massacred the king, guillotined the nobles, destroyed the church, confiscated the estates, rendered bankrupt the nation, denied the Almighty! to exchange European for Asiatic civilization! to destroy the elements of freedom by crushing its strongest bulwarks, and, by weakening the res-

traints of virtue, render unavoidable the fetters of force! Truly their sin has recoiled upon them; they have indeed received the work of their own hands. Mr. Burke long ago said, "that without a complete and entire restitution of the confiscated property, liberty could never be re-established in France." And the justice of the observation is now apparent; for by it alone could the elements and bulwarks of freedom be restored. But restitution, it will be said, is now impossible; the interests of the new proprietors are too immense, their political power too great; the Restoration was based on their protection, and they cannot be interfered with. Very possibly it is so; but that will not alter the laws of Nature. If Reparation has become impossible, RETRIBUTION must be endured; and that retribution, in the necessary result of the crimes of which it is the punishment, is the doom of oriental slavery.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

AMERICA—THE NEUTRAL QUESTION—AND WAR WITH THAT POWER.

ARGUMENT.

Vast outlet provided for Mankind in the American continent—Enchanting aspect of the West India islands—Character of North America—Geographical division of the United States—The Prairies and Rocky Mountains—Description of Mexico—Its vast Agricultural riches, and capacity for Mankind—Physical description of Canada—Its superficial extent, probable resources, and vegetable productions—Immense Rivers of Central America—The Delta of the Mississippi.—Primitive Forests of the Southern provinces—Character of the American Indians—Their striking peculiarities of disposition—Extraordinary growth of the Anglo-Saxon Race in the New World—Prospects of its future growth—Prodigious increase in the valley of the Mississippi—Immense stream of Emigration across the Alleghany Mountains First Settlers, or Squatters—Their Habits and Modes of Life—Striking appearance of the growth of Cultivation in the Forest—Extraordinary progress of the stream of Emigration—Effect of Steam Navigation and Paper Credit upon the United States—Their vast Paper Circulation—Dreadful danger with which it has been attended—General well-being of the People—Proportion of the Agriculturists and other Classes in Great Britain and America—General attachment of Mankind to their Native Seats—Universal migratory turn of the Americans—Causes of this peculiarity—Effect of the prodigious rise in the value of Land in the newly cleared parts of the Country—Extraordinary activity of the Americans—Their ardent and impetuous character—Universal discontent which prevails among all Classes—General thirst for Wealth—Commercial Cities of the Union—Progress of American Commerce and Shipping—Their present Military Establishments—And Naval force—Revenue and Expenditure of the Government—Sketch of the American constitution—The Senate and House of Representatives—Their Formation and Power—Powers of the President—Sovereignty of the People—Religion in the United States—Want of any provision for a National Clergy—Ruinous effect of the dependence of the Clergy on their Flocks—How has this Democratic System worked—Irresistible power of the Majority—Total absence of Originality, or Independence of Thought—Prodigious effects of the Revolutionary Law of Succession—Spoliation already effected of the Commercial Classes—Insecurity of Life and Order in America—Peculiarity of the American Cruelties in this respect—External weakness of the Americans—General banishment of the highest class of Talent from the public Service—State of dependence of the Bench—Literature and the Press—Great extent of Slavery in the United States—Vehement resistance made to its Abolition—Manners in America—How has America escaped the political dangers incident to its situation?—Political State of Canada and its Population—Loyalty of the Canadians—The *habitans* of Lower Canada—Ruinous effect of the Constitution of 1791—Vast importance of the North American Colonies to Great Britain—Real causes of the disastrous issue of the late American War—Effect of these causes on the War—Efforts of Washington to maintain Peace with Great Britain—Progress of the Maritime Dispute with America—The Berlin and Milan Decrees, and British Orders in Council—Effect of these Decrees on the Neutral Trade—Origin of the Differences with America—Mr. Erskine's negotiations with Mr. Madison; which the British Government refuse to ratify—Storm of indignation in the United States at their disavowal—Neither France nor England will repeal their obnoxious Decrees—Affair of the Little Belt and President—Threatening aspect of the Negotiations—Violent measures of Congress in preparing for War—Diminutive scale of their Hostile Preparations—Reflections on this circumstance—Invasion of Canada by General Hull, and his Surrender—Armistice on the Frontier, which is disavowed by the American Government, and dissatisfaction which it excites—Total defeat of the Americans at Queenstown—A Third Invasion of Canada is repulsed—Success of the Americans at Sea—Capture of the *Guerrière* by the Constitution—Action between the *Frolic* and *Wasp*—Capture of the *Macedonian* by the United States; and of the *Java* by the Constitution—Desperate defence of the former—Capture of the *Peacock* by the *Hornet*—Prodigious moral effect of these Victories of the Americans—Reflections on the causes to which they were owing—Vigorous Efforts made in England to repair the Disasters—Great effect of these Efforts, and supineness of the American Government in recruiting the Navy—The *Shannon* and *Chesapeake*—Approach of the two Vessels to each other—The *Chesapeake* is carried by Boarding—Desperate Conflict on her Quarterdeck—Great moral effect of this Victory—Combats of lesser Vessels; The *Boxer* and *Enterprize*, and *Pelican* and *Argus*—Actions in Chesapeake Bay—Operations by land, and Preparations by the Americans for carrying on

the War—Invasion and Defeat of General Winchester, and Capture of Fort Ogdensburg—Capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada, by the Americans—Great Efforts of both Parties on the Lakes—Defeat of the Americans on the Miami, by General Proctor—The Americans effect a Landing on the Niagara Frontier, of which they become entire Masters—Abortive attack by Sir George Prevost on Sackett's Harbour—Surprise of the Americans at Forty Mile Creek, and Defeat of Boestler—Fresh Loan, and New Taxes imposed by Congress—Surprise of Blackrock Harbour by the British—Their Successes on Lake Champlain and at Plattsburg—Repulse of the British at Fort Sandusky on Lake Erie—The Americans acquire the Superiority on Lake Erie, and gallant Action of Captain Barclay there—Defeat of General Proctor by the Americans on the Thames—Indecisive Actions on Lake Ontario—Operations in Lower Canada—Defeat of General Wilkinson by Colonel Morrison—General retreat of the Americans, and results of the Campaign—Capture of Fort Niagara, Defeat of Hull, and Burning of Buffalo—Maritime Operations of 1814—Capture of the *Essex* by the *Phœbe*; of the *Frolic* by the British, and *Reindeer* by the Americans; of the *President* by the *Endymion*, and others—Operations in Canada—Symptoms of approaching separation of the Northern States of the Union—Repeal of the Embargo and Non-Importation Act—President's proclamation concerning Neutral Vessels—Storming of Fort Oswego, and failure at Sandycreek—Capture of Fort Erie by the Americans, and battle of Chippewa—Operations in the Chesapeake—Battle of Bladensburg, and capture of Washington—Failure at Bellair, and of the attack on Baltimore—Lesser Actions in Canada—Sir George Prevost's expedition against Plattsburg—Defeat of the Flotilla on Lake Champlain, and retreat of the British army—Operations at Fort Erie—Expedition against New Orleans—Bloody Battle before that town, and Defeat of the British—Proceedings of the Legislature of Massachusetts—Negotiations at Ghent, and Treaty of Peace between America and Great Britain—Reflections on this Contest—Its disastrous Effects to the Americans—On the causes of the Mutual Failures—And on future Hostilities between the two Countries.

Vast outlet
for man-
kind in the
American
continent.

If the friends of freedom are often led to despair of its fortunes amidst the dense population, aged monarchies and corrupted passions of the old world, the Aurora appears to rise in a purer sky and with brighter colours in the other hemisphere. In those immense regions which the genius of Columbus first laid open to European enterprise, where vice had not yet spread its snares nor wealth its seductions, the free spirit and persevering industry of England have penetrated a yet untrodden continent, and laid in the wilderness the foundations of a vaster monument of civilization than was ever yet raised by the hands of man. Nor has the hand of Nature been wanting to prepare a fitting receptacle for the august structure. Far beyond the Atlantic wave, amidst forests trod only by the casual passage of the savage, her creative powers have been for ages in activity: in the solitudes of the Far West, the garden of the human race has been for ages in preparation; and amidst the ceaseless and expanding energies of the old world, her prophetic hand has silently prepared, in the solitude of the new, unbounded resources for the future increase of man.

Enchanting
aspect of
the West
Indian
islands.

There is a part of the New World where nature appears clothed with the brilliant colours, and decked out with the gorgeous array of the tropics. In the gulf of Mexico the extraordinary clearness of the water reveals to the astonished mariner the magnitude of its abysses, and discloses, even at the depth of thirty fathoms, the gigantic vegetation which, even so far beneath the surface, is drawn forth by the attraction of a vertical sun. In the midst of these glassy waves, rarely disturbed by a ruder breath than the zephyrs of spring, an archipelago of perfumed islands placed, which repose, like baskets of flowers, on the tranquil surface of the ocean. Every thing in those enchanted abodes appears to have been prepared for the wants and enjoyments of man. Nature seems to have superseded the ordinary necessity for labour. The verdure of the groves, and the colours of the flowers and blossoms derive additional vividness from the transparent purity of the air and the deep serenity of

the azure heavens. Many of the trees are loaded with fruits, which descend by their own weight to invite the indolent hand of the gatherer, and are perpetually renewed under the influence of an ever balmy air. Others, which yield no nourishment, fascinate the eye by the luxuriant variety of their form or the gorgeous brilliancy of their colours. Amidst a forest of perfumed citron-trees, spreading bananas, graceful palms, of wild figs, of round-leaved myrtles, of fragrant acacias, and gigantic arbutus, are to be seen every variety of creepers, with scarlet or purple blossoms, which entwine themselves round every stem, and hang in festoons from tree to tree. The trees are of a magnitude unknown in northern climes; the luxuriant vines, as they clamber up the loftiest cedars, form graceful festoons; grapes are so plenty upon every shrub, that the surge of the ocean, as it lazily rolls in upon the shore with the quiet winds of summer, dashes its spray upon the clusters; and natural arbours form an impervious shade, that not a ray of the sun of July can penetrate. Cotton, planted by the hand of nature, grows in wild luxuriance; the potatoe and banana yield an overflowing supply of food; fruits of too tempting sweetness present themselves to the hand. Innumerable birds, with varied but ever splendid foliage, nestle in shady retreats, where they are sheltered from the scorching heats of summer. Painted varieties of parrots and woodpeckers create a glitter amidst the verdure of the groves, and humming-birds rove from flower to flower, resembling "the animated particles of a rainbow." The scarlet flamingoes, seen through an opening of the forest in a distant savannah, seem the mimic array of fairy armies: the fragrance of the woods, the odour of the flowers, loads every breeze. These charms broke on Columbus and his followers like Elysium: "One could live here," said he, "for ever." Is this the terrestrial paradise which nature seems at first sight to have designed; which it appeared to its heroic discoverer? It is the land of slavery and of pestilence; where indolence dissolves the manly character, and stripes can alone rouse the languid arm; where "death bestrides the evening gale," and the yielding breath inhales poison with its delight; where the iron race of Japhet itself melts away under the prodigality of the gifts of nature (1).

Character
of North
America.

There is a land, in the same hemisphere, of another character. Washed by the waves of a dark and stormy ocean, granite rocks and sandy promontories constitute its sea-front, and a sterile inhospitable tract, from a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles broad, and eleven hundred long presents itself to the labours of the colonist. It was there that the British exiles first set their feet, and sought amidst hardship and suffering that freedom of which England had become unworthy. Dark and melancholy woods cover the greater part of this expanse: the fir, the beech, the laurel, and the wild olive, are chiefly to be found on the sea-coast; but in such profusion do they grow, and so strongly characterize the country, that even now, after two hundred years of laborious industry have been employed in felling them, the spaces cleared by man appear but as spots amidst the gloomy immensity of the primitive forest. Further inland, the shapeless swell of the Alleghany mountains rises to separate the sea-coast from the vast plains in the interior; the forests become loftier, and are composed of noble trees, sown by the hand of Nature in every variety, from the stunted pine which strikes its roots into the ices of the Arctic Circle, to the majestic palm, the spreading plane-tree, the graceful poplar,

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 727, 731. Tocq. i, 33, Descourtiz, Descript. des Antilles, i. 265, Irving's Columbus, 3, 269, 271. Bancroft, i, 92.

and verdant evergreen oak, which overshadow the marshes of the Floridas and Carolina. The ceaseless activity of nature is seen, without intermission, throughout these pathless solitudes: the great work of creation is every where followed by destruction, that of destruction by creation; generations of trees are perpetually decaying, but fresh generations ever force their ways up through the fallen stems; luxuriant creepers cover with their leaves alike the expiring and the reviving race; frequent rains, which almost every where stagnate amidst the thickets, attracted by this prodigious expanse of shaded and humid surface, at once hasten decay and vivify vegetation; prolific animal life teems in the leafy coverts which are found amidst these fallen patriarchs; and the incessant war of the stronger with the weaker, strews the earth alike with animal and vegetable remains. The profound silence of these forests is occasionally interrupted only by the fall of a tree, the breaking of a branch, the bellowing of the buffalo, the roar of a cataract, or the whistling of the winds. It is the land of health, of industry, and of freedom; of ardent zeal, and dauntless energy, and great aspiration. In those forests a virgin mould is formed; in those wilds the foundations of human increase are laid: no gardener could mingle the elements of rural wealth like the contending life and death of the forest; and out of the decayed remnants of thousands of years are extracted the sustenance, the life, the power of civilized man (1).

Geographical divisions of the United States. The United States of North America extend from 70° to 127° west longitude, and from 25° to 52° north latitude. They embrace in the territories of the separate States 1,554,000 square miles or about ten times the area of France, which contains 156,000; and seventeen times the British Islands, which embrace 91,000; besides about 500,000 more in the unappropriated western wilds not yet allotted to any separate State—in all, 2,076,000 square miles, or 1,528,896,000 acres, upwards of two-and-twenty times the area of the British Islands (2). This immense territory is portioned out by nature into three great divisions, of which not a third has yet heard the hatchet of civilized man, by the two great chains of mountains, which running from north to south, nearly parallel to the adjacent oceans, separate the continent of North America, as it were, into a centre and two wings. These chains are the Alleghany and the Rocky Mountains. The former, gradually rising from the shores of the St.-Lawrence and the frontiers of Canada, stretching southward to the gulf of Florida, a distance of above fourteen hundred miles, dividing the sea-coast, which first began to be cultivated by the European settlers from the vast alluvial plains of central America. The space between it and the sea is comparatively sterile, and does not embrace above 200,000 square miles. It is beyond the Alleghanys, a comparatively low and shapeless range, seldom rising to five thousand feet in height, that the garden of the world is to be found. In the immense basins of the Missouri, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, to which the waters descend from the whole length of the Alleghanys on the east, and the vast piles of the Rocky Mountains on the west, are contained above 1,000,000 square miles, with hardly a hill or a rock to interrupt the expanse. Of this prodigious space, above six times the whole area of France, and fully eleven times that of the British islands, two-

(1) Tocq. i. 33, 35. Malte Brun, xi. 184, 211. Balbi, 879, 920.

(2) The total territory of the United States, including the Floridas, is, according to Malte Brun, 313,900 square marine leagues, or about 3,000,000

square geographical miles; but that includes the portion covered by water, which is a fifteenth of the whole, and the desert tracts of the Rocky Mountains.—MALTE BRUN, xi. 185.

thirds, being that which lies nearest to the Alleghany range, is composed of the richest soil, in great part alluvial, in others covered with the virgin spoils of decayed forest vegetation during several thousand years. The remaining third stretches by a gentle, and almost imperceptible slope, to the foot of the Rocky Mountains (1).

The Prairies and Rocky Mountains. Gradually as it approaches that stupendous barrier, the character of nature changes : charming savannahs, over which innumerable herds of buffaloes range at pleasure, at first break the dark uniformity of the forest ; wider and more open prairies next succeed, over which the trees are loosely sprinkled, and sometimes attain a prodigious size : naked and dreary plains are then to be traversed, in which a thousand rills meander, with imperceptible flow, towards the great river in the east, almost concealed amidst gigantic reeds and lofty grass, which fringe their banks ; until at length the vast and snowy ridge of the Rocky Mountains, rising in unapproachable grandeur to the height of fourteen and fifteen thousand feet, presents apparently an impassable barrier to the adventurous steps of man. Yet even these, the Andes of Northern America which traverse its whole extent from Icy Cape to the Isthmus of Darien, do not bound the natural capabilities of its territory ; on their western slopes another more broken plain, furrowed by innumerable ravines, is to be seen, descending rapidly towards the Pacific, which embraces 500,000 square miles ; its numerous and rapid streams give it an inexhaustible command of water power ; its rivers, stored with fish and in great part navigable, present vast resources for the use of man : its boundless forests and rich veins of mineral wealth point it out as the future abode of manufacturing greatness (2).

Description of Mexico. These are the great geographical divisions of the territory of the United States ; but they do not comprehend the whole of the immense continent of North America. Mexico on the south, and the British provinces on the north, contain within themselves the elements of mighty empires, and are destined to open their capacious arms for ages to come to receive the overflowing population of the old world. The former of these possesses a territory of above a million of geographical square miles, thinly populated at this time by nearly eight millions of inhabitants (3), yielding just eight to the square mile ; while in England the proportion to the same space is three hundred. The Rocky Mountains run like a huge backbone through its whole territory from north to south, rising here to stupendous volcanic peaks, which in some place attain the height of sixteen and seventeen thousand feet (4). These mountains, which spread their ramifications through a great portion of the country, are stored with the richest veins of gold and silver ; and these minerals are in great part found, not at the shivering elevation of ten or twelve thousand feet above the sea, as in South America, but at the comparatively moderate height of three or four thousand. Vast lakes, most of which are rapidly filling up, are to be found in many of the lofty valleys ; and plateaus or table-lands of prodigious extent, like so many successive steps of stairs, from the sea-shore to the Cordilleras, give every

(1) Balbi, 935, 939. Malte Brun, xi. 185, 200.

(2) Balbi, 935, 939, 1012. Tocq. ii. 387. Malte Brun, xi. 185, 215. American Atlas, No. 6.

(3) The numbers were 7,687,000 by the census of 1841.—*American Statistical Almanack for 1841*, 267.

(4) The following are the heights of some of the highest in the range.

	Fect.
Grand Volcano Popocatepetell, . . .	16,584
Piéd'Orizaba,	16,332
Sierra Nevada,	14,166
Nevada de Taluca,	14,184

—HUMBOLDT, ii. 421 ; and MALTE BRUN, xi. 373.

variety of climate, from the warmth of the tropics to the borders of everlasting snow (1).

Vast agricultural riches, and capacity for mankind. If great part of the country is rocky, parched, and sterile, ample compensation is afforded in the surpassing fertility of the lower valleys of the other districts. Humboldt has told us that he was never wearied with astonishment at the smallness of the portion of soil which, in Mexico and the adjoining provinces, would yield sustenance to a family for a year, and that the same extent of ground, which in wheat would maintain only two persons, would yield sustenance under the banana to fifty; though, in that favoured region, the return of wheat is never under seventy, sometimes as much as a hundred fold (2). The return, on an average, of Great Britain, is not more than nine to one. If due weight be given to these extraordinary facts, it will not appear extravagant to assert, that Mexico, with a territory embracing seven times the whole area of France, may at some future, and possibly not remote period, contain two hundred millions of inhabitants. But notwithstanding all these advantages, it is more than doubtful whether the Spanish race is destined to perpetuate its descendants, or at least retain the sovereignty in this country. Compared with the adjoining provinces of America or Canada, it appears struck with a social and political palsy. The recent successful settlement of a small body of British and American colonists in Texas, a Mexican province, their easy victory over the Mexican troops, and the rapid growth of their republic, may well suggest a doubt whether priority of occupation and settlement will not in this instance, as it has done in many others, yield to the superiority of race, religion, and political character; and whether to the descendants of the Anglo-Saxon settlers is not ultimately destined the sceptre of the whole North American continent (3).

Physical description of Canada. CANADA, and the other British possessions in North America, though apparently blessed with fewer physical advantages, contain a nobler race, and are evidently reserved for a more lofty destination. Every thing there is in proper keeping for the development of the combined physical and mental energies of man. There are to be found at once, the hardihood of character which conquers difficulty, the severity of climate which stimulates exertion, the natural advantages which reward enterprise. Nature has marked out this country for exalted destinies; for if she has not given it the virgin mould of the basin of the Missouri, or the giant vegetation and prolific sun of the tropics, she has bestowed upon it a vast chain of inland lakes, which fit it one day to become the great channel of commerce between Europe and the interior of America and eastern parts of Asia. The river St.-Lawrence, fed by the immense inland seas which separate Canada from the United States, is the great commercial artery of North America. Descending from the distant sources of the Kaministiquia and St.-Louis, it traverses the solitary Lake Winnipeg and Lake of the Woods, opens into the boundless expanse of Lake Superior, and after being swelled by the tributary volumes of the Michigan and Huron waves, again contracts into the river and lake of St.-Clair; a second time expands into the broad surface of Lake Erie, from whence it is precipitated by the sublime cataract of Niagara into "wide Ontario's boundless lake," and again contracting, finds its way to the sea by the magnificent estuary of the St.-Lawrence, through the wooded intricacies of the Thousand Islands. Nor are the means of water navigation wanting on

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 363. Balbi, 1017, 1037.

(2) Humboldt, iii. 29, 36; and ix. 250, 152.

(3) Malte Brun, xi. 363, 391 Balbi, 1017, 1037.

the other side of this marvellous series of inland seas. The Rocky Mountains, sunk there to five or six thousand feet in height, contain valleys capable of being opened to artificial navigation by human enterprize; no considerable elevation requires to be passed in making the passage from the distant sources of the St.-Lawrence to the mountain feeders of the Columbia; the rapid declivity of the range on the western side soon renders the latter river navigable, and a deep channel and swelling stream soon conduct the navigator to the shores of the Pacific. As clearly as the Mediterranean Sea was let in by the Straits of Gibraltar to form the main channel of communication and the great artery of life to the old world, so surely were the great lakes of Canada spread in the wilderness of the new, to penetrate the mighty continent, and carry into its remotest recesses the light and the blessings of Christian civilization (1).

Superficial
extent, and
probable
resources
of Canada.

The superficial extent of the British possessions in North America is prodigious, and greatly exceeds that which is subject to the sway of the United States; it amounts to above 4,000,000 of square geographical miles, or nearly a ninth part of the whole terrestrial surface of the globe (2). Probably seven-eighths of this immense surface are doomed to eternal sterility from the excessive severity of the climate, which yields only a scanty herbage to the reindeer, the elk, and the musk ox; but Upper and Lower Canada alone contain 500,000 square miles, of which 95,000 are in the upper and richer province; and, altogether, there are probably not less than 500,000 square miles in the British dominions in that part of the world capable of profitable cultivation, being more than six times the superficies of the whole British islands, if the wastes of Scotland, not less sterile than the Polar snows, are deducted. Of this arable surface, about 150,000 square miles, or somewhat more than a fourth, has been surveyed, or is under cultivation. The climate is various, being much milder in the upper or more southerly province of Canada, than in the lower; but in both it is extremely cold in winter, and surprisingly warm in summer. In the lower province, the thermometer has been known to stand in July and August at 95° of Fahrenheit, and it is usually from 80° to 90° in the shade; while in winter, it is not unfrequently as low as —40°, so as to freeze mercury. But, notwithstanding this extraordinary variation of temperature, the climate is not only eminently favourable to the health of the European race, but brings to maturity, in many places, the choicest gifts of nature (5).

Vegetable
productions
of the
Canadas.

Vast pine forests, scantily intersected, in the vicinity only of the great rivers, by execrable roads, cover indeed nine-tenths of the northern provinces, as of the corresponding districts of Russia and Sweden in the old world; but they constitute no inconsiderable portion of the national wealth, for in them is found an inexhaustible store of timber, the exportation of which constitutes the great staple of the country, and employs four-fifths of the eight hundred thousand tons of shipping which now carry on the trade between Great Britain and her magnificent transatlantic possessions. Even in Lower Canada, however, when you approach the basin of the St.-Lawrence, the earth becomes fruitful, and yields ample supplies for the use of man—grain, herbage, potatoes, and vegetables, grow in abundance: the almost miraculous rapidity of spring compensates the long and dreary months of winter; and the fervent heat of summer brings all the fruits

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 139, 143. Balbi, 926.

(2) The exact amount is 4,109,630 square geographical miles. The terrestrial globe embraces about 37,000,000.—MALTE BRUN, xi. 179. Besides

this land surface, British North America contains 1,349,000 square miles of water.—Ibid.

(3) Malte Brun, xi. 179; and 143, 145. Balbi, 1096, 1107.

of northern Europe to maturity. In the upper province, the winter is shorter and milder, and the ardent rays of the summer sun so temper the northern blasts, that the vine, the peach, and the apricot, as well as cherries and melons, ripen in the open air. In both, the same change took place which has been observed in Europe since the dark masses of the Hercynian Forest were felled (1), and its morasses drained by the laborious arms of the Germans; and the climate, every season becoming more mild, has undergone a change of 8° or 10° on the average of the year, since the efforts of European industry were applied to the cultivation of their territory.

Immense
rivers of
Central
America.

Although the rivers in the United States of America do not offer the same marvellous advantages for foreign commerce which the St.-Lawrence and its chain of inland seas afford to the activity of British enterprise, they are inferior to none in the world in the immensity of their course and the volume of their waters, and present unbounded facilities both for the export of the produce of the soil, and the marvellous power of steam-navigation. The greatest of these is the Missouri—the main branch of the vast system of rivers which drain the rich alluvial plain between the Alleghany and Rocky Mountains, and which, after a course of two thousand five hundred miles in length, empties itself into the gulf of Mexico, below New Orleans. Already a great river when it issues in the solitude of the Far West from the Rocky Mountains, its passage into the plain is worthy of the majestic character of the Great Father of waters. Between stupendous walls of rock, twelve hundred feet high, and three leagues in length, whose overhanging cliffs darken the awful passage, it issues forth in a deep and foaming current three hundred yards broad, and, soon swelled by other tributary streams, winds its long and solitary way through the prairies to the falls, sixty miles distant, which rival Niagara itself in sublimity and grandeur (2). The Mississippi, the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Illinois, the Arkansas, the Kansas, the White River, the Red River, the St.-Peter, the Ouisconsin, any one of which exceeds the Rhine or the Danube in magnitude, and which have given their names to the mighty states which already are settled on their shores, are but the tributaries of this prodigious artery. These various rivers, all of which are navigable, each with their own affiliated set of tributary streams, several thousand in number, form a vast chain of inland navigation, all connected together, and issuing into the sea by one channel, which, like the arteries and veins of the human body, is destined to maintain an immense interior circulation, and convey life and health to the furthest extremities of the million of square miles which constitute the magnificent garden of central America (3).

The Delta
of the
Mississippi.

If the majestic portals by which the Missouri issues from its icy cradle in the Rocky Mountains is one of the sublimest, the alluvial swamps through which it finds its way to the ocean in the gulf of Mexico, is one of the most interesting objects in nature. There one of the great formations of the earth is actually going forward: we are carried back to what occurred in our own continent before the creation of man. Like all other great rivers, the Missouri, or the Mississippi as it is there called, does not empty itself into the sea in one continuous channel, but in a great variety of arms or mouths, which intersect, in sluggish streams, the great alluvial Delta,

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 143, 145. *Annales des Voyages*, xviii. 114, 126.

(2) They are in all, 384 feet in height; the principal fall alone is 220 feet high, and about 800 broad. They are surmounted by lofty cliffs, and their roar is heard thirteen miles off. In a solitary

tree on an island, in the middle of one of the falls, an eagle has built its nest.—LEWIS and CLARKE, ii. 347, 351.

(3) Malte Brun, xi. 296, 296, 297, 192, 194. Lewis and Clarke, ii. and iii.

which is formed by the perpetual deposit of the immense volume of waters which it rolls into the sea. Between these mouths of the river a vast surface, half land half water, from fifty to a hundred miles in width, and three hundred in length, fringes the whole coast; and there the enormous mass of vegetable matter constantly brought down by the Mississippi is periodically deposited. A few feet are sufficient to bring it above the level of the water, except in great floods; and as soon as that is done vegetation springs up with the utmost rapidity in that prolific slime. Nothing can be conceived so dreary, and yet so interesting, as the prospect of these immense alluvial swamps in the course of formation. As far as the eye can reach over hundreds of square leagues, nothing is to be seen but marshes bristling with roots, trunks, and branches of trees. In winter and spring, when the floods come down, they bring with them an incalculable quantity of these broken fragments, technically called logs, which not only cover the whole of this immense semi-marine territory, but floating over it, strew the sea for several miles off to such an extent, that ships have often no small difficulty in making their way through them. Thus the whole ground is formed of a vast network of logs, closely packed and rammed together to the depth of several fathoms, which are gradually cemented by fresh deposits, till the whole acquires by degrees a firm consistency. Aquatic birds, innumerable cranes and storks, water serpents and huge alligators, people this dreary solitude. In a short time a sort of rank cane or reed springs up, which, by retarding the flow of the river, collects the mud of the next season, and so lends its share in the formation of the delta. Fresh logs, fresh mud, and new crops of cane, go on for a series of years (4); in the course of which, the alligators in enormous multitudes fix in their new domain, and extensive animal remains come to mingle with the vegetable deposits. At length, as the soil accumulates and hardens, a dwarfish shrub begins to appear above the surface; larger and larger trees succeed with the decay of their more stunted predecessors; and at length, on the scene of former desolation, the magnificent riches of the Virginian forest are reared.

Primitive
forest of
the southern
provinces.

Would we behold what this barren marsh, at first the abode only of serpents and alligators, is destined one day to become under the prolific hand of nature? Enter that perfumed and verdant forest, where, on the shores of the rivers of Florida and Virginia, the marvellous riches of nature are poured forth with a prodigality, of which, in more northern climates, scarcely a conception can be formed. So rapidly does vegetation there grow out of the water, that in navigating their rivers, thickets and woods seem to be floating on its surface. The magnificent scarlet blossoms of the *Lobelia cardinalis*, and the gigantic perfumed white petals of the *Pan-cratioma* of Carolina, attract the eye, even in the midst of the endless luxuriance of marsh vegetation. High over head the white cedar towers, and furnishes in its dense foliage a secure asylum for the water eagle and the stork; while wild vines cluster up every stem, and hang in festoons from tree to tree, and every branch in the lower part of the forest teems with luxuriant creepers, often bearing the most splendid flowers. In the natural labyrinths formed in these watery forests, spots of ravishing beauty are often to be found, which might tempt the pilgrim to fix his abode, did not the pestilential air of autumn forbid for a long period the residence of civilized man. But these dangers diminish as the soil becomes higher and more con-

(1) Duvalon's Colonie de Mississipe, 13. Captain Hall's America, iii. 335, 341. Malte Brun, xi. 272, 274, 196.

sistent (1); human perseverance embanks the rivers and excludes the flood : and in no part of the world, when this is done, does such exuberant fertility reward the labour of the husbandman.

Character of the American Indians. The immense regions of North America were not wholly uninhabited when Columbus first approached their shores. Sprung originally from the neighbouring tribes of Asiatics who inhabited the most eastern portion of the old world, and whom accident or adventure had wafted across Behring Straits, its inhabitants have gradually spread over the whole extent of the American continent in both hemispheres, from icy Cape to Cape Horn. Tradition, universal and unvarying, assigns the first origin of the American race to a migration of their fathers from beyond the western ocean : a connected chain of words, which float unchanged through the otherwise forgotten floods of time, may be traced from the tribes of the Caucasian range to the Cordilleras of Mexico and Peru. But climate and circumstances, those great moulders of the human character, have exercised their wonted influence upon the descendants of Shem, and presented in the North American savage a different specimen of the race of man from what the world has elsewhere exhibited. He is neither the child of Japhet, daring, industrious, indefatigable, exploring the world by his enterprize, and subduing it by his exertions ; nor the offspring of Ishmael, sober, ardent, enduring, traversing the desert on his steeds, and issuing forth at appointed intervals from his solitudes, to punish and regenerate mankind. He is the hunter of the forest ; skilled to perfection in the craft necessary for that primitive occupation, but incapable of advancing beyond it. Civilization in vain endeavours to throw its silken fetters over his limbs ; he avoids the smiling plantation, and flies in horror before the advancing hatchet of the woodsman. He does well to shun the approach of the European race ; he can neither endure its fatigues, nor withstand its temptations ; and, faster than before the sword and the bayonet, his race is melting away under the fire-water, the first gift and last curse of civilization.

Their striking peculiarities of disposition. Like the Germans in the days of Tacitus, the life of the North American is divided between total inactivity and strenuous exertion : after sleeping away months in his wigwam, he will plunge into the forest, and walk from eighty to ninety miles a-day, on a stretch, for weeks ; or will lie for days together in ambush waiting for an opportunity to spring upon his foe ; and in following, sometimes for hundreds of miles, the trail of his enemies through the forest, he exhibits a degree of sagacity which almost appears miraculous. Enduring of privation, patient in suffering, heroic in death, he is wavering in temptation, and without honour in the field ; his principle is ever to shun danger if possible, and never attack except at an advantage ; and the man who can bear, without flinching, the most exquisite tortures, will often perish beside a barrel of spirits, which he wanted the resolution to resist. The language of these tribes is poetry ; their ideas are elevated ; the imagery of nature, amidst which they live, has imprinted a majestic character on their thoughts ; but like their companions, the beaver and the elk, they cannot be converted to the habits of laborious life ; they adopt of civilization only its vices ; their remains are fast disappearing under the combined influence of European encroachment and savage indulgence (2) ; already they are as rarely to be seen in New York as in London ; and before many ages have elapsed, their race, like that of the mammoth, will be ex-

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 200, 203. Payne's Geog. iv. 418, 424. Drayton's South Carolina, 20, 28.

(2) Chateaubriand, *Voyages en Amérique*.

ting; and their memory, enshrined by the genius of Cooper, will live only in the entrancing pages of American romance.

Two hundred years have elapsed since the British exiles, flying the real or imaginary persecutions of Charles I, first approached the American shores; and their increase since that time has been unparalleled for so considerable a period, in any other age or part of the world. Carrying with them into the wilderness the powers of art and the industry of civilization; with English perseverance in their character, English order in their habits, and English fearlessness in their hearts; with the axe in their hand, the bible in their pocket, and the encyclopædia by their side; they have multiplied during that long period in exactly the same ratio, and the different States of the Union now contain above seventeen millions of souls, of whom fourteen millions are of the Anglo-Saxon race (1). The duplication of the inhabitants during this whole time has regularly occurred every twenty-three years and a half; it was the same under the British colonial as under the Republican independent government; evidently demonstrating that it has been owing to general and permanent causes altogether independent of the forms of constitutions. The Negro inhabitants at this time are 2,874,578, of whom 2,487,415 are in a state of slavery; but though the black inhabitants increased from 1790 to 1850, faster than the white, yet the balance since that time has been rather turned the other way, and, except in the most southern States, the European race is increasing faster than the African (2).

If this rate of increase should continue for the next hundred, as it has done without the slightest variation for the last two hundred years, America will, by the year 1940, contain two hundred and seventy millions of inhabitants, or thirty more than all Europe west of the Ural mountains at this time, which now are peopled by two hundred and forty millions. Prodigious as this increase of human beings is, it is by no means beyond the bounds of probability that it will be realized :

(1) The following is the increase of the American population since the first regular census was taken in 1790:—

1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
3,929,326	5,306,035	7,239,903	9,638,226	12,853,838	17,068,666

This rate of increase is exactly thirty-four per cent every ten years, being just the growth of population in Lanarkshire during the last ten years.—*MALTE BRUN*, xi. 346; *American Atlas*, No. 6; and *Census for 1840*; *Stat. Almanack*, 265.

The increase in America in the last ten years has been 4,202,646 inhabitants—being a growth of $34\frac{1}{2}$ per cent for the last ten years—less than the increase during the same period in some parts of Great Britain. In the following counties, from 1831 to 1841, the augmentation was—

Monmouth,	36.9 per cent.
Lanark,	34.8 —
Dumbarton,	33.3 —
Durham,	27.7 —
Stafford,	24.2 —
Lancashire,	24.7 —
Forfar,	22.0 —
Surrey,	19.0 —
York, (West Riding,)	18.2 —
Chester,	18.5 —

—*Population Returns, 1841, Great Britain*, p. 2, 3.

But the increase over the whole empire, during these ten years, has been only 14 per cent, not half of what has occurred in America during the same period. Yet when it is recollected that at least from 58 000 to 60,000 persons annually, on an average,

during the same time have emigrated from the British Islands and settled in the United States, it is probable that the increase in *births* in the two countries was not materially different; an extraordinary and portentous circumstance, when it is recollected that in the British islands population is about three hundred to the square mile, whereas in America it is only eleven: the area of the States being about 1,500,000 square miles,

(2) *Census, 1841*; and *Tocq. ii. 329, 370.*

The following is the relative growth of population, in the Blacks and Whites, from 1780 to 1840, in the slave States:—

From 1790 to 1830, Whites increased 80 per cent.	
— — — Blacks — 112 —	
But since 1830 the proportion stands thus:—	
From 1830 to 1840, Whites increased 30 per cent.	
— — — Blacks — 25 —	

What is very remarkable, it appears from all the Returns, that the White race is now gaining rapidly on the Black in all the Northern States, where slavery is abolished, and the Black race is increasing most rapidly in the most Southerly States; a state of things which leads to the hope that in process of time, the Black slave population will be entirely confined to the States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.—See *CAREY'S Letters on Colonization of Society, 1833*: *TOCQUEVILLE*, ii. 239; and *Population Returns, 1840.*

for if the usual causes which retard the advance of mankind will, long ere that time arrives, have come into powerful operation over a great part of the Union, as they already have done in the states on the sea-coast which were first colonized, yet the immense tracts of unappropriated rich land in the basin of the Mississippi will still communicate an unwonted impulse to the principle of population, and perpetuate, on the frontier of the desert, the prolific augmentation of the human race. Gradually, however, as the sea-coast becomes an old-established and densely-peopled country, the temptation to European emigration will diminish while its difficulties must increase; the expense of transporting a family from the shores of the ocean to the Far West, will exceed that of conveying it across the Atlantic; the stream of European settlement will take some other direction, and the hundred thousand emigrants who now annually land on the American shores, from the states of the old world, will disappear (1). But whatever may be the rapidity of their increase, nothing is more certain than the prolific powers of nature will keep far a-head of them; and that, great as is the surplus produce of the American agriculturists at this time, it will, if their society is undecayed, be far greater in proportion to their population a thousand years hence.

Prodigious as has been this increase of population during so long a period, in the whole American states, it is incomparably less than the growth of mankind in particular parts of this favoured quarter of the globe. In the basin of the Mississippi, by far the richest part, as already mentioned, of the states of the Union, the population has multiplied in the last fifty years no less than fifty-fold, having increased in that time from 112,000 to 5,583,000! This is probably the most extraordinary instance of well-authenticated human increase on record in the world (2). It is far beyond the powers of multiplication which mankind possess from their own unaided resources; and is mainly to be ascribed to the vast influx of immigrants into those fertile regions, both from the states of the Union on the shores of the Atlantic, and the more distant British islands. The number of persons who annually settle in the United States of America from Great Britain and Ireland, is, on an average, nearly fifty thousand (3). At New

(1) Alison's Population, i. 60, 62.

(2) The following Table exhibits the growth of population in the provinces in the basin of the Mississippi since 1790. It almost exceeds belief:—

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
Ohio,	3,000	45,365	230,760	581,434	985,884	1,516,467
Kentucky,	73,677	220,959	406,511	564,317	687,917	779,898
Indiana,	—	4,875	24,520	147,178	343,031	685,866
Arkansas,	—	—	—	14,273	30,388	212,267
Illinois,	—	215	12,282	55,211	157,455	476,183
Tennessee,	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,813	684,904	829,210
Missouri,	—	—	20,845	66,486	140,455	383,702
Mississippi,	—	8,850	31,502	75,448	136,621	97,574
Louisiana,	—	—	76,556	153,407	215,529	352,411
Total,	112,368	385,866	1,064,703	2,080,667	3,372,184	5,335,578

—*American Census* in MALTE BRUN, xi. 346: *American Atlas*, No. 6; and *Stat. Almanack*, 1841, 264.

(3) Table showing the number of Emigrants who have landed at New York alone, in the years under-mentioned, from the United Kingdom

1830,	21,433
1831,	22,607
1832,	28,283
1833,	16,109

1834,	26,510
1835,	26,540
1836,	16,749
1837,	59,975
1838,	34,009

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, viii. 199.

York, it is no unusual thing to see five thousand landed in a single week; and great numbers of those who land at Quebec or Montreal, attracted by the fertility of the backwoods of America, make their way across the border. And almost the whole of this vast multitude no sooner arrive on the shores of America, than they crowd away to the back settlements, and seek the prodigious flood of civilization which is overspreading the banks of the Ohio. To these are to be added a still greater stream of immigration from America itself: for clearly marked as is the tendency of emigration from Europe, and especially from the British islands, to the American shores, it operates not less forcibly in directing mankind from the margin of the Atlantic, across the Alleghany Mountains, into the vast and untrodden solitudes of the west. Such has been the growth of the human species in that fertile territory, that the states in its great alluvial surface, though they only began to be seriously cultivated in 1790, contain now above five millions of inhabitants (1); and from the vast rapidity of their increase, compared with that of the other states in the Union, it is no longer matter of doubt that in less than twenty years their representatives will have a preponderating voice in the national legislature.

Immense stream of immigration across the Alleghany Mountains. There is something solemn and almost awful in the incessant advance of the great stream of civilization, which in America is continually rolling down from the summits of the Alleghany mountains, and overspreading the boundless forests of the Far West. Vast as were the savage multitudes which ambition or the lust of plunder attracted to the standards of Timour or Gengis Khan, to oppress and overwhelm the opulent regions of the earth; immense as were the swarms which for centuries issued from the cheerless plains of Scythia to insult or devastate the decaying provinces of the Roman empire; they were as nothing compared to the ceaseless flood of human beings which is now in its turn sent forth from the abodes of civilized man, into the desert parts of the world. No less than three hundred thousand persons, almost all in the prime of life, now yearly pass the Alleghany mountains, and settle on the banks of the Ohio or the Arkansas and their tributary streams. They do not pass through, as the Tartar hordes, like a desolating fire or a raging torrent; they settle where they take up their abode, never to return. Their war is with the forest and the marsh, not the corrupted cities of long-established man. Spreading themselves out over an extent of nearly twelve hundred miles in length, these advanced posts of civilization commence the incessant war with the hatchet and the plough; and at the sound of their strokes, resounding through the solitude of the forest, the wild animals and the Indians retire to more undisturbed retreats. Along a frontier tract, above twelve hundred miles in length, the average advance of cultivation is about seventeen miles a-year. The ground is imperfectly cleared, indeed, by these pioneers of humanity; but still the forest has disappeared under their strokes: the green field, the wooden cottage, the signs of infant improvement have arisen; and behind them, another wave of more wealthy and skilled settlers succeed, who complete the work of agricultural improvement. The wild animals of the forest retire before this incessant advance of civilization; by a mysterious instinct, or the information of other creatures of their race, they become aware of the approach of the great enemy of their tribe; and so far does the alarm penetrate before the approach of real danger, that they are

(1) Tocq. ii. 376, 377. Census of America, 1840.

frequently found to commence their retreat two hundred miles in advance of the actual sound of the European hatchet (1).

First settlers, or squatters. Their habits and mode of life. The first settlers, or squatters, who precede the arrival of regular colonists, constitute a most important class, peculiar to America, of whom no type had previously existed in the world. Consumed by an incessant desire to explore new territories, and skim the surface of the as yet virgin soil, they penetrate with dauntless courage into the wilderness; and, often several hundred miles in advance of the regular clearers of the forest, first make the woods resound with the crack of the rifle and the strokes of the hatchet. The profound solitude with which they are surrounded, the dangers from wild beasts and savage tribes to which they are exposed, the independent roaming life which they lead, possess charms which more than compensate to them for the loss of all the comforts and intercourse of civilized society. The desert attracts them as powerfully as it does the red man or the elk. Under pretence of choosing a more healthy abode, richer soil, or more abundant game, they push incessantly forward; and, advancing into the very depths of the forest or the prairie, gradually drive the native inhabitants of the wilderness before them. Adventurers of this description have often been known to penetrate a thousand miles alone into the woods: in a small canoe, capable of being borne on the shoulders, they descend immense rivers, with no other equipments but a carabine, a bag of powder and shot, a tomahawk, a couple of beaver snares, and a large knife. If the first stragglers of the crowd approach in their rear, they move steadily on, ever far in advance of civilized life; and leave to succeeding and more permanent settlers the labour of felling the trees, of erecting the log-houses, of sowing the maize, and reaping the first fruits of the virgin riches of nature (2).

Striking appearances of the progress of cultivation in the forests. Few objects are more striking than the first appearances of regular cultivation in the midst of the aged magnificence of nature. They have been thus described by the masterly hand of an eye-witness: "Beside," says Chateaubriand, "an ancient cypress-tree of the desert, is to be seen the spring of infant cultivation; the golden ears of the wheat wave over the fallen trunk of an oak, and the harvest of a season replaces the growth of ten centuries. Every where are to be beheld forests delivered over to the flames, sending forth clouds of smoke into the air, and the plough slowly making its way through their roots: land-surveyors with their long chains are measuring the desert, and marking out the first divisions of property on its surface; arbiters settle the disputed limits: the bird abandons its nest; the resting-place of the wild beast is converted into a log-house; and the strokes of the hatchet are the last sounds which are repeated by the echoes, which are themselves perishing with the forests which produced them." Gradually the powers of man assert their destined superiority over those of nature: man not only "replenishes the earth, but subdues it." In a few years the patriarchs of the forest disappear; a few indurated stems, which have withstood alike the fire and the axe of the woodsman, alone rise up above the level expanse of cultivation. The astonishing riches of a virgin soil, impregnated with the ashes of the forest which overshadowed it, reward fifty-fold even the rudest labours of cultivation; the smiling village, the church spire, the infant school, succeed; but with them are mingled the

(1) Tocq. ii. 274. Report of Cass and Clarke to Congress, Feb. 4, 1829.

(2) Michaux, Voyage à l'Ouest des Monts Alleghany, 89, 91. Malte Brun, xi. 253, 254.

spirit shop, the hotel, the attorney's office; and civilization spreads its roots, with its blessings, its passions, and its vices (1).

Extraordinary progress of the stream of emigration.

The violence of the mysterious impulse which thus impels the European race into the western solitudes, appears in the strongest manner in all the public carriages which transport passengers to these distant regions. Thousands and tens of thousands every week in summer descend from the heights of the Alleghany to the margin of the streams, which promise them the means of passing to the distant regions of the west, all eager for an immediate conveyance to the land of promise. Difficulties cannot retard, dangers cannot deter them. With ceaseless activity and persevering courage, they make their way to the first steam-boats, which carry them down the tributaries of the Ohio to that mighty river, and, without regarding the perils of the passage, or the numerous dangers of steam navigation, demand only to be instantly conveyed to the land of their hopes. Such are the multitudes that flock to these means of transport, and the universal anxiety to get forward, that even the sight of a high-pressure steam-engine blown up before their eyes, has no effect in deterring others from instantly embarking in the perilous navigation. They ask only a cheap passage and quick voyage. For weeks and months together in summer, they stream down every road which descends from the Alleghany, and crowd to the quays where the steam-boats take their passengers, almost rolling over each other in their anxiety to get forward. No sooner does a boat touch the quay, than it is instantly filled with passengers; and with scarcely any money in their pockets, and but little provender in their srips, the hardy adventurers rush forward into the wilderness before them, and gain from the chase a precarious subsistence, till the first returns of cultivation afford them the means of support (2).

Effects of steam navigation and paper credit on the United States.

Steam navigation is the vital means of communication, by which this extraordinary activity is conveyed into distant regions. The Ohio, the Mississippi, the Arkansas, and all their numerous tributary streams, are constantly navigated by steam-boats. Nearly three hundred ply on the Mississippi alone; upwards of five hundred are employed in the different rivers which convey this prodigious flood of immigration to the western provinces of the Union. Without the assistance of this mighty agent, which alike aids the descending, and conquers the adverse stream, the progress of cultivation, and clearing of the forest, must have been comparatively slow; propelled by its marvellous powers, the human race has advanced with the steps of a giant through the vast wilderness prepared for its reception. Steam navigation is to the continent of America, what the circulation is to the human frame; and the commercial wealth and paper currency of the great commercial cities on the shores of the Atlantic, are the moving power in the heart which sets the whole circulation in motion (3).

Vast paper circulation of the United States.

Immense has been the extent to which this powerful, but perilous, engine of advancement has been carried in the American continent. From an enquiry set on foot in 1834, it appears that there were in the United States, at that period, five hundred and six banking establishments, independent of the National Bank of the United States at Philadelphia, which last issued notes to the amount of L.5,500,000. The private banks issued notes to the amount of L.16,200,000 more, making in all a paper circulation of L.19,500,000; besides L.10,000,000 in specie. This makes

(1) Chateaubriand, *Voyage en Amérique*, 318. Malte Brun, xi. 206. Hall's *America*, iii. 281, 283.

(2) Tocq. iv. 274. Chevalier, ii. 23, 24. Alison on Population, i. 547.

(3) Chevalier, ii. 24, 25.

the total circulation at that period nearly L.30,000,000, or nearly L.2 a-head to the whole free population ; a proportion considerably greater than obtains in the British Islands, if the vast extent of the commercial dealings of this empire are taken into consideration (1). This vast circulation is pushed into the farthest extremities of the States of the Union by means of the branch banks, which, like so many forcing pumps, disseminate the banknotes through every village and hamlet it contains. Such is the competition of these branch banks for employment, that they are every where established on the frontiers of civilization, almost before the surrounding trees are felled. The discounting of bills is carried to an unprecedented extent: the law allows any rate of interest agreed on by the parties to be taken, and it is often excessive ; one *false* per cent a month is an usual, three per cent a month no uncommon occurrence ; and these immense profits at once tempt bankers to advance money to needy adventurers, and indemnify them for the numerous losses to which such perilous issues are liable. So powerful an agent is this system of paper credit in forcing and maintaining the industry of the United States, that its influence may be seen in the farthest parts of their possessions ; and it is to the greater advantages they enjoy in this respect, more than any other cause, that the superior population, wealth, and cultivation of the southern side of the St.-Lawrence and lakes, to that which appears on the British side of those noble estuaries, is to be attributed (2.) *false*

Dreadful disasters with which it has been attended. He was a wise man who said that paper currency is strength in the outset, but weakness in the end ; and America has more than once bitterly felt the truth of this aphorism. The commercial and monetary crises to which she has long been subject have been such, that they would have crushed, perhaps for ever, the industry of any other nation. During the war with Great Britain in 1814, the commercial distress was such, that the whole northern States, including New York, the commercial capital of America, were on the very point of breaking off from the Union ; and it was computed that at least two-thirds of the whole traders in the States became insolvent. In the course of the great crisis of 1857, nearly all the cotton-growers in the southern States became bankrupt together ; in the still more disastrous convulsion of 1859, the whole banks of Philadelphia and the southern States, including the National Bank of the United States, at once stopped payment ; those of New York only avoided a similar catastrophe by a contraction of credit, not less disastrous ; and such was the effect of these repeated shocks upon the national fortunes, that the exports of Great Britain to the United States, which in 1856 had reached L. 12,425,604, in 1857 were only L. 4,695,225, and in 1858 L. 7,585,760. But these dreadful catastrophes, which would overwhelm any state in the old world with a mass of pauperism from which it could scarcely recover, cast but a passing cloud over the fortunes of the new. The vast flood of British emigration ; the constant increase of population, and consequent rise in the value of every species of property, even without any exertion on the part of its owners ; the continual forward expansion of cultivation, in a very short time obliterate the effects of all these disasters. So boundless are the resources of the country, that no human catastrophes seem capable of arresting them : in a few months, a new race of traders succeed those in New York or Philadelphia who have been swept away by the tempest : their bills, discounted at 12 per cent, soon put them on the perilous road to

(1) The total paper circulation of the United Kingdom is L.42,300,000, and in gold and silver L.33,000,000; in all, about L.75,000,000.—M CULLEN'S *Commercial Dictionary*.

(2) Chevalier, i. 392, 394.

affluence or ruin: their predecessors, who had sunk before the storm, are transported by the steam-boats to the back settlements, where they speedily enter, with exemplary vigour, upon the labours of cultivation: the ladies of New York and Pennsylvania, once delicate and languishing amidst the frivolities of affluence, are seen, active and happy, amidst the variety of rural or household employment: and the deserts of the Ohio are vivified by a fresh stream of intelligent emigrants, from the effect of those very commercial catastrophes, which, to distant spectators, appear to shake to its centre the whole fabric of industry in the New World (1).

General
well-being
of the
people.

This marvellous rapidity of increase has hitherto not only been unattended with any addition to human suffering, but it has taken its rise rather from the prodigious extent to which, owing to the combined bounty of nature and efforts of man, general prosperity has been diffused through all classes of the community. Among the many marvels which strike an European traveller on his first approach to the United States, one of the most extraordinary is the general well-being which pervades all classes of the community. Pauperism, indeed, exists to a most distressing extent in many of the first peopled States along the sea-coast, and nearly all the great commercial towns of the Union: poor's rates are in consequence generally established, and benevolence is taxed nearly as severely as in the old monarchies and dense population of the European nations. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. In the rural districts, and especially in the States which lie in the basin of the Mississippi, there is scarcely a working man who does not eat butcher meat twice a-day; and so great is the universal demand for labour, that common workmen every where receive from sixteen to twenty shillings a week: skilled labourers, such as masons and carpenters, from thirty to forty shillings for their ordinary wages. Such is the magnitude of these gains as compared with the cost of food, clothing, and other necessities, that a common workman, with ordinary prudence, is able in two years to lay by enough to purchase and stock a little freehold of twenty or thirty acres; and at the end of two years more, the return of the few acres which he has cleared and sown is so considerable as to place him and his family, not only beyond the reach of want, but on the fair road to rustic opulence. The old observation of Adam Smith still holds good, that in America a widow with eight children is sought after, and married, as an heiress; and, as in the days of the patriarchs, the greater the number of arrows in the quiver of the American cultivator, the greater is his strength in the gate (2).

Progress of
agriculturist
and other
classes in
Great
Britain and
America.

It is the universal diffusion and extraordinary facility of acquiring property over all the States of the Union, which is the great cause of the coincidence of this astonishing increase, with the continued well-being of all the individuals, at least in the rural districts, of whom the population consist. Over the whole of America there is not to be found a single *farmer* in the European sense of the word—that is, a cultivator who pays rent to a landlord for the ground which he occupies (3). Every man is the proprietor of the land which he cultivates. Nine-tenths of the population in the rural districts are engaged in the cultivation of the soil; and even taking into view the whole inhabitants of the Union, the cultivators are to the whole other classes of society put together,

(1) Tocq. iv. 557. Chevalier, i. 117, 124.

(3) Tocq. iii. 47.

(2) Hall's America. Martineau's, Buckingham's, *passim*. Chevalier, i. 158.

in the proportion of nearly *four to one* (1). This fact is very remarkable, and affords the most decisive refutation of Mr. Malthus's celebrated principle of the increasing pressure of population on subsistence in the later stages of society; for in Great Britain, by the late census, the proportion lies just the other way; *one-fourth* of the whole population engaged in agriculture, furnishing subsistence for the remaining three-fourths engaged in commerce and manufactures (2). Nay, in America itself, the same law of nature is distinctly demonstrated; for while over the whole Union the cultivators are to the other classes as four to one, in the agricultural states beyond the Alleghany they are as *eight to one* (3). And yet, in Great Britain, anterior to the last five extraordinary bad seasons, subsistence, derived almost entirely from domestic cultivation, was not only abundant, but overflowing; and wheat, for the first time for a hundred years, was, in 1855, below forty shillings a quarter; while the average amount of foreign grain imported had been steadily diminishing ever since the commencement of the present century (4). Thus, while on the virgin soil, and amidst the boundless profu-

(1) The following is the proportion of the agricultural to the other classes of Society in the United States in 1840 :—

Agricultural,	3,717,756
Other classes viz.—Mining,	15,203
Commerce,	117,575
Manufactures,	791,554
Sailors,	56,025
On Lakes,	33,067
Learned Professions,	65,236

All other classes,

1,078,660

(2) By the census of 1831, out of 3,414,175 families in Great Britain, 961,131, or nearly a fourth, only (282 in 1000,) are employed in the production of food. By the census of 1841, the agricultural population has in many places declined, and the

manufacturing every where immensely increased, and it will probably appear that hardly a fourth are employed in rearing food for the remaining three-fourths.—PORTER, i. 59; and *Census* 1831.

(3) The following table shows the proportion of the agriculturists to the other classes in the States beyond the Alleghany Mountains. *Fidelicet*—

STATES AND TERRITORIES.	Agriculture.	Mining.	Commerce.	Manufactures and Trades.	Sailors on the Ocean.	Sailors on the Lakes.	Learned Professions.	Total, not Agricultural.
North Carolina, .	217,095	589	1,734	14,322	327	379	1,086	
South Carolina, .	198,463	51	1,958	10,325	381	348	1,481	
Georgia, . . .	209,383	574	2,428	7,984	262	352	1,250	
Alabama, . . .	177,439	96	2,212	7,195	256	758	1,514	
Mississippi . .	139,724	14	1,303	4,151	33	100	1,506	
Louisiana, . .	79,289	—	8,549	7,565	1,322	662	1,018	
Tennessee, . .	227,739	103	2,217	17,815	55	302	2,042	
Kentucky, . .	197,738	331	3,448	23,217	44	968	2,487	
Ohio,	272,579	704	9,201	66,265	212	3,323	5,663	
Indiana, . . .	148,806	233	3,076	20,590	89	627	2,257	
Illinois, . . .	105,337	782	2,506	13,185	63	310	2,021	
Missouri, . . .	92,408	742	2,522	11,100	29	1,885	1,469	
Arkansas, . .	26,355	41	215	1,573	3	39	301	
	2,092,255	4,260	41,369	204,887	3,087	10,053	24,095	287,751

American Census, 1841.

(4) Average of corn imported into	Quarters.
Great Britain from 1800 to 1810	600,468
1810 to 1820	458,578
1820 to 1830	534,992
1830 to 1835	398,509
1835 to 1840 (*)	1,992,548

—PORTER'S *Progress of Nations*, ii. 145; and *Parl. Tables*, ix. 164.

(*) Five bad seasons in succession.

sion of America, four cultivators only maintain one person engaged in pursuits unconnected with agriculture, amidst the dense and long-established population of Great Britain, one cultivator maintains four manufacturers and artizans : a fact which demonstrates, that so far from population, in the later stages of society, pressing on subsistence, the powers of agriculture daily, in such circumstances, acquire a more decisive superiority over those of population (1).

General attachment of men to their landed possessions. But in America there is one circumstance connected with the race of cultivators which is very remarkable, and altogether unparalleled in any other age or country of the world. In every other nation, the enjoyment of property and engrossing of mankind in the cares of agriculture, has been found to be attended with the strongest possible attachment by the owners of the soil to the little freeholds which they cultivate; and nothing short of the greatest disasters in life has been able to tear them away from the seats of their childhood, and the spots on which their own industry and that of their fathers has been exerted. Mungo Park has told us how strong this feeling is in the heart of Africa among the poor negroes : "To him no water is sweet but that which is drawn from his own well, and no shade refreshing but the tabba-tree of his native dwelling. When carried into captivity by a neighbouring tribe, he never ceases to languish during his exile, seizes the first moment to escape, rebuilds with haste his fallen walls, and exults to see the smoke ascend from his native village (2)." In Ceylon, Bishop Heber tells us, the attachment of the cultivators to their little properties is such, that it is not unusual to see a man the proprietor of the hundred and fiftieth part of a single tree (3). In France, the same principle has always been strongly felt; and Arthur Young long ago remarked, that it continues with undiminished strength, though the freehold is reduced to the fraction of a tree; while in Canada local attachment operates among the *habitans* of French descent with such force, that instead of spreading out into the surrounding wilds, the cultivators divide and subdivide among their children the freeholds they have already acquired; population multiplies *inwards*, not *outwards*, and instead of spreading over and fertilizing the desert, it leads, as in old France, to an infinite subdivision among the inhabitants of the land already cultivated (4).

Universal migratory turn of the Americans. In America, on the other hand, for the first time in the history of mankind, this strong and general feeling seems to be entirely obliterated. Though the labourers of that country have probably derived greater advantages from the cultivation of the soil than any other people that ever existed, yet they have no sort of attachment either to the land which they have acquired, or to that which they have inherited from their fathers. Not only is landed property almost always sold and divided at the death of the head of a family, but even during his lifetime, immigration from one spot to another is so frequent, that it may be considered as the grand social characteristic of the American people. However long and happily a proprietor may have lived upon his little domain; though it may have been the sepulchre of his fathers, the playground of his infancy, the arbour of his wedded love, the nursery of his children; though it may be endeared to him by all the ties which can bind man to material nature, and the severance of which in other countries constitutes the last drop in the cup of the vanquished—an American is always ready to sell it, if he can do so for a profit;

(1) Alison on Population, chap. ii. 40, 53.

(2) Park's Travels, i. 247.

(3) Heber's Travels, ii. 247.

(4) Young's Travels in France, i. 486. Tocq. ii. 204.

and putting himself and his family, with all his effects, on board the first steam-boat, transport himself and his household to a distant part of the country, and commence again, perhaps at the distance of some hundred miles, the great and engrossing work of accumulating wealth. To turn money into land, and take root in the soil, and leave his descendants there, is the great object of ambition in the old world; to turn land into money, and leave his children afloat, but affluent in society, is the universal desire in the new. This peculiarity is so remarkable, and so totally at variance with what had previously been ever observed in nations engaged in the cultivation of the soil, that it may be considered in a social point of view as the grand characteristic of society in the United States of America; and its present condition, at least beyond the Alleghany mountains, cannot be so well characterized, in comparison with that of other countries, as by styling it the **NOMAD AGRICULTURAL STATE** (1).

Causes of this peculiarity. This extraordinary peculiarity appears to be mainly owing to to three causes:—1. The universal passion for democratic equality, has led in practice to a universal division of landed estates among all the children equally, or with sometimes a double portion only to the eldest. The law allows a certain portion of the land to be otherwise disposed of by will; but primogeniture is so repugnant to general opinion, that this power is hardly ever acted upon, and equal division is universal. Hence a landed property is never looked to as a permanent family resting-place; it is merely a temporary lodging, to be used till the owner's death breaks it up into lots, or till he can get an opportunity of disposing of it to advantage. Hereditary feeling is unknown in America; even family portraits, pictures of beloved parents, are often not framed, as it is well understood that, at the death of the head of the family, they will be all sold and turned into dollars, to be divided among the children. 2. Agriculture being the general, and in many places almost only profession, it is regarded as a *vulgar* occupation; the aristocracy, except in Virginia and the Carolinas, where primogeniture has more strongly taken root, is never to be found among the landowners any more than among the merchants: the little freeholders on the Ohio and the Mississippi are the grand support of the extreme democratic party; the conservative cause is upheld only by the merchants of New York, Philadelphia, and the other commercial towns on the coast; the democratic cry there is not down with the landed, but down with the *paper* aristocracy. The whole clamour against paper currency, which has recently convulsed the Union, and in its effects brought insolvency upon three-fourths of the whole trading classes throughout the country, was in reality a political movement; they wanted to destroy paper credit, and stop bank issues, because they knew perfectly that was the last citadel in which the influence of property was intrenched, and that when it was ruined the whole power of the state would be centred in numbers (2). The same instinct which roused such a fever in France against the noblesse made the American democrats run at the banks (3).

Effect of the continual rise in the value of land in the newly cleared parts of America.

The prodigious rise in the value of property on the frontiers of civilization, in consequence of the felling of forests and spread of cultivation around it, offers a prospect of accumulating fortunes and amassing wealth, far beyond what can be obtained from the slow and regular returns of long-established agricultural

(1) Tocq. ii. 121. Chev. ii. 121, 123.

(2) Chev. i. 109, 201.

(3) We have felt the same in Great Britain. "To stop the Duke, go for gold."

industry. In the States in the basin of the Mississippi, if a man can only muster up a hundred dollars, and buy as many acres of land, he is certain that in ten years, by the mere lapse of time, and accumulation of population around him, it will be worth, with very little exertion on his part, five hundred or a thousand. Hence the universal fever to get on to the frontier, and by a cheap purchase of virgin land at once reap the first fruits of the bounty of nature, and the first profits arising from the rapid multiplication of man. And truly, when we recollect that the population of the States to the westward of the Alleghany has augmented fifty-fold in the last half century, it may be conceived what prodigious profits must have been realized by all those who were fortunate enough first to get possession of the land ; and we shall cease to wonder at the universal passion which, obliterating all recollection of home, infancy, and place of nativity, perpetually urges the American race towards the frontiers of civilization, the real *El Dorado* of the New World.

Extraordi-
nary acti-
vity of the
Americans.

Nothing is more remarkable in America than the universal activity and industry which prevail in all classes of society. That the Anglo-Saxon race in Europe is laborious, persevering, and energetic, need not be told to any one who witnesses the colossal fabric of British greatness, or the vast impression which England has made in every quarter of the globe. But, enterprizing as it is in Great Britain, it is not influenced by such a restless spirit of activity, such a perpetual fever of exertion, as appears among its descendants in the New World. The vast facilities for the acquisition of fortune, which the prodigious increase of population, and boundless extent of fertile land, afford ; the entire absence of all hereditary rank or property, which opens the career of power and distinction alike to every citizen ; the engrossing thirst for gold, which springs from its being the only source of distinction, and the only durable basis of power, have combined, with the active and persevering habits which they have inherited from their Anglo-Saxon ancestors, to produce in the Americans an universal spirit of industry and enterprize, to which nothing comparable has ever been witnessed among mankind. It is the fervour of Roman conquest, turned only to war with the desert ; the fever of French democracy, yet “guiltless of its country’s blood.” In the British islands, if energy and perseverance distinguish the middle classes, labour and industry the lower, the higher ranks are often indolent or luxurious ; and, with the graces of patrician manners, they have sometimes imbibed the selfishness and indolence of patrician wealth. But in America, all are in a state of activity. Every human being, except the pauper and the lunatic, is engaged in some profession (1).

Ardent and
impetuous
character of
the people.

The enterprize of the Americans, however, differs from that which at least in former times laid the deep and solid foundation of British greatness. It is far more vehement, ardent, and speculative. If it be true, as the Scripture says, that “he who hasteneth to be rich shall not be innocent,” there are few blameless characters in the United States. The few idlers from Europe find themselves so useless and contemptible amidst the general din of activity with which they are surrounded, that they are driven to exertion in their own defence. Wealth being universally felt to be the only passport either to influence, enjoyment, or consideration, it is every where sought after with an avidity unknown even in the most commercial states of the Old World. Speculations the most rash, enterprizes the most dangerous, undertakings often the most absurd, are gone into with avidity,

(1) Chev. ii. 118, 123, 124. Tocq. i. 84.

prosecuted with energy, and never abandoned in sickness. If it turns out, as is not unfrequently the case, that the affair is of such a kind that it can by no possible effort be brought to a successful issue, it is abandoned in a state of bankruptcy: the speculators get on board steamboats, hurry away to the frontier, and commence anew with undiminished energy the great and all-important business of amassing wealth. Every thing goes on at the gallop; neither society, nor the individuals who compose it, ever pause for an instant: new undertakings are incessantly commencing; new paths of life continually attempted by the unfortunate; successful industry ardently prosecuted by the prosperous. Projects of philanthropy, of commerce, of canals, of railways, of banking, of religious and social amelioration, succeed one another with breathless rapidity, and are all gone into with ardent zeal by the different classes of society, according to their inclinations and habits. An European, accustomed to the stillness of social life on the Continent, is almost stunned, when he lands at New York, by the din with which he is surrounded; and even an Englishman, accustomed to the corresponding turmoil in which the commercial cities of his own country are involved, sees enough to convince him that an additional impulse has been communicated to his already active race, by the democratic institutions and vast capabilities of the New World (1).

Universal discontent in America. At first sight it would be supposed that a country such as this, possessing unbounded natural advantages, with unlimited power of elevation and means of advancement, open to all, even the humblest of the community, and with no hereditary rank or arbitrary privileges to keep back or prefer any in the common race, must be not only one of the most rising, but one of the happiest in the world. Nevertheless, it is just the reverse; and this is the people of all others where at once general progress is the greatest, and private discontent the most universal. All classes and ranks are dissatisfied with their condition, and plod on in sullen discontent, which is so strong as to be apparent in their habits, their manners, even the expression of their countenances. The scholars are dissatisfied: they complain of the superficial character of literature, and lament that its tone, instead of rising, is progressively sinking, with the extension of the power of reading to the working orders of society. The professional men are dissatisfied: they allege that their rank is lower than in Europe; that they are overshadowed by commercial wealth, and find no compensation in the esteem or respect in which their avocations are held, or the society, often imperfectly educated and ill-mannered, of which it is composed. The merchants are dissatisfied: they declare that they are worn to death by excessive toil; and are surrounded by such a multitude of competitors, and slippery undertakings, that it is seldom that they can preserve their fortunes during their lives, and still more rarely that they can bequeath them in safety to their children. Even the mechanics and cultivators are dissatisfied: outwardly blessed beyond any other class that society has ever contained, they are ground down by the pressure of competition, and incessant thirst for riches and advancement—a thirst which not even the boundless capabilities of the basin of the Mississippi has been able to slake. In all this there is nothing surprising; individual dissatisfaction, and the desire to remove it by rising in the world, is at once the mainspring of the general progress, and the certain cause of private discontent, in free communities. In despotic states all are contented, because none can get on; in democratic states none are contented, because all can get on;

(1) Chev. ii, 122, 124. Tocq. ii, 128, 130. Martineau, *Society in America*, iii, 40, 41.

and thus it is that Nature, in mercy to her offspring, equalizes in all respects, save from inequality in virtue, the sum of human happiness (1).

General thirst for wealth. "Our present civilization," says Channing, "is characterized and tainted by a devouring greediness for wealth; the passion for gain is every where sapping pure and generous feeling, and raising up bitter foes against any reform which may threaten to turn aside the stream of wealth. I sometimes feel as if a great reform were necessary to break up our present mercenary civilization, in order that Christianity, now repelled by the universal worldliness, may come into near contact with the soul, and reconstruct society after its own pure and disinterested principles (2)." This is strictly true, and it is the necessary effect of those democratic institutions, which, by removing all other distinctions, concentrate the whole aspirations of the human mind upon this one object of ambition. But though beyond all precedent desirous of wealth, the American is far from being avaricious or tenacious in its disposal: like Catiline, he is "alieni appetens, sui profusus." In no country is wealth bestowed with a more lavish hand on all undertakings, public or private, promising a return for money, or gifted, in a more generous spirit, to every institution of a religious or charitable description. All its great towns can boast of noble establishments for education, public worship, and the relief of suffering, almost entirely supported by private contribution, which can vie with any in the world, both in the magnificence of their undertakings, and the benevolent ardour with which they are superintended and supported. It would seem as if the extraordinary facilities which they enjoy of getting wealth make them liberal and generous in its disposal: the most common cause of an avaricious disposition is the experience of difficulty in making money (3).

Commercial cities of America. Although the mission of America evidently is to people what has been well termed "the Reserve of Nature;" and her democratic institutions, and national character, impel her people, with such violence towards that noble destiny: yet she is great, also, in her seaport towns and commercial activity. The very transit of such a multitude of emigrants, in their way to the land of promise in the West—the wants of such a vast and rapidly-increasing population—necessarily induce a very great foreign trade (4). New York, the commercial capital of America, already numbers three hundred and twelve thousand inhabitants, and, at its present rate of increase, will in twenty years have six hundred thousand; Philadelphia has two hundred thousand; Boston, Baltimore, New Orleans, are all rapidly increasing, and will soon rival the greatest commercial cities of the old world.

(1) Martineau, iii. 40, 49. Chev. ii. 374.

(4) Chev. ii. 159. Buckingham's America, ii.

(2) Channing's Letter to Birney, 1837.

237, 248; and *passim*.

(3) The following is the present population and past progress of the principal cities in America:—

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
New York,	33,131	60,489	96,373	123,706	203,007	312,710
Philadelphia,	41,520	70,287	96,664	108,116	167,118	228,691
Baltimore,	13,503	26,614	46,555	62,738	80,625	102,313
New Orleans,	—	—	17,242	27,176	46,310	102,193
Boston,	18,038	24,927	32,250	43,298	71,392	93,383
Cincinnati,	—	750	2,540	9,644	24,831	46,338
Brooklyn,	—	3,298	4,402	7,175	12,042	36,233
Albany,	3,498	5,349	9,356	12,639	24,238	33,721
Charleston,	16,359	18,712	24,711	24,480	30,289	29,261
Washington,	—	3,210	8,208	13,247	18,827	23,364
Providence,	—	7,614	10,071	11,767	16,832	23,171

The ardent spirit of enterprize, the insatiable passion for gambling adventures, by which the inhabitants of the United States are so peculiarly distinguished, occasion, indeed, periodical and rapidly-returning crises of commercial or monetary distress, and overwhelm the land with a flood of embarrassment exceeding any thing ever experienced from pacific causes in the old world. But these dreadful catastrophes, though the cause of unbounded private suffering, produce apparently no sensible diminution in the general progress of their commercial activity. A new race of energetic adventurers, equally capable, equally daring, immediately succeeds that which had been swept away. The great work of private effort and public advancement continues with unabated vigour; the flame, apparently extinguished for ever, burns up again with fresh brilliancy; wave after wave is broken on the shore, but the great flood-tide still streams forward, and rises higher and higher upon the beach.

Progress
of American
commerce
and ship-
ping.

The American seaman possesses all the hardihood and daring which have given to those of Great Britain the empire of the ocean, and is stimulated in addition by a spirit of adventure, a thirst for gain, exceeding that of his hardy progenitors on the wave. The progress of American foreign commerce has been more rapid, for the last half century, than that of England during the same or any former period. The same indomitable perseverance and inextinguishable passion for advancement, which drives their race with such violence towards the Rocky Mountains, has sent them forth with equal vigour in the opposite direction, and impelled their sails into every creek and bay of the navigable seas. Their pendants are to be seen alongside those of England in every harbour of the world: in London and Liverpool, Petersburg and Constantinople; in the waters of Canton and the Gulf of New Zealand; amidst the ices of the South Pole and on the frozen shores of Greenland. Individual adventure, private enterprize, have in so short a time achieved all these prodigies; the American commercial navy owes nothing to the encouragement or power of its government. The American shipmaster stretches across the Atlantic with a scanty crew and ill-equipped ship; indefatigable exertion, untiring watchfulness, supply the want of numbers; he takes in his cargo of tea at Canton, returns to New York, sells it at a halfpenny a pound cheaper than his British rival, and he is content (1). It is in this minute attention to details, and indefatigable vigour,

(1) Table showing the progress of exports and imports of the United States:—

YEARS.	TOTAL VALUE OF EXPORTS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC.	TOTAL VALUE OF IMPORTS.
1821	L. 13,544,661	L. 13,038,592
1825	20,736,539	20,070,849
1830	15,385,314	14,766,025
1831	16,939,703	21,498,140
1832	18,161,862	21,047,764
1833	18,779,255	22,524,648
1834	21,736,868	26,358,610
1835	25,352,822	31,228,279
1836	26,804,799	39,579,174
1837	24,702,355	29,292,544
1838	22,121,854	22,431,350
1839	25,557,104	32,523,120
1840	26,892,041	21,201,470

that the secret of the rapid progress of the American commercial navy is to be found. Yet is its value so considerable as to have now (1840) reached in exports the vast amount of 131,500,000 dollars, or L.26,892,000, of which 115,000,000 dollars, or L.20,220,000, is for the value of domestic produce. Their imports for the same year were 104,000,000 dollars, or L.21,200,000 sterling. Both exports and imports have more than doubled in the last twenty years; a progress somewhat greater than the British foreign commerce has made during the same period (1).

Their present naval establishment.

The American navy at this time (1841) consists of seven ships of the line, and four on the stocks, seventeen frigates, twenty-one sloops, and twelve schooners and brigs; no very formidable force for a power which boasts its ability to contend with Great Britain for the empire of the waves. The real strength of their marine is to be found in the vast and growing amount of their commercial vessels, and the vigour and courage which long training on the storms of the Atlantic have communicated to the already hardy and intrepid race of their seamen. The marine seamen of their whole States for the year 1841 was 56,000; a considerable commercial navy, from whence powerful supplies of sailors, already trained to the most material parts of their duty, may at all times be obtained. The pay they give to the seamen and *inferior* officers is very high; to the superior ones proportionally low; a peculiarity observable universally in the United States, where democratic parsimony can only relax in favour of that class with which itself sympathizes, and from the comforts of which itself may benefit. Gunners receive L.150 a-year, boatswains L.180, captains on duty only L.625. The wages of common sailors, being four or five pounds a-month, are so considerable as to attract a large portion of British seamen into their service (2), whom, from the identity of language and habits between the two states, it is impossible to distinguish; while the diminutive number of their ships, compared with those of Great Britain, renders it impossible for the latter power to attempt to vie with the United States in the amount of the remuneration they can hold out to the naval service.

Their military force.

If the navy of America, even in the present maturity of its power, is small, its military force is still more inconsiderable, and affords a striking proof of the entirely pacific direction which the national strength has hitherto taken. It consists of eight regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and three of artillery, numbering in all 12,537 combatants! This is just the strength of a Roman legion, or of one of Napoléon's divisions. It is not a fifth part of the military force of Bavaria, nor a half of that maintained by Baden or Wirtemberg. Such as it is, this Lilliputian force is scattered over fifty fortified posts on the frontier, and twelve arsenals in the interior, stretching over an extent two thousand miles in length, being not, on an average, two hundred and fifty men to each. Of all marvels, this amount of military force is the most marvellous, when the magnitude and resources of the Republic are taken into view, the vast extent of frontier they have to defend, and the arrogant tone which they assume in their diplomatic intercourse with foreign states. It is true they have a militia every where established, which, in periods of danger, may, it is said, enrol fifteen hundred thousand combatants around its banners (3); but although such a force, composed of

(1) Woodbury's Report to Congress, Dec. 9, 1840.

(2) American Navy List, 1841, in Stat. Almanac, 1842, p. 79, 81.

(3) The militia of the whole States, amounted, according to the army list of 1841, to 1,503,952 men in arms.

That of New York was . . . 169,435
 Pennsylvania . . . 257,178
 Virginia . . . 105,122
 Ohio . . . 146,438

—Militia Abstract, 1841; State Almanac, 35, for 1841.

backwoodsmen, combating behind trees in their forests, may be very formidable, and may sometimes make a stout resistance behind intrenchments in the neighbourhood of towns; yet the result of the war of 1812 demonstrated, what *a priori* might have been readily imagined, that it is incapable of carrying on war in the field, is wholly unfit for offensive operations, and cannot be relied on for the defence even of the strongest positions, if assailed with skill by much inferior forces. The proof of this is decisive: the Americans allowed their capital to be taken and pillaged by a British division, that could not muster three thousand five hundred bayonets. De Tocqueville was never more correct than when he asserted, that if America were placed in the midst of the European powers, it would at the end of a century, it still independent, have made a much more rapid progress than any of them; but that it would run the most imminent hazard of being three or four times conquered, in the interim, by monarchies not possessing a fourth part of its material resources (1).

Revenue and expenditure of the United States. Incredibly small as the naval and military establishments of the United States appear to one accustomed to contemplate the colossal armaments of the European powers, they are fully as large as the scanty revenue at the disposal of the central government can afford to maintain. Such is the impatience of taxation in America, as in all countries where democratic power is really, and not, as in republican France, nominally established, that no consideration will induce them to submit to the burdens necessary to put the national independence on a secure foundation. The ordinary national revenue at this time, (1840,) is only 17,197,000 dollars, or L.3,861,000; and including all extraordinary aids, no more than 28,254,000 dollars, or L.5,858,000. The expenditure is 26,645,656 dollars, or L.5,660,154. There is no national debt properly so called, that is, attaching to the central government, excepting a floating balance of three or four millions of dollars in exchequer bills, issued during the dreadful commercial embarrassments and consequent fall of revenue during the last four years. Of this revenue, four-fifths, or about 15,000,000 of dollars, (L.3,550,000,) is derived from customs: there is no excise or direct taxes to the general government of any kind; and the remainder is almost entirely drawn from the sale of the lands belonging to the State, which, in the year 1840, produced 2,620,000 dollars, or L.536,000. But each of the separate States in the Union has a separate exchequer, receipts, expenditure, and debt of its own, from which its local expenses, such as judges, courts of justice, militia, etc., are defrayed. The greater part of the debt of each separate State has been contracted by their local legislature for the promotion of great public improvements, such as roads, canals, railways, and bridges, for the benefit of the community; and these debts are very considerable, amounting in all to 248,841,540 dollars, or L.51,240,552; a fact of no small moment to Great Britain at this time, considering that at least two-thirds of this sum is due to English capitalists, and that the democratic masters of several of these States have already adopted the convenient device of "repudiating" the debt, in other words, refusing to pay either its principal or interest, after it has been expended for their behoof; and that it is generally made an indispensable pledge, with every representative on the popular side (2), that he is to support the system of "repudiation," and relieve the people of the disagreeable burden of paying their debts.

(1) Army List, 1841. Stat. Almanac, 83. Tocq. ii. 274.

(2) See Finance Statement, 1841, in Stat. Alm. 1841, 97, 98.

Sketch of
the Ame-
rican con-
stitution.

The government of America, as all the world knows, is a pure and unmixed democracy; established on a scale, and over an extent, to which there never has been a parallel in the annals of mankind. The central government—the officers of state, the president of the republic, the judges, and civil officers of every description, in all the States, are elected by the universal suffrage of the people, either through the medium of the elections for their separate legislature, or the general election for the national office-bearers. So great is the amount of the constituency which may be called on to vote on the election of a president, that it is not unusual to see nearly two millions and a half of electors record their suffrages on that interesting occasion; and nearly that number actually voted at the election of General Harrison on 4th March 1841 (1). This is somewhat less than the proportion capable of bearing arms, in a population of 14,500,000 free whites in round numbers, being about *one to six* in the whole free inhabitants. In Great Britain and Ireland there are 850,000 electors out of 27,000,000 people, or 1 in 52 only; in France, less than 200,000 among 52,000,000, or 1 in 190! So widely different is the extent to which the electoral suffrage has been carried, in the three countries in the world where the greatest efforts in favour of freedom have been made, and popular institutions have been established on the broadest basis. It will not appear surprising, when these figures are considered, that the Americans should be repudiating their debts, while those of England have always been, and of France are now, at least, religiously upheld. The mass of the people are, no doubt, deeply interested in the *final* result of keeping faith with the public creditor; but the immediate effect of its violation promises them a most alluring liberation in the outset from disagreeable burdens. The majority of men in all ages are governed by the first effect of measures which strike the senses only; ultimate consequences, overwhelming in their influence on the thinking few, are wholly overlooked by the unthinking many. The majority of men will never discharge their obligations if they can possibly help it. If Great Britain wants to shake off its national debt, it has only to extend the suffrage in any considerable degree, and the burden will not stand three months.

The Senate
and House
of Represent-
atives:
their con-
stitution
and power.

According to the theory of the American constitution, a great variety of checks are established, intended to limit and restrain the inordinate power given to the popular voice in the formation of government. The principle of their union is, that whatever power is not expressly vested in the federal government, belongs of right to the assemblies of the separate States; and the central authority itself is restrained as much as appeased under such a system for its formation. The general government, which meets at Washington in congress, consists of two chambers—the Senate and House of Representatives. Each State sends two members to the Senate, and a certain number, in proportion to the population, which is fixed every ten years, to that of the Representatives. This proportion was originally made one to every thirty thousand persons; but in 1792, this was changed to one in thirty-three thousand; and in 1852, to one in forty-eight thousand souls (2). The house of representatives is named by the

(1) On that occasion there voted for

Harrison,	1,274,783
Van Buren.	1,128,702

Total electors, 2,403,485

—Stat. Almanac, 1841. 53.

(2) Story, Laws of United States, i. 235.

direct and immediate vote of the people; the senate, by the choice of the State legislature : thus the first is the result of a single, the second of a double election. In the first instance, the seat endures for two, in the second, for six years. The chamber of representatives is endowed only with legislative powers; the senate, in addition to these, with certain judicial and executive duties. No bill can become a law until it passes both houses; but in addition to this, the senate judges of impeachments preferred by the lower house for state offences, and its consent is requisite to ratify treaties with foreign powers, and validate certain appointments to offices made by the president (1).

Powers of
the Presi-
dent.

The executive power is vested in a great degree in the president, whose functions are intended to correspond with those of a sovereign in the European monarchies; but both in substantial authority and theoretical right, the two are essentially different. His tenure of office is not for life, but for four years; and a vice president is always elected with the president, who, in the event of his death while in office, succeeds without any further election. The president can propose no laws to Congress, and his ministers are excluded in like manner as himself; so that it is only by indirect means that the views of government can be laid before the legislature. No inviolability is attached to the office of supreme magistrate, as to the constitutional monarchs of France and England. The president carries the laws into execution, but he has no share in their formation; he can refuse his sanction to them, but by a singular anomaly, though that prevents their execution, it does not prevent them from being laws, and carried into effect when a more pliant chief of the republic is elected. The only real source of influence which the president enjoys, is the nomination to employments under government; and their number is very considerable, for it already amounts to sixty thousand (2), the greater part of whom are removed with every change of administration (3).

Sovereignty
of the
people.

It is not, however, either in the president or the senate, in the ministers of state or the house of representatives, that the true sovereignty of the United States resides. Government is really vested in the PEOPLE; and that, too, not in the figurative and hyperbolic sense in which that expression is used in the declamations of modern Europe, but really, practically, and effectively. Each separate state is a democracy in itself, and in it the power of the people is exerted without any control. Every one has its governor, its senate, and house of representatives; the whole number of which are elected by the universal suffrage of the people. The senators, in these state legislatures, vary from twelve to ninety-three in number: the representatives from twenty-six to three hundred and fifty-two. These legislative bodies are vested with what practically amounts to absolute powers in their separate states, and the governor carries into effect the declared will of the majority of both houses, in like manner as he does the declared will of Congress. They exclusively manage their debts, finances, improvements, judicial establishment, militia, harbours, roads, railways, canals, and whole

(1) Story, 199, 314. Tocq. i. 200, and 197

(2) Offices in America in the gift of the Executive :—

Collection of taxes and general administration,	12,144
Military, and service against the Indians,	9,643
Navy,	6,499
Post Office,	31,917

60,203

—CALHOUN'S *Report to the Senate*, 1836. Given in CHEVALIER, ii. 461. Note 46.

(3) Tocq. i. 207, 209. Kent's *Commentaries*, i. 289. Chev. i. 328.

local concerns. So extensive and undefined are their powers, that it may be doubted whether they do not amount to those of declaring peace and war, and acting in all respects as independent states. Certain it is, that on more than one occasion, particularly the dispute with the Southern States in 1854, on the question of nullifying the tariff of duties established by Congress; and the open hostilities which the Northern States carried on with the British inhabitants on the Canada frontier in 1857 and 1859; the separate States, the Carolinas in the first instance, and New-York and Maine in the second, took upon themselves to set the authority of the central government at defiance; and Congress and the executive were glad to veil their weakness under the disguise of moderation, while in reality they succumbed to the whole demands of the insurgent commonwealths. It does not require the gift of prophecy to foretell, that a vast confederacy of separate states, each with its own legislature and armed force, and actuated, from difference of climate and situation, by opposite and conflicting interests, held together by so slender a tie, is not destined to hang long together (1).

Religion in
the United
States.

In one important respect, America differs entirely from any state of Christendom, or indeed any state that ever before existed in the world. It acknowledges no state religion, and no public funds whatever are provided for the clergy, or religious instructors of any denomination. All are on the footing of dissenters in England; that is, they are maintained solely by the seat rents, or the voluntary contributions of their flocks. Churches, especially in the great towns, are numerous, and embrace every possible variety of belief, from the austere Puritan, the genuine descendant of the patriarchs who two centuries ago sought a refuge in Pennsylvania from the persecution of Charles I, to the lax Socinian, whose creed scarcely differs from that of the Deist of ancient times. Episcopacy is the prevailing religion of the higher classes in the principal cities of the Union, except Baltimore: but the Presbyterians are also very numerous: and, in several districts, the Roman Catholics are making great progress, insomuch that they now number above two millions of souls within the pale of their church, in the whole States of the Union. Religion in the United States being entirely separated from civil government, its ministers are relieved from that jealousy which in Great Britain is attached by the democratic party to every person in any situation of trust, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whose nomination is not vested in themselves. The clergy of all denominations are elected by their congregations; they are maintained by them during their incumbency: they may be dismissed by them at pleasure. A strong religious feeling pervades the United States, especially New England and Pennsylvania, which has descended to them from their puritan ancestors; the clergy have no political influence, and never intermeddle with temporal affairs; but in no country in the world have they a stronger influence in society, or are their opinions more attended to, especially by the female portion of their congregations. It is to this general influence of religion, and the unseen chain which it has thrown over the passions and vices of men, more perhaps than any other cause, that the existence of society for so considerable a period as sixty years, without any considerable convulsions, notwithstanding the almost entire absence of external restraint or efficient government, is to be ascribed (2).

Want of a
provision
for a
national
religion.

But the difficulties of the American Church are yet to come, and with the increase of its destitute population, and of the classes which subsist on wages alone, the impossibility of providing by

(1) Tocq. i. 99, 130. Stat. Almanac, 1840, 126.

(2) Tocq. ii. 224, 228. Chev. ii. 328. Mart. iii. 272, 283.

voluntary contribution for the maintenance of religion will become very apparent. No want of religious instruction is felt in the great commercial towns, but in the rural districts the case is often directly the reverse (4); and although the proportion of proprietors has hitherto been so great, no less than five millions of persons already exist in the United States, for whom there is no provision in any place of endowed or provided public worship whatever (2). If this is the case in their infancy, what will it be in their maturity and old age? And how are funds to be raised to provide for the deficiency in a democratic worldly community, which starves down all its public establishments to the lowest point, and where no legislator ever yet has ventured to hint at a general direct tax? If nothing else existed to subject America to the common lot of humanity, the seeds of its mortal distemper are to be found in the want of any provision for the *gratuitous* religious instruction of the poor: the very circumstance which, with the admirers of their institutions, is the most ceaseless subject of eulogy (5).

Ruinous
effects of
the depen-
dence of
the clergy
on their
flocks.

Already the ruinous effect of this dependence of the ministers of all denominations on the voluntary support of their flocks, has become painfully conspicuous. Religion has descended from its function of denouncing and correcting the national vices, and become little more, with a few noble exceptions, of whom Channing is an illustrious example, than the re-echo of public opinion. Listen to the words of an able and candid eyewitness, herself the most strenuous advocate for the voluntary system. "The American clergy," says Miss Martineau, "are the most backward and timid class in the society in which they live; self-exiled from the great moral questions of the time; the least informed with true knowledge; the least conscious of that Christian and republican freedom which, as the natural atmosphere of piety and holiness, it is their prime duty to cherish and diffuse. The proximate causes of this are obvious: it is not merely that the living of the clergy depends on the opinion of those whom they serve; to all but the far and clear-sighted it appears that the usefulness of their function does so. The most guilty class of the community on the slavery question at present, is not the slaveholding, nor even the mercantile, but the clerical. They shrink from the perils of the contest. It will not be for them to march in the noble army of martyrs. Yet if the clergy of America follow in the rear of society, they will be the first to glory in the reformations which they have done the utmost to retard. The fearful and disgraceful mistake which occasions this, is the supposition that the clerical office consists in adapting the truth to the minds of their hearers; and this is already producing its effect in thinning the churches, and impelling the people to find an administration of religion better suited to their need. My final impression is, that religion is best administered in America by the personal character of the most virtuous members of society, out of the theo-

(1) "The Baptist sect alone proclaims a want of above three thousand ministers to supply the existing churches. Churches and funds are sufficient, but men are wanting."—MARTINEAU, iii. 272, 273. This is the precise point where the question hinges, and the difficulty *always* occurs: it is comparatively easy, under the influence of temporary excitement or philanthropic feeling, to *build* churches; to *maintain* their minister in decent competence from voluntary sources, is a very different matter.

(2) "According to a general summary of religious denominations, made in 1835, the number of churches was 15,477: but there were only 12,130 ministers."—MARTINEAU, iii, 272. This is about one church to each thousand inhabitants, and one mi-

nister to each thirteen hundred: the population being at that period about 15,000,000. This too an average might seem to be a fair proportion; but the evil of the system lies in two points. 1. The churches are unequally distributed: abounding sometimes to profusion in the rich towns, and wholly wanting in the rural districts. 2. No provision exists for the *permanent maintenance* of the clergy, which is the real difficulty; and accordingly, in the Baptist persuasion alone, 3000 churches are already without ministers.—See last note, and MARTINEAU, iii. 273.

(3) Toeq. ii. 224, 236. Chev. ii. 284. Buckingham, ii. 231, 284.

gical; and next by the acts and preachings of the members of that profession, who are the most secular in their habits of life. Those exclusively clerical are the worst enemies of Christianity, except the vicious." Such is the fruit of the voluntary system, according to the testimony of its most ardent supporters (1).

How has
this demo-
cracy
worked?

Here, then, is a country in which, if they ever had on earth, republican principles have enjoyed the fairest ground for trial, and the best opportunity for establishing their benefits. The land was boundless, and in the interior, at least, of unexampled fertility; the nation began its career with all the advantages and powers, and none of the evils or burdens, of civilization. They had the inheritance of English laws, customs, and descent; of the Christian religion, of European arts, and all the stores of ancient knowledge: they had neither a territorial aristocracy, nor a sovereign on the throne, nor an hereditary nobility, nor a national debt, nor an established church, which are usually held out as the impediments to the blessings of freedom in the Old World. How, then, has the republican system worked in this, the garden of the world, and the land of promise? The answer shall be given on no mean authority; in the words of one, himself an ardent, though candid, supporter of democratic equality, and whose political writings alone, in this age, deserve a place beside the works of Bacon and Machiavel.

Irresistible
power of the
majority.

"The self-government and all-powerful sway of the majority," says M. de Tocqueville, "is the greatest and most formidable evil in the United States. The reproach to which I conceive a democratic government, such as is there established, is open, is not, as many in Europe pretend, its weakness; it is, on the contrary, its irresistible strength. What I feel repugnance to in America, is not the extreme liberty which reigns in it, but the slender guarantee which is to be found against tyranny. When a man, or a party, suffers from injustice springing from the majority in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority, and blindly obeys its mandates. To the executive? It is named by the majority, and is the passive instrument in its hands. To the public force? It is nothing but the majority under arms. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the judges? They are elected by the majority, and hold their offices at their pleasure. How unjust and unreasonable soever may be the measure which strikes you, no redress is practicable, and you must submit (2)." "Liberty of thought and opinion," says Miss Martineau, "is strenuously maintained in words in America; it has become almost a wearisome declamation, but it is a sad and deplorable fact, that in no country on earth is the mind more fettered than it is here; what is called public opinion has set up a despotism such as exists nowhere else—public opinion, sitting in the dark, wrapt up in mystification and vague terrors of obscurity, deriving power no one knows from whom; like an Asiatic monarch, unapproachable, unimpeachable, undethronable, perhaps illegitimate; but irresistible in its power to quell thought, repress action, and silence conviction; bringing the timid perpetually under the unworthy fear of man, fear of some superior opinion gets astride of the popular breath for a day, and controls, through impudent folly, the speech and actions of the wise." "This country," says Jefferson, "which has given the world the example of physical liberty, owes it that of moral emancipation also; for, as yet, it is but

(1) Martineau's *America*, iii. 278, 283, 293.

(2) Tocq. ii. 145, 146.

nominal with us. The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in practice the freedom asserted by the laws in theory (1)."

Total absence of originality or independence of thought. Original thought, independence of character, nervous opinion, are unknown in America. So completely do their ideas flow in one channel, that you would say they are all cast in one mould, and stamped with one image and superscription. Party spirit, indeed, runs extremely high, the public press abounds with furious and often coarse invective, and the most vehement division of opinion often agitates the whole Union. But in neither of these vast arrays is there any originality or stubborn independence of thought; all follow implicitly, like the well disciplined forces of a Parliamentary leader in England, the opinions of their separate parties; it is a mere struggle of numbers for the superiority, and the moment the contest is decided by a vote the minority give way, and public opinion ranges itself, to appearance, universally on the side of the greater number. It may well be believed that this unanimity is *seeming* only; and that the beaten party do not really become converted to the opinions of their antagonists. But they are compelled to feign acquiescence; they must crouch to numbers. That noblest of spectacles, which is so often exhibited in England, of a resolute minority, strong in the conviction and intrepid in the assertion of truth, firmly maintaining its opinions in the midst of the insurgent waves of an overwhelming majority, is unknown on the other side of the Atlantic. They feel sufficiently often the "*civium ardor prava jubentium*;" but the "*justum et tenacem propositi virum*" is unknown. The reason is obvious: society in America is governed only by one element; individual resolution has no ground to rest on to maintain its position; it is as impossible to avoid being carried away by the tide, as for a dismasted ship in a bottomless ocean to avoid being swept on by the waves (2).

Prodigious effects of the revolutionary law of succession. All the restraints on the excessive power of the majority, devised by the wisdom of Washington and the original framers of the American constitution, have been shattered by two causes; the equal division of landed property by succession, and the growing democratic ambition of the people. Under the equal law of succession established at the Revolution, the death of every proprietor brings about a splitting of his inheritance into little portions; and when their owners in their turn are carried to the great charnel-house of mortality, a similar division takes place; so that the partition goes on *ad infinitum*. Such has been the effect of this system, that it is extremely rare for any considerable fortune to survive the second generation: and the grandchildren of those who were first in wealth and station in the days of Washington, are now lost in the obscurity of the general crowd, nay in great part labouring with their own hands. There are thus few rich persons in America, and no hereditary fortunes, but an immense number of little proprietors; and in the States beyond the Alleghany in particular, their number is prodigious, and hourly increasing. These little land-holders, as is invariably the case, are strongly attached to the democratic party; they are the great supporters of the violent outcry which has been raised in every part of the Union, with such fatal effects, against the paper credit and the commercial aristocracy; and such is the ascendant they have now gained, both in the separate States and the general legislature of the Union, from the continual multiplication of these small properties, under the law of equal succession, which is every

(1) Sober Thoughts on the Times, Boston, 1833.
Martineau, ii, 69, 70. Jefferson's Works, ii, 321.

(2) Tocq. ii. 156, 157. Chev. i. 306, 307. Mart. ii, 8; and ii, 26, 58, and 150.

where established, that all bulwarks have been swept away, the march of democracy has become irresistible, and, for good or for evil, the whole confederacy must go through with its consequences. But equality must have one of two results: all must have power, or none. Hitherto the first effect has taken place in America: let them beware of the last (1).

As a natural consequence of this state of things, there is, in opposition to the will or passions of the majority, no security whatever either for life or property in America. Hitherto, indeed, no direct attack on property has been made, at least where it is vested in land, for this simple reason, that the majority are themselves little landowners, and therefore any such system would be an attack upon their own interests. But the system of spoliating that species of property in which the majority do not participate, and for which they feel no sympathy, has already been carried to a most frightful extent. The run against paper credit, the fury against the commercial aristocracy, the cry, "bank or no bank," which has convulsed all the States of the Union for the last ten years, and at last ruined the national bank, rendered bankrupt nine-tenths of the commercial classes, and reduced the national exports and imports one-half (2), are nothing but so many successful attacks of the Revolutionary majority on that species of property which was vested solely in the wealthy classes of society, of which they were jealous, and which they were desirous to destroy. The determination now openly avowed in many of the States, particularly Arkansas, Illinois, and the democratic communities in the valley of the Mississippi, to repudiate their States debt, and shake off the burden of their public creditors, after they have experienced the full benefit of their capital by expending it on railroads, canals, and other public improvements, is another example of the incipient spoliation of the fundholders. The period when the attack on landed property, if the present system of government continues, will commence, may be predicted with certainty; it will be as soon as the majority of electors, in any of the States, have come, from the natural growth of other trades, to be persons without any interest in the soil, and when the back settlements have become so distant by the advance of civilization, that it is less trouble to take their neighbours' fields than to go to the Far West to seek possessions of their own (3).

Is life secure in the United States, when property is placed in such imminent peril? Experience, terrible experience, proves the reverse; and demonstrates that not only is existence endangered, but law is powerless against the once-excited passions or violence of the people. The atrocities of the French Revolution, cruel and heart-rending as they were, have been exceeded on the other side of the Atlantic; for there the terrible spectacle has been frequently exhibited of late years, of persons obnoxious to the majority being publicly burned alive by the people, and, to render the torment more prolonged and excruciating, over a fire purposely kindled of green wood (4). Combined and systematic attacks on property,

(1) Tocq. i. 82, 85, 87. Chev. ii. 345, 354. Mart. i. 151, 152.

(2)	Exports from Great Britain to America in	1835,	L. 10,568,455
	—	1836,	12,425,604
	—	1837,	4,695,225
	—	1838,	7,585,760

—*Parl. Paper*, 27th May 1840.

(3) Chev. i. 153. Tocq. ii. 284, 287.

(4) "Some months before I left the United States, a man of colour was burned alive without trial, at St.-Louis in Missouri; a large assembly of the 'respectable' inhabitants of the city being present. The majority of newspaper editors made

themselves parties to the act, by refusing through fear to reprobate it. The gentlemen of the press in that city dared not condemn the deed, for fear of the consequences from the murderers. They merely announced the deed as a thing to be regretted; and recommended that a veil should be drawn over the

or-dreadful acts of terror and revenge, have taken place in several great towns; and such has been the prostration of law and paralysis of authority by the will of the sovereign multitude, that, on many of these occasions, not only the press did not venture to denounce the infamous proceedings, but the law authorities did not make any attempt to apprehend or punish the delinquents (1). Murders and assassinations in open day are not unfrequent among the members of Congress themselves; and the guilty parties, if strong in the support of the majority, openly walk about, and set all attempts to prosecute them at defiance. So common have these summary acts of savage violence grown in America, that they have come to be designated by a peculiar and wellknown expression; and the phrase "Lynch law" is understood, all over the world, to express the sudden assumption by the multitude of the office, on a sudden impulse, at once of accusers, judges, juries, and executioners. "Is this the freedom we were promised?" said the French Revolutionists; "we can no longer hang whom we please:" but the Americans have improved on this idea, for their principle is, they may either hang or burn whom they please (2).

Peculiarity of the American cruelties in this respect. The American writers plead, in extenuation of these atrocities, that they are only of occasional occurrence: that the States of their confederacy are in general peaceable and orderly: that the annals of every country exhibit too many examples of occasional outbreaks of popular violence: and that it is unjust to hold their institutions responsible for acts common to them with all mankind. There is some justice in these observations, although it affords but a melancholy proof of the depravity of human nature, if the spread of knowledge and march of intellect have no tendency to check these savage dispositions, and the citizens of the great and well-educated model republic are obliged to plead, in extenuation of their cruelties, that the same things were done during the crusade against the Albigeois, or by the *auto-da-fés* of Castile. But the peculiar and damning blot on America, in this particular, is this, and it is one to which it is impossible to make any reply. In other countries, the frightful atrocities of the stake and the torture have characterized government during savage and ruthless periods, and it has been the well-founded boast of civilization, that

affair. The newspapers of the Union generally were afraid to comment on it, because they saw the St.-Louis editors were afraid."—MISS MARTINEAU, i. 150, 152.

"Just before I reached Mobile, two men were burned alive there in a slow fire in the open air, in presence of the gentlemen of the city generally. No word was breathed of the transaction in the newspapers; and this is a special sign of the times. There is far too much subservience to opinion in the northern States; but in the southern, it is like the terrors of Tiberius Caesar."—*Ibid.* ii. 141, 144.

"Upon a mere vague report or bare suspicion, persons travelling in the south have been arrested, imprisoned, and in some cases flogged or tortured, on pretence that they came to cause insurrection among the slaves. More than one innocent person has been hanged. It was declared by some liberal-minded gentlemen of South Carolina, after the publication of Dr. Channing's work on slavery, that if he were to enter that province with a body-guard of twenty thousand men, he would not come out alive. Hand-bills are issued by the committees of vigilance, offering enormous rewards for the heads or ears of prominent abolitionists. The governor of South Carolina, last year recommended the summary execution, without benefit of clergy, of all persons caught within the limits of the State hold-

ing prominent anti-slavery opinions; and every sentiment of his is endorsed by a select committee of the State legislature."—MARTINEAU, ii. 348, 349.

"A young man at Natebville, in Tennessee, was lately seized by the committee of vigilance, and an abolition newspaper found in his bundle, among a number of Bibles. He was immediately seized, publicly flogged, the mayor of the town presiding, and sent out of the town in that dreadful condition; his horse, gig, and Bibles, of which he was disposing, worth 300 dollars, being no more heard of."—*Ibid.* ii. 139, 140.

(1) "Baltimore was lately, during four days, at the mercy of the genius of destruction. The security of the city was vainly bandied from the mayor to the sheriff, from the sheriff to the commander of the militia; the prisons were forced, the mayor and militia pillaged, but not a person could be found in that city, with 100,000 inhabitants, who would bear any force against the rioters, till an old patriarch of 84, who had signed the declaration of independence, stepped forth, and requesting to be put at the head of thirty men, stopped the disorder, and put an end to the pillage. Well may the Americans say with Mr. Clay, 'We are in the midst of a revolution.'"—CHEVALIER, ii. 347, 348.

(2) Chev. ii. 345, 347. Mart. i. 162.

they have disappeared before the milder spirit which its blessings have introduced. Ebullitions of popular violence have been frequent: horrors unutterable have been committed, and are committed, during their continuance; but these have always been the passing fury of the multitude merely, and the return of order has uniformly been signalized by increased vigour of the executive for the repression of such excesses, and increased horror of the public at their continuance. It was thus that the Reign of Terror, in France, was succeeded by the arms of Napoléon—the violence of the great rebellion by the despotism of Cromwell. But in America, not only is there no reaction against such popular atrocities, or attempt to coerce them, but the human mind is so debased by the tyranny of the majority, that they are not even complained of: the people pass them over in trembling silence, like the stroke of Providence, or the vengeance of an eastern Sultan, to which it is the only wisdom to submit without a murmur (1).

External
weakness
of the Ame-
ricans.

The system of government in the United States has been proved to be wholly unequal to the external security of the nation. America, it is true, is still independent, and is rapidly extending in every direction; but that is only because she has no civilized neighbours in contact with her territory except Great Britain, which has no interest to engage in the fruitless and enormous costs of Transatlantic warfare. But so inefficient is her force both by sea and land, owing to the invincible repugnance to taxation among her people, and the total want of foresight among the ruling multitude, that she rushed headlong into a war with Great Britain in 1812, with an army of six thousand men and a navy of four frigates; and she could not prevent her capital being taken by an English division not mustering three thousand five hundred bayonets. Baden or Wirtemberg would never have incurred a similar disgrace. If America were placed alongside of the European powers, she would be conquered in three months if she did not alter her system of government. In 1840, she was all but at open war with Great Britain, and yet her army was only twelve thousand men, and her navy seven ships of the line, with a population of seventeen millions; being just the population of the British Isles at the close of the war with Napoléon. True, the four frigates in 1812 did great things, and their crews evinced a valour and skill worthy of combating their ancient parent on the waves; but that only confirms the general argument. In democratic communities, measures of foresight are impossible to government, because the masses of whom they are the organ are incapable of looking before them, and never will submit to present burdens from a regard to future and remote dangers. Hence, while Philip was preparing his armament against Greece, the Athenian democracy diverted the funds set apart for the support of the navy to the maintenance of the theatres; and introduced and carried the punishment of *death* against any one who should propose even their repplication to their original destination. But energy unbounded is awakened^a in individuals by such institutions, and hence the great achievements which they effect with inconsiderable means. In despotic states, greatness is sometimes forced upon the nation by the vigour and foresight of the government,

(1) Mart. ii. 177, 178. Chev. ii. 347, 348.

^a "On occasion of the frightful riot at Faneuil Hall, Boston, in 1835, when the celebrated Mr. Garrison narrowly escaped being murdered, no prosecutions followed. I asked a lawyer, an abolitionist, why? He said there would be difficulty in getting a verdict, and if it was obtained, the punishment would be merely a fine, which would be paid on the

spot, and the triumph would remain with the aggressors. I asked an eminent judge the same question; he said he had given his advice against a prosecution. And why? Public feeling was so strong on the subject; the rioters were so respectable in the city: it was better to let the whole affair pass over without further notice."—MARTINEAU, i. 175, 176.

notwithstanding the general lassitude or supineness of the community: in democratic states, greatness is often forced upon the government, despite its own weakness, by the vigour and spirit of the people.

Banishment of higher talent or station from the public service. Ability of the highest kind has been rarely, if ever, called to the direction of affairs in America, since the democratic regime has been fully established by the general triumph of the popular over the conservative party. Men either of great talents or elevated character are disgusted with the low arts and mob-flattery which are the indispensable passport to popular favour: they retire from all contest for office, as in eastern dynasties similar characters do from the sycophancy of courts and the precincts of palaces. It is extremely rare to see persons of considerable property who will, for any consideration, engage at all in public life; they retire into the bosom of their families, and leave open to bustling indigence or pliant ambition the path leading to power, distinction, and political honours. In public, these men profess the most unbounded admiration for popular institutions; they shake hands with every man they meet in the street; they are never to be seen on a platform, that they do not utter sonorous periods on the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the incalculable blessings of democratic institutions; in private, they reveal, in confidence to those whom they can trust, and especially to strangers on the eve of departure, their decided conviction that the present system cannot much longer continue, and that a frightful revolution will, ere long, bury the rising splendour of North, as it has already done that of South America, in its ruins. The wealthy classes, unable to overcome the jealousy with which they are surrounded, and obnoxious to the people merely because they are independent, and will not in general condescend to court them, have every where given up public life, and abandoned all contest for political power. They have taken refuge in exclusive society, and guard its avenues with a degree of jealousy unknown even in the aristocratic circles of London or Vienna. Externally, they are plain in their dress; few carriages are to be seen in the streets considering the fortunes enjoyed, and the exterior of their dwellings exhibits nothing to attract notice or awaken jealousy. It is in the interior of their mansions that they give a full rein to the luxury of wealth; all that riches can purchase of the elegant or costly, is there displayed in profusion: like the Jews in the days of Ivanhoe, and from a similar cause, they are homely in external appearance, and gorgeous in interior display. Democracy and aristocracy have an equal aversion to the highest class of intellect, and neither will in general call in its assistance except in the last extremity, and when no other means of salvation remain; for the first is jealous of the power of mind, which it is unable to combat; the second, of independence of character, which it cannot control. Pliant ability is what both desire (1).

State of dependence of the Bench. Judicial independence is unknown in America, though integrity of judicial character is, to their honour be it said, almost universal.

All the State judges, from the highest to the lowest, are elected by the people, and are liable to be displaced by them. Their tenure of office is sometimes for three, sometimes for four, sometimes for six years, but never for life. They are liable to be removed at any time on the vote of the two branches of the State legislature; in other words, on the simple declared will of the majority. If their decisions are obnoxious to the feelings, however excited, of the multitude, they are sure not to be re-elected. The highest ability at the bar rarely, from this cause, condescends to accept judi-

(1) Tocq. ii. 12, 13.

cial situations; and consequently the ability of the bench is generally unequal to that of the counsel, and their station in life inferior. This appears in the clearest manner from the amount of the salaries paid to these functionaries, which, even in the highest stations, never exceeds L.1200, and in the local judicatures even of the greatest States, seldom reaches L.500 a-year (1). But although these important functionaries hold their offices during pleasure, as they did in all the European monarchies before the dawn of freedom, or as was the case in France after the first outbreak of the Revolution, yet no suspicion attaches to their judgments; and impartial justice is administered, except perhaps in a very few political cases, on the bench. Democratic jealousy, by the dependence which it exacts, and the scanty remuneration which it offers, may effectually seclude elevated character or shining abilities from public situations; but by fixing the attention of all on public functionaries, it provides the only effectual antidote to official corruption (2).

Literature
and the
press.

Literature and intellectual ability of the highest class meet with little encouragement in America. The names of Cooper, Channing, and Washington Irving, indeed, amply demonstrate that the American soil is not wanting in genius of the most elevated and fascinating character; but their works are almost all published in London—a decisive proof that European habits and ideas are necessary to their due development. Such is the concentration of public interest on objects of present and often passing concern, that neither the future nor the past excites any sort of attention: the classics are in little esteem: works in the higher branches of philosophy or speculation are unknown; and we have the authority of Tocqueville for the assertion, that so wholly are they regardless of historical records or monuments, that half a century hence, its history, even of these times, could only be written from the archives of other states. Literary talent is almost entirely directed to the wants or amusements of the day; it is vehement and impassioned upon them, but in general regardless of all other concerns. Legislation, stamped with the same character, is almost entirely engrossed with objects of material, and often only temporary importance. The struggles of interest between contending provinces or classes in society; the formation of railroads, canals, or harbours, for the advantage of particular districts; the establishment of joint-stock companies as a source of individual profit, en-

(1) Salaries paid to judges supreme and inferior in America :—

	Dollars.
Chief Justice of Supreme Court, .	5000 or L.1000
Ordinary Judges,	4500 — 900
Chief Judge of New York, . . .	3500 — 700
Second Judge of New York, . .	2000 — 400
Chief Judge of Pennsylvania, . .	2500 — 500
— North Carolina,	2000 — 400
— South Carolina,	2500 — 500
— Ohio,	1000 — 200
— Missouri,	2000 — 400

And the others in proportion.—*Stat. Alm.* 1841, p. 64.

Connected with this subject there is a very curious fact, indicative of the opposite effect, yet springing from the same motive at both in society, of aristocracy in Europe and democracy in America. It is mentioned by Tocqueville, and the same fact is also attested by Chevalier, that while the higher appointments in America are not paid at so high a rate as a tenth, or sometimes a twentieth part of what the same class of officers in Europe receive, the inferior class of officers draw at an average three, sometimes five times as much as their

brethren on this side of the Atlantic. The President of the United States has six thousand a-year, and the highest judge in the republic twelve hundred; but a common sailor has five pounds a-month, and a sheriff officer or macer from fifty to a hundred pounds a-year. In Great Britain, the sovereign has L.200,000 a year, and the highest judges ten or fifteen thousand. But the common sailor has one pound fifteen a-month, besides his allowances and rations, which may amount to as much more, and the doorkeeper or macer would think himself well paid with half of what his brother in America enjoys. Human nature is the same on both sides of the water. Aristocracy in Europe liberally provides for the functionaries who are drawn from its own class, or of the splendour with which its sympathizes; democracy in America rewards in the most niggardly manner the elevated class of public servants, with whom it feels no identity of interest, and reserves all its liberality for the inferior class of officers, from which it itself expects to derive benefit—See TOCQUEVILLE, ii. 73, 75; CHEVALIER, ii. 151.

(2) Tocq. ii. 44, 176, 177, Chev. ii. 151. Mart. i. 116.

gross nine-tenths both of the general and local legislation of the United States. The press, which every where abounds, and is diffused to a degree unexampled in any other country, though by no means deficient in ability, is uniformly distinguished by violence, personalities, and rancour: its influence is so considerable in guiding the irresistible impulse of public opinion, that it may truly be said to be the ruler of the state, though itself is swayed by the interests and passions of these to whom its productions are addressed; and it is well known in the United States, that public services the most important, private character the most immaculate, furnish no protection whatever against its calumnies; and that by a combination among the editors of newspapers, should so unlikely an event occur, the noblest and best citizens of America may at any time be driven into exile (1).

Great extent of slavery in the United States. Slavery, as all the world knows, exists to a great extent in a large part of the United States. It is in the southern States that this dreadful evil almost exclusively prevails; for although the negro race extends into the State of New York, and some of the adjoining ones to the north and west, yet their number is declining in these districts, while it is rapidly increasing in those to the south; and the present comparative rate of increase of the two races justifies the hope, that ere long slavery will be entirely confined to those parts of America which border on the tropics. There, however, it prevails to a prodigious extent, and nearly the whole labour, both field and domestic, is performed by the African race. In the six States alone of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, there were in 1840 no less than 1,751,529 slaves—a prodigious number, considering that the total free white population of the same States is only 2,406,876. History has not yet solved the questions, either whether the negro race can ever be induced to labour continuously and effectively without the coercion of a master, or whether the whites are capable of bearing the effect of rural work in hot climates. But the experience, alike of Africa in every age, of St.-Domingo in the last, and the British West India colonies in the present, seems to lead to the belief that both questions must be resolved in the negative: that the negro constitution possesses an aptitude for bearing the effect of tropical heat to which the European is a stranger; and that the utmost which philanthropy can do for the descendants of Canaan in the New World—of whom it was prophesied at the flood, that they should be the servants of those of Japhet (2)—is to mitigate their sufferings, and restrain the severity of their oppression.

The most energetic efforts have been made for a number of years back, by

(1) Tocq. ii. 63, 64.

(2) "God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant."—*Gen. ix. 27.*

	FREE WHITES.		SLAVES.	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Virginia,	371,223	369,745	228,661	220,326
North Carolina,	240,047	244,823	123,546	122,271
South Carolina,	130,496	128,588	158,678	168,360
Georgia,	210,534	197,161	139,335	141,609
Alabama,	176,692	158,493	127,360	126,172
Mississippi,	87,256	81,818	98,003	97,208
	1,226,248	1,180,628	875,583	875,946

Vehement
resistance
made against
its abolition.

a humane and philanthropic party in the United States, headed by not a few leaders of genius and ability, to produce a general feeling against the further continuance of slavery in any part of the Union; but although they have succeeded in procuring its abolition in a few States where the negroes were inconsiderable in number, they have made no sort of impression in those where they are numerous. All the efforts of philanthropy, all the force of eloquence, have been shattered against the obvious interest of a body of proprietors dependent for their existence on slave labour. It is perfectly understood in every part of the Union, that the first serious attempt to force emancipation upon the country by a general measure, will be the signal for an immediate separation of the Southern States from the Union. Superficial observers are never weary of throwing their tenacious retention of slavery in America in the face of the Republicans of that country, and proclaiming it as the greatest of all inconsistencies, for those who are so ambitious of maintaining and extending their own privileges, to deny even common freedom to others who happen to be subject to their power. More profound thinkers have observed, that this democratic principle is itself the main cause of the obstinate retention of the servient race in slavery; that in every country and age of the world, those who are loudest in the assertion of their own privileges are the least inclined to share them with others; that they are extremely willing to level *down* to a certain point, but extremely unwilling to level *up* from below to the same point; and that that point is always to be found in that stratum of society where the majority of the electors is placed. There cannot be a doubt that the observations of Mr. Burke on this subject are well founded. The English Reformed House of Commons would never have emancipated the West India negroes, if they had been in the employment of even a part of the electors. Witness the obstinate resistance the democratic members of the legislature make to any restriction on the practical slavery of the factory children.

Manners of
America.

Volumes without number have been written on the manners of the Americans; their exclusive system in society: their national vanity, and irritability at censure; and many of these productions, lively and amusing, are penned in no friendly, and often in no just spirit. The whole subject may be dismissed in a single paragraph. The manners of the Americans are the manners of Great Britain, *minus* the aristocracy, the landowners, the army, and the established church. In New York and Philadelphia, the society of the great merchants is indistinguishable from that of the same rank in the greatest towns of the British Islands: the habits of the American middle class, if a few revolting customs are excepted, will find a parallel in our steam-boats and stage-coaches. Exclusive society is practised to an extent, and pervades all ranks to a depth, altogether unknown in most European communities, where the distinctions of rank have been long established, are well understood, and not liable to be infringed upon, except by peculiar merit or good fortune (1); but that is the necessary result of the total absence of all hereditary rank, and may be witnessed to nearly the same extent, and from the same causes, in the commercial and manufacturing cities of Great Britain. The admiration for rank which is generally felt in America, especially by the fair sex, is excessive; but that is common

(1) " 'You can't imagine,' said an American girl, the daughter of a milliner, to Miss Martineau, 'what a nice set we have at school; we never let any of the *haberdashery* daughters associate with us.' My informant went on to mention how anxious she and her set of about sixty young people were to visit

'*exclusively*' among themselves; 'how delightful it would be to have no *grocer's* daughters among them;' but 'that was found to be impossible.'—MARTINEAU, iii. 33. *Cælum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt.*

to them with republicans all the world over. The abolition of titles of honour in democratic communities, is the result, not of a contempt for, but an inordinate desire for such distinctions; they injure, when enjoyed by a few, the self-love of those who do not possess them; and since the majority cannot enjoy that advantage, for if so it would cease to be one, they are resolved that none shall. They are vain on all national subjects, and excessively sensitive to censure however slight, and most of all to ridicule; but that obtains invariably with those classes or individuals who have not historic descent or great personal achievements or qualities to rest upon, and who, desirous of general applause, have a secret sense that in some particular they may be undeserving of it. The Americans have already done great things: when they have continued a century longer in the same career, they will, like the English, be a proud, and cease to be a vain people. Vanity, as Bulwer has well remarked, is a passion which feeds on little gratifications, but requires them constantly: pride rests on great things, and is indifferent to momentary applause. The English not only noway resent, but positively enjoy, the ludicrous exhibitions made of their manners on the French stage; such burlesques would slay the Americans alive. The English recollect that the French learnt these peculiarities when the British troops occupied Paris.

How has America escaped its political dangers? How then has it happened that a country possessing none of the securities against external [danger or internal convulsion, which have been elsewhere found to be indispensable, has still gone on increasing and flourishing: extending alike in internal strength and external consideration, and still exhibiting, though with several ominous heaves, an unruflled surface in general society? The solution of this peculiarity is to be found in the circumstance, that the United States have no neighbouring powers either capable of endangering their security, or having an interest in provoking their hostility; that the majority of the electors, as yet, are owners of land, and therefore have an interest to resist or prevent spoliation of real property; and that the back settlements furnish a perpetual and ready issue for all their restless activity and discontented energy to exhaust and enrich itself in pacific warfare with the forest. When these peculiarities have ceased to distinguish them, as cease they must in the progress of things—when the growth of population, and completed appropriation of land, have rendered the classes of workmen who live by wages more numerous than those who have property of their own, and the filling up or distance of the frontier settlements has closed that vast outlet to the selfish desires and ill humours of the state, the political power, now vested in numbers will inevitably produce a general disruption and chaos of society, attended with consequences as disastrous as those which in our times have desolated the provinces of South America; unless, as is more probable, a sense of the approaching danger, or events that cannot now be foreseen, restore in the United States those safeguards against human wickedness which have in all other ages and countries been found to be essential to the existence of society.

Political
state of
Canada,
and its
population.

In many of the fundamental particulars which distinguish the United States of America from all other countries of the world, the British provinces in CANADA entirely participate. They have the same boundless extent of unappropriated territory, in some places rich and fertile, in others sterile and unproductive; the same active and persevering race to subdue it; the same restless spirit of adventure, perpetually

urging men into the recesses of the forest in quest of independence; the same spirit of freedom and enterprise; the same advantages arising from the powers of knowledge, the habits of civilization, the force of credit, the capacities of industry. Their progress in respect of wealth and population, accordingly, has been nearly at the same rate, at least since, in the middle of the last century, they fell under the British dominion, as that of the neighbouring provinces in the United States; and both have regularly gone on, doubling in somewhat less than a quarter of a century—a rate of advance which may be considered as the maximum of colonial increase in the most favourable circumstances, and when largely aided by emigration from the parent State. The total inhabitants of the British possessions in America are now about one million seven hundred thousand: but when it is recollected that the natural increase of this number is aided by an immigration, annually, of from thirty to fifty thousand persons in the prime of life from the British islands, which number is rapidly increasing, it may well be imagined that it is destined to become, ere long, one of the most powerful states of the New World (1).

It is not the points of resemblance between Canada and the United States of America, it is the points of their difference, which require to be pointed out; and they are so remarkable, as to indicate not obscurely a different ultimate destiny in the two nations.

Loyalty of
the Cana-
dians.

The character of the Canadians bears the same relation to that of the Americans that the Tyrolese does to that of the Swiss. Both are sprung from the same race, are subjected to the same necessities, are animated by the same ambition, and enjoy, in a great measure at least, the same advantages. But there is this difference between them, and in its ultimate effects it may prove a vital one: the American has no sovereign; in him the aspirations of loyalty are lost, the glow of patriotic devotion is diffused over so immense a surface as to be wellnigh evaporated; and from having no visible or tangible object to rest upon, the generous affections are too often obliterated, and individual ambition, private advancement, the thirst for gold, absorb every faculty of the mind. In the Canadian, on the other hand, patriotic ardour is in general mingled with chivalrous devotion; the lustre of British descent, the glories of British renown, animate every bosom, at least in the British race; and with the well-founded pride arising from the contemplation of their own vast natural advantages and honourable martial exploits, is mingled a strong and personal attachment to the throne. In Up-

(1) Malte-Brun, xi. 179. Martin's Col. Hist. iii. p. 1. and 89.

The population of the British possessions in North America, according to the last census taken in 1834, was as follow:—

Lower Canada,	549,005
Upper Canada,	336,461
New Brunswick,	152,156
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, . .	142,548
Prince Edward's Island, . . .	32,292
Newfoundland,	75,000

Total, 1,287,462

Increase of Population in Lower Canada.

Years.	Population.
1764,	76,275
1783,	113,012
1825,	425,080
1831,	540,628
1841. (Estimated,).	610,000

—MALTE BRUN, ix. 179. In the last eighty years, the population has multiplied eightfold.

But the population of Upper Canada alone, is now above 450,000, and the total inhabitants are not under 1,700,000.—See MALTE BRUN, xi. 179; *American State Alm.*, 267; and MARTIN'S *Colonial History*, iii. p. 1. Table. The number of emigrants who have landed at Quebec and Montreal in the subjoined years, have been as follows. The marked diminution in the year 1838, being the year of the Canadian Revolt, is a striking commentary upon the tendency of the criminal ambition of its unprincipled leaders:—

1831,	49,783	1836,	35,226
1832,	66,339	1837,	29,884
1833,	28,808	1838 (Rebellion)	2,993
1834,	40,060	1839,	26,472
1835,	15,573	1840,	29,649

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vi. 166; and vii. 199; and viii. 199.

per Canada in particular, which now numbers four hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, these sentiments are peculiarly strong; the large bodies of Scottish Highlanders who have settled in its secluded wilds, have borne with them from their native mountains the loyal ardour by which their race has been distinguished in every period of English history; on every occasion of hazard they have been foremost at the post of honour, and to the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that noble province, the preservation of those magnificent possessions to the British crown is mainly to be ascribed. The effect of this spirit upon national character is incalculable; it produces that first and greatest step in social elevation—a forgetfulness of self, a devotion to others, a surrender of the heart to generous affections; and from its tendency to concentrate the energies of men upon patriotic objects, it may at some future period, combined with the incalculable advantages of the water communication by the great chain of lakes, come to counterbalance all the riches of the basin of the Mississippi, and reassert in America the wonted superiority of northern valour over southern opulence.

The *habitans* of Lower Canada.

A peculiar and highly interesting feature of society in Lower Canada is to be found in the *habitans*, or natives of French descent. These simple people, for the most part entirely uneducated, and under the guidance of their Catholic priests, comprise eight-ninths of the whole population of that province, and their number now is not short of five hundred thousand. In every respect they are the antipodes of the Anglo-Saxon race, which elsewhere in the New World has acquired so decided a preponderance. While the colonists of British descent are incessantly penetrating the forests in search of new abodes, and clearing them by their industry, those of French origin have in no instance migrated beyond the seats of their fathers, and remain immovably rooted in their original settlements. Local attachment, unknown in America, is felt in the strongest degree among the *habitans* of Canada; and rather than emigrate from their native habitations, or penetrate the woods in search of more extended or richer settlements, they divide and subdivide those which they already enjoy, till they have in many cases become partitioned into as diminutive portions as in the wine provinces of Old France. The effects of this disposition have been in the highest degree important. While the British race has been continually spreading around them, with the same vigour as in the American States, and the forests in every direction have been falling beneath their strokes, the French inhabitants have been fixed immovably in the seats of their fathers, and their descendants, though immensely increased in numbers, are to be found tilling their native fields. Hence, even in the infancy of the nation, they are already a prey to the evils of long-established civilization; population is become extremely dense in districts where the European race has been little more than a century established, and in the midst of a country which possesses three hundred thousand square miles of fertile territory, land is often partitioned into heritages of an acre and half an acre each. The ultimate results of this most striking peculiarity may already be distinctly foreseen. The British race, impelled into the wilderness by the wandering spirit which belongs to their blood, and the ardent passions which have been nursed by their institutions, will overspread the land, and, like a surging flood, surround and overwhelm those isolated spots where the French family, adhering to the customs, the attachments, and the simplicity of their fathers, are still marrying and giving in marriage in their paternal seats. Democracy is the great moving spring in the social world; it is the steam

power of society, the centrifugal force which impels civilization into the abodes of savage man (1).

Ruinous
effect of
the consti-
tution of
1791.

A rebellion, or possibly a separation from the parent state, was inevitably bequeathed to Canada by the constitution of 1791. That constitution, struck out at a heat during the first fervour of the French Revolution, and founded apparently on an equitable basis, the result of inexperience and an over-estimate of human nature, involved two fatal errors. 1st, The country was divided into different provinces, having separate assemblies, over each of which the representatives of the sovereign presided, without any common or paramount legislature in the colonies. Nothing could be more convenient at first sight, or just in theory, than this arrangement, under which the representatives of each province assembled within their own bounds to discuss their matters of local interest; but what was its effect when the representatives of Lower Canada, nine-tenths of the inhabitants of which were of French descent, were in one house, and those of the Upper Province, seventeen-twentieths of whom are of British origin, in another; and the former were animated by the combined passions of roused democracy and national animosity, and the latter by British spirit and steady loyalty to the throne? 2d, One uniform rate of qualification, viz. the possession of a forty-shilling freehold in the country, or a ten-pound subject held in *tenancy*, as in the British Reform Bill, in towns, was established as the test of the elective franchise in all the British provinces (2); a principle in appearance the most equitable, but in practice the most perilous and unequal, where the population is composed of different races of men, in different degrees of civilization, knowledge, and advancement. It is exactly the same thing as cutting clothes according to one measure for a stripling of fifteen, a man of thirty, and a veteran of sixty, merely because they happen to live under the same roof. The English have felt the evils of this system, in its application to the British islands, since the Reform Bill established one uniform qualification for the sober English, imured to centuries of freedom; the ambitious Scotch, teeming with visions of democratic equality; and the fiery Irish, steeped in hatred of the religion and institutions of the Saxon. But these evils have been still more sorely felt in Canada, where that unhappy constitution, in its ultimate effects, gave the same powers to the French *habitans*, not one in fifty of whom could read, and who, speaking their native language, were but ill reconciled to a foreign dominion, as the hardy English and Scotch emigrants, who had brought with them across the Atlantic the habits and loyalty of their fathers. But the evils consequent on this arrangement as yet lay buried in the womb of time; they were brought to life only by the passions and the weaknesses of a future age: and in 1812, when the war began, one only feeling of loyalty animated the whole inhabitants of the British North American possessions. Above forty thousand effective militia in arms were ready to defend their territory from invasion, and the King of England had not, in his wide-spread dominions, more loyal subjects than the French inhabitants on the shores of the St.-Lawrence (3).

(1) Malte Brun, xi. 155, 156. Tocq. ii. 204.

(2) By the act of 1791, 31 Geo. iii. c. 31, the freehold is vested in forty-shilling freeholders in the country; property to the amount of L.5 sterling, or tenancy of a subject paying L.10 rent, in towns.

(3) Martin's Col. Hist. iii. 127, 128. 31 Geo. iii. c. 31.

Vast importance of the North American colonies to Great Britain.

Incalculable is the importance of its North American colonies to the British empire. Its population, doubling every quarter of a century, promises, in fifty years, to amount to between seven and eight millions of souls; while the opulence of its inhabitants, and the taste for British comforts which they have brought with them from their native country, promises to render it a boundless vent for our manufactures: and the peculiarity of its trade consisting chiefly of those bulky articles, emigrants taken out, and wood brought home, has already rendered it the nursery of the British navy. Already the exports of British produce and manufactures to our North American colonies have reached, on an average of years, nearly three millions sterling; an amount, great as it is, by no means unprecedented, when it is recollected that, in 1812, when the war began, the United States of America, with a population somewhat under eight millions, took off thirteen millions annually of British goods. But the marvels of the shipping employed in the North American trade exceed all other marvels. From the Parliamentary returns, it appears that the tonnage, wholly British, employed at this time (1841) in the trade with the North American provinces, has reached the enormous amount of 800,000 tons, being fully a fourth of that carried on in British bottoms with the whole world put together; and that it has steadily advanced at the rate of doubling every ten years (1). At this rate of increase, in ten years more it will give employment to 1,600,000 tons of shipping, or fully *a half* of the whole British tonnage at this time. And observe, while this is the astonishing value of our colonial trade, both upon our manufactures and shipping, the encouraging effect of our emancipated colonies is widely different; for the Parliamentary Papers demonstrate that at this moment, while seventeen hundred thousand of our own fellow-citizens in Canada consume nearly two millions and a half worth annually of our manufactures, seventeen millions in the United States take off on an average only eight millions worth, or considerably less than what half their number did thirty years ago, before rivalry of British manufactures had commenced; and that while the trade with the Canadas gives employment to eight hundred thousand tons of British ship-

(1) Table showing the progress of the export and import trade and tonnage with our North American possessions, from 1827 to 1840.

YEARS.	EXPORTS.	IMPORTS.	BRITISH TONNAGE.
	DECLARED VALUE.	DECLARED VALUE.	
1827	L. 950,490	L. 468,766	359,793
1828	1,248,288	466,065	400,841
1829	1,117,422	569,452	431,901
1830	1,570,020	682,202	452,397
1831	1,922,089	902,915	480,236
1832	2,078,949	795,652	504,211
1833	2,100,211	756,466	512,820
1834	1,339,629	618,598	524,606
1835	2,127,531	629,051	631,345
1836	2,739,507	633,575	620,722
1837	2,141,035	684,791	631,427
1838 (*)	1,992,459	553,827	665,554
1839	2,467,319	721,679	709,846
1840	2,884,231		796,410

—Parl. Return, May 27, 1840,

(*) Rebellion.

ping, that with the independent States of America, with just *ten times* their population, only employs from eighty to ninety thousand, or a *tenth part* of its amount, the remainder having passed into the hands of the Americans themselves (1).

Real causes
of the dis-
astrous
issue of the
first Ame-
rican war.

Various have been the causes assigned by statesmen and historians for the disastrous issue of the first American war. Two may be specified, of such paramount importance, that they eclipse all the others, and are of themselves perfectly adequate to explain the phenomenon, without recurring to any other. Great Britain was at that period in an especial manner, as she is at all times in a certain degree, the victim at once of democratic parsimony and aristocratic corruption. She undertook the conquest of colonies possessing then three millions of inhabitants, situated three thousand miles from the parent State, with an army which could not bring ten thousand combatants into the field; for the whole military force of the empire, of every description, did not amount to twenty thousand men (2). The furious patriots and country party were perpetually declaiming against the enormous military and naval forces of an empire which even then embraced both hemispheres, when in fact it was considerably less than what Baden and Wirtemberg, or other sixth-rate powers, now maintain, to defend dominions of not a hundredth part of the extent, nor possessing a thousandth part of the resources, of the British empire at that period. This Lilliputian army, such as it was, was still further paralysed by the corruption, that inherent vice of aristocratic as well as democratic governments, which pervaded all its branches. Commissions in the army, bestowed almost entirely as a reward for, or an inducement to secure parliamentary support, were seldom the reward of the most deserving: military education was unknown; it was no unusual thing to see boys in the nursery, captains and even majors in the army; and such was the corruption of commissaries and superior officers, sharing in their gains in the field, that the expense of the troops was nearly doubled, while their efficiency was reduced to less than a half. From the combined operation of these causes, the war, which, by a vigorous and efficient army worthy of the real strength of England, might have been concluded with ease at latest in the second campaign, was protracted till France and Spain, as may always be expected

(1) Table showing the comparative exports and tonnage to the United States of America, and British possessions therein, in 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839 :—

YEARS.	EXPORTS to United States. Declared Value.	EXPORTS to British Possessions. Declared Value.	TONNAGE TO UNITED STATES.		TONNAGE to British Possessions.
			AMERICAN.	BRITISH.	
1836	12,425,605	2,739,507	226,483	86,383	620,722
1837	4,695,225	2,141,035	275,813	81,023	631,427
1838	7,585,760	1,992,459	357,467	83,203	665,354
1839	8,341,672	2,467,619	282,005	92,482	709,846

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vi. 43, and vii. 43.

(2) Supplies for the year 1773 :—

Dec. 3, 1772.—That 20,000 men be employed for the sea service for the year 1773, including 4354 marines.

Dec. 10.—That a number of land forces including 1522 invalids, amounting to 17,070 effective men, commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be employed for the year 1773.

Feb. 13, 1775.—That 2000 men be now added to the navy, in prospect of the war with the Plantations in America.

Feb. 15.—That an augmentation of 4383 men be made to the land forces.—*Ann. Reg.* 1773, 226; *App. to Chron.*; and for 1775, p. 93, 94.

Operation
of these
causes on
the war.

in such a case, joined in the contest; and then England, after a long and costly struggle, was obliged in the end to succumb to a formidable coalition. Even as it was, more than one opportunity of crushing the forces of the insurgents (1) was lost, by the incapacity or selfish desire to protract the war on the part of the military commanders. If Great Britain had put her naval and military forces on a proper footing *during peace*, and been ready, on the first breaking out of hostilities, to act with an energy worthy of her real strength; if she had possessed fifty thousand disposable troops in 1775, and a hundred thousand in 1792, the American war might have been brought to a victorious termination in 1776; the French contest in 1795; six years of subsequent disastrous warfare in the first case, and twenty of glorious, but costly hostilities, in the second, would have been avoided, and the national debt, instead of eight hundred, would now have been under two hundred millions sterling (2).

Efforts of
Washington
to
maintain
peace
with Great
Britain.

It was not surprising that the American people, after the glorious termination of the war of independence, should have retained a warm feeling of gratitude towards their allies, the French, and a strong degree of animosity towards their enemies, the English. The enlightened and truly patriotic leaders of this revolution, however, had discernment enough to perceive, that though the passions of the people were in favour of France, their interests were indissolubly wound up with those of England, and greatness of mind sufficient to risk their popularity for the good of their country. The whole efforts of Washington and his friends in the government, from the conclusion of the American war in 1783, to the retirement of that great man from public life in 1796, were devoted to tempering the democratic ardour which had broken out with such vehemence in their country after the declaration of their independence, and laying the foundation of a lasting pacific intercourse with Great Britain. Yet so strongly were the sympathies of the people enlisted on the side of France and revolution, that it required all his immense popularity to counteract, in 1793, the declared wish of the decided majority of the American citizens to declare war against Great Britain. So vehement was the clamour, that, on more than one occasion at that period, it was apparent that the federalist party, to which he belonged, had lost the majority in the Chamber of Representatives; and such was the fury of the journals out of doors, that he was openly accused of aspiring to the monarchy, and of being, "like the traitor Arnold, a spy sold to the English." But Washington, unmoved, pursued steadily his pacific policy. The horrors of the French Revolution cooled the ardour of many of its ardent supporters on the other side of the Atlantic; and one of the last acts of that great man was to carry, by his casting vote in Congress, a commercial treaty with Great Britain (3).

Progress
of the mar-
itime dis-
pute with
America.

But various causes contributed, in the course of the contest between England and France, at once to increase the partiality of the Americans to the latter country, and to bring such important interests of its citizens into jeopardy, as could hardly fail to involve them in the dispute. Under the influence of the equal law of succession, landed property was undergoing a continual division, while the increasing energy of the democratic multitude was gradually destroying the majority of the conservative

(1) Particularly when the main American army, under Washington, was driven by Lord Howe into Long Island, and might have been made prisoners by a vigorous advance of the British troops, on 29th August 1775.—See *Ann. Reg.* vol. xix. 173.

(2) See *Ante*, ii. 35, 91.

(3) Marshall's *Life of Washington*, v. 314, 355, 265. Tocq. ii. 105. *Ante*, iii. 99, 100.

See the treaty, 19th November 1794, between Great Britain and America, in *MARTIN*, v. 641; and *Ann. Reg.* 1795, *State Papers*, 294.

party in Congress, and augmenting the violence of the popular press in the country. Already it had become painfully evident, from the conduct of the American government on various occasions after Washington's retirement from public life, but especially in the dispute which occurred with France in 1797 (1), in consequence of the sanguinary decree of the Directory, and the readiness with which they accommodated all their differences with that power in 1800, and subscribed the treaty of Mortefontaine, which recognized Napoléon's new maritime code, and, in particular, stipulated that the flag should cover the merchandize, and that no articles should be deemed contraband of war but arms and warlike stores, that their inclinations now ran violently in favour of the French side of the question, and that, right or wrong, for their interest or against it, they might be expected on the first crisis to take part with that power (2). And with the usual tendency of mankind to attach themselves to names and not to things, this strong partiality for the French alliance, which originated in the common democratic feelings by which they both were animated, and the Republican institutions which they both had established, continued after France had passed over to the other side; and the citizens of the United States clamoured as loudly for a junction of their arms with those of the Great Empire, as they had done for an alliance offensive and defensive with the rising Republic.

The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British orders in council.

The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British orders in council, however, brought the American commerce immediately into collision with both the belligerent states, and rendered it hardly possible that so considerable a maritime power could avoid taking an active part in the strife. It has been already mentioned how that terrible contest, distinguished by a degree of rancour and violence on both sides, unparalleled in modern warfare, commenced with Mr. Fox's declaring the coasts of France and Holland, from Brest to the Elbe inclusive, in a state of blockade: which was immediately followed by Napoléon's famous Berlin and Milan decrees, which retaliated upon the English, by declaring the British islands in a state of blockade, and authorizing the seizure and condemnation of any vessel on the high seas bound from any British harbour, and the seizure of all British goods wherever they could be found (3). To this the English government replied by the not less famous orders in council, which, on the preamble of the blockade of the British dominions established by the Berlin decree, declared "all the posts and places of France, and her allies, from which, though not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner (4); and that all trade in articles, the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize."

Effect of these decrees upon the neutral trade.

It is difficult to say which of these violent decrees bore hardest upon neutral powers, or was most subversive of Napoléon's own favourite position, that the flag should cover the merchandize; for on the one hand the French Emperor declared that all vessels coming from England or its colonies, or having English goods on board, should be instantly seized and confiscated; and on the other, the English government at once declared the whole dominions of France and its allies, thus comprehending, after the treaty of Tilsit, nearly the whole of Europe,

(1) *Ante*, iii. 306; 18th January and 29th October 1798; *Ante*, iv. 230; 30th September 1800.

(2) *Ante*, iv. 231.

(3) *Ante*, vi. 162, 163, where the subject is fully discussed, and the orders on both sides given.

(4) *Parl.* Dec. x. 134, 138.

in a state of blockade, and all vessels bound for any of their harbours, or having any of their produce on board, good and lawful prize. Between these opposite and conflicting denunciations, it was hardly possible for a neutral vessel, engaged in the carrying trade of any part of Europe, to avoid confiscation from one or other of the belligerent parties. In such circumstances the Americans, whose adventurous spirit had enabled them to engross, during this long war, nearly the whole carrying trade of the globe, had unquestionably the strongest ground of complaint; but against whom was it properly to be directed? Against the British, who, by Mr. Fox's order, declared only the coast from the Elbe to Brest, in blockade, and supported that declaration by a fleet of a thousand vessels of war, which had long since swept every hostile flag from the ocean; or the French, who, without a single ship of the line, and only a few frigates at sea, had declared the whole British empire in blockade, and all its produce and manufactures, wherever found, lawful prize? If Mr. Fox's blockade of the Elbe and the Weser, besides the harbours of the French channel, was an unwarranted stretch, even when supported by the whole navy of England, what was Napoléon's blockade of the whole British empire, enforced only by a few frigates and sloops at sea? If, therefore, the Americans suffered, as suffer they did, in this unparalleled strife, the party which was to blame was that which first commenced this extraordinary system of declaring blockades to extend beyond the places actually invested by sea or land: and of that unheard-of extension Napoléon was unquestionably the author. If the Americans had been really animated with a desire in good faith to vindicate the rights of neutrals, and restrain the oppression of belligerents, what they should have done was to have joined their arms to those of Great Britain, in order to compel the return of the French Emperor to a more civilized method of warfare.

Origin of the
dispute with
America.

But these were very far from being the views which animated the ruling party now in possession of power in the United States. Mr. Jefferson was now President, and he was the organ of the democratic majority, which, forgetting the wise maxims of Washington and the authors of American independence, without being inclined to submit, if it could possibly be avoided, to actual injustice or loss of profit from either of the belligerent powers, desired if possible to accommodate their differences with France, and wreak their spite on aristocracy, by uniting with that country against Great Britain. This disposition soon appeared in two decisive proceedings. The British government, in December 1806, had concluded and ratified a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with the American plenipotentiary in London; but Mr. Jefferson refused to ratify it, and it fell to the ground. Not long after, propositions were submitted by the American government to Napoléon on the subject of the Floridas, which they were desirous of acquiring from the Spaniards, and regarding which they wished a guarantee from the Emperor; that, in the event of their being attacked by the English, he would use his influence with the Spaniards to obtain their

Dec. 1807. cession. This Napoléon, in the first instance, positively refused, as he had an eye to those possessions for Joseph as an appanage to the crown of Spain; and afterwards an ambiguous answer was returned: but this re-

July 1808. pulse had no effect in weakening Mr. Jefferson's partiality for a French alliance. Meanwhile the American government took the most decisive measures for withdrawing their merchant vessels from aggression on the part of either of the belligerent powers. In the first instance, an angry

Oct. 27, 1807. message was communicated to Congress by Mr. Jefferson, inveighing bitterly against the British orders in council of January 1807, but not

breathing the slightest complaint against the French Berlin decree of November 1806, to which they were merely a reply; and, on receipt of intelligence of the more extended British orders in council, of 11th November 1807, March 1, 1808, he laid a general embargo on all vessels whatever in the American harbours. And this was followed, on the 1st March 1808, by the substitution of a non-intercourse act for the embargo, whereby all commercial transactions with either of the belligerent powers was absolutely prohibited; but the embargo was taken off as to the rest of the world (1). This act, however, contained a clause, (§ 11,) authorizing the President, by proclamation, to renew the intercourse between America and either of the belligerent powers which should first repeal their obnoxious orders in council or decrees. This non-intercourse act had the effect of totally suspending the trade between America and Great Britain, and inflicting upon both these countries a loss tenfold greater than that suffered by France, with which the commercial intercourse of the United States was altogether inconsiderable.

Affair of the Chesapeake. In addition to the other causes of difference, unhappily already too numerous, which existed between Great Britain and the United States, an unfortunate collision, attended with fatal consequences, ensued at sea. The Chesapeake, American frigate, was cruising off Virginia, June 23, 1807, and was known to have some English deserters on board, when she was hailed by the Leopard, of 74 guns, Captain Humphries, who made a formal requisition for the men. The American captain denied he had them, and refused to admit the right of search; upon which Captain Humphries fired a broadside, which killed and wounded several on board the Chesapeake, whereupon she struck, and the deserters were found on board, taken to Halifax, and one executed. The President, upon this issued a proclamation July 14, ordering all British ships of war to leave the harbours of the United States: but the English government disavowed the act, recalled Captain Humphries, and offered to make reparation, as the right of search, when applied to vessels of war, extended only to a *requisition*, but could not be carried into effect by actual force (2).

Mr. Erskine's negotiation with Mr. Madison. This state of matters promised little hopes of an amicable adjustment; but as Mr. Jefferson soon after retired from power, and was succeeded in the office of President by Mr. Madison, who professed an anxious desire to adjust the differences which, to the enormous loss of both, had arisen between Great Britain and the United States, Mr. Erskine, envoy and minister plenipotentiary at Washington, deemed the opportunity favourable for renewing the negotiations, and, if possible, restoring that amicable intercourse between the two countries, on which their mutual welfare was so materially dependent. A correspondence accordingly ensued between April 17, 1809, Mr. Erskine and Mr. Smith, the American foreign secretary, in which it was expressly stated, that the non-intercourse act had produced a state of equality between the United States and the belligerent powers, and that he accordingly offered public reparation for the forcible taking of the men out of the American frigate Chesapeake, which had highly inflamed the national passions on both sides of the water. To this Mr. Smith made a reply April 18, in a similar amicable spirit: and in consequence, Mr. Erskine, on April 19, the 19th, wrote to Mr. Smith, that "his Majesty's orders in council, of January and November 1807, will have been withdrawn, as respects the United States, on the 10th June next." To which Mr. Smith rejoined, that

(1) President's Message, Oct. 28, 1807. Ann. Reg. 1807, 763. State Papers, etc. for 1808, p. 228, Bign. viii. 399. Parl. Deb. xiv. 882, 887.

(2) Hugues, v. 209, Ann. Reg. 1807. App. to Chron. 646.

the non-intercourse act would be withdrawn, in virtue of the powers conferred on the President by the act establishing it, from and after the 10th June; and a proclamation to that effect, from him, appeared the same day (1).

Which the British Government refuses to ratify. This important change of tone and concession had been obtained from the American government by a distinct and serious threat, held out by New England and the five northern States of the Union, to break off from the confederacy if the non-intercourse act were any longer continued in force. To all appearance, therefore, the disputes with America were now brought to a close; and on the faith that they were so, American vessels, in great numbers, poured into the British harbours, and the commercial intercourse between the two countries became more active than ever. This auspicious state of matters, however, was not destined to be of long continuance. In concluding this arrangement with the United States, Mr. Erskine had not only exceeded, but acted in contradiction to his instructions (2); and although nothing could be more advantageous for Great Britain than the renewal of a commercial intercourse with that power, yet it was not by government deemed worth purchasing by an abandonment, so far as the greatest carrying power in existence was concerned, of the whole retaliatory policy of the orders in council. The English ministry, accordingly, refused to ratify this arrangement; a resolution which, although fully justified in point of right by Napoléon's violence, and by Mr. Erskine's deviation from his instructions, may now well be characterised as one of the most unfortunate, in point of expediency, ever adopted by the British government: for it at once led to the renewal of the non-intercourse act of the United States; put an entire stop, for the next two years, to all commerce with that country; reduced the exports of Great Britain fully a third, during the most critical and important years of the war (3); and, in its ultimate results, contributed to produce that unhappy irritation between the two countries, which has never yet, notwithstanding the strong bonds of mutual interest by which they are connected, been allayed (4).

Storm of indignation in the United States at this disavowal. It may well be imagined what a storm of indignation was raised in the United States when the intelligence of the refusal of the British Government to ratify Mr. Erskine's convention was received; and how prodigiously it strengthened the hands of the party already in power, and supported by a decided majority in the nation, which was resolved at all hazards, and against their most obvious interests, to involve the country in a war with Great Britain. Mr. Erskine, as a matter of course, was recalled, and Mr. Jackson succeeded him as British envoy at Washington; but his reception was such, from the very outset, as left little hope of an amicable termination of the differences. From the President's table, where the English minister was treated with marked indifference, if not studied insult, to the lowest alehouse in the United States, there was nothing but one storm of indignation against the monstrous arrogance of the British maritime pretensions, and the duplicity and bad faith of their govern-

(1) See the Correspondence and Proclamation, Ann. Reg. 1809, 694, 697.

(2) This was at first denied, both in the House of Lords and Commons; but on Feb. 5, 1810, Mr. Canning seconded a motion of Mr. Whitbread's, for production of the instructions, which were accordingly produced and printed, and completely proved Mr. Canning's assertion, that they had been violated by Mr. Erskine. No further notice, accordingly, was taken of the subject in parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.* xv. 314; and *Ann. Reg.* 1810, 255, 256.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1809, 255, 256. *Parl. Deb.* xv. 314.

(4) Exports from Great Britain, declared value.

1806.	. . . i	L. 40,874,983
1807.	37,245,877
1808.	37,275,102
1809.	47,371,393
1810.	48,438,680
1811.	32,890,712
1812.	41,716,964

1813 Records destroyed by fire.

—*Porter's Prog. of Nations*, ii. 98.

ment. Unhappily the elections for Congress took place during this whirlwind of passion, and such was the ascendancy which the democratic party acquired in the legislature from this circumstance, that it was plain that all hopes of an accommodation were at an end. Mr. Jackson continued, however, at the American capital, striving to allay the prevailing indignation, and renew the negotiation where Mr. Erskine had left it off; but it was all in vain; and after a stormy discussion of twenty-five days in the House of Representatives, it was determined, by a great majority, to break off all communication with the British envoy; and Mr. Pinckney, the American envoy in London, was directed to request the recall of Mr. Jackson, whose firmness the American government found themselves unable to overcome; and this was at once acceded to by the British administration. And on the 10th August, Mr. Madison formally announced by proclamation, that as "England had disavowed the acts of its minister, the commerce which had been renewed with that country, on the supposition that the orders in council were repealed, must be again subjected to the whole operation of the non-intercourse acts which had been suspended (1)."

Neither
France nor
England
will repeal
their ob-
noxious
decrees.

Meanwhile the maritime dispute, so far as the orders in council and decrees of Napoléon were concerned, seemed to be reduced, as between America and both these powers, to a mere point of etiquette who should give in first. England had constantly declared, both in diplomatic notes and speeches by her ministers in parliament, that the orders in council were retaliatory measures only; and that as soon as the French Emperor would recall the Berlin and Milan decrees, they should be repealed. On the other hand, Napoléon formally declared through M. Champagny, that "if England recalls her blockade of France, the Emperor will recall his blockade of England; if England withdraws her orders in council of 11th November 1807, the Milan decree will fall of itself." And to complete the whole, America had already solemnly stated in the non-intercourse act, and Mr. Madison had acted in terms of it by his declaration of 19th April 1809, that, if either France or England would repeal their obnoxious decrees, the non-intercourse would immediately cease with respect to the country making such concession. And this assurance was again renewed by the American legislature, in a bill brought forward in January 1810, which passed by a large majority. It seems difficult to account, therefore, for the continued adherence to the rigorous system of maritime warfare on the part of either of the belligerent powers, and especially of Great Britain, which had such vital commercial interests at stake in adjusting matters with America, and so little to gain either in honour or profit from a contest with that power. But notwithstanding all this, the misunderstanding seemed to increase rather than diminish; and on March 1st, Mr. Pinckney, in a formal audience, took leave of the Prince Regent, not without, on his own admission, the most emphatic expressions on the part of his royal highness, of a wish to restore amicable relations with the United States (2).

Affair of
the Little
Belt and
President.

After this, it was generally thought a rupture with America was inevitable: and so entirely were the Americans of this opinion, that the intercourse with France was openly renewed, and the American harbours filled with French vessels, which were, for the most part, fitted out as privateers, and did considerable mischief to British shipping.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1810, 258. 261. Big. viii. 399, 400, 408.

(2) Champagny to Mr. Armstrong, Aug. 22, 1809; Big. vi. 414, 416. Ann. Reg. 180.

Matters seemed to be brought to a point, by a collision which soon after took place between a British and American ship of war. On the 16th May, a most gallant officer, Captain Bingham, in the *Little Belt*, of eighteen guns, fell in with the American frigate *President*, of forty-four. The latter gave chase to the former, without either apparently being well aware to what nation the other belonged; and when they were within hail, each party asked the other to what nation they belonged; but before an answer could be received, or at least heard, the American frigate fired a broadside, which was immediately returned. The action now went on with great vigour on both sides, and was maintained with the most heroic valour by the British against such fearful odds for half an hour, when, in a suspension of a few seconds, the hailing was renewed, and as soon as it was understood what they were, both ships drew off, and the action ceased. Captain Rodgers, of the *President*, next morning sent a polite message to Captain Bingham, regretting what had occurred, and offering all assistance in his power, which was declined, and each ship returned to their respective harbours; the *Little Belt* had thirty-two men killed and wounded. The official accounts of the own commanders, as is usual in such cases, differed as to which began the action, each alleging that the other fired the first shot; but in this matter there is an article of real evidence, which seems decisive; it is hardly credible that a sloop with eighteen guns and one hundred and twenty-two men, would provoke a contest with a frigate of forty-four, manned by four hundred (1).*

Threatening aspect of the negotiation.

Notwithstanding this collision, the gallantry displayed in which by Captain Bingham and his crew excited a strong national feeling in Great Britain, and proportionally exasperated the Americans, the English government made one more attempt to adjust the differences between the two countries, by sending out Mr. Foster as envoy plenipotentiary to the United States. The affairs of the Chesapeake and the *Little Belt* were easily adjusted, and in fact constituted complete sets-off against each other, as both had originated in the larger vessel attacking the smaller to enforce the right of search; and both were satisfactorily arranged, by each government disclaiming that right when exercised by the armed vessel of one nation against an armed vessel of another. The seizure of the *Floridas* by America, which had recently before taken place during the distracted state of Spain, to which it belonged, was justified by the Americans on the ground that it was an appendage of Louisiana, which they had acquired by purchase; and it was proposed to discuss the title with the Spanish government, as soon as it should be re-established. More serious subjects of difference arose in the right of search, strenuously insisted for by the British government, and as stoutly resisted by the American; and the orders in council, which the British government still declined to recall, and the revocation of which the Americans, with reason, maintained was an indispensable preliminary to any accommodation. So little favourable, in the close of the year, was the aspect of the negotiation, that the President's speech, in December, to Congress, contained a recommendation to raise ten thousand regular troops and fifty thousand militia; and the vehement temper of the legislature so far outstripped the more measured march of the executive, that the numbers voted were, by a majority of one hundred and nine to twenty-two, increased to twenty-five thousand regular troops, and it was agreed to raise an immediate loan of ten millions of dollars (2).

(1) James, vi. 8, 11. Cooper's Naval Hist. i. 142, 144. Ann. Reg. 1811, 152, 153.

(2) See the Correspondence in Ann. Reg. 1811, 153, 157; and for 1812, 193.

Violent
measures
of Con-
gress pre-
paratory
to a war.

The object of the Americans in thus precipitating hostilities, was to secure the capture of the homeward-bound West India fleet, which was expected to cross the Atlantic in May or June, before the British government was so far aware of their designs as to have prepared convoy; and they made no doubt, that on the first appearance of an American force the whole of Canada would, as a matter of course, fall into their hands.

April 3. With this view, in the beginning of April, a general embargo was laid by Congress upon all the vessels in the harbours of the United States for ninety days; a measure which they hoped would at once prevent intelligence of their preparations from reaching Great Britain, and furnish themselves with the means, from their extensive commercial navy, of manning their vessels of war. The better to work the representatives up to the desired point of fermentation, the President soon after laid before them copies of certain

May 9. documents found on a Captain Henry, who had been dispatched by Sir James Craig, governor of Canada, into Massachusetts, without the knowledge of the government at home; and to such a pitch were they transported, that a bill was brought into Congress, and seriously entertained, the object of which was to declare every person *a pirate*, and punishable with death, who, under pretence of a commission from any foreign power, should impress upon the high seas any native of the United States; and gave every such impressed seaman a right to attach, in the hands of *any* British subject, or of *any debtor* to *any* British subject, a sum equal to thirty dollars a-month during the whole period of his detention. This violent bill, worthy of the worst days of the French Revolution, actually passed a third reading of the House of Representatives, and was only lost in the Senate (1).

June 18.
War de-
clared by
America,
though the
orders in
Council are
repealed.

When such was the temper of the ruling party in the United States, it is unnecessary to follow out ulterior measures, or discuss the objects of complaint ostensibly put forth as the cause of the war. On the 18th of June an act passed both houses, by a majority of 79 to 49, declaring the actual existence of war between Great Britain and America; and hostilities were immediately ordered to be commenced. Nor did the American government make any attempt to recede from these hostile acts, when intelligence arrived a few weeks after this resolution, and before war had commenced, that, by an order in council, the British government had actually *repealed the previous orders*, so that the

June 23. ostensible ground of complaint against this country was removed (2). Great events were about to take place when the Americans thus thrust themselves into the contest: three days after, Wellington crossed the Agueda to commence the Salamanca campaign: six days after, Napoléon passed the Niemen on his march to Moscow. No cause of complaint or hostility now remained; for although the right of search exercised by the British, in conformity with the common maritime law of nations, may have afforded a fit subject for remonstrance and adjustment, it was no ground for immediate hostilities. But on war they were determined, and to war they went. And thus had America, the greatest Republic in existence, and which had ever proclaimed its attachment to the cause of freedom in all nations, the disgrace of going to war with Great Britain, then the last refuge of liberty in the civilized world, when their only ground of complaint against it had been removed; and of allying their arms with those of France, at that very moment commencing its unjust crusade against Russia, and straining

(1) Ann. Reg. 1812, 195. 197.

(2) *Ante*, viii. 52.

every nerve to crush in the old world the last vestige of continental independence (1).

Diminutive scale of the American preparations for war. When the ruling party in America was thus resolved, *per fas aut nefas*, to plunge into a war with England, it may naturally be asked, what preparations had they made for sustaining a contest with that formidable power? They knew that Great Britain was the greatest maritime power in existence; that she had a hundred ships of the line in commission, and that a thousand ships of war bore the royal flag; they were aware that her armies had conquered a vast dominion in India, and long measured swords on equal terms in the Peninsula with the conqueror of continental Europe. They had been preparing for the war for four years; since 1807, such had been the difference between them and the English government, that their intercourse with Great Britain had been almost entirely suspended. Almost all their trading vessels, several thousand in number, were at sea, and lay exposed in every quarter of the globe to the innumerable cruisers and privateers of the enemy whom they were thus anxious to provoke. What preparations, then, had a Republic, numbering eight millions of souls within its territory, so vehemently bent on war, and having had so many years to muster its forces, actually made for a contest of the most impassioned character with such a naval and military power? Why, they had four frigates and eight sloops in commission, and their whole naval force afloat in ordinary, and building for the ocean and the Canadian lakes, was eight frigates and twelve sloops; while their military force amounted to the stupendous number of twenty-four thousand soldiers, not one half of whom were yet disciplined, or in a condition to take the field (2).

Reflections on this circumstance. It is hard to say whether this extraordinary want of foresight, and sway of passion, in the American people and government, or the great things which, with such inconsiderable means, they actually did during the war, are the most worthy of meditation. It demonstrates, on the one hand, how marvellous is the *insouciance* and want of consideration in democratic communities; how blindly they rush into war, without any preparation either to ensure its success or avert its danger; how obstinately they resist all propositions in time of peace to incur even the most inconsiderable immediate burdens to guard against future calamity; how vehemently, at the same time, they can be actuated by the warlike passions; and with what force, when so excited, they impel their government into the perilous chances of arms without the slightest preparation, and when calamity, wide spread and unbounded, is certain to follow the adoption of a measure thus wholly unprovided for. On the other hand, the gallant and extraordinary achievements, both of the American navy and army, during the contest which followed, are no less worthy of consideration, as demonstrating how far individual energy and valour can overcome the most serious difficulties, and the tendency of democratic institutions to compensate by the vigour they communicate to the people, the consequences of the debility and want of foresight which they imprint upon the government.

Invasion of Canada by General Hull, and his surrender. The first exploits of the American army, though such as might naturally have been expected from the total want of preparation on the part of their government or people for a war, were, nevertheless, very different from what the noisy democrats who had driven the nation into it had anticipated. Early in July, General Hull invaded Upper Canada with a force of two thousand eight hundred men, having

(1) Ann. Reg. 1812, 196, 197. Cooper, 172.

(2) Cooper, Hist. of American Navy, ii. 167, 140

crossed the St.-Lawrence at Detroit, and marched to Sandwich, in that province. He there issued a proclamation, in which he expressed entire confidence of success, and threatened a war of extermination if the savages were employed in resisting the invasion. His next operations were directed against Fort Amherstburg, but he was repulsed in three different attempts to cross the river Canard, on which it stands; and General Brock, having collected a force of seven hundred British regulars and militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians, not only relieved that fort, but compelled Hull to retire to Fort Detroit, on the American side of the St.-Lawrence, where he was soon

Aug. 16. after invested by General Brock. Batteries having been constructed, and a fire opened, preparations were made for an assault; to prevent which General Hull capitulated with two thousand five hundred men and thirty-three pieces of cannon—a proud trophy to have been taken, with the fort of Detroit, by a British force of no more than seven hundred men, including militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians (1).

Armistice on the frontiers, which is disavowed by the American Government, and dissatisfaction it excites. This early and glorious success had the most powerful effect in increasing the spirit and energy of the militia of Upper Canada, the inhabitants of which, of British origin, and strongly animated with patriotic and national feelings, had taken up arms universally to repel the hated invasion of their republican neighbours. An armistice was soon after agreed to between Sir George Prevost, the British governor of Canada, and General Dearborn, the American commander-in-chief on the northern frontier, in the hope that the repeal of the orders in council, of which intelligence had now been received, would, by removing the only real ground of quarrel between the two countries, have led to a termination of hostilities. But in this hope, how reasonable soever, they were disappointed; the American government, impelled by the democratic constituencies, had not yet abandoned their visions of Canadian conquest, and they not only disavowed the armistice, but determined upon a vigorous prosecution of the contest. As this determination, however, unveiled the real motives which had led to the war, and demonstrated that the orders in council had been a mere pretext, it gave rise to the most violent dissatisfaction in the northern provinces of the Union, who were likely, from their dependence upon British commerce, to be the greatest sufferers by the contest. So far did this proceed, that many memorials were addressed to the President from these states, in which they set forth, that they contemplated with abhorrence an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life had been an attempt to effect the extinction of all vestiges of freedom; that the repeal of the orders in council had removed the only legitimate object of complaint against the British government; and that, if any attempts were made to introduce French troops into the United States, they would regard them as enemies (2). Nor were these declarations confined

(1) Ann. Reg. 1812, 199. Gen. Brock's Desp. Aug. 16, 1812. Ibid. App. to Chron. 243.

The operations of the war in Canada may be traced by the reader's consulting any of the maps of that province; particularly those in Wild's General Atlas, by far the best, both for that contest and the war in France in 1814, which have fallen under the author's observation.

(2) "On the subject of any French connexion we have made up our minds. We will in no event assist in uniting the Republic of America with the military despotism of France. We will have no connexion with her principles or her power. If her armed troops, under whatever name or character, should come here, we will regard them as enemies."

—Memorial from Rockingham in New Hampshire, 15th September 1812.

"We are constrained to consider the determination to persist in the war, after official notice of the revocation of the British order in council had been received, as a proof that it was undertaken on motives entirely distinct from those hitherto avowed; and we contemplate with abhorrence the possibility even of an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life has demonstrated that the attainment, by any means, of universal empire, and the consequent extinction of every vestige of freedom, are the sole objects of his incessant, unbounded, and remorseless ambition."

—Resolutions of Thirty-four Cities and Counties of

Canada, by crossing the St.-Lawrence, between Chippewa and Fort Erie, with about five hundred men; but they were received in so vigorous a manner by a small British detachment under Colonel Bishop, that they
 Nov. 22. were repulsed with severe loss. About the same time, General Dearborn commenced a systematic invasion of Lower Canada; but the militia and regular forces of that province, under General Prevost, turned out with such alacrity, and in such formidable numbers, that he withdrew without making any serious progress, and put his army into winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Plattsburg. Thus the invasion of the Canadas, from which the Americans expected so much, and from the hopes of which they had mainly engaged in the war, terminated this year in nothing but discomfiture and disgrace (1).

Success of the Americans at sea. But if the Americans were unsuccessful on one element, they met with extraordinary and unlooked-for triumphs on another; which excited the greater sensation, that they shook the general belief that at that time prevailed of British invincibility at sea, and opened up, to the jealousy of other nations at our commercial greatness, hopes of its overthrow at no distant period.

Actions at sea. Capture of the Guerrière by the Constitution. June 21. The first action which took place after war was declared, was between the British frigate *Belvidera*, and American frigate *President*. The British vessel, commanded by Captain Byrn, was in charge of a large fleet of West India merchantmen on their way home, and Captain Rogers came up with her on the 18th June, with a squadron of three frigates and two sloops, which immediately gave chase, and a running fight ensued which lasted for a whole day, each party losing two-and-twenty men; but the result was favourable to the British, whose guns were pointed with great skill, and produced a surprizing effect, as the American squadron failed in taking the single English frigate, and the whole merchantmen escaped untouched. After a cruise of seventy days, the American squadron returned to port, having only captured seven merchantmen in that time, although they fell upon the British commerce when wholly unaware
 July 17 of impending hostilities. Shortly after, the *Constitution* was
 and 18. chased by a squadron of British frigates, headed by the *Africa* of sixty-four guns, and escaped after a most interesting chase, in which great skill and ability were displayed on both sides. But in the next action the result was very different. The *Constitution* fell in on the 19th August
 Aug. 19. with the *Guerrière*, Captain Decres, and a most obstinate action took place. The American frigate was decidedly superior, both in the number and weight of its guns, and the number of its crew (2); but notwithstanding that disadvantage, Captain Decres maintained a close fight, yard-arm to yard-arm, for upwards of an hour with his formidable antagonist. At the end of that time, however, his vessel was a perfect wreck, wholly dismantled, rolling about in the trough of a tempestuous sea, incapable of making any further resistance, with seventy-nine men killed and wounded, and thirty shots in the hull below water-mark; while the *Consti-*

(1) Christie, 65, 68. Ann. Reg. 1813, 177, 178.

(2) The relative force on the two sides was as follows:—

	<i>Guerrière.</i>	<i>Constitution.</i>
Broadside guns. . . .	24	28
Weight in lbs., . . .	517	768
Crew,	244	460
Tons,	1092	1533

—JAMES, vi. 104, and COOPER, ii. 199, 200.

“Captain Decres,” says the American annalist,

“lost no professional reputation by his defeat: he had handled his ship in a manner to win the applause of his enemies, fought her gallantly, and only submitted when further resistance would have been as culpable as in fact it was impossible. That the *Constitution* was a larger and heavier ship than the *Guerrière*, will be disputed by no nautical men, though less it is believed than might be inferred from their respective rates; but the great inferiority of the *Guerrière* was in her men.”

—COOPER, ii. 199, 201.

tution had only seven killed and as many wounded. In these circumstances further resistance was evidently hopeless, and the English colours were mournfully lowered to the broad pendant of their emancipated offspring (1).

Hardly had the English recovered from the shock of this unwonted naval disaster, when other blows of the same description succeeded each other with stunning rapidity. On the night of the 16th October, the Frolic British sloop of eighteen guns fell in with the American brig Wasp of the same number of guns, but considerably superior both in weight of metal, tonnage, and crew (2). The crew of the Frolic were labouring to repair their rigging, which had been severely damaged the day before in a gale, when the action commenced, and was kept up with equal skill and spirit on both sides; but the rigging of the Frolic was in so shattered a condition from the effect of the previous storm, that in ten minutes she lay an unmanageable log in the water, which gave her opponent such an advantage, that in twenty minutes more she was compelled to strike. This disaster, however, except in so far as the moral influence of the triumph to the American arms was concerned, was speedily repaired; for a few hours after the action, the Poitiers of seventy-four guns hove in sight, and at once captured the Wasp and recaptured the Frolic, the captain of which, in just testimony of his valour, was continued in the command (3).

But a more serious disaster soon occurred. On the 25th October, the American frigate United States hove in sight of the British frigate Macedonian. As usual on all these occasions, the American vessel was superior by about a half in tonnage, crew, and weight of guns (4). From the very commencement of the combat, which for some time was at long shot only, it was evident that the Americans were cutting the British to pieces with comparatively little loss on their side; and when at length the English commander succeeded in engaging the enemy in close fight, which Commodore Decatur of the United States willingly joined in, the superiority of the enemy's fire was such, that the Macedonian was soon dismasted—she had received nearly a hundred shots in her hull, and her lower tier of guns, owing to the rolling of the vessel in a tempestuous sea, were under water; while a third of her crew were killed or wounded. On the other hand, the American vessel, having no sail which she could not set except her mizen topsail, remained perfectly steady. Even in these desperate circumstances, however, the native spirit of British seamen did not desert them: as a last resource, an attempt was made to carry the enemy by boarding, and the moment this intention was announced, every man was on deck, several of whom had lost an arm but a few minutes before in the cockpit; and the universal cry was, "Let us conquer or die." At this moment, however, the fore brace was shot away, and the yard swinging round, threw the vessel upon the wind, so that boarding was impossible. The United States then stood athwart the bows of the Macedonian without firing a gun, and passed on out of shot; and it was at first supposed she was making off by the British sailors, who loudly cheered; but this was only to refill her

(1) Captain Deeres' Account, Ann. Reg. 1812, 249, App. to Chron. James, vi. 105. Cooper, ii. 172, 201.

(3) James, vi. 109, 112. Cooper, ii. 208, 211.

Macedonian. United States.

	Frolic.	Wasp.
(2) Guns, broadside, . . .	9	9
Crew,	92	135
Tons,	384	434

(4) Broadside guns, . . .	24	28
Weight of broadside, lbs. . .	528	864
Crew, men only, . . .	254 (35 boys)	474
Tons,	1081	1535

—JAMES, vi. 112.

—JAMES, vi. 119, and COOPER, ii. 206.

cartridges, which had been expended, and soon tacking, she took up a raking position across the stern of her now defenceless antagonist, and soon compelled her to strike her colours. The superiority of the American force, as well as her weight of metal, was then very apparent; for while the Macedonian had thirty-six killed and sixty-eight wounded, the United States had only five killed and seven badly wounded (1).

Nor was this the last of the discomfitures which at this period befell the British navy. The Java, forty-six guns, had sailed from Spithead on the 12th November, with a motley crew of 297 persons, nearly one-half of whom were wholly inexperienced; and, on the 28th, they discharged six broadsides of blank cartridges, being the first that the majority of the crew had ever assisted in firing. Captain Lambert, who commanded her, had warmly remonstrated against this wretched crew, declaring that with such people he was not only no match for an American of superior, but hardly for a Frenchman of equal size; but all the answer he got from the Admiralty was, that "a voyage to the East Indies and back would make a good crew." Obligated to submit, the English captain set sail, and, on the Dec. 29. 28th December, fell in with the American frigate Constitution;

and, notwithstanding the superior bulk and weight of his antagonist (2), and the wretched condition of his crew, Captain Lambert immediately made up to the enemy, although nineteen of his men were away with a prize he had shortly before made. The Constitution at first stood away under all sail before the wind, to gain the distance at which the American gunnery was so destructive; but finding the British frigate gained upon her, she shortened sail, and placing herself under the lee bow of the Java, a close action immediately commenced. The first broadside of the English frigate told with such effect on the American hull, than the latter wore to get away; but the skilful Englishman wore also, and a running fight ensued for a considerable time, during which Captain Lambert's superiority of seamanship was very apparent (3).

After a desultory engagement of this sort for forty minutes, during which the Java, notwithstanding the superior weight of the enemy's metal, had suffered very little, the two vessels came within pistol-shot, and a most determined action ensued. Captain Lambert now resolved on boarding; but just as he was making preparations for doing so, the foremast of the Java fell with a tremendous crash, breaking in the fore-castle and covering the deck, and soon after the main-topmast came down also, and, to complete their misfortunes, Captain Lambert fell, mortally wounded. The command now devolved on Lieutenant Chads; but he found the vessel perfectly unmanageable, and the wreck of the masts falling over on one side, almost every discharge set the vessel on fire. Still the action continued with the most determined resolution; but at length, after it had lasted three hours and a-half, the Java was found to be rapidly sinking, while the Constitution had assumed a raking position, where every shot told, and not a gun could be brought to bear on her. In these desperate circumstances, Lieutenant

(1) Captain Cadin's Desp. Oct. 28, 1812. Ann. Reg. 255. App. to Chron. James, vi. 113, 117. Cooper, ii. 205, 207.

(2) Comparative force of the two vessels:—

	Java.	Constitution.
Broadside guns,	24	28
Weight—lbs.,	517	768
Crew—men only,	344	460
Tons,	1092	1533

—JAMES, vi. 404 and 434; and COOPER, ii. 225

"The same peculiarity," says Cooper, "attended this combat as had distinguished the two other cases of frigate actions. In all the three the American vessels were superior to their antagonists; but in all three the difference in execution was exactly disproportioned to the disparity in force."—ii. 225.

(3) Brenton, ii. 461. Ann. Reg. 1312. for 1812. James, vi. 128, 129. Cooper. ii. 219, 220.

Chads at length struck; and the vessel was so disabled that, as soon as the crew were taken out, the American captain blew her up. In this desperate and most unequal engagement, the Java had twenty-two killed and one hundred and two wounded; the Constitution ten killed and forty wounded. Captain Bainbridge sullied the glory of his triumph by unmanly and ungenerous treatment of the seamen made prisoners, whom he handcuffed, and robbed of every thing they possessed, though he treated the officers most generously (1); a conduct which afforded a striking contrast to that of Captain Hull of the Constitution, and Captain Decatur of the United States, who treated their prisoners of all ranks with the courtesy which is ever the accompaniment of heroic minds (2).

The Peacock taken by the Hornet. Another action between smaller vessels, but terminating in the same results, took place on the 14th February 1815, between the British sloop Peacock and the American brig Hornet. In this, as in all the previous instances where the Americans had proved successful, the superiority on their side was very decided (3); but the action which ensued was, nevertheless, of the most bloody and destructive kind. It lasted an hour and a half; but, at the end of which time, the effect of the American's fire was so tremendous, that the Peacock was found to be in a sinking state. A signal of distress was immediately hoisted, which was answered with praiseworthy humanity by the brave Americans, and every effort was made by the crews of both vessels to save the sinkingship; but notwithstanding all their efforts she went down in a few minutes, with thirteen of her own crew and three of the Hornet's, who were engaged in the noble act of striving to save their enemies (4).

Prodigious moral effect of these victories. No words can convey an adequate idea of the impression which the successive capture of these three frigates and two sloops made, not only in Great Britain and America, but over the whole civilized world. The triumphs of the British navy, for above a century, had been so uninterrupted, and the moral influence they had in consequence acquired had become so prodigious, that it was generally believed both at home and abroad that they were invincible, and that no other nation had any chance of success in combating them on the ocean, but by the most decided superiority of force. When, therefore, it was seen that in repeated instances of combats of single vessels of the same class against each other, the ships of the United States had proved victorious, the English were stunned as by the shock of an earthquake, the Americans were immeasurably, and with good reason, elated, and the other nations in Europe thought they discerned at last the small black cloud arising over the ocean which was to involve the British maritime power in destruction. The majority of men in the Continental States, ever governed by the event, and incapable of just discrimination, took no trouble to enquire whether or not the vessels opposed to each other had been equally matched, but joined in one universal chorus of exultation at the defeat of a nation which had so long been the object of

(1) Brentnall, ii. 460, 462. James, vi. 127, 137. Cooper, ii. 220, 224. Lieut. Chads' Account, Dec. 31, 1812. Ann. Reg. 1813, 132. App. to Chron.

(2) The heroism displayed on both sides in this action never was surpassed. A midshipman, Mr Keele, a boy thirteen years of age, had his leg shot away, and suffered amputation. He anxiously enquired, after the action was over, whether the vessel had struck, and seeing a ship's colour spread over him, the little hero grew uneasy till he saw it was an English flag. He died next day. The boatswain, Mr. Humble, had had his hand shot away, and he

was wounded above the elbow; but no sooner was the tourniquet put on than he hastened on deck to cheer his comrades with his pipe in boarding.

(3) Comparative force of the combatants :—

	Peacock.	Hornet.
Broadside guns, . . .	9	10
Weight—lbs. . . .	192	297
Crew—men only, . .	110	162
Tons,	386	460

—JAMES, vi. 193.

(4) James, vi. 193. Cooper, ii. 227, 228.

their avowed dread and secret jealousy. And it was generally said, apparently not without reason, that a naval power which, with the command only of four frigates and eight sloops, had in so short a time achieved such successes, might look forward at no distant period, when its navy was enlarged, to wresting from Great Britain the sceptre of the ocean (1).

Reflections on the causes which gave rise to them. In truth, this succession of disasters, like all calamities which occur in such numbers together as to be obviously beyond the effect of chance, gave much subject for serious reflection, not merely to the heedless multitude, but to the reflecting statesmen. It was now painfully evident that the English were not invincible on their favourite element; that foresight in preparation, as well as energy in action, were necessary to sustain their fortunes; and that, if these were neglected, they had no exemption from the common lot of humanity. All the world saw indeed to what cause the disasters had been owing. The British government, maintaining a hundred ships of the line, and five hundred smaller vessels actually in commission, and carrying on war at once in every quarter of the globe, could not by possibility man their vessels with the same picked and skilled crews as the Americans, who had merely a few frigates and sloops to fit out from the resources of a great commercial navy. The frigates and brigs of the United States, built with extraordinary skill and in a peculiar manner, to which there was no parallel in the British navy, were at once too swift sailers to be overtaken by ships of the line, and of too heavy metal to be a fair match for frigates nominally of the same class. This peculiarity in the constitution of their vessels had been wholly overlooked by the Admiralty, who anticipated no danger from so diminutive a marine as that of the United States, though it was well known, and had been the subject of anxious solicitude to better-informed individuals in the community (2). But admitting the full weight of these circumstances, it was plain that a new era in naval warfare had arisen, since the English came to contend with their Anglo-Saxon brethren on the other side of the Atlantic. The very fact of the comparison which they so anxiously instituted with their American antagonists, and the superiority on the part of the latter, in weight of metal and strength of crews, in the encounters which had taken place, which they justly pointed out, afforded decisive proof of this: with the French and Spaniards, they had been accustomed to look only to the class of vessels, and never to count guns. In seamanship, the British sailors, inured to the storms of every quarter of the globe, might justly claim an equality with the Americans similarly instructed, and a superiority to the mariners of any other country in the globe; but in the practice of gunnery, especially at a distance, it was very evident that they were, at that moment, their inferiors; and experience had now proved, that long-continued and unexampled success had produced its wonted effect in relaxing the bands of British naval preparation; and that they had much need to recollect, that in the language of the ancient conquerors of the world, the word for an *army* was derived from the verb to *exerceise* (3).

In this, as in other cases, however, it soon appeared, that as much as unbroken prosperity is pernicious, so occasional disaster is beneficial to na-

(1) Cooper, ii. 197. Ann. Reg. 1812, 108, 109.

(2) In 1808, four years before the American war broke out, the author well recollects hearing his uncle, the late Dr. Gregory of Edinburgh, say, "The Americans are building long forty-six gun frigates, which really carry fifty-six or sixty guns; when our forty-fours come to meet them, you will hear something new some of these days." In England,

as in every constitutional monarchy, the intelligence and information of enlightened individuals often precede those of government or public functionaries. If the direction of affairs could be confined to such men, or those whom they can influence, no wise man would object to the widest extension of the elective franchise.

(3) *Exercitus*, from *exerceo*, to exercise.

Vigorous efforts made in England to repair the disasters.

tions, provided only that the patriotic spirit is not extinct in their members, or the generous feelings buried under the weight of selfish indulgences. The officers who had commanded in the vessels which had been taken were all tried by court-martial, honourably acquitted, and immediately after employed anew. This was going to work in the right spirit; there was no attempt to select a second Byng to be the expiatory victim for popular clamour or ministerial neglect. The most vigorous efforts were made by the Admiralty, at once to strengthen the squadrons on the coast of America, and fit out single ships, which might, from their size, crews, and weight of metal, really be a match for the gigantic frigates which the United States had sent forth to prowl through the deep. Several vessels were commenced on the model of the American frigates and sloops, which had been found by experience so swift-sailing and formidable in action; and secret instructions were given to the commanders of vessels on the North American station, not to hazard an encounter with an opponent nominally of the same class, unless there was something like a *real* as well as an apparent equality between them. Greater care was, at the same time, taken in the selection of crews; a larger proportion of men was given to the cannon on board; and orders were issued for the frequent exercise of the men in ball practice, both with small arms and great guns; a point of vital importance in naval warfare, but which had hitherto been in an unaccountable manner neglected, with a very few exceptions, in all the departments in the British navy (1).

The good effects of these efforts, and supineness of the American Government. The good effects of the improvements speedily appeared in the next naval actions which ensued. Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded on the North American station, established a vigilant blockade of the harbours of the United States; their commerce was soon entirely ruined, the immense carrying trade they had so long conducted, slipped from their hands (2); and such was the consequence of this upon their national finances, which depended almost entirely on custom-house duties, that the public revenue had sunk, since the war had commenced, from twenty-four millions of dollars annually, to eight millions. Paralyzed in this manner, in the sinews of war, by the first results of the contest, the American government were in no condition to augment their expenditure; and, notwithstanding the enthusiasm which their glorious successes had excited in the country, no attempt was made by Congress during the year 1812 to increase their naval force. In the beginning of the next year, however, they passed two acts, the one authorizing the building of four 74 gun ships, and four of 44: and in March, six additional sloops were ordered to be built for the ocean; and for the lakes, as many as the public service might require. But a very considerable period might be expected to elapse before these vessels could be ready for sea, and mean time their trade was destroyed and the danger imminent. On the other hand, a close blockade was maintained by the British of all their harbours: the bays of the Chesapeake

(1) James, vi. 144, 151, 196. Ann. Reg. 1813. 108, 109.

(2) Home produce, and of foreign countries, exported from America.

Years.	Foreign.	Home.	Total.
1805,	L. 11,078,964	L. 8,830,625	L. 19,909,589
1806,	12,559,006	8,594,526	21,153,552
1807,	12,425,741	10,145,747	22,571,488
1812,	1,769,817	6,256,689	8,026,506
1813,	593,301	5,220,031	5,813,322
1814,	30,243	1,412,973	1,443,216

April 29. and the Delaware were scoured by Admiral Cockburn at the head of a light squadron, appointed for that purpose, and various landings, by bodies of marines, effected along their shores (1), which, besides, doing considerable damage to the enemy's naval stores and arsenals, kept the towns on the coast in a constant state of alarm.

The Shannon and Chesapeake. Among the many officers in the British navy who ardently desired to meet even on inferior terms, but with an adequate crew, with the American forty-four gun frigates, was CAPTAIN BROKE of the Shannon. This admirable officer commanded a frigate pierced for 38 guns, but really mounting 52; and he had for many years trained the crew, whom, by admirable management, he had brought to the highest state of discipline and subordination, to the practice of ball firing. Being stationed off Boston, where the Chesapeake, under Captain Lawrence, of 49 guns, had passed the winter, Captain Broke, to render the combat equal, sent away the Tenedos, of equal strength, his consort, with instructions not to return for three weeks; and when she was fairly out of sight, he stood in to the mouth of the harbour, and sent a challenge, couched in the most courteous terms, to the Captain of the Chesapeake, stating the exact amount of his forces, and inviting him to single combat for the honour of their respective flags (2). Having dispatched this letter, Captain Broke, with colours flying, lay close in to Boston Lighthouse; and soon the Chesapeake was under way, surrounded by numerous barges and pleasure boats, which, amidst loud cheers, accompanied her some way out to what they deemed a certain victory. Captain Lawrence of the Chesapeake had not received Captain Broke's challenge when he stood out; but he was too brave a man to shun an offered combat on equal terms, and such was the confidence which the inhabitants of Boston entertained in his success, that they had prepared a public supper to greet the victors on their return, with their prisoners, to the harbour (3).

Approach of the Shannon and Chesapeake. June 1. Meanwhile, Captain Broke at the mast-head was anxiously watching the movements of the American frigate, and beheld with a thrill of delight, such as the brave only can know, first her fore-topsail, then her other topsails loosed and sheeted home, and soon after a signal gun fired, the topgallant sails loosed and set, and at length the vessel under weigh, and standing out with a light air for the bay. The order to clear for action was immediately given on board the Shannon, and as promptly obeyed; and soon the two vessels neared, the Shannon clewing up her foresail, and with her main-topsail braced flat, under a light breeze from the shore, that the Chesapeake might overtake her. The American came gallantly down with three flags flying, on one of which was inscribed, "Sailors' rights and free trade." The Shannon had an unicorn jack at the fore-mast, and an old rusty blue ensign at the mizen peak, and two other ensigns rolled up and ready to be hoisted, if either of these should be shot away. Her heavy guns were loaded alternately with two round shot and a hundred and fifty musket-balls, and with one round and one double-headed shot in each gun.

(1) Cooper, ii. 204, 205. Ann. Reg. 1813, 109.

(2) As the Chesapeake appears to be now ready for sea, I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shannon with her ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. All interruption shall be provided against. I entreat you, Sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the Chesapeake; we have both nobler motives. You will feel it as a compliment, if I say, that the result of our meeting may

be the most grateful service I can render to my country; and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in *even combat*, that you can console your country for the loss of that trade it can no longer protect. Favour me with a speedy reply; we are short of provisions and water, and cannot remain long here."—JAMES, vi. 199.

(3) James, vi. 198, 199. Cooper, ii. 284, 285.

At a quarter to six the enemy hauled up within two hundred yards of the Shannon's weather beam, and her crew gave three cheers; Captain Broke upon that harangued his men, telling them that that day would decide the superiority of British seamen, when properly trained, over those of all other nations; and that the Shannon would show how short a time the Americans had to boast when opposed to an equal force. Loud cheers followed this gallant appeal, and the two ships being now not more than a stone-throw asunder, the order was given to the crew of the Shannon to commence firing (1).

The Chesapeake is boarded.

Slowly, and with deliberate aim, the British guns were pointed, and discharged successively at the American frigate as she passed, receiving, at the same time, her broadside, which was delivered at once, and with great effect. But the Shannon's guns, admirably directed, soon injured the Chesapeake's rigging, as well as made dreadful havoc among her men; and after two or three broadsides had in this manner been exchanged, the Chesapeake, attempting to haul her foresail up, fell on board the Shannon, whose starboard bower-anchor locked with her mizen channels. In this situation the great guns ceased firing, except the Shannon's two after-most guns, thirty-two pound carronades, loaded with grape and round shot, which soon beat in the stern-ports of the Chesapeake, and sweeping the deck, drove the men from their quarters. For a few minutes a sharp fire of musketry was kept up by the marines on both sides; but ere long, Captain Broke observing that the Americans were not standing to their guns, ordered the two ships to belashed together, and the boarders to be called up from below. Mr. Stevens, the Shannon's boatswain, a veteran who had fought in Rodney's action, immediately set about making the ships fast, outside the Shannon's bulwark, and while so employed, he had his left arm, which held on to the enemy's rigging, hacked off by repeated sabre cuts from their marines, and his body mortally wounded with musketry from the tops; but, in spite of all, he had fastened the ships together with the right arm ere his hold relaxed in death!—a deed of heroism worthy of ancient Rome (2).

Desperate conflict by which she was carried.

Meanwhile, however, the brave Captain Lawrence, and several other officers in the Chesapeake were wounded, and Captain Broke, at the head of the boarders, leapt upon the Chesapeake's quarter-deck, on which scarce an American was to be seen; and the men quickly following, the seamen on the gangways, twenty-five in number, were, after a desperate struggle, overpowered or driven below; and the second party of boarders having now come forward amidst loud cheers, the hatchways were closed down, and a sharp fire opened upon the marines in the tops, who kept up a destructive discharge of musketry. The sailors from the Shannon's foreyard, headed by Mr. Smith, at the same time forced their way up to the Chesapeake's main yard, and thence to her tops, which in a few minutes were cleared. Captain Broke at this moment was furiously assailed by three American sailors who had previously submitted; he succeeded in parrying a thrust at his breast, but was immediately after knocked down by the butt-end of a musket. As he rose, he had the satisfaction of seeing, in his own words, "the American flag hauled down, and the proud old British Union floating triumphantly over it." So rapid was the action, that fifteen minutes only elapsed from the time the first gun was fired, till the Chesapeake was entirely in the hands of the British. Unhappily, Lieutenant Watt, who hauled down the

(1) James, ii. 202. Cooper, ii. 287.

(2) James, ii. 202, 203. Brent, ii. 491, Cooper,

ii. 287. Captain Broke's Desp. Ann. Reg. 1812, 185. App. to Chron.

enemy's colours, not having immediately succeeded in hoisting the British above it, was killed, with two of his men, by a discharge of musketry from the Shannon's marines, in the belief that the conflict still continued. Yet, in this short period, the Chesapeake had sustained a loss of forty-seven killed and ninety-eight wounded; a dreadful proof of the admirable training in the use of their arms, both small and great, which the Shannon's people had received. Her own loss had also been severe: it amounted to twenty-four killed, and fifty-nine wounded (1).

Great moral effect of this victory. Perhaps no single combat between vessels of war ever produced so great a moral impression as this did, both in the United States and the British Islands. The Americans had fallen into the fault of the British, and began to think themselves, from their extraordinary success, invincible in naval warfare: the English, unaccustomed to disasters at sea, had almost begun to fear that their long career of glory on the ocean was drawing to a close, when they sustained such repeated shocks from a maritime force so diminutive as that of the United States. Proportionally great was the despondency on one side and joy on the other, when the result of this action, where an equality for the first time obtained between the combatants, and due attention had been paid in both cases to their training, explained at once to what causes the former disasters had been owing. The effect in restoring public confidence in Great Britain in the efficiency of the navy was immense, and the feelings of every right thinking man in the country went along with government when they made Captain Broke a baronet. The brave victor brought his prize, amidst the loud cheers of the inhabitants and sailors in the harbour, who manned every spar of their vessels, into Halifax, where the lamented Captain Lawrence soon after breathed his last, and was buried with military honours in presence of all the British officers on the station, who uncovered as their noble antagonist was lowered into the grave (2).

Combats of lesser vessels. The Boxer and Enterprize, the Pelican and Argus. Sept. 5. No long period elapsed before it appeared from other detached combats, of which alone this naval warfare admitted, that the old superiority of the British navy remained unimpaired. The British brig Boxer, of fourteen guns and sixty-six men, was indeed taken by the American brig Enterprize, of sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men; the former defect of inadequate manning having paralyzed all the efforts of devoted valour, which proved fatal to the commanders of both vessels, who were killed during its continuance; but on the next occasion, when any thing like equality of force existed, the result was in favour of the British. On the 14th August the Pelican, British brig of eighteen guns, met the American brig Argus, of twenty; and as the crew of the latter was somewhat superior, and the broadside weight of metal a little in favour of the former, the combatants were very nearly matched (3). The action soon became extremely warm, and before it had lasted many minutes Captain Allen of the Argus was severely wounded, and the rigging of his vessel so much cut up that the command of it was lost. At

(1) Cooper, ii. 289, 290. Brenton, ii. 492, 493. James, vi. 202, 205. Captain Broke's Desp. Ann. Reg. 1812, 185.

Comparative force of the combatants.

	Shannon.	Chesapeake.
Broadside guns,	25	25
Weight in lbs.,	538	590
Crew. Men only,	306	376

—JAMES, vi. 209.

(2) Cooper, ii. 294, 293. James, vi. 209.

	Pelican.	Argus.
(3) Broadside guns,	9	10
Weight in lbs.,	262	228
Crew, men only,	101	122
Tons,	385	316

—JAMES, vi. 223; and COOPER, ii. 308.

length, after a gallant resistance, the Pelican succeeded in raking the Argus, and shortly after carried her by boarding. The Argus had six killed and eighteen wounded : the Pelican two killed and five wounded. This action was the more remarkable, that it took place off St.-David's in the mouth of the Irish channel (1).

Various operations were undertaken this summer in the bay of Chesapeake, by the British squadron under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren, but they were not attended with any remarkable success. An attack on Crancy Island, which the Americans had fortified, failed, from the water being found too shallow, when the boats approached the shore, to admit of the troops being landed : but some gallant boat enterprises against schooners of the enemy had previously proved successful. The British were consoled for this check by the victorious issue of an attack

made by Sir Sidney Beckwith, with a strong body of marines, on an American post and battery at Hampton, which was quickly stormed two days after, and all its guns taken ; some acts of violence were committed on the inhabitants, during the heat of the assault, which gave rise to much acrimonious feeling in the United States. Shortly after, two fine brigs, the

Anaconda and Atlas, the former of ten, the latter of eighteen guns, were taken in Ocracoke harbour by the boats and marines of the squadron

under Lieutenant Westphal ; and Captain Fleury in the Martin, who had grounded in the Delaware, most gallantly beat off an attack by a cloud of American gun-boats, and at length, when the tide rose, made off with one as his prize, to the great mortification of the crowd on shore, who had hastened to witness what they deemed a certain victory. The American squadron of frigates put to sea from New York, but was speedily pursued by the British squadron of superior strength, and blockaded in New London. Upon the whole, although the operations in the Chesapeake and Delaware bays were not attended with any great results, yet they had the effect of completely destroying the trade of the most flourishing harbours in the United States ; and sensibly demonstrated to the people the folly of the war in which they had engaged, in which, without the slightest hope of territorial aggrandizement, they were undergoing the realities of naval blockade, national insult, and commercial ruin (2).

The operations by land during the year 1813 were conducted on a greater scale than in the preceding campaign, and though they terminated, upon the whole, gloriously for the British arms, yet the contest was more bloody, and success more various. The absorbing interest of the contest, yet doubtful and undecided, in the Peninsula, and the urgent necessity of sending off every sabre and bayonet that could be spared to feed the army of Wellington, rendered it a matter of impossibility to despatch an adequate force to the Canadian frontier, and compelled government, how reluctantly soever, to entrust the defence of those provinces mainly to the bravery and patriotism of their inhabitants. Nor was the confidence reposed in vain ; although, as the Americans had now accumulated a considerable force on the frontier, the struggle was more violent, and victory alternated with disaster. The American government, as is the case with all democratic states, had rushed into the contest wholly unprepared, alike by land and sea, to maintain it, and they had, in consequence, sustained nothing but disaster on the former element ; and if, on the latter, they met

(1) James, vi. 221, 223. Brenton, ii. 495. Cooper, ii. 308, 309. Ann. Reg. 1813, 112.

(2) James, vi. 224, 239. Ann. Reg. 1813, 184. Cooper, ii. 312, 326.

with extraordinary success, it was entirely owing to the hardihood and skill of their seamen, coupled with the dispersion of the British force, and the accidental ignorance of the English government of the structure and size of the American frigates. But the national passions were now roused in the United States, and great efforts were made to prosecute the war with vigour. It has been already noticed, that four additional ships of the line and four

Jan. 3. sloops were ordered to be built, and a loan of 16,000,000 dollars
March 5. was contracted for at $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent; and in order to excite the ardour of their own, and, if possible, shake the fidelity of British seamen, the war was justified, in an elaborate report presented by the committee of foreign relations to Congress, and approved of by them, entirely on the ground of the right claimed by the English government to search for and reclaim British subjects on board of American vessels. This they declared they were determined at all hazards to resist, should they stand alone in the contest : “for to appeal to arms in defence of a right, and to lay them down without securing it, would be considered in no other light than as a relinquishment of it (1).”

Invasion and defeat of General Winchester, and capture of Ogdenburg. The first operations of the campaign in Canada proved singularly unfortunate to the Americans. In the end of January, General Winchester, with a thousand men, crossed over to attack Fort Detroit in the upper province, and, before any force could be assembled to resist him, made himself master of Frenchtown, twenty-six miles from that place. General Proctor, however, who commanded the British forces in that quarter, no sooner heard of this irruption, than he hastily assembled a body of five hundred regulars and militia, being the Glengarry fencibles, and six hundred Indians, and commenced an attack upon the invaders two days afterwards in the fort of Ogdenburg. The assault was made Jan. 22. under circumstances of the utmost difficulty : deep snow impeded the assailants at every step, and the American marksmen, from behind their defences, kept up a very heavy fire ; but the gallantry of the British overcame every obstacle, and the fort was carried, with eleven guns, all its stores, and two armed schooners in the harbour (2).

Capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada. But a far more material success soon consoled the Americans for their reverses. By indefatigable exertions during the winter, they had augmented their naval force in Sackett's harbour so considerably, that the British squadron on Lake Ontario was no longer a match for them. Nor is this surprising; for the Americans built their ships at their own doors, with all their materials at hand, while the British, from the long export of timber to England, had not even wood in abundance, and were obliged to bring all their naval stores from Great Britain, and it was computed that each gun, before it was launched on the lakes, had cost a thousand pounds. Encouraged by this circumstance, the Americans fitted April 27. out an expedition of seventeen hundred men, who sailed from Sackett's harbour on board fourteen armed vessels, and two days afterwards effected a landing, after a sharp conflict, at the old fort of Toronto, three miles from York, the capital of Upper Canada. General Sheaffe commanded the British forces in that quarter; but he could only collect seven hundred regulars and militia, and a hundred Indians; with these, however, he made a stout resistance in the woods and thickets, in the course of which the grenadiers of the 8th Regiment fell to a man. He was at last overpowered, and

(1) Report to Congress, Jan. 29, 1813. Ann. of 1812, i. 67, 86, Christie's War in Canada, 71, Reg. 1813, 178, 181. Cooper, ii. 204, 205. 73.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1813, 179, 180. Armstrong's War

compelled to fall back to the town, which was weakly fortified; and in its bastion was a large magazine of powder, which exploded as the assailants were advancing to the attack. Two hundred of them, with General Pike, their commander, were blown into the air by this catastrophe, and half that number of the British; but the walls were thrown down by the shock, and the defences were no longer maintainable, while, at the same time, Chauncey, with his flotilla, had worked his way into the harbour. Sheaffe, therefore, wisely availed himself of the consternation produced among the Americans by the explosion, to effect his retreat in the direction of Kingston, with the whole regulars who remained unhurt, about four hundred in number; and, though the enemy seized all the public stores that were left in the place, they re-embarked with such haste that they were all abandoned; and, by their own admission, the only trophies they brought away were "a stand of colours and a human scalp." The Americans, however, carried off three hundred prisoners, and an equal number were killed and wounded on either side in the action; and the British sustained a severe loss in a large ship on the stocks, and extensive naval stores, which they were obliged to burn to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands (1).

April 26.
Success at
the forts of
Miami, and
failure at
Sackett's
harbour. The American squadron, after this success, sailed away to Sackett's harbour for reinforcements, in order to prosecute their ulterior operations; and meanwhile Colonel Proctor crossing Lake Erie, made a dash, with nine hundred regulars and militia, and twelve hundred Indians, at General Harrison, who lay with his division near the rapids of the Miami, on the American side, in a position strengthened by blockhouses and batteries, which defied every attack made upon them. Meanwhile, two American regiments, eight hundred strong, under General Clay, approached to aid Harrison, and at first, by a sudden attack, carried

May 5. part of the British batteries. Having incautiously followed up their success too far, however, these regiments were surrounded by the British and Indians, and, after a desperate struggle, totally defeated, with the loss of two hundred killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners, while the English lost only fifteen killed and forty-five wounded. Meantime, a considerable reinforcement of sailors having reached the British side of Lake Ontario, the squadron on that lake, under their able and gallant officer, Sir James Yeo, was enabled to put to sea from Kingston, and a combined attack by land and water was attempted on Sackett's harbour, the principal

May 28. naval establishment of the enemy on that inland sea. The expedition excited great interest on both sides of the water, and the most sanguine hopes were entertained by the British, that it would lead to the destruction of this growing and formidable naval establishment of the enemy. These hopes, however, were miserably disappointed. The troops landed indeed, and, after some sharp skirmishing, advanced over a narrow isthmus, connecting the island on which they had landed with the mainland. Though the British were only seven hundred strong, and the Americans, in the absence of their main force, about a thousand; yet the whole American militia took to flight on the first discharge, leaving the regulars, not more than four hundred strong, to sustain the combat. In the first moment of alarm, their officers actually set fire to their naval storehouses, arsenal, and barracks, which were speedily consumed. Unhappily, this was deemed a sufficient achievement by Sir George Prevost, who, conceiving his force not adequate to any further operation, re-embarked his troops, at a time when a

(1) Ann. Reg. 1813, 180, Christie, 74, 75, Armstrong, i, 129, 132.

vigorous assault would probably have led to the entire capture of this important depot, and the immediate settlement of the naval contest on the lakes (1).

Reduction
of Fort-
George by
the Ame-
ricans.
May 27.

The principal American force on Lake Ontario, about six thousand strong, were at this juncture engaged in an attack on Fort George at the western extremity of the lake. Early in the morning of the 27th May, a combined attack was made, both by the naval and military forces, on that stronghold; the former under the command of Commodore Chauncey, the latter led by General Dearborn. General Vincent, who commanded the British in that quarter, could not muster above nine hundred soldiers; but with this handful of men he made a most gallant resistance, until at length the works, especially on the lake-front, being torn in pieces by the heavy cannonade, the British commander blew up the fort, and withdrew, with the loss of three hundred and fifty men, to a strong position on Burlington heights, near the head of the lake, where he collected detachments from Chippewa, Fort Erie, and other points, and assembled about sixteen hundred troops, of which one-half were regular soldiers (2). After this success the Americans advanced to Queenstown, and being strongly reinforced, established themselves in a solid manner on the Niagara frontier, with nearly six thousand men.

The Ame-
ricans are
defeated at
Stony Creek,
Beavers'
Dams, and
Black Rock.
June 8.

This was by far the most formidable lodgment which the Americans had effected in the Canadian territory, and it excited, in consequence, equal attention and alarm through the whole British possessions. General Dearborn now confidently anticipated their entire conquest at no distant period; and to dislodge Vincent from his position, he pushed forward a body of three thousand infantry, two hundred and fifty horse, and nine guns. No sooner was the English general apprized of their approach, than he dispatched eight hundred men, under Colonel Harvey, to retard their advance; and this gallant officer finding, when he arrived near the enemy, that they kept a bad look-out, resolved on a nocturnal surprise. This was accordingly executed, in the most brilliant style, as soon as it was dark, and with such success, that two generals and a hundred and fifty men were made prisoners, and four guns captured. After this check, the enemy retreated to Fort George in great confusion. Having recovered from this disaster, Dearborn, a fortnight after, sent out an expedition of six hundred men to dislodge a British picquet, which was posted at a

June 24.

place called Beavers' Dams, a few miles from Queenstown. They were soon beset on their road through the woods by Captain Kerr, with a small body of Indians, and Lieutenant Fitzgibbons, at the head of forty-six of the 49th regiment, not two hundred strong in all; but this little force was so skilfully disposed as to make the Americans believe they were the light troops of a very superior army, which in fact was approaching, though it had not come up. They surrendered in consequence, five hundred in number, with two guns and two standards. Shortly after, a successful expedition was undertaken against the American fortified harbour of Black Rock on Lake Ontario, which was burned, with all its naval stores and vessels by a British detachment under Colonel Bishopp, who unfortunately fell in the moment of victory; while the British flotilla on Lake Champlain captured two armed schooners, of eleven guns each—a success of no small importance,

(1) Christie, 77, 79. Ann. Reg. 1812, 182, 183. Armstrong, i. 123, 147.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1813, 182, 183. Armstrong, i. 133, 135. Christie, 75, 76.

in a warfare where so much depended on the command of those inland waters (1).

Blockade of Fort George, and repulse of Proctor at Sandusky. These repeated disasters so disconcerted the Americans, that though their force at Fort George was still more than double that of the British who advanced against it, yet they kept cautiously within their lines; and submitted to be insulted by the English troops, who not only cooped them up within their walls, but actually advanced to within a few hundred yards of their guns. Prevost, however, wisely judged that it would be the height of imprudence to assault the Americans, driven to desperation, with half their number, in works bristling with cannon, and supported by the fire of Fort Niagara on the other side of the river; and as no provocation could induce them to quit their lines, he left a force to maintain the blockade, and returned to Kingston. Meanwhile the war was vigorously prosecuted on Lake Erie by General Proctor, who

Aug. 2. invested the fort of Lower Sandusky on the Sandusky River, with five hundred regulars and militia, and above three thousand Indians. The works having been battered, Proctor led his troops to the assault. They crossed the glacia with great gallantry, though entirely deserted by their Indian allies, whom no consideration could induce to face the great guns, and were actually in the ditch (2), when the head of the column was smote with such a fire of grape and musketry, that they were driven back, and obliged to re-embark with the loss of a hundred killed and wounded, and he soon after raised the siege.

Success of the British on Lake Champlain. These mutual injuries, though, upon the whole, highly favourable to the British arms, yet in truth decided nothing; it was on the lakes that the real blows were to be struck, and a decisive superiority acquired by the one party over the other. Events in the outset of this inland naval warfare were highly favourable to the British arms. Strengthened by the two armed schooners, which had been taken on Lake Champlain, and which had been christened the Broke and the Shannon, the English flotilla, with nine hundred men on board, stretched across the lake, took Plattsburg, which was evacuated by twelve hundred Americans without firing a shot, burned part of the naval stores, and brought away the rest, and also destroyed their naval establishments at Burlington and Champlain. By these successes, a decisive superiority was acquired on Lake Champlain for the remainder of the campaign. Sir James Yeo also gained considerable

Aug. 10 and 11. success on Lake Ontario, particularly on the 10th August, when he Aug. 28. captured two schooners, and destroyed two others; but no decisive engagement took place on that inland sea, as neither party was sufficiently confident in his strength to risk the fate of the campaign by a general battle on its surface (3).

Defective state of the British flotilla on Lake Erie. But while the campaign, both by land and water, was thus prosperous in the upper provinces, a dreadful disaster occurred on Lake Erie, which more than compensated all these advantages, and immediately exposed the British provinces in North America to imminent danger, which was the more alarming, that the force at the command of Sir George Prevost was so small as to be wholly inadequate to the defence of a frontier, every where vulnerable, and above twelve hundred miles in length. Both parties had made the greatest efforts to augment their naval

(1) Christie, 81, 82, 85. Armstrong, i. 137, 151.
Ann. Reg. 1813, 182, 183.

(2) Christie, 83, 84. Ann. Reg. 1813, 186, 187.
Armstrong, i. 164, 168.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1813, 186, 187. Christie, 87, 91.
Armstrong, i. 165, 166. James, vi. 246.

force on Lake Erie; but owing to the superior facilities of the Americans for ship-building at their own doors, while the whole British naval stores had to come from England, the weight, as well as the number of their vessels, became soon superior to that of the British, while the total stoppage of their mercantile navy gave them ample means for manning them with numerous crews of picked seamen. Captain Barclay, an officer inferior to none in the service of Great Britain for skill and gallantry, was appointed in May to the command of the squadron on the lake, and immediately entered on his unenviable duty, when the whole force was not equal to a British 20 gun-brig. The *Detroit*, however, was soon after launched, and fifty English seamen having been received and distributed through his ships, Barclay set out, early in September, with his little fleet, consisting of two ships, two schooners, a brig, and a sloop, carrying in all 65 guns. Thus there was not one British sailor to each gun; the rest of his crews being made up of 240 soldiers and 80 Canadians. On the other hand, the American squadron, of two more vessels and an equal number of guns, was nearly double the weight of metal and number of hands (1); and still more superior, from their crews being all experienced seamen, to meet the wretched mixture of five landsmen to one sailor, who manned the British fleet (2).

Desperate
action on
Lake Erie,
and defeat
of the
British.

Barclay, in the first instance, with this feeble force, blockaded the American flotilla in the harbour of Presque-Isle, now Erie, which he could do with safety, notwithstanding his inferiority, as the Americans could not get their squadron over the bar in its front, but with the guns out, which of course prevented their attempting it in the face of an armed force. At length, however, their Commodore, Captain Parry, adroitly seized the moment when Barclay was absent, and got outside the bar. The British commander upon this returned to Amherstburg, where he was soon blockaded by the American squadron; the former being busily engaged mean time in exercising the soldiers at the guns, and accustoming the Canadians to handle their ropes. Soon, however, provisions on that desolate shore fell short; and Barclay, deeming his crews a little more efficient, put to sea. An action ensued between the opposite squadrons, which for valour and resolution displayed on both sides never was surpassed. In the first instance, the *Lawrence*, which bore Commodore Parry's flag, was cut to pieces by the British guns: she became unmanageable, Parry shifted his flag on board the *Niagara*, and soon after the colours of the *Lawrence* were hauled down amidst loud cheers from the British squadron. After this, the firing ceased on both sides for a few minutes, and a breeze at the same time having sprung up behind the Americans, Parry skilfully gained the weather-gage, while the British vessels, in endeavouring to wear round to present a fresh broadside to their antagonists, fell, from the inexperience of the crews, into confusion, and for the most part got jammed together with their bows facing the enemy's broadsides. So defective, too, was Barclay's equipment, that he had only one boat on board of his own vessel, the *Detroit*, and it was pierced with shot: he could not, in consequence, take possession of his prize; the *Lawrence* drifted out of fire, and her crew imme-

(1) James, vi. 247, 249. Armstrong, i. 167, 168.

(2) Force of American and British squadrons.

	British.	American.
Ships, brigs, and schooners,	6	8
Broadside guns,	34	34
Weight of metal in lbs.,	459	928
Crews,	345	580
Tons,	1250	960

diately rehoisted their colours; and Parry took advantage of the weather-gage which he had gained, to take a position with his remaining vessels, which raked the principal British ships; while they, from the unskilfulness of their men, were unable to handle their ropes so as to extricate themselves from the danger. The result was, that after a dreadful carnage and desperate engagement of three hours, the whole British vessels were taken: but not until they had become wholly unmanageable, all the officers, including Barclay, being killed or desperately wounded, and they had lost forty-one killed, and ninety-four wounded, or above a third of the whole men on board the flotilla (1).

Retreat
and disaster
of General
Proctor.

The effects of this dreadful defeat speedily were felt in the military operations. The Americans being now entirely masters of

Lake Erie, had it in their power at once to intercept the whole coasting trade, by which Proctor's force and auxiliary Indians were supplied with provisions, and to land any force they chose in his rear, and entirely cut him off from Kingston and York, and the lower part of the upper province. He was constrained, therefore, immediately to commence a retreat,

Sept. 26. abandoning and destroying all his fortified posts beyond the Grand River. Amherstburg and Detroit accordingly were immediately dismantled, and with the Indians under Tecumseh, who preserved an honourable fidelity in misfortune, the British commenced a retreat towards the River Thames. In this retrograde movement, however, they were immediately followed by Harrison, who was attended by Parry's squadron on the lake, while the British, almost starving, toiled through wretched roads and interminable

Oct. 4. forests. On the 4th October, Harrison came up with the British rear, and succeeded in capturing all their stores and ammunition. Unable to retreat further in any thing like military array, Proctor had now no alternative but to endeavour to check the enemy by a general battle; and for this purpose he took up a position at the Moravian village on the Thames.

Oct. 5. Here he was attacked next day by the Americans with greatly superior forces: the Indians, little inured to regular battles, gave way after a gallant resistance, and their brave chief, Tecumseh, was slain; the first line of the British was overthrown by a sudden charge of the Kentucky horse; and after a short combat they were totally defeated, with the loss of six hundred men, almost all made prisoners. The remainder dispersed in the woods, and after undergoing incredible hardships, reassembled at Ancaster at the head of Lake Ontario, to the number of only two hundred and forty (2).

Disaster on
Lake
Ontario,
and raising
of the siege
of Fort
George.

On the same day on which this defeat was sustained on the shores of Lake Erie, six schooners, having on board two hundred and fifty soldiers, proceeding from York to Kingston without convoy, were captured on Lake Ontario. These repeated losses, coupled with the alarming intelligence received at the same time of great preparations for a general invasion of Lower Canada, made Sir George Prevost wisely determine it to be impossible to continue any longer the investment of Fort George; and the siege was accordingly raised a few days after. Though the British force at this point was so much weakened by sickness, that not a

Nov. 3. thousand firelocks, out of three thousand, could be brought into action, yet the retreat was conducted with perfect order, and the troops concentrated in a strong position on Burlington heights, where they were soon after joined by the fugitives from Proctor's detachment, and succeeded in

(1) Cooper, ii. 447, 467. James, vi. 247, 253. Christie, 93, 94. Ann. Reg. 1813, 187. Captain Barclay's Account.

(2) Christie, 96, 97. Ann. Reg. 1813, 188. Prevost's Official Account, Oct. 30, 1813. App. to Chron. 221. Armstrong, i. 170, 174.

mustering fifteen hundred bayonets. They showed so strong a front, that the Americans did not venture to attack them, and this stemmed the torrent of disaster in that quarter. But by driving the British from the territory to the westward of the river Thames, the Americans had in a great degree cut them off from their Indian allies, with whom they now could maintain no communication but by the distant and now isolated fort of Michilmackinac; an advantage of no small moment for the future progress of the war (1).

Preparations
for a grand
invasion of
Canada.

The Americans were so elated with these successes, that they openly announced their intention of forthwith conquering Lower Canada, and taking up their winter quarters at Montreal. Nor were their preparations and forces, if the numerical amount of their troops is alone considered, at all inadequate to such an undertaking. Their generals, abandoning for the time their operations in Upper Canada, transported all their forces by water on Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, so as to take part in the grand combined attack on the lower province. With this view they concentrated the great bulk of their forces at Sackett's harbour; and their troops were much more formidable than on any former occasion, for they amounted in all to eighteen thousand regular soldiers and ten thousand militia, divided into three armies; that on Lake Erie amounting to eight thousand, under Harrison; Wilkinson having ten thousand at Sackett's harbour, and Hampton four thousand, and as many militia, on the Chateauguay river, near Lake Champlain. Threatened by so many enemies, Sir George Prevost issued an animated proclamation to the Canadians, and put the militia of the lower province on permanent duty. It will immediately appear how nobly they answered the appeal (2).

Defeat of
the invasion
of Lower
Canada.

Hampton, with the right wing of the army of invasion, was the first to take the field. Early on the 21st October he crossed the frontier at the junction of the Chateauguay and Outard rivers;

Oct. 21. but though he had four thousand effective infantry, two thousand militia, and ten guns, he was so vigorously and gallantly resisted by the frontier light infantry of the Canadians, not six hundred in number, under Colonel De Lalabery, who fought with the steadiness of veteran soldiers in their woods, that after three days' desultory fighting, he was driven with disgrace

Oct. 25. back into the American territory, pursued and harassed by the Canadian militia, and his troops were so discouraged by their reverses, that they became incapable of taking any further part in the campaign. Mean-

Oct. 26. while Wilkinson, with the centre of the invading force, about ten thousand strong, left Sackett's harbour, and crossing Lake Ontario, mustered his troops in the end of October in Grenadier island, opposite Kingston, where General De Rottenburgh, lay awaiting his attack. Having delayed till the principal forces of the upper province were concentrated around that great depot, the American general skilfully shifted his line of attack, and embarking his troops on board three hundred boats, escorted by Chauncey, reached the lower end of the lake, and dropping down the St.-Lawrence,

Nov. 3. landed on the 18th October near Point Iroquois. No sooner was the British general apprized of this circumstance, than he detached Colonel Morrison, with eight hundred regulars and militia, to follow the motions of the fleet, and oppose them wherever they attempted a landing. Morrison came up with the enemy near Chrystler's Point, twenty miles above Cornwall, in number about three thousand, who had landed from their boats;

(1) Christie, 97, 98, Armstrong, i, 170, 175. Ann. Reg. 1813, 189.

(2) Ann. Reg. 189; and Gen. Prevost's Desp. Oct. 1813. App. to Chron. 217. Christie, 99, 100.

Nov. 11. and a violent encounter ensued. The Americans were unable, however, to bear the attack of the British bayonet: they broke and fled in disorder before the detachments of the 48th, 79th, and 89th, supported by the militia, and lost one gun and two hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Disconcerted by this defeat, Wilkinson re-embarked his troops; and having received at the same time accounts of Hampton's failure, he deemed the attack on Lower Canada hopeless, and landed them on the American shore, and put the men into winter quarters (1).

Total defeat of the enemy in Upper Canada, and evacuation of Fort George. This glorious defeat of an invasion so confidently announced and strongly supported, diffused the most heartfelt joy in Lower Canada, and terminated the campaign there in the most triumphant manner; but it was immediately followed by successes equally decisive in the upper province. All cause of apprehension for Montreal and the lower province being now removed, a strong body of troops was dispatched under Colonel Murray from Kingston, to repel the invasion of Upper Canada, and, if possible, clear that province of the enemy. They set out from Kingston accordingly, and advanced towards Fort George, with a view to resume the investment, even amidst all the severities of a Canadian winter. The American general, however, did not await his approach, but precipitately evacuated that Fort, and retreated Dec. 12. across the Niagara, but not without having, by express orders, reduced the flourishing village of Newark to ashes (2). Such was the indignation excited in the breasts, equally of the British soldier and the Canadian militia, by this inhuman act, which at once reduced above four hundred human beings to total destitution, amidst the horrors of a Canadian winter, that Colonel Murray resolved to take advantage of it to carry Fort

Dec. 18. Niagara, on the frontier of the United States. A detachment of five hundred men, accordingly, under the command of Murray, crossed the river Niagara in boats, and succeeded in surprising the fort, with the loss of five killed and three wounded. The garrison nearly four hundred strong, with three thousand stand of arms and vast military stores, fell into the hands of the victors. Immediately after this success, the troops attacked a body of Americans, who had erected a battery opposite Queens-town from which they were discharging red-hot shot at that town, defeated them, and carried the fort (3).

Defeat of Hull, and burning of Buffalo. Dec. 28. Still following up these successes, General Drummond, with eight hundred men, crossed the Niagara to Black Rock, which was stormed, and the fugitives pursued to Buffalo, a few miles distant, where they rallied on a body of two thousand men who had assembled, under Hull, to defend that rising town. Such, however, was the vigour of the British attack, that the Americans were speedily routed with the loss of four hundred, while the victors were not weakened by more than one hundred. Buffalo was immediately taken and burnt: all the naval establishments there and at Black Rock were destroyed; while the Indians, let loose on the surrounding country, took ample vengeance for the conflagration.

(1) Morison's Official Account, Nov. 12, 1813. Ann. Reg. 1813, 235. App. to Chron. Christie, 105, 108. Armstrong, ii. 8, 18.

(2) "The post of Fort George, not being tenable against the enemy, must be abandoned, the garrison removed to Fort Niagara, and the exposed part of the frontier protected, by destroying such of the Canadian villages in its front as would best shelter the enemy during winter." Such were the orders of government. This new and degrading

system of defence, which, by substituting the torch for the bayonet, furnished the enemy with both motive and justification for a war of retaliation, was carried into full execution on the 10th December. Newark was reduced to ashes, and orders were given to fire hot shot on Queenstown."

—ARMSTRONG, i. 20.

(3) Christie, 110, 111. Armstrong, ii. 19, 20. Ann. Reg. 1814, 176, 177.

gration of Newark, which had commenced this savage species of warfare. Though it had the desired effect, however, by making the Americans feel the consequences of their actions, of putting a stop to this barbarous system of hostilities, yet it was so much at variance with the British method of carrying on war, and so shocking to the feelings, both of the officers and Jan. 12; 1814. men engaged in it, that Sir George Prevost, shortly after, issued a noble proclamation, lamenting the stern necessity under which he had acted in permitting these reprisals, and earnestly deprecating any further continuance of so inhuman a species of warfare (1).

General result of the campaign. This terminated the campaign of 1815 in Canada, and though not unchequered by disaster, yet was it, upon the whole, eminently glorious, both to the arms of Britain, and to the inhabitants of her noble American colonies. The superiority of the enemy, both in troops and all the muniments of war, was very great: twenty thousand regular soldiers, besides as many militia, were at their disposal; the vessels built on the lakes were at their own door, armed from their own arsenals, and manned by the picked men of their commercial marine, now thrown almost utterly idle. On the other hand, the whole British force did not exceed *three thousand* regular soldiers (2), who were charged with the defence of a frontier nearly a thousand miles in length; and although they were supported by thirty thousand gallant militia, yet these troops could not be moved far from home, or kept embodied for any considerable length of time, and they could not be relied on except in small bodies for offensive operations. The British naval force on the Lakes required to bring every gun, and great part of its naval stores, from Great Britain, a distance of three thousand five hundred miles; and the government could with difficulty spare, from the wants of a navy which was spread over the globe, even a handful of sailors for this remote inland service. To have repelled all the efforts of the Americans in such circumstances and with such forces, is of itself distinction; but it becomes doubly glorious when it is recollected, that this distant warfare took place during the crisis of the contest in Europe, at the close of a twenty years' war, when every sabre and bayonet which could be spared was required for the devouring Peninsular campaigns, and when eleven millions were sent in subsidies in that one year from Great Britain to the German and other continental powers. If these circumstances be duly weighed, it must appear evident, especially when the vast subsequent increase in the British population of Upper Canada is taken into consideration, that if the affections of our North American possessions are secured by a just system of colonial administration, Great Britain has now no reason to apprehend danger from the utmost efforts of the United States.

Capture of the Essex by the Phœbe. The naval operations of the year 1814 commenced with a successful attack on the American frigate Essex by the British frigate Phœbe, supported by the Cherub brig. The Essex, under Captain Porter, had set out in the autumn preceding, on a cruise to the South Seas; and after having made some valuable captures, was at length overtaken with two of her prizes, one of which she had armed with twenty guns, and manned with ninety-five men, in the roads of Valparaiso on the 9th February. After a close blockade of three weeks, during which various attempts to

(1) Christie, 111, 112. Armstrong, ii. 19, 23. Ann. Reg. 1814, 176, 177.

(2) "Throughout the campaign, Prevost's regular force, covering a frontier of nine hundred miles

from the Sorel to Fort St.-Joseph, did not exceed three thousand men."—ARMSTRONG, (*the American Secretary at War*,) i. 113.

Feb. 23. escape were made, the British commander, Captain Hillyar, succeeded in bringing the *Essex* to action in the roads of Valparaiso before she could get back, and without the aid of her lesser consort. This unequal combat, however, was maintained for forty minutes by Captain Porter with the utmost gallantry; the crews on both sides were strongly excited; the Americans having the motto flying, "Free trade and sailors' rights:" the British, "God and our country; traitors offend both." Early in the action the *Phœbe* received a shot in her rigging, which for a short time deprived her crew of the management of the vessel, so that she dropped almost out of shot; but the mischief being shortly repaired, the action was renewed, and as the *Cherub* raked the *Essex* while the *Phœbe* exchanged broadsides with her, both firing with great precision, the carnage on board the American vessel was soon frightful. Twice she took fire; and at length Captain Porter, having exhausted every means of defence, and sustained a loss of one hundred and fifty-two men, of whom fifty-eight were killed, was compelled to lower his colours. The loss on the side of the British was very trifling, being five killed and two wounded; a fact which sufficiently proves the inequality of the combat, though it had been managed with the greatest skill by the British commander. Nearly a hundred British sailors were on board the American vessel when the engagement commenced, who jumped overboard when it appeared likely she would be taken; forty of these reached the shore, thirty-one were drowned, and sixteen were picked up when at the point of perishing (1).

The *Frolic* taken by the *Orpheus*, and *Reindeer* by the *Wasp*. Early in February the American sloop *Frolic*, pierced nominally for eighteen guns, but really carrying twenty-two, was captured, after two shots only had been fired, by the British frigate *Orpheus* of thirty-six guns. The *Epervier* British sloop of eighteen guns, however, was soon after taken by the American sloop *Peacock* of twenty-two; and on the 28th June, a most desperate combat took place between the British sloop *Reindeer* of eighteen guns, and the American sloop *Wasp*. The preponderance of force was here in a most extraordinary degree in favour of the Americans (2); but notwithstanding this advantage, Captain Manners of the *Reindeer*, one of the bravest officers who ever trod a quarter-deck, the moment he got sight of the American vessel, gave chase, and as soon as it was evident to the American captain that he was pursued by the *Reindeer* alone, he hove to, and the action commenced. Never were vessels more gallantly commanded and fought on both sides. The engagement lasted, yard-arm to yard-arm, for half-an-hour, at the end of which time the *Reindeer* was so disabled, that she fell with her bow against the larboard quarter of the *Wasp*. The latter instantly raked her with dreadful effect; and the American rifles, from their tops, picked off almost all the officers and men on the British deck. But Captain Manners then showed himself indeed a hero. Early in the action the calves of his legs had been shot away, but he still kept the deck; at this time a grape-shot passed through both his thighs, but though brought for a moment on his knees, he instantly sprang up, and though bleeding profusely, not only refused to quit the deck, but exclaiming, "Follow me, my boys; we must board!" sprang into the rigging of the *Reindeer*, intending

(1) James, vi. 285, 286. Captain Hillyar's Account, March 30, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 179. App. to Chron. Cooper, ii. 262, 269.

	<i>Reindeer</i> .	<i>Wasp</i> .
(2) Broadside guns, . . .	9	11
Weight of metal—lbs., . .	189	338
Crew, men only, . . .	98	173
Tons,	385	539

—JAMES, vi. 296.

to leap into that of the Wasp. At this moment, two balls from the American tops pierced his skull, and came out below his chin. With dying hand he waved his sword above his head, and exclaiming, "O God!" fell lifeless on the deck. The Americans immediately after carried the British vessel by boarding, where hardly an unwounded man remained, and so shattered was she in her hull, that she was immediately after burned by the victors. Never will the British empire be endangered while the spirit of Captain Manners survives in its defenders (1).

Action between the President and the Endymion. Jan. 14.

An action more prosperous, but not more glorious for the British arms, than that between the Reindeer and Wasp, took place next spring, which terminated in the capture of the noble American frigate President, one of the largest vessels of that class in the world, by the Endymion, Captain Hope, slightly aided by the Pomona. On the 14th January 1815, the President and Macedonian brig set sail from New York on a cruise, and were shortly after chased by the British blockading squadron, consisting of the Majestic, 56 guns, the Endymion, 40, and Pomona, 58. Being evidently no match for so great a superiority of force, Commodore Decatur, who commanded the American vessels, endeavoured to get back, but he was intercepted, and chased for fifty miles along the coast of Long Island, in the course of which the Tenedos, British frigate, also joined in the pursuit. Towards evening the Endymion gained rapidly on the American frigate—while the Majestic and Pomona fell behind out of gunshot—and opened a fire with her bow-chasers, which was vigorously returned by the President from her stern guns. At length the Endymion gained so much on the American, as to permit her first broadside guns to begin to bear, and a close running fight ensued: the two vessels sailing under easy way, within half-musket-shot distance. Commodore Decatur suffered so severely, especially in his rigging, under their fire, that he took the gallant resolution of lying along-side the Endymion, with the view of carrying her by boarding, and going off with his prize, leaving his own crippled vessel to the enemy, before the other British ships could get up (2).

Capture of the former by the British.

But the Endymion skilfully avoided this risk, which, with the enemy's great superiority of men, might have been serious, by keeping at a short distance, and preserving the advantage she had gained by a fire at half-gunshot range. Thus the fight continued for two hours longer, both vessels being most gallantly fought and skilfully handled; at the end of that time the Endymion's sails were so much cut away by the American bar-shot, that she fell astern, and the Pomona coming up, gave the President two broadsides with little or no effect, owing to the darkness of the night, but this circumstance saved the American's honour, as two vessels had now opened their fire upon him; and he accordingly hauled down his colours, and was taken possession of by the boats of the Pomona. In this long and close cannonade, the President lost thirty-five men killed and seventy-six wounded: the Endymion ten killed and twelve wounded; but her upper rigging, at which the enemy chiefly aimed, was very much cut away. This action was one of the most honourable ever fought by the British navy, and in none was more skilful seamanship displayed; for although at the close

(1) James, vi. 294, 295. Cooper, ii. 232, 235.

The Wasp itself, with its gallant captain (Blakely) and crew, were, in the same year, lost during a cruise, and no trace of them was ever obtained. They had previously compelled the Avon, of 18 guns, to surrender, but not till the latter vessel was so cut to pieces that she sank immediately after. The Ame-

ricans must allow the British Empire to share with them the honours of the brave and skilful Captain Blakely, for he was born in Dublin.—COOPER, ii. 341; and JAMES, vi. 297, 299.

(2) Captain Hayes' Official Account, Ann. Reg. 1815. App. to Chron. 139. Cooper, ii. 538, 545. James, vi. 364, 367. Brenton, ii. 538.

of the action the Pomona came up, yet during its continuance the superiority was strongly on the side of the President (1). When she struck, there were no less than one hundred and eighty British seamen found in her crew, the greater part of whom had fought under English colours in the Macedonian, and been since enticed, in moments of intoxication, into the service of their enemies (2).

Lesser actions, which closed the war. This was the last action between frigates that occurred during the war; but several lesser combats ensued, honourable alike to the sailors and officers of both nations. Let it not be said these combats were trivial occurrences: nothing is trivial which touches the national honour. Napoléon felt this at the battle of Maida, albeit not more momentous to his colossal power than the capture of a sloop to Great Britain. The superiority of her navy is an affair of life or death to England: when her people cease to think so, the last hour of her national existence has struck. On the

March 23. 25d March, long after peace had been signed, the Hornet met the Penguin, and a furious conflict ensued, both commanders being ignorant of the termination of hostilities. Both vessels were of equal size and weight of metal, but the American had the advantage in the number and composition of her crew (5); and after a desperate conflict, in the course of which the brave Captain Dickinson of the Penguin was slain in the very act of attempting to board, the British vessel surrendered, having lost a third of her crew killed and wounded. The Hornet was shortly after chased by the Cornwallis, of seventy-four guns, and only escaped into New York by

June 30. throwing all her guns overboard. Lastly, the American brig Peacock, of twenty-four guns, fell in with the British East India Company's cruiser, the Nautilus, of fourteen guns, which was of course captured after a few broadsides, although the British commander assured the American that peace had been signed. Thus terminated at sea this memorable contest, in which the English, for the first time for a century and a half, met with equal antagonists on their own element; and in recounting which, the British historian, at a loss whether to admire most the devoted heroism of his own countrymen, or the gallant bearing of their antagonists, feels almost equally warmed in narrating either side of the strife; and is inclined, like the English sailors who were prisoners in the hold of the French vessel that combated in the bay of Algeiras (4); to cheer with every broadside which came in, for it was delivered, in descent at least, from English hands (5).

Financial measures of the American Government. At the beginning of 1814, the long continuance of the war, the total destruction of the American trade, and blockade of their harbours, and the evident hopelessness of the contest at land, after the pacification of the European continent had enabled Great Britain to send its victorious troops to the fields of transatlantic warfare, increased to a very great degree the discontent of that large party in the United States who had throughout opposed the contest, and actually, in two of the Northern States,

	Endymion. President.		metal might have been most effectually brought into play.	
(1) Broadside guns,	24	28	(2) James, v. 366, 367. Captain Hayes' Official Account, Jan. 17. Ann. Reg. 1815, 139. App. to Chron. Cooper, ii, 542, 544.	
Weight of metal in lbs., . .	664	852		
Crew (men only),	319	465		
Tons.	1277	1533		
—JAMES, vi. 367.				
In justice to the Americans, however, it must be observed, that as they were chased by other vessels besides the Endymion, though they had not yet come up, they could not venture to range up alongside, when their great superiority in guns and				
			Men. Boys. Total.	
(3) Hornet,			163	2 165
Penguin,			105	17 122
—JAMES, vi. 385, 386.				
(4) <i>Ante</i> , iv. 290.				
(5) James, vi. 385, 387. Cooper, iv. 551, 554.				

had influence sufficient to prevent their sending their contingents of armed men to carry it on. The blockade of their harbours, and stoppage of their trade, had almost entirely ruined the American customs, the only source of revenue, except the sale of waste lands, on which their government had hitherto relied; and from sheer necessity Congress was driven to lay on a great variety of new taxes on exciseable articles, to supply the alarming deficiency of the public revenue. These taxes were laid on wine licenses, licenses to distil spirituous liquors, on sales by auction of merchandize, ships and vessels, on sugars refined in the United States, bank notes, and stamps for bills of exchange, and on imported salt. These taxes were to continue during the whole period of the war, and for a year after its termination. A

Aug. 24, 1813. further loan of 7,500,000 was concluded in August 1813, for the service of that year and the first quarter of the next. Thus the Americans, under the pressure of warlike necessity, were fast gliding into the long-established system of taxation in the European States, and losing the peculiar advantage they had hitherto enjoyed, of being placed beyond the hostility of the Old World, and consequently relieved from its burdens (1).

Repeal of the Non-Importation Act. It may readily be imagined that these direct or excise taxes, to which they had hitherto been wholly unaccustomed, did not increase the popularity of the war in the United States; the more especially after the evident approach of a termination to the European contest left the war equally without an object as without hope. To such a height did these discontents rise, even among the democratic party, who had hitherto been the most violent supporters of the war, that government was obliged to do something indicating a disposition to recede from the inveterate system of hostility which they had hitherto pursued. In the end of March, a Message from the President to Congress recommended the repeal of the non-importation act; and in pursuance of the recommendation a bill soon after passed both houses, by a large majority, repealing both the embargo and non-importation acts. The decisive approach to pacific measures awakened sanguine hopes throughout the Union of reviving trade and a speedy termination of hostilities; but they were soon undeceived by a proclamation by the British government, which declared the ports north of New York, as well as those to the southward, in a state of blockade; in answer to which the American government issued a counter proclamation, in which, after setting forth that a blockade of a coast two thousand miles in length was an unwarrantable stretch and could not be enforced, ordered all vessels, whether national or privateers, bearing the flag of the United States, to pay no regard to such blockade, and not to molest any vessels belonging to neutral powers bound for any harbour in the United States (2).

Symptoms of a breaking up of the Union. Jan. 12. But the discontents of the Northern States had now risen to such a height as seriously threatened the dissolution of the Union. The two States of Massachusetts and New England continued to refuse to send their contingents to the army; and the governor of the former State thus addressed the State Legislature in the beginning of the year:—"If our conduct to both belligerents had been really impartial, all the calamities of war might have been avoided. We had assumed the character of a neutral nation; but had we not violated the duties imposed by that character? Had not every subject of complaint against one belligerent been amply displayed, and those against the other palliated or concealed? When France and Eng-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1813, 185. Armstrong, i. 271.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1814, 179, 181.

land were engaged in an arduous struggle, and we interfered and assaulted one of them, will any man doubt our intention to assist the other?" At a Dec. 13. subsequent period of the same year, the state of Massachusetts took still more decisive measures. Openly asserting their inherent rights to frame a new constitution, they resolved to "appoint delegates to confer with delegates from New England on the subject of their grievances and common concerns, and to take measures if they think proper for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States to revise the constitution." These propositions were the more alarming, that the general discontent was much increased by the vast augmentation of the taxes, which were progressively swelled to the end of the year, and had already arisen to the most alarming amount. The direct taxes were advanced fifty *per cent*; that on auctions was doubled, and many new imposts added, expected to produce eleven or twelve millions of dollars, or about L.2,500,000. And with all these aids, so low had the credit and resources of the treasury fallen, that the government could not negotiate a loan; and were driven to the necessity of issuing treasury notes to a large extent, which were to bear interest like English Exchequer bills, and supply the want of a circulating medium in the States (1).

Preparations in Canada, and among the Indians. The greatest exertions were made during the winter in Canada to augment the efficient military force of the provinces, and prepare in the most vigorous manner for the ensuing campaign. The Houses of Assembly warmly seconded the efforts of the British; thanks were unanimously voted Colonel De Lalaberry and the other officers who had distinguished themselves during the preceding campaign; the embodied or regular militia was augmented to four thousand men, besides the voltigeur and frontier corps, which numbered as many more; and considerable sums were voted by the chief towns to expedite the transmission of the troops. In March 15. March, a solemn embassy from the Indians waited on the governor at Quebec to supplicate the powerful protection of Great Britain, in shielding them from the continual encroachments of the American States. "The Americans," said they, "are taking lands from us every day; they have no hearts, father; they have no pity for us, they want to drive us beyond the setting sun; but we hope, although we are few, and are here as it were upon a little island, our great and mighty father, who lives beyond the great lake, will not forsake us in our distress, but will continue to remember his faithful red children." They received the strongest assurance of protection and support, and were sent back to their wilds loaded with presents, determined to avenge their beloved chief Tecumseh, and prosecute the war with redoubled vigour (2).

Storming of Fort Oswego, and failure at Sandy Creek. March 30. No material movement occurred on either side on the Canadian frontier till the end of March, when the American general, Wilkinson, on the extreme right on Lake Champlain, collecting a large force from Plattsburg and Burlington, attacked the Canadian outposts at La Cole Mill; but he was repulsed with considerable loss, with very little injury to the British detachments. A more serious attempt was made, in Upper Canada, by Sir James Yeo and General Drummond, on Fort Oswego, situated on Lake Ontario. This fort was an important station, as it served as a resting-place and depot in the transit of military stores from Sackett's harbour, the grand arsenal on the lake, to its upper extremity in the neighbourhood of Niagara, where it was known the principal effort was to be made in

the ensuing campaign. Three hundred seamen and marines were landed from the flotilla, who carried the place in gallant style, destroyed the barracks, carried off the stores, and brought away the guns. At this time the British had a superiority on Lake Ontario, though the Americans were assiduously labouring to augment their force; and accordingly Sackett's harbour was closely blockaded, and an attempt was made by Captain Pop-

May 4.

May 3x.

ham, who commanded the blockading squadron, to destroy the enemy's flotilla in Sandy Creek, which was conveying a considerable quantity of naval and military stores. This attempt, however, which was gallantly made with two hundred seamen and marines, was repulsed with the loss of seventy men, in consequence of the assailants being suddenly attacked by forces three times more numerous, consisting of riflemen, militia, and Indians, from the bloody tomahawks of the latter of whom the English prisoners were with difficulty rescued by their humane American enemies (1).

Capture of
Fort Erie,
and battle
of Chippewa.
June 3.

The American forces destined for the invasion of Upper Canada were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Buffalo, Black Rock, and other places on the Niagara frontier; and two strong brigades crossed over, under General Ripley, containing about five thousand men, and not only effected a landing without opposition, but succeeded in making themselves masters of Fort Erie, with its garrison of a hundred and seventy men, without firing a shot. Having thus gained one stronghold on the British side, Ripley advanced confidently to the neighbourhood of Chippewa, and

June 5.

was making preparations to carry that place, when General Riall, who had collected about fifteen hundred regular troops and a thousand militia and Indians, adopted the bold resolution, notwithstanding the enemy's great superiority of force, of hazarding an immediate attack. The action commenced at five o'clock in the afternoon, by the militia and Indians attacking the light infantry of the enemy: but the Kentucky Rifles fought stoutly; their marksmen dealt out death with no sparing hand among the trees; and it was only by the light companies of the Royal Scots and 100th that they were finally driven in. The main body, consisting of these regiments, the King's, and the militia, now advanced to the attack in column, the Americans receiving them in line, thus reversing the usual order of the British and French in the Peninsular campaigns. The result was the same as what had there so often occurred; the head of the British column was crushed by the discharges of the American line, which stood bravely, and fired with great precision; and though they succeeded in deploying with much steadiness, the loss sustained in doing so was so serious, that General Riall was obliged to retreat with the loss of 151 killed, and 520 wounded. The American loss was 251. After this repulse, the British retired to their intrenched camp; but the Americans, now commanded by General Brown, having discovered a cross-road, which enabled them to threaten his communications, Riall fell back to Twenty-Mile Creek, abandoning Queenstown, which was occupied by the enemy (2).

Defeat of
the Ameri-
cans at
Chippewa.

This well-fought action was the most considerable which had yet occurred during the war, and as it terminated unfavourably for the British, though with a great superiority of force on the part of the enemy, it demonstrated that increased experience and protracted hostilities were beginning to produce their ordinary effects in teaching a people naturally brave the art of war. Their triumph, however, was not of

(1) Christie, 122, 129. Ann. Reg. 1814, 149,
150. Armstrong, ii. 63, 74.

(2) General Riall's Account, July 6, 1814. Ann.

Reg. 1814, 200. App. to Chron, Christie, 128, 130-
Armstrong, ii. 86, 89.

long duration. Brown advanced to the vicinity of Fort George, where, according to the plan of the campaign, he was to have met the flotilla: but as the British still had the superiority on Lake Ontario, he not only met there with none of the naval succour which he had expected, but found the English flotilla lying in the harbour, and their land forces considerably augmented. The forts also, both of George and Niagara, were so strengthened as to leave no hope of a successful siege of them with the means at his disposal. Brown accordingly, after remaining a week in the neighbourhood of Fort George, commenced his retreat to Chippewa, which he reached on the evening of the 24th. General Riall immediately moved out of his intrenched camp in pursuit; and General Drummond having come up at the same time

with reinforcements from Kingston, an attack with the united body—in all about three thousand, of whom eighteen hundred were regulars—was made upon the enemy, whose force was about five thousand strong. The British guns, nine in number, happily seized a commanding eminence, which swept the whole field of battle. With great resolution, however, and highly elated with their recent success, the Americans advanced to the charge. The action began about six in the evening, and the whole line was soon warmly engaged, but the weight of the conflict fell upon the British centre and left. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts, the latter was forced back, and General Riall was severely wounded and made prisoner. In the centre, however, the 89th, Royals, and King's regiments opposed a determined resistance: and the guns on the hill, which were worked with prodigious rapidity, occasioned so great loss to the attacking columns, that Brown soon saw that there was no chance of success till that battery was carried, and a desperate effort was resolved on to obtain the mastery of it (1).

Awful circumstances of the action. The Americans, under General Millar, advanced with the utmost resolution, and with such vigour, that five of the British cannon at first fell into their hands. So desperate was the onset, so strenuous the resistance, that the British artillerymen were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of their guns were advanced to within a few yards of the English battery. This dreadful conflict, when, literally speaking, "Greek met Greek," continued till after dark, with alternate success, in the course of which the combatants fought hand to hand, by the light of the discharges of the guns, and the artillery on both sides was repeatedly taken and retaken. At length, after an hour's vehement struggle, the combatants sank to rest from pure mutual exhaustion, within a few yards of each other, and so intermingled, that two of the American guns were finally mastered by the British, and one of the British by the Americans; so that, on the whole, one gun was gained for England in this unparalleled struggle with her worthy offspring. During this period of repose, the loud roar of the battle was succeeded by silence so profound, that the dull roar of the falls of Niagara, interrupted at intervals by the groans of the wounded, was distinctly heard. Over the scene of this desperate strife, the moon threw an uncertain light, which yielded occasionally to the bright flashes of musketry or cannon, when the combat was partially renewed. Drummond skillfully took advantage of this respite to bring up the left wing, which had been repulsed, so as to form a support to the centre, while the line was prolonged to the right, where there was some danger of being outflanked; so that the bloodstained hill now formed the pivot of the British right. Upon this, the

(1) General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814. Ann. Reg. App. to Chron. 203. Christie, 132, 133. Armstrong, ii. 89, 91,

American general, being in no condition to continue the contest, gave orders for a retreat, which was carried into effect about midnight, the whole army retiring into their camp near Chippewa; and the next day the retreat was continued to Fort Erie, with such precipitation, that the whole baggage, provisions, and camp equipage (1), were thrown into the rapids, and precipitated over the awful cataract of Niagara.

Results
of the
battle.

In this desperate battle, the loss on both sides was very severe, but more so to the Americans than to the British. The former lost nine hundred and thirty killed and wounded, including in the latter Generals Brown and Scott; besides three hundred prisoners and one gun. The latter were only weakened by eight hundred and seventy men, of whom forty-two were made prisoners; among the latter were General Riall and his staff. But the result of the action was of the highest importance, as it entirely stopped the invasion of Upper Canada, and threw the Americans, late so confident of success, back into Fort Erie, where they were immediately

besieged by a force little more than half their amount. The operations were pushed with great activity: three armed schooners, anchored off the fort, were captured by a body of marines who pushed off in boats during the night; and the defences were so much injured, that Drummond determined to hazard an assault early on the morning of the 15th August (2).

Unsuccessful
assault on
Fort Erie. This daring attempt to storm an intrenched camp resting on a fort, and garrisoned by three thousand five hundred men, with two thousand, had very nearly succeeded. The assailants were divided into three columns, and the first, under Colonel Fischer, had actually gained possession of the enemy's batteries, at the point assigned for its attack, two

hours before daylight. If the other columns had reached their destined points of attack at the same time, the fort and intrenched camp would have been won, and the whole invading force made prisoners; but the supporting columns got entangled by marching too near the lake, between the rocks and the water, and came up later, when the enemy were on the alert, who opened a tremendous fire upon the head of the column, which threw it into confusion. Meanwhile the other column succeeded, after a desperate resistance, in affecting a lodgment in the fort, by creeping in through the embrasures of a bastion, and had actually turned its guns for above an hour upon the enemy; when the stone building in the interior, which they still held, took fire, and a quantity of powder placed in it having caught the flames, the whole blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that the troops, thinking a mine had been sprung, were seized with a sudden panic, and in spite of all the efforts of their officers, rushed in disorder out of the fort. The enemy now turned their whole forces upon Fischer's column, which was driven out of the works it had won, and the assault was repulsed at all points. In this gallant but abortive attempt, the British lost 157 men killed, 508 wounded, and 186 prisoners. The loss, how heavy soever, was more than compensated next day, by the arrival of two new regiments from Lower Canada; but notwithstanding this, General Drummond did not deem himself in sufficient strength to hazard a second assault, but contented himself with drawing closer the investment, and cooping the large American army up in a corner of the British territory, where they were rendered perfectly useless during the remainder of the campaign (5).

(1) General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 204. App. to Chron. Christie, 133, 134. Armstrong, ii. 93, 95.

(2) Christie, 134, 135. Armstrong, ii. 94, 95.

(3) General Drummond's Official Account, Aug. 15, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 209. Christie, 132, 133. Armstrong, ii. 99, 100.

Operations
in Chesapeake Bay.

The operations of the British armament, on the southern coasts of America, had hitherto been on a small scale, calculated rather to irritate than alarm; but the termination of the war in Europe having rendered the whole navy and great part of the army of Great Britain disposable, it was resolved to prosecute hostilities there and in Canada with much vigour, and on a scale commensurate to the strength and reputation of the empire. Three regiments of Wellington's army, the 4th, 44th, and 85th, were embarked at Bordeaux on the 2d June on board the Royal Oak June 2. seventy-four, and Dictator and Diadem of sixty-four guns each, and on the 24th arrived at Bermuda, where they were joined by the fusiliers, and three regiments from the Mediterranean in six frigates, forming altogether a force of three thousand five hundred men, which arrived in Chesapeake Bay in the middle of August. General Ross commanded the land forces, Admiral Cockburn the fleet; and no two officers could have been found, whose vigour, judgment, and daring, were better calculated to effect great things with small means. Their first measure was to take possession of Tangier's Island, where they erected fortifications, built storehouses, and hoisted the British flag; inviting at the same time the negroes in the adjoining provinces to join the British force in the island, and offering them emancipation in the event of their doing so. Seventeen hundred speedily appeared, were enrolled and disciplined, and proved of no small service in subsequent operations. This incitement of the negro population to revolt, was a step of very questionable morality in a political point of view, and it in the end cost the British no small sum as a compensation to the injured proprietors (1); but it marked, in an unequivocal manner, the perilous foundation on which society in the southern provinces of the United States is rested, and the heedlessness of the people who, placed on the edge of such a volcano, urged on the war which might at once lead to its explosion.

Preparations
for the attack
on Washington.

The chief approach to Washington is by the river Potomac, which discharges itself into the upper extremity of the bay of Chesapeake. It may also be reached by the Patuxent from the town of Benedict, on which river there is a good road to the metropolis. After much deliberation, it was determined by the British commander to make a dash at this capital, and to approach it by the latter river, partly on account of the greater facility of access which it afforded, partly in order to accomplish the destruction of Commodore Barney's powerful flotilla of gun-boats, which had taken refuge in creeks in the upper parts of its course. The latter part of this service was speedily and effectually performed: the ships of war having ascended the stream as far as Benedict, beyond which there is not sufficient draught of water for large vessels, the boats of the fleet were dispatched after the flotilla; and the Americans, finding escape impossible, committed it to the flames, which consumed in a few hours fifteen fine gun-boats; another, which resisted the conflagration, was brought away, with thirteen merchant schooners which had sought protection under cover of the armed vessels. This brilliant stroke having at once destroyed the enemy's whole naval force in the river, it was determined immediately to make an attack on the capital. The troops were accordingly disembarked at Benedict, and, with the addition of some marines, amounted in all to three thousand five hundred comba-

(1) James, vi. 304, 305. Brenton, ii. 521. Armstrong, ii. 124, 125. Ann. Reg. 1814, 183.

By the treaty of Ghent, the compensation to be paid to the injured proprietors was referred to the Emperor of Russia; and that prince, influenced doubtless in some degree by the danger of a simi-

lar mode of hostility in his own dominions, awarded the enormous sum of £250,000, or nearly £150 a-head for each negro that gained his freedom.—See Mr. BENTINCK'S *Speech, Chancellor of Exchequer, 28th February 1825, Parl. Deb.*

tants (1), with two hundred sailors to draw the guns; and with this handful of men, carrying with them two three-pounders, and provisions for three days, the British general commenced his march against the capital of a republic which numbered eight millions of inhabitants, and boasted of having eight hundred thousand men in arms.

Preparations for the defence of Washington.

The American government were far from being unprepared for this attack. From some hints imprudently dropped by the British commissioners who at this period were negotiating with those of America at Ghent, they had become aware that an attempt on the capital was in contemplation; and nearly a month before Ross landed in the Patuxent, July 18.

measures had been taken for placing, in case of invasion, sixteen thousand six hundred men at the disposal of General Winder to cover the capital, while a requisition for the whole militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia, ninety-three thousand strong, was made, and cheerfully answered. But the result soon showed what reliance is to be placed on the nominal paper-musters of such militia arrays when real danger is to be faced. Of the ninety-three thousand combatants of Pennsylvania and Virginia, nothing was heard when the day of trial approached: of the sixteen thousand active troops placed at the disposal of General Winder, not one-half appeared at the place of muster: and when the British troops were within five miles of Washington, only six thousand five hundred bayonets, three hundred horse, and six hundred seamen to work the guns, were assembled round the standards of the American general. He had, however, twenty-six guns to the British two: and with this force, about double that of the British, he took post at BLADENSBURG, a small village on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac (2), and commanding the only bridge by which that river could be crossed. The great road ran straight through the centre of his position, and the artillery was placed so as to enfilade all the approaches to the bridge.

Battle of Bladensburg. Aug. 24.

Ross's decision was soon taken. Forming his troops into two columns, the one under the command of Colonel Thornton, the other of Colonel Brooke, he immediately gave orders for the attack. Thornton's men advanced in double quick time, in the finest order, through the fire of the guns, dashed across the bridge, carried a fortified house at the other end, which was occupied and loopholed, and being quickly followed by the other division, spread out their sharpshooters on either flank, and moved direct against the American batteries. So vigorous was the attack, so feeble the defence, that they were all carried, and the first line thrown back in confusion on the second by the first division alone, not more than fifteen hundred strong, aided by the fire of a few rockets, before the second could get across the bridge. Ten guns were taken, and the whole army, totally routed, took to flight, and reached Washington in the utmost confusion, where they tarried not an instant, but hurried through to the heights of Georgetown to the westward. Hardly any pursuit was attempted by the British, partly from having no cavalry, partly from the extraordinary heat of the day having so exhausted the troops, that even the stoutest men in the army were unable to proceed till it was somewhat abated by the approach of evening. Their loss was surprisingly small, being only sixty-one killed and a hundred and eight-five wounded. After two hours' rest, however, the march was resumed, and the troops arrived within a mile of Washington at eight

(1) Armstrong, ii. 125, 127. James, vi. 308, 309. Ann. Reg. 1814, 183. 184. General Ross's Official Account, Aug. 30, 1814. App. to Chron. 219.

(2) Ross's Official Account, Aug. 30, 1814. Ann.

Reg. 1814, 219. App. to Chron. James, vi. 308. Armstrong, ii. 128, 130. British Camp. of Washington, 96, 102.

at night, where two thousand of them were halted, and the remainder, accompanied General Ross and Admiral Cockburn into the city. A proposition was then made to the American authorities to ransom the public buildings, by paying a sum of money. This having been refused, the British general, on the following morning, applied the torch not only to the arsenals and storehouses, but to the public buildings of every description. In a few hours the capital, including the senate-house and house of representatives, the arsenal, dockyard, treasury, war-office, president's palace, rope-walk, and the great bridge across the Potomac, were consumed. The navy-yard and arsenal, with immense magazines of powder, were set on fire by the Americans, and destroyed before they retired, and with them twenty thousand stand of arms were consumed. A fine frigate, of sixteen hundred tons, nearly finished, and a sloop, the *Argus*, of twenty guns, already afloat, were burnt by them before evacuating the city. Immense stores of ammunition, two hundred and six pieces of cannon, and one hundred thousand rounds of ball cartridge, were taken by the British, and destroyed; and having completed the ruin of all the warlike establishments in the place, they leisurely retired on the evening of the 25th, and reached Benedict by easy marches on the 29th, where they embarked next day without being disquieted by the enemy (1).

Reflections on this expedition. The capture of the American capital, notwithstanding all their preparations for above a month to avert the danger, by so inconsiderable a British force, and the immense importance of the blow thus struck at the naval and military resources of the enemy, render this expedition one of the most brilliant ever carried into execution by any nation. As such, it excited at the time a prodigious sensation in the United States; and it has hardly done less service to future times, and the cause of historic truth, by demonstrating in a decisive manner the extreme feebleness of the means for national protection which democratic institutions afford, when not coerced by military or despotic power. Yet it is to be regretted that the lustre of the victory has been much tarnished to the British arms, by the unusual, and, in the circumstances, unwarrantable extension, which they made of the ravages of war to the *pacific* or ornamental edifices of the capital. The usages of war, alike in ancient and modern times, have usually saved from destruction, even in towns taken by storm, edifices which are dedicated to the purposes of religion or embellishment; the Parthenon, after having stood two thousand years, and been the prey alternately of the Goth, the crusader, and the Saracen, was still entire, when it was accidentally blown up by a bomb at the siege by the Venetians of the Acropolis in 1689; the majestic edifices of Rome were really wasted away, not by the torches of Alaric or Genseric, but the selfish cupidity of its unworthy inhabitants, who employed them in the construction of modern buildings. It is no small reproach to Napoleon, that he wantonly extended the ravages of war as well as the hand of the spoiler, into these hitherto untouched domains; and in the destruction of the bastions of Vienna, and the Kremlin of Moscow, gave proof at once of a little and malevolent spirit, unworthy of so great a man. The cruel devastation by the Americans on the Canadian frontier is no adequate excuse; they had been amply and rightly avenged by the flames of Buffalo and Black Rock; and Alexander had recently given proof of the noblest revenge for such outrages by saving Paris. It would appear, that as the contest between Great Britain and America resembled in more points than one a civil war, so it partook oc-

(1) General Ross's Account, Aug. 30, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 219. App. to Chron. James, vi. 310, 311. Armstrong, ii. 130, 131. Camp. at Washington, 117, 129.

casionally of the well-known inveterate character of that species of hostility; and the British historian, in recounting the transaction, will best discharge his duty by acknowledging the error of his country, and rejoice that it was in some degree redeemed by the strict discipline observed by the troops, and the complete protection afforded to the persons and property of the inhabitants during their occupation of the American capital (1).

Capture of Fort Washington and Alexandria. Aug. 27. Sept. 5. The capture of Washington was immediately succeeded by an exploit of inferior magnitude, but equally vigorous and successful, in the Potomac river. Captain Gordon, in the Seahorse frigate, with the Euryalus brig, and several bomb vessels, skilfully overcame the intricacies of the passage leading by that river to the metropolis; and on the evening of the 27th arrived abreast of Fort Washington, constructed to command the river, as Fort Lillo does the Scheldt. It was immediately bombarded; and the powder magazine having soon after exploded, the place was abandoned, and taken possession of, with all its guns, by the British. From thence they proceeded to Alexandria, and the bomb vessels having assumed such a position as effectually commanded the shipping, the enemy were compelled to capitulate, and give up all their vessels, two-and-twenty in number, including several armed schooners, which were brought away in triumph. On returning down the river heavily laden with their numerous prizes, the British squadron had a very serious danger to encounter from some American batteries which had been erected to cut off their retreat, and which were manned by the crews of the Baltimore flotilla: but such was the skill with which the vessels were navigated, that none went aground, and the shells from the bombs were thrown with such precision, that the Americans were driven from their guns, and the whole squadron emerged safely with its prizes from the Potomac (2).

The successful issue of these attacks naturally suggested a similar expedition against Baltimore; and, after some deliberation, the British naval and military commanders agreed to undertake it. The fleet, accordingly, moved in that direction, and reached the mouth of the Patapsco, which leads to Baltimore, on the 11th September. Next day the troops were landed, and marched directly towards the city, while the ships moved up to co-operate in the attack that was contemplated. No opposition was attempted for the first six miles, though several intrenchments, newly thrown up, were passed, which had been abandoned; but when they approached Baltimore, a detachment of light troops was observed occupying a thick wood through which the road passed. General Ross, impelled by the daring courage by which he was distinguished, immediately advanced with the skirmishers to the front, and soon received a mortal wound in the breast. He survived only to recommend his young and unprovided family to his king

(1) "The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested."—*National Intelligencer*, 25th August 1814, quoted in JAMES, vi. 311.—"The value of the public property destroyed was 1,624,280 dollars, or L 365,463 sterling."—*Ibid*.

It is but justice to the gallant officers employed in this expedition to observe, not only that they are noways responsible for the destruction of the public buildings of Washington, as they acted under distinct orders from their own government, but that they deserve the highest credit for carrying those barbarous instructions into execution in the most forbearing and considerate manner, confining the destruction to public edifices, and observing the strictest discipline in relation to private life and

property. On the 14th August 1814, Admiral Cochrane officially announced to Mr. Monroe, "that, under the new and imperative character of his orders, it became his duty to destroy and lay waste all towns and districts of the United States found accessible to the attack of British armaments." What a contrast to the glorious and withal politic forbearance of Wellington in the south of France! And both had their reward—Wellington, in the capture of Toulouse and surrender of Bordeaux; the "new and imperative system," in the failure at Baltimore and defeat at New Orleans.—See ARMSTRONG, ii. 155.

(2) James, vi. 313, 315. Armstrong, ii. 131, 134. Brenton, ii. 522.

and country. Colonel Brooke, however, immediately assumed the command; and the light troops coming up, the enemy fell back, still skirmishing from behind the trees with which the country abounded, to a

Sept. 12. fortified position running across a narrow neck of land which separated the Patapsco and Back rivers. Six thousand infantry, with four hundred horse and six guns, were here drawn up in line across the road, with either flank placed in a thick wood, and a strong wooden paling covering their front. Brooke, however, gave orders for an immediate attack; and it was made with such vigour, that, in less than fifteen minutes, the enemy were routed, and fled in every direction, leaving six hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle, besides three hundred prisoners, and two

Sept. 13. guns, in the hands of the British. Early on the following morning the march was resumed, and Brooke arrived within a mile and a half of Baltimore, where he found a body of fifteen thousand men, with a large train of artillery, manned by the sailors of the frigates lying at Baltimore, strongly posted on a series of fortified heights which encircle the town. The magnitude of this force rendered it imprudent to hazard an immediate attack with three thousand bayonets; but Brooke, relying on the admirable spirit of his troops, determined on a night assault, when the enemy's artillery would be of little avail, and the whole dispositions were made for that purpose. At nightfall, however, and when the troops were just taking up their ground for the attack, advices were received from Admiral Cochrane, stating that the enemy, by sinking twenty vessels in the river, had prevented all further access to the ships, and rendered naval co-operation impossible. Brooke, in these circumstances, wisely judged that the loss likely to be incurred in storming the intrenchments would more than counterbalance the prospect of advantage from the reduction of the town, and withdrew, without molestation, to his ships. The commanders of the *Severn*, *Euryalus*, *Havannah*, and *Hebrus* frigates, had offered to lighten their ships, and lay them alongside of Fort-le-Henry, which commanded the passage, and the possession of which would have left Baltimore at their mercy; and it is to be regretted that any view to ulterior operations should have led to this offer not being accepted, as it probably would have led to the destruction of the *Java* frigate, and *Erie* and *Ontario* brigs, which lay at Baltimore, and have prevented the land troops from being deprived of the fruit of their gallant victory (1).

Lesser actions on the coast. A naval expedition, crowned with complete success, took place at this time under Sir John Sherbrooke and Admiral Griffith, in the *Penobscot* river. They sailed from Halifax on the 1st September, and on their approach, the Fort of Custine, which commands the entrance of the river, was evacuated by the enemy and blown up. An American frigate, the *John Adams*, having run up the river for safety as high as the town of Hampden, where her guns were taken out and placed in battery, a detachment of sailors and marines was landed from the ships, which attacked and stormed the batteries, manned by double their force, upon which the frigate was set on fire, and totally destroyed. The expedition then Sept. 5. pushed on to Bangor, which surrendered without resistance, with twenty-two guns; and thence to Machias, which also surrendered by capitulation, the whole militia of the county of Washington being put on their parole not to serve again during the war. Formal possession was then taken

(1) James, vi. 320, 321. Colonel Brooke's Official Account, Sept. 17, 1814. Aug. Reg. 1814, 229. App. to Chron. Armstrong, ii. 134, 135. Admiral Cochrane's Official Account, Sept. 15, 237.

of the whole country between the Penobscot and the British frontier of New Brunswick, a district a hundred miles broad; and a provisional government established, to rule it till the conclusion of the war. This success was not only important in itself, but still more so, as giving practical demonstration of the dispositions of that part of the state of Maine, and evincing the ease with which, in the event of the continuance of hostilities, it might be severed from the United States (1).

Sir George Prevost's expedition against Plattsburg. Meanwhile a great expedition was preparing in Lower Canada, intended to co-operate with that of Sherbrooke and Griffith on the coast. Prevost's force had been progressively augmented by the successive arrival of brigades, detached, after the close of hostilities, from the army in the south of France; so that, in the end of August, he had in all sixteen thousand regular troops in the two Canadas under his command, of whom twelve thousand were in the lower province. A force so considerable not only removed all danger of successful invasion from the American forces, but rendered feasible a serious inroad upon the adjoining provinces of Maine and New York from those of the British. Such an attempt was also advisable in itself, in order to make the enemy feel, in their own territory, the weight of that power whose hostility they had so needlessly provoked. A body of eleven thousand men accordingly was collected on the frontier of Lower Canada, with a formidable train of artillery, and commanded, under Prevost, by several generals and officers who had acquired durable renown in the Peninsular campaigns. If any thing could have added to the wellfounded expectations entertained of this noble force, it was the circumstance of its being in great part composed of the veterans who had served with Wellington in Spain and France, and the remainder of the not less heroic band which had so gloriously struggled against overwhelming superiority of numbers in the two preceding campaigns, and who burned with anxiety to emulate the deeds of their brethren who had gained their laurels in the fields of European fame. But, unfortunately, the naval part of the expedition, upon which, as in all Canadian warfare, the success of the land forces in a great measure depended, was by no means equally well provided. By a strange remissness on the part both of the British Admiralty and the local authorities, the flotilla on Lake Champlain, though consisting of a frigate, a brig, and twelve gun-boats, was wretchedly equipped, and the crews, not a fifth part of whom were British sailors, were made up of a strange medley of English soldiers and Canadian militia (2).

Success of the expedition in the outset. The first operations of the armament were attended with complete success. The American general, Izzard, had sailed from Sackett's harbour on Lake Ontario, towards the upper part of the lake, with four thousand men, on 10th August, to reinforce the troops in Fort Erie; so that the only forces which remained to resist Prevost on the banks of Lake Champlain were fifteen hundred regulars and as many militia, under General Macomb. Prevost's advance, accordingly, met with no interruption; and, on the 6th, his powerful army appeared before Plattsburg, then defended by three redoubts and two block-houses, strongly fortified. So inconsiderable had been the resistance made by the Americans to the British advance, that General Macomb says, the latter "did not deign to fire upon them." The three following days were employed in bringing up the heavy artillery, and it had all arrived by the 10th; but still the English

(1) Ann. Reg. 1814, 193. 199. Armstrong, ii. 525. Ann. Reg. 1814, 190. Christie, 140. Brenton, ii. 139. James, vi. 329, 331.

(2) James, vi. 339. Armstrong, ii. 110, 111.

general did not deem it expedient to make the attack till the flotilla came up; and so backward was the state of its preparations, that it only hove in sight on the morning of the 11th; and the shipwrights, as she moved through the water, were still busy at work on the hull of the *Confiance*, which bore the British commodore's flag (1).

The relative strength of the squadrons on this, as in every other naval action during the war where the British were defeated, was decisively in favour of the Americans (2); but this disparity, already great in the number of vessels and men, and weight of metal, was rendered overwhelming by the wretched condition of the British crews, not a fourth of whom were sailors, and the unfinished state of the commodore's vessel. Sir George Prevost's solicitations, however, were so pressing for the squadron to advance, that on the 11th, while the clank of the builders' hammers was still heard on board the *Confiance*, Captain Downie gave the signal to weigh anchor. He relied upon the assurance given, that the troops should commence an assault on the redoubts at the same time that the squadron attacked the flotilla in the bay, and it was not doubted that the early capture of the forts, by depriving the enemy's ships of the support of their batteries, would lead to their defeat, and the final decision of the naval contest on the lake. The moment, accordingly, that the *Confiance*, which led the British flotilla, rounded Cumberland head at a quarter to eight, Downie scaled his guns, as had been agreed on; but instead of answering the signal by an order to prepare for action, Prevost ordered his men to cook their breakfasts—a judicious step in general before a battle, but unfortunate in this instance, as it postponed the military co-operation till it was too late. Meanwhile Downie gallantly led his little squadron into action; the American fleet, under its brave and skilful commander, Captain M'Donough, being moored in line in the bay, the *Saratoga* of twenty-six guns, bearing his flag, in the centre, and the brigs *Eagle* of twenty guns, *Ticonderago* of seventeen guns, and *Pride* of seven guns, and ten gun-boats, lying on either flank (3).

As the *Confiance* mounted thirty-seven guns, she was greatly superior to any single vessel in the American flotilla; and if the British gun-boats had all followed the example set them by their commander, the combat might, notwithstanding the Americans' great superiority on the whole, have been not altogether unequal. But while the *Confiance* was gallantly leading into action amidst a tremendous fire from the American line, the whole gun-boats, except three, and one of the cutters, took to flight, leaving Downie in the midst of the hostile fleet, with his own frigate, brig, and sloop, wholly unsupported either by the land forces or his own smaller vessels. Undaunted, however, by this shameful defection, the British commander held steadily on without returning a shot, while his

(1) Prevost's Official Account, Sept. 11, 1814. Ann. Reg. 213. App. to Chron. James, vi. 341. Armstrong, ii. 111, 112. Christie, 140. 141. Cooper, ii. 489.

(3) Cooper, ii. 495, 466. James, ii. 341, 342. Christie, 141, 142. Captain Pring's Account, Sept. 1, 1814. Ann. Reg. 215. App. to Chron.

(2) Comparative force of the combatants:—

	British squadron.	American.
Vessels, (*)	8	14
Broadside guns, . . .	38	52
Weight of metal, lbs., .	765	1,194
Aggregate of crews, .	537	950
Tons,	1,426	2,540

—JAMES, vi. 346, and COOPER, ii. 495, 497.

(*) The *Finch*, a British brig, grounded out of shot and did not engage; and five of the gun-boats disappeared and never fired a shot, so these vessels are excluded from the comparison, as are the two American sloops which were not engaged.

rigging and spars were fast falling under the well directed fire of the American fleet; but the wind failing just as he was on the point of breaking their line, he was under the necessity of casting anchor within two cables' distance, and bringing his broadside to bear on the enemy. Instantly the *Confiance* appeared a sheet of fire; all her guns were discharged at once, aimed at the *Saratoga*, which bore Captain M'Donough's flag; and such was the effect of the broadside that nearly half the crew of the American vessel were struck down, and the accumulation of dead on her deck was so great that it became necessary to remove the fastenings and pass them below. The *Linnet* and *Chubb* now came up, and took up their appointed stations; but in a short time the latter was so crippled that she became unmanageable, drifted within the American line, and was obliged to surrender, while the *Finch* struck on a reef of rocks and could not get into action (1).

Total defeat of the British squadron. The whole guns of the American flotilla were now directed against the *Confiance*, which, enveloped by enemies, still maintained a gallant fight: broadside after broadside came from her, untill at length the *Saratoga*, against which her fire was almost entirely directed, had all her long guns dismounted, and her carronades so disabled that she had not a single available piece of ordnance left. Nothing was now wanting but one or two of the gun-boats to have given the British a decisive victory. But they had all fled; the *Confiance* herself was suffering severely from the concentric fire of the brigs and gun-boats which clustered round her in every direction, some raking, some astern, as well as under her bows, and Captain Downie had fallen early in the action; while her antagonist, the *Saratoga*, which she had completely silenced, lay at such a distance that she could not be taken possession of. So destructive, however, was the fire which the *Confiance* still kept up, that the *Saratoga* was on the point of surrendering, when, as a last resource, M'Donough made an effort to wind the ship round, so as to bring her larboard side hitherto untouched, to bear upon the British vessel. This skilful movement was successfully performed; the *Confiance* strove to do the same, but, from the inexperience of her motley crew, the attempt failed, and the larboard guns of the *Saratoga*, almost all untouched, now spoke out like giants, and soon compelled the *Confiance* to strike. The only remaining British vessel was now the *Linnet*; and against her the whole guns of the American squadron were immediately directed, and after a quarter of an hour's heroic resistance, she too was compelled to surrender. Captain M'Donough, on receiving the sword of Lieutenant Robertson, who commanded the *Confiance* after Downie had fallen, said, with the magnanimity which is ever the accompaniment of true valour,—“You owe it, sir, to the shameful conduct of your gun-boats and cutters, that you are not performing this office to me; for had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the *Saratoga*, that I could hold out no longer (2); and, indeed, nothing induced me to keep up her colours, but my seeing, from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the *Confiance*, and her unsupported situation, that she must ultimately surrender (5).”

Retreat of Sir George Prevost. While this desperate battle was raging on the lake the greater part of the army ashore, agreeably to Prevost's orders, continued

(1) James, vi. 344, 345. Cooper, ii. 504, 505. Christie, 142, 143. Captain Pring's Official Account, Sept. 12, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 215.

(2) Cooper, ii. 505, 507. James, vi. 341, 345. Captain Pring's Official Account. Ann. Reg. 1814, 215, 217. Christie, 143.

(3) In this desperate conflict, the *Confiance* had forty-one killed, including the lamented Captain

Downie, and sixty wounded; the total loss of the British squadron was fifty-seven killed, and ninety-two wounded: the Americans lost on board the *Saratoga*, twenty-eight killed and twenty-nine wounded; their total loss were fifty-two killed and fifty-nine wounded — James, vi. 346, and Cooper, ii. 507, 508.

inactive, though the guns of the batteries opened on the American squadron as soon as the firing commenced, but too far off to have any effect. At length the signal to attack was given, and one column, under General Robinson, advanced to ford the Saranac, and attack the works in front, while another column, led by General Brisbane, was to make a circuit and assault them in rear. Robinson's troops, however, were led astray by their guides, and did not reach the point of attack till the shouts from the American works announced that the fleet had surrendered. To have carried the works when the troops did get up, would have been a matter of ease, and would have formed a set-off at least to the naval disaster; but Sir George Prevost being of opinion, that after the command of the lake was lost, no further advance into the American territory was practicable, and consequently, that the men lost in storming the redoubts would prove an unavailing sacrifice, gave the signal to draw off, and soon after commenced his retreat. Such was the indignation which this order excited among the British officers, injured in Spain to a long course of victory, that several of them broke their swords (1), declaring they could never serve again; and the army, in mournful submission, leisurely wound its way back to the Canadian frontier, without being disquieted by the enemy.

Reflections on this expedition. The actual casualties in this ill-fated expedition were under two hundred men, though four hundred were lost by desertion during the depression and facilities of the retreat. But the murmurs of the troops and of the people of Canada were loud and long at such a termination of the operations of an armament, composed, so far as the military force was concerned, of such materials, and from which so much had been expected: and the result was, that Sir George Prevost resigned, and demanded a court-martial. He was accused accordingly, at the instance of Sir James Yeo, upon the charges of having unduly hurried the squadron on the lake into action, at a time when the Confidence was as yet unprepared for it; and, when the combat did begin, having neglected to storm the batteries as had been agreed on, so as to have occasioned the destruction of the flotilla and the failure of the expedition. The death of that ill-fated commander before the court-martial commenced, prevented these charges from being judicially investigated; but historic truth compels the expression of an opinion, that though proceeding from a laudable motive—the desire of preventing a needless effusion of human blood—the measures of Sir George Prevost were ill-judged and calamitous. His personal courage was undoubted; his character amiable in the highest degree; the mildness and conciliatory spirit of his government had justly endeared him to the Canadians; and the prudence and judgment which he had evinced, in struggling successfully with very scanty means against the formidable invasion of 1813, had gained for him general applause. From an equitable sense of these important services, the Prince Regent, after Sir George Prevost's death, publicly expressed his high sense of his conduct, and, in testimony of it, conferred additional armorial bearings on his family. Even in the campaign of 1813, however, it had become evident that his moral resolution was not equal to his personal courage; and the failure to prosecute his advantages at Sackett's harbour, had evinced a character little qualified for the actual direction of warlike operations (2). The same defects appeared still more clearly on occasion of the attack on Plattsburg; and with

(1) Sir George Prevost's Official Account, Sept. 2, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 214. App. to Chron. James, vi. 348. Christie, 144, 145. Armstrong, ii. 112, 113.

(2) *Ante*, x. 329.

every possible wish to extenuate the failing of a public servant, whom grief, perhaps, brought to an untimely grave, it is necessary to point out the disastrous effects of such ill-judged economy, even of human blood, on the future fortunes of his country. By delaying, and finally countermanding the attack on the American redoubts, at the same time that he urged the flotilla into action, he at once contributed to the naval disaster, and prevented a military triumph which would have counterbalanced it; and the saving of two or three hundred lives on that occasion, has, in its ultimate effects, perhaps bequeathed to his country a disastrous future war, in which two or three hundred thousand will be sacrificed (4).

Sortie from Fort Erie, and its evacuation by the Americans. Sept. 17. The British were in some degree consoled for this discomfiture by the repulse of a very formidable sortie made from Fort Erie. In the outset the Americans gained considerable advantages, and having succeeded, during a thick mist and heavy rain, in turning unperceived the right of the British picquets, they made themselves masters of two batteries, and did great damage to the British works. Speedily, however, the besiegers collected their troops, and the enemy were driven back to their works with great slaughter. The loss on each side was about equal; that of the British being six hundred, of whom one-half were prisoners; that of the Americans five hundred and eleven. Both parties after this became weary of this destructive warfare, carried on in a corner of Upper Canada, and Sept. 21. attended with no sensible influence on the fate of the campaign. On the 21st, as the low grounds around Fort Erie had become unhealthy, Drummond retired to higher and better quarters in the neighbourhood of Chippewa, after in vain endeavouring to provoke the American general to Nov. 5. accept battle; and soon after, General Izzard, who had come up from Sackett's harbour to Fort Erie with four thousand additional troops, so far from prosecuting the advantages which so considerable accumulation of force at that point promised, blew up Fort Erie, recrossed the Niagara, and withdrew with his whole troops into the American territory. "Thus," says Armstrong, the American war secretary, "literally fulfilling his own prediction, that the expedition would terminate in disappointment and disgrace (2)."

The British acquire the superiority on Lake Ontario. This total evacuation of the British territory, after so much bloodshed, and such formidable preparations of the Americans for its conquest, was mainly owing to the British having at length acquired a decisive superiority on Lake Ontario. During some months in autumn, Commodore Chauncey had the advantage both in the number and weight of his vessels; and while Sir James Yeo was taking the most active measures to turn the balance the other way, he had the virtue—for to a British seaman it was a virtue—of meantime submitting to be blockaded in Oct. 10. Kingston by the American squadron. At length, the St.-Lawrence, a noble three-decker of 100 guns, was launched: Chauncey instantly withdrew, and was blockaded in his turn in Sackett's harbour, and the British acquired an entire command of the lake for the remainder of the war. Oct. 16. Sir James Yeo immediately availed himself of this advantage, to convey a large quantity of stores and considerable reinforcements of troops to the upper end of the lake, and preparations were making for an active campaign in the ensuing year on both sides, the Americans having laid down two line of battle ships, and the British two frigates, on the stocks, when hostili-

(1) See Christie's Postscript, 150.

(2) Armstrong, ii. 100, 103. De Watterville's

Official Account, Sept. 17, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 259, 260. Christie, 146, 147.

lities were terminated by the conclusion of peace between the two countries (4).

Expedition against New Orleans. To conclude this history of the American war, it only remains to notice the attack on New Orleans, which terminated in so calamitous a manner to the British arms. This rising town, which then numbered seventeen thousand inhabitants, was not a place of warlike preparations; but it was the great emporium of the cotton trade of the southern States, and it was supposed, not without reason, that the capture of a city which commanded the whole navigation of the Mississippi, would prove the most sensible blow to the resources of the American government, as well as furnish a rich booty to the captors. The expedition, accordingly, which had been baffled at Baltimore, was sent in this direction, and it was the dread of crippling it for this important stroke which paralyzed its efforts on the former occasion. The troops and squadron arrived off the shoals of the Mississippi

Dec. 8. on the 8th December; but there they found a flotilla of gun-boats prepared to dispute with the boats of the fleet the landing of the troops. Immediately a detachment of seamen and marines was put under the command of Captain Lockyer, and, after a hard chase of six-and-thirty hours, he succeeded in coming up with and destroying the whole, six in number, manned by two hundred and forty men. This pursuit, however, had taken the boats thirty miles from their ships; adverse winds, a tempestuous sea, and intricate shoals, impeded their return; and it was not till the 12th that

Dec. 15. they could get back, nor till the 15th that the landing of the troops commenced. Incredible difficulties were undergone, both by the soldiers and sailors, in effecting the disembarkation and conducting the march at that inclement season; and, what is very remarkable in that latitude, nothing retarded them more than the excessive cold, from which the troops, and in particular the blacks, suffered most severely. At length, however, by the united and indefatigable efforts of both services, these obstacles were overcome; the troops, in number about four thousand five hundred comba-

Dec. 23. tants, and a considerable quantity of heavy guns and stores, were landed; an attack of the American militia was repulsed with ease the same evening; Sir Edward Pakenham arrived next day, and the army advanced in two columns to within six miles of New Orleans, where preparations for defence had been made (2).

Description of the American position, and preparatory movements. GENERAL JACKSON, an officer since become celebrated both in the military and political history of his country, commanded a military force destined for the defence of the city, which amounted to above twelve thousand men. He had turned to good account the long delays which the formidable obstacles that opposed the disembarkation of the British troops had occasioned, and the fortified position in which he now awaited an attack was all but impregnable. The American army was posted behind an intrenchment about a thousand yards long, stretching from the Mississippi on the right to a dense and impassable wood on the left. This line was strengthened by a ditch about four feet deep which ran along its front, and was defended by flank bastions which enfiladed its whole extent, and on which a formidable array of heavy cannon was placed. On the opposite bank of the Mississippi, which is there about eight hundred yards across, a battery of twenty guns was erected, which also flanked the whole front of the parapet. Some attempts were made, for some days, to commence regular

(1) Cooper, ii. 486, 490. Christie, 149.

(2) Breton, ii. 531, 533, James, iv. 357, 359. Ann. Reg. 1814, 122, 123. Armstrong, ii. 159, 165.

approaches against this formidable line of intrenchments, which was evidently much too strong to be carried by a *coup de main*; but it was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior in weight and numbers, that nothing was to be expected from that species of attack. All hands were therefore set to deepen a canal in the rear of the British position, by which boats might be brought up to the Mississippi, and troops ferried across to carry the battery on the right bank of the river; but this proved a work of such extraordinary

labour, that it was not till the evening of the 6th of January that the cut was declared passable. The boats were immediately brought up and secreted near the river, wholly unknown to the enemy, and dispositions for an assault made at five o'clock on the morning of the 8th. Colonel Thornton, with fourteen hundred men, was to cross the river in the night, storm the battery, and advance up the right bank till he came abreast of New Orleans; while the main attack on the intrenchments in front was to be made in two columns – the first under the command of General Gibbs, the second led by General Keane (1). Including seamen and marines, about six thousand combatants on the British side were in the field: a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayonets, and loaded with heavy artillery.

Dreadful
slaughter,
and re-
pulse of the
British.

Unexpected delays, principally owing to the rapid falling of the river, hindered the boats, fifty in number, which were to convey Thornton's men across, from reaching their destination at the appointed hour; and this, by preventing the attacks on the opposite banks being simultaneous, had a most prejudicial effect upon the issue of the operations. The patience of Pakenham being at length exhausted, the assault on the left bank was ordered, even before it was known whether the troops had been got across, and Gibbs' column advanced to the works. By this time, however, the wintry dawn had begun to break, and the dark mass was discerned from the American batteries moving over the plain. Instantly a tremendous fire of grape and round shot was opened on both sides from the bastions upon it; but nevertheless the column, consisting of the 4th, 21st, and 44th, moved steadily forward, and reached the edge of the glacis. There, however, it was found that, through some neglect on the part of the commander of the 44th regiment, the scaling ladders and fascines had been forgotten, so that it was impossible to mount the parapet. This necessarily occasioned a stoppage at the foot of the works, just under the enemy's guns, while the ladders were sent for in all possible haste; but the fire was soon so terrible that the head of the column, riddled through and through, fell back in disorder. Pakenham, whose buoyant courage ever led him to the scene of danger, thinking they were now fairly in for it, and must go on, rode to the front, rallied the troops again, led them to the slope of the glacis, and was in the act, with his hat off, of cheering on his followers, mortally wounded, pierced at the same moment by two balls. General Gibbs also was soon struck down; Keane, who led on the reserve, headed by the 95d, shared the same fate; but that noble regiment, composed entirely of Sutherland Highlanders, a thousand strong, instead of being daunted by the carnage, rushed on with frantic valour through the throng, and with such fury pressed the leading files on, that, without either fascines or ladders, they fairly found their way by mounting on each other's shoulders into the work. So close and deadly, however, was the fire of the riflemen when they got in, that the suc-

(1) General Lambert's Official Account, Jan. 10. Breton, ii. 533. British Camp. in New Orleans, 147. 1815. Ann. Reg. 1815, 141, 142. App. to Chron. 161. Armstrong, ii. 167, 170.

cessful assailants were cut off to a man. At the same time Colonel Ranney on the left also penetrated into the intrenchments; but the companies which carried them not being supported, were mowed down by grape-shot as at Bergen-op-Zoom. Finally, General Lambert, upon whom the command had now devolved from the death of Pakenham and the wounds of Gibbs and Keane, finding that to carry the works was impossible, and that the slaughter was tremendous, drew off his troops, who by this time had been thrown into great confusion (1).

While this sanguinary repulse, which cost the British two thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, was taking place on the left bank of the Mississippi, Colonel Thornton, with his division, had gained the most decisive success on the right. This able officer, with his fourteen hundred men, had repaired to the point assigned to him on the evening of the 7th, but found the boats not yet arrived; and it was not till near midnight that a number, barely sufficient to transport a third part of his troops across, were brought up. Deeming it, however, of essential importance to co-operate at the appointed time in the proposed attack, he moved over with a third of his men, and by a sudden charge, at the head of part of the 85th and a body of seamen, headed by himself, on the flank of the works, succeeded in making himself master of the redoubt with very little loss, though defended by twenty-two guns and seventeen hundred men, and amply stored with supplies of all sorts. He was just preparing, when the daylight broke; to turn these guns on the enemy's flank, which lay entirely exposed to their fire, when advices were received from General Lambert, of the defeat of the attack on the left bank of the river. Colonel Dickson was sent over to examine the situation of the battery which had been won, and report whether it was tenable; but he did not deem it defensible but with a larger force than Lambert could dispose of for that purpose, and therefore this detachment was withdrawn back to the left bank of the river, and the troops at all points returned to their camp (2).

The British troops after this bloody defeat were in a very critical position, far advanced into the enemy's country, with a victorious army, double their own strength, in their front, and a desert country, fourteen miles broad, to traverse in their rear, before they reached their ships. Lambert, not deeming himself in sufficient strength to renew the attack, retreated on the night of the 18th, and effected the movement with such ability, that the whole field artillery, ammunition, and stores of every description were brought away, excepting eight heavy guns, which were destroyed. The whole wounded also were removed, except eighty of the worst cases, with whom movement would have been dangerous, who were left to the humanity of the enemy: a duty which General Jackson discharged with a zeal and attention worthy of the ability and gallantry he had displayed in the action. The British troops were safely re-embarked on the 27th, and soon after in some degree consoled for their disasters by the capture of Fort Boyer, near Mobile, commanding one of the mouths of the Mississippi; which yielded, with its garrison of three hundred and sixty men and twenty-two guns, to a combined attack of the land and sea forces on the 12th February. On the very next day intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace between the United States and Great Britain at Ghent (3).

(1) Lambert's Official Account, Jan. 10. 1815, 142, 143. Ann. Reg. App. to Chron. James's Military Occurrences, ii. 170, 171.

(2) Thornton's Official Account, Ann. Reg. 157.

App. to Chron. for 1815. James's Mil. Occur. ii. 356, 361.

(3) General Lambert's Official Account, Feb. 14, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1815. 159, 161. App. to Chron.

Conclusion
of peace at
Ghent.

Conferences had for some time been going on at that city in the Netherlands, between the British and American commissioners; and as the termination of the continental war had entirely set at rest, at least for the present, the question of neutral flags, and the United States were in no condition to sustain a war singly with Great Britain, for the mere assertion of sailors' privileges against the right of search to apprehend deserters, there was no difficulty in coming to an accommodation. Accordingly on the Dec. 24, 1814. 24th December a treaty was concluded at Ghent, on terms highly honourable to Great Britain. A general restitution of conquests and acquisitions on both sides was stipulated, with the exception of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, which were to remain as to possession *in statu quo* until the decision of the commissioners appointed by the two governments, and in the event of their differing in opinion, the decision of some friendly sovereign, whose judgment was to be final. The more important point of the boundary between the American State of Maine and the British province of New Brunswick, which has since become the subject of such angry contention, both between the governments and inhabitants of the two countries, was in like manner referred to two commissioners, one to be appointed by each party; and failing their decision, or in the event of their differing in opinion, to the decision of "some friendly sovereign or state, whose judgment shall be final and conclusive (1)." A similar provision was made for the ascertainment of the disputed boundary, through the lakes Ontario, Erie, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods. All hostilities with the Indian tribes were forthwith to cease, on the part of both the contracting parties; and it was further provided, "that whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to procure its entire abolition (2), it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object." Nothing was said either on the flag covering the merchandize, or on the right of search for seamen, claimed and exercised by Great Britain.

Reflections
on this
Treaty.

Such was the treaty of Ghent, which put an end to the bloody and costly war between Great Britain and America. That it was advantageous to England, and that the United States emerged upon the whole worsted from the fight, is evident from the consideration, that neither their ostensible nor their real objects in engaging in the contest were attained. The ostensible objects were establishing the principles, that the flag covers the merchandize, and that the right of search for seamen who have deserted is inadmissible. The real objects were to wrest from Great Britain the Canadas, and, in conjunction with Napoléon, extinguish its maritime and colonial empire. Neither object was attained, for peace was concluded with-

and Jan. 28, 1815; *Ibid.* 149. James's Mil. Occur. ii. 364, 371. Armstrong, ii. 174.

(1) Whereas neither that part of the highlands lying due north from the source of the river St.-Croix, designated in the former treaty of peace between the two powers as the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, nor the north westernmost head of the Connecticut river, have yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two powers which extends from the source of the river St.-Croix directly north to the above mentioned north-west angle of Nova Scotia; thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St.-Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-westmost head of Connecticut

river; thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude till it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not yet been surveyed—it is agreed that, for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorized to examine and decide upon the said claims, according to such evidence as shall be laid before them by his Britannic Majesty and the United States respectively; and in the event of their differing, both parties agree to abide by the decision of such friendly sovereign or state as shall be mutually chosen."—*See Ann. Reg.* 1815, 254; *State Papers.*

(2) See the Treaty in *Ann. Reg.* 1815, 352, 358. *State Papers*; and *Martin's Sup.* ii. 76.

out one word being said about neutral rights; and so far from losing her North American possessions, Great Britain retained every part of them, and emerged from the contest with a much stronger and more defensible colonial dominion than she went into it. Yet were the great questions really at issue in the war, rather adjourned than decided; and the treaty itself is to be regarded rather as a long truce than a final pacification. The Maine frontier remained undecided; a territory as large as all England, and part of which is of vital importance to the security of our American possessions, was left in dispute between the parties; the commissioners of the two powers, as might have been expected, adhered to the views of their respective cabinets; the award of the King of the Netherlands, given in 1834, who was chosen umpire, which divided the disputed territory between the parties, satisfied neither side, and by common consent was repudiated; the right claimed by Great Britain of searching merchant vessels remained untouched, and was therefore virtually conceded; the important duty of searching for slaves, left unsettled, threatens, at no distant period, to render it again the subject of angry contention between the two nations; and the triumphs of Plattsburg and New Orleans, with which the war terminated, have so elated the inhabitants of the United States, and blinded them to the real weakness of their situation, that little doubt remains, that out of this premature and incomplete pacification, the germs of a future and calamitous war between the two countries will spring.

Reflections
on the
battle at
New
Orleans.

The heroic valour displayed by Sir Edward Pakenham, General Keane, and their brave comrades, in the attempt to carry by storm the lines before New Orleans, must not make us shut your eyes to the gallant and honourable, but still imprudent, hardihood which made them unduly despise their enemy, and seek to gain by force what might have been achieved by combination. When we recollect that Colonel Thornton, with his column, carried the battery on the right bank of the river with hardly any loss, thereby completely turning the enemy's position, rendering it untenable against any considerable force cannonading from that side, and exposing the city to an immediate attack from a quarter where it had no defence, it is impossible not to regret the imprudent and needless display of valour which was attended with so grievous a loss, and caused to miscarry an enterprize so well conceived, and up to that point so ably executed. True, various unforeseen accidents conspired to mar the assault; the boats did not get through the canal so soon as had been expected, so that Thornton's co-operation on the right, came too late to retrieve affairs on the left bank; and the unhappy oblivion of, or delay in bringing up, the fascines and scaling ladders, converted what might have been a successful assault there into a bloody repulse: but still these accidents are the usual attendants of a night assault, especially where the columns of attack are combined from different quarters; and the point is, might the risk of incurring them not have been avoided by throwing the whole troops on the right bank of the river as soon as the boats were got up and launched on its waters, and thereby rendering unavailing, as Napoléon did by the passage of the Danube at Entzersdorff, all the formidable intrenchments erected at so great a cost of labour by the Austrians in front of Essling? It would appear that the rapid and brilliant success of a small British force at Bladensburg, as well as on many occasions in Canada, when they met the troops of the United States in the open field, had rendered the British general insensible to the dangers of attacking them when behind formidable intrenchments, and caused him to forget that the American rifle, though unable to withstand the shock of the English bayonet

in regular combat, is a most formidable weapon when wielded by gallant hands behind trees, or under shelter of the redoubts, which so rapidly, and often fatally, equalize the veteran and inexperienced soldier.

Perhaps no nation ever suffered so severely as the Americans did from this war, in their external and commercial relations. Their foreign trade, anterior to the estrangement from Great Britain, so flourishing as to amount to L.22,000,000 of exports, and L.28,000,000 of imports, carried on in 1,500,000 tons of shipping, was, literally speaking, and by no figure of speech, *annihilated*, for the official returns show that the former had sunk in 1814 to L.1,400,000, or little more than an eighteenth part of their former amount, the latter to less than three millions (1). The capture of no less than fourteen hundred American vessels of war and merchandize, appeared in the London Gazette during the two years and a half of its continuance (2), besides probably an equal number which were too inconsiderable to enter that register; and although, no doubt, they retaliated actively and effectively by their ships of war and privateers on British commerce, yet their number was too small to produce any considerable set-off to such immense losses; and the rapid growth of British commerce (3), when placed in juxtaposition to the almost total extinction of that of the United States, demonstrates decisively, that while the contest lasted the sinews of war were increasing in the one country as rapidly as they were drying up in the other. In truth, the ordinary American revenue, almost entirely derived from customhouse duties, nearly vanished during the continuance of the war, and the deficit required to be made up by excise and direct taxes levied in the interior, and loans, which in the year 1814 amounted to no less than 20,500,000 dollars, or above L.4,000,000 sterling; an immense sum for a state, the annual income of which in ordinary times was only 25,000,000 dollars, or L.4,600,000. Two-thirds of the mercantile and

(1) Total of American exports and imports during the three years before the rupture with Great Britain, and during the three years of its continuance, Dollars converted at 4s 2d. to the dollar.

	Exports.	Imports.
1805,	L.19,909,589	L.25,125,000
1806,	21,153,552	26,978,416
1807,	22,571,488	28,869,765
1812,	8,026,506	16,047,916
1813,	5,813,322	4,584,916
1814,	1,443,216	2,701,041

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 191.

(2) Brenton, ii. 539.

(3) Table showing the official value of British exports and imports in the same years as in the preceding table.

	EXPORTS.		TOTAL.	IMPORTS.
	Foreign and Colonial.	British Manufactures.		
1805, . . .	7,643,120	23,376,941	L.31,020,061	L.28,561,270
1806, . . .	7,717,555	25,861,879	33,379,424	26,899,658
1807, . . .	7,624,312	23,391,214	31,015,526	26,734,426
1812, . . .	9,533,065	29,508,508	38,041,573	26,163,431
1813, . . .	Records	destroyed	by fire
1814, . . .	19,365,081	34,207,258	53,573,234	335,264

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 98.

trading classes in all the States of the Union became insolvent during these disastrous years; and such was the suffering and public discontent in the northern States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New England, that it altogether overcame their sentiment of nationality, and the inhabitants, when peace arrived, were formally taking steps to break off from the Union, assert their national independence, and make peace with Great Britain, the future protector of their republic (1).

Pernicious effects of this war to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain. A war fraught with such disasters to the United States, was not without its evils also to the inhabitants of Great Britain. In ordinary times, the cessation of the North American market, which at that period took off, on an average of years, twelve millions' worth of British produce and manufactures, would have been most severely felt, and it was mainly to its stoppage that the great distresses in England in 1811 and the first months of 1812 had been owing. But this market had, from the operations of the American embargo and non-intercourse act, been long in abeyance: commerce had discovered new channels; and an ample compensation for its loss, for the time at least, had been found in the markets of Russia, Germany, and Italy, now suddenly thrown open to British enterprize by the triumphs of the Allied arms. But a lasting effect, fraught with consequences injurious to British manufacturing interests, was found in the forcible direction of a large portion of the capital, and no inconsiderable part of the industry, of the United States to manufacturing employment, an effect which has survived the temporary causes which gave it birth, and, by permanently investing large capitals in that species of industry, has rendered the subsequent exports of Great Britain, if the vast increase of population in the United States is taken into account, by no means so considerable as they were before the war. When the great and growing extent of the British colonies, and the prodigious market they have opened and are opening to British manufacturing industry, both in the eastern and western hemisphere, are considered, this dependence for the sale of so large a portion of our manufactures on any foreign nation whatever, may possibly appear to be fraught with serious danger, and its curtailment rather a benefit than an injury; but an unmixed evil has arisen from the jealousy of British manufactures, which has necessarily grown up, especially in the Northern States of the Union, from the growing importance of their own fabrics, and the animosity against this country, which has in consequence arisen in those States which, when the war commenced, were most firmly attached to our alliance.

Evils which a rupture with the United States would produce. When we consider the vast evils to both countries which must inevitably arise from a renewal of hostilities between America and Great Britain; when we recollect that our exports to the United States are still on an average nine millions annually; when we call to mind that England is the great market for the cotton of the southern States, and that the intercourse between the two countries is so immense, that out of 2,096,000 tons which now constitute the foreign trade of the United States, no less than 754,000 are employed in conducting the traffic between the two countries (2); while the connexion between them is so close, that failures to any great extent in the American provinces never fail to produce stagnation and distress in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain; and two consecutive bad harvests in the British Islands, by the

(1) Tocq. i. 289. Ann. Reg. 1814, 193. *Ante*, p. 350.

(2) Porter's Parl. Tables, ix. 591, 592.

strain on the money market of London which they occasioned, caused the whole banks of the southern States of America, including the national bank of the United States, to fall in 1839; it will appear hardly possible that human folly could go so far as to produce hostilities between the two nations. This will appear the more improbable, when it is recollected how strenuously and laudably the supreme government, in both countries, have laboured to remove or soften, of late years, all causes of discord between them, and how clearly the leading men in the United States, as well as in this country, are impressed with the indissoluble union which subsists between their interests, and the disastrous effect which a rupture could not fail to have upon them. Nevertheless, nothing is more certain than that hostilities with the United States are yet not only probable, but imminent; that the deep wounds they will inflict upon either country will furnish no security against their occurrence; and that, however much the patriots of both may lament, it is their duty to provide against them. The solution of this apparent paradox is easy, if the nature of the two governments is taken into consideration.

Democracy is universally and necessarily *expansive*; for the superabundant energy which it generates at home, can only find vent in foreign acquisition. Whether it is *aggressive* or not, depends upon the situation of the democratic power, and the means it enjoys of finding vent, either in the pacific establishment of colonies, or warlike conquests with the sword. Carthage and Tyre in ancient, Genoa, Venice, and Great Britain, in modern times, have chiefly poured forth their superfluous numbers and energy in colonization: Sparta, Athens, and Rome, in antiquity, and republican France in modern times, have forced their way into the adjoining States, not with the olive branch of colonial industry, but the sword of ruthless conquest. If we would judge how rapidly and certainly democratic institutions render a powerful nation aggressive, we have only to look to the numerous wars of conquest which have been undertaken by Great Britain in the East, especially since the great democratic convulsion of 1832. America shared to the full in these spreading propensities of all republican communities; and such is the growth of its population, that expansion is to it the condition of existence. It is impossible that two such communities, brought in so many points in contact, and having so many subjects of national as well as individual rivalry, should not ere long be brought into collision. Large as it is, the New World is not, at least in their own opinion, large enough for both.

The pretensions the Americans have set up to an immense portion of the British possession in Maine, and which a glance at the map must convince every unprejudiced mind are wholly unfounded, arise from this expansive and aggressive propensity of democracy: they would willingly shoulder off the white man in the North, as they have done the red man in the West, or the effeminate Spaniard in the South. No dangers, no ultimate consequences will deter; no wisdom on the part of government will be able to restrain them: the question will not be, what do Mr. Webster or the enlightened patriots of Washington desire, but what have the ardent democrats of Maine, the Ohio, and the Mississippi determined? It is there that the ruling power of America is to be found: it is in their dispositions and passions that the spring of its future fortunes is placed. That they are essentially both expansive and aggressive, can be doubted by none who have watched the systematic efforts which they have made along the Canadian frontier for several years past to bring on a war with Great Britain. They would suffer little, at least in the first instance,

What is
the real
cause of the
danger?

Aggressive
disposition
of the Ame-
ricans, as of
all demo-
cratic states.

from such a contest, for their connexions are all inland, and their main dependence is on agricultural labour; and if they derive no other satisfaction from hostilities, they will at least be sure of this, to them no small one, of seeing the commercial wealth and paper aristocracy of New York, Pennsylvania, and the great cities on the coast, the object of their undying jealousy, destroyed by the first convulsion consequent on a rupture.

Regarding, then, hostilities with the United States as not only probable, but, it is to be feared, unavoidable, it is of importance to gather such lessons from the past as may best avoid disaster in the future.

Weakness
of America
in the
outset, and
vigour in
the end.

I. Democracy in war is just the reverse of paper credit: it is weakness in the outset, but strength in the end. Its uniform want of preparation, and resistance to present burdens for the sake of future advantages, induce the former: its inherent energy and inexhaustible resources, when fully roused, occasion the latter. It will be wisdom in British statesmen to calculate on both these occurrences. They should recollect in 1812 the Americans rushed into long meditated war with Great Britain with four frigates eight sloops, and six thousand men; but they should recollect also that with these tiny forces they achieved a greater number of victories over the British at sea than the French did during the whole course of the revolutionary war, and baffled at land the veterans of the peninsular campaigns. In a contest with America, therefore, more than any other power; it is of the highest importance to strike hard and successfully in the outset. The superior military and naval establishment, more ample revenue, and larger share of patrician direction of Great Britain, give her the means of inflicting the most serious blows on America in the commencement of the war; while the extraordinary vigour of the American people, and their native courage, render it all but certain that success will come to be more nearly balanced in the end. Every thing therefore will depend on the energy with which hostilities are *at first* conducted, and the skilful direction of the strokes which are first delivered.

Necessity
of concen-
trating the
British
forces in
such a war.

II. In such a contest, it is more than probable that England will, in the first instance, assume the offensive, and strive to make the United States feel the weight of her fleets and armies, before they have assembled any considerable or experienced forces for their defence. Towards success in such a warfare, however, it is indispensable that adequate forces should from the very outset be placed at the disposal of her military commanders, and the wretched system of starving the war in the beginning be from the beginning abandoned. Every shilling saved then will cost a pound before hostilities are over. The deplorable plan of sending out a seventy-four gun ship, four or five frigates, and three thousand soldiers, to keep the coasts of the United States in a state of alarm, must be never again renewed. If it is, a repetition of the failure at Baltimore, and the disaster at New Orleans, may with confidence be anticipated. A squadron of ships of the line and armed steamers, such as that which tore down the ramparts of Acre, should at once be equipped and kept together; not less than ten, if possible fifteen thousand land troops, should be put on board. Such a force, if directed by able officers, would, with the powerful aid of war steamers, and the present gunnery of the British marine, destroy the whole naval establishments of the United States in a single campaign. The employment of a few thousand men, merely to land here and there, as we did at Baltimore, and as we have recently done in China, would infallibly terminate, after great expense, in disappointment and defeat.

Military force by which we are likely to be opposed.

III. The military resources of the United States to resist such a system of warfare are perfectly trifling; and there is no likelihood, as long as the democratic *régime* continues in that country, of their consenting during peace to such assessment as is necessary to give them any thing like a respectable military force at the commencement of hostilities. The militia, which is established in every part of the country, cannot be considered as affording a considerable addition at any one point to the military force of the United States; for it cannot be removed far from home, and therefore the defence of each place must rest on its own immediate neighbourhood; and being exercised only three days in the year, and for the most part destitute even of uniform, it cannot be relied on for proper military operations in the field. But the experience of the last war demonstrates what, *a priori*, might have been readily anticipated, that behind intrenchments or stockades, or in the defence of woody positions, this species of force may often be extremely formidable; and the example of the contest in Tyrol in 1809, is not required to demonstrate that in such a warfare, skilful marksmen, well acquainted with the localities of the country they are employed to defend, may often succeed in defeating the best disciplined regular forces. It will be the wisdom of England, therefore in any future hostilities, to make no attempt on the American coast but with a very powerful military force; and if such is not at her disposal, to confine her efforts to a close blockade of the harbours of the United States, and bombardment of such towns as appear to be accessible to that species of attack.

All attack on private property should be avoided.

IV. In such a warfare, it is of the last importance that hostilities should be directed against *public* property or merchandize *afloat* only; and that the piratical system recently adopted in China, of threatening a city not fortified with destruction, if it does not redeem itself by a large contribution, should above all things be avoided. That was just Napoléon's system of war, which ultimately occasioned his ruin; and it was by steadily resisting any retaliation even of such a system upon him, that Wellington avoided lighting up a national war of resistance in the south of France. The conflagration of the public buildings, other than the arsenals at Washington, was as injudicious as it was unwarranted; it was that unhappy step which produced the vigorous resistance at Baltimore, and manned the redoubts at New Orleans. The open announcement of "Beauty and Booty" as the object of that expedition (1), was the mode of all others best calculated to awaken a vigorous spirit of opposition. In every mercantile community where opulence has made any progress, the great object of the citizens is, to extricate their property without serious injury from the perils of war; and when the public defence has come to depend mainly on their exertions, it is seldom that they may not be paralyzed by an offer of security to private property, and hostility only against the armaments of the state. On the other hand, a sense of danger to their own possessions, from the city falling into the hands of the enemy, is more likely than any thing to rouse its burghers to an energetic defence; and the examples of Baltimore and New Orleans may show at what a cost the resistance even of such urban militia can only be overcome.

Absolute necessity of maintaining a superiority on the Lakes.

V. The last war has clearly demonstrated that the command of the lakes is decisive of a campaign in the Canadian frontier; and that, without it, the best-laid plans of defence may fail. Both the discomfitures sustained at land in our North American possessions

—the defeat of Proctor at the Moravian village, the retreat of Prevost from Plattsburg—were the immediate consequences of the disasters on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. The movement of Chauncey gained the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Toronto was taken; and the serious invasion, which was arrested only by the heroism at Chippewa, was commenced. Knowing, then, where the danger lies, and where the means of averting it are to be found, it is the duty of the British government to be at all times prepared for hostilities, and in an especial manner ready at a moment's warning to equip or prepare a formidable naval force alike on Champlain, Erie, and Ontario. And on this subject it will be well to bear in mind two facts demonstrated by the experience of the last war, attention to which will prove of vital importance on the first renewal of hostilities. 1. That such are the facilities for shipbuilding on the lakes which the United States enjoy, partly from being at home on their shores, partly from the woods in their neighbourhood not having been felled to any considerable extent, that the American government had entered into a contract with shipbuilders at Sackett's harbour in December 1814, to have two sail of the line of 100 guns each ready for sea on Lake Ontario within *sixty days* of the time when the timber was standing in the forest (1). 2. That the rapidity of shipbuilding is much impaired on the British side, by the older civilization of the country, and the extent to which the forests near the waters on the Canadian shores have been felled for the market of Great Britain. In consequence, preparation and foresight are more imperatively required on the English than the American part; and let it be recollected, that early success, important in all wars, will probably prove decisive in the next contest with America, from the ardent passion which it will awaken in their democratic community, and the wide extent of defenceless shores which a superiority on the Lakes will at once expose to their incursions. Have we, then, an adequate supply of seasoned wood, and an ample stock of naval stores ready to turn instantly to the purposes of shipbuilding, as soon as hostilities break out, or appear imminent, with the United States; and are these stores so well secured by fortifications as to be beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*? These are questions upon which it will become the British government and nation to reflect: for upon the answer to them our preservation of Canada, our retention with it of one-fourth of our commercial marine, and consequent maintenance of our maritime superiority and national existence, are indissolubly wound up.

Errors of
the British
Government in the
late war.

VII. It must be evident to every observer, that the British government were much in error in many particulars connected with the late war with America. Undue contempt for their adversaries—ignorance of the peculiar style of frigates which they had constructed—imperfect and hasty manning of vessels—neglect in providing adequate crews of seamen for the vessels on the Lakes, lie at the root of all the disasters which were incurred. The extraordinary pressure of the latter years of the war, the wants of a navy which had then six hundred ships of war in commission, and the absolute necessity of turning every spare hand and guinea to the prosecution of the contest with Napoléon, may excuse this neglect previous to the taking of Paris, but they furnish no apology for its continuance after that period; and it was precisely then that the greatest disasters were incurred. No excuse will remain for a repetition of the errors in any future contest. We know to what causes our past reverses have been owing, and we will have ourselves to blame if they are again incurred. And of all the neces-

(1) Cooper, ii, 529.

sities of such a contest, there is none so urgent as that of providing in its very *outset* adequate crews of skilled seamen, both for the squadrons on the lakes, and the single vessels which are to combat the detached frigates which the Americans will certainly send out to cruise against our marine. Unless this is attended to, it is next to certain that disaster will be incurred : for they will man a few frigates at sea, and squadrons on the lakes, with the choice of fifty thousand seamen, thrown idle by the blockade of their harbours, and having one-half of their number English sailors.

There is
little danger
of Canada
being con-
quered by
America.

VIII. If due attention be paid to these measures of provident defence, it does not appear that any apprehension need be entertained that America will succeed, by force of arms, in wresting Canada from the British crown. It is vain for the United States to refer to their fifteen hundred thousand militia in arms : these local forces, for the most part wretchedly disciplined, and spread over an extent of territory equal to all Europe, can add little to the strength of an invading army. Such an irruption, if it is to be carried beyond the burning a few towns or arsenals on the frontier, must be conducted by means of regular forces, and the American democracy will never tax themselves, during peace, for the establishment of a powerful standing army. If, indeed, they could make war maintain war, and, like Napoléon, quarter half their troops permanently on other countries ; or like the Romans, after the subjugation of Macedonia, proclaim an universal liberation from imposts to themselves as the result of their conquests, there can be no doubt that they would gladly accede to any augmentation of their standing army. But as there is no chance of their effecting such a transference of burdens to the shoulders of the vanquished, by the conquest of their only neighbours, the Mexicans and savages, taxation, to be effective, must begin at home, and therefore, while the present constitution lasts, it never will be attempted, at least for prospective objects. The militia of the North American provinces of Great Britain amount now to above a hundred thousand : and, from a population of seventeen hundred thousand souls, they are capable of being raised to double that amount. Such a force, though of little service from the difficulty of moving it in offensive operations, is, with the aid of twenty thousand regular British soldiers, amply sufficient, especially in a woody country, to repel any invasion which the United States, with an army in peace of only twelve thousand men, could bring against it.

The Americans are not likely to become a great naval power.

IX. Notwithstanding the brilliant exploits of the American navy in the late war, and the serious conflicts which always will await the British in contending with them on that element, it may well be doubted whether the United States are ever destined to become a great naval power. Their reluctance to submit to any heavy or direct taxation during peace, with a view to secure the contingent benefits of war, must permanently prevent them from equipping an adequate number of ships. They have now a population of seventeen millions, being just the population of the British islands at the close of the war with Napoléon : Great Britain had then two hundred and forty ships of the line, and eight hundred frigates and smaller vessels in the navy (1) ; and America has now, including all building, just eleven ships of the line, seventeen frigates, and thirty-three brigs and sloops (2). The prodigious outlet for population and industry in the basin of the Mississippi, the great fortunes to be realized there, and the evident determination of the inhabitants of the United States in that direction,

(1) *Ante*, ix. 45.

(2) *Stat. Alm. of America*, 77.

leaves little doubt that agricultural industry will form the staple of the country for a course of ages. America, with its population of seventeen millions, has now only fifty-six thousand sailors in her commercial marine (1): Great Britain, with its population of twenty-seven millions, has two hundred thousand. Of the fifty-six thousand sailors in the United States, it is understood, no less than thirty-three thousand are of British origin (2). And what decisively proves that the situation of Britain is better adapted for seafaring employment than that of America, it appears from the Parliamentary returns, that while the reciprocity system, during the twenty years of its continuance, has nearly extinguished the British trade with the Baltic powers, and augmented theirs with England in a similar proportion, alone of all other countries it has led to the increase of British in a much greater ratio than of American shipping in carrying on the trade of the United States (3). And although, therefore, her tonnage is now very considerable, yet above a third of it is employed in the trade with Great Britain or her colonial possessions; while of the total tonnage of the British islands not a ninth part is employed in conducting the commercial intercourse with the American Republic (4).

Danger from Colonial defection. X. After all that can be done to secure our North American possessions by the prudence and foresight of the mother country, their maintenance must always chiefly depend on the attachment and support of their inhabitants. Much as all must lament the effect which the unprincipled acts and criminal ambition of the revolutionists of Lower Canada have had in alienating the affections of the simple-minded and industrious, and once loyal and devoted inhabitants of the lower province from the British government, the evil done is not yet irremediable; and, if taken in the right spirit, it may be rendered, as passing evils often are, of lasting benefit. It will bring to light and force into notice many evils that otherwise might have lain unobserved, and clearly suggest the necessity of their removal. The vast increase of the British inhabitants of Upper Canada, the province of our North American possessions most exposed to incursion from the United States, is an additional ground for security. But the attachment and co-operation even of that gallant and loyal race can be permanently relied on

(1) Census, 1840.

(2) Captain Marcyat's America.

(3) Table showing the comparative progress of British and American tonnage in conducting the trade with the United States:—

	British Tons.	American Tons.
1821 . . .	35,188 . . .	765,098
1822 . . .	70,669 . . .	787,961
1823 . . .	89,553 . . .	775,271
1824 . . .	67,351 . . .	850,033
1825 . . .	63,036 . . .	880,754
1826 . . .	69,295 . . .	942,206
1827 . . .	99,114 . . .	918,361
1828 . . .	104,167 . . .	868,381
1829 . . .	86,377 . . .	872,949
1830 . . .	87,231 . . .	967,227
1831 . . .	215,887 . . .	922,952
1832 . . .	288,841 . . .	949,622
1833 . . .	383,487 . . .	1,111,441
1834 . . .	453,495 . . .	1,074,670
1835 . . .	529,922 . . .	1,352,653

British shipping has, during these 15 years, increased 860 per cent.
American, 77 —

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 167.

(4) Total American and British tonnage in the year 1838:—

	Tons.
American,	1,477,928
Foreign,	624,814
Total,	2,102,742
Of which to Great Britain and Ireland,	269,466
— North American colonies,	385,506
— East Indies,	10,557
— West Indies,	76,749
— Guiana,	4,392
— Honduras,	6,434
— Australia,	1,053
Total tonnage to British Empire,	754,157
Tonnage of Great Britain in 1838:—	
British,	2,876,236
Foreign,	1,222,803
Total,	4,099,039
Of which to America—British	109,951
— — — American,	373,810
Total to United States,	483,761

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, ix. 591, 592; and 43, 44.

only in one way, and that is, by the adoption and steady prosecution of a good system of colonial government.

True prin-
ciple of Co-
lonial govern-
ment.

What should be the leading principle of such a government is no longer a matter of doubt; it was announced eighteen hundred years ago as the rule of all intercourse between man and man; and subsequent experience has only tended to demonstrate its universal application. It is simply to do as we would be done by. Consider the colonies as distant provinces of the empire; regard them in the same light as Yorkshire or Middlesex; treat them accordingly, and it will be long indeed ere they will seek to throw off the British connexion. Legislate for them as you would wish they should legislate for you, if Quebee or Calcutta were the seat of the central government, and Great Britain and Ireland the remote dependencies. Seek no profit of them which you are not willing that they should make of you; subject them to no burdens for your own advantage which you are not willing to bear for theirs; give them, in so far as distance and circumstances will admit, the same privileges and rights which you yourselves enjoy. It was neglect of these first principles, so easy to see, so hard to practise, which lost the British the United States in North, and the Spaniards the whole of South America; it is in their observance that the only secure foundation for our present magnificent colonial empire is to be found. And this affords another example of the all-important truth, which so many other passages of contemporary history tend to illustrate, that the laws of morality are not less applicable to social or political than private conduct, and that the only secure foundation for national prosperity is to be found in the observance of that system of combined justice and good-will in the concerns of nations, which the Gospel has prescribed as the rule for private life.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA, AND HUNDRED DAYS.

ARGUMENT.

Universal transports in England at the conclusion of the War—Anticipations of the friends of freedom on its results—Different issue of events—Honours and Rewards conferred upon the Generals engaged—Thanks of the House of Commons returned to Wellington in person—The Norwegian question, and commencement of the coercion of that country—Argument on the subject by the Opposition in Parliament—Answer of the Administration—Continued resistance of the Norwegians—Failure of all attempts at a Negotiation—Conquest of Norway by Sweden—Reflections on this subject, and the true grounds on which the conduct of the Allies is to be rested—The English Corn-Laws—Historical sketch of them—Progress of exportation and importation during the last hundred years—Pressing reasons for a protection to the native agriculture—Debates on this subject in Parliament—Mr. Huskisson and the Government's argument in favour of the Corn-Laws—Argument on the other side by Mr. Rose and its opponents—Progress of the Bill, which is at length carried—Reflections on this subject—Great benefit which protection to home Agriculture affords to home Manufactures—Extraordinary difficulties which beset Louis XVIII in France—Commencement of divisions in his councils—Views of the King, and formation of the Constitution—Injudicious expressions used by the King's ministers in the Legislative body—Leading Articles of the Charter—Its provisions in favour of public freedom—Its obvious defects—Real difficulties of the Restoration—Penury and embarrassment of Government—System which the Cabinet of the Bourbons pursued—Their great errors, especially in regard to the Army—Faults of their Civil Administration—Injudicious regulations concerning the troops—Character of the Ministers of Louis XVIII—General causes of complaint alleged against the Government—Commencement of the Congress of Vienna—Points on which the great powers were united—Alexander demands the whole of Poland on behalf of Russia—Views of Austria, France, and England, on this point—Division on the question of Saxony, and mutual understanding of France, Austria, and England—Great displeasure of the Emperor Alexander, and his intimacy with Prince Eugene—Triple Alliance of Austria, France, and England, against Russia and Prussia—Affairs of Switzerland, of the Netherlands, and of Italy—Consternation in the Congress of Vienna at the Landing of Napoléon—Unanimity and vigour of the resolutions of the Allied Sovereigns—Declarations of the 12th March—Enthusiasm of the German people—General coalition against France—Commencement of a conspiracy in France in favour of Napoléon—Its vast ramifications in the Army—Secret correspondence of Napoléon with Murat—Napoléon's life in Elba, and conversations with Sir Neil Campbell—His profound dissimulation—Preparations for embarking—Leaves Elba and lands in the Gulf of Juan—His first proclamation and hivouae on the French soil—His line of march by Gap towards Grenoble—Prodigious fermentation in France—Defection of Labedoyère, and memorable meeting of Napoléon with his troops—His entry into Grenoble and decrees there—Measures taken at Paris on this intelligence being received—Dismissal of Soult, and the Count d'Artois sent to Lyons—Ineffectual attempts to stimulate a Royalist resistance—Advance of Napoléon to Lyons, and general defection of the Army—Dissolution of the Chambers, and last measures of the Court—Departure of Marshal Ney for the Army, and his flagrant treason—Conduct of the Court in the last extremity—The King retires from Paris and goes to Ghent—Napoléon arrives at Fontainebleau—And makes his entry at night into Paris—Transports of joy among the Imperial party there—His civil and military appointments—General stupor of the people over France—Efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême to organize a resistance in the south—The Duchess d'Angoulême at Bordeaux—Termination of the Civil War in the southern provinces—Military Treaties between the Allies, and immense Force which was at their disposal—Preparations of the British Government for the war—Finances and Budget of Great Britain for 1815—Napoléon's prodigious activity in Military Preparations—Measures for the Restoration of the Army, and Force which he collected for the Campaign—Carnot, Fouché, and the Republicans—Their great influence with Government—Financial measures—Formation of a Constitution—Ineffectual attempts of the French diplomacy to open a Negotiation with the Allied Powers—Murat commences hostilities, and advances to the Po—Rapid march of the Austrians, and his total Defeat at Teletino—Restoration of the Bourbons to the Throne of Naples—State of the Court of Louis XVIII at Ghent—M. Chateaubriand and his able Writings—Commencement of an Insur-

rection in la Vendée—Measures of Napoléon to crush it, and Pacification of that Province—The Champ de Mai at Paris—Speech of Napoléon on the occasion—Great division of opinion at Paris—Napoléon's plan of the Campaign—Formation of a Government for his absence—Commencement of the Campaign—Force and position of the Allied Armies—Disposition of the French soldiers—Defensive preparations of Blucher and Wellington—Their effective Forces—Description of the Field of Ligny—Battle of Ligny—Desperate Conflict between the two Armies—Their mutual Exasperation—Defeat of the Prussians—Battle of Quatre Bras—Desperate Resistance of the British—Their great Losses—But ultimately repulse the Enemy—Retreat of Wellington to WATERLOO—He resolves to give Battle, in concert with Blucher—Description of the Field of Battle—Night before the Battle, and feelings in the two Armies—Force on both Sides—Commencement of the Battle—Defeat of the French Attack under D'Erlon—Capture of La Haye Sainte—Desperate charges of Cavalry in the Centre—Arrival of Bulow's corps of Prussians at Planchenois—Their repulse—Frightful carnage in both Armies—Last attack of the Imperial Guard—Its defeat—Arrival of another Prussian corps on the Field—Advance of the British and overthrow of the Old Guard—Total Rout of the French—Flight of Napoléon—His arrival at Paris—Consternation in the Chambers—Vehemence of Lafayette and the Republicans against the Emperor—Intrigues to force him to Abdicate—His second Abdication—Advance of the British and Prussians to Paris—Stormy Scenes in the Chamber of Peers—Attempts to defend Paris—Their entire Failure, and its Capitulation—Entrance of the English and Prussians into the French capital—Journey of Napoléon to Rochfort—He delivers himself up, and is taken on board the Bellerophon—Letter to the Prince Regent—Removal to St. Helena—Melancholy condition of Paris after the second Restoration—The bridge of Jena is saved by Wellington—Restoration of the objects of Art in the Museum to their rightful owners—Treaty of Peace—Severe measures of Government—Trial and Execution of Labeledoyère and of Marshal Ney—Reflections on this Event—Seizure and Execution of Murat—Napoléon at St. Helena—Conduct of the British Government towards him—His last Illness and Death—Interment at St. Helena—Parallel between him and Wellington—Subsequent Transport of his Bones to Paris—And final Deposit of them in the Church of the Invalides.

Extraordi- THE glorious termination of the war excited a degree of enthu-
nary and siastic joy in the British dominions, of which it is impossible to
unanimous give an adequate idea, and of which subsequent ages will scarcely
enthusiasm be able to form a conception. A great proportion of the people had
in Great Brit- grown into existence during the continuance of the contest, and inhaled with
tain after the peace. their earliest breath an ardent desire for its success : all capable of reflection
felt, that whatever opinion they might have entertained as to policy in the
outset, the fate and character of the British Empire had been irrevocably staked
upon the throw, and that their own and their children's freedom depended
upon its result. The progress of the struggle had been watched with intense,
and often hopeless anxiety : its conclusion was marked by a splendour as un-
looked-for as it was unexampled. With whatever diversity of feelings its
commencement had been regarded by the great parties who divided the
nation, its long continuance had united their wishes : the bloody triumphs
of the French Revolutionists had alarmed even the warmest votaries of
liberty : the stern despotism of Napoléon had alienated their affections ; his
unrelenting war against freedom, terrified their adherents. The patriots
rejoiced in the result, because it secured the glory and independence of their
country : the partizans of the aristocracy, because it closed a gulf which threat-
ened to swallow up all ancient institutions ; the friends of liberty, because it
had been achieved by the united efforts of the European people, and appeared
likely to terminate in the establishment of lasting freedom in France. The
former anticipated the commencement of an era of unexampled prosperity
from the sacrifices which had been made : the latter beheld, in the necessities
to which the continental sovereigns had been reduced, and the spirit which
they had been compelled to call forth, the dawn of a brighter day in the
annals of freedom. The visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England in the
summer of 1814, wound up these feelings to the very highest pitch. All
ranks, from the throne to the cottage, shared in the general enthusiasm. In

the anxiety and animation of public events, the distresses and the joys of private life were for a time forgotten : misery itself lost its poignancy in the contagion of general exultation. No other subject was spoken of in the streets, no other canvassed in company, hardly any other thought of in private. The feelings of the whole British nation resembled those of a crowded audience in a theatre, when the genius of the actor, and the enthusiasm of a multitude, break down the barriers of individual restraint, and draw from assembled thousands one simultaneous burst of common emotion.

Even after "the festive cities' blaze" was no longer seen, and the roar of artillery had ceased to cause the heart to throb, more thoughtful observers reflected with feelings of extraordinary thankfulness for the past and sanguine anticipations for the future on the marvellous events of the war. There seemed a poetical justice in its result, an equity in the retribution which had befallen the great and guilty nation, which spoke at once the present God. Anticipations the most sanguine on the future progress of liberty in France itself, were formed by its most zealous supporters in this country. "Deplorable as have been the excesses," it was said, "bloodstained the hands of the first apostles of freedom in that country, their labours have not been in vain. A constitutional monarchy has at last been erected : guarantees of liberty established : compared with the freedom she will enjoy under the restoration, her condition under the old monarchy was slavery itself. The blood of Robespierre was but for a season : the carnage of Napoléon has passed away ; but the glorious fabric of freedom has emerged unsullied even from the sanguinary hands of its founders, and a brighter era opened on the human race, from the very crimes which appeared to overcast its prospects."

Such hopes are the dream of the poet ; they constitute the charm of the melodrama, but they are not the history of man. A constant struggle with evil, a perpetual contest for the mastery with the powers of sin, is his destiny from the cradle to the grave of nations. The crimes committed during the Revolution had been too great, the breaches formed too wide, the blood shed too profuse, the injuries inflicted too serious, to admit of a pacific and prosperous society being built up out of the ruins they had produced. Human passions do not subside like the waves of the ocean when the winds are stilled ; human iniquity, once let loose, cannot be restrained as soon as the original actors in it have been destroyed. The winged words spoken, the immortal thoughts written, the irreparable deeds done, must work out their appropriate effect ; for good or for evil they are committed to the stream of time, and generations yet unborn must reap their fruits. Irreligion, passion, the thirst for illicit gratification, are easily let in to a nation ; they find a ready entrance in the deceitful desires of the human heart ; they are admitted amidst a chorus of joyous hopes and sanguine anticipations ; ages must elapse, generations unborn descend to their tomb, possibly a new dominant race be introduced from distant and uncorrupted states, before they can be extirpated. The effect of noble thoughts, of just principles, of elevated conceptions, is never lost ; it is more durable upon the human race, and often finally improves its fortunes ; but in the first instance it is incomparably more slow in the purification of mankind than the passions of vice are in corrupting them. He knew the destiny of mortals, and the laws of the moral world better, who said, "For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and show mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments."

Anticipations of the friends of freedom on the results of the Revolution.

Very different was the real issue of events.

Munificent
grant to the
Duke of
Wellington
and his chief
generals.
July 7.

The peace with France formed the subject of universal thought throughout the nation; but its conditions were so glorious to this country, that they could hardly form the subject of debate in parliament, and mere congratulatory addresses are hardly worthy of a place in history. Munificent provision, though not beyond his deserts, was made for testifying the national gratitude to the Duke of Wellington. It was proposed by government that L.500,000 should be voted to that illustrious commander, in addition to the L.100,000 already bestowed on him by Parliament; but when the subject was brought forward in the House of Commons, it was proposed by Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Ponsonby, highly to their honour, considering the persevering resistance they had made April 12. to the war, that it should be increased to L.400,000, making half a million in all which he had received from the gratitude of his country. The enlarged sum was voted without a dissentient voice; so completely had the transcendent services of the British hero stifled the voice of envy and stilled the passions of political hostility. Sir Thomas Graham was raised to the peerage by the title of Lord Lynedoch, with a pension of L.2000 a-year to himself and his next two surviving heirs: a similar honour and pension were bestowed on Marshal Beresford and Sir Rowland Hill, who obtained the dignities of Lords Beresford and Hill. All these grants were in like manner passed unanimously; and the gratitude of the crown was appropriately evinced by raising all his principal officers, including Picton, Cole, Leith, Clinton, and almost all the names which have now acquired a durable place in history, to the honours of knighthood; while ribands and stars were profusely scattered among their less elevated brethren in arms. Wellington himself, with the unanimous approbation of the nation, was elevated to the rank of duke (1).

Wellington's
reception
by the House
of Com-
mons, and
the
Speaker's
address.

A striking and impressive scene occurred when the British hero was presented to the House of Commons, to receive publicly the thanks of the House for the achievements which had shed such lustre on his country. He was received with loud cheers, all the members standing; and the Speaker addressed him in the following eloquent and dignified terms,—"My Lord, since I last had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed, but none without some mark and note of your rising glory. The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children. It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendancy of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires. For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction that,

amidst the constellation of illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all common acclamation conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven and the common destinies of our nature shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name—an imperishable monument—exciting others to like deeds of glory; and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country among the ruling nations of the earth (1).”

Solemn thanksgiving in St.-Paul's for peace. Indescribable was the enthusiasm which these eloquent and characteristic words excited in all who listened to them, and rapturous the applause which ensued, when Lord Castlereagh moved that they be entered on the journals of the House. The Duke of Wellington replied in modest and suitable terms, in which, without pretending to disclaim all merit himself, he ascribed the success which had been achieved mainly to the persevering support he had received from the government, and the fortitude and discipline of the troops under his command. A few days afterwards a solemn thanksgiving was returned in St.-Paul's by the Prince Regent and whole royal family, accompanied by the whole ministers and privy council, the Houses of Lords and Commons, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and functionaries in London, and the principal persons of the British empire who were then assembled in London. The multitude were deeply impressed when the august procession, decked out with all the splendour of royalty, passed through the streets; and when the Duke of Wellington, with the sword presented to him by the State before him, sat down on the right hand of the Prince Regent in the cathedral, one burst of almost overpowering emotion thrilled through every bosom in its immense extent. But who can rely on the permanent affection of the ever-changing multitude? Could the eye of prophecy have pierced the depths of futurity, it would have beheld the hero of England then “the observed of all observers,” and almost sinking under “the electric shock of a nation's gratitude,” reviled by the majority of his countrymen, execrated by the mob, and narrowly escaping death from their infuriated hands, in the vicinity of that very spot, on the anniversary of his great and crowning victory of Waterloo! Themistocles, the saviour of Athens, was obliged to seek refuge from his countrymen at the court of the great king; Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, died an exile on a foreign shore; his ungrateful country did not possess his bones (2).

Interference of Great Britain to force the annexation of Norway to Sweden. An important discussion, alike interesting from the simple character of the people whose fate was at issue, and the principles in regard to the future settlement of Europe which it involved, took place in Parliament on the subject of Norway. It has been already mentioned, that it was part of the secret engagements contracted by Alexander to Bernadotte, at Abo in 1812, that he should receive that kingdom, in exchange for the continental possessions of the Swedish crown which were ceded to Denmark, and that by the subsequent treaty with Great Britain, not only had the consent of the cabinet of St.-James's been obtained to their arrangement, but his Britannic Majesty engaged, if necessary, to assist in an active manner with his fleet to carry the treaty into effect (3). The period had now arrived when Bernadotte claimed the performance of these stipulations, and when it became necessary for Great

(1) Ann. Reg. 1814, 139. Parl. Deb. xxiii. 491.

(3) *Ante*, ix. 168.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1813. 58, 59. Chron.

Britain to perform her engagements for the coercion of the Norwegians into obedience to this transfer. The court of Denmark had acceded to it, by the treaty which admitted them into the Grand Alliance (1), as indeed it was impossible for them to do otherwise, after the overthrow of the external power of France by the battle of Leipsic and evacuation of Germany. But the Norwegians loudly protested against this forcible transfer of a free people to the rule of their hereditary enemies; and not only refused to admit the Swedish authorities, in obedience to the injunctions of the King of Denmark, but made preparations to resist any forcible occupation of their territory, and dispatched envoys to Great Britain to interest the English people in their cause. In consequence, a Swedish army assembled under the Crown Prince on the frontier, and Great Britain dispatched some vessels of war, to commence a blockade of the harbours of Norway. This proceeding excited the liveliest interest in Europe, both from the importance of the questions at issue to the parties, and the indication which it afforded of the intentions of the Allied Powers in regard to other countries, which, in like manner, it might be deemed expedient to transfer from their ancient dominion to new sovereigns. It became the subject of warm debates in the British Parliament; and the arguments there urged are the more worthy of attention, that they were brought forward in the only assembly in existence where the subject could with perfect freedom be discussed (2).

Argument
on the sub-
ject of
Norway by
the Oppo-
sition.

On the side of the Opposition, it was maintained by Earl Grey, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Wynne—"British policy never sustained a deeper shock, nor British character a deeper stain, than in the conduct which has recently been pursued in regard to Norway. If indeed it were incumbent on this country, on a fair construction of the treaty with Sweden, to assist by the co-operation of force in the reduction of Norway, it might fairly be urged that the evil, how great soever, was beyond the reach of remedy, and that even oppressions must be enforced, rather than breach of faith incurred. But are we bound by the treaty to employ force to compel the Norwegians to submit to a forcible junction with Sweden? Nothing can be clearer than that we are not. It is merely stipulated 'that we are to use our good offices to obtain the annexation, and even to employ force, if necessary.' But force was not to be employed, unless the King of Denmark refused to join the northern alliance. If, then, force had been already employed to compel that junction, we had done all that we engaged, and are liberated from any further obligations. Now, when were we called on to interpose force to compel this junction? When Denmark had joined the northern alliance—when her troops have marched in support of the common cause—and when she has not only ceded Norway, but has expressly fulfilled that condition, upon the refusal of which the employment of force was made to depend.

"We are clearly, therefore, not bound to co-operate by force, either by the letter or the spirit of the treaty; and if not, are we called upon to interpose by the nature of the transaction, or the merits of the hostility to which we have chosen to make ourselves a party? Here the argument is, if possible, still stronger. The King of Denmark had no right to transfer the people of Norway against their will. He might withdraw himself from their protection; he might absolve them from their allegiance to him; but he had no right to transfer that allegiance to another state: it became then the right of the people to determine to whom their allegiance should be transferred.

(1) *Ante*, x. 25.

(2) *Ann*, Reg. 1814, 118, 119.

Authority is not necessary to support a position so plain, so entirely in unison with the first principles of natural justice. If it were necessary to quote authority on such a point, our greatest international lawyers, Grotius, Puffendorff, and Vattel, are unanimous upon it. They state that a sovereign may, in case of necessity, withdraw his garrisons from their towns, but that this being done, it rests with the people themselves to select the state to whom they will transfer their allegiance. Provinces of an empire, indeed, such as Franche-Comté and Lorraine, have often been transferred without the consent of the inhabitants; but that does not apply to the cession of an integral independent state, such as Norway. And whenever such a stretch has been attempted, as in the subjugation of Corsica by France, or the transfer of Scotland by Baliol to Edward I, the iniquitous measure has met with the unanimous condemnation of subsequent times, and the heroes who strove to resist it have been the admiration of the historian, the theme of the poet, in every subsequent age. If a more recent example is required, look at Spain. Ferdinand VII ceded his people to Napoléon by the treaty of Bayonne; but instead of acquiescing in the transfer, they strenuously resisted it, and for the last six years our whole efforts have been directed to aid them in withstanding that usurpation, which we are now with as little justice about to force on the Norwegians.

“Have the services of Sweden in the common cause been so important, the fidelity of the Crown Prince to his engagements so conspicuous, as to call for such an act on the part of Great Britain? It is notorious that the very reverse is the case. Have Sir C. Stewart and Mr. Thornton never stated in their despatches, that Sweden was backward in aiding the common cause? Have her troops ever taken the part assigned to them in the combined operations? Even at the battle of Leipsic, Sir C. Stewart has loudly complained that Sweden hung back, and that the utmost efforts were necessary to bring her troops into action. Subsequently, instead of directing his troops to the theatre of war in Flanders, the Crown Prince employed them entirely against Denmark; and during the campaign in France, his inactivity became so conspicuous, that the Hanseatic Legion, intended to have been under his direction, was transferred to that of General Bulow, and two entire corps of his army were at once withdrawn from his orders, and placed under the directions of Marshal Blucher. Is it then for such a lukewarm, suspicious ally that we are to incur the odium of concurring in the subjugation of a freeborn and gallant people?

“The policy of this co-operation is as mistaken as its principle is unjust. Sweden is attached to France, because it may be aided, and cannot be injured by it: it is jealous of Russia, because it may be injured, and cannot be benefited by it. The Crown Prince will never lose his attachment to the land of his birth; in his case, national partiality, old recollections, will conspire with new interests and acquired desires to attach him to the French alliance. Rather than see Norway annexed to Sweden, it would be incomparably better to see it erected into an independent power. And as such a power, if independent, would necessarily be closely connected with this country, it would prove of essential service in furnishing materials for our navy from a quarter from whence the supplies are never likely to fail. But fail they unquestionably will if this annexation is persisted in; for on the first general war in Europe, Sweden will join with France, from inevitable and well-founded dread of the power of Russia (1).”

And of the
Adminis-
tration.

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Castlereagh, Lord Harrowby, and Lord Liverpool—"This question is to be determined, not by the general considerations which have been brought forward with such glowing eloquence on the opposite side, but the necessities of the case when the treaty with Sweden was concluded, and the plain meaning of that treaty itself. It was the anxious desire of this country, at the time when the co-operation of Sweden was essential to the interests of Europe, to obtain the assistance of that power against the common enemy; and to that end we engaged to put Sweden in possession of Norway, which being in possession of a hostile state, rendered it impossible for its government to send forces to any considerable amount to the continent until it was secured from attack on that vulnerable side. The Emperor of Russia, accordingly, by his treaty with Sweden, bound himself to secure to the latter power the crown of Norway; and Great Britain pledged itself by its treaty to the same effect, by using its good offices with Denmark, and if necessary by naval co-operation. It was certainly provided that we should not employ force without making an attempt to induce Denmark to join the general confederacy, and that power had done so. But unless there was something illegal in the original treaty, can it be maintained that we are bound to stop short at the nominal cession, and do nothing to put our ally in possession of the territory which we had expressly agreed he should possess?

"As to the justice of the treaty itself, that was a different question, which it was too late to discuss, as it had been concluded and acted upon, and formed part of the public convention of Europe. But even if that question were to be again opened up, nothing could be clearer than that the treaty with Sweden might be defended on the best principles of justice and expedience. Many weighty authorities indeed have laid it down, that a sovereign cannot, without the consent of the inhabitants, alienate his *whole* dominions: but they also state, what common sense sufficiently demonstrates, that a particular town or province may be validly ceded without such consent. By all the treaties which have terminated the great wars of Europe, large cessions of territory have been made; they were in fact the price of the pacification, and without them that blessing could not have been obtained. In particular, this was done by the treaties of Westphalia, of Amiens, and of Utrecht; and by all concluded by Napoléon, large provinces were ceded without any complaint being made by the gentlemen opposite. Sicily, Naples, Flanders, and almost all the smaller states of Italy, as much independent states as Norway, have at different times been ceded. Did not Lord Chatham boast that he would conquer Germany in America? a saying which, according to the doctrine now advanced, would be founded in gross injustice. If the consent of the people to their cession were requisite to the legal validity of their transfer, treaties would be nugatory; every attempt at pacification would lead only to a difficult and often ineffectual negotiation with the subjects of the territory proposed to be ceded; and wars would be interminable, from the impossibility of guaranteeing to the victorious party any advantage which might induce him to terminate his hostility. The obligation on the part of subjects to submit to such transfers, is but a part of the general result of the social union, by which the original liberty of each citizen is to a certain degree impaired for the public good.

"Whether or not the Crown Prince has in every instance exerted himself with the greatest vigour for the prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy, is not now the question. Suffice it to say, that his co-operation on the whole has been of the most essential service, and such as fully entitles him

to his stipulated reward. Had he not, by his accession to the alliance, created a formidable diversion in the rear of the French army which penetrated into Russia, we might have been at this moment occupied, instead of discussing the *minutiæ* of our engagements with Sweden, in anxiously deliberating on the means of averting invasion from our own shores. The policy of strengthening Sweden is equally clear : the great evil of modern Europe, which has hitherto led to such frequent wars of ambition by the greater powers, has been the number of lessèr states with which they are surrounded, at once a field for their hostility and a prey to their cupidity. It is our wisdom, therefore, so to strengthen the second-rate powers as may render the balance more even, and prevent their dominions from becoming, as heretofore, the mere battle-field in which the greater powers find an arena for their contests and the prize of their hostility. The resistance of the Norwegians to this projected union with Sweden has been entirely fomented by the Danes, who, having secured their equivalent in Pomerania, are now striving also to retain Norway : it has been consequent on a journey of the heir-presumptive of the crown of Denmark, who went from Copenhagen to Norway, and was declared king of that country. The terms of the proposed union were studiously concealed from the Norwegians; but when they come to be known, all opposition on their part will cease, as it has already done in a large portion of the most respectable and enlightened inhabitants (1)."

Continued
resistance
of the Nor-
wegians.

Upon a division Parliament supported ministers in the course they had adopted on this subject in both houses : the majority in the Peers being 81, in the Commons, two days afterwards, no less than

158. The resistance of the Norwegians, however, still continued; and it became necessary for the Swedish government to have recourse to actual hostilities to effect the occupation of this much-coveted acquisition. A proclama-

Feb. 24. tion of the King of Sweden, containing an engagement to leave to the nation the power of establishing a constitution on the footing of national representation, to leave to its inhabitants the power of taxing themselves,

April 13. and not to consolidate the finances of the two countries, met with very little attention, as did a letter addressed to them by the King of Denmark two months afterwards, in which he counselled them to submit, disavowed the act of Prince Christian, who had gone to Norway and been proclaimed King of that country, and forbade all the officers in his service to remain in the country in its present state. Prince Christian, however, was not discouraged; he traversed the mountains between Sweden and Drontheim, and was every where met by crowds of peasants, shouting with enthusiastic ardour, "We will live or die for old Norway's freedom;" and when at the monument in the pass of Gutbrandsthal, famous for the destruction of a band of Swedish invaders, he read the inscription, "Woe to the Norwegian whose blood does not boil in his veins at the sight of this monument!" thousands of voices rent the sky with the exclamation, "Thou shalt not leave us!"

Feb. 19. Continuing his journey to Drontheim he was unanimously saluted as Regent : the Danish flag was taken down to the sound of a funeral dirge; the Norwegian banner hoisted amidst shouts of acclamation; Norway was

Feb. 21. declared independent; peace was declared with Great Britain; a deputation appointed to wait on the British government to deprecate the proposed coercion; and Count Axel Rosen, the Swedish envoy, who came commissioned to receive execution of the treaty from the government of Stockholm, was informed that, till the declaration of independence was commu-

(1) Parl. Deb. xxviii. 783, 807,

nicated to the powers of Europe, no answer to his requisitions could be made (1).

Failure of
all attempts
at negotia-
tion.

The engagements of the Allied powers, however, towards Sweden, were too stringent to permit of any attention being paid even to these touching appeals of a gallant people struggling for their independence. Mr. Anker, the Norwegian envoy to the Court of London, was informed by Lord Liverpool of the situation and obligations of the British government, and desired to return to Norway; but still the Norwegians were undismayed, and on the 19th April, the Diet, by a considerable majority, conferred the crown on Prince Christian and his male heirs.

April 19.

July 10.

July 26.

Aug. 17.

M. Morier was afterwards dispatched by the British government to endeavour to effect a pacific settlement of the differences, and soon after the envoys from all the Allied powers arrived in Norway with a similar intention, but all their efforts were fruitless; they departed from Drontheim without having induced either Christian or the Diet to submit, and preparations on both sides were immediately made for war (2).

Conquest
of Norway
by Sweden.
July 26.

It belongs to the northern historians to relate in detail the circumstances of the brief but interesting campaign which followed. Suffice it to say, that the Norwegian flotilla was defeated near the Hualorn islands, with hardly any loss to the Swedish squadron, and that Bernadotte having put himself at the head of the invading army, twenty thousand strong, the frontier was immediately crossed; and, although General

Aug. 2.

Aug. 4.

Aug. 10.

Gahn was, in the first instance, defeated in an attempt to force the mountain passes, yet Frederickstadt was captured two days after; the strong position of Isebro was soon after forced, with considerable loss to the Norwegians; General Vegesack defeated a body of six thousand gallant mountaineers; Sleswick was abandoned, and taken possession of by the invaders; the passage of the Glomman was forced; preparations were made for the bombardment of Frederickstein, before which Charles XII lost his life; the ridge of the Kgolberg was carried after a brave resistance, and

Aug. 11.

Aug. 12.

preparations were made for surrounding, with a very superior force, the army of Prince Christian, situated near Moss. Further resistance would now have been hopeless; the match was evidently unequal; and therefore Prince Christian made proposals to the Crown Prince which

Aug. 14.

were accepted. By this convention the Danish prince resigned all pretensions to the Crown of Norway; and, on the other hand, the Crown Prince accepted the constitution for Norway which had been fixed by the Diet of Eswold, and engaged to govern it with no other changes than were necessary to the union of the two kingdoms. After some local disturbances and great heartburnings among the peasantry, this convention was submitted to; the Diet at Christiana, by a majority of 74 to 5, agreed to accept their new King, and consent to the union of the two kingdoms; the terms arranged were in the highest degree favourable to the Norwegians, who preserved the substance though not the form of independence, and a degree of popular power which would be inconsistent with good government in a less primitive state of society. Bernadotte has since ruled them with leniency and judgment; and though many old patriots still mourn over the loss of their political independence, Norway has had no real reason, from its subsequent government, to regret its union with the Swedish monarchy (3).

Oct. 5.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1814, 40, 41. Parl. Deb. xxvii. 807, 864.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1814, 43, 44. Mém. de Charles Jean, ii. 156, 161.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1814, 44, 48. Mém. de Charles Jean, ii. 183, 197. Bulletin of Bernadotte, Aug. 6, 1814. Ibid.

Reflections
on this
subject.

Although the military events of this miniature contest are of little importance, yet the moral and political questions which it involves are of the highest interest, and by much the most material which arose for the consideration of the statesmen of Europe upon the overthrow of the French Empire. By that great event, dominions which had been incorporated with it under the sceptre of Napoléon, containing thirteen millions of souls, besides states embracing a still greater number, forming part of his Allied dependencies, had been in great part bereft of their former government, and lay at the disposal of the Allied powers. It became, therefore, a matter at once of the highest importance, and of no small difficulty, to provide properly for the political distribution of the conquered or rescued states; for, on the one hand, the general interests of Europe imperatively required that the old arrangements should not in every instance be specifically resumed, as experience had demonstrated that if they were so, the weakness of the intermediate states rendered them an immediate prey to the ambition of the greater; and on the other, the attachment of the people to their old sovereigns and form of government was often strong, always respectable; and it ill became the champions of European independence to terminate their work of deliverance by an act of injustice which might be paralleled to any to terminate which they had taken up arms.

And the
true ground
on which it
is to be
rested.

In these difficult circumstances, where state necessity and insurmountable expedience pointed to one course, and a sense of justice and regard to the rights of man appeared to demand another, it is not surprizing that the decision of the Allied powers should have been the subject of impassioned declamation, and that the annexation of Norway to Sweden, of great part of Saxony to Prussia, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, the Milanese to Austria, and Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont, should have been represented as acts of violence and spoliation, equal to any which had stained the arms of Napoléon. Without pretending to vindicate all those measures, and fully admitting the principle, that the end will not justify the means, there is yet this important fact to be observed, which draws a broad and clear line of distinction between all these acts of incorporation, and those which were so loudly complained of under the government of the French Emperor. All these states, which were disposed of, some against their will, by the Congress of Vienna, were at the close of hostilities *at war* with the Allied powers: they were part of the French Empire, or of its Allied dependencies; and if they were allotted to some of the conquering powers, they underwent no more than the stern rule of war, the sad lot of the vanquished from the beginning of the world. The contest, moreover, on the termination of which they were partitioned, was one of the grossest aggression on their part: their forces had all formed part of the vast crusade, at the head of which Napoléon had crossed the Niemen, and carried the sword and the firebrand into the heart of Russia; and if they in the end found the scales of fortune turned against them, and lamented their forcible transference to the rule of another, they underwent no other fate than the just law of retribution; they experienced no more than they had inflicted on the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Dutch; than they had attempted to inflict on the Spaniards and the Russians.

The English
Corn Laws.

Another subject in the highest degree interesting, both to the domestic historian of Great Britain and the general annalist of Europe, which underwent a thorough discussion, and was placed on a new footing at this period, was the English CORN LAWS.

Historical
sketch of
the Corn
Laws.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century, England had been to a certain, though not a large, extent an exporting country; and so great was the influence of the landowners in the legislature, that they were powerful enough to obtain the granting of a bounty of five shillings a quarter on the exportation of wheat to foreign states. By the 1 statute of William and Mary, c. 42, passed in the year 1688, exportation was allowed when wheat shall be at or under 48s. the quarter, and a bounty of 5s. a quarter, was allowed. The bounty was repeatedly suspended during the next century when grain was high, and a great variety of temporary statutes were passed to alleviate passing distress; but this bounty continued to be the general law of the country till 1765, when, by the 5 Geo. III., c. 51, the bounty was entirely abolished, and all import duties repealed. This continued the law till 1791, when, by the 51 Geo. III., c. 50, the old bounty of 5s. was revived when wheat shall be under 44s. the quarter; when above 46s., exportation was prohibited. On imported wheat, if prices were under 50s., a duty of 24s. 3d. was imposed: from 50s. to 54s., the duty fell to 2s. 6d.: and above 54s., the duty was only 6d. This scale was to a certain degree modified by the 44 Geo. III., c. 109, passed in 1804, by which act export was allowed when wheat was at and under 48s., with a bounty of 5s.: above 54s. there was no export: import, if prices were under 65s. was allowed only on payment of a duty of 24s. 3d.; from 65s. to 66s., at a duty of 2s. 6d.; above 66s., at a duty of 6d. The object of these, and an immense number of intermediate temporary or partial acts, was to prevent that grievous evil to which society is subjected in the great fluctuation of the prices of grain, and secure (1), as far as human foresight could, the advantage of a plentiful supply and steady prices in the article of human subsistence.

Under the operation of these statutes, Great Britain long continued an exporting country. From 1697 to 1766, a period of nearly seventy years, the annual amount of exports was, with the exception only of six years, much greater than that of imports, and this excess had, in the middle of the eighteenth century, sometimes reached as high as 900,000 quarters (2). From 1766, however, the balance turned the other way, and the amount imported, generally, though not always, exceeded that exported; until, during the dreadful scarcity of 1800 and 1801, and the scarcely less severe season of 1810, the quantity imported had ranged from 1,200,000 to 1,500,000 quarters (5). This was a most

(1) Parl. Deb. xxvii. 670, 682.

(2) Quarters of wheat exported and imported from England:—

		Quarters Exported.		Imported.		Price of Wheat per Quarter.
1748	—	545,387	—	385	—	L. 1 12 10
1749	—	629,949	—	382	—	1 12 10 ¹ / ₄
1750	—	947,602	—	279	—	1 8 10
1751	—	661,416	—	3	—	1 14 2
1752	—	429,279	—	0	—	1 17 2 ¹ / ₄

Parl. Debates, xxvii. 682.

		Wheat Quarters exported.		Quarters imported.		Price of Wheat.
(3) 1800	—	22,013	—	1,264,520	—	L. 6 7 0
1801	—	28,406	—	1,424,766	—	6 8 6
1802	—	149,304	—	647,664	—	3 7 2
1803	—	76,580	—	373,725	—	3 0 2
1804	—	63,673	—	461,140	—	3 9 6
1805	—	77,959	—	920,834	—	4 8 0
1806	—	29,566	—	310,342	—	4 3 0
1807	—	21,365	—	400,759	—	3 18 0
1808	—	77,567	—	84,466	—	3 19 2

important change, and that in prices was hardly less so; for on an average of ten years for the last hundred and fifty years, the price of wheat had doubled, and as compared with the middle of last century more than tripled (1). These facts naturally awakened the anxious solicitude of the legislature and the country at the close of the war, when the restoration of a general peace exposed the British farmer anew to the competition of the foreign producer, and the vast change of prices consequent on the suspension of cash payments in 1797, and subsequent boundless expenditure of the war, had rendered him so much less qualified to bear it.

Pressing reasons for a protection to native agriculture. Agriculture had immensely increased under the combined influence of foreign exclusion and domestic encouragement in the latter years of the contest. Capital to the amount of several hundred millions sterling had been invested in land, and was now producing a remunerating return; the home cultivators, notwithstanding an increase of nearly fifty per cent in the number of the people during the last twenty-five years, had kept pace both with the wants of the people, and the rapidly augmenting luxury of the age; the importation of grain for the three preceding years had been a perfect trifle, and it had become a very grave question, whether these advantages should now be thrown away, and the nation, after having by a painful process of foreign warfare been raised to a state of independence of foreign supplies, should now, by the inundation of continental grain, consequent on the expenses and high prices which that very war had occasioned, be reduced to a state of dependence on external powers for the most necessary articles of subsistence.

Mr. Huskisson's and the Government's arguments in favour of the Corn Laws. On the one hand, it was argued by Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Frankland Lewis—"The two grand objects which the House has to obtain by the proposed measures, are to render the nation independent of foreign supply, and to keep the price of corn as nearly equal as possible. Under the system begun in 1763, which has now been in operation for nearly fifty years, the country has been gradually becoming more and more dependent of foreign countries for a supply of grain, and prices have been kept in a continual state of fluctuation. All this has happened in consequence of deviating from a system, which, for nearly sixty years previously, had rendered the country nearly independent of foreign supply, and during which period the fluctuation of prices had never exceeded one third. Instead of which, during the last forty years, large importations had taken place, and the fluctuations had risen as high as three to one, instead of one to three. What must be the state of the law

		Wheat Quarters exported.		Quarters imported.		Price of Wheat.
1809	—	31,278	—	448,487	—	5 6 0
1810	—	75,785	—	1,530,691	—	5 12 0
1811	—	27,765	—	292,238	—	5 8 0
1812	—	46,324	—	129,866	—	6 8 0
1813	—	Records destroyed by fire.				6 0 0

—*Parl. Deb.* xxvii. 682, 683.

(1) Average price of wheat during ten years:—

Ending	1655	51	7½
—	1665	50	5¼
—	1675	40	11½
—	1685	41	4½
—	1695	39	6¼
—	1705	42	11
—	1815	44	2½
—	1725	35	4½
—	1735	35	2

Ending	1745	32	1
—	1755	33	2½
—	1765	39	3½
—	1775	51	3½
—	1785	47	8½
—	1795	54	3¼
—	1805	81	2½
Eight years to	1813	101	9½

—*Report of Committee on Corn Laws, 1814; Parl. Deb.* xxvii. 687.

which produced these evils, if they have been produced by law, of which there can be no doubt? and is not some remedy necessary?

“It is impossible on temporary fluctuation to raise the price of labour in proportion to the rise in the price of grain; and as the agricultural labourers constitute the largest class, and their earnings approach nearest to what is necessary for mere existence, any temporary rise in the price of grain is more severely felt by them than any others, and this evil has exhibited itself in augmented poor-rates and many other forms. The fluctuation of prices is an evil as much to be guarded against as too high a price: a total prohibition of exportation, it is true, may raise the price; but a medium may be found which will at once keep the price steady, and not unduly elevate it. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the importance of importation of grain, it is well known that in no year has it reached higher than a tenth or twelfth of the annual consumption. If no foreign corn had been imported, the nation would have saved in the last twenty years sixty millions sterling; nor can it be said, that without this importation sixty millions worth of our manufactures would have remained unsold; for what would those sixty millions have effected if they had been invested in land? What improvements would they have effected in our agriculture—what increased means of purchasing our manufactures would they have given to our cultivators? When the law permitting the importation of corn was first passed, there was a violent outcry against it; but what had been its effect? Why, that Ireland had come to supply England with corn, for which she had received several millions which had been employed in improving her soil, which, but for that law, would have gone to Holland or some other country. The importations from Ireland now amount to three millions annually, with a probability of a still greater increase. Are we prepared to throw away that benefit to our own subjects? Circumstances over which we have no control have of late years given an extraordinary impulse to British agriculture, and rendered us again independent of foreign nations. Having paid the price of our independence, would it be wise now to permit the domestic culture of the country to be destroyed, and render us again dependent on foreign nations? Such an advantage would be readily seized on by any power, and used to the annoyance, it might be the subjugation, of any country which should submit itself to such an evil. If the law is left in its present form, agriculture will speedily recede; the low price of corn produced by foreign importation will at once decrease the supply of corn, and throw out of employment a vast multitude of agricultural labourers; and thence will arise a double evil at once to the land-owners, the farmers, and the nation—a loss of capital to a prodigious extent will ensue; rents will be immediately lowered; the best market for our manufactures, the home market, will be essentially injured. The true wisdom of the legislature will be to impose a fluctuating scale of duties, which shall, when prices are high, let in importation from all the world, and gradually rising as prices fall, shall, when they reach a certain point of depression, operate as a prohibition against it—assuming 65s. the quarter, then, as the turning point at which the prohibitory duty of 2½s. 3d. should operate, the true principle appears to be to adopt a sliding scale, which shall add a shilling to the duty for every shilling which wheat falls, and take off a shilling for every shilling which it rises; so that at 86s. there should be no duty at all; and, at the same time, to lower these duties to one half on grain imported from our own colonies (1).

Argument
on the
other side
by Mr.
Rose and
its oppo-
nents.

On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Rose and Mr. Canning, —“ Taking it for granted that no one entertains the slightest idea of introducing an entirely free importation, the great point is, at what price is importation to be restrained, and exportation permitted. The last average price of wheat at Dantzic is 56s., and the charges thence to the port of London are 26s., which in the war had risen as high as 82s. The supply of wheat in times of scarcity is now almost entirely from Poland, and the prices there are chiefly determined by those in this country. Now, if there be no restraint in the way of export, corn may be sent out of the country to such an extent as to be altogether beyond the reach of the artisans and labourers. It is mere legislation in favour of a particular class in society, to make the regulating price for the duties on the exportation of corn a very high one, while at the same time free and unrestrained importation is permitted. What in such a case becomes of the consumer? The middle and labouring classes have for many years endured, with exemplary patience, such a rise in the price of the necessaries of life as has exposed them to the severest privations. What then can be more unjust than now, when they may with confidence look forward, from the return of peace, to a fall of prices, to perpetuate their distresses by such forced measures of legislation as shall permanently retain prices at the war level? The interests of the grower and consumer, when properly understood, are by no means incompatible; but the question is, whether, in the measures recommended by the committee, and now pressed upon the House, the only point considered has not been the interest of the grower?

“ The poor-rates must be inevitably and seriously augmented if the present high rate of prices continue, and will not that abstract a large portion of the profits which they will bring to agriculture? This was sorely felt in 1800 and 1801, during which years this burden was in many places doubled. The revenue will be seriously affected by the virtual prohibition in ordinary years of all imports of grain, and consequent cessation of the whole duties obtained on its introduction. We are told the farmer requires protection, and would be ruined by foreign competition. How do the facts tally with this assertion? From 1801 to 1811 the population of England alone has increased 1,448,000; of the whole British islands probably 2,500,000; in that period the average excess of importation over exportation has increased by 586,000 quarters; not a fifth part of the wants of the increased population, at a quarter a head; and even that includes two years of the severest scarcity ever known. This clearly demonstrates that the remainder has been obtained by the additional produce of our own agriculture, and in fact the advances made in that branch of industry of late years have been immense, as every part of the country demonstrates. If, then, agriculture is already so flourishing, why seek to prop it up at the expense of the other classes by artificial legislative enactments?

“ To one class of society the committee and their supporters in this House hold out an expectation, that by increased cultivation bread will become cheap; to another, that by raising the prices of importation, and lessening those of exportation, corn will become dearer. These propositions cannot both be true; and there appears every reason to believe that the benefit to the landowner and farmer will be incomparably less than the detriment to the consumers. The former have hitherto in one way or other been indemnified for their burdens; but the latter have not; and it will be the height of injustice to pass a law which shall render the price of grain permanently twice as high as it was before the war began. Delay in a question of such

importance, and so vital in its consequences to the country, is loudly called for; and during the prorogation of parliament information may be collected, which may be the means of adjusting it more in conformity with the interests of all classes in the nation (1).

Progress of the bill, which is at length carried.

The arguments of Mr. Huskisson and Sir Henry Parnell proved entirely successful in the House of Commons, by whom the resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parnell as the chairman of the committee, with the modification contended for by Mr. Huskisson, were carried without a division, and the sliding scale, commencing with a duty of 24s. at 65s. the quarter, and declining 1s. with every shilling the price advanced, was agreed to. But the reception of these resolutions by the country was very different. Great alarm arose in the large towns and manufacturing districts, that their interests were about to be sacrificed to those of the landed proprietors; petitions for delay and further enquiry flowed in from all quarters; Mr. Canning presented one from Liverpool, signed by twenty-two thousand names; and such was the effect of these remonstrances, that after the subject had been repeatedly before the House, it was finally carried by

June 6.

General Gascoigne, by a majority of ten, that the bill should be taken into consideration that day six months, in other words it was lost. The bill was, however, brought forward again in the next session of Parliament, when it was made the subject of most able debates in the two Houses of Parliament; but at length it was carried by large majorities in both Houses, that in the Commons being 164, in the Peers 124 (2).

Reflections on this subject.

“High prices and plenty,” says Adam Smith, “are prosperity: low prices and scarcity are misery.” “It is to no purpose,” said Dr. Johnson, “to tell me that eggs are a penny the dozen in the Highlands; that is not because eggs are many, but because pence are few.” In these profound and caustic sayings is to be found the true principle which in every old and opulent community, of necessity renders a corn law and heavy duties upon the importation of foreign grain, except during periods of actual scarcity, unavoidable. It is in their very riches, the multitude of their cash transactions, in the weight of their taxes, the magnitude of their debt, the bequest of previous ages of credit, that the reason for this necessity is to be found. The prices of labour, of cultivation, of the implements of husbandry, of horses, of seed-corn, are necessarily higher in the old established community than in the comparatively infant state, for the same reason as they are dearer in the metropolis than in the remote provinces of the same empire, or in the metropolis itself during the season of gaiety or fashion, than in the other times of the year. This reason being permanent, and founded in the nature of things, is of universal application.

Great benefit which protection to home agriculture affords to home manufactures.

Nor do the manufacturing classes suffer by such regulations as in ordinary seasons confine the supply of the home market to domestic cultivators: for their effect is to augment the riches, and increase the means of purchasing manufactured articles, in the possession of the best consumers of domestic fabrics. It would be a poor compensation to the British manufacturer, if a free importation of grain ruined the cultivator of Kent or East Lothian, who consumed at an

(1) Parl. Deb. xxvii. 666, 706.

It is impossible in such a question as the corn laws, where details and figures constitute the foundation of the subject, to give any idea, in an abstract of a few pages, of the arguments on either side. This debate, with the report of the committee on which it is founded, will be found to contain

more ample information, both on the statute law, regarding the corn laws, and the influence they had on prices for one hundred and fifty years before 1814, than any other documents in existence. —See *Parl. Debates*, xxvii. 670, 690.

(2) Parl. Deb. xxx. 123, 149.

average seven pounds' worth of British manufactures, to remind him that by so doing you had called into existence the serf of Poland or the Ukraine, who did not consume the amount of sevenpence. The best trade which any nation can carry on, as Adam Smith remarked, is that between the town and the country; and subsequent experience has amply demonstrated the truth of the observation (1). No nation can pretend to independence which rests for any sensible portion of its subsistence in ordinary seasons on foreign, who may become hostile, nations. And if we would see a memorable example of the manner in which the greatest and most powerful nation may in the course of ages come to be paralysed by this cause, we have only to cast our eyes on imperial Rome, when the vast extent of the empire had practically established a free trade in grain with the whole civilized world; and the result was, that cultivation disappeared from the Italian plains, that the race of Roman agriculturists, the strength of the empire, became extinct, the legions could no longer be recruited but from foreign bands, vast tracts of pasturage overspread even the fields of Lombardy and the Campagna of Naples, and it was the plaintive confession of the Roman annalist, that the mistress of the world had come to depend for her subsistence on the floods of the Nile (2).

While England was occupied with this momentous subject, forced on its immediate attention by the return of pacific relations with the Continent of Europe, France was painfully emerging from the crisis which had terminated in the overthrow of Napoléon. No task that ever fell to the lot of man to perform, was probably more difficult than that which now devolved on the French monarch: for he had at once to restrain passion without power, to satisfy rapacity without funds, and to satiate ambition without glory. During the dreadful struggle which had immediately preceded the fall of the empire, the evils experienced had been so overwhelming, that they had produced a general oblivion of lesser grievances, and an universal desire for instant deliverance. But now that the terrible conqueror was struck down, and the parties whose coalition had effected his overthrow were called on to remodel the government, to share the power, to nominate the administration, irreconcilable differences appeared among them. Mutual jealousies, as rancorous as those which had rent asunder the empire at its fall, already severed the monarchy on the first days of its restoration; and opposite pretensions, as conflicting as those which brought about the Revolution, tore the government, even from its cradle. The seeds of the disunion which paralyzed the restoration, were beginning to spring even before Louis XVIII had ascended the throne: and his subsequent reign, till the Hundred Days, was

(1) Table showing the exports from Great Britain and Ireland in 1836, with the population and proportions per head, in the under mentioned countries, viz.:—

	Population.		Exports in 1836.		Proportion per head.		
Russia,	60,000,000	—	L. 1,742,433	—	L. 0	0	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Prussia,	14,000,000	—	160,472	—	0	0	3 $\frac{2}{3}$
France,	32,000,000	—	1,591,381	—	0	0	11 $\frac{1}{2}$
Sweden,	3,000,000	—	113,303	—	0	0	9
British North	1,500,000	—	2,739,291	—	1	11	6
American colonies, }							
British W. Indies,	900,000	—	3,786,453	—	3	12	6
British Australia,	100,000	—	1,180,000	—	11	15	0
Great Britain and Ireland, . .	26,000,000	—	200,000,000	—	7	16	9

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, 1836, vi. 102.

(2) Tacit. Annal. xii. 53. Gibbon, vi. 235.

but an amplification of the causes which produced the return of Napoléon (1).

Commencement of divisions in the councils of Louis XVIII. The republicans in the senate, the veterans of the Revolution, the hoary regicides decorated with the titles of the empire, had joined with Talleyrand and the royalists to dethrone Napoléon, solely on the promise that their wishes should be attended to in the formation of the new constitution, and that they should individually obtain a large share in the appointments and influence of the monarchy. The most extravagant expectations had in consequence been formed as to the extent to which popular power was to revive with the Restoration: the constitution of 1791 was openly talked of as the basis of the restored monarchy: it was declared that the king would only be recalled on condition that he implicitly subscribed the constitution chalked out by the senate. The Emperor Alexander publicly supported these principles, and used his influence to procure from Louis XVIII, even before he left London, a declaration to that effect; while the Abbé de Montesquieu, who was the most confidential adviser of the king, warmly espoused the opposite side, and counselled the monarch to disregard altogether the restraints sought to be imposed on the royal prerogative. The Count d'Artois, when he arrived at Paris, embraced the same views; and the Abbé de Montesquieu, in repeated memorials, pressed similar advice on the monarch. These divisions soon transpired, parties were formed, leaders took their sides; and to such a length did the dissensions arise, that it required all the influence of Talleyrand and Fouché, who had now come up to the scene of intrigue, to procure the proclamation of Louis XVIII by the senate, before its conditions had been formally agreed to (2).

Views of the King, and formation of the Constitution. The ideas of the French king, however, matured by long misfortune and reflection, were completely formed. He was determined to steer a middle course between the Royalists and the Republicans; and hoped, without submitting to such conditions as might alienate the former, to acquiesce in all the reasonable demands of the latter. With these views, he determined to make no terms with his subjects, but simply mount the throne of his ancestors, and, when there, grant of his own free-will such a constitution to his subjects as might satisfy even the warmest friends of civil liberty. A commission was accordingly formed, consisting of nine members of the legislative body, nine of the senate, and four commissioners appointed by the king, to frame a constitution. Their labours were not of long duration; they continued only from the 22d to the 27th May, at the close of which time the celebrated CHARTER was prepared, which was solemnly promulgated with great pomp, to both the senate and legislative body, on the 4th June, in the Bourbon palace. The king there read a speech which he had composed himself; he addressed the peers and deputies as the representatives of the nation, and announced that he had prepared a charter which would be read to the meeting. He concluded with these words: — “A painful recollection mingles with my joy at thus finding myself for the first time in the midst of the representatives of a nation which has given me such numerous proofs of its affection. I was born, I hoped to remain all my life, the most faithful subject of the best of kings—and now I occupy his place. But he yet breathes in that august testament which he intended for the instruction of the august and unhappy infant to whom it has been my lot to succeed. It is with my eyes fixed on that immortal work

(1) Cap. Cent Jours, i. 42, 44. Thib. x. 117.
119.

(2) Cap. i. 43, 49. Thib. x. 117, 118.

—it is penetrated with the sentiments which dictated it—it is guided by the experience, and seconded by the counsels of many among you, that I have drawn up the constitutional charter which shall now be read (1).”

Injudicious expressions used by the King's ministers in the Legislative body. These words were received with loud applause from all sides; but a feeling of surprize, a murmur of dissatisfaction ran through the assembly, when M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, declared, that “the king, taught by twenty-five years of misfortune, had brought his people an ordinance of reformation, by which he extinguishes all parties, as he maintains all rights. *In full possession of his hereditary rights* over this noble kingdom, the king has no wish but to exercise the authority which he has received from God and his fathers, by himself placing limits to his power. He has no wish but to be the supreme chief of the great family of which he is the father. It is he himself who is about to give to the French a constitutional charter, suited at once to their desires and their wants, and to the respective situation of men and things.” It concluded with the words, “Given at Paris in the year of grace 1814, in the nineteenth year of our reign.” The veterans of the Revolution, at these expressions, recollected the words of Mirabeau, when Louis XVI, in 1789, announced his concessions to the States-General. “The concessions made by the king would be sufficient for the public good, if the *presents* of despotism were not always dangerous (2).”

Leading articles of the Charter. The concessions in favour of freedom contained in the charter, though ushered in by these injudicious and ominous expressions, were such as might have satisfied, in the outset of the revolutionary troubles, the warmest friend of real freedom. The great foundations of civil liberty, liberty of conscience and worship, freedom of the press, equality in the eye of the law, the right of being taxed only by the national representatives, the division of the legislature into two chambers, and trial by jury, were established. The Chamber of Peers owed its existence to the charter; it came in place of the Senate of Napoléon, the adulations and tergiversations of which latter body had so degraded it in the public estimation, that its existence could no longer be maintained. The Chamber of Peers, who were all nominated by the king, consisted of six ecclesiastical peers, twenty of the old noblesse, twelve of the dignitaries of the Revolution, ninety-one of the Senate of Napoléon, and six generals of the ancient *régime*. A considerable number of the Senate of Napoléon were by this selection excluded, consisting chiefly of the most dangerous democratic characters. The powers of the legislative body were greatly enlarged by the charter—in fact, it was rendered the depository of nearly the whole public authority; and the constitution was received in consequence by that assembly with sentiments of the most lively gratitude. Yet were there two circumstances connected with the chamber of representatives worthy of notice, and singularly characteristic of the scanty elements for the construction of a really free monarchy which now existed in France. The first was, that an annual pension was secured to every member of it, of the same amount as they had enjoyed under Napoléon; the second, that no person could be elected a deputy unless he paid 1000 francs (L.40) of direct taxes annually to government, and that the right of election was limited to persons paying 300 francs (L.12) of direct taxes yearly—a restriction which threw the nomination entirely into the hands of the more opulent class of society, and confined it to less than eighty thousand persons out of thirty millions (3).

(1) *Moniteur*, June 5, 1814. *Thib.* x. 101, 102. *Cap. Hist. de la Rest.* ii. 34, 35.

(2) *Ante*, i. 108. *Cap. Ibid.* ii. 34, 35.

(3) Charter, in *Moniteur*, June 5, 1814; and *Ordonnance of Laws*, June 4, 1814.

Its provisions in favour of public freedom.

Abstractedly considered, however, the charter contained, in many points, the elements of true freedom. All public burdens were to be borne equally by all classes in proportion to their fortune : all were declared equally admissible to all civil and military employment : prosecution or imprisonment was forbidden except in the cases provided for by the law, and according to its forms : universal liberty of conscience and worship was secured, but the Roman Catholic ministers were alone to be entitled to support from the state : publication of thoughts was permitted, provided the laws were attended to which guarded against the abuses of the press : an universal amnesty for the past was proclaimed : the conscription abolished : the person of the king declared sacred and inviolable—his ministers alone responsible for his actions : the king was alone invested with the power of proposing laws : he commanded the forces by sea and land, declared war and made peace, concluded all treaties and conventions, nominated to all public employments civil and military, and “ was entrusted with the right of making all the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws and the safety of the state (1).” Laws, in general, might be introduced by authority of the king, either in the first chamber of peers or in that of deputies ; but the consent of both was essential to their validity, and those relating to taxes could only be proposed, in the first instance, in the lower house. The Chambers were entitled to petition the king to propose a particular law, and indicate what they desired should be its tenor ; but this could only be done after it had been discussed and carried in secret committee. If carried there, and in the chamber itself, it was then, after the lapse of ten days, to be sent to the other chamber ; and if agreed to by it also, the petition was then submitted to the king, who might grant or reject it ; but, if rejected, it could not again be brought forward during that session. The king alone was entrusted with sanctioning and promulgating the laws, and the civil list was to be fixed for the whole of each reign during the first session held under it. The cognizance of cases of high treason was confined to the Chamber of Peers ; that of ordinary offences, to the courts of law with the assistance of juries ; all judges were to be named by the king and hold their office for life, except the *juges de paix*, who were subject to removal ; and justice, except where privacy was requisite from a regard to public decency, was to be administered with open doors. The Code Napoléon was continued as the ordinary law of France ; the ancient noblesse resumed their titles ; the new noblesse preserved theirs (2) ; the king was declared the sole fountain of honours in future ; the legion of honour was kept up ; the deputies were elected for five years, every year a fifth retired, and re-elections to that extent took place.

Its obvious defects.

Every one must admit that these changes contained the elements of a wise system of government, and were calculated, so far as they went, to combine the blessings of freedom and equal rights, with those of protection to life and property, and stable administration. But what are laws without the support of public morality ? and what the most anxious provisions for the liberty of the subject if the spirit is wanting, in the governors and the governed, by which it is maintained ? Amidst all the numerous and anxious provisions for freedom which the charter contained, four circumstances were remarkable, which, to the sagacious observer, augured ill both as to the degree of protection to civil liberty which in the progress of time

(1) An ambiguous and perilous power, the exercise of which, in after times, was made the pretext for chasing the elder branch of the House of Bour-

bon from the throne, and in its ultimate effects restored the government of the sword.

(2) Charter, in *Moniteur*, June 5, 1814.

the new constitution might afford, or even the extent to which it was understood in the country, and the stability which the charter might attain amidst the receding waves of the Revolution. 1. No provision was inserted to prevent or restrain arbitrary imprisonment, or limit the period during which a person arrested might be detained before trial. 2. No attempt was made to limit or abolish the oppression of the police—a set of civil functionaries who impose such excessive and unnecessary restraints on human action, in all the Continental States, that it may safely be affirmed real freedom is inconsistent with their existence. 3. The upper house, instead of being composed of great proprietors, hereditary in their functions, respectable from their fortunes, illustrious from their descent, was made up for the most part of salaried officials, nominated by the crown, who enjoyed their seats only during life. 4. No provision was made, more than in Revolutionary times, for the establishment of the church or public instruction on an adequate basis; but the teachers in both were left to languish in the obscurity and indigence bequeathed to them by the perfidy and rapacity of the Revolution. No blame, it is true, could be attached to the French sovereign or his ministers for these defects; they could not by possibility have been supplied; but that only demonstrates that the crimes of the Revolution had rendered impossible the construction of durable liberty in France.

Real difficulties of the Restoration.

It was comparatively an easy task, however, to frame a constitution which might balance, in form at least, the conflicting powers of the Revolution; the real difficulty was, to reconcile the conflicting interests, calm the furious passions, and provide for the destitute multitudes which its termination had left in France. Restoration is always a work of difficulty; Henry IV had perished under, James II fled before it; but in France the difficulties were now of such overwhelming magnitude, that it is not surprizing that the feeble dynasty of the Bourbons ere long sunk under them; the only thing to be wondered at is, that they were able at all to keep possession of the throne. The public joy at the Restoration had been as sincere as it was general: it arose from the sense of deliverance from instant and impending evils which had become insupportable. But when these evils had passed away; when the Allied armies no longer oppressed the country; when the conscription had ceased to tear the tender youth from their weeping mothers, and France was left alone with its monarch, its losses, and its humiliation, the bitterness of the change sunk into the soul of the nation. Whole classes, and those too the most powerful and important, were in secret alarm or sullen discontent. The holders of national domains—an immense body, amounting to several millions—were devoured with anxiety; it was to no purpose that the government had guaranteed the possession of their estates; they were a prey to a secret disquietude, because it was not participant in the iniquity by which they had been acquired; they felt the same uneasiness at the restoration of lawful government, that the resettlers of stolen property do at the approach of the officers of justice. The regicides, and numerous able and powerful men who had been involved in the actual crimes of the Revolution, felt still greater apprehensions: the unqualified amnesty contained in the charter was far from removing their disquietude; conscience told them that they deserved punishment; the fact of the Restoration seemed an act of accusation against them, a condemnation of all they had done since the commencement of the convulsion; and they incessantly demanded fresh guarantecs and additional securities. The army was in despair: defeated in the field, driven back into France, humiliated in the sight of Europe, they had now the additional mortification of being in great part disbanded, and

universally condemned to inactivity. The wandering life of camps, the excitement of the battle-field, the joys of the bivouac, the terrors of the breach, the contributions from provinces, the plunder of cities, were at an end; and instead, they found themselves dispersed over the provincial towns of France, or sent back to their homes, a prey to ennui, and destitute of either interest or hope in life. The civil and military *employés* who had been fastened by the imperial government on the provinces beyond the Alps and the Rhine, now wrested from France, returned in shoals to the capital, bereft of their employments, cast down from their authority, in great part deprived of subsistence: the marshals and numerous dignitaries of the Emperor who had obtained estates or revenues in Germany, France, and Italy, as appendages to their titles, found themselves deprived of half their income by the loss of these possessions, and destitute of all hope of improving their fortunes by fresh conquests (1).

Penury and
embarrass-
ments of
Govern-
ment. If these were the sad realities of disaster in war to the most influential and formidable classes of society, the difficulties of government were still greater; and the most profound sagacity, the most fruitful invention, could hardly discover a mode either of appeasing the public discontents, or satisfying the innumerable demands upon the public treasury. The Count d'Artois, in his progress towards Paris, had taken as his watchword, "Plus de droits réunis (excise), plus de conscriptions;" and the latter promise had formed an express article in the charter. But how was the first to be realized without depriving the crown of a large, and what had now become an indispensable, part of the public revenue (2); or the latter without reducing by at least two-thirds the ranks of the army, and throwing twenty thousand officers, without pay or occupation, back in fearful discontent to their hearths? The Tuileries were besieged from morning to night by clamorous crowds, composed of men as far divided in principle as the poles are asunder, but uniting in one loud and importunate cry for employment or relief from the government; one-half were Royalists, demanding compensation for the losses they had sustained during the Revolution, or a return for the fidelity with which they had adhered to the cause of the exiled monarch, or aided his return: the other, dignitaries or persons in employment under the Imperial *régime*, who had been deprived of all by the overthrow of Napoléon, or the contraction of the French empire to the limits of the ancient monarchy. The wants of the troops were still more pressing, and they were of a kind which could not be resisted. Eight months' pay was due when the Restoration took place, to the officers and soldiers of the army; ten months' arrears to the commissaries and civil administrators. To meet these accumulated embarrassments, Louis XVIII had an exhausted treasury, a diminished territory, and a bankrupt people. So excessive had been the taxations, so enormous the requisitions in kind, during the two last years of Napoléon's reign, that the provinces which had been the seat of war were almost wholly unable to bear any taxation; and such was the general exhaustion of the country, that the arrears of the two last years had reached the enormous amount of 1,508,000,000 francs,

(1) Cap. i. 52, 54. Thib. x. 117, 118.

(2) The "droits réunis," or excise, had constituted in latter times a considerable part of the ordinary revenue of Napoléon. They had amounted, in

And taking the proportion of Old France to the provinces ceded, the abolition of this impost would occasion a loss of 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000 annually.—See DUC DE GAETA, i. 303, 309.

	Francs.		
1811. . .	127,734,000	or	L.5,100,000
1812. . .	144,069,398	or	5,650,000
1813. . .	146,660,621	or	5,745,000

(L.55,000,000,) of which only 759,000,000 francs (L.50,500,000) was deemed recoverable; and while the most rigid economy, and extensive reductions on the part of the government, could do no more than bring down the expenditure to 827,415,000 francs, or L.52,250,000, the receipts only reached 520,000,000 or L.20,800,000; and even this sum was obtained with the greatest difficulty, and by adding above a third to the direct taxes (1).

It would have required the genius of Sully, united to the firmness of Pitt, to have made head with such means against such difficulties; and the capacity of the king and his ministers was far indeed from being equal to the task. Striving to please both parties, they gained the confidence of neither: aiming at a middle course, they incurred its dangers without attaining its security. They left the crown in the midst of pressing perils, without either moral or physical support. The celebrated saying of Napoléon, "Ils n'ont rien appris, ils n'ont rien oublié," conveyed an accurate idea of the cause to which their errors were owing. They had not power or vigour enough to undertake a decided part, and yet sufficient confidence in their legitimate title to venture on a hazardous one. Their system was to retain all the imperial functionaries, civil and military, in their employment: to displace no one, from the prefect to the humblest court officer: to continue to the military their rank, their titles, and, so far as it was possible, their emoluments: to make no change in the nation, in short, except by the substitution of a king for an emperor, and the introduction of a few leading royalists into the cabinet. By this conduct, which, so far as it went, was well conceived, they hoped to gain the powers of the Revolution by injuring none of its interests. But they forgot that mankind are governed by desires, passions, and prejudices, as well as selfish considerations; and that Napoléon had so long succeeded in governing the empire only because, while he sedulously attended in deeds to the interests of the Revolution, he carefully in words and forms flattered its principles. The latter part of his policy was entirely forgotten by the Bourbons, and in nothing more than in their treatment of the army. Their capital error consisted in this, that while they wholly depended on the physical forces of the Revolution, they made no attempt to disguise their aversion to its tenets; and that, without endeavouring to establish any adequate counterpoise to its powers, they irrecoverably alienated its supporters (2).

They abolished the national colours, the object of even superstitious veneration to the whole French soldiers, and substituted in their room the white flag of the monarchy, with which hardly any of the army had any association, and the glories of which, great as they were, had been entirely thrown into the shade by the transcendent glories of the empire. They altered the numbers of the whole regiments, as well infantry as cavalry, destroying thus the glorious recollections connected with the many fields of fame in which they had signalized themselves, and reducing those which had fought at Rivoli or Austerlitz to a level with a newly-raised levy. The tricolor standards were ordered to be given up; many regiments in preference burnt them, in order that they might at least preserve their ashes. The eagles were generally secreted by the officers; the men hid the tricolor cockades in their knapsacks. They altered the whole designations of the superior officers, resuming those now wholly forgotten of the old monarchy. Thus generals of brigade were denominated marshals

(1) Cap. i. 32, 62. Duc de Gaeta, ii. 16, 26. Thib. x. 167, 168. Finance Report, 1814. Moniteur, Sept. 23, 1814. Moniteur, Sept. 24.

(2) Cap. i. 58, 64. Thib. x. 127, 130.

of the camp; generals of division assumed the title of lieutenant-generals. Catholic and Protestant soldiers were alike compelled to go to mass, to confess, to communicate. The Imperial guard, which in the first instance was entrusted with the service of the Tuileries, was speedily removed, and its place supplied by troops obtained from Switzerland and la Vendée. That noble corps was even removed from Paris, under pretence of avoiding quarrels with the foreign troops in occupation of the capital; the whole officers on half-pay were ordained to return to their homes, there to await their ulterior destination; and the most severe orders issued to the troops who had returned from foreign garrisons, to prevent any allusion even to the name of the Emperor. Six companies of *gardes du corps*, several red companies of guards, or military household—in fine, the whole military splendour of Louis XV was revived, and these new troops, in their yet unsullied uniform, supplanted alike the old troops and the national guard in the service of the palace. These things were submitted to in silence, but they sunk deep into the heart of the army and the nation (1).

Errors of
their civil
adminis-
tration.

The civil regulations of the new government, though not so important in themselves as those which related to the military administration, were not less material in their ultimate effects: for they exposed the court to the most fatal of all attacks in Parisian society—the assaults of ridicule. An ordinance of the police forbade ordinary work to proceed on Sunday; this regulation, though expressly enjoined by religion,

and loudly called for by the interests of the working-classes, became the object of unmeasured obloquy, because it abridged the pleasures or the gains of an unbelieving and selfish generation. The restoration of all the services of the Roman Catholic Church, with extraordinary pomp in the Tuileries, excited the ridicule, and awakened the fears of a revolutionary people, by a great majority of whom these rites were regarded as the remnants only of a worn out and expiring superstition. The ladies of the ancient *régime* indulged in cutting sarcasms against those of the new noblesse; not one of the marshals' wives, or duchesses of the empire, was placed in the royal household; and female animosity added its bitter venom to the many other causes of jealousy against the court. The restoration of the ancient orders, and especially of the order of St.-Louis, the crosses of which were distributed with profusion, gave rise to so general a rumour of an intention to supersede or undermine the Legion of Honour, that the king, by an express ordinance, was obliged

to clear himself from the imputation. In fine, the civil government of the Restoration, while in all essential particulars favourable to the interests of the Revolution, yet in language, form, and ceremony, had reintroduced the most antiquated and obnoxious traditions of the monarchy: and the French had discernment enough to see, that in the intoxication of success, words and forms betrayed the real thoughts, and that acts favourable to revolutionary interests were imposed on the government only by state necessity (2).

Injudicious
regulations
regarding
the army.

The army was reduced, partly from the embarrassment of the finances, partly from the policy of government, to a degree inconsistent with either the safety of the country or the attachment of the troops themselves. The abolition of the conscription, so loudly called for by its ruinous effects, at once revealed the exhaustion of the physical strength of the monarchy. Reduced successively to a hundred and forty

(1) Thib. x. 128, 133. Cap. i. 59, 64.

(2) Thib. x. 135, 140. Cap. i. 62, 65. Montg. viii. 60, 68.

thousand, and eighty thousand men, it was still encumbered with officers, and except from la Vendée, the recruits came in with extreme tardiness; above a hundred thousand leaves of absence had been given; and the soldiers, when once they had reached their homes, were in no hurry to return. The dynasty of the Restoration was to the last degree unpopular in the army; the throne had, literally speaking, no armed force on which it could depend, except a few regiments of Guards and Swiss at Paris. The general discontent of the troops was greatly augmented by an ordinance, which put every officer not in actual employment on half-pay—a reduction hitherto unknown in the French army; and still more by another, which absolutely forbade any officer of whatever rank, not in actual service, to reside at Paris, if not already domiciled there. These were the circumstances which induced the fall of Louis XVIII, and occasioned the incalculable evils to France of the Hundred Days; the civil errors were of remote consequence and comparatively little importance—it was the alienation of the affections of the military, before any other force to supply their place had been organized, and when the throne had no moral support in the nation, which was the fatal mistake. And, in fact, such was the discontent of the troops arising from their disasters, that it is more than doubtful whether any human wisdom could have averted the catastrophe (1).

Character of the ministers of the Restoration. Notwithstanding these obvious and flagrant errors, the cabinet of Louis XVIII was far from being destitute of men of ability. M. Blacas, the real premier and principal confidant of the king, had an ingenious mind and an upright heart; but his information was limited: he judged of France as he had seen it through the deceitful vision of the emigrants, and was entirely ignorant of the vast, the irremediable changes, both in the opinion of the influential classes, and the distribution of political and physical power, which had taken place during the Revolution. M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, an old lawyer of eminence in Normandy, and M. Ferrand, a monarchical theorist, caused considerable damage to the Restoration, by the long declamations in favour of now antiquated and jealously received doctrines regarding the authority of legitimate monarchs, with which they prefaced all the royal decrees. The Abbé Montesquieu was inclined to the liberal side: he had embraced the principles of the Constituent Assembly, and shared a large portion of the confidence of the king. Guizot, then little known, had already embraced those doctrines of mingled conservatism and philosophy, to which his genius has subsequently given immortality; the Abbé de Pradt, at the head of the Legion of Honour, and M. de Bourrienne, as postmaster-general, had each brought talents of no ordinary kind to the direction of their several departments. But the ability of the whole cabinet could not stem the difficulties with which they were surrounded; and if they had been gifted with far greater practical sagacity and acquaintance with men than they actually possessed, they would have been shattered by the unpopularity of General Dupont as minister at war; an appointment the most unfortunate that could have been made, for it continually reminded the army of the disaster of Baylen—the first and most humiliating of its reverses. To such a pitch, indeed, did the public discontent on this head arise, that the court were subsequently obliged to remove that ill-fated

Dec. 5, 1814. general, and substitute Marshal Soult in his room; but the army was by this time in such a state of ill-humour, that even his great abilities proved wholly unable to give it a right direction (2); and his strong leaning

(1) Thib. x. 140, 149. Cap. i. 61, 62.

(2) Cap. i. 66, 67. Thib. x. 146, 150. Montg. viii. 86, 94.

to the exiled Emperor, subsequently proved in no slight degree instrumental in bringing about his return.

General cause of complaint alleged against the Government. As the restoration of Napoléon was entirely a military movement, and the discontents of the people, founded or unfounded, had scarcely any share in bringing it about, the briefest summary, will suffice of the domestic events in France which preceded the Hundred Days. Such was the exasperation of the popular party and the Imperialists at the Bourbons, that by mutual consent they laid aside their whole previous animosities, and combined all their efforts to decry every measure of the government, and misrepresent every step, judicious or injudicious, which they took. A clamour was raised against every thing. The celebration of a solemn

and most touching funeral service in Notre-Dame, soon after the return of the royal family, to the memory of Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth (1), was set down as the commencement of persecution against the leaders of the Revolution; the exhumation of the remains of several Vendéan and Chouan leaders, to re-inter them in consecrated ground, a proof of the most deplorable superstition; the erection, under the auspices of Marshal Soult, after he had been made minister at war, of a monumental edifice in Quiberon Bay, to the memory of those who

had fallen victims there to loyal fidelity and revolutionary perfidy, an indication of a desire to revert to the principles of the Chouans and Vendéans. A solemn ceremony by which, on the anniversary of the death of Louis XVI, his remains and those of Marie Antoinette were removed from their place of sepulture in the garden of Descloseaux, in the Rue Anjou, was

regarded as a decided attack on the whole principles of the Revolution (2). Few remains of the royal martyrs were to be found; what could be collected, had owed their identification and preservation from insult to the pious care of M. Descloseaux, the proprietor of the garden where they were laid, who worthily received the order of St.-Michael and a pension, as the reward of his fidelity. The bones and ashes were carefully enclosed in lead coffins, and translated with extraordinary pomp to the royal mausoleum at St.-Denis. The miseries and insolvency entailed on the nation by the ruinous wars of Napoléon (3), formed a necessary part of the financial *exposé* of the ministers, and constituted the best vindication of the great reductions in all departments which had become unavoidable; this was immediately set down as a direct and scandalous attack on the glory of the empire. The undisposed-of national domains were, by a just proposition which passed both Chambers, restored to their rightful owners; and this act of justice, joined to a proposition of Marshal Macdonald in the Chamber of Peers, to provide an indemnity to the victims of the Revolution (4), which he called a debt of honour, and to the

(1) It was one of the most imposing spectacles ever witnessed, being attended by all the monarchs, generals, and ministers then in Paris—including the whole marshals of France: the interior

of the cathedral was all hung in black, and lighted with a profusion of lamps.—*Personal Observation.*

(2) *Ante*, l. 254.

(3) See *Ante*, X.

(4) For the indemnity of the victims of the Revolution, he submitted the following calculations to the Chamber of Peers:—

	Francs.	Sterling.
Value of National Property (sold),	4,000,000,000	or L.160,000,000
Moveable effects (confiscated),	900,000,000	36,000,000
	<hr/> 4,900,000,000	<hr/> 196,000,000
Deduct Inscribed on the Public Fuods, 300,000,000		
National Domains (unsold), 300,000,000		
	<hr/> 600,000,000	<hr/> 24,000,000
Remained to be provided for,	4,300,000,000	L.172,000,000

—See THIBAUDEAU, x. 199; and BECHEZ and ROUX, xl. 29. 30.

military men who had been mutilated in the service of their country, which he denominated the debt of blood, though based on the equitable principle of doing evenhanded justice to both parties, excited the most general apprehensions. It is unnecessary to go further : every act of the government of the Restoration—some wise and natural, others injudicious or ill-timed—was misinterpreted, and ascribed to the worst possible motives; and the great party and numerous interests of the Revolution, conscious of their sins, trembled, like Felix in holy writ, when the government spoke of a future world, or alluded even to judgment to come (1).

Commence-
ment of the
Congress
of Vienna. While the French Government were thus striving, amidst the chaos of revolutionary passions, to close the wounds and mitigate the sufferings of the Revolution, negotiations of the most important character for the general settlement of Europe had commenced and were already considerably advanced, at Vienna. It had been originally intended that the Congress of Vienna should have commenced its sittings on the 29th July; but the visit of the Allied Sovereigns to England, and their subsequent return to their own capitals, necessarily caused it to be adjourned; and it Sept. 25. was not till the end of September that the Congress commenced, by the entry of the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia into the Austrian capital. They were immediately followed by the Kings of Bavaria, Denmark, and Wirtemberg, and a host of lesser princes; while Lord Castlereagh, and subsequently the Duke of Wellington, on the part of England, and M. Talleyrand on that of France, more efficiently than any crowned heads could have done, upheld the dignity and maintained the interests of their respective monarchies. But although the sovereigns and ministers in appearance kept up the most amicable and confidential relations, it was easy to see that their interests and views were widely at variance; and that the removal of common danger and the division of common spoil had produced their usual effect, of sowing dissensions among the victors (2).

Commence-
ment of
the Con-
gress of
Vienna. A preliminary question of precedence first arose as to the rank of the different states assembled, and their representatives; but this was at once terminated by the happy expedient of Alexander, that they should be arranged and sign according to the alphabetical order of the first letter of the name of their respective states. But a more serious difficulty soon after occurred as to the states which should in their own right as principals take part in the deliberations; and it was at first proposed by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, that Sept. 22. they should in the first instance come to an agreement as to the disposal of the territories wrested from France and its allies, before they entered into conferences with France and Spain. This proposal was naturally resisted by Talleyrand and the Spanish plenipotentiary; and it was their earnest endeavour in an energetic note to show, that the treaty of Oct. 5. Chaumont, though formally to endure for twenty years, had in reality expired with the attainment of all its objects, and that France, at least, should be admitted into the deliberations. Lord Castlereagh, who early perceived the necessity of a counterpoise to the preponderating influence of Russia in the conferences, supported this note of M. Talleyrand, and Prince Metternich, who was actuated by similar views, did the same: and, in consequence, it was agreed that the committee to whom the questions coming before the Congress should be submitted, should be the minis-

(1) Thib. x. 150, 203. Buchez and Roux, xi, 29, 38.

(2) Buchez and Roux, xl. 41. Cap. i. 70, 73. Hard, xii. 452, 453.

ters not only of the four Allied powers, but of France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The Cardinal Gonzalvi, on the part of the court of Rome, was afterwards received, through the personal intercession of the Prince Regent of England : while the plenipotentiaries of Murat, king of Naples, the kings of Sicily, of Bavaria, the Low Countries, Saxony, and Denmark, besides the ministers of the Swiss and Genoese republics, though not admitted to the conferences of the greater powers, were in attendance at Vienna, and had their interests attended to by such of their more powerful neighbours as were disposed to support them (1).

Points on which the great powers were united. This preliminary difficulty, as always occurs in such cases, furnished a key to the course which the different powers were likely to take in the approaching negotiation; but a considerable time elapsed before the real divisions appeared. Much was done, in the first instance, without any difference of opinion taking place. Territories inhabited by 31,691,000 persons were at the disposal of the Allied powers, and there was for each enough and to spare. It was at once agreed, in conformity with the secret articles of the treaty of Paris, that Belgium, united to Holland, should form an united kingdom, under the title of the Netherlands; that Sweden and Norway should be united; that Hanover, with a considerable accession of territory, taken from the kingdom of Westphalia, should be restored to the king of England; that Lombardy should again be placed under the rule of Austria, and Savoy of Piedmont. So far all was easily arranged; but the question of how Poland, Saxony, and Genoa were to be disposed of, were not so easily adjusted; and the first of them gave rise to dissensions so serious, that they not only completely broke up for the time the grand alliance which had effected the deliverance of Europe, but had it not been for the unexpected, and in that view most opportune, return of Napoléon from Elba (2), they would, in all probability, have led to the flames of war again breaking out, and the old allied forces being conducted to mutual slaughter.

Alexander demands the whole of Poland as a separate monarchy, of which he was to be the head. Alexander loudly insisted that the whole Grand Duchy of Warsaw should be ceded to Russia as an indemnity for the sacrifices she had made, and losses sustained during the war. He represented, that were he to return to St.-Petersburg without having obtained some adequate compensation for the sacrifices the nation had undergone, it would be as much as his crown was worth; that Poland was already *de facto* occupied by the Russian troops, and the Poles expected a revival of their nationality solely from an union with the Russian empire, or their separate establishment under a prince of the Russian imperial family; and that, considering the immense losses which his empire had sustained during the war, and the vast exertions she had made, it was in the highest degree reasonable that she should now obtain a territory essential to her security, and extending along no inconsiderable part of her frontier. These arguments, in themselves by no means destitute of weight were powerfully supported by the significant hint that he had three hundred thousand men ready to march at a moment's notice; that his troops already occupied the whole of Poland; and that, by representing the Russian alliance as the only means of restoring their lost nationality, the whole warlike force of the Sarmatians would soon be ranged on his side (5).

(1) Hard. xii. 454, 456. Cap. i. 75, 77. Bachez and Roux, xi. 41.

(2) Hard. xii. 455, 457. Cap. i. 78, 79.

(3) Note of Russia, Dec. 18, 1814. Cap. i. 87. Hard. xi. 456, 458.

Views of Prussia, entirely under the influence of Russia, as well from Saxony. gratitude as situation, entered warmly into these pretensions, and supported them with all her influence at the Congress. She had her own views, independent of the immense debt of gratitude which she owed to Russia for deliverance from the thralldom of Napoléon, in this adhesion. It had been stipulated in the treaty of Kalisch, which formed the basis of the grand alliance, that Prussia was to be "reinstated, at the close of hostilities, in all respects, statistical, financial, and geographical, as it had stood at the commencement of the war of 1806, with such additions as might be deemed practicable (1)". The Prussians now demanded fulfilment of this promise; and claimed, besides various provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, which were at the disposal of the Allies by the dissolution of the French empire, the whole of Saxony. Prince Hardenberg, the able minister of the court of Berlin, supported this demand in an elaborate note; and insisted that, as Russia claimed a considerable part of Prussian Poland to round her proposed acquisitions on the Vistula, it was Oct. 22, and Dec. 2. indispensably necessary that Prussia should be largely indemnified in Germany: that the interests of Europe imperatively required that a powerful intermediate state should be placed between Russia and France; and that the recent dangers which Europe had escaped, clearly pointed to the side on which the necessary additions should be made to her territory. On condition, then, of obtaining Saxony and an indemnity on the Rhine, Prussia proposed to cede to Russia the southern provinces of Poland; and, to appease the jealousy of the German powers at this aggrandizement of Russia, suggested that the fortifications of Thorn and Dantzic should be demolished (2). In conclusion, he strongly contended, that, as so reconstructed, Prussia, with a population of 9,800,000 souls, would not be strengthened in the same degree as Russia would be by the acquisition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and Austria by Lombardy and the Milanese.

Views of The views of France, Austria, and England, were decidedly op- England, posed to these sweeping annexions of territory to the northern France, powers. Independent of the obvious peril to the security of the and Aus- other European states, if Russia were augmented by the greater tria on the proposals. part of Poland, and brought down by means of her outwork Prussia to the Elbe and the Rhine, which was sufficient to range the courts of Paris and Vienna on his side, Lord Castlereagh in an especial manner, and with the most energetic ability, opposed the union of the crowns of Poland and Russia on the same head, or the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as contrary to the great principles of justice on which the war against Napoléon had been maintained (3). The conduct of the British minister on this occasion was worthy of the cause for which he had contended, and the nation which he represented; and he met with a cordial support both in M. Talleyrand and Prince Metternich, who beheld with undisguised apprehension these proposed additions to the power of their nearest neighbours. The former of these statesmen, in particular, resisted the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as a measure of severity to a fallen monarch alike inexpedient and unjust.

(1) *Ante*, ix. 68.

(2) Note, Oct. 22, and Dec. 16, 1814. Schoell, *Traité de Paix*, xi. 45, 49. Hard. xii. 458, 463. Cap. i. 81, 84.

(3) Lord Castlereagh declared in repeated memorials, "that he opposed firmly, and with all the force in his power, in the name of England, the erection of a kingdom in Poland, the crown of

which should be placed on the same head with, or which should form an integral part of the empire of Russia: that the wish of his government was to see an independent power more or less extensive established there, under a distinct dynasty, and as an intermediate state between the three great monarchies."—*Memorial*, 16th December, 1814; See *CARL-FIGUE, Cent-Jours*, i. 86.

Alexander expected the resistance of Austria and England to his designs, and no serious alienation ensued in consequence between him and their ministers; but he was quite unprepared for the vigorous stand made by France on the occasion. He openly charged Louis XVIII with black ingratitude, and his displeasure was manifested without disguise to M. Talleyrand; at the same time he contracted close relations with Eugène Beauharnais, who was Vienna at the time, openly espoused the cause of Murat, in opposition to the Bourbon family, in the contest for the throne of Naples, and spoke of the unfitness of the elder branch of the Bourbons for the throne, and the probability of a revolution similar to that of 1688, which might put the sceptre in the hands of the house of Orleans (1).

To such a height, however, did the divisions arise, that they were soon not confined to mere indications of ill humour at the Congress. Both parties prepared for war. Alexander halted in Poland his whole armies on their return to Russia, where they were kept together and retained in every respect on the war footing. Hardenberg declared that "as to Prussia, it would not abandon Saxony; that it had conquered it, and would

keep it, without either the intention or the inclination of restoration;" and the cabinet of Berlin, to support the declaration, armed its whole contingents, as if war were on the point of breaking out. At the same time the Grand Duke Constantine, who commanded the whole Russian armies, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, in Lithuania and Poland, published an animated address, in which he announced the intention of the Emperor his brother to restore to the Poles their lost nationality, and called on them to rally round his standards, as the only means of effecting it (2). On the other side the three powers were not idle—Austria put her armies in Galicia on the war footing; France was invited to suspend the disarming, which the ruined state of her finances had rendered necessary; British troops in great numbers were sent over to Belgium; the absent forces in America, rendered disposable by the prospect of peace with that country, were destined on their return to the same quarter; and in the midst of a Congress assembled for the general pacification of the world, a million of armed men were retained round their banners ready for mutual slaughter (3).

Matters at length were brought to a crisis, by the conclusion of a secret treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Austria, France, and England, at Vienna, on Feb. 3, 1815. By this treaty it was stipulated that the contracting parties should act in concert, and in a disinterested manner, to carry into effect the stipulations of the treaty of Paris. It set out with the preamble, that the "high contracting parties, convinced that the powers whom it behoved to carry into effect this treaty, should be maintained in a state of perfect security and independence, to enable them worthily to discharge that important duty, consider it in consequence as necessary, with reference to the pretensions recently manifested, to provide against every aggression to which their own possessions, or any of them, might be exposed, from a feeling of resentment

(1) Cap. i. 87, 88. Hard. xii. 461, 468. Schoell, *Trait. de Paix*, xi. 50, 56.

(2) "The Emperor, your powerful protector, invokes your aid. Rally around his standards: Let your arms be raised for the defence of your country and your political existence."—CONSTANTINE'S *Proclamation*, 11th Dec. 1814; CAPEFIGUE, i. 86.

	Men.
(3) Viz. Russia,	280,000
Prussia,	173,000
Austria,	220,000
Anglo-Belgian,	80,000
Piedmont,	60,000
Lesser German Powers,	100,000
France,	100,000

Total, 1,013,000

at the propositions which they have felt it their duty to submit, and to sustain by a common agreement the principles of justice and equity which they had advanced in carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Paris." On this narrative, the three contracting powers agreed mutually to support each other if one was attacked; and, in order to do so with effect, to maintain severally a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand should be cavalry; in the event of war breaking out, the views of the Allies were to be strictly regulated by the terms of the treaty of Paris, so far as the extent and frontiers of their several possessions were concerned, and a commander-in-chief was to be appointed. The plan of the proposed operations was traced out by Generals Radjewski and Langeron on the part of Austria, Marshal Wrede on that of Bavaria, and General Ricard on that of France; and they were intended to meet the case supposed, that the Russian armies would invade Moravia and move upon Vienna. The kings of Hanover, Bavaria, and Piedmont, were invited to accede to this treaty, which they immediately did; so that, in effect, by it the whole forces of Western and Southern Europe were arrayed against Russia and Prussia (1).

Effect of this treaty on the negotiations. What pains soever the principal powers concerned may have taken to prevent this treaty from coming to the knowledge of the other sovereigns at the Congress, it to a certain extent transpired, and produced a considerable modification in the views of the northern powers. Fortified by this support, Metternich took a bolder tone, and in reply to the menacing note of Hardenberg, transmitted an answer, in which,

Feb. 4. after representing that the safety of Austria, already compromised in Poland by the increase of Russia, would be destroyed by the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, he explained in what sense the secret articles of the treaties of Kalisch and Reichenbach, so far as they related to the aggrandizement of the latter power, were to be understood (2), and contended that they would be amply carried into effect by the cession to Prussia of a portion of Saxony on the right bank of the Elbe, containing 800,000 souls. The reply

Feb. 6. to that note clearly showed that the northern powers had taken the alarm: for Hardenberg, in the name of Prussia, agreed to relinquish the possession of Thorn, and the district of Tarnapol adjoining it. Several other

Feb. 8. notes were interchanged; Russia relinquished several districts of Poland; Prussia agreed to be satisfied with a part of Saxony; and it was evident that the high pretensions of these powers had undergone an abatement: but nothing had definitively been fixed on, when an event occurred, which resounded like a thunderbolt from one end of Europe to the other, extinguished all these jealousies, and instantly drew the bonds of the old grand alliance as close together as they had been in the days of Leipsic and Paris (3).

Formation of the German Confederacy. One of the most important matters which came under the consideration of the Congress of Vienna, though not so difficult of adjustment, was the reconstruction of the Germanic confederacy. The old empire and younger confederations of the Rhine having been both swept away by the changes of time, it became necessary to create some new bond of union, which should at once provide for the security, and furnish a shield to the rights of the lesser Germanic States, and prevent that catastrophe which had uniformly occurred in former wars, of the French crossing the Rhine, and finding their battle-field and the sinews of war in the territories

(1) See the articles in Cap. i. 94, 96; and Hard. xii. 468, 470.

(2) *Ante*, ix. 68; and 183.

(3) Hard. xii. 469, 470. Cap. i. 177, 178. Schoell, *Cong. de Vienne*, vi. 121, 124.

of the lesser States of Germany, before the jealousies or foresight of the greater powers would permit them to arm for their relief. The mutual jealousies of Prussia and Austria, rendered this no easy matter; but the judgment and tact of Metternich proved equal to the task. He proposed the union of the whole Germanic States into a great confederacy, bound to afford mutual support in case of external attack, and to be directed by a diet, in which Austria and Prussia were each to have two voices, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Hanover, each one; but with the power to these greater powers of making separate war and peace for themselves. The legislative power was to be vested in an assembly composed as well of the representatives of the larger states, as of those of the lesser and free towns: but the powers of this assembly had regard only to matters of internal and pacific arrangement, and did not extend to the declaration on their own authority of peace and war. As this constitution subjected the whole of Germany to the political direction of a diet, in which Austria and Prussia had four votes out of seven, it practically gave these states, if they drew together, the entire government, so far as external relations went, of the confederacy: but such was the influence of the greater powers, and such the sense which was still entertained of the necessity of a strong barrier against the aggressions of France, that Talleyrand was unable to stir up any resistance to it, and it was agreed to without opposition (1).

Formation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Austria having renounced all claim to the Low Countries, which had been found by experience to be rather a burden than an advantage to the monarchy, little difficulty was experienced in arranging the affairs and establishing the kingdom of the Netherlands. It had been one of the secret articles of the treaty of Paris (2), that the Netherlands and Holland should be united into one kingdom, under a prince of the house of Nassau; and this stipulation was now carried into effect by the reunion of the whole old seventeen provinces into a monarchy, under the title of the kingdom of the Netherlands. The great fortress of Luxemburg, with its adjacent territory, was only excluded, which, from its military importance, was declared to form part of the German confederation, of which it was one of the frontier bulwarks; but the king of the Netherlands acquired it also as March 16, 1815. Duke of Luxemburg. By patent, dated 16th March 1815, the king of Holland took the title of King of the Netherlands and Grand Duke of Luxemburg, which title was immediately recognized by all the courts of Europe (3).

Treaty between England and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Holland ceded to Great Britain by this arrangement the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; but in return Great Britain restored to the king of the Netherlands the noble island of Java—a colony worth all the other islands in the eastern archipelago put together, and which, under British management, since its capture in 1810, had become so flourishing, that it promised soon to yield a larger surplus revenue than the whole of our Indian possessions put together. The uncalled-for restitution of this splendid possession, though owing to an honourable generosity, was one of the greatest errors ever committed by the English government, and is the most important political mistake chargeable against Lord Castlereagh; but the attention of that great man, absorbed by continental interest, was not at that moment sufficiently drawn to the great and growing colonial empire of Great Britain. The dominions thus acquired

(1) Hard. xii. 473, 475. Schoell, xi. 257, 277.
Cong. de Vienne, vi. 147, 243.

(2) *Ante*, x. 256.

(3) Schoell, xi. 146, 147.

by the house of Orange embraced the richest and most flourishing provinces in Europe, containing in all, with Holland, no less than 5,424,000 inhabitants, peopled at the rate of 1829 to the square leaguc. It was a condition of its erection, that the new kingdom should be ruled by a representative government, framed very much on the model of that of France, and the kingdom of the Netherlands, jointly with England, should undertake the burden of a loan of 50,000,000 florins, (L.4,200,000,) formerly borrowed by Russia from the capitalists of Amsterdam (1).

Settlement of the affairs of Switzerland. The affairs of Switzerland, at the same time, occupied the attention of the Congress; but as the desire for aggrandizement on the part of none of the great powers was turned in that direction, they were adjusted with ease and with great impartiality. The confederacy was declared to embrace the whole nineteen cantons, as they stood by the convention of Bâle on 20th December 1815 (2), on an equal footing, which effectually excluded the unjust principle, that one state should be subjected to another state. The Valais, Geneva and its territory, with the principality of Neufchatel, were united to Switzerland, and formed so many cantons.

May 27. The bishopric of Bâle, with the town of Bienne, were restored to the canton of Berne (3); and a great variety of lesser decisions were adopted, to regulate the pecuniary concerns of the different cantons, of which these mountaineers were in the highest degree tenacious. This constitution was formally acceded to by the whole cantons, on 27th May 1815, and has ever since formed the basis of the Helvetic confederacy.

Affairs of Italy, and alarm of Napoleon's return. Italy presented in some respects a more complicated field for diplomacy. The cession, indeed, of Lombardy to Austria, and the Genoese republic to the kingdom of Piedmont, was at once agreed to without any difficulty, despite the earnest remonstrances of the citizens of the latter commonwealth, who passionately desired the restoration of their ancient form of government; so strongly was the necessity felt of strengthening the states on the French frontier, and above all, the kingdom of Sardinia, in whose hands the keys of the most important passes from France into Italy were placed. But the conflicting claims of Murat and the old Bourbon family to the throne of Naples, excited a warm interest at the Congress; the more especially as Alexander, out of pique at the resistance of the court of France to his views in regard to Poland and Saxony, now openly supported the claims of the former to the throne, grounding his support on the engagement of Austria to maintain him in his throne and enlarge his territory when he joined the Grand Alliance. The other powers, however, were far from sharing these sentiments: the court of Rome felt the utmost alarm at the close proximity of an ambitious prince, who openly coveted, and had more than once attempted to seize, the papal territories; and Austria was little inclined to permit the permanent establishment of a revolutionary throne so near the inflammable materials of her Italian provinces. Murat Feb. 25. earnestly appealed, in a laboured memorial, to England to support him in his throne, in terms of the engagement undertaken by Lord William Bentinck and General Nugent; but Lord Castlereagh officially announced to the Congress in the end of February, that Murat had so completely failed in the performance of his own engagements, that he had virtually liberated the Allies from theirs, and that they were not bound to maintain him on the throne. Meanwhile Murat was so far from anticipating any dan-

(1) Treaty, May 19, 1815. Schoell, xi. 119. Malte Bruu, viii. 667.

(2) *Ante*, x. 29.

(3) Schoell, xi, 96, 145; and Recueil, viii. 336.

ger to his Neapolitan crown, that he was dreaming of the sceptre of the whole of Italy south of the Po; and with that view, in spite of all the representations of Austria and the court of Rome, kept military possession of the three legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Ravenna, as the frontier provinces of his anticipated dominions. Nay, so far did he carry his extravagance, that on Feb. 15. the 15th February he made a formal demand for the passage of eighty thousand men through the Austrian territories in Italy, to act against France; a proposition which only tended to augment the apprehensions of the cabinet of Vienna, and led to the force of that power, in the Italian peninsula, being augmented to a hundred and fifty thousand men (1).

Conference for the removal of Napoléon from Elba, when he leaves that island. This military position and demand excited the jealousy of the Allied powers; the more especially, as, towards the end of February, rumours reached Vienna of constant correspondence between the isle of Elba and the adjoining shores of Italy, and an intended descent by Napoléon on the coast of France. These rumours soon acquired such consistency, that the propriety of removing him from the neighbourhood of Italy had already been more than once agitated in the Congress; and various places of residence for him, in exchange for Elba, had been proposed—among others, one of the Canary islands, which was suggested by the Portuguese minister, and St.-Helena or St.-Lucie, which were proposed by Lord Castlereagh. Alexander, however, still firmly held out for adhering to the treaty of Fontainebleau, and maintaining the fallen Emperor in possession of the island of Elba: alleging as a reason, that his personal honour had been pledged to his great antagonist for that asylum, and that he would not be the first to break it. Metternich, however, was so strongly impressed with the impending danger, that he secretly dispatched a letter to Fouché at Paris, enquiring “What would happen if Napoléon returned? what if the King of Rome with a squadron of horse appeared on the frontier? and what would France do if left to its spontaneous movement?” The sagacious minister of police replied, that if one regiment sent against Napoléon ranged itself on his side, the whole army would follow its example—that if the King of Rome was escorted to the frontiers by an Austrian regiment, the whole nation would instantly hoist his colours: and that, if no external stimulus was applied, the nation would seek refuge in the Orleans dynasty. These dangers, however, were only appreciated by the few who had foresight equal to the Austrian statesman or French revolutionist: and all heads at Vienna were involved in a whirl of gaiety, splendour, and dissipation, which gave rise to the witty saying of the Prince de Ligne, “the Congress dances, but it does not advance;” when, on the 7th March, intelligence was brought to Metternich at a great ball at Vienna, that NAPOLEON HAD SECRETLY LEFT ELBA (2).

Prodigious sensation excited in the Congress by this event. March 7. If a thunderbolt had fallen in the middle of the brilliant circle assembled in the Imperial ball-room at Vienna, it could not have excited greater consternation than this simple announcement. It was deemed expedient, nevertheless, to conceal the alarm which all really felt, and next day, Metternich, Wellington, and Talleyrand went to Presburg, to announce to the King of Saxony, as had been previously arranged, the determination come to by the Congress in regard to the cessions of territory which he was required to make, under the pain of losing his crown. The affairs of Saxony, however, were soon adjusted. All minor differences

(1) Schoell, *Trait. de Paix*, xi. 189, 195.

(2) Cap. i. 177, 180. Hard, xii. 475, 476, Schoell, xi. 207, 208.

were immediately forgotten : the strides of Russia, the aggrandizement of Prussia, the terrors of Austria, were buried in oblivion : all lesser subjects of alarm were absorbed in the pressing danger arising from the return of Napoléon to the throne of France. Alexander was profoundly irritated at the event. Alone he had for long contended against the other powers at the Congress for the maintenance of Napoléon in the island of Elba, as a thing to which, whether right or wrong, his personal honour was engaged ; and he felt it, therefore, as a personal injury, when the object of his solicitude was the first himself to break his engagement. Much uncertainty at first prevailed as to the place of his destination, and many suspected it was Naples, where Murat was openly preparing for hostilities : but all doubt was soon removed ; the posts of the succeeding days brought intelligence by the way of Turin, that he had landed in the Gulf of St.-Juan, near Frejus ; that he had taken the road for Paris through the mountains of Gap : in fine, that Labédoyère and the garrison of Grenoble had joined him, and he was making an unre-sisted and triumphant progress towards Lyons (1).

Decided
measures
of the Con-
gress
against
Napoléon.

As the revolt of the army and approaching downfall of the throne of Louis XVIII could no longer be doubted, the Congress took the most vigorous measures to provide against the danger. The cabinet of Vienna felt it incumbent on it to take the lead on this occasion ;

not only as its apprehensions had been the main cause of the late divisions which had prevailed in the deliberations of the Allies, but because Napoléon, relying on his family connexion with the imperial house of Hapsburg, had disseminated with profusion on his road to Grenoble a proclamation, in which he declared that he had returned to France with the concurrence of Austria, and that he was speedily to be supported by a hundred thousand

March 12.

of the troops of that nation. Metternich, therefore, in the first formal meeting held to deliberate on the course which should be pursued, stated, that “ it would be worthy of the Allied powers, and of the highest importance in the existing crisis, to express their opinion on an event, which could not fail to create a great sensation in every part of Europe ; that Napoléon Buonaparte, in quitting the island of Elba, and disembarking in France at the head of an armed force, had openly rendered himself the disturber of the general peace ; that as such he could no longer claim the protection of any treaty or law ; that the powers who had signed the treaty of Paris, felt themselves in an especial manner called upon to declare in the face of Europe in what light they viewed that attempt ; that they should add that they were resolved at all hazards to carry into effect the whole provisions of the treaty of Paris ; and that they were all prepared to support the king of France with their whole forces, in the event of circumstances rendering their assistance necessary.” These sentiments, which had been previously concerted with Talleyrand, specially in order to detach the cause of Napoléon from that of the independence of the French monarchy, met with the unanimous and cordial concurrence of all present : and, in consequence, a declaration was forthwith drawn up and signed by all the Powers, which, in the most rigid terms, proscribed Napoléon as a public enemy with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded, and expressed the determination of the powers to employ the whole forces at their disposal, to prevent Europe from being again plunged into the abyss of revolution (2).

(1) Sir C. Stuart's Despatch to Lord Castlereagh, March 8, 1815. Cap. i. 179, 185. Thib. x, 224, 225.

(2) Schoell, Hist. des Trait. xi, 207, 208. Cap. i. 182, 183.

“ The powers which signed the treaty of Paris, reassembled in Congress at Vienna, informed of the escape of Napoléon Buonaparte, and of his entry with an armed force into France, owe it to their own dignity and to the interest of nations, to make

Military
prepara-
tions of the
Allied
Powers.

This energetic and decisive proclamation was immediately forwarded to Paris by the way of Strasburg, with instructions to the courier entrusted with it, to circulate as many copies as possible in the different towns and villages through which he passed in his route from the Rhine to the capital. Nor were the efforts of the allied sovereigns confined to mere denunciations on paper: the most vigorous measures were immediately taken to assemble a powerful force in the field. The Russian troops in Poland, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, were directed to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice: and Alexander declared "that he was ready to throw into the crusade the three hundred thousand men of whom he had the disposal, to put an end to these revolts of Prætorian guards: and that, as he was the most culpable in having retained Napoléon so long at Elba, so he would be the first to repair his fault." Austria put on the war footing her armies in Italy and Germany, amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand men: Prussia called forth the landwehr in all her dominions, and raised her forces to two hundred thousand men, of whom a hundred and fifty thousand were ordered to march to the Low Countries: the lesser states of Germany all called out their respective contingents, and, amidst the songs of triumph and threats of vengeance, moved towards the Rhine: while England, now delivered from the pressure of the American war, exerted extraordinary activity both in pouring troops into Flanders, and providing for the equipment of the newly-raised forces of the Belgians: numerous levies were raised in Hanover, and the old troops already had begun their march for the Flemish frontier: even Denmark and Sweden, forgetting their recent divisions, began to arm, and prepared to join the general coalition of Europe: and the Swiss cantons, departing from the cautious neutrality hitherto preserved, prepared to take an active part in the strife, and assail France on the side where it was most vulnerable: while Spain and Portugal joined in the general league, and slowly prepared their battalions to march towards the Pyrenees. And thus was verified the saying of Chateaubriand, "that if the cocked-hat and surtout of Napoléon were placed on a stick on the shores of Brest, it would cause Europe to run to arms from one end to the other (1)."

Settlement
of the
affairs of
Poland.

The imminent danger which the whole powers ran from the return of Napoléon, speedily led to a decision of the long-debated questions of Poland and Saxony. Russia at length agreed to accept of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, without the fortress of Thorn and its dependent territory, with the exception of a portion of it, containing eight hundred thousand souls, which was to be ceded to Prussia; and it was expressly stipulated that Poland should not be incorporated with Russia,

a solemn announcement of their sentiments on the occasion. In breaking, after this manner, the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Buonaparte has destroyed the sole legal title to which his political existence is attached. By reappearing in France, with projects of trouble and overthrow, he has not less deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and made it evident in the face of the universe that there can no longer be either peace or truce with him. The powers, therefore, declare that Buonaparte has placed himself out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as the general enemy and disturber of the world, he is abandoned to public justice. They declare at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain untouched the treaty of Paris of 30th May 1813, and the disposi-

tions sanctioned by that treaty, they will employ the whole means at their disposal to secure the preservation of general peace, the object of all their efforts; and although firmly persuaded that the whole of France will combine to crush this last mad attempt of criminal ambition, yet, if it should prove otherwise, they declare that they are ready to unite all their efforts, and exert all the powers at their disposal, to give the King of France all necessary assistance, and make common cause against all those who shall compromise the public tranquillity. — METTERNICH, TALLEYRAND, WELLINGTON, HARBENBERG, NESSELRODTE, LOWENHEIM. — See SCHOELL, *Recueil des Pièces Officielles*, v. 1.

(1) Cap. i. 194. 196. Schoell, *Hist. des Trait. de Paix*, vi. 213, 244.

but should form a separate kingdom, preserving its own laws, institutions language, and religion. After a great deal of negotiation, a treaty was concluded on these bases on the 3d May, between Russia and Saxony; another on the same day, between Prussia and Russia; and a third between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. By these treaties, Saxony ceded to Russia in perpetuity the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, to be erected into a separate kingdom in favour of the Emperor of Russia but not incorporated with that empire: the ancient town of Cracow, with a small territory adjacent, was erected into a separate republic, containing in all 64,000 souls, with the shadow at least of independence. By this treaty a portion of Poland recovered its long-lost nationality: above four millions of Sarmatians were restored to the rank of a separated people: the Russian viceroy at Warsaw maintained regal state, surrounded by Polish soldiers, Polish uniforms, Polish ministers, and Polish institutions. A constitution, defective indeed in some essential particulars establishing the elements of freedom, but still a vast improvement upon its old stormy *comitia*, was guaranteed: and such was the growth of the nation, and the improvement of its strength under the regular and stable government which followed, that on occasion of the revolt of 1830, it singly withstood, guided by the genius of Skrynecki, the whole military force of Russia for nine months, and was at length subdued only by the accession of Prussia to the league of its enemies. Such as they were, these blessings were mainly to be ascribed to the philanthropic disposition of the Emperor Alexander, and the determined stand made by Lord Castlereagh: but, in common with many other guarantees of real freedom, they perished fifteen years afterwards under the assault of democracy, roused into frantic activity by the triumph of the barricades, which subverted the throne of Charles X (1).

And of Saxony. The decision of the question regarding Saxony was somewhat more expeditious. The unhappy Frederick Augustus, who, since the fatal overthrow of Leipsic, had inhabited the castle of Fredericksfield as a sort of state prisoner, was invited by the Allied sovereigns to approach the vicinity of Vienna, and arrived at Presburg on the 4th March, just two days before intelligence arrived of the departure of Napoléon from Elba. By the intervention of Great Britain, this intricate and delicate negotiation was adjusted; the share of Saxony devolving to Prussia was reduced to a territory containing 1,400,000 souls; and Hanover was contented with a portion containing 250,000. Prussia accepted these modifications; and the King of Saxony, threatened with the total loss of his dominions in the event of refusal, had no alternative, after long holding out, but compliance. Under protest, therefore, that his consent to the alienation of so large a portion of his dominions was constrained, he submitted to the conditions; the King of Prussia was authorized, by a note of the Congress, to take possession of the ceded territory; and at length, by a formal treaty concluded March 12. on the 18th May, peace was finally concluded between the contending parties. By this treaty, Saxony ceded to Prussia, in perpetuity, the whole of Lower Lusatia, part of Upper Lusatia, the fortress and circle of Wittenberg, the circle of Thuringia, and various other territories on the right bank of the Elbe, containing 1,400,000 souls. Prussia at the same time acquired a portion of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, containing 840,000 inhabitants, in addition to the whole territories which she possessed before May 18.

(1) See the Treaties, in Marten's N. R. ii. 236, 251; iv. 127: and abridged in Schoell, *Trait. de Paix*, xi 74, 89.

the battle of Jena; acquisitions which raised her population to above ten millions of souls, and elevated her to the rank of a first-rate power. Dresden, Leipsic, and not quite two-thirds of his old dominions, remained to the King of Saxony; and although Europe deeply sympathized with the cruel partition of the territories of an ancient and respectable house, yet it was impossible to deny that the sovereign had brought the catastrophe upon himself; and that, as he had cast in his lot with Napoléon (1), largely participated in his conquests, and to the last resisted all the efforts of the Allies to detach him from his alliance, so he could not in justice complain if he shared his fall.

Acts of the Congress for the free navigation of the Rhine, and the abolition of the Slave Trade. It only remains to add, before finally taking leave of the Congress of Vienna, that on two points of importance to the internal interests of Europe, and the general interests of humanity, its deliberations, actuated by philanthropy and guided by wisdom, conferred a lasting benefit on mankind. 1st—Wise regulations were established for securing the free navigation of its great rivers, particularly the Rhine, the Neckar, and the Meuse, without at the same time abrogating the just rights of the potentates who were interested in the dues of its passage. Moderate duties were established, to be drawn by a central board, and allotted to each of the proprietors who substantiated titles in proportion to their respective interests. The rents amounted to 544,000 florins, or L.42,000 a-year. 2d—The great and important subject of the abolition of the slave trade occupied a considerable portion of the attention of the Congress. The House of Commons had petitioned the King of England to use his endeavours to procure the abolition, by all civilized nations, of this infamous traffic, and several states had concluded treaties with Great Britain, more or less stringently, for its limitation or abolition. In particular, this had been done by a treaty with the Court of Rio Janeiro in 1810, and Sweden March 3, 1813, in 1815. Denmark had previously set the first example of the great deed of justice, by abolishing the traffic in 1794, by an edict to come into operation after the lapse of ten years. Before leaving Paris, Lord Castlereagh had addressed a circular to all the Allied powers, earnestly requesting their co-operation in that great object; and not only had they all expressed opinions favourable to the proposed abolition, but the King of the Netherlands, by a decree in June 1815, abolished it in his dominions. A treaty was also concluded between England and Spain, by which the King of Spain engaged to take efficacious measures for abolishing the slave trade throughout his dominions; and at the Congress of Vienna a great step was made in the same career by a treaty with Portugal, by which the slave trade was absolutely prohibited to the subjects of Portugal to the north of the equator: no less than L.600,000 was the price paid by England for this concession to the principles of humanity. Great resistance, however, was made by France and Spain to the efforts of Lord Castlereagh, to procure the consent of their respective courts to the entire abolition of the slave trade within any limited period; and all that he could obtain was, a joint declaration signed by all the powers of their abhorrence of the traffic, and their desire for its being effectually put an end to, but leaving the period for its entire abolition to be fixed by separate negotiations between the different powers (2).

Return of Napoléon from Elba. It was not surprising that the European powers strove to reconcile their divisions, and accommodate their differences at the Congress

(1) See the Treaty, in Martens' N. R. ii, 272: (2) Schoell, Hist. des Trait. de Paix, xi. 247; and Schoell, xi. 61, 72. 257, and 173, 189.

of Vienna; for an event had now occurred on the shores of the Mediterranean, which again placed the fate of the world at hazard, and loudly called for their united efforts to stem the torrent of evil. This event was the return of Napoléon from Elba.

Situation of
Napoléon
at Elba.
Commence-
ment of a
conspiracy
in France
in his
favour.

With a blindness to the future and probable course of events, which now appears scarcely conceivable, but of which, at the time of the treaty of Fontainebleau (1), Lord Castlereagh had fully appreciated the danger, the unreflecting generosity of the Allied sovereigns had assigned to Napoléon, in independent sovereignty, a little island on the Tuscan coast, within sight of Italy, within a few days' sail of France, and in a situation, of all others, the most favourable for carrying on intrigues with both countries. As if, too, they had purposely intended to invite a second descent, he was placed there with an ample revenue; an armed force, which was soon raised, by veterans who flocked to his standard from the adjacent shores, to above a thousand tried and experienced soldiers; and three small vessels of war at his disposal, while there was not a single English line-of-battle ship or frigate to prevent an expedition sailing against the coast of France. Sir Neil Campbell and the other Allied commissioners, indeed, were there, and enjoyed a large share of the society of the Emperor; but they were merely a species of accredited diplomatists at his court: they could only report to their respective cabinets what was going on, and were neither entitled to restrain his proceedings, nor had they any armed force at their disposal to coerce his attempts. A brig of eighteen guns indeed cruised off the island; but it was wholly unable to blockade Porto Ferrajo, or prevent the descent of the Emperor at the head of his guards on the adjacent shores. It was easy to foresee what would be the result of this extraordinary facility afforded to the dethroned conqueror. A constant correspondence was maintained by Napoléon with his adherents in France and Italy: his friends and relatives were continually in communication with or visiting him; and soon a vast conspiracy was formed, with its centre in Paris, and its ramifications throughout the whole army and a great part of the civil functionaries (2), and having for its object to overturn the dynasty of the Bourbons, and replace the Emperor on the throne.

Its great
ramifications
in the army,
and Napoléon's
correspondence
with Murat.

The inferior officers and soldiers of the army were in an especial manner the seat of this conspiracy. The marshals and generals, worn out with war, and glad at any price to secure the peaceable possession of their titles and fortunes, had in good faith, for the most part, embraced the party of the Restoration: but though the troops had formally taken the oath to the new government, yet in their hearts they had never renounced their allegiance to the Emperor; and their devotion to him was only the more profound, that "distance lent enchantment to the view," and that no present fatigue or sufferings interfered with the charm of old recollections. The snows of Russia, the overthrow of Leipsic, the disasters of France, were forgotten: he appeared only to their recollection as the hero of Rivoli or Austerlitz: the resistless chief who led them conquering and to conquer to every capital of Europe. These feelings were all but universal in the troops and in the officers, from the colonel downwards: and while the generals and marshals besieged the antechambers of the Tuileries, and signed loyal addresses, resounding with the fleurs-de-lys, Henry IV,

(1) *Ante*, x. 242.

(2) Sir N. Campbell's MS. Thib. x. 223, 225. Cap. i. 104, 105. Montg. vii. 98, 99.

and the white flag, the poor soldiers, often the last depositaries in a corrupted age of fidelity and attachment, in secret adhered to their old allegiance: they guarded the Emperor's eagles as their household gods, kept the tricolor cockades with pious care in their knapsacks—spoke with rapture of his exploits in their barracks, and worshipped his image in their hearts. Various words to signify the beloved object were invented, and though known to thousands and tens of thousands, the secret was religiously preserved (1): He was called “Père la Violette,” and the “Petit Caporal:” and the rumour spread through the army, “that he would appear with the violet in spring on the Seine, to chase from thence the priests and emigrants who have insulted the national glory”

Napoléon's correspondence with Murat. Found dissimulation, and life in Elba. Its close proximity to the Italian shore, led naturally to a secret correspondence between the island of Elba and the court of Naples. Murat, ever governed by ambition, and yet destitute of the firmness of purpose requisite to render it successful, now found that his vacillation of conduct had ruined him with the aristocratie, as it had formerly done with the revolutionary party, and that the Allies were little disposed to reward his deviation from his engagements by the lasting possession of the throne of Naples. He threw himself therefore once more into the arms of France, and it was arranged that the descent of Napoléon on the coast of Provence should be contemporaneous with the advance of his troops to the Po, and the proclamation of the great principle of Italian unity and independence. At the same time, various illustrious strangers of both sexes visited Napoléon at Elba: among the former was Lord Ebrington, who has given the world a most interesting account of his conversation with the fallen hero; among the latter, the Polish lady who had fascinated him before the battle of Eylau (2)—the French countess who had alleviated his anguish amidst the desertions of Fontainebleau (3). Amidst this varied society, by some of whom the great intrigue which was going forward was conducted, the language of the Emperor was always the same, and his profound powers of dissimulation were never more strikingly evinced. To the English, he spoke only of the new constitutions in France, the errors and difficulties of the king; the irretrievable folly of the Bourbons; the inapplicability of British institutions to the present state of French society; the impossibility of finding a Chamber of Deputies not either servile or turbulent; the entire termination of his own political existence, and the calm eye with which he now looked back on the stormy scene in which he had no longer any interest. To Sir Neil Campbell, in particular, he was apparently communicative and confidential in the highest degree; almost every morning he admitted him to his breakfast table, when the conversation ranged over every subject of history and politics; they then strolled out along the beach, in company with some of the other commissioners, and he not unfrequently embarked with Sir Neil alone in a small boat, under pretence of fishing, and when he got a little way out from the shore said, “Now, we are out of their hearing, ask me any thing, and I will tell you.” By these means, the Emperor so far gained upon the confidence of that able officer, that he contented himself with reporting these precious conversations to his cabinet, and, deeming no danger at hand, though not unlikely at some future period to occur, was frequently absent for days together, at Florence or Leghorn, where he had several interesting acquaintances. But even if he had been every day at the

(1) Cap. i. 110, 113. Thib. x. 224, 225.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 26.

(3) *Ante*, x. 243.

Emperor's side, it would have been of no avail, for there were no visible preparations going on; if there had, he had no force whatever at his disposal to check them; and his instructions were merely to attend general Buonaparte to Elba, to see him established there, and remain as long as the ex-Emperor might desire his presence (1).

Napoléon's preparations for embarking from Elba. All things being at length in readiness, and the preparations in France, by means of the inferior officers of the army, the veteran Republicans at Paris, and the old Imperial functionaries still retained in office by the government, completed, Napoléon, on the 26th of February, gave a brilliant ball at Porto Ferrajo to the principal persons of the island, over which the grace and beauty of his sister, the Princess Pauline, who presided, threw an unusual lustre. Sir Neil Campbell unfortunately was absent, having sailed on the 17th in the Partridge for Leghorn: and so well had the preparations for departure been concealed, that Captain Adige of the Partridge, who was cruising round the island, had no conception that any departure was intended, and sailed from Leghorn the very day of Napoléon's embarkation. Sir Neil was well aware that Napoléon meditated an outbreak, and some recent indications, particularly the arrival of three feluccas from Naples, made him suspect that it would ere long occur: but as he had no force at his disposal, and the single British cruiser, the Partridge of 18 guns, was wholly unequal to the encounter of the whole flotilla of Napoléon, he contented himself with warning government of the chance of his escape (2), and had gone to Leghorn, principally to concert measures with Lord Burghersh, the British envoy at Florence, on the means of averting the danger which appeared approaching, by detaching a line-of-battle ship and frigate which lay at Genoa to cruise off the island, when in his absence it actually occurred.

Leaves Elba, and steers for the gulf of Juan. While Napoléon's mother and sister were doing the honours of the ball, he himself walked around the room, conversing in the most affable manner with the guests; and meanwhile secret orders had been dispatched to his guards, to hold themselves in readiness on the quay. At three o'clock in the afternoon they were all drawn up there, in number about eleven hundred, of whom four hundred were the Old Guard, under the command of Bertrand, Drouot, and Cambronne. Napoléon joined them at half-past four, and orders were immediately given for commencing the embarkation. By seven o'clock it was completed, and the Emperor stepped on board the Inconstant brig, which contained four hundred of his old comrades in arms. His air was calm and serene: he merely said, in an under voice to those around him, "The die is now cast." The eyes of Bertrand gleamed with joy; Drouot was pensive and thoughtful; Cambronne seemed

(1) Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. i. 121, 126. Lord Ebrington's Conversations with Napoleon in Elba, 23, 36.

"You will pay every proper respect and attention to Napoléon, to whose secure asylum in Elba it is the wish of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to afford every facility and protection; and you will acquaint Napoléon in suitable terms of attention, that you are directed to reside in the island till further orders, if he should consider that the presence of a British officer can be of any use in protecting the island and his person against insult or attack." LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Instructions to Sir Neil Campbell*. Paris, 16th April. — SIR NEIL CAMPBELL'S MS.

(2) Sir N. Campbell's MS. Jour. Captain Adige's Report to Admiral Penrose, March 15, 1815.

"If I may venture an opinion upon Buonaparte's

plan, I think he will leave General Bertrand to defend Porto Ferrajo, as he has a wife and several children with him to whom he is extremely attached, and probably will not communicate his intentions to him till the last moment. He will take with him General Drouot, and those of his guards upon whom he can most depend, embarking General Cambronne (a desperate, uneducated ruffian, who was a drummer with him in Egypt) in the Inconstant, L'Etoile, and the other vessels mentioned in the memorandum; he will go himself, probably a day or two before the troops, with General Drouot in the Caroline, and the place of disembarkation will be Gaeta, on the coast of Naples, or Civita Vecchia, if Murat has previously advanced to Rome." SIR N. CAMPBELL to LORD CASTLEREAGH, dated Leghorn, 26th February 1815; SIR N. CAMPBELL'S MS, *Papers*, Despatch, No. 45.

entirely occupied with the arrangement of his soldiers. It was dark when the flotilla, which consisted in all of seven small vessels, got under weigh; Napoléon had given out to the inhabitants "that he was going to the coast of Barbary to chastise the pirates, who from time immemorial had infested the coasts of Elba;" and sealed instructions were delivered to the captain of the *Inconstant*, not to be read till they were at open sea. The night was calm, the wind light from the south; and it was not till they were two leagues from the harbour that the captain opened his instructions, and saw that his destination was the gulf of Juan on the coast of Provence. He immediately steered in that direction, and the transports of the soldiers could no longer be restrained. "Officers and soldiers of my guard," said Napoléon, "we are going to France." Loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur* immediately burst out on all sides, but after the first transport of enthusiasm was over, sad presentiments filled the breasts of the soldiers; the recollection of Moscow and Leipzig returned to their minds, and even the bravest hesitated as to the result of an expedition, in which the Emperor, at the head of a thousand men, set out to brave the military force of all Europe (1).

Voyage, and landing there. During the night the wind fell, and at daybreak they were only six leagues from the nearest point of Elba. Napoléon shut himself up in his cabin, and dictated those proclamations to the people and army, which soon thrilled the breast of France, from Calais to Bayonne. Some of the least resolute on board, seeing the wind fail, suggested that it would be prudent to return to Porto Ferrajo; but the Emperor replied, "If the ships are too heavily laden, throw all the baggage overboard; the idea of returning to Elba is pusillanimous; we bear France on the point of our swords." Opposite Leghorn on the 27th, a French frigate was descried five leagues to windward; but it did not approach. The Zephyr French brig soon after came within hail: the soldiers took off their caps, and lay flat on deck to avoid discovery; and the captain having asked if they had come from Elba, and how was Napoléon, he himself answered, "Il se porte à merveille."

Feb. 27. Suspecting nothing, the brig passed on: on the evening of the 29th, the lofty towers of Antibes were descried; and Napoléon, amidst loud cheers, read his proclamation to his soldiers, who all mounted the tricolor cockade. Without molestation the fleet pursued its course; soon the olive-clad slopes of Cannes opened to the view, and at three o'clock on the afternoon of the Feb. 29. 1st March, the whole vessels cast anchor in the gulf of St.-Juan. The Old Guard, under Drouot, was immediately landed without opposition; shortly after, Napoléon himself descended into the long boat of the brig, and approached the shore; on reaching the sand, it was moored to the trunk of an olivetree. "That is a good omen," cried the Emperor, whose mind on momentous occasions was singularly alive to superstitious impressions; and he caused it to be mentioned to his soldiers, who received it with joyfulness. Stepping ashore, he gave a few napoleons to his officers, to buy horses from the neighbouring peasants: spoke cheerfully, and with the magic which he had so wonderfully at his command, to the men: encouraged his officers by animated and varied conversation; and at night the watches were set, and the troops bivouacked, as on the eve of the battles of Austerlitz or Wagram (2).

March 1. The dangers of the passage were now over; but there remained the perils of the shore, which were sufficient to daunt the most

He marches by Gap to Grenoble.

(1) Sir N. Campbell's Journal, MS. Cap. i. 153, 154. Beauch. iii. 141, 143. Thib. x. 225, 226.

(2) Fleury de Chaboulon, i. 23, 26, Cap. i. 139, 141.

resolute breasts. Though the great conspiracy, having for its object the overthrow of the Bourbons, had ramifications in almost every regiment in the army, yet it was in a few instances only that the superior officers had been gained; and it was as yet uncertain whether or not the men would disobey their orders. The first attempt was unsuccessful; twenty-five of the old guard were sent to Antibes to endeavour to seduce the garrison by the name of the

March 1. Emperor, but General Corsin, who commanded in that fortress, arrested the men; and on a second detachment being brought up, which began to read at the foot of the rampart the proclamations issued by Napoléon, he cut the matter short by threatening to discharge the guns. This check spread great discouragement among the soldiers, and induced a moment's hesitation in the mind of the Emperor: but he had gone too far to recede; and at four o'clock in the following morning he took the road by Gap to Grenoble, through the mountains. This road, after quitting the Var at Sisteron, ascends into the Alpine range, which it never quits till it arrives in the neighbourhood of the latter town. No district of France could have been selected more favourable to the Emperor's designs; for it contains no great towns or wealthy districts, and the inhabitants, strongly imbued with the feelings of Helvetic independence, fearless and active as are all mountaineers, were in great part holders of national domains, and strongly imbued with the principles of the Revolution. They received him in consequence with open arms; and his versatile disposition flattered the prevailing wish wherever he went. Every where he spread the announcements most likely to be agreeable to the simple people to whom they were addressed.

March 2. Sometimes he declared that he was weary of war; that he would be as pacific as the Bourbons; that he would abolish the *droits réunis*, and never revive the conscription: at others, that Austria had engaged to support him with a hundred thousand men; that Murat was following him with eighty thousand; in fine, that the Congress had dethroned Louis XVIII. On all occasions he styled the people citizens, and spoke the language most calculated to revive the revolutionary fervour in their minds: "Why had he come to France? why had he hoisted the tricolor flag? It was to restore the liberty of 1789, to recognise all the privileges conquered by the Revolution, to secure the proprietors of the national domains menaced by the Bourbons, to give equal rights to all." Meanwhile the advance was pressed with extraordinary activity; in the first two days they marched fifty-four miles; at

March 4. Digne, on the 4th, his proclamations were printed; near Sisteron the troops admired the good fortune which had left the formidable pass of the Saulce, between the Durance and an overhanging precipice, unguarded; at Gap he rested a few hours, and distributed his proclamations, and continuing his march with ceaseless vigour, was already approaching Grenoble, when, on the 6th March, General Cambonne, at the head of the leading companies, met on the road of Vizille the advanced guard of the troops detached from the garrison of that fortress to arrest his progress (1).

Defection of Labédoyère, and his character. Hitherto the march of Napoléon had been unresisted, and the dispositions of the peasants in the country through which he had passed had been favourable; but nothing was yet decided. It was not by the mountaineers of Dauphiny, but the troops of France, that the contest for the throne was to be determined; in such an enterprize as he was now engaged in, the conduct of the first regiment generally determines the rest, and every thing depended on the issue of the crisis which had now

(1) Cap. i. 145, 148. Beauch. iii. 149, 161.

arrived. According to the plan which had been agreed on before Napoléon left Elba, part of the garrison of Grenoble, under the command of Colonel Labédoyère, was to march out to meet him; and from their treason the defection of the whole army was anticipated. Labédoyère was an officer of handsome figure and elegant manners, descended of a respectable family, young, enthusiastic, and daring. He had owed his promotion and appointment to the royal court, but his heart dwelt on the glories of the empire; he had readily yielded at Paris to the seductions of the salons of the Duchess of St.-Leu, one of the most fascinating supporters of Napoléon, and his mind, debased by the chicanery of the Revolution, saw nothing dishonourable in holding a high military command under the Bourbons, and employing the power it gave him to accomplish their destruction. Charity forbids us to stigmatize such conduct by its true appellation. Infidelity and revolution had totally perverted the human heart, and almost dried up the springs of conscience in many breasts. Marlborough himself, in similar circumstances, did the same. It is the strongest proof of the peril of revolution, and the infernal agency at work in its creation, that it overturns the whole principles of virtue in all breasts save those fortified by religion, and converts bravery and honour themselves into treachery and treason (1).

Memorable meeting of Napoléon with his troops. March 7. An accidental circumstance, however, had wellnigh frustrated all these arrangements, and overthrown at its very outset this deep-laid conspiracy. General Marchand, the governor of Grenoble, although an old comrade of Napoléon in Egypt, was a man of honour, and faithful to his trust, and, entirely ignorant of the treason at work in his garrison, he had dispatched towards Vizille a battalion of infantry and some guns, not under Labédoyère, with orders to observe the enemy, and retire before them to the ramparts of Grenoble, but on no account to permit any communication with Napoléon's soldiers. It was with these men that Cambronne's advanced guard first came up: and he was filled with consternation upon finding, when he approached, that no signs of defection appeared—that no parleying was permitted between the troops, and that resistance was evidently prepared. He immediately dispatched an aide-de-camp to the Emperor, with the alarming intelligence. "We have been deceived," said Napoléon to Bertrand, "but it is no matter—forward!" Advancing then to the front of the advanced guard, in the well-known surtout and cocked hat which had become canonized in the recollection of the soldiers, he said aloud to the opposite rank, in a voice tremulous from emotion, "Comrades, do you know me again?" "Yes, sire:" exclaimed the men. "Do you recognize me, my children?" he added: "I am your Emperor: fire on me if you wish: fire on your father: here is my bosom," and with that he bared his breast. At these words, the transports of the soldiers could no longer be restrained; as if struck by an electric shock, they all broke their ranks—threw themselves at the feet of the Emperor—embraced his knees with tears of joy, and with indescribable fervour again raised the old cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* Hardly had they risen from the ground, when the tricolor cockade was seen on every breast: the eagles reappeared on the standards; and the whole detachment sent out to combat the Emperor, ranged itself with fervent devotion on his side (2). The spot where this memorable meeting occurred is marked by a tree which overhangs the road, amidst those savage alpine solitudes; few more interesting scenes

(1) Cap. i. 147, 148.

(2) Cap. i. 149, 150 Fleury de Chaboulon, i. 210, 213. Personal observation of the scene,

are to be met with, even on the time-bespangled shores of the Mediterranean sea.

His de-
into
Grenoble. Meanwhile, Labédoyère had assembled his regiment, and in defiance alike of the commands of General Marchand, and of the injunctions of the prefect, who in vain endeavoured to retain him in his duty, left Grenoble at the head of his men, in the most violent state of excitement. Hardly was he out of the gates when he drew an eagle from his pocket, which he embraced before the soldiers, who shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* and a drum having been opened containing tricolor cockades, which were immediately distributed among the men, the whole, amidst tumultuous shouts of joy, advanced, and met Napoléon. He bestowed on Labédoyère the most flattering marks of regard, and the united columns, now nearly three thousand strong, in the afternoon approached the fortress. Marchand and the prefect did their utmost to induce the garrison to resist, but all their efforts were in vain : the *prestige* of the Emperor was irresistible, and finding their orders disregarded, they took the part of men of honour, and retired from situations of trust in which they could no longer exercise their functions. Soon after, Napoléon arrived at the gates of Grenoble, behind which an enthusiastic crowd of soldiers and citizens was assembled in the most vehement state of exultation. The gates were locked : but they were soon forced open, and Napoléon made his entry by torchlight, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, and took up his abode at the Cheval Blanc, kept by an old veteran of his guard (1).

His de-
crees from
thence.
March 8. Three decrees of great importance were issued by the Emperor from Grenoble. The first declared that all the acts of government should henceforth run in his name; this was in effect to resume the throne. By the second, the National Guards of the five neighbouring departments were called out and placed in activity. By the third, the fortress of Grenoble was entrusted to these National Guards. At the same time, he explained in conversation to M. Champollion the view which he took of the altered state of his affairs. "The Bourbons," said he, "had accustomed the people to political rights : he was prepared to follow out the same system : in a word, to apply to the cause of the Revolution the results of a constitutional government." In conformity with these ideas, he said, in answer to an address from the authorities and citizens of Grenoble, "I have been too fond of war : I will wage it no longer : I return to restore its rights to the nation : I desire only to be its first citizen." In proclamations drawn in the

March 11. masculine spirit of ancient oratory, one addressed to the French people, the other to the army, he repudiated the idea of their defeat, ascribed their misfortunes to treachery, and invited them again to range themselves around the tricolor standard. "Soldiers!" said he, "we have not been conquered! Two men sprung from our ranks have betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor. Shall those whom we have seen during twenty years fly over every part of Europe to raise up opposition against us; who have passed their lives in the enemies' camps uttering execrations against our beautiful France; shall they pretend to command us, to enchain our eagles—they who have so often quailed beneath their glance? Shall we suffer them to reap the fruit of our glorious labours : to take possession of our honours, of our effects : to calumniate your glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost : even to the recollection of your glorious days,—with what bitterness do they denounce them! how do they

seek to detract from what the world admires! and if any defenders of your glory yet remain, it is among our ancient antagonists on the field of battle. Soldiers! in my exile I have heard your voice: I have come hither through all perils, despite all obstacles: your General, called to the throne by the choice of the people, and elevated on your bucklers, is restored to you. Come and join him: come and range yourselves under the standards of your chief: he has no existence but in yours: his interest, his honour, his glory, are no other than yours. Victory will march at the *pas de charge*: the eagle, with the national colours, will fly from steeple to steeple, till it lights on the towers of Notre-Dame. There you will be able in safety to boast of what you have done: you will be the deliverers of your country. In your old age, surrounded and respected by your fellow-citizens, you will recount your great deeds: you will say with pride—‘And I, too, was part of that army which entered twice into the walls of Vienna, which passed twice through those of Rome, of Berlin, of Madrid, of Moscow, which delivered Paris from the stains that treason had affixed to it.’ Honour to those brave soldiers, the glory of their country! and shame to the criminal Frenchmen, in what rank soever fortune may have originally placed them, who have combated twenty-five years with the stranger to tear in pieces their country (1).”

Measures
taken at
Paris on
the news
being re-
ceived.

While Napoléon was thus thundering forth proclamations destined to strike again the strong chord of French nationality, to thrill every patriotic heart with emotion, and in their ultimate effects convulse Europe from end to end, the court of the Tuileries, thunderstruck with the intelligence, vacillated between affected indifference and real apprehension. On the morning of the 3d March, a telegraphic despatch from the prefect of Toulon announced the landing of Napoléon in the gulf of Juan; and soon after the full details were received: M. Blacas treated the enterprize with contempt, as the last effort of a madman: Louis XVIII judged differently: from the outset, he declared that it threatened the most serious consequences. The Duke of Berry, desirous of glory, could not conceal the joy which he felt at an event, which he doubted not would add his name to the paladins of the monarchy. Three days after the first news had been received, the confidence of the court continued unabated, and exhaled in an indignant proclamation, which proved a feeble counterpoise to the heart-stirring appeals of Napoléon, which were already beginning to convulse France (2). As the unresisted approach of the Emperor, however, to Grenoble, and the defection of the garrison of that fortress became known, alarm spread through all classes, and even the most devoted adherents of the Bourbons began to tremble for the result. An indescribable confusion pervaded the court; and while the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with loyal addresses from the marshals, superior officers, and all the constituted authorities, that general quiver, the invariable precursor of revolution, was distinctly visible in all classes. A royal proclamation convoked the two Chambers with all possible expedition: the Count d’Artois was dispatched,

(1) *Moniteur*, March 21, 1815. Cap. i. 135, 137.

(2) “Buonaparte has escaped from the island of Elba, where the imprudent magnanimity of the Allied Sovereigns had given him a sovereignty, in return for the desolations which he had brought into their dominions. That man who, when he abdicated his power, retained all his ambition and his fury; that man covered with the blood of generations, comes at the end of a year, spent seemingly in apathy, to strive to dispute, in the name of his usurpations and his massacres, the legitimate and mild authority of the King of France. At the head

of a few hundred Italians and Piedmontese, he has dared again to set his feet on that land which had banished him for ever: he wishes to re-open the wounds, still but half-closed, which he had made, and which the hand of the king is healing every day. A few treasonable attempts, some movements in Italy excited by his insane brother-in-law, inflamed the pride of the cowardly warrior of Fontainebleau. He exposes himself, as he imagines, to the death of a hero: he will only die that of a traitor. France has rejected him: he returns: France will devour him.”—*Moniteur*, 6th March 1815.

in company with the Duke of Orleans and marshal Macdonald, to Lyons, the former to secure the adhesion of the Constitutionalists, the latter to steady the wavering fidelity of the army; a special messenger was dispatched to the Duke d'Angoulême, who, with the duchess, had recently before set off for Bordeaux to celebrate the first anniversary of the raising of the royalist standard in that city, to warn him of the danger, and the necessity of rousing the southern provinces; the Duke de Bourbon was sent down to la Vendée to endeavour, by the great name of Condé, to revive the devoted fidelity of the peasants of the Bocage; while the command of an army of reserve, to be formed at Essonne and Fontainebleau, destined specially for the defence of the capital, was entrusted to the Duke de Berry (1).

Ineffectual
attempts
to stimu-
late a roy-
alist re-
sistance.

Great efforts were made by the court to stimulate a royalist resistance; but they were only partially successful. In Paris, indeed, the young men of the universities, aware that France owed to the Bourbons its first decided step in the path of freedom, which Napoléon would speedily frustrate, and that the conscription and wars would soon decimate their ranks if the imperial *régime* were restored, enrolled themselves with alacrity as volunteers; but the youth of the country, constituting nine-tenths of the physical strength of the nation, hung back. They had a latent dread of the resumption of the national domains by the royalist government, because they felt that justice demanded their restitution; they identified Napoléon with their cause and that of the Revolution, because he had risen from their ranks; and they were so thoroughly exhausted by previous wars, that neither for one party nor the other could they be induced to make any movement whatever. The great bulk of the influential citizens in towns were favourable to the government of the Restoration, and entertained a serious dread of the resumption of supreme power by Napoléon; but they were few in number, unarmed, and undisciplined: the rural population regarded the Bourbons with undisguised aversion; but they, too, were apathetic, and desired only to remain with their ploughs: the whole real strength of the nation was placed in the army, and it, with the exception of a few regiments of royal guards at Paris, was unanimous, in all but the superior ranks, in favour of the Emperor. It was not difficult to foresee what must be the result of a civil war commenced among a people placed in such circumstances (2).

Soult and
Ney's pro-
testations
of fidelity.

The court, however, was strongly supported, in words at least, by the marshals and dignified functionaries of the empire. Marshal Soult, as minister at war, issued a vehement proclamation to the troops, in which he stigmatized the ex-Emperor's enterprize as the work of an insensate madman, and conjured them by every feeling of honour patriotism, and fidelity, to abide by the lilies banner (3). The columns of the

(1) *Moniteur*, March 6, 1815. Cap. i. 155, 162. *Thib.* x. 226, 227. *Beauch.* iii. 168, 175.

(2) Cap. i. 163, 164. *Thib.* x. 227, 228.

(3) "Soldiers! That man who so lately abdicated in the face of all Europe an usurped power of which he made so fatal an use—Buonaparte—has descended on the French soil, which he should never have seen again. What does he desire? Civil war. Whom does he seek? Traitors. Where will he find them? Will it be among the soldiers, whom he has deceived and sacrificed a thousand times, in misleading their valour? Will it be in the bosom of their families, whom his bare name fills with a shudder? Buonaparte despises us enough, to think that we are capable of abandoning a legitimate and beloved monarch, to share the lot of a man who is now but an adventurer. He believes it, madman

that he is! And his last act of insanity reveals him entirely. Soldiers! The French army is the bravest army in Europe—it will also be the most faithful. Let us rally round the spotless lilies banner, at the voice of the father of his people, of the worthy inheritor of the virtues of the great Henry. He has himself traced to you the path which you ought to follow: he has put at your head that Prince, the model of French chevaliers, whose happy return to his country has chased the usurper from it, and who now sets forth by his presence to destroy his single and last hope."—*Le MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE*, *Moniteur*, 9th March 1815; and *THIBAudeau*, x. 228, 229. Contrast this with Soult's proclamation to his soldiers, on March 14, 1814, *Ante*, x. 166; and say what is the consistency or fidelity of a Revolution.

Moniteur were loaded for above a fortnight with addresses in the same strain from the municipality of Paris and the other great towns in France, the whole courts of law, universities, and colleges in the kingdom: the marshals and officers in command, whether of armies or garrisons: in fine, the whole authorities and constituted bodies throughout the monarchy. Recollecting what followed, a more melancholy instance of human baseness is not to be found in the annals of mankind. Marshal Ney, in particular expressed in the loudest terms his indignation at the insane attempt of the Emperor; and such faith did the government put in his fidelity, that they entrusted him with the command of the army assembling at Lons-le-Saulnier to stop the progress of the invaders. On the 7th March, he presented himself at the levee at the Tuileries to take leave of the King, previous to setting out for his command. "Sire," said he, "I will bring back Buonaparte in an iron cage (1)." "Farewell!" replied the monarch, "I trust to your honour and fidelity." These words, coming from so renowned a warrior and brave a man, made a great impression, and nothing was talked of in Paris for some days but Marshal Ney, his fidelity, and the iron cage (2).

Dismissal
of Soult,
and failure
of the
Count
d'Artois at
Lyons.

Mortier received the command in the north of France: Augereau was sent to Normandy: full powers were forwarded to Massena at Toulon: Oudinot was at Marseilles; and every thing announced the most vigorous resistance. But, meanwhile, the progress of Napoléon was unopposed; defection after defection succeeded in the army, and it was unhappily soon apparent that the corps of thirty thousand men, which, by direction of Marshal Soult, had been formed in *échelon* on the frontier, between Besançon and Lyons, to observe the threatened movements of Murat, was giving the most fatal examples of disaffection. This circumstance was immediately ascribed to the treacherous forethought of the war-minister: the clamour daily became louder as the defection of one regiment after another was ascertained, and at length it arose to such a height, that he was publicly denounced in the Chamber of Deputies as a confederate of Napoléon, and obliged to resign his appointment. His successor, Clarke, began in the right spirit, when in his order of the day, announcing his appointment to the army, he said, "No capitulation can be entered into without infamy, and, sooner or later, without punishment. To what a deplorable illusion do those abandon themselves who now yield to the voice of a man who is coming to tear asunder France by the hands of Frenchmen, and abandon it a second time to the fire and sword of strangers!" But though a momentary confidence was restored by the energetic conduct of the new war-minister, the accounts from the south daily added strength to the melancholy conviction that all was lost. The Count d'Artois, with the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Macdonald, had arrived at Lyons, the second city in the kingdom, and the first likely to be exposed to the seduction of Napoléon; and though they were received with enthusiasm by the higher, more opulent, and educated classes, yet the lower orders hardly attempted to conceal their joy at the return of the tricolor standard; the national guard, as usual in all serious crises, was divided and irresolute, while the disposition of the soldiers was so manifest, that they refused to obey the order given for putting the city in a state of defence, and

(1) The truth of this statement is undoubted: Marshal Ney admitted he had said so at his subsequent trial.—See *Procès de Ney*; and *CARRÉFUGUE*, i. 164.

(2) Cap. i. 164. Beauch. iii. 172, 173 *Moniteur*, March 6 to 18, 1815.

already began to murmur because they had not been led out to join the standard of their beloved Emperor (1).

Advance of Napoléon to Lyons, and decrees issued there. March 12. It was soon apparent, from the agitation among the troops, the ardent enthusiasm of the inferior officers, and the universal disregard of the orders of the superior, that the crisis was approaching, and that Napoléon might soon be expected on the opposite bank of the Rhone. In effect he soon appeared, surrounded by an immense concourse of soldiers, national guards, and peasants, on the road leading from Beauvoisin. The Count d'Artois, on being informed by the prefect that the case was hopeless, left Lyons, and retired on the road to Paris. Macdonald waited a little longer, but without being able to produce any impression on the troops; and hardly had he left the city, when Napoléon, at the head of his advanced guard, entered the suburb of La Guillotière, and amidst the enthusiastic cheers of an immense crowd, composed for the most part of the lowest class of the inhabitants, was conducted to the palace of the archbishop, where he received the keys of the city. None of the constituted authorities, however, and few of the respectable citizens, attended his levee. This great success at once gave the Emperor the command of the centre of France; emissaries joined him from all quarters, and were dispatched by him in all directions; and considering himself as now virtually in possession of the March 13. supreme authority, he issued three decrees, the first dissolving the Chambers of Peers and Deputies, enjoining the Deputies to return forthwith to their homes, and convoking the electoral colleges for an extraordinary assembly in the May ensuing; the second banishing of new the whole emigrants returned to France, who had not already obtained letters of amnesty from the imperial or republican governments; the third abolishing titles of honour and noblesse, and restoring the whole laws of the Constituent Assembly in that respect, under reservation of those who had obtained titles for national services, and which had been verified at the Council. By a fourth decree, not less important than the former, the whole emigrant officers in the army, who had received commissions since 1st April 1814, were struck off the list, and the minister at war was absolutely prohibited from granting them any pay, even for past services. These decrees at once indicated the spirit of the government of the Hundred Days, and which was never departed from during the whole of their continuance. It was no longer the imperial conqueror, whose will was law, and who was striving to reconstruct the scattered fragments of monarchical power, who was at the head of affairs—it was the Consul of the Revolution who was now in the ascendent; and the Emperor, constrained by misfortune to court the alliance of those who, of all men, he most cordially detested, was glad to purchase the passive acquiescence of the nation, by the adoption of principles which he had spent his life in combating (2).

Flagrant treason of Marshal Ney. Meanwhile Marshal Ney travelled rapidly on the way to the army to Auxerre, where he alighted at the hotel of M. Gamott, the prefect, his brother-in-law, and a warm partizan of Napoléon. Doubts were there, for the first time, instilled into the marshal's mind as to the possibility of upholding the cause of the Bourbons; and these increased as he advanced nearer to Lyons, and perceived the vehement fermentation which was arising in all the towns and among the troops, on the approach of Napoléon. The Emperor, well aware of the vacillating and irresolute character of his lieute-

(1) Cap. i. 201, 203. Beauch. iii. 194, 201. Thib. v. 230, 231.

(2) Moniteur, March 21, 1815. Cap. i. 207, 211. Beauch. iii. 205, 215.

nant every where but on the field of battle, besieged him incessantly with emissaries, who represented the cause of the Bourbons as irrecoverably ruined, appealed to his old recollections, and repeated with warmth, "The Emperor has no rancour against you; he stretches out his arms to receive you; he agrees with you as to the stranger: there will be no more war: the national principles are about to triumph." These earnest appeals from his old companion in arms proved too much for the fidelity of the marshal. In charity to so brave an enemy, let the British historian adopt the version of his deplorable and disgraceful treachery, which he himself has given: "I had in truth," said he at his trial, "kissed the hand of the King, his Majesty having presented it to me when he wished me a good journey; the descent of Buonaparte appeared to me so extravagant, that I spoke of it with indignation, and made use, in truth, of the expression of the iron cage. In the night of the 13th of March—down to which time I protest my fidelity—I received a proclamation drawn by Napoléon, which I signed. Before reading it to the troops, I read it to General Bourmont, who was of opinion that it was necessary to join Buonaparte, and that the Bourbons had committed such follies that they could no longer be supported." On the 14th, accordingly, the fatal proclamation was published to the troops, which afterwards cost him his life, and has for ever disgraced his memory (1). France was far indeed from the days when the Chevalier Bayard, addressing the Constable de Bourbon with dying voice, when stretched on the wayside in the valley of Aosta, with his eyes fixed on the cross of his sword-hilt, said, "Pity not me; pity those who fight against their king, their country, and their oath."

Ney himself read the proclamation to his troops, and as soon as ^{General defection of the army.} it was over threw his hat in the air, waved his sabre, and cried, *Vive l'Empereur*. The enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds; the privates, drummers, and inferior officers of all the regiments, foot and horse mixed, crowded in ecstasy round the marshal to express their gratitude; caps and sabres were waved aloft in air, with frantic joy; but the superior officers kept aloof, and many honourable men, particularly Lecourbe and Beauregard, openly expressed their detestation at a step which, recalling the shameless treachery of the Pretorian Guards in the lower empire, had for ever disgraced the French army. The defection of Ney, which was immediately followed by that of his whole army, proved at once fatal to the royal authority. Not only was there no longer any obstacle whatever to the approach of Napoléon to Paris, but every possible facility was afforded to it; for the troops sent out to oppose him having all joined the Imperial standards, he was advancing at the head of a formidable force to the capital. Nor were affairs less menacing in the northern and eastern provinces. In the former, Lefebvre Desnouettes having set out from Paris for that purpose, had penetrated into La Fere, corrupted its garrison, and having been checked by the

(1) Cap. i. 211, 215. Procès de Marshal Ney, 32. Beauch. iii. 235, 245.

"Officers and soldiers, the cause of the Bourbons is irrevocably lost! The legitimate dynasty which the French nation has adopted, is about again to mount upon the throne; it is to the Emperor Napoléon our sovereign, that it alone belongs to reign over this beautiful country. What care we whether the noblesse of the Bourbons shall determine again to emigrate or remain amongst us? The sacred cause of liberty and of our independence shall no longer be blasted by their presence. They have sought to wither our military laurels, but they are deceived. Those laurels are the fruit of noble toils, which are for ever engraven in our memo-

ries. Soldiers! the time has gone past when mankind were to be governed by stifling their voice; liberty triumphs at last, and Napoléon, our august Emperor, is about to establish it for ever. Let this noble cause henceforth be ours, and that of all Frenchmen; let all the brave men, whom I have the honour to command, be penetrated with that great truth. Soldiers! I have often led you to victory; now I am about to unite you to that immortal phalanx which Napoléon leads to Paris, and which will arrive there in a few days; and there our hopes and our happiness will be for ever realized. *Vive l'Empereur!*"—*Le Maréchal de l'Empire, PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA, Lons-le-Saulnier, 13th March 1815; Moniteur, 21st March 1815; and CAPEFIGUE, i. 215.*

firmness and fidelity of General Abouville, the governor, renewed his attempts on the principal towns of Picardy, the garrisons of which were with difficulty retained in their duty; while d'Erlon, at Lille, led out his troops on the road to Paris to join in the conspiracy; but he was met on the way by Mortier, on his road to take the command in the northern fortresses, sent back to Lille, and arrested. It was by this fortunate event alone that the means of escape were left open to the royal family (1).

Conduct of the Court in the last extremity. In this extremity the measures of the government were as vigorous as the exigency of the circumstances required; but all their efforts were rendered unavailing from the want of any armed force to defend the throne. The Chamber of Deputies met, in pursuance of the summons of the king; loyal addresses were carried by a vast majority, thanks in profusion voted to the officers and soldiers who, in this trying crisis, had adhered to their duty and their oaths; the garrisons of Antibes and La Fere were declared to have deserved well of their country; Marshals Macdonald and Mortier received the warmest thanks of both houses; and the court for a brief season flattered themselves that by these measures, and the influence of the legislature on the public mind, the progress of treason in the army and disaffection in the people would be arrested. But the time was past when a vote of the legislature could make the arms drop from the soldiers' hands; the Revolution had accustomed them to violent changes in the government; the Prætorian Guards laughed at votes of the Chambers, and were resolved to have an emperor of their own selection. The fatal news of the treachery of Marshal Ney, and the defection of his troops, paralysed every heart; it at once demonstrated that the army had determined to place the Emperor on the throne, and that all hope for the royalists was lost. Driven from every other position, the government endeavoured to stop the movement by frequent and earnest appeals to the charter, which were carried by great majorities in both Chambers, and Napoléon was denounced as a public enemy; but what was the charter to an impassioned soldiery, or the denunciation of the Conqueror by the legislature to the ruthless veterans who sighed for the restoration of the glory, licence, and plunder to which he had accustomed them? Every post brought accounts of the desertion of fresh bodies of men, and the universal transport which had seized upon the army: the defection of Lyons, and of Ney in Burgundy, determined the troops assembled as the last reserve at Essonne and Fontainebleau; and the despatches of the Duke de Berri and Marshal Oudinot, who commanded them, announced that they could no longer be relied on. As a last resource, the aged king appealed in vain to the honour and loyalty of the French character. "I have pledged myself," said he, "to the Allied sovereigns for the fidelity of the army in the face of Europe. If Napoléon triumphs, five hundred thousand strangers will immediately inundate France. You who follow at this moment other standards than mine, I see in you nothing but children led astray: abjure your error; come and throw yourselves into the arms of your father, and I pledge my honour that all shall be forgotten." Vain words! The army rejected with contempt the proffered amnesty; the Chamber of Deputies in vain called on the youth of France to imitate those of Prussia, and enrol themselves for the defence of their country (2); vain was the promise that the approaching campaign should count triple to the troops, and a national recompense be

(1) Beauch, iii. 205, 223. Cap. i. 218, 221. Thib. x. 232, 236.

March 18. Cap. i. 223, 255. Thib. x. 239, 241. Beauch, iii. 223, 231. Buchez and Roux, xl. 63, 80.

(2) Proclamation, March 18. 1815. Moniteur,

awarded to those who distinguished themselves by their fidelity; all, all was shattered against the treason and revolt of the army.

The King retires from Paris and goes to Ghent. At length the fatal hour arrived. On the 19th March a review of the national and royal guards took place; but few of the former, and still fewer volunteers were to be seen; and after it was over, the latter, instead of taking the road to Fontainebleau, as had been announced, to combat the enemy, defiled by that to Beauvais, evidently to cover the retreat of the royal family. At dinner, the king announced to the few faithful friends who still adhered to him, that he was about to abandon the Tuileries. Tears fell from every eye, the mournful prospect of a second exile, of France subjected again to military despotism, vanquished, overrun, and probably partitioned, arose in gloomy perspective to every mind. The king, March 19. calm and resigned, addressed a few words of comfort to each, and after making a few necessary arrangements, signed a proclamation dissolving the Chambers, directing the members forthwith to separate, and to assemble again at such place as the king should appoint. This proclamation, drawn on the night of the 19th, appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 20th, when Paris was, literally speaking, without a government; for the king and royal family

March 20. departed at midnight, taking the road to Beauvais. They travelled rapidly; by noon on the 20th they were at Abbeville, and in the evening at Lille, the capital of French Flanders. There they received proofs of fidelity, to which, in old France, they had long been strangers; the inhabitants, un-

March 21 and 22. touched by the profligacy of the Revolution, crowded round the illustrious exiles with unfeigned enthusiasm, and manifested such sympathy that the king was induced to establish his residence there for a few days; and more than one royal ordinance bears date from that place. It was soon discovered, however, that the garrison could not be trusted; in vain Marshals Macdonald and Mortier exerted themselves, with an energy worthy of the ancient loyalty and present warlike renown of the French army, to retain the troops in the path of their duty; the contagion was universal; the intelligence that Napoléon had entered Paris, rendered the ferment irresistible; the men maintained that it was intended to give them up to the stranger, and loudly declared that they would not embrue their hands in the blood of their fellow soldiers. Meanwhile, the royal guard and volunteers who had followed the king into French Flanders, worn out by marching, misled by perfidy, repelled from every fortified gate, melted away or disappeared; and the unhappy Louis, finding treachery and disaffection thickening on all sides around him, was glad to leave Lille, abandon the French territory, and take the road by Ypres to Ghent, where he established his court on the 23th, and remained during the melancholy period of the Hundred Days (1).

Napoléon arrives at Fontainebleau, and reaches Paris at night. Meanwhile, Napoléon travelled so rapidly from Lyons, that his faithful guard could not keep up with his carriage, and on the 19th reached Fontainebleau. He has himself described the journey from Frejus to Paris as being the happiest period of his life (2), and it is not surprising that it was so; for it at once restored his fortunes and penetrated his heart: it was prodigal of enthusiasm and redolent of joy: it banished melancholy and revived hope. During that marvellous journey, the Emperor seemed to tread on air; borne aloft on the enthusiasm of the soldiers, and the ardour of the people, he literally flew to empire: the throne

(1) Buchez and Roux, xl. 80, 81. Cap. i. 243, 249. Beauch. iii. 249, 255. 325, 340.

(2) Las Cases, iv. 242.

of the Bourbons sank before his approach, the glories of the empire seemed to redescend upon his brows. Such was the rapture which this marvellous resurrection inspired in his mind, that it was not even for a moment damped by the sight of Fontainebleau, and the spot where he had addressed his faithful guard (1): with almost infantine joy he wandered over the splendid apartments of the palace, the successive scene of his festivity and wretchedness, and conversed familiarly with his attendants on the beauty of the undulated outline of the forest, and the vast marble basins where the swans exhibited their stately plumage. It was not surprising that such all-absorbing transports had seized the mind of the Emperor, for the intelligence from Paris exceeded his most sanguine expectations. Couriers from Lavalette, the postmaster, who had long secretly, and now openly espoused his cause, announced, early on the morning of the 20th, that the King and Royal Family had left the Tuileries the night before, and that the Emperor's arrival was anxiously expected. He set out, in consequence, at two o'clock in the afternoon, but purposely delayed his progress, so that it was a quarter to nine at night before his carriage entered the court of the Tuileries (2).

Universal
transports
among the
Imperial
party.

This was done in order that the population of the capital, with the majority of whom the Emperor was well aware he was not popular, should not be made acquainted with his arrival, which accordingly was the case. But the doors of the palace, and the whole inner court of the Carrousel, from the triumphal arch to the foot of the great staircase, was filled with a crowd of generals, officers, and soldiers, who were in the secret, and who received their beloved chief with the most unbounded transports of joy. The moment that the carriage stopped, he was seized by those next the door, borne aloft in their arms, amidst deafening cheers, through a dense and brilliant crowd of epaulettes, hurried literally above the heads of the throng up the great stair into the salon of reception, where a splendid array of the ladies of the imperial court, adorned with a profusion of violet bouquets, half-concealed in the richest laces, received him with transports, and imprinted fervent kisses on his cheeks, his hands, and even his dress. Never was such a scene witnessed in history: it was more personally gratifying than the English joy at the return of Charles II; for it was not the gratitude of a nation for the restoration of a government, but the transports of a party for the return of a man (3).

His civil and
military ap-
pointments.

Napoléon might well have asked on this night, like Voltaire on his last return to Paris, whether they meant to make him die of joy; and he has without doubt truly described this day as the most delightful of his life, but it was also his last of unmixed satisfaction. After the transports of the first reception were over, and he retired to rest in the imperial apartments of the Tuileries, he had leisure to reflect on the situation in which he was placed, and the means he possessed of maintaining his position on the dizzy pinnacle on which he was again elevated. On landing in the gulf of St.-Juan, his first words had been, "Voilà le Congrès dissous;" but he had too much penetration not to be aware that the effect would be just the reverse: that his return would at once terminate all the divisions, and still all the jealousies, which were beginning to alienate the European sovereigns, and that legions as formidable as those beneath which he had already sunk, would ere long inundate his dominions. To meet the forces of coalesced Europe, the means at his disposal were fearfully diminished.

(1) *Ante*, x. 244.

(2) *Moniteur*, March 21, 1815. *Buchez* and

Roux, xl. 86, 87. *Cap.* i. 251, 253. *Thib.* x. 251, 253.

(3) *Cap.* i. 253, 254. *Thib.* x. 252, 253.

Nothing, indeed, could exceed the ardour and enthusiasm of the army and of the imperial functionaries, and he could reckon with certainty on their cordial support; but the troops under arms did not exceed a hundred thousand, and even if the whole veterans were recalled to his standards, their number would not be more than doubled; the civil *employés* were incapable of forming a corps in the field; and amidst all the transports of his journey from St.-Juan, he had perceived, with secret disquietude, that his supporters were chiefly to be found in the very lowest classes, and that the more respectable peasants in the country, and citizens in the towns, gazed with silent wonder on his progress. General support from the physical strength of the nation he could not hope for; the recollection of the conscription was too recent; the horror at war too strong; the exhaustion of the military population too complete, to permit any effectual aid: and, strange to say, the mighty conqueror who had been borne to the throne on the shoulders of the army, found his chief embarrassment from the want of military resources (1).

His great difficulty in filling up his appointments. The very next morning showed on what an altered and precarious footing his authority was now placed. The whole troops in Paris indeed assembled with tumultuous joy in the court of the Tuileries, enthusiastic cheers burst from them when the Emperor appeared, and they received with rapture the veterans of the old guard, who had now been forwarded by post-horses from Lyons, and whose sunburnt visages, worn shoes, and dirty garments, showed the fatigues they had undergone in keeping up with the rapid advance of Napoléon. But when he came to make his appointments for the imperial government, a very different disposition manifested itself. The imperial party were all in raptures at the Emperor's return; but very few among them were willing to accept the perilous honour of a situation of responsibility in his government. A secret sense of their shameful tergiversations; a feeling that they were disgraced in the eyes of Europe, equally by their treachery to the empire and the restoration; a clear perception of the danger with which any prominent situation would be attended under this second revolutionary dynasty, kept almost all the leading men at first aloof from his service. Fouché was the first person he sent for: it was a signal proof to what straits the Emperor was reduced, when he was obliged to commence with the old bloodstained regicide, for whose treachery to himself he had formerly said with truth that the scaffold would have been the appropriate punishment (2).

His civil and military appointments. Fouché, aware of his importance as the head of the old Republican party, upon whose temporary alliance with the army the Emperor's power was entirely founded, made his own terms. He at first desired to be minister of foreign affairs; but Napoléon was desirous for him to return to his old situation as the head of the police, to which he at length acceded, from a belief, which the event proved to be well founded, that it would give him the entire command of the interior. Cambacérès was offered the situation of minister of justice; he at once declined it, and was only prevailed on to accept, on the engagement that he should not be called on to take a part in any political measures. Even Caulaincourt refused the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs; he was too well aware of the ban under which he would be laid by the potentates of Europe, to undertake its responsibility. M. Molé resolutely declined the same office, and frankly

(1) Cap. i. 255, 256. Thib. x. 253, 257.

(2) Cap. i. 256, 264. Thib. x. 260, 261.

“Duc d’Otrante, votre tête doit tomber sur l’écha-

faud.”—FOUCHÉ, *Memoirs*, i. 417, 418, and *Ante*, vii. 396.

avowed to the Emperor that he thought the drama was concluded; that the dead could not be resuscitated. Napoléon admitted the immense difficulties of his situation, and that they proceeded chiefly from the impracticable character of the party with which he was linked in the interior. As a pledge of his adoption of their principles he appointed Carnot minister of the interior, with direction of the whole organization of the national guard; Caulaincourt, by his positive command, was compelled to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs, as Maret, by a similar compulsion, was forced to take that of secretary of state; while Davoust, who had been in disgrace during the whole of the Restoration, without difficulty accepted the situation of minister at war (1).

General stupor of the people over France. The same disinclination for office—a most unusual and ominous circumstance in France—was manifested in all the inferior departments of government. The situation of prefect, formerly solicited with such eagerness, and accepted with such gratitude, became now so much the object of aversion, that it was bestowed on persons who would never have been deemed competent, or who had been actually disgraced under the imperial government; among the rest M. Frochet, who had been so severely stigmatized by the Emperor for his weakness in the conspiracy of Malet, reappeared as prefect of the department of the Rhone. A general stupor prevailed in all the provinces; even those of which the inhabitants had in the first instance manifested the greatest joy at the Emperor's return. The people of the eastern provinces in particular, among whom the revolutionary spirit had always been most ardent, and who, from their localities having been the theatre of war during the last invasion, were most exasperated against the Allies, were thunderstruck by the declaration of the Congress of Vienna of the 15th March, and contemplated with undisguised apprehension a return of the innumerable hordes of Cossacks and Calmucks to ravage their fields. A general stupor pervaded the whole of France, the result partly of shame, partly of distrust, partly of terror. It was evident that the once colossal power of the Emperor had been irrevocably shaken by his first overthrow, and consequent abdication; confidence at once in his good fortune and stability of character was at an end; while the efficiency and vigour of his administration was essentially impaired by the alliance, evidently forced, which had taken place between him and the Jacobins, and the admission of many of the most dangerous of their faction into the most important offices of government (2).

Efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême to stimulate a royalist resistance in the south. The march of Napoléon to Paris had been so rapid, that the provinces were in great part ignorant of his having advanced beyond Grenoble, when they were informed of his arrival at Paris. Thus their inhabitants were stupefied by this portentous event; and in the southern and western provinces at least, far from being disposed to transfer their allegiance, and trample under feet their oaths, at the beck of the Prætorian guards of the capital, Guienne, Languedoc, Provence, and Bordeaux, spontaneously took up arms; the Duke d'Angoulême, in the southern provinces, actively commenced the organization and direction of the new levies; while the presence of the Duchess at Bordeaux, whither she had gone, as already noticed, to be present at the anniversary of the 12th March, when the Royalist standard was first hoisted in that city, roused to the highest pitch the loyal enthusiasm of its inhabitants. Such was

(1) Thib. x. 260, 261. Cap. i. 259, 261. Buchez and Roux, xl. 87, 88.

(2) Cap. i. 264, 272, Thib. x. 261, 266. Beauch. iii. 371, 381.

the ardour which her character and the chivalrous gallantry of her bearing excited, that fifteen thousand national guards, in that city and its department alone, declared for her; and even the troops of the line in the adjoining
 March 13. forts of Blaye and Chateau-Trompette, whom she passed in review, seemed to have caught the generous flame, and to incline at least to support her cause. At Toulon, the Duke d'Angoulême was most favourably received, both by the troops of the line and the national guards; Marshal Massena, who commanded there, remained firm in his allegiance; and so unanimous was the desire to resist the imperial government, that the old Republicans stood side by side in the volunteer ranks with the young Royalists. Encouraged by these favourable appearances, a vast, but withal skilfully combined, plan of operations was concerted. It was agreed that the army of the south, fifteen thousand strong, should march in two divisions, the one by Avignon and Valence, the other by Gap and Grenoble, on Lyons, the common centre of their operations; while the army of Bordeaux, of equal strength, should move towards la Vendée and Brittany, and awaken the dormant but inextinguishable loyalty of the western provinces (1).

How formidable, wide-spread, and well-combined soever this
 Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces. movement undoubtedly was, it was soon shattered against the treason of the army, the magic of the Emperor's name, and the deplorable subjection of the provinces to Paris, which had resulted from the centralization of the Revolution. Grouchy, whose former zeal for the Bourbons, and recent desertion of their cause, was a sufficient guarantee for his fidelity, was sent with all the troops he could collect at Lyons against the Duke d'Angoulême; while Clauzel, whose republican principles had long kept him in comparative disgrace with the Emperor at the zenith of his fortunes, was sent with a large body of men, collected in the central provinces, against the Duchess d'Angoulême. The instructions of both officers were brief and simple—"to put an end at any sacrifice to the civil war."

The unbounded sway of the Emperor with the soldiers, rendered this a more easy task than had been anticipated. Marching through the central provinces, and distributing every where the Emperor's proclamations, Clauzel soon rallied the whole regular troops there to his standard, and approached the Gironde with so formidable a force, that the regular soldiers in the forts of Bordeaux were entirely paralysed, and they declared, that although they
 March 29. would not permit any injury to be done to the Duchess d'Angoulême, they would not combat against their comrades in arms. In vain, with the spirit of Maria Theresa, she appealed to their loyalty, their oaths, their patriotism, and every feeling which could rouse men of honour; she addressed not the simple and loyal Hungarians, but the corrupted and demoralized

French. A mournful silence, interrupted only by isolated demonstrations of attachment, met all her heroic appeals; and with a heart penetrated with grief, she was obliged to leave the city and embark on board a British vessel (2), which soon conveyed her far from the treason of her country to the more faithful shores of England.

The efforts of the Duke d'Angoulême in the southern provinces, though attended in the end with no better success, were, in the outset, of a more serious description. The chief royalist army there, under the command of the duke in person, advanced in the beginning of April from Toulouse, eight thousand strong, composed for
 Progress and termination of the war in the south. April 3.

(1) Cap. i. 275, 280. Thib. x. 269, 275. Beauch. iii. 384, 400.

(2) Cap. i. 275, 294. Beauch. iii. 484, 499. Thib. x. 283, 284.

the most part of National Guards, towards Valence, and defeated a body of regular soldiers at the bridge of La Drome. Encouraged by the successful result of this action, in which he displayed equal courage and conduct, the prince advanced to Valence and threatened Lyons. This was a very serious matter, and Napoléon was no sooner informed of it by telegraph, than he dispatched Grouchy to that city, with full powers to combat or negotiate, but with the most positive instructions, at all hazards, to terminate the civil war. This soon became no difficult matter. While the principal army, which advanced by Valence, was gaining this success, the second royalist corps, under General Ernouf, occupied Sisteron, and advanced to Gap, on the same road which Napoléon had so recently traversed. But there the men were so moved by the accounts which they received from the peasants of his marvellous progress, and the proclamations from his nervous pen which they saw placarded on the walls, that the regular soldiers all mounted the tricolor cockade, and declared for the cause of Napoléon (1).

Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces.
April 4.

By this defection the right flank of the Duke d'Angoulême was uncovered : Grouchy was advancing with a powerful force in front from Lyons; and, at the same time, intelligence arrived that General Gilly, with another body of regular troops, was marching from Nismes upon the Pont St.-Esprit to cut off his retreat. In these circumstances, to retire became unavoidable; and no sooner had the retrograde movement commenced, than the hatred of the peasants of Dauphiny to the royalist cause, and their ancient enemies the Provençals, broke out on all sides with such vehemence, that the situation of the prince became extremely critical. The obvious danger of a prince of the blood-royal falling into the hands of Napoléon, now induced the duke's generals to urge him in the strongest manner to provide for his individual safety, which he might easily have done by escaping into the adjoining provinces of Piedmont; but he positively refused, with true honour, to separate from his brave companions in arms. A convention was therefore proposed to General Gilly at Pont St.-Esprit, and at once agreed to, by which it was stipulated that the royal army should lay down its arms and be disbanded, and an entire amnesty be awarded to all persons engaged in it. Grouchy, however, would not ratify the capitulation, and retained the duke in captivity, in defiance of its provisions. The first telegraphic despatch announced the conclusion of the capitulation, and Maret prevailed on Napoléon to ratify it. A few hours after, a second telegraphic despatch declared that Grouchy had not ratified the convention; but Monnier, the under-secretary of state, did not communicate it to the Emperor till the evening, by which time, in consequence of the first, the prince was already free. A violent ebullition of the imperial wrath immediately took place; but it was soon over, and Napoléon was secretly rejoiced in the end that he was saved the necessity of acting with severity to a descendant of Henry IV. Soon after, the Duke de Bourbon retired from la Vendée, where he had failed in exciting any insurrection : resistance speedily disappeared on all sides, and on the 20th April a hundred guns, discharged from the Invalides, and reechoed from all the fortresses of France, announced that the civil war was terminated and the imperial authority every where re-established. To the honour of Napoléon, it must be added, that no executions or bloodshed stained his restoration, and that, with the exception of a few measures of police against the emigrants and Royal Guards, and the vigorous

(1) Cap. i. 293, 293. Beauch. iii. 393, 433.

application of the laws against the Bourbons, no measures of severity marked the commencement of the Hundred Days (1).

Military
treaties
between
the Allies.

Napoléon's authority was now fully established in France; but it was not in France that the real obstacles to his sovereignty were to be found. It was at Vienna that the enemies alone capable of overturning his empire existed; and the intelligence of his marvellous success, by revealing the hitherto unsuspected extent of the sway which he still had over the French army, only rendered to them more apparent the necessity of the most vigorous measures for his overthrow. The Powers in this crisis acted with a vigour and unanimity worthy of the highest praise, and which in the end proved the salvation of Europe. Calmly measuring with prophetic eye the extent of the danger, they saw, in the elevation of Napoléon to the throne on the bucklers of the troops, the clearest proof that he would infallibly be driven to war: that a rapacious soldiery, which hailed his return as the restoration of the days of their glory, would never be at rest till again plunged into conquest; and that, even if the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots, and the Emperor were really desirous of peace, he would inevitably be forced into hostilities by the passions and necessities of his followers. Proceeding on these principles, the declaration of 15th March was not allowed to remain a dead letter; and on the 25th March a treaty was concluded, which in effect revived the treaty of Chaumont, for the preservation of Europe from the renewed dangers which now menaced it. By it the cabinets of of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain "engaged to unite their forces against Buonaparte and his faction, in order to prevent him from again troubling the peace of Europe; they agreed to furnish a hundred and eighty thousand men each, for the prosecution of the war, of which a tenth was to be cavalry, and, if necessary, to draw forth their whole military forces of every description." By a secret treaty concluded on the same day, it was solemnly stipulated that the contracting parties should not lay down their arms till they had effected the complete destruction of Napoléon. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 25th April; and, within a fortnight after, it was acceded to by all the lesser powers in Europe. The contingent of Bavaria was fixed at sixty thousand men—that of Piedmont at thirty thousand—that of Hanover at twenty-six thousand (2).

And im-
mense
force at
their dis-
posal.

The forces at the disposal of the coalition were immense. According to the returns which were laid before the Congress in their secret sittings, of the military resources of the European states banded in this alliance, the number of troops which they could dispose of for active operations, without unduly diminishing the garrison and other services in their respective interiors, amounted to the enormous number of 986,000 men (3). Germany, arrayed in the Germanic confederation, was to

(1) Thib. v. 264, 885. Cap. i. 293, 305. Beauch. iii. 483, 521.

(2) See the Treaty in Marten's N. R. ii. 112, 116; and Cap. i. 321. Schoell, *Traité de Paix*, xi, 218, 221.

(3) The composition of the principal armies of this immense host was as follows:—

I. Army of Upper Rhine, Schwartzenberg, viz.—

Austrians,	150,000
Bavarians,	65,000
Wirtemberg,	25,000
Baden,	16,000
Hessians, etc,	8,000
	<hr/>
	264,000

II. Army of Lower Rhine, Blucher, Prussians, Saxons, etc. 155,000

III. Army of Flanders—British, Belgians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, . . . 155,000

IV. Russian Reserve, Barclay de Tolly, 168,000

743,000

take a part in this great alliance, worthy of its vast strength and ancient renown : and the forces of its lesser powers, animated by experienced wrongs, and inspired by recent victory, promised to be of a very different mould from the old and unwilling contingents of the empire. After making every reasonable deduction for the sick, absent, and non-efficient, it was calculated that six hundred thousand effective men might be brought to bear on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Flemish frontier. In a secret meeting, held at Vienna on the 31st March, it was resolved forthwith to form three
 March 31. great armies, by which active operations were to be commenced as soon as possible; the first of two hundred and sixty-five thousand, chiefly Austrians and Bavarians, on the Upper Rhine, under Schwartzemberg; the second, of a hundred and fifty-five thousand Prussians, on the Lower Rhine, under Blucher; the third, of an equal number of English, Hanoverians, and Belgians, in the Low Countries. It was resolved that military operations should be commenced early in June; before which time it was hoped that the great Russian army, a hundred and seventy thousand strong, could be on the Upper Rhine from Poland, and entering France by Strasburg and Besançon, form a reserve to the invading armies from the eastward. In addition to these great armies, lesser diversions, but still of no inconsiderable importance, were to be attempted on the side of Switzerland, which had declared for the Allies, and the Pyrenees; the former by an united force of Austrians, British, and Piedmontese, the latter by Spaniards and Portuguese, while England was also to send succours to organize the formidable strength of la Vendée in the cause of loyalty and religion (1).

From these arrangements, as well as the geographical position of the country which they occupied, it was evident that the British
 Preparations of the British Government for the war. troops in Flanders would be first exposed to the shock of war; while at the same time it was of the highest importance to the general cause not to lose the vantage ground which they there possessed, or to permit, as had so often previously been done, the advanced work of Europe against France to be converted into the advanced post of France against Europe. The preparations of the newly-erected monarchy of Belgium could not be expected to be in any state of forwardness : the Hanoverian levies were as yet not raised; and the flower of the British army was in Canada, or scattered over the American coast. In these circumstances, every thing depended on the vigour of the British cabinet and the unanimity of the British people, and neither were wanting on the occasion. On the 6th
 April 6. April, a message from the Prince Regent formally announced to both Houses of Parliament the events which had recently occurred in France, in direct contravention of the treaty of Paris, the communications entered into with his allies on the subject, and the necessity of augmenting the military forces by sea and land. The address, which as usual was an echo of the message, was moved in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool, and in the Commons by Lord Castlereagh; and so strongly were the members of both houses impressed with the awful nature of the crisis, and the necessity of making a vigorous effort in the outset to meet it, that the address in the House of Peers was carried without a dissenting voice; and in the Commons by a majority of 183, the numbers being 220 to 37. Lord Castlereagh put the matter upon its true footing in the concluding sentence of his speech : " Some may think that an armed peace would be preferable to a

(1) Conferences, 623. Mem. and Protocol, March, i. 328, 331; and Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi. 213, 21. 1815. Schoell, Congr. de Vienne, iv. 170. Cap. 215.

state of war; but the danger must be fairly looked at : and knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the party to be treated with—knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision they come to must rest on the principle of power, and not that of reliance on the man (1).”

Nor were the financial, naval, and military preparations of Great Britain on a scale incommensurate to the magnitude of the undertaking in which she was engaged, and the engagements she had contracted with foreign powers. On the 19th April, the House of Commons, by a majority of 423, the numbers being 185 to 58, renewed the property-tax, producing now fully L.15,000,000 annually, for another year—a decisive proof that they were in earnest in supporting government. The whole war-taxes were continued, and supplies to an unprecedented extent voted; those for the navy being L.18,000,000, while those for the army rose to the enormous amount of L.24,000,000, besides L.5,800,000 for the ordnance. With these large sums, two hundred and seven thousand regular soldiers were maintained, besides eighty thousand militia, and three hundred and forty thousand local militia; in all, six hundred and fifty thousand men in arms, and the ships of the line placed in commission were fifty-eight. The subsidies to foreign powers amounted to no less than L.11,000,000; and the whole expenditure of the year, when all was paid, reached the unparalleled sum of L.110,000,000. To provide for this enormous expenditure, the permanent and war-taxes produced L.80,000,000, and loans to the amount of L.39,000,000 were raised for the service of Great Britain and Ireland; but these sums, great as they were, proved unequal to the charges of the year, and when the whole expenditure of the war was wound up at the close of the year, the unfunded or floating debt had risen to L.48,725,000; the capital of the funded debt was L.792,000,000; the annual charge of the debt was L.42,000,000; but of that sum no less than L.12,968,000 was for the support of the sinking fund. If that noble establishment had been kept up by maintaining the indirect taxes, set apart by the wisdom of former times for its maintenance, it would have paid off the whole national debt by the year 1845; and the nation, from the effects of the long peace, purchased by the sacrifices of the war, would have discharged the whole burdens contracted during its continuance (2).

(1) Parl. Deb. xxx. 356, 371; and 418, 463. Ann. Reg. 1815, 12, 13.

(2) Finance Accounts, 1816. Ann. Reg. 1816, 435. Parl. Deb. xxxi. 795, 814. James, vi. App. No. 23.

Public Income of Great Britain for the year ending 5th January 1816.

HEADS OF REVENUE :—

Ordinary Revenue. Permanent and Annual Taxes.		Gross Produce.	Net Produce.
Customs.		L.11,807,322 12 1 $\frac{3}{4}$	L 9,070,554 13 7
Excise,		23,370,055 8 3 $\frac{1}{2}$	20,539,028 14 11
Stamps,		6,492,804 14 10	6,139,585 8 9 $\frac{1}{4}$
Land and Assessed Taxes,		7,911,938 4 9 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,609,015 10 11
Post Office,		2,349,519 0 10	1,755,896 2 1
Pensions and } 1s. in the pound,		20,280 19 1	19,908 15 2
Salaries, } 6d. —		11,776 6 6	11,138 3 3
Hackney Coaches,		29,283 14 10	24,721 9 8
Hawkers and Pedlars,		21,591 10 2	18,516 9 0
Total permanent and Annual Duties,		L.51,014,572 11 5 $\frac{3}{4}$	L.45,168,368 4 4 $\frac{1}{2}$

Subsidies
granted to
foreign
powers by
England.

In addition to these immense military and naval preparations, the subsidies which Great Britain became bound to advance to foreign powers were so considerable, that it might truly be said

Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.

	Gross Produce.	Net Produce.
Alienation Fines,	L.11,769 15 5	L.10,620 7 5
Post Fines,	6,880 4 6	6,584 15 2
Seizures,	9,445 7 2	9,445 7 2
Compositions and Proffers,	626 15 4	626 15 4
Crown Lands,	145,146 13 8	142,761 9 2

Extraordinary Resources.

War Taxes.

Customs,	L.2,841,406 1 7	L.2,280,634 17 8
Excise,	6,737,028 19 0	6,667,776 18 6
Property Tax,	15,277,499 9 4	14,978,248 18 2
Arrears of Income, Duty, etc.,	313 19 1	308 5 9
Lottery, net profit, (one-third for the service of Ireland),	327,906 13 4	304,651 10 6
Monies paid on account of the Interest of Loans raised for the service of Ireland,	[3,981,783 6 2	3,981,783 6 2
On account of balance due by Ireland on joint-expenditure of the United Kingdom,	6,107,986 12 3	6,107,986 12 3
On account of the Commissioners for Grenada Exchequer Bills,	25,000 0 0	25,000 0 0
On account of the interest, etc. of a loan granted to the Prince Regent of Portugal,	28,585 1 6	28,585 1 6
Surplus Fees of Regulated Public Offices,	98,750 13 2 $\frac{1}{4}$	98,759 13 2 $\frac{1}{4}$
Imprest Monies repaid by sundry public Accountants, and other Monies paid to the Public,	107,836 16 10	107,836 16 10

Total, independent of Loans,	86,722,038 19 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	79,939,669 19 2
Loans paid into the Exchequer (including the amount raised for the service of Ireland),	39,421,959 2 0	39,421,959 2 0

Grand Total,	L.126,143,908 1 10 $\frac{1}{2}$	L.119,361,629 1 2
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—*Annual Register for 1816, p. 420.*

Public Expenditure of Great Britain for the year ending 5th January, 1816.

1. For interest of the National Debt, and Charges of the Sinking Fund,	L.41,015,527 10 0	
2. Interest on Exchequer Bills,	3,014,003 3 8	
3. Civil List, Courts of Justice, Mint, Allowance to Royal Family, Salaries and Allowances, Bounties,	1,555,408 8 4	
4. Civil Government of Scotland,	126,613 11 9	
5. Other payments in anticipation of the Exchequer Receipts—viz. Bounties for Fisheries, Manufactures, Corn, Pensions on the Hereditary Revenue, Militia, and Deserters' Warrants,	364,117 14 5	
6. The Navy,	16,371,870 7 5	
7. Ordnance,	3,736,424 17 3	
8. Army—viz.: Ordinary Services,	L.21,333,831 10 8	
Extraordinary Services,	1,843,992 16 10	
9. Loans, etc. to other Countries—viz: Ireland,	7,277,032 8 8	
Austria,	1,796,229 8 8	
Russia,	3,241,919 7 0	
Prussia,	2,382,823 14 8	
Hanover,	206,590 6 4	
Spain,	147,333 19 10	
Portugal,	100,000 0 0	
Sweden,	521,061 16 1	
France, Canton of Berne, Italy, and Netherlands,	78,152 14 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Minor Powers, under engagements with the Duke of Wellington,	1,724,001 8 4	
Miscellaneous,	837,134 17 0	
10. Miscellaneous Services,		18,312,280 1 9
		3,371,173 13 8
Total,		111,045,249 3 9
Deduct sums, which, although included in this account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain—viz.: Loans, etc. for Ireland, interest $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, and management on Portuguese Loan, Sinking Fund on loan to the East India Company, etc.		7,460,734 4 8
Total,		L.103,584,514 19 1

that the whole military force of Europe was in this year arrayed in British pay against France. Such was the exhaustion of the finances of the greater powers, from the unparalleled efforts they had made during the two preced-

Table showing the state of the National Debt of Great Britain, on 1st February 1816.

I. Funded Debt.

	Total Capitals.	Annual Interest.	Total of Annual Expenses.
Total debt of Great Britain;	L.724,092,611	L.25,091,785	L.37,203,412
— Ireland, payable in Great Britain,	103,032,750	3,194,966	4,398,715
— Amount of loans to the Emperor of Germany, payable in ditto,	7,502,633	225,079	495,675
— Amount of loans to the Prince Regent of Portugal, payable in ditto,	895,522	26,865	57,047
	<u>L.835,523,516</u>	<u>L.28,583,695</u>	<u>L.42,149,849</u>
In the hands of the Commissioners for the reduction of debt,	40,392,540	1,211,776	—
	<u>L.795,130,976</u>	<u>L.27,326,919</u>	<u>—</u>
Transferred to the Commissioners by purchasers of life annuities, pursuant to Act. 48, Geo. III. c. 142,	3,097,551	92,926	—
	<u>L.792,033,425</u>	<u>L.27,233,993</u>	<u>L.42,149,849</u>
Total charge for debt, British and Irish, payable in Great Britain,			

II. Unfunded Debt.

	Amount.	Outstanding.
Exchequer—		
Exchequer bills provided for,	L.19,772,800	
— unprovided for,	21,669,100	
	<u>L.41,441,900</u>	
Treasury—		
Miscellaneous services,	530,535	
Warrants for army service,	20,615	
Treasury bills,	1,005,544	
	<u>1,556,664</u>	
Army,		1,030,107
Barracks,		125,005
Ordnance,		876,857
Navy,		3,694,821
Civil list advances,		—
		<u>L.48,725,356</u>

Summary.

Total funded debt,	792,033,425
Total unfunded debt,	48,735,356

Grand total of national debt at the close of the war,
—*Annual Register for the year 1816*, pp. 434–435. L.840,758,781

Public Funded Debt of Great Britain on 1st February 1816.

An account of the progress made in the redemption of the Public Funded Debt of Great Britain at 1st February 1816 :—

Funds.	Capitals.	Redeemed by Commissioners from 1st August 1786, to 1st February 1816.	Total sums paid by Commissioners.
Total stock created for sums borrowed,	L.1,000,986,526	L.273,418,402	L.172,009,352
Transferred to the Commissioners on account of land-tax redeemed,	25,155,056		
	<u>L.975,831,470</u>		
Ditto for purchase of life annuities, per 48 Geo. III.	3,097,551		
	<u>L.972,733,919</u>		
Redeemed by the Commissioners,	273,418,402		
	<u>L.699,315,517</u>		
Debt of Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, unredeemed at 1st February 1816,	L.699,315,517		
— <i>Annual Register for 1816</i> , p. 431.			

ing years, that they were wholly unable to put their armies in motion without this pecuniary assistance. By a treaty concluded at Vienna, between April 30. England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the former of these powers agreed to furnish to the three latter a subsidy of L.3,000,000, to be paid by monthly instalments to the ministers of these three powers in equal proportions; and if peace was concluded within the year, they were to receive after its signature, Russia four months', and Austria and Prussia two months' subsidy each, to provide for the return of the troops to their own dominions. Sweden obtained L.521,000, Hanover L.206,000, the lesser German powers L.1,724,000 : the stipulated sums paid to the greater powers required to be enlarged; and the total sum paid by Great Britain in the year to foreign powers exceeded L.11,000,000 (1).

Napoleon's difficulties, and military preparations. Nothing which vigour and activity could do was wanting on the part of Napoleon, to provide the means of defence against this prodigious phalanx of enemies ready to overwhelm him; but such was the exhaustion of the military strength of the country in consequence of his preceding wars, and the apathy or despair of the people from the effects of long-continued disaster, that all his efforts were unable to raise any thing like an adequate force. The arsenals and fortresses were nearly empty, especially on the eastern frontier, which was most exposed to danger, from the exhaustion of the preceding campaign or the abstractions of the Allied armies; twelve thousand pieces of cannon in fifty-three fortresses had been ceded by the treaties at Paris; and the regular force in arms did not amount to a hundred thousand men. The treasury, after the first six weeks' expenditure, was exhausted; arrears of taxes were almost irrecoverable; national credit was equal to nothing. To provide forces for withstanding the hostility of combined Europe, with such means and in such a country, was indeed an herculean task; but the genius of Napoleon was equal to the undertaking, and but for the surpassing firmness of Wellington, and the gallantry of the British troops, his efforts would in all probability have proved successful. His first step was to restore, with their eagles, their numbers to the old regiments, ennobled by so many heroic deeds, and so unwisely taken away by the late government; and those precious memorials of past glory were given back to the regiments with every pomp and circumstance most likely to reanimate the spirits of the soldiers. The skeletons of three additional battalions were next organized for each regiment; and to provide men to fill their ranks, the whole retired veterans were by proclamation invited to join their respective corps. Two additional squadrons were in like manner added to each regiment of cavalry; and thirty new battalions of artillery raised, chiefly from the sailors of Cherburg, Brest, and Toulon; forty battalions, in twenty regiments, were added to the Young Guard, entirely drawn from ve-

(1) See the Treaty, April 30, 1815. Martens, N. R. ii. 121; and Ann. Reg. 1815, 377. State Papers. The subsidies paid were:—

Austria,	L.1,796,220
Russia,	3,241,919
Prussia,	2,382,823
Hanover,	206,590
Spain,	147,333
Portugal,	100,000
Sweden,	521,061
Italy and Netherlands,	78,152
Minor Powers,	1,724,000
Miscellaneous,	837,134

Total, L.11,035,232

terans who had served six campaigns; and two hundred battalions of the National Guard were organized, so as to be capable of taking the duty of the garrison towns and interior, and thus permit the whole regular troops to be moved to the frontier. By these means the Emperor calculated that the effective strength of the army, by the 1st June, would be raised to four hundred thousand men, of which one-half might be disposable for active operations in the field; and by the 1st September his sanguine temperament led him to hope that he would have five hundred battalions of troops of the line and fifty-two of the guards, mustering six hundred thousand combatants, besides sixty thousand admirable horse (1).

His efforts
to obtain
arms and
replenish
the arsenals,
and forces
which he
collected
for the
campaign.

To provide arms and the muniments of war for so prodigious a multitude out of the exhausted arsenals, and with the worn-out finances of the empire, was a still more difficult matter; but the ardent genius of the Emperor, appealing to the generous feelings, and rousing the national spirit of the people, was here, too, attended with surprising success. The whole workmen in all the manufactories of arms in the country were doubled: twenty thousand muskets a-month were thus obtained; but this was far from meeting the exigencies of the moment. To procure additional supplies, bodies of permanent workmen were established in many places, in imitation of the corps of workmen on the plains of Grenoble during the Revolution: the old arms were every where called in by proclamation, repaired, and served out to the young soldiers: the founderies were every where set to work with the utmost vigour to replenish the arsenals with guns: purchases of horses, to a vast extent, made in all the fairs of the empire: all those of the gendarmerie were taken, and requisitions made from the peasants of draught horses for the use of the artillery and waggon train. Great part of these purchases were not, as may well be believed, paid for in ready money: orders on the treasury, at distant dates, were lavishly given, and, under military government, could not be refused; and they constituted no small part of the embarrassment of the government of the second Restoration. But, in the mean time, the things were got: the arming of the troops and equipment of the guns went on with extraordinary rapidity; and an order on the different communes to furnish each a certain portion of the clothing of a battalion, soon provided them with uniforms. Before the beginning of June, two hundred and twenty thousand men, almost all veteran soldiers, were completely armed, equipped, clothed, and in readiness to take the field: an astonishing proof of the patriotic spirit of the people, and the enthusiastic ardour with which, in the last struggle of their country, the old soldiers had thrown themselves into the breach (2).

Fouché,
Carnot,
and other
Republicans:
their
great
influence.

In military arrangements, the power of the Emperor was unfettered, and his genius and prodigious activity appeared in their highest lustre; but in civil administration he was entirely in the hands of Fouché and the Republicans; and they steadily pursued one object, which was to provide a counterpoise to his power in the revival of the republican spirit of the people. Carnot, entirely engrossed in the herculean task of reorganizing the national guard, left the direction of civil affairs entirely to Fouché, and he made such skilful use of his unbounded power and influence as head of the police, that the old regicides and Jacobins were every where called up again into activity, and the election for

(1) *Jom.* iv. 614, 615. *Cap.* i. 358, 359. *Thib.* x. 364, 365.

(2) *Archives de la Guerre*; and *Cap.* i. 359, 360. *Thib.* x. 365, 336.

the approaching Chamber of Deputies, summoned for the Champ de Mai, had almost entirely fallen into their hands. His language in this respect was undisguised to his republican allies. "If that man there," said he, "shall attempt to curb the Jacobin ideas, we will overturn him at once and for ever." Napoléon knew and deeply resented this conduct; but his precarious situation compelled him to dissemble, and continue Fouché in power: for he had no hold of the nation, apart from the army, but through the medium of the Republicans. Meanwhile, such was the address of the Emperor and the charm of his conversation, that he succeeded in detaching many of the leading men of talent in Paris, who had formerly taken a prominent part against him, from the Royalist cause. Among the rest, M. Sismondi, the great historian, and Benjamin Constant, the able supporter of constitutional freedom, were entirely won over to his side; and they were entrusted with the arduous duty of aiding in the formation of a constitution. One of the most extraordinary of the many extraordinary gifts with which this wonderful man was endowed, was the power he possessed of subduing the minds of men, and the faculty he had acquired, of dazzling penetration the most acute, and winning over hostile prepossessions the most confirmed, by the mere magic of his fascinating conversation (1).

Financial
measures of
Napoléon.

The financial difficulties of the Hundred Days were singularly lessened by the comparatively prosperous condition in which the treasury had been left, from the diminished expenditure and increased economy of the Bourbon government. Nearly forty millions of francs (L.1,600,000) were left by Louis XVIII in the treasury, or in the balance due by the receivers-general; and an equal sum fell in shortly after, at stated periods, from the sale of national wood, which they had previously made, but for which the bills were not yet all due. It was from these resources that the first and indispensable expenses of the Imperial government were defrayed, but they were soon exhausted by the vast purchases for the army; and, as the capitalists had no confidence whatever in the dynasty of Napoléon, it became a very difficult matter to say how the treasury was to be replenished. As a last resource, the sinking fund, hitherto invariably respected, was offered as a security to a company of bankers, and at first refused; but their consent was at length purchased by such exorbitant interest, that the four millions of francs to which it amounted annually, produced only thirty-one millions of francs: in other words, the government borrowed at twelve per cent. The bills due by the receivers-general were discounted at the rate of seventeen and eighteen per cent; and by these extraordinary resources, and forestalling the ordinary revenue, eighty millions of francs (L.3,200,000) were raised in April and May, which kept the treasury afloat till the battle of Waterloo terminated at once the difficulties and political existence of Napoléon (2).

Formation
of a con-
stitution.

The task of framing a constitution, in a country so long habituated to that species of manufacture as France had been since the Revolution, proved much less difficult than that of restoring the finances. The commission to whom this duty had been devolved, presided over by Benjamin Constant, consisted chiefly of the old patriots of 1789 who had survived the Revolution: and it was governed, accordingly, by the visionary ideas of perfectability which had characterized that dreamy period. The first draft of a constitution which they submitted to the Emperor, was accordingly so democratic, that even in his present necessities it was at once rejected by

(1) Cap. i. 384, 385. Constant, Cent Jours, 23, 41. (2) Cap. i. 377, 380.

him : "I will never," said he, "subscribe to such conditions : I have the army on my side, and after what it has done on the 20th March, it will know how to defend France and its Emperor." Defeated in this attempt, the Liberal party in the commission drew up another constitution ; and this one, styled the "additional act," the work of Constant and Regnaud de St.-Angely, was little different from the Charter of Louis XVIII. Two Chambers, one of Peers and one of Commons, were established on nearly the same footing as they had been by the former government. But three particulars in this new constitution were very remarkable, and demonstrated how much more clearly Napoléon saw the exigencies of the times, and the necessity of bulwarks to power, than the Bourbons had done. 1. The peerage was declared to be *hereditary*—not for life only : a provision which at once announced the intention of reviving a feudal nobility. 2. The punishment of confiscation of property, a penalty so well known in the dark ages, abolished by the Charter, was restored in cases of high treason. 3. The family of the Bourbons was for ever proscribed, and even the power of recalling them denied to the people. It was in vain to disguise, that while these articles indicated in the strongest manner an intention to prevent a second restoration of the royal family, they pointed not less unequivocally to the practical abrogation of the power of self-government, and the construction of a strong monarchy for the family of the Emperor ; and thus the publication of the "*acte additionnel*" on the 25th April, excited unbounded opposition in both the parties which now divided the nation, and left the Emperor in reality no support but in the soldiers of the army (1).

Violent opposition which it excites. The public feeling appeared in an article which was inserted in the *Censeur Européen*, the very existence of which demonstrated how the Emperor's authority had declined from the palmy days of the empire. It was entitled, "On the influence of the mustache on the reason, and the necessity of the sabre in government." "What," exclaimed the fearless writer, "is glory ? Has a lion, which makes all the animals of the surrounding country tremble, glory ? Has a miserable people, which knows not how to govern itself, and is to its neighbours an object only of terror and hatred, glory ? If glory is the sole attribute of men who have done good to their race, where is the glory of a conquering people ?" So vehement did the clamour become, especially among the republicans, that Carnot, who felt himself compromised with his party by the *Acte additionnel*, April 28. wrote to the Emperor, strongly representing that "dissatisfaction was universal, civil war on the point of breaking out, and that it was indispensable to publish a decree, forthwith authorizing the Chambers to modify the constitution in the next session, and to submit the modification to the primary assemblies of the people." But Napoléon replied, "With you, Carnot, I have no need of disguise : you are a strong-headed man, with sagacious intellect. Let us save France, and after that we will arrange every thing. Let us not sow the seeds of discord, when the closest union is required to save the country." To the honour of Carnot it must be added, that from that moment he made no opposition to a dictatorial power being for the time placed in the hands of the Emperor (2).

While Napoléon was vainly striving to blend into one united whole the fervent passions and wounded interests of revolutionary France, Caulaincourt was strenuously endeavouring to open up a diplomatic intercourse with

£ (1) *Acte additionnel*, *Moniteur*, April 25, 1815. Goldsmith's *Recueil*, vi. Cap. i. 384, 296.

(2) Carnot to Napoléon, April 29, 1815. Cap. i. 395, 396.

Ineffectual attempt of the French diplomacy to open a negotiation with the Allied powers.

the Allied powers. In this vital matter every thing depended on the success or failure of the first step; for if the Allies had consented to a negotiation of any kind with the Emperor, it would have been a recognition of the decree of the 13th March. But all his efforts were ineffectual; and what is remarkable, the Emperor Alexander, who in 1814 had most warmly espoused his cause, was now the most decided against him. "We can have no peace," he said with energy to a secret agent who approached him with overtures from the Emperor Napoléon; "it is a mortal duel betwixt us—he has broken his word. I am freed from my engagement: Europe requires an example." "Europe," said Metternich, in an official article from Vienna in the *European Observer*, "has declared war

April 26. against Buonaparte. France can, and ought to prove to Europe, that it knows its dignity sufficiently not to submit to the domination of one man. The French nation is powerful and free: its power and freedom are essential to the equilibrium of Europe. France has but to deliver itself from its oppressor, and return to the principles on which the social order reposes, to be in peace with Europe." The spirit of Germany was hourly more and more exalted by those declarations: already the ferment was as wide-spread, the enthusiasm as universal, as when the Allied armies first approached the Rhine. Thus all attempts of Caulaincourt to open a negotiation, all the declarations of Napoléon that he aspired now only to be the first in peace, proved ineffectual. His insincerity was universally known: the necessities of his situation universally appreciated. Napoléon, on the

April 1. 1st April, addressed a circular to all the sovereigns, commencing in the usual style from one sovereign to another, "Sir, my brother," and concluding with the strongest protestations of his desire to commence a new strife in the arena of peace (1). But all his efforts were ineffectual: none of M. Caulaincourt's couriers could reach their destined point: one was stopped at Kehl, another at Mayence, and a third near Turin. At the same time Caulaincourt was informed, in a confidential communication with Baron Vincent, that it was no longer possible to make the Allied sovereigns swerve from their determination, or separate them from each other (2).

Murat commences hostilities, and advances to the Po. His defeat and overthrow. Murat was the first who raised the standard of war. Anxious to deprive Napoléon of such an ally, and prevent the distraction of its forces by an Italian war, when it was necessary to combine every effort for the overthrow of Napoléon, Austria, had offered to guarantee to him the disputed marches, and procure for him the recognition of all the sovereigns at Vienna of his right to the throne of Naples if he would declare for the Allies; when the brave but infatuated king, transported by the intelligence of the success of Napoléon in France, and deeming the time

(1) "The true nature of the events which have taken place, must now be fully known to your Majesty. They were the result of an irresistible power; the work of the unanimous wish of a great nation, which knows its duties and its rights. The dynasty which force had imposed upon the country was not suited to it; the Bourbons were neither associated with its sentiments nor its habits. France required to separate from them. France has recalled a liberator; the inducement which had led me to the greatest sacrifices no longer existed. I returned; and from the moment when I landed on the shore, the love of my people has borne me to the capital. The first wish of my heart is to repay so much affection by an honourable tranquillity; my sweetest hope is to render the re-establishment of

the Imperial throne a guarantee for the peace of Europe. Enough of glory has illustrated, in their turn, the standards of all nations; the vicissitudes of fate have sufficiently often made great reverses succeed the most glorious success. A nobler arena is now opened to sovereigns; I will be the first to descend into it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great combating, it will be now sweeter to exhibit henceforth no other rivalry but that of the advantages of peace—no other strife but that of the felicity of nations."—*Napoléon to the Allied Sovereigns, April 1, 1815; Moniteur, April 2; and CAPEFIGUE, i. 311, 312.*

(2) *Cap. i. 304, 313. Thib. x. 286, 295. Napoléon to the Allied sovereigns, April 1, 1815. Cap. i. 311.*

had arrived when he might strike with effect for the independence of Italy and the throne of that beautiful peninsula, suddenly commenced hostilities.

March 31. On the 31st March he crossed the Po, and published from Rimini a sonorous proclamation, in which he called on the Italians to unite with him in asserting their independence. "The moment," said he, "is arrived, when great destinies are about to be accomplished: Providence at length has called us to become an independent people. From the summit of the Alps to the extremity of Sicily one cry is heard—the independence of Italy." But although these sentiments found a responsive echo in the general breast, yet the event soon proved on what a sandy foundation all projects for Italian independence were rested, which were based on the military operations of the Italian people. Although the King of Naples was at the head of a well disciplined, splendidly equipped, and beautifully dressed army of fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand advanced to the Po, the remainder being left in reserve in his own dominions, yet was his overthrow so easily effected, that it could hardly be called a war. The Neapolitan troops, in the first instance, gained a slight success; but the Austrian generals, Bellegarde, Bianchi, and Frimont, quickly united their forces and attacked Murat at Tolentino. The Neapolitans fled like a flock of sheep at the first fire; a second

April 9 engagement completed their rout, and dispersed the fugitives
and 11. through the Roman States, from whence, in the utmost terror, they regained their own frontier; Murat himself, wholly deserted by his troops,

April 30. was glad to embark at Naples for Toulon, which he reached in safety; while his queen, Caroline, escaped on board an English merchant vessel, and was conveyed to Austria. Thus fell the throne of the Buonaparte family in Naples; and thus was accomplished the prophecy of Napoléon, who, when he heard of his commencing hostilities, said that his brother-in-law would ruin himself by taking up arms in 1815, as in 1814 he had ruined him by failing to do so. Nothing now remained to prevent the Sicilian family from resuming their ancient throne of Naples, which they accordingly immediately did, and were recognized by all Europe (1).

Louis XVIII
at Ghent.
Chateaubriand and
his writings. While these important events were in progress in Europe, the monarch whose fall had occasioned them all, and around whom this terrible conflagration was breaking forth, was living in seclusion, but yet not forgotten, at Ghent. Louis XVIII kept up in that ancient city the state of a sovereign; M. Blacas, General Clarke, and Chateaubriand, had followed him in his exile, and kept up diplomatic communications with foreign courts, the ambassadors of all of whom, still in exile, waited on the dethroned monarch. Ambition and intrigue were not wanting; Ghent had its salons and coteries as well as either Paris or Vienna. But what contributed most of all to give the court there consideration in the eyes of Europe, was the nomination of M. Lally Tollendal and Viscount Chateaubriand to the offices of ministers of state; and the powerful declamations which they soon began to launch out against the usurper of the French throne. The Duke of Wellington visited the king in his seclusion, and he had the satisfaction of hearing from the duke the assurance, that "he regarded the restoration of the Bourbons as essential to the equilibrium of Europe." Clarke furnished valuable information in regard to the situation and strength of the French army when he left the ministry of war at Paris; while Chateaubriand, in the *Moniteur de Gand*, which appeared daily, combated the proclamations and state papers of Napoléon, published in the *Moniteur* at Paris, with such

(1) Thib. x. 319, 322. Cap. ii. 15, 17. Bot. iv. 417, 419.

ability, and inveighed with such impassioned eloquence against his government, that he contributed in a powerful manner to uphold the spirit of the European alliance (1).

La Vendée had in the first instance disappointed the expectations of the Duke de Bourbon and the French Royalists; but the course of events in that province proved in the end eminently serviceable to the restoration of the monarchy. The Duke de Bourbon was personally unknown to the Vendéans;

May 1. his name had never figured in their heart-stirring annals: but in the beginning of May, when the Marquis Louis de La Rochejaquelein made his appearance on their coast, the glorious name at once produced a general insurrection among them; and an animated proclamation from him drew thousands to the royal standard. M. de Suzannet was soon at the head of four thousand armed peasants in the Bocage; M. D'Autichamp raised a still larger number; M. de Sapineau was placed at the head of a third, five thousand strong; and Auguste de La Rochejaquelein led a fourth. The presence of twenty thousand armed men in the thickets of la Vendée, produced no small uneasiness in the mind of the Emperor; and he dispatched Generals Lamarque and Travot to command a formidable army of twenty thousand men for their subjugation, while Fouché opened in secret a negotiation with their chiefs. The astute minister, foreseeing a second restoration, and having already commenced measures to secure his ascendancy in the event of it, dispatched two able emissaries—M. de Malarbic and De la Berandière—with instructions, by the most conclusive of all arguments, to put an end to the civil war. "Why," said he, "should the Vendéans go to war; French blood will soon flow in sufficient streams without theirs being mingled with it? Let them wait a month or two, and all will be over. Above all, let not the English interfere in the business; for they come only to profit by our divisions. Conclude an armistice till the inevitable restoration. La Vendée is but an incident in the great European war about to break out in the plains of Belgium. The contest between the Blues and the Whites is henceforth without an object (2)." By these means, which were entirely in accordance with his whole policy throughout the Hundred Days, Fouché hoped to have the merit, in the eyes of Napoléon, of terminating the contest in la Vendée; in those of the Bourbons, of detaching twenty thousand men from his standard at the most critical period of his fortunes; and of the nation, of closing the frightful gulf of civil war.

Measures of Napoléon to crush it, and pacification of the province. These deep-laid schemes proved entirely successful; and their favourable result was much aided by the divisions which prevailed among the Vendéan chiefs themselves. Louis de La Rochejaquelein aspired to the supreme command; and his great name and family influence, as well as the support of the English government, with which he was in close communication, fully entitled him to the honour. But his pretensions were contested by the other chiefs, particularly D'Autichamp and Suzannet, not from any distrust of his qualifications for the lead, but a secret and not unnatural jealousy of external influence, and above all of British co-operation. Thus there was no cordial union among them, and this appeared in the very outset of operations; for La Rochejaquelein, buoyant with courage, and ardent to enrol his name in the records of Vendéan fame, was desirous at once to commence hostilities, while the other chiefs were inclined to follow Fouché's advice, and wait, at any rate till the war broke

(1) Cap. ii. 41, 63. Thib. x. 311, 315.

(2) Cap. ii. 70, 81. Fouché, Mem. ii. 332, 333. Beauch. iv. 157, 163.

out on the frontier, before they declared themselves. La Rochejaquelein, however, who deemed his honour pledged to follow out his engagements with the British government, and whose heroic spirit could brook no delay, May 29. took up arms, and moved to the sea-coast, to cover the disembarkation of military stores and equipments which had commenced from the British vessels. He was followed by Lamarque at the head of eight thousand men, and several inconsiderable actions took place, in which the Vendéans displayed their accustomed valour, and reached in safety Croix de Vie on the sea-coast, where the English vessels were lying, and the disembarkation was continued under their protection. But there the effect of Fouché's ambiguous counsels appeared: D'Autichamp, Suzannet, and Sapineau, determined not to enter into communication with the British, withdrew with their divisions and disbanded their men. Thus La Rochejaquelein, with his division five thousand strong, was left alone to withstand eight thousand veteran soldiers who pressed upon him; yet with this handful of men he was not discouraged, but with a heart swelling with indignation at the desertion of his countrymen, and the glorious recollections of his race, marched to meet the enemy. He sought only what he soon found—a glorious death. The Vendéans fought with their accustomed gallantry; but the loss of their chiefs spread a fatal discouragement among their ranks: the Marquis de La Rochejaquelein, impelled by a generous ardour, spurred his charger out of the line, reached an eminence close to the enemy's line to reconnoitre a body of men which he saw approaching, belonging to the troops of the Marais, fell mortally wounded, breathed a short prayer for his king and country, and expired. Auguste de La Rochejaquelein soon after was severely wounded; and the Vendéans, despairing of the combat after the loss of their chiefs, gave way and dispersed. This action terminated the war in la Vendée, as the other leaders had all gone into Fouché's plan of awaiting the issue of events. But the heroic Louis de La Rochejaquelein did not die in vain: his firmness retained at a critical time twenty thousand veteran French in the western provinces, when the campaign was just beginning in Flanders; and who can say what effect they might have had if thrown into the scale when the beam quivered on the field of Waterloo (1)?

Composition of the Chamber of Deputies. Meanwhile, Napoléon was engaged with the meeting of the deputies at Paris, and the preparation of the great fête of the Champ de Mai, on a scale of magnificence which might at once captivate the people of the capital, and recall to the Republican party the popular demonstrations of the Revolution. April 30. On the 30th April a decree was passed, convoking the electoral colleges for the nomination of deputies to the Chamber of Representatives, and ordaining that the deputies named should repair to Paris, to be present at the assembly of the Champ de Mai, and to form the chamber, to which the "Acte additionnel" should be submitted. The election of deputies was every where a vain formality, and did not afford the smallest indication of the real state of the public mind. In most of the departments not a tenth part of the qualified persons came forward to the vote; in some, particularly those of Bouches du Rhone and la Vendée, the deputies were appointed by five electors; in twenty-nine no election whatever took place. The respectable citizens every where kept aloof from contests conducted under the auspices of Fouché, Carnot, and the violent republicans; the men of property deemed it unnecessary to mix themselves up with an ephemeral legislature, or to make any effort for a cause which

(1) Beauch. iv. 180, 185. Thib. x. 368, 368. Cap. ii. 81, 82.

would soon be determined by the bayonets of the Allies. Thus the elections fell into the hands, as in the commencement of the Revolution, of a mere knot of noisy orators, ignorant declaimers, and salaried agents of administration; and a legislature was returned in which the great majority was composed of needy unprincipled adventurers, base worn-out hacks of the police, and furious Jacobins, whose presumption as usual was equalled only by their ignorance (1). Nothing could be expected but rashness and imbecility from such a legislature, and yet it was to be called to duties requiring above all others the soundest judgment, the purest patriotism, the most exalted courage.

The Champ de Mai at Paris. Aware, however, how strongly the French are influenced by theatrical representations, no pains were spared by the Emperor to render the approaching ceremony in the Champ-de-Mai as imposing as possible. For above a month workmen had been engaged in preparing for it; the most glowing descriptions of its probable magnificence had been frequently given in the public journals, and the preparations were on a scale which recalled the famous assembly on the same spot on the 14th July 1790 (2). A cardinal, two archbishops, and several bishops, presided over the religious part of the ceremony: the Emperor appeared, surrounded by his chamberlains, his pages, and all the pomp of the empire; the marshals, the generals, the great officers of state were there, attended by brilliant staffs and retinues, and all the circumstances of military and civil splendour: four thousand electors chosen by the electoral colleges throughout France were assembled, deputations from all the regiments around Paris attended, and the presence of thirty thousand national guards of the metropolis added to the imposing aspect of the ceremony. The day was fine; above two hundred thousand spectators crowded round the benches, arranged in the form of an amphitheatre, where the persons appointed to take part in the ceremony were stationed; and the commencement of the votes of the electors in their primary assemblies, when announced, showed that the "Acte additionnel" was approved by an immense majority of the electors; the numbers being fifteen hundred thousand to five thousand (3). It is a striking proof of the vanity of all such references to the popular voice, that of the immense number of votes which appeared in the majority, certainly not one in a thousand knew what they were voting about; and not one in ten thousand, if they had, would, in all probability, have approved of the new constitution (4).

Napoléon's speech on the occasion. Napoléon addressed the electors in these words: "Gentlemen, deputies of the army and navy in the Champ-de-Mai—Emperor, consul, soldier, I owe every thing to the people. In prosperity, in adversity, in the field of battle, in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the only object of my thoughts and actions. Like the king of Athens, I have sacrificed myself for the people, in the hope of seeing the promise realized, of thereby securing to France its natural frontiers, its honours, its rights.

(1) Cap. i. 397, 398. Thib. x. 332, 333. Fouché, Mem. ii. 337, 338. Montg. viiii. 170, 171.

(2) *Ante*, I. 153.

(3) The numbers were :—

	Ayes.	Noes.
64 Departments,	1,288,357	4207
Army,	222,100	320
Navy,	22,000	275
Total,	1,532,457	4802

—*Moniteur*, 2d June 1815; and *TRIBAUDEAU*, x. 334.

(4) Thib. x. 332. 335. Cap. ii. 94, 99, Montg. viiii. 167, 169. *Moniteur*, June 2, 1815.

Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, the fruit of twenty-five years of victory, disregarded or lost; the cry of withered honour, the wishes of the nation, have brought me back to the throne which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of the independence, the rights, and honour of the French people. Frenchmen! in traversing amid the public joy the different provinces of the empire to arrive in my capital, I trusted I could reckon on a long peace; nations are bound by treaties concluded by their governments, whatever they may be. My whole thoughts were then turned to the means of founding our liberty on a constitution resting on the wishes and interests of the people. Therefore it is that I have convoked the assembly of the Champ-de-Mai. I soon learned, however, that the princes who resist all popular rights, and disregard the wishes and interests of so many nations, were resolved on war. They intend to extend the kingdom of the Low Countries, by giving it for a barrier all our frontier places in the north, and to reconcile all their differences by sharing among them Lorraine and Alsace. We must prepare for war! Frenchmen, you are about to return into your departments. Tell your fellow-citizens that the circumstances are perilous! but that with the aid of union, energy, and perseverance, we shall emerge victorious out of this struggle of a great people against its oppressors; that future generations will severely scrutinize our conduct; that a nation has lost all when it has lost its independence. Tell them that the stranger kings whom I have placed on their thrones, or who owe to me the preservation of their crowns, and who in the days of my prosperity have courted my alliance and that of the French people, now direct all their strokes against my person. Did I not know it is against our country they are aimed, I would sacrifice myself to their hatred. But my wishes, my rights, are those of the people: my prosperity, my honour, my glory, can be no other than the prosperity, the honour, and the glory of France." At the conclusion of these eloquent words, Napoléon took the oath on the Gospels to observe the constitution, which was immediately taken by the officers of state, marshals, deputies, and soldiers present (1); and the Eagles were, at the same time, delivered with extraordinary pomp to the regiments.

Great division of opinion at Paris.

But in the midst of all this seeming unanimity and enthusiasm, opinion at Paris was extremely divided; a formidable opposition against the Emperor was organized in the bosom of the Chamber of Deputies, and some of his principal ministers were engaged in such secret correspondence with his enemies, that he was on the point of making them lose their heads. From the very outset of their sittings the hostility of the Chamber of Deputies to the Emperor was unequivocally evinced, and mutual ill humour appeared on both sides. When the choice of M. Lanjuinais, the old Girondist, to be president, was announced to the Emperor, instead of his brother Lucien, whom he had designed for that dignity, his first impulse was to refuse to confirm the appointment, and he coldly answered, "I will return my answer by one of my chamberlains." When this expression was repeated, it raised a perfect storm in the Chambers. To return an answer by a chamberlain was a direct insult, it was said, to the national representatives. The Emperor, however, was obliged to submit, and all the influence of the court failed in the appointment of the vice-president; M. Flareqerguis, Dupont de l'Eure, Lafayette, and Grenier, all known for their extreme popular principles, were elected. Napoléon opened the Chamber of Deputies in person; his speech, though abundantly liberal, was coldly received.

June 6.

A great review of the forty-eight battalions of the national guard was still more unsatisfactory; hardly any cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard from the ranks, and it was followed by a procession of the *fédérés* of the suburbs, so hideous and disorderly, that it recalled the worst days of the Revolution, and excited no small apprehensions in the minds of those around the Emperor. Every thing announced that the reign of lawyers, adventurers, and democracy was returning in the Chambers, and with it the ascendancy of Jacobins, massacre, and revolution in the metropolis (1).

Napoléon
sets out for
the army.
June 7.

The spirit of the Chamber of Peers, named by the Emperor, was abundantly pliant; but that of the Deputies, daily more refractory, soon became so hostile, that the Emperor, to avoid the pain of witnessing its absurdities, was glad of an excuse for setting out for the army.

June 4. A proposition to declare him the "saviour of the country," was almost unanimously rejected; in the midst of the most pressing external dangers, their attention was exclusively occupied with the means of propagating liberal principles, and rendering more popular the constitution. The "Acte additionnel," so recently sworn to with such solemnity, was already ridiculed as an unworthy compromise, which would not for a moment bear the lights of the age. Every thing showed that the Chambers contemplated the speedy seizure of the supreme power. The answer of Napoléon to their address on the eve of his departure, evinced the disquietude which filled his mind, and contained the words of true patriotic wisdom—"This night," said he, "I shall set out for the army; the movements of the enemies' corps render my presence indispensable. During my absence, I shall learn with pleasure that a committee of the Chamber is meditating on the constitution. The constitution is our rallying point; it should be the sole polar star in moments of storm. Every political discussion which should tend, directly or indirectly, to diminish the confidence which we feel in our institutions, would be a misfortune for the State: we should find ourselves in the midst of shoals without rudder or compass. The crisis in which we are engaged is a terrible one: let us not imitate the Greeks of the lower empire, who, pressed on all sides by Barbarians, rendered themselves the laughing-stock of posterity, by occupying themselves with abstract discussions at the moment that the battering-ram was thundering at their gates (2)."

Formation
of a govern-
ment for the
Emperor's
absence.

To direct public affairs during his absence, the Emperor appointed a provisional government, consisting of fourteen persons, viz. his brother Joseph, who was the president, and Lucien, his eight ministers, Cambacérès, Davoust, Caulaincourt, Fouché, Carnot, Gaudin, Mollière, and Decrès; with Regnaud de St.-Angely. Boulay de la Meurthe, Desermont, and Merlin, who were admitted into the Council, though not holding office, on account of their talents for public speaking, and the consideration they enjoyed with the popular party, so powerful in the Representative Chamber. In truth, however, Carnot and Fouché were the only persons in this large number who were really in communication with influential parties in the state; so that the power was substantially in their hands. And though both old regicides and republicans, they were very far indeed from being united now in regard to the course which should be pursued, and both had a cordial hatred and utter distrust of each other. Fouché regarded Carnot as an obstinate old mule, who would any day sacrifice himself and his party to the maintenance of a principle: Carnot, with

(1) Buchez and Roux, xl. 147, 152. Cap. ii. 103, 111. Thib. x. 352, 354. Fouché, ii. 340, 341.

(2) Buchez and Roux, xl. 164, 165.

more justice, looked on Fouché as a supple villain, who had never any principle at all, but was at all times ready to elevate himself on the shoulders of whatever party appeared likely to gain the ascendant. Yet was his influence such that Napoléon, though well aware of his treachery, did not venture to dismiss him from the ministry. Shortly before his departure, a secret despatch from Metternich to the minister of police came to the knowledge of the Emperor : and the messenger who conveyed it, in his terror, revealed various important details of the correspondence. Napoléon was no sooner informed of it, than he ordered Fouché to be sent for, openly charged him before the Council with being a traitor, and declared he would have him shot next morning. But Carnot calmly replied, " You have it in your power to shoot Fouché, but to-morrow, at the hour he suffers, your power is annihilated." " How so ?" cried Napoléon. " Yes, sire ;" said Carnot, " this is not a time for dissembling. The men of the Revolution only allow you to reign, because they believe that you will respect their liberties. If you destroy Fouché, whom they regard as one of their most powerful guarantees, to-morrow you will no longer have a shadow of power." The Council agreed with Carnot ; the idea of a military execution was abandoned ; and Fouché was not a man to let any legal evidence of his secret treasons exist, so that the affair blew over. Napoléon's suspicions, however, were not allayed, although he could not convict his minister in legal form, and his last words to him before leaving Paris were these :—" Like all persons who are ready to die, we have nothing to conceal from each other ; if I fall, the patriots fall with me ; you will play your game ill if you betray me. With me, all you Revolutionists will perish under the Bourbons ; I am your last dictator ; reflect on that." It is a striking proof of the ascendancy which guilt acquires in revolutions, that this arch-intriguer, who, while directing the ministry of the interior under Napoléon, was on the one hand secretly corresponding with Metternich and Wellington, and on the other with D'Autichamp and the Vendéans, and who was at the same time rousing into fearful activity the old Jacobin party over all France, though known to be a traitor by all parties, could not be dispensed with by any (1).

Napoléon's
plan of the
campaign.

Napoléon's plan of the campaign was in a great measure based on the fortification of Paris, which, by the indefatigable efforts of General Haxo and the engineers, had by this time acquired a considerable degree of consistency. No one knew better than the Emperor the value of such central fortifications ; he felt that it was mainly owing to their want, that all his efforts had proved abortive in the preceding year. Under Haxo's able direction, the whole heights to the north of Paris, from Montmartre to Charonne, were covered with redoubts ; the canal of Ourcq was finished so as to cover the plain between La Villette and St.-Denis, and the latter town was retrenched, and covered with the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crow. To the west of Montmartre, which formed the most elevated point of the line, was erected a series of intrenchments, which extended as far as the Seine at Clichy ; and the space at the other extremity, between Vincennes and Charenton, was also strengthened with redoubts. These works were nearly completed, and armed with seven hundred pieces of cannon they rendered Paris almost impregnable, even to the greatest force on the whole northern semicircle. Lyons also was strongly fortified with field intrenchments, mounting three hundred and fifty guns ; and relying on the strength of these two important points to retard any decisive success on

(1) Fouché, ii. 329, 331. Cap. ii. 154, 156. Thib. x. 364, 369.

the part of the Allies, Napoléon resolved to act with the main body of his forces, which amounted to a hundred and twenty-five thousand men, with three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, on the offensive in Flanders, on the frontiers of which that formidable force was already collected between the Meuse and the Sambre. Other lesser armies were stationed at other points on the frontier, with instructions to retire if out-numbered, and retard the enemy as much as possible; Suchet commanded two divisions, numbering twenty-two thousand combatants, on the frontiers of Savoy; a small corps of observation of ten thousand was placed at Befort, under Lecourbe; while Rapp with three divisions, amounting to seventeen thousand, was stationed in Alsace, with his headquarters at Strasburg. Twenty thousand men were detained in distant and necessary inactivity on the frontiers of la Vendée and Brittany; while small divisions were at Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, to overawe the Royalists in these cities. In all, not more than a hundred thousand men were arrayed in these lesser corps to resist not less than four hundred thousand enemies, preparing to invade France on the south and east; but they were merely regarded as the nucleus of so many armies, numbering three times the present amount of combatants, which might be assembled before the distant Allied hosts could be brought together. Every thing depended on the Grand Army under the immediate command of Napoléon (1).

Wellington's plan of the campaign.

Wellington on his side had profoundly meditated on the plan of the approaching campaign; and after much reflection he had resolved to invade France direct from Flanders, between the Marne and the Oise; but in order to conceal this design from the enemy, he

(1) Vict. et Conq. xxiv. 159, 160. Vaud. iii. 110. Jom. iv. 624. Cap. ii. 123, 124. Nap. Camp. of Waterloo, 49, 52.

1. *Wellington's whole Army at the opening of the Campaign.*

British and King's German Legion, . . .	43,236
Hanoverians,	10,447
Brunswickers,	8,000
Belgian and Nassau troops,	28,387
Total,	90,070

Under Wellington's orders, but who had not arrived at the opening of the campaign.

Hanse troops,	4,000
Danes,	12,000

Grand Total, 106,070

—PLOTTO, iv. App. 45.

II. *Wellington's Army at Waterloo.*

1. *British and King's German Legion:*

Infantry—viz.:	
Officers,	1,077
Sergeants, etc.	1,189
Trumpeters, etc.	500
Rank and file,	17,895
	20,661

Cavalry—viz.:

Officers,	521
Sergeants, etc.	641
Trumpeters, etc.	125
Rank and file,	7,448

8,735

Artillery, Engineers, etc.—viz.

Officers,	291
Sergeants, etc.	231
Trumpeters, etc.	75
Rank and file,	6,280
	6,877

General summary—viz.:

English Infantry,	20,661
— Cavalry,	8,735
— Artillery and Engineers,	6,877

British and King's German Legion,

Total, 36,273

2. *Hanoverians—viz.:*

Infantry,	6,312
Cavalry (Estorff's brigade), . . .	1,135
	7,447

3. *Brunswickers, 8,000*

4. *Belgian and Nassau troops, . . . 21,000*

suggested that the Austrians and Russians should invade, in the first instance, by Befort and Huningen, in order to attract the enemy's principal forces to

Total amount of Wellington's Army that fought at Waterloo—viz.:

British and King's German Legion,	36,273
Hanoverians,	7,447
Brunswickers,	8,000
Belgian and Nassau troops,	21,000

72,720

See *Table of the Strength of the British Army on the Morning of the Battle of Waterloo.*

III. Prussian troops under Blücher who took part in the Campaign.

		Men.	Bat.	Esq.	Bat.	Can.
The 1st corps d'armée under Gen. Ziethen,		34,800	34	32	12	96
2d — — under Gen. Kleist,		36,000	36	36	12	96
3d — — under Gen. Thielman,		33,000	33	32	12	96
4th — — under Gen. Bulow,		37,000	36	48	12	96
		141,600	139	148	48	384

IV. Prussian Forces that advanced upon Waterloo, after deducting the loss at Ligny.

The 1st corps d'armée under Gen. Ziethen,	27,000	34	32	12	96
2d — — under Gen. Kleist,	29,000	36	36	12	96
4th — — under Gen. Bulow,	30,000	36	48	12	96

Total, 86,000 106 116 36 273

Deduct one-half of the 2d corps which did not come into action, . . . 14,000 18 18 6 45

Total Prussian corps which advanced to Waterloo, of whom about } 72,000 88 38 30 228
40,000 were actually under fire,

—Plötho, iv. *Appendix page* 36, 55.

V. French Force.

Army with which Napoleon entered Flunders on the 15th of June 1815.

1st corps—Count d'Erlon.

Corps, Commanders, and Divisions.	Force of each division.			
	Infantry.	Cav.	Artil. men.	Guns.
1st division, —	4,120	—	160	8
2d — — —	4,100	—	160	8
3d — — —	4,000	—	160	8
4th — — —	4,000	—	160	8
1st division of cavalry, —	—	1,500	120	8
Reserve of Artillery, —	—	—	160	8

Force of 1st corps: men 18,640, cannon 46.

2d corps—Count Reille.

5th division, —	5,000	—	160	8
6th — — —	6,100	—	160	8
7th — — —	5,000	—	160	8
9th — — —	5,000	—	160	8
2d division of cavalry, —	—	1,500	120	6
Reserve of Artillery, —	—	—	170	8

Force of 2d corps: men 23,530, cannon 46.

3d corps—Count Vandamme.

10th division, —	4,430	—	160	8
11th — — —	4,030	—	160	8
8th — — —	4,300	—	160	8
3d division of cavalry, —	—	—	120	6
Reserve of artillery, —	—	—	180	8

Force of 3d corps: men 15,290, cannon 38.

4th corps—Count Gerard.

12th division, —	4,000	—	160	8
13th — — —	4,000	—	160	8
14th — — —	4,000	—	160	8
6th division of cavalry, —	—	1,500	120	6
Reserve of artillery, —	—	—	160	8

Force of 4th corps: men 14,260, cannon 38.

6th corps—Count Lobao.

19th division, —	3,500	—	170	8
20th — — —	3,500	—	160	8
21st — — —	4,000	—	160	8
Reserve of artillery, —	—	—	280	14

Force of 6th corps: men 11,770, cannon 38.

STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE MORNING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. (18TH JUNE 1815.)

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.	STATIONS.	OFFICERS.				TROOP QUARTER MASTERS AND SERGEANTS.					TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS.					RANK AND FILE.					
				Field Officers.				Present.	SICK.		Command.	Total.	Present.	SICK.		Command.	Total.	Present.	SICK.		Command.	Prisoners of War and Missing.	Total Rank and File.
					Captains.	Subalterns.	Staff.		Present.	Absent.				Present.	Absent.				Present.	Absent.			
Artillery, Engineers, etc.,		Royal Artillery, . . .		8	50	91	26	152	9	—	—	161	44	—	—	—	44	4,573	306	17	9	9	4,573
		Artillery, K. G. L. . .		2	5	12	6	20	—	—	1	21	6	—	—	—	6	520	73	—	29	—	622
		Royal Engineers, . . .		1	17	29	—	33	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		— Sappers and Miners		—	—	10	—	—	—	—	2	35	19	—	—	—	19	683	10	8	17	—	715
		— Waggon Train, . .		1	2	9	4	17	—	—	3	20	2	—	—	—	2	266	—	3	10	—	279
		— Staff Corps, . .		1	4	11	2	9	—	—	—	9	4	—	—	—	4	238	5	—	—	—	243
Total Artillery, . .				13	78	162	38	231	9	—	6	96	75	—	—	—	75	6,280	394	28	65	9	6,776
Cavalry	1st Lord E. Somerset. 2nd Ponsonby. 3rd Dornberg. 4th Vandeleur. 5th Grant. 6th Vivian. 7th Arents-childt.	1st Life Guards, . . .	Position in front of Waterloo.	1	3	4	4	19	—	—	3	18	14	—	—	—	4	210	10	1	7	—	228
		2nd — — — — —		1	4	8	3	19	—	—	2	17	3	—	1	—	4	197	—	4	30	—	231
		Royal Horse Guards, .		2	4	7	1	46	—	1	4	20	4	—	—	—	4	213	—	9	15	—	237
		1st Dragoon Guards, .		1	9	14	4	20	—	—	2	47	8	—	—	—	8	515	12	—	3	—	530
		1st Dragoons,		2	5	15	6	30	—	—	—	28	6	—	—	—	6	364	7	1	22	—	394
		2nd — — — — —		3	6	13	6	33	1	—	—	34	6	—	—	—	6	375	1	5	10	—	391
		6th — — — — —		2	6	12	6	29	1	—	—	30	6	—	—	—	6	384	7	—	8	—	396
		1st Lt. Dragoons, K.G.L.		2	9	15	7	48	—	2	5	54	10	—	—	—	10	443	6	20	27	15	511
		2nd — — — — —		4	8	14	6	30	1	9	2	41	10	—	—	—	10	433	14	37	31	13	528
		23d Light Dragoons, . .		3	7	12	6	22	—	1	3	26	4	—	2	—	6	287	—	39	16	45	387
		11th — — — — —		2	6	14	5	34	—	—	—	34	6	—	—	1	7	368	7	1	14	—	390
		12th — — — — —		2	7	12	5	34	—	—	—	34	4	—	—	—	4	363	3	—	22	—	388
		16th — — — — —		2	6	17	6	36	—	—	—	36	5	1	—	—	6	362	5	1	25	—	393
		7th Hussars,		1	4	9	4	23	—	5	6	34	5	—	—	1	6	316	—	16	84	14	380
		15th — — — — —		2	7	13	6	30	—	—	—	30	6	—	—	—	6	383	3	—	6	—	392
		1st — — — — — K.G.L.		2	9	17	7	44	2	—	8	33	9	1	—	—	10	498	16	6	93	—	613
		10th — — — — —		3	7	11	5	31	—	—	1	32	6	—	—	—	6	389	—	—	1	—	390
		18th — — — — —		1	4	14	6	33	—	—	—	33	6	—	—	—	6	378	5	5	8	—	396
		3d — — — — — K.G.L.		2	10	20	5	46	2	1	14	63	11	—	—	—	11	590	26	22	149	—	787
		13th Light Dragoons, .		1	7	15	5	34	—	—	—	34	6	—	—	—	6	580	7	1	1	1	390
Total Cavalry, . .				38	128	252	103	641	7	19	50	498	125	2	3	2	132	7,448	119	148	472	88	8,352
Infantry	1st Cooke. 2d Clinton. 3d Alten. 4th Colville. 5th Picton. 6th.	1st British 1st Guards, 2nd batt.	Position in front of Waterloo.	—	4	21	4	45	—	8	5	56	21	—	1	—	22	688	—	276	12	—	976
		1st — 1st — 3rd —		—	7	17	5	40	—	8	5	58	20	—	2	—	22	758	—	255	8	—	1,021
		2nd — 2nd — 2nd —		1	5	25	5	55	3	1	6	65	15	1	—	6	22	939	49	4	11	—	1,003
		3rd — 2nd — 2nd —		1	5	26	3	55	2	—	10	67	9	1	—	7	17	957	41	6	57	—	1,061
		52nd Regt. 1st batt.		2	10	41	6	65	1	1	2	69	22	—	—	—	22	1,002	18	12	6	—	1,038
		71st — 1st — — —		3	9	32	6	61	—	—	1	62	21	—	—	—	21	798	6	4	2	—	810
		95th — Prov. — —		1	2	5	2	11	—	—	1	12	6	—	—	—	6	176	2	2	8	—	188
		95th — 2d — — —		2	6	20	6	37	1	—	3	41	17	—	—	—	17	567	10	3	5	—	585
		1st Line Batt. K.G.L.		2	6	16	5	25	3	2	18	48	12	—	—	—	12	389	20	27	17	5	458
		2d — — — — —		1	6	17	5	30	1	3	16	50	12	1	1	—	14	423	25	32	13	18	511
		3d — — — — —		3	4	17	6	32	—	2	13	47	13	—	—	—	13	508	6	30	11	—	555
		4th — — — — —		2	5	17	6	26	—	4	3	33	9	—	—	1	10	413	—	38	11	—	462
		30th Reg., 2d batt.		3	5	26	6	33	—	5	5	43	14	—	—	—	14	548	—	45	9	13	615
		33d — — — — —		1	4	21	5	22	—	4	10	36	12	—	2	4	18	501	10	14	6	30	561
		69th — 2d — — —		2	6	17	5	28	1	1	4	34	19	—	—	—	19	461	23	16	8	5	516
		73d — 2d — — —		2	5	12	4	32	—	5	5	42	17	—	—	1	18	426	—	102	34	—	562
		5th Line Batt., K.G.L.		2	4	20	5	30	—	1	16	47	16	—	—	—	16	394	32	21	10	—	457
		8th — — — — —		2	6	18	6	31	—	—	15	46	15	—	—	—	16	436	11	3	95	—	545
		1st Light Batt., — —		3	5	18	6	23	3	7	20	53	12	—	1	1	14	382	26	57	20	—	485
		2d — — — — —		1	5	19	6	24	3	4	19	50	14	—	—	1	15	382	28	59	12	—	431
		14th Reg., 3d Battalion.		2	8	23	5	33	1	—	2	36	11	—	—	—	11	548	9	7	7	—	571
		23d — 1st — — —		3	10	25	6	35	—	—	3	38	23	—	—	—	23	639	—	5	3	—	647
		51st — — — — —		2	9	28	6	39	—	—	2	41	14	2	2	—	18	521	5	17	6	—	549
		28th — 1st — — —		2	8	20	5	36	1	2	1	40	27	—	1	—	28	458	—	88	9	2	557
		32d — 1st — — —		2	4	14	6	36	—	6	2	44	14	—	—	1	15	427	—	218	17	—	662
		79th — 1st — — —		—	4	17	5	30	—	—	12	3	45	10	—	2	13	371	5	290	34	—	703
		95th — 1st — — —		1	3	7	6	27	—	11	—	38	10	—	—	2	12	364	—	185	—	—	519
		1st — 3d — — —		1	5	23	7	34	—	14	—	48	17	—	3	—	20	366	—	236	2	—	604
		42d — 1st — — —		—	1	13	3	25	—	12	1	38	15	—	—	1	16	272	9	220	25	—	526
		44th — 2d — — —		2	4	18	6	39	2	2	3	46	15	—	—	1	16	396	12	32	15	—	455
		92d — 1st — — —		1	2	15	4	27	—	16	1	44	12	—	3	1	16	361	—	217	10	—	588
		4th — 1st — — —		1	2	20	4	36	—	2	2	40	11	1	—	—	12	596	6	55	12	—	639
		27th — 1st — — —		—	3	15	3	34	—	1	1	36	8	—	—	—	8	687	—	10	1	—	698
		40th — 1st — — —		2	9	27	5	55	—	2	1	53	17	—	—	—	17	747	—	11	3	—	761
Total Infantry, . .				53	181	670	173	1189	22	136	199	1546	500	6	24	23	553	17,895	353	2599	499	73	21,359
Total at Waterloo, . .				104	387	1084	314	2061	38	155	255	2140	700	8	27	25	760	31,623	966	2775	1036	170	36,487
Cavalry.	4th. 7th.	35th Reg., 2d Battalion.	Near Braine-le-Comte. Bruxelles. Antwerp. Nieupoort. Ostend. Antwerp. Ostend. Courtrai.	2	5	23	6	31	—	1	2	34	16	—	2	—	18	481	6	69	14	—	570
		54th — 1st — — —		2	5	29	5	38	—	3	3	44	19	—	—	19	497	—	37	7	—	541	
		59th — 2d — — —		3	6	21	6	38	1	—	1	40	15	—	—	15	432	18	10	7	—	481	
		91st — 1st — — —		1	8	27	6	48	1	3	1	53	21	—	—	2							

that quarter; and as soon as this was done, the British and Prussians united were to march direct upon Paris from Mons and Namur. He had eighty

Corps, Commanders, and Divisions.	Force of each division.			
	Infantry.	Cav.	Artil. men.	Guns.
Imperial Guard :—				
Young Guard, —	3,800	—	320	16
Chasseurs, —	4,250	—	320	16
Grenadiers, —	4,420	—	320	16
Light Cavalry, —	—	2,120	240	42
Cavalry of Reserve, —	—	2,120	240	12
Artillery of Reserve, —	—	—	480	24
Reserve Cavalry under Marshal Grouchy :—				
1. Corps—Count Pajol, { 4th —	—	1,820	120	6
{ 5th —	—	1,420	120	6
2. Corps—Count Excelmans, { 9th —	—	1,300	120	6
{ 10th —	—	1,300	120	6
3. Corps—Count Kellerman, { 11th —	—	1,310	120	6
{ 12th —	—	1,300	120	6
4. Corps—Count Nilhaud, { 13th —	—	1,300	120	6
{ 14th —	—	1,300	120	6
Total,	85,820	20,460	7,020	350..

Engineers, Pontooners, Sappers, Drivers, etc.

9,184

Grand Total,

122,464

—GOURGAUD, *Campagne de 1815*, p. 150; VAUDONCOURT, iv. 108; PLOTNO, iv. Appendix, p. 8, 9; and NAPOLEON, Book ix. 71.

VII. Force commanded by Napoleon and Ney at Ligny and Quatre-Bras on March 16th.

At Ligny.	At Quatre-Bras.
Infantry, 53,500	Infantry, 32,320
Cavalry, 12,730	Cavalry, 7,710
Artillery, 4,850	Artillery, 2,170
71,080	42,000
With 242 guns,	With 108 guns.

VIII. French Force which fought at Waterloo.

1st Corps—Erlou.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	
			Men.	Cannon.
4 divisions of infantry,	16,220	—	—	—
1 division of cavalry,	—	1,400	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	900	46
3 divisions of infantry	12,640	—	—	—
2d corps—Reille.				
1 division of cavalry,	—	1,300	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	710	38
3d corps.				
1 division (Dumont) attached to 6 corps,	—	1,370	—	—
6th corps—Lobau.				
2 divisions of infantry,	7,000	—	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	640	30
Imperial guard.				
Young guard (Duchesse),	3,800	—	—	—
Middle guard,	4,200	—	—	—
Old guard,	4,400	—	—	—
Cavalry of reserve,	—	2,100	—	—
Cavalry (grenadiers and dragoons)	—	2,000	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	1,920	96
Cuirassiers—Kellerman.				
2 divisions,	—	2,330	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	220	12
Cuirassiers—Milhaud.				
2 divisions,	—	2,530	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	210	42
Corps of Pajol.				
1 division (Subervich),	—	1,130	—	—
Artillery,	—	—	110	6
	48,260	14,160	4,680	240
Men,	67,100			
Sappers,	7,000			
Total,	74,100			

* Cannon,

240

thousand effective men under his orders; Blucher a hundred and ten thousand; but of the large host clustered round the British standards, a considerable part were raw Belgian and Hanoverian levies, upon whom little reliance could be placed; and for the actual shock of war, Wellington could only rest on the British and King's German Legion, about forty-six thousand strong, and the old Hanoverians and Brunswickers, fourteen thousand more. The British army was far from being equal, in composition or discipline, to that which crossed the Pyrenees, a large part of which was absent in Canada; and their place was supplied by a number of second battalions, and troops which had never seen service or acted together. But several of the most distinguished Peninsular regiments were there; the foot and horse guards appeared in splendid array; nine thousand noble horse seemed confident against the world in arms; a hundred and eighty guns, admirably equipped, were in the field: Picton, Hill, Clinton, Cole, Pack, and many of his old comrades, surrounded Wellington; the spirit of the army was at the highest point, and the troops possessed that confidence in themselves and their leader, which is the most important element in military success. Blucher's army was of a less heterogeneous character; his troops, almost all veterans of one nation, and inspired with the strongest hatred against the French, were filled with a well-founded confidence in themselves and their gallant commander; and having acted together in two previous campaigns, they had acquired that most valuable quality in soldiers, a thorough knowledge of their duties, and a firm reliance, founded on experience, on each other (1).

Napoléon's plan of operations. Napoléon's plan of operations was based on the necessities of his situation, and the vast advantages likely to be gained by a decisive success in the outset. He determined to collect all his forces into one mass, and boldly interposing between the British and Prussian armies, separate them from each other, and strike with the utmost vigour, first on the right hand, and then on the left. It was thus that, with a force not exceeding sixty thousand men, he had so long kept at bay the united armies of Blucher and Schwartzberg, two hundred thousand strong, on the plains of Champagne: and what might not be expected, when he had a hundred and twenty thousand admirable troops, all veterans, and animated with the highest spirit, and not more than a hundred and ninety thousand in the field to combat? "The force of the two armies," says Napoléon, "could not be

Force under Marshal Grouchy at Wavres.

Infantry,	25,520
Cavalry,	4,870
Artillery,	1,830
Men,	32,220 with 110 guns.

General Abstract.

Army under Napoleon at Waterloo,	74,100	240
With Grouchy at Wavres,	32,220	110
Lost at Ligny,	6,800	
At Quatre-Bras,	4,140	
	<hr/> 117,260	<hr/> 350

—GOURGAUD, *Camp. de 1815*, Tables p. 150 and p. 71, 72.

This is the statement given by Gourgaud; but there can be no doubt it is below the truth, as Ney's corps set down here (the first) as only 18,640 men, was stated by Ney himself, shortly after the battle, to have amounted to between 25,000 and 30,000.—See NEY's Letter to FOUQUÉ. June 26, 1815.—Given in JONES's *Battle of Waterloo*, 262.

(1) Cap. ii. 149, 155. Mem. of Wellington to Allied Sovereigns. Plötho, iv. 247, 254.

estimated by a mere comparison of the numbers; because the Allied army was composed of troops more or less efficient, so that *one Englishman might be counted for one Frenchman*, but *two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the Confederation*, were required to make up one Frenchman; and their armies were under the command of two different generals, and formed of nations divided not less by their sentiments than their interests (1)."

Dispositio
of the French
troops, and
Napoleon's
address to
them. Soult was, on the 2d June, appointed major-general of the army, and he immediately took the command, and issued a proclamation (2), which strangely contrasted with that which, not three months before, he had thundered forth as minister-at-war to the Bourbons (3). Napoléon left Paris at one o'clock in the morning of the 12th, breakfasted at Soissons, slept at Laon, and arrived at Avesnes on the 13th. He there found his army all concentrated between the Sambre and Philipville, and the returns on the evening of the 14th gave a hundred and twenty-two thousand four hundred men present, under arms (4). The camp was placed behind small hills, just a league from the frontier, in such a situation as to be screened from the enemy's view; and it contained three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon. The arrival of the Emperor raised the spirit of the soldiers, already elevated by their great strength, to the very highest pitch; and the following proclamation was issued to the troops:—"Soldiers! This is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland. Then, as after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous; we gave credit to the oaths and protestations of princes whom we allowed to remain on their thrones. Now, however, coalesced among themselves, they aim at the independence and the most sacred rights of France. They have commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Are we not then the same men? Soldiers! at Jena, when fighting against those same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were as one to two: at Montmirail as one to three. Let those among you who have been in England recite the story of their prison-ships, and the evils they have suffered in them. The Saxons, Belgians, and Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Rhenish confederacy, groan at the thought of being obliged to lend their arms to the cause of princes, enemies of justice, and of the rights of nations. They know that the coalition is insatiable: that after having devoured twelve millions of Italians, six millions of Belgians, a million of Saxons, it will also devour the lesser states of Germany. Fools that they are! a moment of prosperity blinds them. If they enter France, they will find in it their tomb! Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, perils to encounter; but with constancy the victory will be ours; the rights, the honours of the country will be re-conquered. For every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment has arrived to conquer or die (5)."

Inactivity
of Wel-
lington
and Blücher. Wellington and Blücher, at this critical period, were relying almost entirely upon secret intelligence, which was to be forwarded to them by Fouché. The most rigorous measures had been adopted by the French to prevent any intelligence crossing the frontier; but

(1) Nap. Book ix. 60, 61.

(2) "All the efforts of an impious league can no longer separate the interests of the great people and of the hero whose brilliant triumphs have attracted the admiration of the universe. It is at the moment when the national will manifests itself with such energy, that cries of war are heard, and foreign armies advance to our frontiers. What are the hopes of this new coalition? Does it wish to extirpate France from the rank of nations, to plunge twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen into a

degrading servitude? The struggle in which we are engaged is not above the genius of Napoléon. nor beyond our strength. Soldiers! Napoléon guides our steps—we fight for the independence of our beautiful country—we are invincible!"—See Napoléon's *Memoirs*, Book ix. p. 65, 66.

(3) *Ante*, x. 424.

(4) See note, p. 452.

(5) Nap. ix. Book, 70, 73, 74. Vict. et Conq. xxiv. 161, 162. Jom. iv. 625.

June 6. notwithstanding that, Wellington knew on the 6th June that Napoléon was expected to be in Laon on that day, and that the number of troops collected in Maubeuge and the adjoining towns was immense; and

June 7. in consequence, orders had been given to declare Antwerp, Ypres, Tournay, Ath, Mons, and Ghent in a state of siege, the moment that the

June 10. enemy crossed the frontier. On the 10th he received intelligence, which proved to be premature, that the Emperor had arrived in Maubeuge on the preceding day; but notwithstanding the alarming proximity of such a man at the head of such a force, no steps were taken to concentrate either army; and when the French troops, a hundred and twenty thousand strong, crossed the frontier in front of Fleurus on the morning of the 15th, Wellington's men yet lay in their cantonments, from the Scheldt to Brussels, and Blucher's scattered over the frontier, from thence to Namur. This extraordinary delay in collecting the troops, when the enemy, under so daring a leader, was close at hand, cannot be altogether vindicated, and it was wellnigh attended with fatal consequences; but the secret cause which led to it is explained in Fouché's memoirs (1).

Fouché's unparalleled duplicity. That unparalleled intriguer, who had been in communication with Wellington and Metternich all the time he was chief minister under Napoléon, had promised to furnish the English general not only with the exact moment of attack, but with the plan of the campaign. Wellington was hourly in expectation of this intelligence, which would have enabled him to know in what direction he should concentrate his forces; and thence it was that he lay motionless in his cantonments. How he did not receive it must be given in Fouché's own words—"My agents with Metternich and Lord Wellington had promised marvels and mountains; the English generalissimo expected that I should at the very least give him the plan of the campaign. I knew for certain that the unforeseen attack would take place on the 16th or 18th at latest. Napoléon intended to give battle on the 17th to the English army, after having marched right over the Prussians on the preceding day. He had the more reason to trust to the success of that plan, that Wellington, deceived by false reports, believed the opening of the campaign might be deferred till the beginning of July. The success of Napoléon, therefore, depended on a surprise; and I arranged my plans in conformity. On the very day of the departure of Napoléon, I dispatched Madame D——, furnished with notes written in cipher containing the whole plan of the campaign. But at the same time I privately *dispatched orders for such obstacles at the frontier*, where she was to pass, that she could not arrive at the headquarters of Wellington till after the event. This was the real explanation of the inconceivable security of the generalissimo, which at the time excited such universal astonishment (2)."

The French army crosses the frontiers. At daybreak on the 15th, the French army crossed the frontier and moved on Charleroi. The Prussian army, which occupied that town, evacuated it at their approach, and retired to Fleurus. The French army passed the Sambre at Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chatelet. It was evident that the enemy were taken by surprise, and Napoléon conceived sanguine hopes of being able to separate the British and Prussian armies. With this view, Ney was dispatched with the left wing, forty-six thousand strong, to QUATRE BRAS, an important position, situated at the point of intersection of the roads of Brussels, Nivelles, Charleroi, and Namur. By the possession of this decisive post, the French would have entirely cut off the

(1) Gurw. xii. 449, 457.

(2) Fouché, Mem. ii. 340, 342.

communication between the British and Prussian armies, and have been in a situation to fall with a preponderating force on either at pleasure. Meanwhile, Napoléon himself, with seventy-two thousand men, marched towards Fleurus, right against the Prussian army, which was concentrating with all imaginable expedition, and falling back towards LIGNY. It was in the evening of the 15th, at half-past seven, that Wellington received this intelligence at Brussels; orders were immediately dispatched to the troops in every direction to concentrate at Quatre-Bras; and after they had been sent off, he dressed and went to a ball at the Duchess of Richmond's, where his manner was so undisturbed, that no one discovered that any intelligence of importance had arrived; many brave men were there assembled amidst the scenes of festivity, and surrounded by the smiles of beauty, who were, ere long, locked in the arms of death (1).

Descrip-
tion of the
field of
Ligny, and
Napoléon's
plan of
attack.

Blucher's army, with the exception of the fourth corps, which, being stationed between Liege and Hannuy, had not yet come up, was concentrated on the 16th on the heights between Brie and Sombref, with the villages of St.-Amand and Ligny strongly occupied in its front. This position was good and well chosen; for the villages in front afforded an admirable shelter to the troops, and the artillery, placed on the semicircular convex ridge between them, commanded the whole field of battle, while the slope behind, surmounted by the windmill of Bussy, formed a strong *point d'appui* in case of disaster. Although the fourth corps had not yet come up, the Prussian field-marshal had assembled eighty thousand men, of whom twelve thousand were cavalry, with two hundred and eighty-eight guns. Napoléon's force was less numerous; it consisted of seventy-two thousand men, of whom eight thousand were cavalry, with two hundred and forty-eight guns. The Emperor's orders to Ney had been to move early in the morning, and occupy Quatre Bras before the English army were assembled, and having left a strong detachment there, move with half his forces on Brie, so as to fall on the rear of the Prussians and complete their destruction. The attack in front was not to commence till Ney's guns, in the rear, showed that he had reached his destined point; and Napoléon waited impatiently with his army ready drawn up, till three o'clock in the afternoon, expecting the much wished-for signal; but not a sound was heard in that direction, while the loud and increasing cannonade on the side of Quatre Bras, which was only three miles and a half distant, told clearly that a desperate combat was going on there. There was now not a moment to lose, if the Prussian army was to be attacked before the fourth corps under Bulow came up; and Napoléon at four o'clock gave the signal for attack (2).

Battle of
Ligny.
Desperate
conflict.
June 16.

The better to conceal his real designs, Napoléon made great demonstrations against St.-Amand on his left; but meanwhile he collected his principal force, concealed from the enemy, opposite the Prussian centre at Ligny, which was to be the real point of attack. St.-Amand was carried, after a vigorous resistance, by the French corps under Vandamme; and no sooner was the enemy's attention fixed on that quarter, whither reinforcements were directed by Blucher, than Napoléon's centre, thirty thousand strong, commanded by Gérard, issued from its concealment, crossed the streamlet of Ligny, and pushing up the opposite bank, commenced a furious assault on the village of the same name. But if the attack was vehement, the resistance was not less obstinate; three times Ligny was

(1) Join. iv. 625, 626. Vict. et Conq. xxiv. 175.
#78. Wellington's orders, June 15, 1815. Gurw.
xii. 472, 476.

(2) Nap. ix. 96, 97. Blucher's Official Account,
June 16, 1815. Join. iv. 626, 627. Plötho, iv. 36,
38. Gourg. Bat. de Waterloo, 50, 51.

taken by the impetuous assault of the French grenadiers, and three times the Prussians, with invincible resolution, returned to the charge, and with desperate valour regained the post at the point of the bayonet. Each army had behind its own side of the village immense masses of men, with which the combat was constantly fed; and at length the conflict became so desperate that neither party could completely, by bringing up fresh columns, expel the enemy, but they fought hand to hand in the streets and houses with unconquerable resolution; while the fire of two hundred pieces of cannon, directed on the two sides against the village, spread death equally among friend and foe. At seven o'clock, after three hours' furious combat, nothing was yet decided, and Blücher, by directing in person a fresh corps against St.-Amand, had retaken part of that village and an important height adjoining, commanding a large part of the field of battle (1).

By degrees, all Blücher's reserves were engaged, and his position became very critical: for the attack of the French centre continued with unparal- leled vigour, and neither Bulow's corps had come up on the one flank, nor the much wished-for British succours on the other. Both parties almost equally exhausted, dispatched the most urgent orders to their other corps or allies to join them: that of Napoléon at this juncture was so pressing, that he declared to Ney that the fate of France depended on his instantly obeying it (2). Ney, however, so far from being in a condition to make the prescribed movement, was himself with difficulty contending against defeat at Quatre Bras: but a happy accident almost supplied his place. At seven o'clock, D'Erlon's corps, part of Ney's force, which had been stationed by that marshal in reserve two leagues from Quatre Bras, withdrawn from there by the positive orders of the Emperor, made its appearance on the extreme Prussian right, beyond St.-Amand. They were at first taken for Prussians, and excited no small alarm in the French army: but no sooner was the mistake discovered, than fear gave place to confidence, and Napoléon, now entirely relieved, brought forwards his guards and reserves for a decisive attack on the centre. Milhaud's terrible cuirassiers advanced at the gallop, shaking their sabres in the air; the artillery of the guard under Drouot moved up, pouring forth with extraordinary rapidity its dreadful fire; and in the rear of all, the dense columns of the Old Guard were seen moving forward, with a swift pace and unbroken array. This attack, supported by D'Erlon's infantry and a charge of twenty squadrons of his cuirassiers, on the Prussian right flank, proved decisive; the infantry posted behind Ligny began to retire, the bloodstained street of the village fell into the enemy's hands; and in the confusion of a retreat commenced just as darkness began to overspread the field, the troops naturally fell into some degree of confusion. The cannon, in retiring through the narrow lanes behind Ligny, got entangled, and twenty-one pieces fell into the enemy's hands. The veteran Blücher himself, charging at the head of a body of cavalry, to retard the enemy's pursuit, had his horse shot under him; the Prussian horse, overpowered by the French cuirassiers, were driven back, and the victorious French rode straight over the Prussian marshal as he lay entangled below his dying steed. A second

(1) Gourg. 51, 52. Nap. 97, 98. Blücher's Official Account, Plötho, iv. 38, 39. Jom. iv. 628. Vaud. iv. 143, 144.

(2) "At this moment, Marshal, the armies are warmly engaged. His Majesty commands me to direct you instantly to envelop the right of the enemy and fall on his rear; his army is lost if you

act vigorously: the fate of France is in your hands. Do not lose a moment in making the prescribed movement, and march direct on the heights of Brié and St.-Amand, to contribute to a victory which will probably prove decisive."—*Soult to Ney*, 16th June 1815, a quarter past three; *Capefigue*, ii. 481, 482.

charge of Prussian horse repulsed the cuirassiers; but they, too, in the dark passed the marshal without seeing him, and it was not till they were returning that he was recognised, and with some difficulty extricated from the dead horse, and mounted on a stray dragoon trooper. The loss of the French in the battle was six thousand eight hundred men; the Prussians were weakened by fifteen thousand, four standards, and twenty-one pieces of cannon, but ten thousand more dispersed after the action, and were lost to the Allied cause (4).

Movements before the Battle of Quatre Bras. While this desperate conflict was raging on the left of the Allied position, an encounter, on a less extensive scale, but equally bloody and more successful, took place between Wellington and Ney at Quatre Bras. At midnight on the 15th, the drums beat and the trumpets sounded in every quarter of Brussels: at daylight the troops assembled at their several rallying points, and were rapidly marched off to meet the enemy. The Highland regiments, the 42d and 92d, which had their rallying point in the Park and Place Royal, were particularly remarked for the earliness of their muster, the discipline and precision of their movements, and the air, at once grave and undaunted, with which they marched out of the town, Quatre Bras was the point of union assigned to the whole army; but as its distance from Brussels was not above sixteen miles, and other corps of the army, particularly the cavalry and artillery, had, some twenty, some thirty miles to march, they came up at different times, and Picton's division, with the Brunswickers, were first on the ground. A brigade of the Belgian troops had been assailed the evening before by Ney's advanced guard at Frasnes, and retreated to Quatre Bras, where ten thousand of their countrymen were assembled under the Prince of Orange. Had Ney attacked early and with vigour, he would probably have made himself master of this important point before the British troops arrived from Brussels; but he moved with such circumspection, that it was not till noon that he advanced from Gosselies, where he had passed the night, and it was half-past two before he had collected any considerable force in front of Quatre Bras, by which time Picton's division and the Brunswickers were on the ground; but their whole force, with the Belgians, did not exceed at that time twenty thousand, all infantry, and Ney had more than double the number of troops, of whom five thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and sixteen guns (2).

Battle of Quatre Bras. June 16. It was well for the British corps that the French marshal did not concentrate his whole army together, and commence his attack with his united force; for if so, they must inevitably have been crushed. But Napoléon's orders to him, to reserve a large body in hand to strike the decisive blow against the Prussians at Ligny, led him to leave D'Erlon with twenty thousand men in reserve near Gosselies, to be at hand to support the Emperor at Ligny; and in effect it was the approach of that corps which won that battle. Ney himself with twenty-two thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and forty-six guns, commenced the attack at Quatre Bras. The Belgians were soon overthrown; but, as they were retiring from the field, Picton's division and the Duke of Brunswick's men came up in great haste and some disorder: instantly forming with precision when they got in sight of the enemy, they prepared to receive their attack. The Allies

(1) Jom. iv. 627, 628. Gneisenau's Official Account, June 19, 1815. Gourg. 51, 54. Nap. 100, 101. Vaud. iv. 147, 151. Plotho, iv. 40, 43. Kausler, 679, 680.

(2) Nap. Book ix. 103, 104. Gourg. 55. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815. Gurw. xii. 479.

were equal in number to the French, both being somewhat above twenty thousand; but they had not a single gun or horseman, which gave the French at first a decided advantage. Encouraged by this circumstance, the French cuirassiers rode with the utmost gallantry close up to the British infantry, and charged them with such rapidity, that the sabres were upon more than one regiment of infantry before they had time to form square. The 42d in particular were charged in the middle of a field of tall rye; two companies had not fallen back into the square when the cuirassiers were upon them, and these companies were almost cut to pieces, with their brave colonel, Sir Robert Macara, who was killed on the spot. The French horsemen, however, paid dear for their success; for a well-directed volley from the remainder of the regiment stretched the greater part of them on the plain. Meanwhile Pack's brigade, consisting of the 44th, 79th, and 92d, succeeded, after an arduous conflict, in repulsing the French on the right of the high-road, while the Royal Scots, 28th, and 95th, maintained their ground on its left; and although the French troops, both cavalry and infantry, fought with the utmost fury, and repeatedly rode up to the very bayonets of the soldiers, calling out, "Down with the English—no quarter—no quarter!" and the enemy's cannon with unresisted fire made dreadful havoc in the British squares, yet no ground was gained, and Quatre Bras was still in the hands of the Allied troops (1).

Desperate
resistance
of the
British.

Wellington arrived in person at four o'clock, and with him the first and third divisions under General Cook and Sir Charles Alten, in all nearly ten thousand men, which raised the Allies on the field to thirty-six thousand. Still the artillery and cavalry had not appeared, and Ney, with Reille's corps and the cuirassiers, was making the most desperate efforts to force the English from their position. But such was the rapidity and precision of the British fire, that all his efforts proved ineffectual; and towards evening, when the guns came up, it became evident that the weight of force had inclined to the British side. The French marshal, however, accustomed to victory, and trusting to the support of D'Erlon's corps, which he every moment expected to arrive on the field, continued his attacks with the utmost impetuosity. They were all repulsed with great loss; and at last, finding that D'Erlon had not come up, he sent a positive order for him to retrace his steps from Ligny, where he had produced such an impression on the flank of the Prussians, but he did not arrive till after it was dark, and when the battle was already lost. Ney at nightfall retired to Frasnes, a mile from the field of battle; and Wellington's men, wearied alike with marching and fighting, lay on the ground on which they had fought at Quatre Bras, surrounded by the dead and the dying (2).

Loss on
both sides.

In this bloody combat, the British and Hanoverians had 530 killed, 2580 wounded, and 172 made prisoners; and the loss of the Belgians and Brunswickers was 1300 more—in all, 5200 men. The French loss amounted to 4140; and the fact of the repulsed army sustaining a smaller loss than the victorious one, is easily explained by the fact, that during the greater part of the day the British infantry, without cavalry or artillery, combated against the French, who had forty-six guns and three thousand admirable horsemen in their ranks. Among the killed was the gallant Duke of Brunswick, who nobly fell while heading a charge of his Death's-head hussars in the latter part of the day. No guns, and few prisoners, were taken

(1) Near Observer, 10, 11. Nap. ix. 104, 106.
Wellington to Lord Bathurst, J 14 c 19, 1815. Garw.
xii, 479. Join. iv. 629, 630. Gourc. 55 56.

(2) Wellington to Earl Bathurst, June 19, 1813.
Garw. xii. 479, 480.

on either side ; for the French having commenced the combat with giving no quarter, and evinced unparalleled exasperation during the whole day, the British troops were driven into a sanguinary species of combat, alike foreign to their previous habits and present inclinations (1).

^{Retreat of Wellington to Waterloo.} During the night of the 16th, Wellington received intelligence of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, and that they were retreating in great confusion in the direction of Wavres. The English general at once saw that he could not maintain his position at Brussels, when his left flank was uncovered by the retreat of the Prussians. Accordingly at ten o'clock next morning, the British army, which was now in great part concentrated at Quatre Bras, retreated through Genappe to Waterloo. Napoléon, according to his usual custom, rode over the ghastly field of battle at Ligny on the morning after the conflict, and observed with satisfaction the great proportion which the Prussian dead, lying around that village, bore to the loss of the French. From that he moved with his staff and guards to Quatre Bras, from which Wellington had recently before retired on his road to Waterloo. So rudely, however, had the French been handled on the field of battle on the preceding day, that no attempt was made by them to disturb the retreat of either army, excepting by a body of French cuirassiers, which, about four o'clock in the afternoon, charged the English cavalry who were covering the retreat between Genappe and Waterloo. The French cuirassiers and lancers in the first instance overthrew the British light horse (the 7th hussars) which covered the rear, as, in spite of the gallantry of that distinguished corps, its light horses were no match for the ponderous cuirassiers of France. Lord Uxbridge, now the Marquis of Anglesea, no sooner perceived this, than he charged in person at the head of the first Life-guards. These magnificent troops, albeit unprotected by armour, bore down upon the French horsemen with such vigour that the shock was irresistible, and in a few minutes the cuirassiers were totally defeated, and no further serious attempt was made by the enemy to disquiet the retreat. Wellington retired with his whole troops to the front of the forest of Soignies, where he took up his position on either side, in front of the village of Waterloo, which he had already selected as the theatre of a decisive battle. Napoléon followed with the great bulk of his forces, and arranged them nearly opposite to the English, on both sides of the high-road leading from Charleroi to Brussels, with headquarters at La Belle Alliance. Thirty-one thousand had been detached under Grouchy to observe the Prussians who were retiring towards Wavres, and the troops which had assembled at nightfall amounted to about eighty thousand men. Wellington was not equal in point of numerical amount, but he was still more inferior in artillery and in the quality of part of his troops. His cannon amounted to only one hundred and eighty pieces, while the French had two hundred and forty; and the British, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers alone, in number about fifty-eight thousand, could be relied on for the shock of war—the remainder being composed of Belgians (2), or recently raised Hanoverian levies, upon whom little dependence could be placed in any serious conflict (3).

Never was a more melancholy night passed by soldiers than that which followed the halt of the two armies in their respective positions on the night

(1) Viet. et Conq. xxiv. 180, 181. Gurw. xii. 485. Near Observer, xi. 11. Belgian Official Account, June 17, 1815. Jones's Battle of Waterloo, 198. Ney's Official Account, June 26, 1815. lb. 262.

(2) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815. Gurw. xii. 479, 480, 481. Gourg. 70, 71. Nap. ix. 112, 114. Jom. iv. 631, 632.

(3) See note, p. 451.

Night before the battle, and feelings of the soldiers on both sides.

of the 17th. The whole of that day had been wet and cloudy; but towards evening the rain fell in torrents, insomuch that, in traversing the road from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo, the soldiers were often ankle deep in water. When the troops arrived at their ground, the passage of the artillery, horse, and waggons, over the drenched surface had so completely cut it up, that it was almost every where reduced to a state of mud, interspersed in every hollow with large pools of water. Cheerless and dripping as was the condition of the soldiers, who had to lie down for the night in such a situation, it was preferable to that of those battalions who were stationed in the rye-fields, where the grain was for the most part three or four feet high, and soaking wet from top to bottom. The ground occupied by the French soldiers was not less drenched and uncomfortable. But how melancholy soever may have been their physical situation, not one feeling of despondency pervaded the breasts either of the British or French soldiers. Such was the interest of the moment, the magnitude of the stake at issue, and the intensity of the feelings in either army, that the soldiers were almost insensible to physical suffering. Every man in both armies was aware that the retreat was stopped, and that a decisive battle would be fought on the following day. The great contest of two-and-twenty years' duration was now to be brought to a final issue: retreat after disaster would be difficult, if not impossible, to the British army, through the narrow defile of the forest of Soignies:—overthrow was ruin to the French. The two great commanders, who had severally overthrown every other antagonist, were now for the first time to be brought into collision; the conqueror of Europe was to measure swords with the deliverer of Spain. Nor were sanguine hopes and the grounds of well-founded confidence wanting to the troops of either army. The French relied with reason on the extraordinary military talents of their chief, on his long and glorious career, and on the unbroken series of triumphs which had carried their standards to every capital in Europe. Nor had recent disasters weakened this undoubting trust, for the men who now stood side by side were almost all veterans tried in a hundred combats; the English prisons had restored the conquerors of continental Europe to his standard, and for the first time since the Russian retreat, the soldiers of Austerlitz and Wagram were again assembled round his eagles. The British soldiers had not all the same mutual dependence from tried experience; for a large part of them had never seen a shot fired in anger. But they were not on that account the less confident. They relied on the talent and firmness of their chief, who, they knew, had never been conquered, and whose resources the veterans in their ranks told them would prove equal to any emergency. They looked back with animated pride to the unbroken career of victory which had attended the British arms since they first landed in Portugal, and anticipated the keystone to their arch of fame from the approaching conflict with Napoléon in person. They were sanguine as to the result; but come what may, they were resolute not to be conquered. Never were two armies of such fame, under leaders of such renown, and animated by such heroic feelings, brought into contact in modern Europe, and never were interests so momentous at issue in the strife.

Description of the field of battle.

The field of Waterloo, rendered immortal by the battle which was fought on the following day, extends about two miles in length from the old chateau, walled garden, and enclosures of Hougoumont on the right, to the extremity of La Haye Sainte on the left. The great *chaussée* from Brussels to Charleroi runs through the centre of the position, which is situated somewhat less than three quarters of a mile to the south of the vil-

lage of Waterloo, and three hundred yards in front of the farm-house of Mont-St.-Jean. This road, after passing through the centre of the British line, goes through La Belle Alliance and the hamlet of Rossomme, where Napoléon spent the night. The position occupied by the British army followed very nearly the crest of a range of gentle eminences, cutting the high-road at right angles, two hundred yards behind the farm-house of La Haye Sainte, which adjoins the highway, and formed the centre of the position. An unpaved country road ran along this summit, forming nearly the line occupied by the British troops, and which proved of great use in the course of the battle. Their position had this great advantage, that the infantry could rest on the reverse of the crest of the ridge, in a situation in great measure screened from the fire of the French artillery; while their own guns on the crest swept the whole slope, or natural glacis, which descended to the valley in their front. The French army occupied a corresponding line of ridges, nearly parallel, on the opposite side of the valley, stretching on either side of the hamlet of La Belle Alliance. The summit of these ridges afforded a splendid position for the French artillery to fire upon the English guns; but their attacking columns, in descending the one hill and mounting the other, would of necessity be exposed to a very severe cannonade from the opposite batteries. The French army had an open country to retreat over in case of disaster; while the British, if defeated, would in all probability lose their whole artillery in the defiles of the forest of Soignies, although the intricacies of that wood afforded an admirable defensive position for a broken array of foot soldiers. The French right rested on the village of Planchenois, which is of considerable extent, and afforded a very strong defensive position to resist the Prussians, in case they should so far recover from the disaster of the preceding day, as to be able to assume offensive operations and menace the extreme French right. The whole field of battle between the two armies was unenclosed, and the declivities and hollows extremely gentle; but the rugged hedge of La Haye Sainte, which ran for half a mile to the left of the village of the same name on the crest of the ridge, afforded great support to that part of the British line, and the thick wood which surrounded the orchard and garden of Hougomont was impervious to artillery, and proved of essential service in impeding the attack of the French columns (1).

Wellington
resolves to
give battle,
in concert
with Blü-
cher.

Wellington had stationed General Hill, with nearly seven thousand men, at Hal, six miles on the right, in order to cover the great road from Mons to Brussels; and he dispatched letters to Louis XVIII at Ghent, early on the morning of the 18th, recommending him, in the event of the enemy attempting to turn him by that town, to retire to Antwerp. Orders were at the same time sent to the governor of that fortress to open the inundations on the side of the Tête de Flandre, and to the person in charge of the magazines in the rear, to remove them to Antwerp. These precautionary measures, with the long trains of wounded which were brought in from Quatre Bras, and the exaggerated reports of the disaster sustained at Ligny, produced such consternation at Brussels, that all the English who could get away were taking measures for their departure; the road to Antwerp was already covered with fugitives of all descriptions; and the partizans of Napoléon joyfully looked forward to his entering on the following day. Wellington, however, was resolved to stand firm: his whole army, with the exception of the detachment under Hill, near Hal, was now assembled; and Blücher, with whom he had communicated during the night, had promised

(1) Personal observation. Cap. ii. 189, 190. Vict. et Conq. xxiv. 201, 202. Vaud. iv. 3, 7.

to support him, not merely with two corps, as he had requested, but with his whole army. He promised to be on the ground by one o'clock; and his line of march was to be in two columns, by St.-Lambert and Ohain upon Planchenois, so as to fall perpendicularly on the French flank after the combat was fully engaged (1).

Appearance
of the two
armies on
the morn-
ing of the
battle.

The morning of the 18th opened with a drizzling rain; but the clouds were lighter, and the sun occasionally broke in fleeting glimpses through the hazy atmosphere. Eagerly the men in both armies started from their dripping beds; at once they awoke to a rapid consciousness; but numbers were so stiff that it was with difficulty they could rise out of the water in which they had passed the night. But the sight which presented itself when they arose, soon riveted every eye, and moved every heart even in the most unthinking breasts in those vast arrays. Never was a nobler spectacle witnessed than both armies now exhibited; its magnificence struck even the Peninsular and Imperial veterans with a feeling of awe. On the French side, eleven columns deployed simultaneously to take up their ground; like huge serpents clad in glittering scales, they wound slowly over the opposite hills, amidst an incessant clang of trumpets and rolling of drums, from the bands of a hundred and fourteen battalions and a hundred and twelve squadrons, which played the Marseillaise, the Chant de Départ, the Veillons au Salut de l'Empire, and other popular French airs. Soon order appeared to arise out of chaos: four of the columns formed the first line, four the second, three the third. The formidable forces of France were seen in splendid array; and the British soldiers contemplated with admiration their noble antagonists. Two hundred and fifty guns, arrayed along the crest of the ridge in front, with matches lighted and equipment complete, gave an awful presage of the conflict which was approaching. The infantry in the first and second lines, flanked by dense masses of cavalry, stood in perfect order; four-and-twenty squadrons of cuirassiers, behind either extremity of the second, were already resplendent in the rays of the sun; the grenadiers and lancers of the guard in the third line, were conspicuous from their brilliant uniforms and dazzling arms; while in the rear of all, the four-and-twenty battalions of the Old Guard, dark and massy, occupied each side of the road near La Belle Alliance, as if to terminate the contest. The British army, though little less numerous, did not present so imposing a spectacle to either army, from their being in great part concealed by the swell of the ridge on which they stood. They were drawn up, for the most part, in squares, with the cavalry in rear, and the guns in front skilfully disposed along the summit of the swell. No clang of trumpets or rolling of drums was heard from their ranks; silently, like the Greeks of old, the men took up their ground, and hardly any sound was heard from the vast array, but the rolling of the guns and occasional word of command from the officers. Napoléon had been afraid that the English would retreat during the night, and expressed the utmost joy when their squares appeared in steady array next morning, evidently with the design of giving battle. "I have them, these English!" said he. "Nine chances out of ten are in our favour." "Sire," replied Soult, "I know these English; they will die on the ground on which they stand before they lose it (2)."

Disposition
of the troops
on either side.

The British army on the ground amounted to 72,000 men, the French to 80,000 (2); but the superiority in artillery, and the

(1) Wellington to the Duke de Berri, June 18. 1815. Gurw. xii. 477, 478. Gneisenau's Official Account, 204. Near. Observer.

(2) Cap. ii. 189, 191. Tem. Ocul. 6, 7. Gourg. 75, 76. Nap. Book ix. 127, 128.

(3) See note, p. 451.

quality of all the troops, except the British, King's German Legion, and Brunswickers, was still greater. Napoléon had 252 guns, Wellington 186, of which 124 were English. The Allied army was drawn up in the following order:—The château, garden, and wood of Hougoumont were strongly occupied by General Byng's brigade of Guards, as was the farm of La Haye Sainte by a battalion of the King's German Legion; Picton's division and Clinton's stood on the left of La Haye Sainte, along the line of the ragged hedge; Coles's, the Brunswickers, Hanoverians, and Belgians, were in the centre. The cavalry were all in the rear, behind the second line. The left was uncovered except by a deep ditch impassable for artillery, which, however, proved such an impediment that no serious attack was made on that extremity. The artillery was arranged along the whole front of the positions, and swept the gentle slope which descended from it to the low ground which separated the two armies, wholly unbroken by enclosures or impediments of any kind. The French artillery was in like manner placed along the summit of their ridge in a semicircular form, directly fronting the British guns, at the distance of from half to three quarters of a mile; and their army was divided into the eleven columns already mentioned. D'Erlon, with the first corps, was on the right of the *chaussée* of La Belle Alliance: Reille and Foy in the centre: Jerome on the left, in front of Hougoumont. Ney was destined for the serious attacks of the reserve and Old Guard in the centre. The cavalry, both light and heavy, was behind the infantry, the Guards in reserve. "Never," says Napoléon, "had the troops been animated with such spirit, or taken up their ground with such precision; the earth seemed proud of being trod by such combatants."

Commencement of the battle. The village clock of Nivelles was striking eleven when the first gun was fired from the French centre, immediately followed by a quick rattle of musketry from the left, as the weighty column commanded by Jerome, six thousand strong, approached the enclosures of Hougoumont. The English light troops fought stoutly in the wood, and slowly falling back, contested every tree, every bush, every sapling, until the fire became so warm that every branch was cut through by numerous, some as many as twenty, shot. Thirty British guns opened their fire upon the wood; Napoléon immediately advanced Reille's and Kellerman's guns in reply, and supported Jerome by Foy's division. Gradually, in spite of their utmost efforts, the wood around the chateau was carried by the assailants: but the garden and castle, defended by a high brick wall, in which a double tier of loopholes had been struck out, presented an invincible resistance. Six companies of English, and a Brunswick and Nassau battalion, soon after regained the orchard, which they held for the rest of the day. Napoléon upon this ordered a battery of howitzers to play upon the building, which soon set it on fire: the flames burst forth with unquenchable fury, and the chateau was entirely consumed; but the first and second Foot Guards, under Colonel Macdonell, Colonel Home, and Lord Saltoun, still held the court-yard with unconquerable resolution: and the former of these brave officers, when a vehement onset had burst open the gate of the court-yard, actually, by a great exertion of personal strength, closed it in the face of the French bayonets!

Grand attack of D'Erlon on the left. This assault, how vehement soever, was but a feint to conceal the real point of attack, which was in the right centre, and was entrusted to Marshal Ney, with D'Erlon's corps, full twenty thousand strong,

(1) Nap. 132, 135. Vaud, iv. 25, 29. Curw. xii. 481. Kausler, 676, 677.

(2) Nap. ix. Book, 142, 143. Cap. ii. 192, 193.

Gourg. 78, 79, Kausler, 678. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815. Gurw. xii. 481. Scott's Nap. vii. 464.

arrayed in four massy columns. Already the corps had moved to the front, when the Emperor perceived on his extreme right, in the direction of St.-Lambert, a dark mass in the openings of the wood. All glasses were immediately turned in that direction—"I think," said Soult, "it is five or six thousand men, probably part of Grouchy's army." Napoléon thought otherwise; he never doubted they were Prussians. Three thousand horse were detached to observe this corps, two divisions of infantry followed, and an order was soon after dispatched to Grouchy to hasten to the field of action. Meanwhile the cannonade had grown extremely warm along the whole line; four hundred and fifty guns kept up an incessant fire; the tirailleurs along the front were warmly engaged on both sides; and in the midst of it, Ney received orders to direct his attack on the farm-house of La Haye Sainte, and the line on its left, in order to force back the British left and interpose between it and the Prussians, who still remained stationary in the wood. It was now noon. Ney pushed forward his batteries to the most advanced heights on his own side of the valley, and his troops in four weighty columns advanced to the attack. D'Erlon's men were on the right, and moved against the British left, stationed along the hedge of La Haye Sainte; Ney himself directed the attack on the centre, and marched against the farm of the same name; and powerful bodies of cavalry advanced in the flank or rear of either column, to take advantage of any opening which might be effected (1).

Defeat of that attack, and brilliant cavalry charge on the British left. Wellington no sooner perceived the formidable attack preparing against his left centre than he drew up the noble brigade of horse, under Sir William Ponsonby, consisting of the Scotch Greys, Enniskillens, and Queen's Bays, close in the rear of Picton's division, and stationed Vandeleur's light brigade of cavalry on the extreme left. A brigade of Belgians formed the first line; they, however, speedily gave way before the formidable mass of the French columns, and D'Erlon's men, sustaining with undaunted resolution the heavy fire which the British cannon and infantry opened upon their front, still pressed up the slope till they were within twenty yards of the British line. Here they halted, and a murderous fire commenced, which soon fearfully thinned the first British line under Kempt, which began to yield. Picton, upon this, ordered up Pack's brigade, consisting of the 42d, 92d, 1st or Royal Scots, and 44th; and these noble veterans, as on the brow of the Mont Rave at Toulouse (2), advanced with a loud shout, and poured in so close and well-directed a fire, that the French columns broke and recoiled in disorder. At this instant, the heroic Picton, as he was waving his troops on with his sword, was pierced through the head with a musket-ball, and fell dead (3). Kempt immediately took the command; the rush of horse was heard, and Ponsonby's brigade, bursting through or leaping over the hedge which had concealed them from the enemy, dashed through the openings of the infantry, and fell headlong on the wavering column. The shock was irresistible; in a few seconds the whole mass was pierced through, rode over, and dispersed; the soldiers in despair fell on their faces on the ground and called for quarter, and in five minutes two thousand prisoners and two eagles were taken, and the column utterly destroyed. Transported with ardour, the victorious horse, supported by Vandeleur's brigade of light cavalry on their left, charged on against a battery of D'Erlon's guns, consisting of twenty-four pieces, which was

(1) Kausler, 679. Jom. iv. 634. Nap. ix. book, 150, 151. Picton's Mem. ii. 357.

(2) *Ante*, x. 178.

(3) He had been severely wounded at Quatre

Bras, and had two of his ribs broken, but his ardent spirit led him to conceal an injury which had already, as was afterwards discovered, left a mortal wound.—ROBINSON'S *Memoirs of Picton*, ii. 362.

quickly carried. The Highland foot soldiers, vehemently excited, breaking their ranks, and catching hold of the stirrups of the Scots Greys, joined in the charge, shouting, "Scotland for ever!" Unsatisfied even by this second triumph, these gallant horsemen amidst loud shouts charged a third line of cannon and lancers, and here also they were triumphant. So forcibly was Napoléon struck by this charge, that he said to Lacoste, the Belgian guide, who stood beside him, "Ces terribles chevaux gris; comme ils travaillent!" He instantly ordered Milhaud's cuirassiers from the second line to charge the victorious British; and these fresh troops, clad in their steel armour, easily overthrew the English horsemen, now much disordered, and entirely blown by their unparalleled effort. In the hurried retreat to their own position, Ponsonby was killed, and the brigade hardly brought back a fifth of its numbers; but never perhaps had a charge of an equal body of horse achieved such success, for, besides destroying a column five thousand strong and taking two thousand prisoners, we have the authority of the great military historian of Napoléon for the fact, that they carried, cut the traces, and rendered useless for the remainder of the day, no less than eighty pieces of cannon (1).

Capture of La Haye Sainte, and defeat of the Cuirassiers by the Guards. By this great disaster Ney had lost his whole artillery, one of his columns of attack was totally destroyed, and another repulsed in disorder. Napoléon, however, immediately moved forward the batteries in the centre to his support, the centre columns advanced, and twenty thousand men speedily enveloped La Haye Sainte. The brave Hanoverians of the King's German Legion, who formed its garrison, three hundred and eighty in number, long maintained their ground against the surging multitude; but their ammunition having been at length exhausted, and all communication with the British line, of which that farm-house was the advanced post, cut off, the gates were forced open, and they were nearly all put to death, bravely combating to the last. Encouraged by this success, which he thought would prove decisive, Napoléon ordered a brigade of Milhaud's cuirassiers to advance up the great road, right against the British centre, where Wellington stood on the right of the *chaussée* at the foot of a tree, while Ney's columns pressed on round La Haye Sainte, under cover of which they now formed to pierce the centre of the Allied position. The weighty columns of horsemen soon mounted the slope above La Haye Sainte, and the infantry pushed on almost to the very foot of Wellington's tree. There, however, the British general ordered the 79th Highlanders to advance; and these steady veterans, led by their brave colonel, Douglas (2), cheered loudly, fired, and, advancing steadily, forced back the column. Wellington at this instant advanced with a Hanoverian battalion on one flank, while two others moved up on the other side; and they were driving the column in disorder down the hill before them, when Milhaud's cuirassiers fell upon one of the Hanoverian battalions before it could form square, which was almost destroyed. But Wellington soon had his revenge. He instantly ordered up the heavy brigade of Lord Edward Somerset, consisting of the Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, and 1st Dragoon Guards; and these splendid troops, overflowing with strength, bore down with such vigour on the French

(1) Vaud, iv. 34, 36. Jour. iv. 634, 635. Nap. Book ix. 150, 151. Robinson's Mem. of Picton, ii. 361, 362. Jour. Atlas Port. 73. Tem. Ocul. 7, 8. Kausler, 679. Personal information from officers engaged.

"By this charge some battalions were cut to

pieces; the eighty guns of Ney were seized, or rather, the English dragoons, after sabring the drivers, cut the traces and the throats of the horses, and rendered them totally useless."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoléon*, iv. 634, 635.

(2) Now Sir Neil Douglas.

cuirassiers, that they were fairly rode over by the weight of man and horse, and a considerable number, driven headlong over a precipice into a gravel pit, were killed by the fall (1), while the remainder, trod under foot and crushed by the wheels of some artillery and waggons which at the moment were coming up, perished miserably.

Progress of the battle on the British right. During this terrible strife Wellington remained at his position at the foot of his tree, calmly observing the progress of the enemy, occasionally throwing himself into a square, or directing the advance of a line when the circumstances appeared critical. So heavy was the fire of cannon-shot to which he was exposed, that nearly all his suite were soon killed or wounded by his side, and he was obliged, in the close of the day, to the casual assistance of a Portuguese who stood near to carry the most necessary orders. "That's good practice," said he, as the cannon-shot struck the branches above his head; "they did not fire so well in Spain." At length, however, all the attacks of infantry in the centre were repulsed; but Napoléon, still persisting in the effort to carry that part of the field, brought up his whole light cavalry to the attack, and supported them by the cuirassiers in the second line. Such was the ardour of the French horse, however, that many of the reserve brigades followed without orders, and soon the whole cavalry was engaged. Their attacks were directed on both sides of the great road by La Haye Sainte, and also round Hougomont, now entirely surrounded by multitudes of foot and horse, though still held by the Guards and Brunswickers, to turn the right flank of the British. So great was the pressure in that quarter, that Wellington was obliged to bring up General Chasse's brigade of Dutch troops, and his whole reserve from Braine-la-Leude, where they had been stationed, to prevent that flank being turned; and a Belgian regiment, the Cumberland hussars, a thousand strong, which were ordered to charge the French horse in that quarter, were received with so dreadful a fire on crossing the ridge, that they turned about and fled, never drawing bridle till they reached Brussels, where their unexpected entry created the utmost alarm. Chasse's brigade, however, with the 52d and the Brunswickers, on the right, stood firm, and forming in a semicircle facing outwards, with their batteries in front, not only opposed an invincible barrier to the progress of the enemy, but regained the orchard of Hougomont, which had been carried in the earlier part of the day (2).

Desperate charges of cavalry in the centre. Meanwhile the British centre continued for nearly three hours to be the theatre of the most extraordinary conflict which had occurred during the whole Revolutionary war. The French horse, twelve thousand strong, in great part clad in glittering armour, streamed up the slope in front of the English line, and, with loud cries and unparalleled enthusiasm, threw themselves on the squares. Napoléon rode through the lines, both of infantry and cavalry, and harangued the men: General Devaux, who commanded the artillery of the Guard, was killed by his side: never had the French soldiers been known to exhibit such enthusiasm. Reille's corps, in two columns, advanced against Wellington's right centre, while the remains of D'Erlon's men re-formed again and assailed the left; and the whole French guns, brought as far forward as possible, sent a storm of shot and shells through the British squares. The charge of the horsemen in the centre was irresistible; disregarding the terrible fire of the British batteries, which, firing grape and canister point-blank, made frightful chasms in their

(1) Kausler, 679. *Jom. Atl. Mil.* 73. Vaud. iv. 35, 36. Beamish, ii. 355, 366. Jones's *Waterloo*, 111.

(2) Kausler, 680, 681. Beamish, ii. 358. Vaud. iv. 37, 39. *Jom. Atl. Mil.* 73.

ranks, the cuirassiers rode steadily forward, carried the guns amidst cries of "*Vive l'Empereur*," and dashing on, swept round the squares within pistol-shot, often coming to the very muzzles of the British muskets. But vain were all attempts to break that heroic infantry, which seemed, as it were, rooted in the earth. Lying down to avoid the driving shot which swept over the field, the men, in silence, beheld their ranks torn by bombs and ricochet shot without once moving; but no sooner did the cuirassiers appear, than the whole, instantly starting up, threw in such a volley that half of the proud horsemen were stretched on the plain, and the remainder recoiled in disorder out of the frightful strife. Repeatedly the British guns, which stood in front, forty in number, fell into the hands of the cuirassiers, whose valour, always great, was now roused to the most enthusiastic pitch of daring; the gunners took refuge in the nearest squares: the horsemen rode round them, anxiously looking for an opening, until the rolling fire of the infantry repelled the charge; and as soon as the horsemen turned about, the gunners issued forth, quickly loaded their pieces, and sent a destructive storm of grape after the retiring squadrons. During this unparalleled struggle, Wellington and the Prince of Orange threw themselves into the steady squares; and the latter received a severe wound while animating a corps of his men. "Stand fast, 93th," said the British chief, "we must not be beat: what would they say of us in England?" "Never fear, sir," they replied; "we know our duty (1).

During this terrible struggle in front of Mont St.-Jean and around La Haye Sainte, Blücher's troops, pressing on with unparalleled ardour, were doing their utmost to clear the defiles through the woods behind Frischermont; but such were the difficulties of the passage, owing to the horrible state of the roads, that it was not till half-past four that Bulow, who led the advanced guard, was able to deploy from the woods. He then appeared, however, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and marching in *échelon*, the centre in front, fell perpendicularly on the French flank. General Mouton, who commanded there, was soon driven back, but he retired in squares in excellent order; and Napoléon, seeing the progress of the Prussians, detached Count Lobau with seven thousand infantry to arrest their advance. Lobau's men in their turn drove back the Prussians; but Bulow, rallying on his two other divisions, which had now come up, again returned to the charge. The artillery cleared the wood, and arranged themselves on its skirts; sixty Prussian guns opened their fire, and their balls fell on the *chaussée* of Charleroi, in the very line of the French communications, and Planchenois, the bulwark of the French right flank, was carried. Napoléon upon this detached first Duhesme with two brigades of infantry, and twenty-four guns of the Young Guard, who retook Planchenois; the Prussians again carried it; and at last Morand, with four battalions of the Old Guard and sixteen guns, was pushed forward to support Lobau and retake the village. These redoubted veterans restored the combat; Planchenois was regained; Bulow was driven back into the wood; the balls ceased to fall on the *chaussée*, and the French flank appeared to be sufficiently secured (2).

But although Napoléon's flank was thus protected for the time, yet as he

(1) Vaud. iv. 45, 47. Cap. ii. 193, 194. Beamish, ii. 359, 361. Kausler, 680. Vict. et Cong. xxiv. 217, 218. Nap. Book ix. 158, 159. Tem. Ocul. 134, 125. Jones's Battle of Waterloo, 134. Scott's Paul's Letters, 147.

(2) Nap. Book ix. 154, 155. Gourg. 84, 85. Kausler, 681. Vict. et Cong. xxiv. 218, 219. Beamish, ii. 374, 375. Cap. ii. 195, 196. Pioche, iv. 59, 62.

had intelligence that another corps of Prussians, under Zeithen, was coming up by Ohain on the right, and notwithstanding repeated orders sent no advices had been received of Grouchy to oppose them, he resolved to make a grand effort with his Young and Old Guard, supported by the whole remaining cuirassiers, against the British centre, in hopes of piercing it through, and destroying Wellington before the bulk of the Prussian forces came up. With this view he recalled several of the battalions and batteries of the Guard which had been detached to Planchenois, and Drouot received orders to arrange the eight battalions of the Old Guard on the *chaussée* beside La Belle Alliance. The cavalry on the heights, who saw this movement, and beheld at the same time the retreat of Bulow's corps, now deemed the battle gained, and loudly cheered: it was universally thought that the final charge of the Old Guard, as on all former occasions, would decide the victory. Uneasiness prevailed in the British line: Halket's brigade had sustained eleven charges of horse; the 69th had been partially broken; many of the regiments were reduced to mere skeletons; Picton's Highland brigade could not muster six hundred bayonets; multitudes of wounded had crawled to the rear; and the waggon-drivers and Belgian fugitives, crowding along the road through the forest of Soignies, spread the report that all was lost. One general officer was compelled to state that his brigade was reduced to a third of its numbers, and that the survivors were so exhausted with fatigue, that a temporary relief was indispensable: "Tell him," said the Duke, "what he asks is impossible: He and I, and every Englishman on the field, must die on the spot which we now occupy." "Enough," returned the general: "I, and every man under my command, will share his fate." The Duke, however, though calm, was anxious: all his orders were given with his usual quick decided manner; but he repeatedly looked at his watch, and expressed afterwards the satisfaction he felt as one hour of daylight after another slipped away, and the position was still maintained. He still felt, however, and expressed to all the troops whom he addressed, confidence in the final result (1). "Hard pounding this, gentlemen," said he, to a square into which he had thrown himself when the cuirassiers swept past: "but we will pound the longest."

Grand attack of the Old Guard.

The Imperial Guard was divided into two columns, which, advancing from different parts of the field, were to converge to the decisive point on the British right centre, about midway between La Haye Sainte and the nearest enclosures of Hougomont. Reille commanded the first column, which was supported by all the infantry and cavalry which remained of his corps on either flank, and advanced up the hill in a slanting direction, beside the orchard of Hougomont. The second was headed by Ney in person, and moving down the *chaussée* of Charleroi to the bottom of the slope, it then inclined to the left, and leaving La Haye Sainte to the right, mounted the slope, also in a slanting direction, converging towards the same point whither the other column was directing its steps. Napoléon went with this column as far as the place where it left the hollow of the high-road, and spoke a few words—the last he ever addressed to his soldiers—to each battalion in passing. The men moved on with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*, so loud as to be heard along the whole British line above the roar of artillery, and it was universally thought the Emperor himself was heading the attack. But, meanwhile, Wellington had not been idle. Sir Frederick Adam's brigade, consisting of the 52d, 71st, and 95th, and General Maitland's brigade of

(1) Vaud. iv, 46, 47. Scott's Paul's Letters, 149, 150. Nap. Book ix. 166, 167.

Guards, which had been drawn from Hougomont, with Chasse's Dutch troops, yet fresh, were ordered to bring up their right shoulders, and wheel inwards, with their guns in front, towards the edge of the ridge (1); and the whole batteries in that quarter inclined to the left, so as to expose the advancing columns coming up to a concentric fire on either flank: the central point, where the attack seemed likely to fall, was strengthened by nine heavy guns: the troops at that point were drawn up four deep, in the form of an interior angle: the Guards forming one side, the 73d and 30th the other: while the light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur was brought up behind the line at the back of La Haye Sainte, and stationed close in the rear, so as be ready to make the most of any advantage which might occur.

Defeat of
the last
attack of
the French
Guards. It was a quarter past seven when the first column of the Old Guard, under Reille, advanced to the attack; but the effect of the artillery on its flank was such, that the cavalry were quickly dispersed; and the French battalions uncovered, showed their long flank to Adam's guns, which opened on them a fire so terrible, that the head of the column, constantly pushed on by the mass in rear, never advanced, but melted away as it came into the scene of carnage. Shortly after, Ney's column approached with an intrepid step: the veterans of Wagram and Austerlitz were there; no force on earth seemed capable of resisting them: they had decided every former battle. Drouot was beside the Marshal, who repeatedly said to him they were about to gain a glorious victory. General Friant was killed by Ney's side: the Marshal's own horse was shot under him; but bravely advancing on foot, with his drawn sabre in his hand, he sought death from the enemy's volleys. The impulse of this massy column was at first irresistible; the guns were forced back, and the Imperial Guard came up to within forty paces of the English Foot-guards, and the 73d and 30th regiments. These men were lying down, four deep, in a small ditch behind the rough road which there goes along the summit of the ridge—"UP GUARDS, AND AT THEM!" cried the Duke, who had repaired to the spot; and the whole on both sides of the angle into which the French were advancing, springing up, moved forward a few paces, and poured in a volley so close and well-directed, that nearly the whole first two ranks of the French fell at once. Gradually advancing, they now pushed the immense column, yet bravely combating, down the slope; and Wellington, at that decisive instant, ordered Vivian's brigade to charge the retiring body on one flank, while Adam's foot advanced against it on the other. The effect of this triple attack, at once in front and on both flanks, was decisive: the 52d and 71st, swiftly converging inwards, threw in so terrible a volley on their left flank, that the Imperial Guard swerved in disorder to the right; and at that very instant the 10th, 18th, and 21st dragoons, under Vivian, bore down with irresistible fury, and piercing right through the body, threw it into irrecoverable confusion. The cry, "Tout est perdu—la Garde recule!" arose in the French ranks, and the enormous mass, driven headlong down the hill, overwhelmed every thing which came in its way, and spread disorder through the whole French centre (2).

(1) Vaud. iv. 53, 54. Kausler, 681. Nap. Book ix. 167, 168. Beamish, ii. 375, 376. Cap. ii. 195. 196. Gourg 88, 89. Tem. Ocul. Jones's Waterloo, 138. Scott's Paul's Letters, 157, 158.

(2) Crisis at Waterloo. United Service Gazette, Nap. Book ix. 168, 169. Beam. ii. 377. Scott's Paul's Letters. 159, 160. Cap. ii. 196, 197. Gourg. 90, 91. Vict. et Conq. xxiv. 217. 218. Vaud. iv. 53, 54.

In the preceding account of the repulse of the Old Guard at Waterloo, I have, in addition to the authorities quoted in the margin, availed myself of the information of two gallant officers who combated at the spot: Colonel Warrington of the 10th hussars, who rode through the Imperial Guard, and Captain Ross of the 73d, the fire of whose company, with that of the guards, brought down their leading files.

From morning till night on this eventful day, the British squares had stood as if rooted in the earth, enduring every loss and repelling every attack with unparalleled fortitude. But the moment of victory had now arrived; the last hour of Napoléon's empire had struck. At the very moment that Ney's column of the Old Guard was recoiling in disorder down the hill, with their flanks reeling under the fire of infantry and the charges of horse on either side, Wellington beheld Blücher's standards in the wood beyond Ohain; and the fire of guns from thence to Frischermont showed that Zeithen had come up, and that the Prussians in great strength and in good earnest, were now about to take a part in the fight. He instantly ordered a general advance, in the formation in which they stood – the British in line, four deep, the Germans and Belgians in column or square; and himself, with his hat in his hand, rode to the front and waved on the troops. Like an electric shock, the heart-stirring order was communicated along the line; confidence immediately revived: wounds received and dead comrades were forgotten; one only feeling, that of joyous exultation, filled every breast. With joyful step, the whole line pressed forward as one man at the command of their chief; and the last rays of the sun glanced on fifty thousand men, who, with a shout which caused the very earth to shake, streamed over the summit of the hill. The French, who had believed that the British infantry was wholly destroyed, from not having seen them for so long a period on the crest of the ridge, were thunderstruck when they beheld this immense body advance majestically in line, driving before them the last column of the Imperial Guard who had made the attack. At the same time, Bulow and Zeithen's corps of Prussians, of whom six-and-thirty thousand had already come up, emerged entirely from the wood, and advanced with a swift step, and in the finest order, in the double-necked column then peculiar to their country, to join in the attack (1). A hundred guns, arranged in the form of an amphitheatre on the skirts of the wood, opened a tremendous fire over their heads, and the balls soon began to fall in the midst of the French army, on the *chaussée* of La Belle Alliance. Despair now seized upon the French soldiers; they saw at once that all was lost, and horse, foot, and cannon, breaking their ranks, fled tumultuously towards the rear; while the British cavalry eight thousand strong, streamed in every direction down the slope, cutting down those who attempted to resist, and driving before them the mass of fugitives who still attempted to keep their ranks.

Napoléon witnessed this terrible reverse with feelings which it is impossible to describe; but he still preserved his calm demeanour, till the Old Guard recoiled in disorder, with the British cavalry mingled with their bayonets. He then became as pale as death, and observed to the guide, “*Ils sont mêlés ensemble.*” There was not a moment, however, to lose; for the English horsemen, sweeping up the French side of the slope in great masses, already threatened to envelope him on either flank, and the rapid advance of Bulow, who had now carried Planchenois after a violent struggle, would very soon cut off his retreat. The Emperor then ascended a small elevation, with the squadrons on service as the guard, and there directed the fire of four pieces of cannon, which were worked to the last, and one of the discharges of which carried away Lord Uxbridge's leg. The rapid approach of the English and Prussians, however,

(1) Nap. ix. 168, 169. Tem. Ocul. Jones's Water-
loo, 138, 139. Vaud. iv. 55, 56. Jom. iv. 627. Ney's

Account to Fouché, June 26, 1815. Gneisenau's
Account, Jones, i. 206.

soon rendered this last post untenable. Turning, then, to Bertrand, he said, "A present tout est fini! Sauvons-nous!" and turning his noble horse round, fled across the fields in great haste, attended only by a few followers. The Emperor was already several miles from the field of battle, when the Old Guard, disdaining to fly, formed themselves into four great squares, and strove to stem the tide of disorder. But it was all in vain. The British cavalry charged their flanks; the mass of fugitives overwhelmed their front, and prevented their firing; in a few minutes they were pierced through in every direction, cut down, or made prisoners, with their generals, Duhesme, Lobau, and Cambronne. After the Guard was broken, all resistance ceased. Blucher, assembling all his superior officers, gave orders to send the last horse and the last man in pursuit of the enemy. The whole French army became one mass of inextricable confusion. The *chaussée* presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck, covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. Wellington rode constantly with the advanced posts, regardless of the balls from both friends and foes which were falling around them. When urged by some of the officers in attendance not to expose himself so much, he replied, "Never mind, let them fire away—the battle's gained." A noble sentiment coming from such a man at such a time! Before the pursuit of the British ceased, from the men through absolute exhaustion being unable to carry it on further, a little beyond La Belle Alliance, a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, three hundred and fifty caissons, and six thousand prisoners, had already fallen into their hands; and of the vast army which, in the morning, had borne so splendid an aspect, not two companies were to be found together (1)!

Total rout of the French. Blucher and Wellington, by a singular chance, met at the farmhouse of La Belle Alliance, and mutually saluted each other as victors. After cordially shaking hands, the English general represented to the Prussian that his men were so exhausted with fighting the whole day, that they were hardly able to continue the pursuit. "Leave that to me," replied Blucher; "I will send every man after the enemy." And in effect Zeithen continued the pursuit without intermission during the whole night. Nine times the wearied French, ready to drop down, tried to form bivouacs; nine times they were roused by the dreadful sound of the Prussian trumpet, and obliged to continue their flight without intermission. Such was their fatigue, that the greater part of the foot soldiers threw away their arms; and the cavalry, entirely dispersing, rode every man for his life across the country. The dejection was universal and extreme. At Genappe some resistance was attempted, and a brisk fire of musketry was kept up for a few minutes from behind a barricade of overturned cannon and carriages. But a few shots from the Prussian horse artillery soon dispersed the enemy, and the town was taken amidst loud cheers, and with it Napoléon's travelling carriage, private papers, hat and sword. It was in a field near Quatre Bras that the Emperor first drew bridle, and rested for a few minutes to take a slight refreshment, the first that he had tasted since the morning, and immediately after mounting his horse again, rode all night, and reached Charleroi at six in the morning. The fugitives were already pouring over the bridge, and after stopping an hour he continued his flight to Philipville. The torrent—horse, foot, and artillerymen all intermingled—continued to defile over the bridge

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815, 379. Scott, in Paul's Letters, 163, 165. Jom. iv. Gurw. xi. 482, 483. Kaus. 681, 682. Nap. 171, 637, 638. 172. Vaul. 55, 59. Gourg. 94, 97. Beam. ii. 378.

at Charleroi during the whole day; but scarce forty thousand passed the Sambre, and they carried with them only twenty-seven guns. The whole remainder of their artillery fell into the hands of the English on the field of battle, or of the Prussians in the pursuit (1).

The loss of the Allies was immense in this battle. That of the British and Hanoverians alone amounted to 10,686, of whom 2,047 were killed, exclusive of the Prussians, who lost 6,000 more. The Prussian loss on the 16th and 18th, including the action at Wavres on the latter of these days, was 55,152. Of the French army, it is sufficient to say that its loss was at least 40,000; but, in effect, it was totally destroyed, and scarce any of the men who fought at Waterloo ever again appeared in arms. After they had passed the Sambre and regained their own country, the troops became utterly desperate; the infantry dispersing in the villages, the cavalry and artillery selling their horses and making the best of their way to their respective homes (2).

Action of Grouchy at Wavres. While this terrible battle was raging at Waterloo, Marshal Grouchy, with his corps, was actively engaged with Thielman in the neighbourhood of Wavres. Napoléon's orders to that marshal were, to march upon Sombref and there take a position; and similar instructions had been given to Count Gérard and Vandamme, who were placed under his orders. Napoléon had also verbally directed him, when he assumed the command, to follow the Prussians, to attack them, and never to lose sight of them. In pursuance of these orders, Grouchy, early on the morning of the 18th, began to press upon Thielman's corps, which was opposed to him; and, after an obstinate resistance, the Prussians were driven back in the direction of Wavres. At noon the cannonade at Waterloo was distinctly heard in Grouchy's army: Count Gérard strongly urged the marshal to abandon the pursuit of the Prussians, and move towards Waterloo, where it was evident the decisive struggle was going forward. But Grouchy was too well aware of the implicit obedience to orders which the Emperor exacted, to adopt these suggestions; for he had just received instructions from Soult, dated ten o'clock on the 18th of June, to *continue* his movement on Wavres (3). He continued, accordingly, implicitly to obey his orders, and moved direct upon Wavres till five o'clock; when a second despatch from Soult, dated one o'clock afternoon, enjoined him to manœuvre on St.-Lambert, where Bulow's columns had begun to appear. He immediately did so; Gérard at the head of his corps forced the passage of the Dyle; while twelve thousand more, under Pajol, also passed the Dyle, won the opposite heights after severe fighting, and repulsed the rearguard of Bulow, as they had been directed. On the following morning Thielman attacked Grouchy at daybreak, but was vigorously repulsed; and Grouchy was preparing to follow up his success and march upon Brussels, when the fatal news arrived of the rout at Waterloo on the preceding day, with orders from the Emperor for Grouchy to retreat upon Laon, and effect a junction there with the remainder of the army. He faithfully obeyed his instructions, and reached that town on the 26th, with thirty-two thousand men and a hundred and eight cannons, having more than repaired his losses by the stragglers whom he picked up during the retreat. It aug-

(1) Gneisenau's Account, 206, 207. Jones's Waterloo. Nap. 174, 177. Gourg. 112, 113. Plotho, 62, 70.

(2) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815. Gurw. xii. 483, 485. Kaus. 683. Plotho, App. 97, 98.

(3) "The Emperor desires me to inform you that at this moment he is about to attack the English army, which has taken a position in front of the

forest of Soignies, His Majesty desires that you should direct your movements upon Wavres, in order to approach us, and conduct our operations in concert, driving before you all the Prussian corps who have taken that direction, or who might stop at Wavres, where you should endeavour to arrive as soon as possible."—SOULT to GROUCHY, 18th June 1815, *Ten o'clock*; GROUCHY, p. 21.

ments the admiration which all must feel at the noble conduct of Marshal Blucher and General Gneisenau on the eventful day of Waterloo, that when they adopted the resolution to unite their whole force, except Thielman's corps, to bear on the decisive point at Waterloo, they were aware of the disaster which that general had sustained at Wavres, but resolved, with equal spirit and generalship, to sacrifice all minor objects, and even endanger their communications, in order to achieve the destruction of Napoléon's great army at Waterloo (1).

With such rapidity did Napoléon continue his flight, that he was himself the first man who brought to the French capital authentic accounts of his own defeat. The telegraph had annouced in exaggerated terms the victory of Ligny, and the Imperial partisans immediately expected the total overthrow of the English army; when, on the morning of the 19th, sinister rumours began to circulate in the capital, that a great battle had been fought near Mount-St.-Jean, and that the army had been destroyed. These reports increased in strength and minuteness during the remainder of the day; and while the partisans of Napoléon, and the workmen in the suburbs, were thrown into despair, the shopkeepers and wealthier classes of the citizens recovered confidence, and the public funds of all descriptions rose with surprizing rapidity. The opinion soon became universal, that the cause of the Emperor was desperate; that he had staked his last throw on victory at Waterloo, and that overthrow there was irrecoverable ruin. From Charleroi, he had written in the most encouraging terms to the government, adding, that courage and firmness was all that was necessary to re-establish affairs. He was far, however, from feeling the confidence which he expressed in his letter; Labédoyère and the officers round him were in the deepest dejection, and already began to anticipate that punishment for their treachery to the Royal government, which they were well aware they richly deserved. Meanwhile Fouché, who had got the earliest intelligence of the disaster, was straining every nerve to secure his own interest in the approaching revolution, when Napoléon, at four o'clock in the morning of the 21st, arrived at Paris, and alighted at the Élysée Bourbon (2).

His first step, on arrival, was to send for Caulaincourt; his agitation was such, that he could hardly articulate. "The army," said he, "has performed prodigies; but a sudden panic seized it, and all has been lost. Ney conducted himself like a madman; he made my cavalry be massacred. I can do no more. I must have two hours of repose and a warm bath, before I can attend to business." After he had taken the bath he became more collected, and spoke with anxiety of the Chambers, insisting that a dictatorship alone could save the country—that he would not seize it, but he hoped the Chambers would offer it. "I have no longer an army," added he; "they are but a set of fugitives: I may find men, but how shall I arm them? I have no muskets. Nothing but a dictatorship can save the country." He had altogether miscalculated, however, the temper of the Chambers. The utmost agitation prevailed in the Deputies, to whom the Emperor's bulletin, giving an account of the fatal battle of Waterloo, had just been read; and the Chamber was inundated with officers from the army, who even exaggerated the extent of the calamity, great as it was. Already the parties were formed: Carnot and Lucien strongly supported a dictatorship being conferred on Napoléon; but Fouché, Lafayette, Dupin, and the

(1) Nap. 179, 180. Gourg. 118, 119. Grouchy, Montgr. viii. 218, 219. Fouché, ii. 343, 345. Thib. 53, 54.

(2) Buchez et Roux, xl. 201. Cap. 210, 217.

392, 393.

leaders of the popular party there, had entered into a coalition, the object of which was to erect, as in 1789, the National Assembly into absolute sovereignty, and, amidst the wreck of the national fortunes, establish the vain dogma of the sovereignty of the people. “The House of Representatives,” said Lafayette, “declares, that the independence of the nation is menaced. The Chamber declares its sittings permanent. Every attempt to dissolve it is declared high treason. The troops of the line and the National Guards, who have combated, and do combat, to defend the liberty and the independence of France, have deserved well of their country; the minister of the interior is invited to unite to the general staff the commanders of the National Guard at Paris, and to consider the means of augmenting to the greatest amount that civil force, which, during six-and-twenty years, has been the only protection of the tranquillity of the country, and the inviolability of the representatives of the nation.” This resolution, which at once destroyed the Emperor’s power, was carried by acclamation; Prince Lucien accused Lafayette of ingratitude to Napoléon. “You accuse me of wanting gratitude towards Napoléon!” replied Lafayette; “have you forgot what we have done for him? Have you forgotten that the bones of our children, of our brothers, every where attest our fidelity, in the sands of Africa, on the shores of the Guadalquivir and the Tagus, on the banks of the Vistula, and in the frozen deserts of Muscovy? During more than ten years, three millions of Frenchmen have perished for a man who wishes still to struggle against all Europe. We have done enough for him. Now our duty is to save the country (1).”

It was evident, from the profound sensation which these sentiments made upon the Deputies, that the cause of the Emperor was lost; already the fatal words—“Let him abdicate! let him abdicate!” were heard on the benches; and, what was still more alarming, the National Guards mustered in strength and ranged themselves round the Hall of Assembly, and there was scarcely any armed force in the capital to support his cause. The Chamber appointed a commission of five persons, including La Fayette, Lanjuinais, Dupont de L’Eure, Grenier, all decided enemies of Napoléon, who were to confer with two other committees, appointed by the Council of State and the peers, on the measures necessary to save the country. Meanwhile the Chamber resumed its sittings in the evening, and the cry for the abdication of the Emperor became universal. “I demand,” said General Solignac, “that a deputation of five persons shall wait upon the Emperor, and inform him of the necessity of an immediate decision.” “Let us wait an hour,” cried Lucien. “An hour, but no more,” replied Solignac. “If the answer is not then returned,” added La Fayette, “I will move his dethronement.” When Lucien went with this commission to Napoléon he found him in the utmost agitation, sometimes proposing to dissolve the Chambers by military force, at others to blow out his brains. Lucien openly told him that there was no alternative but to dismiss the Chambers, seize the supreme power, or abdicate; and, with his usual boldness, he strongly advised him to adopt the former alternative. Maret and Caulaincourt, on the other hand, strongly counselled an abdication, insisting that the times were very different from the 18th Brumaire, and that the national representatives were now strongly founded in the opinion of the people. “The Chamber,” said Napoléon, “is composed of Jacobins, of madmen, who wish power and disorder; I should have denounced them to the

(1) Buchez et Roux, xl 267, 215. Thib. x 398, 400. Cap. 223, 224, 229.

nation, and chased them from their places. Dethrone me ! they would not dare." " In an hour," replied Regnaud de St.-Angely, " your dethronement, on the motion of La Fayette, will be irrevocably pronounced : they have given you only an hour's grace—do you hear? Only an hour." Napoléon then turned with a bitter smile to Fouché and said, " Write to these gentlemen to keep themselves quiet—they shall be satisfied." Fouché immediately wrote to the Deputies that the Emperor was about to abdicate (1). The intelligence diffused universal joy among the Deputies, who exclaimed, " The Emperor has abdicated—no Bourbons—no Imperial prince!" as if the days of the Revolution had returned, and they had only to proclaim the sovereignty of the people (2).

While these decisive measures were going on at Paris Wellington and Blucher were advancing with the utmost expedition through the French territory. The former advanced by Quesnoi and Valenciennes, the latter by Landrecy and Maubeuge. In conformity with his former conduct on crossing the Pyrenees, the English general issued the most peremptory orders to his troops to abstain from pillage of every description, and to observe the strictest discipline, reminding the soldiers that the people of France were the subjects of a friendly sovereign, and that no pillage or contributions of any kind were to be permitted. In spite of all his efforts, however, many disorders occurred, especially among the Belgian regiments; for the soldiers had only recently begun to act together, and long habits of discipline are necessary to prevent a victorious army from indulging in depredation. He wrote, in consequence, in the sternest language to the Belgian generals, declaring that he would hold the officers of corps personally responsible for any pillage by the men under their command. Blucher took hardly any pains to prevent plundering, but pushed on with the utmost energy direct towards Paris. The important fortress of Cambray was surprised and carried by escalade, by Sir Neil Campbell and Colonel Mitchell, on the night of the 24th of June, with the loss of only thirty-five men. Peronne, styled La Pucelle from its never having been taken, was carried by storm in the most gallant manner by the Guards on the evening of the 26th. Excepting in these instances, no opposition whatever was experienced on the march; and with such expedition did both armies move, that on the 28th Blucher's advanced guard defeated the rearguard of Grouchy, with the loss of six pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners, on the road from Soissons at Villers Cotteret; on the 29th the advanced guard of the British crossed the Oise, and on the day following occupied the wood of Bondy close to Paris; while Blucher moved to the right, crossed the Seine at St.-Germain, and established his right at Plessis, his left at St.-Cloud, and his reserve at Versailles (3). The object of these movements was to turn the strong line of fortifications, erected by Napoléon

(1) Thib. x. 403, 405. Buchez et Roux, xl. 221. 222. Cap. 234, 235.

(2) Napoléon's abdication was in these terms :— " In commencing the war to sustain the national independence, I counted on the union of all efforts, of all inclinations, and of all the national authorities. I had good reason to hope for success, and I had braved all the declarations of the powers against me. The circumstances appear changed, and I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they be sincere in their declarations, and direct their hostility only against my person. My political life is ended; and I pro-

claim my son, under the title of Napoléon the Second, emperor of the French. The existing ministers will form the council of government. The interest which I feel in my son, induces me to invite the Chambers to organize without delay the regency by law. Let all unite for the public safety, and the maintenance of the national independence."—*CALISTO*, ii. 236.

(3) Wellington's General Orders, June 20, 1815. Gurw. xii. 493. *Ibid.* xii. 503, 232; and Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Gurw. xii. 507. Plinthe, 124, 136. *Jom.* iv. 642.

to the north of Paris, by the south and left bank of the Seine, where no fieldworks had yet been erected for its protection.

June 20. Stormy scene in the Chamber of Peers. Meanwhile, the Imperial party in the Chamber of Peers, headed by Lucien, Labédoyère, and Count Flahault, made the most energetic efforts to sustain the imperial dynasty in the person of the young Napoléon. Davoust had just read a report of the military resources that yet remained to France in the most favourable point of view; and Carnot was commencing a commentary in the same strain, when Ney, who had just arrived, vehemently interrupting him, said, "That is false! That is false! They are deceiving you: they are deceiving you in every respect. The enemy are victorious at all points. I have seen the disorder, since I commanded under the eyes of the Emperor. It is a mere illusion to suppose that sixty thousand men can be collected. It is well if Marshal Grouchy can rally ten or fifteen thousand men; and we have been beaten too thoroughly for them to make any resistance to the enemy. Here is our true state. Wellington is at Nivelles with eighty thousand men. The Prussians are far from being beaten. In six or seven days the enemy will be at the gates of the capital." Vehement agitation followed this announcement, and soon after, Lucien, Joseph, Labédoyère, and the whole Imperial party, entered with plumed hats and in full dress, and Lucien exclaimed with a loud voice, "The Emperor is politically dead. Long live the Emperor Napoléon the Second!" Many voices opposed this proposition. "Who opposes it?" said Labédoyère. "A few base individuals, constant in the worship of power, and who show themselves as skilful in detaching themselves from it in misfortune, as in flattering it in prosperity. I have seen them around the throne—at the foot of the sovereign, in the days of his greatness; they fly from it at the approach of danger; they reject Napoléon the Second, because they wish to receive the laws of the strangers, whom they already call their Allies, possibly their friends. Is it then, great God! decided that nothing is ever to be heard in this Chamber but the voice of baseness? What other voice has been heard here for ten years?" And, with these words, he rushed out of the assembly. But these violent sallies determined nothing, and at length the Peers adopted unanimously a middle course, and appointed a commission of five persons to carry on the government, consisting of Caulaincourt and Quenett, with Fouché, Carnot, and Grenier. Such was the address of Fouché, that he contrived to get himself named the president of the commission, and soon obtained its entire direction (1).

Attempts to defend Paris. Their failure, and its capitulation.

It was not, however, by any debates in the Chamber of Peers or Deputies that the government of France was to be decided; an overwhelming foreign force was advancing with rapid strides, and every thing depended on the negotiations with the Allied generals, and the means that would be taken to defend the capital. Carnot exerted himself to the utmost to strengthen it on the left bank of the Seine, where it was obviously to be attacked; and in a laboured speech, on the 2d July, to the Councils of government, endeavoured to show that resistance was yet practicable. Soult, however, expressed a decided opinion that Paris was so weak on the left bank of the Seine, that it was in vain to think of prolonging its defence; that there were not at the utmost more than forty-five thousand men in the capital, and that he could not answer for the result of a combat. Massena supported this opinion, and after referring to his defence of Genoa as a proof that he was not disposed lightly to surrender a fortified place, de-

clared that he would not engage to defend Paris an hour. The matter was ultimately referred to a commission of all the marshals and military men in the capital, and they unanimously declared that the city could not be defended. It was determined, therefore, to enter into a capitulation; and, in fact, Wellington had been in close communication with commissioners of the government ever since his arrival in the vicinity of Paris, on the 29th June.

July 2. Meanwhile, Zeithen, after a short conflict, succeeded in establishing himself on the heights of Meudon, and in the village of Issy. On the following day, the French attacked him in the latter village in considerable

July 3. force, but they were repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. A bridge was begun to be erected at Argenteuil, to establish the communication between the British and Prussian armies, and an English corps moved to the left bank of the Seine by the bridge of Neuilly. Davoust, upon this, sent to propose an armistice for the conclusion of a convention; but some difficulty was at first experienced from Blucher positively insisting upon the whole French army laying down their arms, to which the French marshals declared they never would be brought to submit. At length, Fouché, who was doing every thing to pave the way for the return of the Bourbons, persuaded them that the restoration of Louis XVIII would be much facilitated, both with the populace and the army, if a capitulation were granted to the troops; and the terms were at length agreed upon on the evening of the 3d July. It was stipulated that the French army should, on the following day, commence the evacuation of the capital, with their arms, artillery, caissons, and whole personal property: that, within eight days, they should be entirely established to the south of the Loire (1): that private property of every description should be respected, as well as public, except in so far as it was of a warlike character. The twelfth article, which acquired a melancholy interest from the tragedy which followed, was in these terms:—"Individual persons and property shall be respected; and, in general, all the individuals who are at present in the capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties, without being disquieted or prosecuted in any respect, in regard to the functions which they occupy, or may have occupied, or to their political conduct or opinions."

It is impossible for any language to convey an idea of the universal interest excited in the British empire, by the brief but stirring campaign of Waterloo, or the unbounded transports which were felt at the glorious victory which terminated it. Although the official accounts of the battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo were received together, yet intelligence had been received two days before of Napoléon having crossed the frontier and attacked the Prussian troops, and the utmost anxiety pervaded all classes at the result of the impending conflict. No one who was then of an age to understand what was going on, can ever forget the entrancing joy which thrilled the British heart when the thunder of artillery proclaimed the joyous news, and when Wellington's letter was read aloud to crowds with beating hearts in every street, by whoever was fortunate enough to have obtained first a copy of the *London Gazette*. Even those who had lost sons or brothers in the conflict, and they were many, shared in the general exultation; grief was almost overwhelmed amidst the universal joy; it was felt that life could not have been so well sacrificed as for the advancement of such a cause. Spontaneous illumination was seen in every city; exultation beamed in every eye; a ge-

(1) Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 4, 1815. 542, 544. Plötho, iv. 153, 180. Vaud. 235, 246. Gurw. xii. 541. Convention, July 3, 1815. Ibid. Cap. ii. 296, 354.

neral thanksgiving appointed by government, met with a responsive echo in every heart; both Houses of Parliament unanimously voted their thanks to the Duke of Wellington and the soldiers who had fought at Waterloo; and a medal was struck by government, which was given to every officer and man who had borne arms on the eventful day, and was preserved by them and their descendants with religious care to the latest hour of their lives. Yet was the most touching proof of the universal sympathy of the nation afforded by the general subscription, spontaneously entered into in every chapel and parish in the kingdom, for the widows and orphans of those who had fallen at Waterloo, or the relief of those who had been maimed in the fight, and which soon amounted to the immense sum of five hundred thousand pounds sterling.

Entry of the
English and
Prussians,
and Louis
XVIII into
the French
capital

The 7th of July was the proudest day in the annals of England. On that day her victorious army, headed by Wellington, made their public entry, along with the Prussians, into Paris, where an English drum had not been heard for above four hundred years. They entered by the barrier of Neuilly, and spreading on either side round the boulevards, took military possession of all the principal points in the capital. The English established themselves in the Bois de Boulogne in a regular camp; the Prussians bivouacked in the churches, on the quays, and in the principal streets. The aspect of the troops was in the highest degree interesting, and the Highland regiments in particular attracted universal admiration. But it was a very different spectacle from the former entry of the Allies on the 31st of March 1813. Joy then beamed in every eye, hope was buoyant in every heart; all felt as if rescued from death. The reality of subjugation was now felt: the crime of the nation had been unpardonable; its punishment was unknown. With a proud step and beating hearts, to the triumphant sound of military music, the British troops defiled through the capital; but the French regarded them with melancholy and anxious looks. Few persons were to be seen in the streets; hardly any sound but the clang July 8. of the horses' hoofs was heard when they marched through the city. On the following day, Louis the XVIII, who had followed in the rear of the English army from Ghent, made his public entrance, escorted by the National Guard. But his entry was still more melancholy, and of sinister augury to the future stability of his dynasty. Even the Royalists were downcast; their patriotic feelings were deeply wounded by the defeat of France; they augured ill of the restoration of the king in the rear of the English bayonets. On the same day Fouché announced to the commission, which had hitherto carried on the government, its dissolution, as the English and Prussian armies had occupied the capital, and their deliberations were no longer free. The wily minister shortly afterwards received the reward of his treacherous conduct, by being appointed minister of police under the new government (1).

Journey of
Napoléon to
Rochefort.
He delivers
up himself
to the
English.

After his abdication of the Imperial authority, Napoléon had retired to Malmaison, the scene of his early happiness with Joséphine, and of his first triumphs "in life's morning march, when his bosom was young." It had been irrevocably determined by the Allied sovereigns, that they would no longer either recognize Napoléon as a crowned head, or suffer him to remain in Europe; and that his residence, wherever it was, should be under such restrictions as should effectually prevent his again breaking loose to desolate the world. Napoléon himself, however, was anxious to embark for America, and the provisional govern-

ment did every thing in their power to facilitate that object. During his residence at Malmaison he offered, if the government would give him the command of the army, even for a single day, to attack the Prussians, who had incautiously thrown themselves to the south of the Seine without any proper communication with the English on the north, and assured them that there could be no doubt of the success of the enterprise; but they deemed this, probably justly, too hazardous, and likely to injure the negotiations in which they were engaged with the Allied generals. After a me-

July 29. lancholy sojourn of six days at Malmaison, Napoléon set out for Rochefort, with an immense number of carriages laden with all the most precious articles which he could collect from palaces within his reach, and travelled with all the pomp and circumstance of an emperor to that harbour, where he arrived on the morning of the 3d of July. His resolution, however, finally to quit the scene of his greatness was not yet taken; for during the course of his journey, and after his arrival at Rochefort, he had various communications with the troops at Paris, and on their march to the Loire, which continued down to the moment of his embarking on the 14th. But he found that the blockade of the English cruisers was so vigilant, that there was no possible chance of avoiding them; and after ten days' vacillation, and having considered every possible project of escape, he at length adopted the resolution of throwing himself on the generosity of the British government; sent to Captain Maitland of the *Bellerophon* the following letter ad-

July 13. dressed to the Prince Regent:—"Exposed to the factions which divide my country, and to the hostility of the great powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to seat myself by the hearth of the British people. I put myself under the protection of its laws, and claim it from your royal highness as the most July 14. powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies." On the following day he embarked on board the *Bellerophon*, and was received with the honours due to his rank, as a general, by Captain Maitland, who immediately set sail with his noble prisoner for the British shores (1).

Removal of Napoléon to St. Helena. Had the British government been acting alone in this transaction, they might have had some difficulty how to conduct themselves on the occasion; for certainly never was a more touching appeal made to the humanity of a great nation, and never was there an occasion on which a generous heart would have felt a more ardent desire to act in a manner worthy of the splendid testimony to their character, thus borne by their great antagonist. But England was but a single power in the alliance; their whole measures were taken in concert; the power of Napoléon over his troops had recently been evinced in a manner so striking, and his disregard of the obligation of treaties was so universally known, and had been so recently exemplified by his return from Elba, that it was obviously altogether impossible to think of keeping him in Europe. It was politely, July 19. therefore, but firmly, intimated to him by the British government, that the determination of the Allied sovereigns was irrevocably taken, and that he must be removed to St.-Helena. Napoléon vehemently protested against this measure, which he alleged was a breach of the understanding on which he had delivered himself up to Captain Maitland; although nothing could be clearer than that he had made no terms with that officer, and that, if he had any claim at all, it was only on the generosity of the British government. After

(1) Cap. ii. 545, 552. Thib. x. 493, 498. Scott's Napoléon, ix. 61, 72.

remaining a fortnight in Plymouth Roads, during which time he was the object of the most flattering curiosity and attention, from all who could get a glimpse of him from the neighbouring towns, he was removed on board the Northumberland, and set sail for St.-Helena, which he reached on the 16th of October. Both during the voyage out, and while on board the Bellerophon, the charm of his conversation, and fascination of his manner, won the hearts of the sailors, as the acuteness of his remarks and depth of his reflections excited the admiration of the officers. With his accustomed mental activity, he enquired into the minutest particulars—into the discipline of the ships, and was particularly struck with the silence and order which always prevailed. “What could you not do with a hundred thousand such men?” said he; “I now cease to wonder that the English were always victorious at sea. There was more noise on board the *Epervier* schooner, which conveyed me from Isle d’Aix to Basque Roads, than on board the Bellerophon, with a crew of six hundred men, between Rochefort and Plymouth.”

Melancholy condition of Paris after the Restoration. The bridge of Jena saved by Wellington. Paris exhibited a melancholy aspect after the second restoration of Louis the Eighteenth. The whole charm of the restoration, in the eyes even of the Royalists, was gone; its hopes to the nation were at an end. The bridges, and all the principal points of the town, were occupied by strong bodies of infantry and artillery; patrols of cavalry were to be seen at every step; the reality of subjugation was before their eyes. Blucher kept aloof from all intercourse with the court, and haughtily demanded a contribution of a hundred million of francs (L.4,000,000 sterling) for the pay of his troops, as Napoléon had done from the Prussians at Berlin. Already the Prussian soldiers insisted with loud cries that the pillar of Austerlitz should be pulled down, as Napoléon had destroyed the pillar of Rosbach; and Blucher was so resolute to destroy the bridge of Jena, that he had actually begun operations by running mines under the arches for blowing it up. A long negotiation ensued on the subject between him and Wellington; and it was only by the latter placing a sentinel on the bridge, and declaring that, if it was blown up, he would consider it as a rupture with Great Britain, that the destruction of that beautiful monument was prevented. The manner of the Prussian officers and soldiers was often rude and harsh, and beyond the limits of Paris their troops indulged in every species of pillage. It was not that they were naturally fierce, or wanted generosity of feeling; but that they were profoundly wounded by the injuries of their country, and determined, now that they had the power, to avenge them (1).

Restoration of the works of art from the Museum of the Louvre. But a more melancholy humiliation awaited the French nation. The Allied sovereigns now arrived in Paris, and insisted upon the restoration of the objects of art in the museum of the Louvre, which had been pillaged from their respective states by the orders of Napoléon. The justice of this demand could not be contested; it was only wresting the prey from the robber. Talleyrand, who had now resumed his functions as minister of foreign affairs, appealed to the article in the capitulation of Paris, which provided for the preservation of public and private property, if not of a military description; but to this it was replied with justice, that these objects of art, seized contrary to the law of nations by Napoléon, could not be regarded as rightly the property of the French na-

(1) Maitland's Narrative, 74, 82. Scott's Napoléon, ix, 75, 105. Cap. i. 355, 364.

(2) Cap. ii. 362, 366. Wellington to Blucher, July 8, 1815. Gurw. xii. 318, 518.

tion, and that, even if they were so, it was beyond the power of the Allied generals to tie up the hands of absent and independent sovereigns, who took no benefit by the capitulation, by any stipulations of their own. The restitution of the objects of art, accordingly, was resolved on, and forthwith commenced, under the care of British and Prussian soldiers, who occupied the Place de Carrousel during the time the removal was going forward. Nothing wounded the French so profoundly as this breaking up of the trophies of the war. It told them, in language not to be misunderstood, that conquest had now reached their doors; the iron went into the soul of the nation. The bronzed horses brought from Corinth to Rome, from thence transported to Constantinople by the great founder of that city, and from thence to Venice by the Doge Dandolo, were restored to their old station in the front of the Church of St.-Mark. The Transfiguration, and the Last Communion of St.-Jerome, resumed their place in the halls of the Vatican; the Apollo, and the Laocoon, again adorned the precincts of St.-Peter's; the Venus was enshrined anew amidst beauty in the tribune of Florence; and the Descent from the Cross, by Rubens, was restored to the devout worship of the Flemings in the Cathedral of Antwerp. Whoever has witnessed the magnificent gallery of the Louvre, when yet untouched in 1814, and again visited the paintings it contained in their native seats, will rejoice that this restoration took place; for the accumulation of beauty in that great museum fatigued the mind; its enchanting objects had been transplanted among a nation, who could little appreciate their beauty, though infinitely proud of their possession; they had been withdrawn from the people to whom they formed the proudest inheritance, and had become the trophy of angry strife and vehement passion, which "to party gave up what was meant for mankind." Impartial justice must admire the dignified restraint which confined the restitution to the removal of objects illegally seized by Napoléon during his conquests, and abstained, when it had the power, from following his bad example, by the seizure of any which belonged to the French nation (1).

Excessive
demands of
the Allied
powers.

The breaking-up of the museum was an ominous event to the French nation, for the neighbouring powers had territories as well as paintings to reclaim; and the spirit of conquest as well as revenge loudly demanded the cession of many of the most important provinces which had been added by the Bourbon princes to the monarchy of Clovis. Austria insisted upon getting back Lorraine and Alsace; Spain put in a claim to the Basque provinces; Prussia alleged that her security would be incomplete unless Mayence, Luxemburg, and all the frontier provinces of France adjoining her territory, were ceded to her; and the King of the Netherlands claimed the whole of the French fortresses of the Flemish barrier. It was with no small difficulty, and more from the jealousy of the different powers among each other than any other cause, that these natural reprisals on French rapacity were prevented from taking place. The negotiation was protracted at Paris till late in autumn; Russia, which had nothing to gain by the proposed partition, supported France throughout its whole continuance; and the different powers, to support their pretensions in this debate, maintained their armies, who had entered on all sides, on the French soil; so that above eight hundred thousand foreign troops were quartered on its inhabitants for several months (2). At length, however, by the persevering efforts of Lord Castlereagh, M. Nesselrode, and M. Talleyrand, all difficulties

(1) Cap. Hist. de la Restauration, iii. 89, 89.
Scott's Paris revisited, 242, 256.

(2) Cap. ii. 567, 582. Martens, Sup. ii. 682.
Hord. xii. 540, 544.

were adjusted, and the second Treaty of Paris was concluded in November 1815, between France and the whole Allied powers.

Terms of the treaty. By this treaty, and the relative conventions which were signed the same day, conditions of a very onerous kind were imposed upon the French government. The French frontier was restored to the state in which it stood in 1790, by which means the whole of the territory, far from inconsiderable, gained by the treaty of 1814, was resumed by the Allies. In consequence of this, France lost the fortresses of Landau, Sarre-Louis, Philipville, and Marienburg, with the adjacent territory of each. Versoix, with a small district round it, was ceded to the canton of Geneva; the fortress of Huningen was to be demolished; but the little county of Venaisin, the first conquest of the Revolution, was ceded to France. Seven hundred millions of francs (L.28,000,000 sterling) was to be paid to the Allied powers for the expenses of the war; in addition to which it was stipulated that an army of 150,000 men, composed of 50,000 from each of the great powers of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and the lesser powers of Germany, was to occupy, for a period not less than three, or more than five years, the whole frontier fortresses of France, from Cambray to Fort-Louis, including Valenciennes and Quesnoi, Maubeuge and Landrecy; and this large force was to be maintained entirely at the expense of the French government. In addition to this, the different powers obtained indemnities for the spoliation inflicted on them by France during the Revolution, which amounted to the enormous sum of seven hundred and thirty-five millions of francs more, (L.29,500,000 sterling). A hundred millions of francs were also provided to the smaller powers as an indemnity for the expenses of the war; so that the total sums which France had to pay, besides maintaining the army of occupation, was no less than fifteen hundred and thirty-five millions of francs, or L.61,500,000 sterling. Truly France now underwent the severe but just law of retaliation; she was made to feel what she had formerly inflicted on Germany, Italy, and Spain. Great Britain, in a worthy spirit, gave up the whole sum falling to her out of the indemnity for the war, amounting to nearly L.5,000,000 sterling, to the King of the Netherlands, to erect the famous barrier against France which Joseph II. had so insanely demolished; and the Allied powers unanimously gave the highest proof of their sense of Wellington being the first of European generals, by conferring upon him the command of the Army of Occupation (4).

Review of the British and Russian troops. Sept. 15. Two magnificent events followed the long occupation of the French territory by the Allied armies previous to the signature of this treaty. The first was a review of all the British troops in the presence of the whole Allied powers, which took place in the plain of St.-Denis. The British army before this time had been greatly strengthened by the arrival of the troops from Canada, and by the recovery of a great part of the wounded who had suffered at Waterloo; and they mustered sixty thousand redcoats. Never had such an array of native British troops been seen, and probably never will be seen again. The soldiers, as if by enchantment, went through with admirable precision, under the orders of their chief, the whole manœuvres that had won the battle of Salamanca. The other was a great review of all the Russian troops that were in France on the plains of Vertus, on 10th September 1815. This review conveyed an awful impression of the strength of the Russian empire when fairly roused; for a hundred and sixty thousand men, including eight-and-twenty thousand cavalry, were

(4) See Treaty in Martens, ii. 682: and Schoell, xi. 501, 515.

under arms on the field, with five hundred and forty pieces of cannon. The day was sultry but clear, and from a small hill in the centre of a large plain, at a short distance from Châlons, the whole immense lines were visible. The eye had scarcely time to comprehend so vast a spectacle, when a single gun, fired from a height, was the signal for three cheers from the troops. Even at this distance of time, those cheers sound as it were fresh in the ears of all who heard them; their sublimity, like the roar of the ocean when near, and gradually melting away in the distance, was altogether overpowering. A general salute was then given by a rolling fire along the line from right to left; the Russians then broke from their lines into grand columns of regiments, and marched past the sovereigns in splendid array. "Well, Charles," said the Duke of Wellington to Sir Charles Stuart, now Marquis of Londonderry, after the review was over, "you and I never saw such a sight before, and never shall again—the precision of the movements of these troops was more like the arrangements of a theatre than those of such an army; but still I think my little army would move round them in any direction while they were effecting a single change (1)."

Trial and execution of Labédoyère and Ney. But the pomp and splendour of military display did not alone terminate the war in France. The muffled drum is in prospect. The Allied powers, irritated beyond endurance by the treachery and defection of the whole French army, and the perfidy with which the partisans of Napoléon had revolted to his side, insisted peremptorily upon measures of severity being adopted by the French government. A very long list of proscriptions was at first rendered by the European powers, and it was with the utmost difficulty that they were reduced, by the efforts of Talleyrand, supported by Lord Castlereagh, to fifty-eight, of persons to be banished. But banishment was not enough; the flagrant treason of the Hundred Days demanded the blood of some of the principal offenders, and Ney, Labédoyère, and Lavalette were selected to bear the penalty. They were brought to trial accordingly, and all three convicted, upon the clearest evidence; of high treason. The life of Lavalette was saved by the heroic devotion of his wife, who, in visiting him in prison, changed dresses with her husband, and thus effected his escape; but Ney and Labédoyère were both executed, and met their fate with that heroic courage which never fails deeply to impress mankind. They both themselves gave the order to the soldiers to fire; but in Ney's case it was deeply affecting. Being brought in a carriage to the place selected in the gardens of the Luxemburg, near a wall, the marshal stood erect, with his hat in his left hand, and his right on his heart, and facing the soldiers, exclaimed, "My comrades, fire on me!" He fell, pierced by ten balls. The place of his execution is still to be seen in the gardens of the Luxemburg; and few spots in Europe will excite more melancholy emotions in the mind of the traveller (2).

Reflections on this event. The death of Ney is a subject which the English historian cannot dismiss without painful feelings. His guilt was self-evident; and never perhaps was the penalty of the law inflicted upon one for a political offence who more richly deserved his fate. But the question of difficulty is, Whether or not he was protected by the capitulation of Paris? The clause in that treaty has been already given, which expressly declares, that no person should be molested for his political opinions or conduct during the Hundred Days; and it is very difficult to see how this clause could be held as not protecting Ney, who was within the city at the time of the treaty. Wellington

(1) Londonderry's War in Germany, 334, 335.

(2) Cap. Hist. de la Rest. 370, 484.

and Blücher concluded the capitulation : their sovereigns ratified it : Louis XVIII took benefit from it. He entered Paris the very day after the English army, and established himself in the Tuileries, under the protection of their guns. How, then, can it be said that he, as well as the Allied sovereigns, were not bound by the treaty, especially in so vital and irreparable a matter as human life—and that the life of such a man as Marshal Ney? It is very true a great example was required; true, Ney's treason was beyond that of any other man; true, the Revolutionists required to be shown that the government could venture to punish. But all that will not justify the breach of a capitulation. The very time when justice requires to interpose is, when great interests or state necessity are urgent on the one hand, and an unprotected criminal exists on the other. To say that Louis XVIII was not bound by the capitulation; that it was made by the English general without his authority; and that no foreign officer could tie up the hands of an independent sovereign, is a quibble unworthy of a generous mind, and which it is the duty of the historian invariably to condemn. This was what Nelson said at Naples, and what Schwartzberg said at Dresden; and subsequent times have unanimously spoken out against the violation of these two capitulations. Banished from France, with his double treason affixed to his forehead, Ney's character was irrecoverably withered; but to the end of the world his guilt will be forgotten in the tragic interest and noble heroism of his death.

Seizure and
execution
of Murat.

Another of the paladins of the French empire perished not long after, under circumstances to which the most fastidious sense of justice can take no exception. Tormented with the thirst for power and the desire to regain his dominions, Murat was fool-hardy enough to make a descent on the coast of Naples with a few followers, in order to excite a revolt among his former subjects against the Bourbon government. He was seized, tried by a military commission, under a law which he himself had introduced, condemned, and executed. He met his fate with the courage that might have been expected from so brave a soldier; but however humanity may mourn his doom, reason must admit its justice; for he suffered the penalty which, seven years before, he had inflicted on so many noble patriots, striving to rescue their country from foreign thralldom, in the squares of Madrid (1).

Napoléon at
St. Helena
Conduct of
the British
Government
towards him.

Napoléon did not long survive his old companions in arms. Although he was subjected to no restraint at St.-Helena, was permitted to ride over nearly the whole island, and enjoyed a degree of luxury and comfort, both in his habitation and in the society with which he was surrounded, which bore a striking contrast to the stern severity with which he had treated state prisoners, yet his proud spirit chafed against the coercion of being confined at all to an island. The British government had given the most express instructions that he should be treated with all the respect due to his rank as a general, and with all the indulgence consistent with security against his escape; but Sir Hudson Lowe, who was appointed to the military command of the island, proved an unhappy selection. His manner was rigid and unaccommodating, and his temper of mind was not such as to soften the distress which the Emperor endured during his detention. A great impression, accordingly, was made upon the world by the publication of the St.-Helena Memoirs, in which were interwoven exaggerated statements of the indignities to which he was said to have been subjected, with the interesting

(1) Biog. Univ. *Voece Murat*, *Ante*, vi, 277.

disquisitions and profound reflections, which will perhaps add as much to his fame with the thinking portion of mankind, as his great military achievements will with the enthusiastic and enterprising. But while all must regret that it should have been necessary, under any circumstances, to act with even seeming harshness towards so great a man; yet justice can see nothing to condemn in the conduct of the British government in this particular, whatever it may do as to want of courtesy in the governor of the island. It was indispensable to the peace of the world to prevent his escape; and the expedition from Elba had shown, that no reliance could be placed either on his professions or his treaties. Detention and secure custody, therefore, were unavoidable; and every comfort consistent with these objects was afforded him by the British government. He was allowed the society of the friends who had accompanied him in his exile; he had books in abundance to amuse his leisure hours; saddle horses in profusion were at his command; he was permitted to ride several miles in one direction; Champagne and Burgundy were his daily beverage; and the bill of fare of his table, which is given by Las Cases as a proof of the severity of the British government, would be thought the height of luxury by most persons in a state of liberty. If the English government had acted towards Napoléon as he did to others who opposed him, they would have shot him in the first fortress, as he did the Duke D'Enghien or Hofer, or shut him up in an Alpine fortress, as he did the Cardinal Pacca.

^{His last illness, and death.} But his mortal career in the scene of his exile and suffering was not destined to be of long duration. The vexation which he experienced at finding all the plans frustrated which had been formed for his escape, the fretting which he suffered from the sight of the English sentries round his dwelling, the recollection of his lost greatness, the prospect of endless detention, combined with a hereditary malady to produce severe stomach complaints. He suffered much from this cause; but it was at first hoped that they would yield to the skill of his medical attendants. Gradually, however, the affections became more severe: and they at length assumed the decided symptoms of cancer in the stomach, to which his father had fallen a victim at a still earlier age. In February 1821, he became so rapidly worse, that, by the special directions of the Prince Regent, Lord Bathurst wrote to Sir Hudson Lowe, to express his Royal Highness's sympathy with his sufferings, and his wish, if possible, to relieve them. This mark of regard, however, came too late: towards the end of March his strength sunk rapidly: he dictated his will, with a great variety of minute bequests; but obstinately refused to take medicine, to which he had a great aversion. "All that is to happen," said he, "is written down: our hour is marked: we cannot prolong it a minute beyond what fate has predestined." He directed that his heart should be sent to the Empress Marie Louise at Parma, and his stomach examined, to see if he had died of his hereditary malady. At two o'clock on the 5d May he received extreme unction, declared that he died in the Roman Catholic faith, which had been that of his fathers, and gave minute directions for his body being laid in state in a *chapelle ardente*, according to the form of the Catholic worship. "Can you not," said he to Antomarchi, his physician, "believe in God, whose existence every thing proclaims, and in whom the greatest minds have believed?" On the 5th, a violent storm of wind and rain arose: the last struggles of Napoléon took place during its fury; and the last words he was heard to utter were, "*Tête d'armée.*" He breathed his last at eleven minutes before six in the evening. In his will, which contained a vast

number of bequests, were two very remarkable; the one was a request "that his body might repose on the banks of the Seine, among the people whom he had loved so well;" the other, a legacy of 10,000 francs to the assassin Cantillon, who had attempted recently before to murder the Duke of Wellington (1).

His interment at St. Helena. Napoléon had himself indicated the place in St.-Helena where he wished his remains to be interred. It was in a small hollow called Slane's valley, where a fountain, shaded with weeping willows, had long been a favourite spot for his meditation. The body, after lying in state as he had directed, was carried to the place of interment on the 8th of May. The whole members of his household, including the noble-hearted Bertrand, Count Montholon, and all the other faithful friends who had shared his exile, and all the officers, naval and military, in the island, attended on the occasion. He was laid in the coffin in his three-cornered hat, military surtout, leather under dress, and boots, as he appeared on the field of battle. As the hearse could not get up to the place of sepulture, a detachment of British grenadiers bore him to the spot. The coffin was lowered amidst the speechless emotion and tears of all present; three successive volleys of musketry and artillery announced that the mighty conqueror was laid in his grave; a simple stone of great size was placed over his remains; and the solitary willow wept over the tomb of him for whom the earth itself had once hardly seemed a fitting mausoleum (1).

Reflections on the campaign of Waterloo. The campaign of Waterloo having been the immediate cause of the overthrow of Napoléon, has been made, as may well be believed, the subject of unbounded discussion and criticism both on the Continent and Great Britain, and equally on the part of the Allied writers as the French. The latter have, as was very natural, strained every nerve to palliate their defeat, partly by exaggerating the forces of their opponents, partly by diminishing their own, and partly by misrepresenting the nature of Marshal Grouchy's operation, and unduly magnifying the effect which would have followed from his having disobeyed his orders, and come up to the field of battle before the conclusion of the fight. The continental writers, on the other hand, and particularly the Prussians, have endeavoured to arrogate to themselves a larger share than was really due to them in the honours of the conflict, and to underrate what should in fairness be ascribed to the unconquerable firmness of the British troops. The English writers also have not been a whit behind their continental brethren in exaggeration; and by seeking to ascribe every thing to their own countrymen, and endeavouring to keep out of view altogether the necessary effect of Prussian co-operation, have gone far to make the continental readers distrust what really is authentic and undoubted in the exploits of the British troops on that glorious day. A very few observations, conceived in an European spirit, will be sufficient to show where the truth really lies amidst these conflicting statements.

Wellington and Blücher were surprised. 1. In the first place, it is evident, whatever the English writers may say to the contrary, that both Blücher and the Duke of Wellington were surprised by Napoléon's invasion of Belgium on the 15th of June; and it is impossible to hold either of them entirely blameless for that circumstance. It has been already seen from the Duke's despatches, that on the 9th of June, that is, six days before the invasion took place, he was aware that Napoléon was collecting a great force on the

(1) Napoléon's Testament. Antomarchi, ii. 229. (2) Scott's Nap. ix, 294, 302. Antom. ii, 180, App. No. Scott, ix. 296, 301. Antomarchi, ii. 246, 192.
312.

frontier, and that hostilities might immediately be expected (1). Why, then, were the two armies not immediately concentrated, and placed in such a situation that they might mutually, if attacked, lend each other the necessary assistance? Their united force was full one hundred and ninety thousand effective men; while Napoléon's was not more than one hundred and twenty, or, at the utmost, one hundred and forty thousand. Why, then, was Blücher attacked unawares and isolated at Ligny, and the British infantry, unsupported either by cavalry or artillery, exposed to the attack of a superior force of French, composed of all the three arms, at Quatre Bras? It is in vain to say that they could not provide for their troops if they had been concentrated, and that it was necessary to watch every by-road which led to Brussels. Men do not eat more when drawn together, than when scattered over a hundred miles of country, Marlborough and Eugene had long ago maintained armies of one hundred thousand men for months together in Flanders; and Blücher and Wellington had no difficulty in feeding one hundred and seventy thousand men drawn close together after the campaign did commence. It is not by a cordon of troops scattered over a hundred miles, that the attack of one hundred and twenty thousand French is to be arrested. If the British army had from the first been concentrated at Waterloo, and Blücher near Wavres, Napoléon would never have ventured to pass them on any road, however unguarded. Those who, in their anxiety to uphold the English general from the charge of having been assailed unawares, assert that he was not taken by surprise in the outset of the Waterloo campaign, do not perceive that in so doing they bring against him the much more serious charge of having so disposed his troops, when he knew they were about to be assailed, that infantry alone, without either cavalry or artillery, were exposed to the attack of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in superior numbers, contrary not only to the plainest rules of the military art, but of common sense on the subject.

And out-
generaled
at first.

2. It results from these considerations, that in the outset of the Waterloo campaign, Wellington and Blücher were out-manœuvred by Napoléon. Being superior by at least seventy thousand troops to those at the command of the French Emperor, it was their business never to have fought at a disadvantage, and not made a final stand till their two great armies were in a situation mutually to assist and support each other. There seems no reason why this should not have been done by their mutually converging from the frontier to Waterloo without abandoning Brussels. But even if it had been necessary to evacuate that capital before the union was effected, prudence suggests that it would have been better to have done so, even with all its moral consequences, than to have exposed either army to the chance of serious defeat, in consequence of being singly assailed by greatly superior forces. Nevertheless, Napoléon so managed matters in the outset of the campaign, that though inferior upon the whole by full seventy thousand men to the Allied armies taken together, he was superior to either at the points of attack at Ligny and Quatre Bras. That is the most decisive test of superior generalship.

Napoléon
was out-
generaled
in the end.

3. It results from the same principles, that as clearly as the Allied generals were out-generaled in the outset, Napoléon was out-generaled by them in the close of the campaign. His favourite military manœuvre of interposing between his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the right hand and then on the left, was now met and conquered

by the method of resistance obviously appropriate to it; viz. the concentric retreat of the two Allied armies into such close proximity, that in the event of a general battle they could mutually support and assist each other. Napoléon committed a flagrant military error when, with the Prussian army, repulsed only but still unbroken, on his flank, he hazarded all on the desperate chance of defeating the British army before its arrival on the ridge of Waterloo. Wellington acted with true military skill when he resolved to give battle in front of the forest of Soignies, with a promise from Blucher that he would assist him by mid-day with two corps. That was precisely retaliating upon Napoléon the brilliant attack of Ney on the flank of the Allied armies, by which he had gained the battle of Bautzen (1). In resisting his furious onset, it is hard to say whether we have most cause to admire the ardent spirit and quick determination which prompted Blucher, so soon after his own defeat, to strain every nerve in order to bring up his troops to the decisive point at Waterloo, or the incomparable constancy and unshaken determination which led Wellington, amidst a sea of carnage, to maintain his ground immovable till the glancing of the Prussian standards announced the signal of decisive victory. Prudence should have counselled Napoléon to have retreated, rather than incurred the desperate hazard of being assailed either in the moment of victory or defeat by fifty thousand fresh troops. A just appreciation of the advantages of their situation, equally with their own heroic spirit, prompted Wellington and Blucher to act as they did on this memorable field; and it is very remarkable that their success would probably have been comparatively incomplete, had it not been for the success gained by Napoléon on the 16th over the Prussians at Ligny; for it was that which led Napoléon to believe that the Prussian army was entirely put *hors de combat*, at least for some days, and that he might with safety, even to the eleventh hour, hurl his whole forces with almost desperate energy against the British legions in front of Waterloo.

Admirable conduct of Wellington on the field. 4. It is impossible to estimate too highly the military ability of the Duke of Wellington, both in his selection of the field of battle, in the disposition which he gave to his troops, and the admirable firmness with which he maintained his ground till the promised succour arrived. The slightest inspection of the field of Waterloo must be sufficient to convince every observer, that it was in a singular manner adapted for a great defensive stand, being furnished with a gentle slope along its whole front, which, like a regular glacis, exposed the attacking columns to a fire from the summit every step that they advanced; having the farm-houses and enclosures of La Haye Sainte and Hougomont, like so many out-works, to retard the enemy's advance, and the reverse of the hill affording a gentle slope and hollow to the other side, where the troops, invisible to those who stood on the opposite ridge where the French army bivouacked, might be at once in a great measure sheltered from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and at the same time ready to repel the assault of his columns, if, after braving the fire of the British, they had reached the summit of the ridge. But the advantages of this position, great as they were, would have been as nothing without the invincible tenacity, heroic courage, and admirable steadiness with which Wellington maintained his ground against greatly superior forces during the terrible conflict, and gained time, at the moment when the fate of Europe quivered in the balance, for the Prussian corps to come up and effect a decisive overthrow. Constancy less immovable, moral

(1) *Ante*, ix. p. 117.

courage less unconquerable, would have led to the abandonment of the field when the Prussian troops had not arrived at one o'clock, the hour appointed, and the great superiority of the enemy in effective troops had become apparent, and thus postponed to an indefinite period, perhaps for ever, Napoléon's final destruction. The annals of war do not afford a more striking, perhaps not so striking, an example of the intuitive glance of true military genius, as that which led Wellington to resist, even to the death, in his defensive position, down to the very last moment, and then suddenly hurl his whole troops, with the ocean's mighty sweep, upon the foe.

Comparative merits of the English and Prussians at Waterloo. 5. In considering the comparative shares which the British and Prussian armies had in the achievement of this glorious victory, an impartial judgment must award by far the highest part to the British troops. When it is recollected that the English and King's German Legion soldiers in the field did not exceed thirty-seven thousand, and that, including the Hanoverians, the whole troops on whom reliance could be placed were little more than fifty thousand, and that they were assailed, for above five hours, by continual attacks from eighty thousand veteran French, before even Bulow's Prussians arrived in the field at four o'clock, it must be admitted that this day must ever be reckoned as the proudest of the many proud days of English glory. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the arrival of Bulow's corps at that hour, which compelled Napoléon to detach eleven thousand of his Young and Old Guard to maintain Planchenois against them, and consequently withdrew them from the field of battle as against the English, went far to diminish the superiority, and bring nearer to an equality the military forces of the contending armies. No official account of the Prussian loss has ever been published, although it is stated by their military writers to have amounted to 6000; so that it is impossible to say with precision what their share in the fight actually was. Had they not appeared on the field as they did in force at half-past seven at night, there can be no doubt that the French army would have been repulsed, because their last attack actually was so, and their Old Guard routed before Blucher's standards were seen in the wood issuing from St.-Lambert, or the Prussians had taken any part further than in drawing off the eleven thousand of the Guard to Planchenois, from the fight, by Bulow's vigorous attack at four o'clock. The victory, however, would have been incomplete, and probably little more than a bloody repulse, without their co-operation; and possibly the superiority of the French, if there had been no other army in the field, might have enabled Napoléon to compel the British to retreat, by menacing their flank next day, as he did that of the Russians after the terrible fight of Borodino. It was unquestionably the arrival of the Prussians which rendered the victory complete, and converted a bloody repulse into a total overthrow; and probably but for the prospect of their co-operation, Wellington would never, with a force so inferior in military strength, have hazarded the risk of so dreadful a conflict.

6. The effect of Grouchy's not coming up, and the circumstances of his share in the campaign, has been made the subject of great exaggeration on the part of the French writers. Without doubt, if two-and-thirty thousand French troops had come upon the flank of the British army, without being followed by any Prussians, they might have exposed them to a defeat as signal as Napoléon himself experienced, from a similar attack being made upon him when exhausted by the fight. But *were* Grouchy's troops in a situation to do this? Was he not fully matched by the Prussians under Thielman, whom he combated at Wavres? Had not the Prussian general strict

orders to follow Grouchy closely? And what would it have availed the French if the latter had come up to their succour with 32,000 men, if the former, with 35,000, at the same time reinforced Blücher and joined Wellington? It is by entirely keeping out of view this important fact of Grouchy being fully matched at Wavres, and the impossibility of his joining Napoléon, without Thielman at the same time, with a superior force, joining Wellington, that the French have been at all able to elevate into a degree of importance the alleged failure of this marshal appearing in the field at the decisive moment. And whether he did right or wrong in acting as he did, nothing is more certain than that he strictly obeyed his orders; and that, if there was any fault in the case, Napoléon could in justice ascribe it to no one but himself.

Parallel of Napoléon and Wellington. Napoléon and Wellington having risen, by the common consent of men to the highest rank on their respective sides in the great revolutionary contest, and the awful strife having been finally determined under their guidance on a single field, like that between Rome and Carthage under the banners of Scipio and Hannibal, the attention of men, to the end of the world, will be forcibly drawn to their characters. We know, after the lapse of two thousand years, with what eagerness we yet dwell on those of the Roman and Carthaginian leaders who met at Zama; and we may anticipate with confidence a similar undying interest in the comparison between the British and French heroes who combated at Waterloo. Happy, indeed, if the pen of the historian could keep pace with the greatness of the subject, and the English language would afford the means of painting, in a few touches, with the hand of Livy or Tacitus, the salient points in the minds of those whose deeds are for ever engraven on the records of mankind!

Their points of difference. Napoléon and Wellington were not merely individual characters: they were the types of the powers which they respectively headed in the contest. Napoléon had more genius, Wellington more judgment: the former combated with greater energy, the latter with greater perseverance. Rapid in design, instant in execution, the strokes of the French hero fell like the burning thunderbolt: cautious in counsel, yet firm in action, the resources of the British champion multiplied, like the vigour of vegetation, after the withering stroke had fallen. No campaign of Wellington's equals in genius and activity those of Napoléon in Italy and in France; none of Napoléon's approaches in foresight and wisdom that of Wellington's at Torres Vedras. The vehemence of the French Emperor would have exhausted in a single campaign the whole resources which during the war were at the disposal of the English general; the caution of Wellington would have alienated in the very beginning the troops which overflowed with the passions of the Revolution. Ardour and onset were alike imposed on the former by his situation, and suggested by his disposition: foresight and perseverance were equally dictated to the latter by his necessities, and in unison with his character. The one wielded at pleasure the military resources of the half of Europe, and governed a nation heedless of consequences, covetous of glory, reckless of slaughter: the other led the forces of a people distrustful of its prowess, avaricious of its blood, but invincible in its determination. And the result, both in the general war and final struggle, was in entire conformity with this distinction: Wellington retired in the outset before the fierce assault of the French legions, but he saw them, for the first time since the Revolution, recoil in defeat from the rocks of Torres Vedras: he was at first repeatedly expelled from Spain, but at last he drove the invaders with disgrace across the Pyrenees: he was in the beginning surprised, and wellnigh overpowered in Flanders, but in the end he baffled all

Napoléon's efforts, and rising up with the strength of a giant, crushed at once his army and his empire on the field of Waterloo.

Contrast of their moral characters. The personal and moral character of the two chiefs was still more strikingly opposed, and characteristic of the sides they severally led. Both were distinguished by the unwearied perseverance, the steady purpose, the magnanimous soul, which are essential to glorious achievements: both were provident in council, and vigorous in execution: both possessed personal intrepidity in the highest degree: both were indefatigable in activity, and iron in constitution: both enjoyed the rarer qualities of moral courage and fearless determination. But, in other respects, their minds were as opposite as the poles are asunder. Napoléon was covetous of glory, Wellington was impressed with duty: Napoléon was reckless of slaughter, Wellington was sparing of blood: Napoléon was careless of his word, Wellington was inviolate in faith. Treaties were regarded by the former as binding only when expedient—alliances valid only when useful: obligations were regarded by the latter as obligatory, though ruinous; conventions sacred, even when open to objection. Napoléon's wasting warfare converted allies into enemies; Wellington's protecting discipline changed enemies into friends: the former fell, because all Europe rose up against his oppression; the latter triumphed, because all Europe joined to share in his protection. There is not a proclamation of Napoléon to his soldiers, in which glory is not mentioned and duty forgotten: there is not an order of Wellington to his troops, in which duty is not inculcated, nor one in which glory is alluded to. Singleness of heart was the great characteristic of the British hero, a sense of duty his ruling principle: falsehood pervaded the French conqueror, the thirst for glory was his invariable motive. The former proceeded on the belief, that the means, if justifiable, would finally work out the end: the latter, on the maxim that the end would in every case justify the means. Napoléon placed himself at the head of Europe, and desolated it for fifteen years with his warfare: Europe placed Wellington at the head of its armies, and he gave it thirty years of unbroken peace. The one exhibited the most shining example of splendid talents devoted to temporal ambition: the other, the noblest instance of moral influence directed to exalted purposes. The former was in the end led to ruin, while blindly following the phantom of worldly greatness: the latter was unambitiously conducted to final greatness, while only following the star of public duty. The struggle between them was the same at bottom as that which, anterior to the creation of man, shook the powers of heaven: and never was such an example of moral government afforded as the final result of their immortal contest.

Removal of Napoléon's remains from St. Helena. Time rolled on, and brought its usual changes on its wings. The dynasty of the Restoration proved unequal to the arduous task of coercing the desires of the Revolution, weakened, but not extinguished, by the overthrow of Napoléon: a new generation arose, teeming with the passions and forgetful of the sufferings of former times; and the revolt of the barricades restored the tricolor flag, and established a semi-revolutionary dynasty on the French throne. England shared in the renewed convulsion consequent on these momentous events: a great organic change in the constitution placed the popular party for a course of years in power; a temporary alliance, founded on political passion, not national interest, for a time united its government with that of France; and under the auspices of M. Thiers's administration, a request was made to the British to restore the remains Sept. 1840. of their great Emperor to the French people. This request, received in a worthy spirit by the English administration, was immediately com-

plied with, in the hope, as it was eloquently, though fallaciously said at the time, "that these two great nations would henceforth bury their discord in the tomb of Napoléon." The solitary grave in St.-Helena was disturbed : the lonely willow no longer wept over the remains of the Emperor : the sepulchre was opened in presence of all the officers of the island, and many of his faithful followers : and the winding sheet, rolled back with pious care, revealed to the entranced spectators the well-known features of the immortal hero, serene, undecayed, in his now canonized military dress, as when he stood on the fields of Austerlitz or Jena. The body was removed from its resting-place with the highest military honours : the British army and navy in the island, with generous sympathy, vied with each other in doing honour to their great antagonist; and when it was lowered amidst the thunder of artillery into the French frigate, England felt that she had voluntarily, but in a right spirit, relinquished the proudest trophy of her national glory.

And their final interment in the Church of the Invalides. The remains of the Emperor were conveyed in safety to Europe on board the *Belle Poule* frigate, and landed, with appropriate honours, at Havre de Grace. From thence they were removed to Paris, with a view to their being interred, with the other illustrious warriors of France, in the Church of the Invalides. The re-interment, which awakened the deepest interest in France and over Europe, took place on the Dec. 15, 1840, 13th December 1840. The day was fine, though piercingly cold; but such was the interest excited, that six hundred thousand persons were assembled to witness the ceremony. The procession approached Paris by the road from Neuilly, so often traversed by the Emperor in the days of his glory; it passed through the now finished and stupendous arch erected to the Grand Army at the barrier of Neuilly; and slowly moving through the Elysian fields, reached the Invalides by the bridge of la Concorde. Louis-Philippe and all his court officiated at the august ceremony, which was performed with extraordinary pomp in the splendid church of the edifice; but nothing awakened such deep feeling as a band of the mutilated veterans of the Old Guard, who with mournful visages, but a yet military air, attended the remains of their beloved chief to his last resting-place. An aged charger, once rode by the Emperor on his fields of fame, survived to follow the colossal hearse to the grave. The place of interment was worthy of the hero who was now placed beneath its roof: it contained the remains of Turenne and Vauban, and the paladins of France: enchanting music thrilled every heart as the coffin was lowered into the tomb: the thunders of the artillery, so often vocal to his triumphs, now gave him the last honours of mortality: the genius of Marochetti was selected to erect a fitting monument to his memory; and the bones of Napoléon finally reposed on the banks of the Seine, amidst the "people whom he had loved so well." Yet will future ages perhaps regret the ocean-girt isle, the solitary stone, the willow-tree. Napoléon will live when Paris is in ruins: his deeds will survive the dome of the Invalides;—no man can show the tomb of Alexander!

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of historical review to mankind—Perpetual alternation of progress and decline in human affairs—Errors in supposing that any one state of things is to continue permanent—General progress of mankind notwithstanding these vicissitudes—Steady growth of improvement through them all—Failure of all attempts to introduce any lasting improvement in the condition of men by mere changes in the form of their government—Expectations of the world at the breaking out of the French Revolution—Demonstration of their fallacy which that convulsion has afforded—Entire disappointment of these expectations in its external relations—Their subsequent failure during the Restoration—Subsequently in the Revolutions of Southern Europe—In the results of American equality—And in the effects of Reform in the British Islands—This all flows from the general corruption of mankind—What is meant by this principle—Necessary consequences of the principle of perfectibility—Opposite effects of general corruption—Views of the popular party on the intellectual character of men—Opposite conclusions of Experience on this subject—These opposite views will for ever divide mankind—Explanation which this affords of the hostility of the Revolutionary party to Christianity—Apparent support which the Christian religion gives to Republican equality—And causes of democratic hostility to it—General results as to the corruption of all classes—Individuals in all ranks are equally inclined to evil—Whence the difference in the effect of civil government on mankind—Advantages of Monarchical government—Advantages and evils of Aristocratic government—Great powers of Democracy as a spring—Its evils—Why Democratic evils are less generally complained of than Aristocratic—What has led to the speedy destruction of all Democratic communities—Causes of the different tendency of Aristocratic and Democratic institutions—Permanence of the interests of the holders of property—Training of the higher class to government as a profession—Interests of holders of property lead them to look forward to the future—Grievous want of this quality in the great body of mankind—Security which this form of government affords against the corruptions of power—Cause of the prevalence of virtuous moral opinion in a rightly organized community—And of the rapid corruption of opinion in Democratic states—Example of this difference afforded in a public theatre—Cause of the general cruelty of Democracy—Want of all responsibility in the real rulers of Republican societies—It is an open, not a close Aristocracy, which is attended with these advantages—Evils of the former species of government—Contention of Aristocracy and Democracy in all free states—Great effects, and brief endurance, of combined Aristocratic direction and Democratic vigour—Reasons of this moral law—To what cause is the general tendency to decay in mankind to be ascribed—Increased principles of vitality in modern times—But they still have the seeds of decay in their bosoms—Final cause of the prevalence of war among mankind—Its apparent unmitigated evils—But real tendency to stifle the selfish by the generous passions—Striking example of this which the history of the Revolutionary war affords—Remarkable physical conformation of Asia in this respect, and its difference from Europe or America—Effects of this difference in the continual regeneration of the Asiatic states—Which was unnecessary in Europe and America from the internal efforts of the Democratic principle—Continual alternations of action and reaction which are in consequence exhibited in European communities—Examples of this from the Reformation and French Revolution—Ultimate danger which threatens to destroy this vital principle—Combination of this provision for human progress with justice dealt out to individual nations—Agency by which this administration of affairs is effected—And its consistency with the perfect freedom of human actions—Democracy is the great moving power in mankind—And the principle cause of the dispersion of the human race—Aristocracy is the controlling and regulating power—Irreparable evil is only to be dreaded when either has destroyed the other—Which was what was effected in France by the Revolution—Its vast effect on the spread of the Christian religion—By the colonies of England and the conquests of Russia—General conclusion.

Importance
of historical
review to
mankind.

“HISTORY,” says Bolingbroke, “is philosophy teaching by examples;” and it would have been well for mankind in past times, if they had more generally acted upon the experience and information to be derived from the annals of their forefathers. Society, it is true, is

ever changing; the human race is continually advancing, and never recedes; and it is rarely indeed that a combination of circumstances occurs again, precisely similar to any which had preceded it. But amidst the infinite diversity of human affairs, and the increasing progress of the human race, there are certain general principles which are of universal application, and the neglect or observance of which, in all ages, has been attended with the same consequences. It is in the discovery of those principles, hidden from the ordinary gaze amid the multiplicity of human events, that the great use of history consists; it is in their general diffusion through all the thinking classes of the community, that the only sure foundation either for social prosperity or national security is to be found. "Man," says Sir Walter Scott, "only differs from birds and beasts, because he has the means of availing himself of the knowledge acquired by his predecessors. The swallow builds the same nest which its father and mother built: the sparrow does not improve by the experience of its parents. Our ancestors lodged in caves and wigwams, where we construct palaces for the rich, and comfortable dwellings for the poor;—and why is this? Because our eye is able to look back upon the past, to improve upon our ancestors' improvements, to avoid their errors. This can only be done by studying history, and comparing it with passing events (1)." The more widely that the people are admitted into a share of government—the more direct the influence which they exercise upon the decision of the legislature has become—the more indispensable is it that these principles should be generally inculcated and understood; for without wisdom in the direction of government, no security can exist either for national or individual welfare—and without general information on historical subjects among the people, they will rarely, except under the pressure of immediate necessity, either submit to the sacrifices, or acquiesce in the course, which wisdom requires.

Perpetual
alteration
of progress
and decline
in human
affairs.

"Whatever," says Dr. Johnson, "makes the past or the future predominate over the present, exalts us in the scale of thinking beings." The words are familiar to every one, till they have become trite; but the thought is often far removed, even from the most contemplative breasts. To rise superior to the pressure of existing events, to generalize at once from the past and the present, and to draw inferences in regard to the future, which shall be just even in the ever-changing current of human affairs, is perhaps the highest effort of philosophical power; yet it is not sufficient to do so that the observer is imbued with the spirit of his own times, and that he is deeply impressed with the progress among mankind, and vast changes in society that he sees around him. If he limits his observation to them alone he will be led as widely astray as if he regarded only the past, and cast aside all observation of the present. At one period, and in some countries, mankind appear to make the most rapid progress; their numbers multiply with incredible rapidity, they expand in every direction, and come to exercise a great, sometimes a durable influence on human affairs. At other times, nations become stationary, or even retrograde, their energies seem exhausted, their fire is burnt out; and centuries elapse without their giving birth to one original thought, or achieving a single action worthy of being recorded in the annals of mankind. In the first period, the thoughtful observer is apt to be unduly influenced by the strength of the current in which he finds himself placed: he sees every thing around him in rapid motion; institutions changing, new powers

(1) Lockhart's Life of Scott, v. 117.

rising into action, old influences sinking or forgotten. He not unnaturally imagines that this violent current is to continue for ever the same, when, in fact, the very rapidity of its motion is only accelerating the period when it is to be followed by a calm. He forgets that the rapids of Niagara are succeeded by the calm expanse of Lake Ontario. In the latter situation, the observer is often led unduly to despair of the fortunes of his species: indignant at the corruption or selfishness with which he is surrounded; unable to arouse his countrymen to activity or public virtue; desponding, from observing the community to which he belongs sinking in the scale of nations, he becomes hopeless of the improvement of mankind, and vents his discontent in cutting satires on the prevailing vices, and which appear to form the melancholy termination of national exaltation. He forgets that such a state of things is not eternal; that a remedy, and an effectual remedy, is provided against its evils in the rise of other states, the advent of fiercer passions, or the inroad of braver nations; and that as certainly as the bursting vegetation of spring succeeds the torpid vitality of winter, so surely will the energy and powers of mankind come to revive the decaying spirit of nations.

Error in supposing that any one state of things is to continue permanent. It is a common subject of complaint with the writers of the present age, which is in a peculiar degree a period of progress, that a portion of the community, considerable in number and powerful from the possession of property, fix their eyes with undue partiality on the institutions of their ancestors; that they are blind to the lights of the age, solicitous to perpetuate the now worn-out and expiring system of society, and insensible to the continual and rapidly-increasing influence of new elements and agents upon the fabric of society. There is, without doubt, often much foundation for this complaint; and many of the most calamitous convulsions which have agitated mankind have arisen from blindness to this progress, and the attempt to perpetuate in one generation institutions which arose in, and were adapted to another. But the error is not the less manifest, though now it is the more general, of those who imagine that the progress of one period is to be continual; that human thought and human wishes are invariably to run in one channel and in one direction; and that the ultimate destiny of society in the civilized world may, with confidence, be predicted from the tendency of its movement at a particular period. The greatest political writers of the present age are not exempt from this delusion. When M. de Tocqueville asserts that the evident tendency of mankind, both in the old and new world, is every where to establish democratic ascendancy; that the current of popular ambition, and the increasing strength of popular power, is such as to be altogether irresistible; and that, for good or for evil, republican institutions are the evident destiny of mankind—he is disregarding the caution of the sage, and not permitting the past and the future to predominate over the present. He forgets what was the termination of Grecian democracy, what the end of the Roman republic; he overlooks the vast reaction which over great part of modern Europe succeeded the first burst of the Protestant reformation; he shuts his eyes to the transports of joy which in England marked the restoration of the Stuarts, and the unanimous efforts of Europe in our own times to throw off the dreadful oppression of the French Revolution. The eastern sage had a far deeper insight into human affairs who desired the Sultan to inscribe on his ring, as the moral alike for adverse and prosperous fortune, “And this too shall pass away.”

So strongly has this perpetual recurrence of action and reaction impressed itself upon the most profound observers of mankind, that a few deep thinkers in every age have held that human affairs proceed not in a straight line,

General
progress of
mankind
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these vicis-
situdes.

but in a circle; that, literally speaking, the aphorism is true, that there is nothing new under the sun; and that what is supposed to be the infusion of fresh elements into society, and the advent of a new age in the world, is in reality nothing more than the repetition to another state or generation of the same eternal round of valour, effort, greatness, discord, degeneracy, and decline, which from the earliest periods, like the seven ages of individual man, has marked the progress of nations from their nativity to their grave. It must be confessed that an attentive consideration of the course of human affairs, as they are exhibited, not in one country or one age, but on an extended survey of mankind at all times, affords, with reference to individual states, much reason for believing that this disheartening view is well founded. But they are widely mistaken who anticipate from that circumstance a corresponding succession of progress and decline in the general fortunes of *mankind*. Nothing seems better established, from the most extensive survey of the history of mankind, than the fact, that an unceasing progress may be observed throughout all its changes and vicissitudes; that although individual nations seem liable to the ordinary lot of mortality, yet the fortunes of the human race partake of the immortality of the works of nature; and that, amidst all the successive rise and fall of individual states, a vast system for the extension and improvement of the species is to be discerned. And if a fanciful analogy to physical motion, or mathematical figures, is to be admitted to illustrate such a progress, perhaps the nearest approximation which can be made to it is, to assimilate the advance of mankind to the movement ascribed by the Ptolemaic astronomers, anterior to the days of Copernicus, to the planetary bodies; and to hold, that while each state performs in due season its own separate revolution, yet the centre round which it revolves, sustained by the arm of Omnipotence, is continually advancing.

Steady
growth of
improve-
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through
all these
changes.

If we compare the extent of civilization, the diffusion of knowledge, and the scene of human happiness in the first ages recorded in authentic history, in the days of Herodotus, with that which now obtains, when the light, then faintly glimmering along the shores of the Mediterranean, has spread over the whole world as far as the waters of the ocean extend; and the freedom for which the Grecian republics then heroically contended, has extended over great part of Europe, and into another hemisphere; ample ground for the most cheering anticipations, in regard to the future destiny of the human race, will be found to exist. The Greek, the Carthaginian, the Roman, the Persian empires have successively fallen; but the human race has survived all the catastrophes which for a time appeared to darken its prospects; and the sacred fire transmitted in the human breast from one age or nation to another, has on every successive occasion gleamed forth with additional lustre, and now illuminates the whole world with its beams.

Failure of
all attempts
to introduce
any lasting
improvement
in the con-
dition of
mankind by
forms of
government.

A nearer examination, however, of the progress of nations, and still more, perhaps, a practical acquaintance with mankind, under any circumstances or stage of advancement, will probably suggest an important modification of this evident law of social progress, and unfold the principal cause to which the continued failure of all attempts, by changes in the form of government, or social condition of the people, either to elevate their character, increase their happiness, or avert the numerous evils incident to their situation, is to be attributed. The treasures of knowledge, the powers of art, the triumphs of science, constitute a permanent addition to the inheritance of mankind; and the art of printing

has apparently given them a durable existence, and for ever preserved for future generations the acquisitions of the past. But a very slight acquaintance with men, is sufficient to show that it is neither in these acquisitions, nor the powers that they confer, that the secret either of national strength or individual elevation is to be found. Intellectual cultivation is unhappily proved, by all history, to be but too consistent with moral neglect; the spread of knowledge with the diffusion of corruption; the triumphs of art with degradation of character. Nay, so uniformly has this melancholy progress hitherto at least attended the greatest intellectual efforts of mankind, that, till within the last sixty years, it had long passed into a maxim with the wisest philosophers and the most experienced observers, that moral elevation and national greatness were inconsistent with great advancement in arts and sciences; and that in the words of Bacon, "in the infancy of a state, arms do prevail; in its maturity, arms and learning for a *short season*; in its decline, commerce and the mechanical arts."

Expectations of the world at the breaking out of the French Revolution.

At the breaking out of the French Revolution, it was almost universally imagined by philosophers, that the extension of knowledge, the humanizing of manners, and the diffusion of education, had provided an effectual antidote to this tendency to decay hitherto always observable in human affairs, and at the same time discovered a remedy for almost all the moral, and even the physical evils of humanity. The more that the writings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Raynal, and all that school of philosophers, are examined, the more clearly will it appear that this position formed the corner-stone of their whole system, and that it was to illustrate it that all their efforts were directed. Condorcet expressly states, in his *Life of Voltaire*, that that was the cardinal point of his philosophy (1). Nor are such doctrines confined to that age or to that country. The doctrine of human perfectability—the principle that there is an indefinite progress in human affairs, not only in mechanical or scientific acquisition, but in moral elevation and social happiness—is so agreeable to the human heart, so flattering to human vanity, and withal, so nearly allied to the generous affections, that it will, in all probability, to the end of the world constitute the basis on which all the efforts of the popular party will be rested, and all the visions of social amelioration justified. It is already the prevailing, in fact almost universal, creed in America, which hardly any writer, even of the highest class, in that land of freedom ventures to gainsay; and it is a doctrine which will be found to lie at the root of the principles of all those numerous parties in Great Britain who aim at ameliorating the condition of mankind by merely altering their political institutions. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to enquire to what extent this principle is well founded; to examine how far it is consistent with the experience of human nature; and in what degree it is warranted by the past annals of mankind.

The French Revolution affords the most decisive demonstration which the history of the world has yet exhibited of the entire fallacy of this opinion.

(1) "Error and ignorance are the sole causes of the misfortunes of the human race; and superstitious errors are the most fatal, because they corrupt the sources of reason, and their fatal enthusiasm leads to the commission of crimes without remorse. The more men are enlightened, the freer will they be, and the less will it cost them to become so. What in those circumstances is the duty of a philosopher? To attack superstition; to demonstrate to governments, peace, riches, power, as the infallible reward of laws which secure religious freedom. He

will enlighten them on all that they have to fear from the priests, whose secret influence will ever menace the repose of nations if entire liberty of writing is not guaranteed; for perhaps, before the discovery of printing, it was impossible to extricate mankind from a yoke as shameful as it is fatal: and as long as the sacerdotal power is not destroyed by reason, there is no medium between absolute debasement and dangerous disturbances."—*Vie de Voltaire*, par CONDORCET; *Oeuvres de Voltaire*, i. 150.

Demon-
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this fallacy
which the
French
Revolution
affords.

It was avowedly based by all its authors, both philosophical and political, upon the principle of the perfectability of mankind: this doctrine was repeated in all their writings and speeches, till it had passed into a sort of universal maxim; it was the ground on which they at once rested their legislation, and justified their cruelties. "You can never," it was said, "give the people too much power; there is not the slightest danger of their abusing it. Tyranny in former ages has arisen entirely from the vices of kings, the ambition of ministers, and the arts of priests; when the great and virtuous mass of the people are admitted into the direction of affairs, these evils will at once cease, because those will become the governors whose interest it is to be well governed. Gentleness, philanthropy, wisdom, may be expected universally to prevail, when the sovereignty is vested in those who are all equally to be blessed by the establishment of these virtues. Possibly much suffering may have been inflicted, some injustice may doubtless have been committed, on the part of the people, in the effort to secure for themselves these blessings; but these evils are temporary, and not worthy to be for a moment weighed against the permanent blessings of republican institutions." We may conceive what must have been the anguish of the persons, who, after promulgating and acting upon these principles, found themselves and their country involved in unheard-of miseries from their effects; when they saw the people whom they had represented, and whom they believed to be so innocent, instantly, on the acquisition of power, steeped in atrocities infinitely greater than had ever disgraced the government of kings or the councils of priests; and found that the middle class, whom they had always held out as the secure depositaries of public virtue, were themselves taking the lead in the commission of every species of political atrocity. It is not surprising that anxiety to avoid witnessing such fruits from their efforts, should have led numbers even of the most enlightened to commit suicide; that Roland should have been found dead on the wayside, with a writing in his pocket, testifying that he "cared not to live in a world stained by so many crimes;" and that Condorcet, who had carried his dreams of human perfectability so far as to have anticipated, from the combined discoveries of science, and stilling of the angry passions of the human breast through the spread of freedom, an extension of human life through indefinite ages, should have been led to shorten his own existence, by poison administered by his own hand.

Entire dis-
appointment
of those ex-
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foreign wars
of the
revolution.

The external conquests of the French during the Revolutionary wars, and the brilliant but devastating and disastrous career of Napoléon, were nothing but the application of these principles to the external concerns of the world. This observation has already been made more than once in the course of this work; but it is of such vast importance that it never can be sufficiently enforced, and illustrations of it will be found to arise in almost every page of this history. Of all the dangers to be anticipated from the establishment of popular power, probably that which was least anticipated was, that it would lead to a general passion for war and foreign conquest; for these evils, so severely felt in every age, had for long, by the common consent of philosophers, been set down to the ambition of kings, the cruelty of priests, or the rivalry of ministers. Yet was this effect immediately found to follow from it, and that too with such fury and violence, that for twenty years it deluged Europe with blood, and all but prostrated the whole military powers of the Continent before the Republican bayonets. To any one, however, who considers the principles of human nature, the immediate effects of a revolution, and the

passions which it awakens among the people, it must at once appear that such a result was not only probable but unavoidable. The dreams of philosophers, and the visions of philanthropists, anticipated from the establishment of Government upon a highly democratic basis, the immediate and entire cessation of wars and tumults, and the advent of a general period of philanthropy, benevolence, and mutual charity, among mankind. But what was the effect which actually occurred? Precisely that which any man practically acquainted with human nature would have anticipated, which the experience of every age had demonstrated, and which a few of the profoundest thinkers had foretold—viz. that the working classes were immediately thrown out of employment by the total cessation of trade, and the universal terrors of the capitalists; that the expectations of the middle ranks became unbounded; that the wicked passions of the human heart immediately burst into overwhelming activity; and that an universal stoppage of employment, and starvation among the poor, were found to coincide with the anticipated social resurrection of the state. At the same time the government, from the failure of the revenue, became utterly insolvent; all the methods that were tried of restoring the finances, by confiscation of the property of the church, seizure of the estates of the emigrants, and issue of assignats, proved entirely illusory, and in their ultimate effects became the greatest possible aggravation instead of an alleviation of the public distress, by the overwhelming ruin which they brought upon private families, and the total destruction of capital and credit which they occasioned. Thus the Republican French were driven into the career of foreign conquest alike by financial necessity, democratic ambition, and popular misery; and in its excitements and glories they found a transient compensation for their sufferings, until the oppression and wretchedness which it had brought on other nations, roused an unanimous feeling of resistance throughout Europe, and brought on their dreadful overthrow.

After the fall of Napoléon, it was confidently hoped by the friends of popular institutions, that notwithstanding all her crimes and all her sufferings, France at length was about to receive a reward for the strenuous efforts she had made in the cause of freedom, and that, under the sway of a constitutional monarch, the glorious fabric of civil liberty would be permanently established in that great country. If the material prosperity of the government of the Restoration is alone considered, there appeared good reason for supposing that this expectation was about to be realized. During the fifteen years of its weak but gentle government, peace was preserved; the carnage of Napoléon was in great part repaired by the vivifying powers of population; industry and wealth increased to an incredible degree; the freedom of the press, and the guarantees of constitutional liberty, were established to an extent altogether unknown in Continental Europe; and the general well-being of the people indicated the existence of a salutary administration of public affairs. But all this was as nothing to the Revolutionists, “as long as Mordecai the Jew sat at the king’s gate.” The government of the Restoration was obnoxious, for it reminded them, how innocently soever on the part of the Royal Family, of the days of their humiliation; the passions of the Revolution, long pent up, came at last to require a vent; the restraints of morality, law, and order, were felt as insupportable, by a people accustomed to the license of anarchy and the splendours of military conquests; and the imbecile hands of a race of pacific monarchs proved unequal to the task of restraining the fiery coursers of a Revolution. Thus the dynasty of the Restoration fell, and with it all the

Their failure
during the
Restoration.

hopes of governing France by the powers of a constitutional monarchy, and the moral influences of religion, morality, and public spirit. In the vigorous hands of Louis Philippe, a very different and far more suitable mode of government to the spirit of the nation has been established. The forms of a constitutional monarchy were retained, but its spirit was annihilated; the army was immensely augmented; the public expenditure increased a half; the ordonnances which had occasioned the fall of Charles X. were re-enacted with additional severity; formidable fortifications erected round Paris; an army of sixty thousand men permanently quartered in its neighbourhood, and the reality of military government established.

And in the revolutions of the south of Europe. Still the advocates of democratic equality, and the believers in human perfectability, were not discouraged. They looked for a realization of their dreams in the efforts of the Carbonari of Naples, of the patriots of Piedmont, and of the ultra-liberals of Spain. Disheartening indeed was the result of all these expectations. In the two former countries, the efforts of the republicans were overthrown with hardly any resistance; in the latter, the attempts of the Revolutionists, after occasioning a dreadful civil war, which for eight years bathed the Peninsula in blood, have terminated in the prostration of the crown, the ruin of the country, the destruction of freedom, and the establishment of a military despotism, rivalling in severity, as the previous efforts of its supporters had equalled in atrocity, that which formed the termination and punishment of the French Revolution.

And in the results of American equality. Even then, the sanguine hopes of the believers in the innocence of mankind and the doctrine of human perfectability were not altogether cast down. "These calamitous results, it was said, were the consequences only of the corruptive oppressions and vices of the old world: the reaction against ages of former misrule has been so violent as to have defeated its object, and thence the general failure of all attempts to establish liberty and equality in the old world. But in the new, a very different result may be anticipated; there, the human race have begun their career unmanacled by the fetters of former despotism; no pre-existing evils exist to avenge; the career of freedom will be unstained by blood, and amidst the untrodden riches, and unbounded capabilities of its forests, the glorious fabric of liberty will be founded on the basis of universal education and equality." How have these expectations been realized? Why, in no other way than that, amidst all the unbounded room for expansion which the human race there enjoys, the innate propensities of the human heart have been not less conspicuous than on the old theatre of European contention; that even the boundless riches of the far west have not been able to furnish an adequate vent for the selfish and angry passions of the human breast; that all the attempts to ameliorate the condition of their millions of slaves have been strenuously resisted in one part of the country, while in another, the most violent attacks have been made upon the national establishments, on which the credit and even the existence of the mercantile classes were dependent; that bankruptcy and ruin, to an unheard of extent, have prostrated commercial wealth, and popular injustice has already begun to proclaim the necessity of abolishing the national debt; that independence of thought, and dignity of character, have been crushed by the overwhelming power of numbers, and that deeds of violence have been perpetrated in many parts of the United States by the tyrant majority, with entire impunity, of so frightful a character, that they exceed in cruelty all the savage

atrocities of the French Revolution, and have made the Americans vain to seek a parallel for them in the hideous persecutions and iniquities which have for ever disgraced the Roman Catholic religion.

Failure of
their hopes
in the
British
islands.

Great hopes were at one time entertained in the British islands, that the vast organic change which convulsed the country in 1832, would terminate in such an improved frame of government

as would in this asylum of constitutional freedom at last realize the hopes of so many of the ardent friends of humanity. Hitherto, however, the result has certainly not been such as to justify the opinion, that this country is destined to form any exception to the inferences deducible from so many previous examples of anticipated success and realized failure. It will be the province of some future historian to point out with pride the superior moderation and order which have distinguished the English Revolution from the more sanguinary convulsions by which it has been surrounded, and the greater ease with which its inhabitants have fallen back, after the contest was over, into habits of peace, and the established channels of constitutional warfare. Yet must he at the same time record, that symptoms of no unequivocal kind have appeared, of as dangerous a spirit in the lower classes of the English people, as in the most violently excited portions of the French population; that the flames of Bristol, of Nottingham, and of Birmingham, have demonstrated, that the torch can be wielded with as infuriated hands in Great Britain as either in France or America; that the dreams of the socialists, and the projects of the chartists, tend to a demoralization of society as thorough, and spoliation of property as complete, as were contemplated by the followers of Babeuf, or the partisans of Chaumette; that the complaint of the working classes now is, that none of their grievances have been removed by the diffusion of more popular power into the legislature, while the relief of the destitute has, by democratic selfishness, been grievously abridged; that the comparatively bloodless termination of the strife in Great Britain, on the whole, is to be ascribed rather to the patriotic conduct and bold front of the holders of property, than to the greater gentleness or sense of justice in its enemies; and that in external affairs, the spirit of democratic government, at once parsimonious at home and aggressive abroad, has not only induced the most formidable financial embarrassments in the state, but involved the nation in disasters greater than it had ever before experienced, and which have shaken to its foundation the solid fabric of the British Empire.

This all
flows from
the gene-
ral cor-
ruption of
mankind.

Consequences so uniform, and yet so unexpected by the advocates of human perfectability, evidently point to the operation of some great law of nature, against which all these efforts for social amelioration have been so signally shattered, and which in every

age has led to the speedy discomfiture of every project formed for the improvement of human institutions, based on democratic principles. It is not difficult to see what it is that has occasioned all these results, and so often blasted the hopes of so many of the warmest friends of humanity. It is no new or unknown principle that has had this effect; it is announced in the earliest records of humanity, and stands proclaimed in every subsequent page of history; but it is a doctrine which the self-love of mankind will, to the end of the world, always render the last to be generally received. It is the principle of HUMAN CORRUPTION.

What is
meant by this
principle.

In referring to this principle, it is not meant to assert, as has been sometimes erroneously imagined by divines, that any inherent taint has descended to the human race from the fall of our first pa-

rents, like an hereditary physical disease, *independent of their own actings* as free agents. For such a position no authority can be found in any passage of scripture when properly considered; nor is any countenance given to it, either by our innate sense of justice, or observation of the Divine administration. What is meant is a different position, equally consonant to the divine justice and to the experience of mankind, viz. : that every individual is *born innocent, but with dispositions to evil*, and dispositions so strong, that in no instance whatever is their effect altogether avoided; and that without the most sedulous care and incessant efforts, aided by all the influence of religion, every person will inevitably be led, under the guidance of his passions, into criminal actions. Whether such a doctrine is consistent with human nature, may be left to the innate consciousness of every human breast. Let him that feels himself innocent throw the first stone. Whether it is consistent with the experience of mankind in private life, may be determined by every one from the conduct of the persons with whom he is acquainted, and the more extensive and practical that acquaintance is, the more strong will be his convictions on the subject; and in social affairs, and the contest of nations, its truth is loudly proclaimed in every page of history, from the origin of the human race to the present hour. Nevertheless, it is probably the last doctrine that ever will be embraced by the great body of mankind; and the insensibility to it, or determination to resist it, is the real cause of the whole innumerable disasters, which in every age have made democratic ascendancy terminate in misery, bloodshed, and ruin. Superficial observers will ask, what has social amelioration or political discussion to do with theological disputes, or questions of original sin: they might as well ask what has population to do with the passion of sex or warlike triumphs with military courage.

Necessary consequences of the principles of perfectability. Concede to the popular party and the advocates of human perfectability the principles with which they uniformly set out, and which they hold out as axioms which lie at the foundation of all political philosophy, and it is utterly impossible to resist the conclusions for republican institutions and self-government, for which they contend. Admit with them that the human mind is naturally inclined to gentleness, benevolence, and philanthropy; that the savage or the hunter is a model of every virtue; that angry passions are instilled into the breast of man in subsequent times by the tyranny of kings, the delusions of priests, and the oppression of wealth; concede the dogma that the light of knowledge and the progress of education are fitted to extirpate all the cruel and savage propensities of mankind, and prepare the world for the general reign of innocence and peace; admit that the many, if permitted to govern, will avoid the passions, iniquities, and cupidity of the few; and the argument for self-government becomes irresistible. *Ut cives feliciter vivant*, is unquestionably the object both of legislation and political philosophy; and if it be once discovered that the principles of the majority of mankind will always be inclined to the side of moderation, virtue, and wisdom, it is impossible too soon to commence by universal democratic institutions the advent of the second age of gold.

Opposite effects of the Christian doctrine of general corruption. Concede, on the other hand, to the Christian philosopher, or the experienced observer of mankind, the conclusions at which they both arrive; admit with them that the human heart contains the spring at once of good and of bad actions; that the former, though often predominant in the end, by the influence of religion, effort, and cultivation, are uniformly weaker in the outset than the latter; admit, what few experienced in the ways of man will be inclined to deny, that the "heart

s' deceptful above all things and desperately wicked;" admit with them that the temptations to sin are powerful, immediate, and such as instantly strike and captivate the senses, while the inducements to virtue are remote, slow of growth, and difficult of execution; that *immediate* gratification and pleasure are the rewards held out by the former, and labour, effort, and self-denial, the sacrifices required in the commencement by the latter; admit further, that these opposite sets of motives to action are placed before beings universally desirous of immediate enjoyment, and in comparatively few instances accessible to the influence of remote or distant considerations; admit these things, and it will at once appear that the idea of self government is an entire delusion; that the great body of mankind, if left to themselves, will plunge headlong into the career which promises immediate gratification to their interests or their passions, without any regard to ultimate consequences, whether in this world or the next; and that violence, injustice, and ultimate bloodshed, must inevitably result from opening the floodgates which admit the unrestrained passions of the human heart to bear upon the direction of public affairs.

View of the popular party on the intellectual character of man. Discrepancies, not less irreconcilable, separate the two parties which now divide mankind, in regard to the intellectual powers of the majority of men in all ages. The advocates of human perfectability admit, that in times past the majority of men in most countries have been unfit to be entrusted with the work of legislation, and that they have been, in a great measure, of necessity subjected to the government of a few. But this, they allege, was owing entirely to the want of education and intellectual cultivation; that a totally different result may be anticipated from the diffusion of knowledge, the spread of education, and the habit of political discussion; and that great as have been the dangers of suddenly admitting benighted man into the exercise of political rights, they would all vanish like the shades of night before the rising sun of knowledge.

Opposite conclusions of experience on this subject. The more experienced observers of human affairs reason after a different manner. They maintain that the great distinction between the mass of mankind and the small body of thinking men to be found among them, consists in the different degrees by which they are influenced by distant consequences; that in all assemblies of men, of whatever rank, if at all numerous, there is nothing so difficult as to induce the majority to take into view *remote* consequences; that present relief, present gratification, or present advantage, constitute the motives which universally sway the great majority; and that these dispositions are even more conspicuous among the middle and working classes of society, than in those possessed of property, and having had the advantage of a moral and refined education. If this position be conceded, it at once strikes at the root of the possibility of successfully entrusting the management of public affairs to a mere majority of men, independent of the qualification of property or education; since the very first requisite of government is to foresee and guard against dangers which are not visible to, or are disregarded by the majority of men; and the very derivation of the epithet applied to the Supreme Being — *Providence* — implies that the quality of foresight is the one which forms the leading characteristic of government in the Supreme Ruler of the universe.

These opposite views will for ever divide mankind.

These two subjects of the general corrupt tendencies of the human heart, and of the universal want of foresight among the majority of men, constitute the fundamental points of difference between the two parties which now divide the world; and neither will ever

be able to maintain a successful combat against the other, either by reason or force of arms, but by constantly basing their arguments upon one or other of these grounds. Sanguine visions of the future, exalted conceptions of the capacity and virtue of human nature, warm anticipations of the ultimate destinies of the species, ever have and ever will constitute the strength of the popular party, and will in every age not fail to enlist on their side not only the selfish and the vicious, who aim at the destruction of every restraint, human and divine, but also a considerable and sometimes an overwhelming portion of the philanthropic, the enthusiastic, and the benevolent, in all classes. A constant recurrence, on the other hand, to human iniquity, a loud denunciation of the extent to which it pervades all ranks and all classes, a sedulous inculcating of the principle, that virtue can be attained only by exertion and religious influence, and that the direction of affairs can be entrusted only to those whose habits of foresight, moral and mental qualifications, entitle them to assume the lead, must be the basis on which the principles of the opposite party must be rested. As oblivion of the past, and anticipation only of the future, constitute the strength of the one party, so actual experience and historical authority furnish the strength of the other. Hence the one alleges that history is an old almanack; the other, that it is the great basis on which all political knowledge must be reared. But the latter principles will never be placed on a proper foundation, nor will those who hold them ever assume a position from which they cannot by possibility be forced, until they fairly take their stand on this ground, and boldly front all the obloquy to which it will expose them; but if they do so, their principles, however disagreeable to human vanity, can never be overthrown; for experience will ever demonstrate their universal application, and the very men who are most loud in declaiming against their falsehood, will in general, by their conduct, afford the most signal proof of their truth.

This explains how Christianity is so obnoxious to Democracy. These considerations explain a fact, which would otherwise be wholly inexplicable; but the illustrations of which may nevertheless be observed in every page of history, viz.—that the popular and democratic party, so far from resting on the principles of the Christian religion, in general evince the most deadly hostility to its tenets, and that its principles form the corner-stone of the opposite body, who endeavour to maintain the ascendancy of property and education. During the first fervour of the Reformation, indeed, the stubborn supporters of religious freedom formed a temporary alliance with political enthusiasts, and the puritans of Cromwell stood side by side with the republicans and fifth-monarchy men; but that was a temporary union, arising from mutual necessity, which did not long survive the circumstances which gave it birth. Religious freedom, in truth, was the object for which the Protestants fought in the sixteenth century; civil liberty was regarded only so far as it might prove conducive to spiritual independence. It was in the eighteenth century that the real democratic spirit was first fully developed, and then it was at once rested on the dogma of human perfectability: its advocates loudly proclaimed the native innocence of man, and inculcated a total separation from all the restraints of religion; and before the close of the contest, the contending parties had universally hoisted their true colours, and liberty, philosophy, indulgence, were inscribed on the banners of the one side; and religion, self-denial, duty, on those of the other.

If we consider, however, the principles of the Christian religion, such a result must appear at first sight not a little surprising. More than any religion that ever existed, the religion of the gospel provides for the poor, and en-

Apparent
consistency
of Chris-
tian with
popular
principles.

joins duties on the great among mankind. Alone of all other faiths, it from the outset proclaims the universal equality of mankind in the sight of heaven; it preaches in an especial manner the gospel to the poor; it denounces greater risks of ultimate punishment to the rich than to the indigent; and incessantly inculcates the duty of charity to the unfortunate as the first of Christian graces, and which will alone atone for a multitude of sins. How then has it happened, that a faith of this description, inculcating doctrines so eminently favourable to the poorer ranks, and so subversive of all distinction in the different classes of men, at least in moral responsibility, has not been universally seized upon as the very corner-stone of the popular party throughout the globe?

Causes of
the hostility
of Demo-
cracy to it.

Simply because it at the same time inculcates the doctrine of human corruption; because, if it announces the universal equality of men in the sight of heaven, it as loudly proclaims their universal tendency to guilty indulgence; because it gives no countenance to the idea, that alterations in the form of government, how important soever in themselves, will be of the least effect in remedying human evils, unless accompanied, or preceded by, a corresponding change in the active dispositions of men; and that the only reform which is likely to be of the least efficacy, is the reform of the human heart. Sedulously avoiding the mention of external things, hardly ever alluding to the forms either of civil or ecclesiastical government, except to inculcate obedience to existing authority, it as uniformly proclaims the equal responsibility of the governors and the governed; and imposes upon both, under equal sanctions, the duty of integrity in conduct and charity in feeling. It loudly proclaims the iniquity of the world and the miseries of mankind; it tells us that a remedy exists for these multifarious evils; but it tells us, at the same time, that that remedy does not consist in substituting the government of the many for the government of the few, but in the adoption by all, whether in or out of authority, of the golden rule, to do to others as they would that they should do unto them. Thence it is that the religion of the gospel is so generally obnoxious to the democratic party all the world over; for it at once strikes at the root of their dreams of human perfectability, and announces, as the only remedy for existing evils, the extirpation of existing and wide-spread wickedness. It prescribes a contest to the many as well as to the few; but it is not a contest with temporal power, but with spiritual temptation—its theatre is not the arena of politics, but the recesses of the breast. And yet few experienced observers, either of the streams of human events, or mankind as they exist around them, will probably doubt that it is there only that a really efficacious reform can be adopted; and that, if the one thing needful is generally done, then it is of comparatively little importance what is effected elsewhere.

General
result as to
the corrup-
tion of all
classes.

Instead, therefore, of arriving at the conclusion, that alterations in the form of government should be the great object of patriotic effort, and that important social benefits may be effected by such changes, unattended with moral improvement, the precepts of religion, equally with the results of experience, point to the conclusion, that the only secure foundation that can be laid for general amelioration is in private rectitude; that the heart is, literally speaking, the fountain from which the issues both of individual and social improvement must flow; and that unless moral and religious cultivation have preceded the acquisition of political power, it will speedily be converted into an engine merely for indulging all the worst passions of the human breast. And this explains how it happens, that in some simple and remote countries, such as the Swiss cantons, even a

pure democracy has been found to exist for centuries without inducing any public calamities; while in others, more advanced in civilization, no sooner have political privileges been given to the people, than they instantly applied them to the worst purposes, fell under the dominion of the most selfish characters in the community, and, like victorious soldiers after the storm of a town, broke out into the most unbridled excesses of rapine, lust, and social conflagration. It is the want of moral restraint which lets in all this flood of evils; and, generally speaking, the danger of their overwhelming society upon the acquisition of power by the people, is just in proportion to the absence of religious influence, the age, and corrupted state of the community.

The individuals in all ranks are equally inclined to evil.

It cannot be said that any class of society is exempt from this inherent weakness; or that in any hands, whether few or many, the possession of power is not likely to lead to its abuses. All have equal need of the internal restraint of moral principle; and all, to improve that principle, require external coercion. Whoever asserts that the absolute government of kings is the best form of civil society, and that they may be safely entrusted with the uncontrolled direction of human affairs, is a mere flatterer of courts, and his opinion is belied by every page of history. Whoever asserts that an oligarchy or an aristocracy stand in need of no restraint, because their interests are identified with those of the people on their estates, and because the greatest efforts of nations have been achieved by their means, is not less insensible to the evidence of facts, or less apt, if his opinions are implicitly followed, to mislead the world. Whoever asserts that the great body of mankind are capable of the arduous duty of self-government, that democratic institutions are the only true foundation for good administration, and that abuse of power need never be apprehended in their hands, because they are at once beyond its seductions and exposed to its evils, is not less a sycophant of power than the eulogist of courts or the minion of aristocracy; and his flatteries are only the more dangerous that they are addressed to a larger, a more impassioned, and a less enlightened circle than is to be found either in the halls of princes or the precincts of nobles.

Whence the difference in the effect of civil government on mankind.

How then has it happened, if all mankind are thus equally corrupted, and disposed to farm out political power for no other purpose but self-aggrandizement, that so marked a distinction is to be observed in the different effects of different forms of government upon human society, and whence the astonishing variety in the progress and elevation of mankind at different periods of the world, and under the influence of different forms of government? The question is a natural one, and if the foregoing principles are well founded, it must meet with a solution in consistency with them. And a very slight consideration must be sufficient to explain, not only how this great diversity has happened, but to point in the most decisive manner to the form of government which promises the greatest social happiness and public elevation.

Monarchical government; its advantages.

Since the creation of man, a vast majority, probably at least nine-tenths, of the human race have existed under the government of single monarchs or chiefs, exercising nearly absolute power within their separate principalities. Not to mention other examples that must be familiar to every reader, the whole of Asia, embracing six hundred millions of inhabitants, or nearly two-thirds of the whole human race, has, from the earliest period to the present hour, been uniformly governed by the absolute power of a single individual. Certain restraints upon the uncontrolled exercise of human power have no doubt existed in Asia as well as in other parts

of the world; but they consist not in any limitation of power in the sultan or chief, but in his occasional dethronement: the remedy against the evils of oppression is not the limitation of authority, but the murder of the despot. Great as have been the evils which in every age have flowed from the selfishness, the rapacity, and iniquities of these arbitrary governors of their species, it is yet evident that there must be some general and substantial benefits which have resulted from their rule, or it would long ago have been terminated by the common consent of mankind. Lightly as European independence may think of Asiatic despotism, philosophy will not despise a system of government under which two-thirds of the human race have subsisted from the beginning of time; and which is so firmly rooted in universal consent, that no amount of tyranny on the part of individual sovereigns, and no changes resulting from religion or conquest, have ever made them for one moment think of altering it. Whatever is found to have existed to a great extent among mankind for a very long period, must necessarily have been attended with great practical advantages which have overbalanced its evils; and the sagacious observer of such institutions, if he cannot discover their utility, will rather suspect that his powers of observation have been defective, than that mankind for so long a period, and over so great a surface, have obstinately persisted in what was destructive to themselves. But it is evident what has occasioned this uniformity of government in the East; the advantages of despotism are as clearly marked as its evils. They consist in the rude but effective coercion of human passion by the vigorous hand of single administration; the substitution, it may be, of the oppression of one for what certainly would be the licentiousness of all.

Aristocratic government; its evils, and advantages. Aristocratic societies are those which in every age have made the most durable impression on human affairs; and where patrician rule has been combined with a certain development of democratic energy in society, they have led to the greatest and the most splendid of human achievements. The empires of Carthage and Rome in ancient, and of Great Britain in modern times, are sufficient to demonstrate, that under no other form of government is it possible to combine such great and heroic achievements with such steady and durable progress. Its evils, as those of all earthly things, are many, and they consist chiefly in the uniform tendency of all holders of aristocratic power to consider it a patrimony for themselves and dependents—instead of a trust to be exercised for the public good—and the consequent restriction of office and power to a limited circle of society. But amidst many and evident evils, these examples decisively demonstrate that such a form of government is at least a move in the right direction. No community need be afraid of going far astray which treads in the footsteps of Rome and England. The secret of the prodigious ascendancy that this form of government has given to the nations that have embraced it, consists in the combination of fixity of purpose, arising from the durability of interest on the part of the holders of property, who constitute the ruling power, with courage and energy in the lower classes, springing from the facilities given them of rising in society. It is the power of steam restrained from its frightful devastation, and subjected to the guidance of firm and experienced hands.

Great powers of Democracy as a spring. Democratic government has produced, at different times, effects so opposite and contradictory, that it is not surprising that the opinions of men should be divided as far as the poles are asunder, in regard to its merits. Examined in one view, it exhibits the examples of the brightest eras on which the eye of the historian can rest. The arts of

Greece, the arms of Rome, the navy of England, the peopling of America, have arisen from its exertions. All the greatest achievements of the human mind have been effected under the influence of its fervour; whatever may have been the suffering and agony with which the convulsions it produced have been accompanied, they have led to the most splendid exertions of human genius, and the widest spread of the human race; and no one can contemplate the shore of the Mediterranean, studded with the successive colonies of Greece, Carthage, and Rome, or the shores of the ocean now beginning to glitter with those of England, without seeing that to this social agent of transcendent power, it is given to effect the greatest and the most momentous changes in the destiny of man. The Roman Empire itself was built up of the colonial settlements formed by its democratic citizens, or those of the Grecian republics on the adjoining coasts of Europe and Asia. Its conquests were but the bursting of the bands of armed and disciplined democracy into the savage tribes or enfeebled monarchies by which it was surrounded. If the French Revolution was to that great country a source of lasting evil, it gave it also a brief period of surpassing glory; and if we would seek the latent spring which at an interval of two hundred years has implanted the British race in the western and southern hemisphere, we shall find it in the efforts of the sturdy puritans in the days of Charles the First, and the visions of social regeneration in those of William the Fourth.

Its evils. If we examine democracy in another view, it appears the most biting scourge that the justice of Heaven ever let loose upon guilty man. At no other periods than when it was in the ascendant, and by no other agents than its conquests or oppression, has such intense suffering been inflicted on the human race. To the surrounding nations, Rome appeared a vast fountain of evil, always streaming over, yet always full, from which devastating floods incessantly issued to overwhelm and destroy mankind. We may judge how far and wide it laid waste the neighbouring states, from the nervous expression which Tacitus put into the mouth of the Caledonian chief, "*ubi solitudinem fecerunt, pacem appellant*;" and if any doubt could exist as to the piercing nature of the evils which republican ambition brings upon mankind, they would be established by the fact, that in twenty years it occasioned a slaughter of not less than ten millions of human beings on the two sides during the French Revolutionary war; and that such was the acute suffering which was produced throughout Europe by its triumph, that it overcame all the jealousy of nations and all the rivalry of cabinets, and induced a universal combination of mankind to effect its overthrow.

Why are Democratic evils less generally complained of than Aristocratic? The reasonings of the learned, the declamations of the ardent, the visions of the philanthropic, have generally been rather directed against the oppression of sovereigns or nobles, than the madness of the people. This affords the most decisive demonstration, that the evils flowing from the latter are much greater and more acute than those which have originated with the former; for it proves that the former have been so tolerable as to have long existed, and therefore have been long complained of, whereas those springing from the latter have been intolerable, and speedily led to their own abolition. The evils of democracy, when intrusted with the direction of public affairs, have in every age been found to be so excessive, that they have immediately produced its overthrow; and thus the experience of individuals does not in every age present the same numerous examples of democratic, that it does of aristocratic oppression; just because the former species of government is so dreadful, that it *invariably in every old community destroys itself* in a single generation, while the latter often maintains

its dominion for hundreds, or even thousands of years. History, indeed, is full of warnings of the terrible conflagration which democracy never fails to light up in society; and it is a secret consciousness of the damning force with which it overturns their doctrines, that makes the popular party everywhere treat its records with such contempt. But how many of the great body of the people, even in the best-informed community, make themselves masters of historical information? Not one in a hundred. Thus in periods of political convulsion, history points in vain to the awful beacons of former ruin to warn mankind of the near approach of shipwreck; while perfidious democracy, ever alive to the force of falsehood, or misled by the deceitfulness of sin, again for the hundredth time allures the unsuspecting multitude by the exhibition of the forbidden fruit; and popular change is eagerly longed for by the simple masses, just because its evils are so excessive, that they invariably quickly terminate the republican regime; actual personal experience can rarely be appealed to as to the effect of a contagion which almost always consigns its victims to the grave. And thus it is that the strength of revolution consists in the very magnitude of the falsehoods on which its promises are founded, and the universally-felt impossibility of bringing them for any considerable time to the test of actual experience.

What has led to the speedy destruction of all Democratic communities? A system of government founded on principles utterly subversive of order, security, and property, cannot by any possibility maintain itself for any length of time. It must either destroy the community or be destroyed itself. Democracy, accordingly, in an old community cannot by possibility exist for any lengthened period. It must either overthrow national freedom, and pave the way for the government of the sword, or be itself subverted by the aroused indignation of all the better classes of mankind. The near advent of the one or other of these two results is inevitable, in every old community in which popular passion has once obtained a legislative triumph. Which of the two results is to obtain, depends entirely on the degree of moral rectitude and public spirit which pervades the community where it has arisen. In ancient Greece, the democratic republicans, after a brief space of glorious existence, sank under the inherent evils of the form of government which prevailed; the liberties of Rome, rudely torn by the ambition of the Gracchi, soon perished under the contending swords of Cæsar and Pompey; the dreams of French equality were speedily extinguished by the guillotine of Robespierre and the sword of Napoléon—for in all these communities the majority were essentially selfish and corrupt. But in Great Britain, the heart of the nation, amidst all its convulsions, has still been sound; and though it has been often dazzled for a time by the false glare of the revolutionary meteor, it has ever in the end fixed its steady gaze again upon the principles of order and the precepts of religion.

Causes of the different tendency of Democracy and Aristocracy. The reason why, in every age of the world, the triumph of democracy has immediately, or at least shortly, been followed by the destruction of all the best interests of society, and the total ruin in particular of the whole principles of freedom for which it itself contended, is clearly illustrated by experience; and the moment it is stated, it must be seen to be one of universal application. It is not that the working classes of the community are in themselves more depraved or more corrupted than the classes who possess property, and have acquired information. It is probable that all men, in every rank of life, when exposed to the influence of the same temptations, are pretty nearly the same. But there is this difference between them, and it is an essential one in its ultimate effects

upon the interests of mankind, that though the dispositions of the Aristocratic or Conservative party may be just as selfish at bottom as those of the Democratic, there are several causes which permanently retain them in a comparatively fixed, safe, and beneficial course of government, and which, as they depend on general principles, may be expected to be of universal application. And these causes are the following:—

The interests of the holders of property are permanent. 1. In the first place, the interest of the holders of property is permanently to protect that property from injury or spoliation; whereas the interest of the democratic body, who are for the most part destitute of funds, is to advocate such measures as, by trenching upon or ultimately inducing a division of property, may, as they hope, have the effect of securing for them the advantages which at present they do not enjoy. Accordingly, it has uniformly been found, in all ages, that the holders of property advocate measures to protect that property; while the destitute masses are perpetually impelled to those likely to induce revolutionary spoliation. "*Egestas cupida novarum rerum*," is the most prolific source in troubled times of public ruin. This, however, is a matter of the very highest importance; for experience has now abundantly proved, what reason, from the beginning of the world, had asserted, not only that the security of property in every class of society, from the lowest to the highest, is the mainspring of all prosperity and happiness, both public and private, but that freedom itself is never so much endangered as by measures having a tendency to induce the division of property; and by the success of those measures, is immediately and irrevocably destroyed. To be satisfied of this, we have only to look to the condition of France, where measures of the most revolutionary and democratic character, directed against the aristocracy of land, of wealth, and of industry, were pursued with the most insatiate thirst, and crowned with the most entire success; and in consequence there are now no less than *ten millions eight hundred and sixty-two thousand separate landed properties in that kingdom*, divided among at least six millions of different owners, while the territorial and commercial aristocracy is almost totally destroyed. And what has been the result? Simply this, that the establishment or preservation of freedom has been rendered utterly impracticable in the country, because no power remains in the state capable of counterbalancing the influence and authority of the central government, resting on the armed force and universal patronage of the nation.

The higher classes become trained to government as a profession. 2. In the next place, although no man who is acquainted with human nature would claim, either for the higher ranks or more educated classes in the community, any natural superiority in talent over their humble but not less useful brethren, yet, on the other hand, nothing can be more consonant to reason, than to assert that those classes in society who from their affluence possess leisure, and from their station have received the education requisite for acquiring extensive information, are more likely in the long run to acquire and exhibit the powers necessary for beneficial legislation, than those who, from the necessities of their situation, are chained to daily toil, and from the limited extent of their funds, have been disabled from acquiring a thorough education. In claiming for the higher, and above all the more highly-educated ranks, a superiority in the art of government to the other classes of the community, it is only meant to assert a principle of universal application, and which has not only been recognized and acted upon from the beginning of the world, but is perfectly familiar to every person practically acquainted with the affairs of life in every department. All the professions and all the trades into which

men are divided, require a long education, and no inconsiderable amount of actual practice; and with the exception of those rare individuals to whom nature has given the power of mastering various branches of science or art at once, success is, in general, only to be acquired by constant and undivided attention to one. No person of a different profession would think of competing with a physician in the treatment of a person afflicted with a dangerous disease, or with a lawyer in the management of an intricate or difficult lawsuit; and probably the most vehement supporter of popular rights would hesitate before he gave an order to a committee of electors to make a coat for him, or entrusted the building of his house to delegates from many different trades, instead of a master tailor or builder who had acquired proficiency in one of them. In asserting and maintaining the proposition, therefore, that the classes who enjoy property and have received an extensive education, mainly directed to that end as the profession to which they are called, are better fitted to discharge with advantage to the public the intricate and difficult science of government, than the classes which, though endowed with equal natural talents, have not had them directed to the same objects or matured in the same manner—we only assert a fact of universal notoriety among mankind, and apply to the most difficult branch of knowledge the principles by which alone success ever has or can be attained in the easiest. And it would be surprising indeed if the science of government—a branch of knowledge which requires, more than any other, a course of unremitting study during a whole lifetime, and which can never be mastered but by those whose minds have acquired extensive information on a vast variety of subjects—could be as successfully pursued by those classes whose time is almost wholly absorbed in other pursuits, as by those who had made it the undivided object and study of their life.

Interest of holders of property leads them to look forward to the future.

3. In the third place, the interest of the holders of property naturally and unavoidably leads them not only to resist measures of aggression on it, but to adopt those steps which, although attended with a present burden, promise to produce ultimate advantage. Experience every day proves, that insensibility to the future is, with very rare exceptions, the accompaniment of excessive poverty, and that the power of foresight, and of submitting to present burdens from a sense of ultimate advantage, exists very nearly in proportion to the extent to which that advantage is to be enjoyed by the individual or his descendants. Hence the excessive anxiety for the acquisition or increase of wealth which is so general among those who have attained a certain degree of affluence, and the total disregard of the most pressing evils of present poverty and future destitution, which may invariably be observed among those to whom indigence has long been familiar. The common proverb, wherever extraordinary care is conspicuous in a domain, that “the eye of a master may be seen there,” shows how uniformly the experience of mankind has proved that, generally speaking, it is in vain to look for attention to the future, but among those whose interests property has wound up with its changes. But what is true of individuals, is true also of nations; for what is a nation but an aggregate of the individuals who compose it? When the Grecian sage said to the enthusiastic declaimer in favour of popular government, “You admire democracy; go home and try it in your own family,” he expressed a truth not less applicable to the domestic than the social concerns of men.

Whoever has closely observed the dispositions of large bodies of men, whether in social or political life, must have become sensible that the most uniform and lasting feature by which they are distinguished, is that of insen-

*Grievous
want of this
quality in
the great
body of
mankind.

sibility to the future. They often make the greatest sacrifices at the moment when their passions are strongly roused, or their feelings thoroughly awakened; and perhaps the most heroic deeds recorded in the annals of mankind have been performed under the influence of such excitement. But it is always present emotion, passion, or interest, which is with them the moving power; future consequences, remote interests, the fate of unborn generations are, to the great bulk of mankind, matter of hardly any concern. The reason is, that the power of looking forward to the future and resisting present allurements, from a regard to its interests, is a gift which is bestowed by Providence only on a limited portion of mankind, and never is generally developed, unless among those who are either endowed with remarkable powers of thought, or have had their attention forcibly drawn to the future, by the durable interests of property. Hence it is that democratic societies have been distinguished in every age of the world by such extraordinary want of foresight, often redeemed, it is true, when danger was pressing, by the most transcendent exertions. Hence it was that the Carthaginians at one time refused to send succours to Hannibal, when a few thousand men would have enabled him to overturn the Roman republic, and at another consented to purchase a temporary respite from hostility, by giving up the arms of the republic to that inveterate enemy. Hence it was that all the eloquence of Demosthenes failed in rousing the Athenians to a sense of the danger arising from the ambition of Philip, and that in the midst of his most splendid orations against that ambitious sovereign, they passed a law, not only appropriating the whole funds of the navy to the support of the public theatres, but denouncing the punishment of death against any one who should presume to propose even that that portion of the revenue should be restored to its former destination. Thence it was that America urged on a naval war with Great Britain, when she had only four frigates and eight sloops to protect her vast defenceless and commercial navy; and thence it was that England, under the pressure of undue popular influence, during the long peace which followed the battle of Waterloo, went on, without any necessity, taking off one indirect tax after another till she had fairly annihilated the noble fabric of the sinking fund, and rendered the national debt a hopeless burden upon the nation. Thence too it was that Polish democracy obstinately resisted all the efforts of John Sobieski to establish durable institutions and a regular army, and fell at last under the swords of the surrounding nations, which they had taken no means whatever to avert. On the other hand, the long and glorious existence of Rome, Venice, and Great Britain, clearly demonstrate, that where the energy of democracy is duly restrained and coerced by the foresight of patrician power, a lasting and glorious existence is secured for the state, by the constant effort of its rulers to guard against ultimate and remote dangers.

Security
which this
form of
government
affords
against the
corruption
of power.

4. In the fourth place, there arises in the ascendancy of the classes possessed of property and education, provided always that they are duly restrained and watched by the more numerous, but less educated classes of society, the best security which human weakness has ever yet devised against the corruption of government, and the selfish dispositions of those intrusted with the reins of power. This is one of the most important observations which can be made with reference to the science of government, and it explains at once the universal failure of all attempts to establish permanent good government on a democratic basis, and the greater chance of its enjoyment under a well-tempered and checked aristocracy. The reason is not apparent at first sight,

but when stated it is sufficiently convincing, and deserves the serious consideration of every reflecting mind.

Causes of
the preva-
lence of
virtuous
opinions in
a rightly
organized
community.

“It has been often observed,” says Mr. Hume, “that there is a wide difference between the judgment which befalls the conduct of others, and that which we ourselves pursue when placed in similar circumstances. The reason is obvious : in judging of others, we are influenced by our reason and our feelings; in acting for ourselves, we are directed by our reason, our feelings, and our desires.”

In this simple observation is to be found the key, both to the fatal corruption which democratic ascendancy never fails to produce in the state, and to the more effectual check which, in conservative ascendancy, is provided at once against own tendency to selfish projects, and the dangerous encroachments of the other classes of society. When the holders of property are in power, and the masses are in vigilant but restrained opposition, the majority of the community, who give the tone to public thought, necessarily incline to the support of virtuous and patriotic principles, because they have no interest to do otherwise. Hence, although doubtless in such communities some abuses do prevail, and will prevail to the end of the world, from the universal tendency to corruption in mankind when acting for themselves, and actuated by their own interests, yet, upon the whole, the administration of affairs is comparatively pure and virtuous, and the community obtains a larger share of good government than has ever yet been obtained under any other form of human institutions. Above all, in such circumstances, the public mind is preserved untainted; public spirit is general, and forms the mainspring of national action; and this invaluable temper of mind, more precious far than all laws or political institutions, not only preserves the heart of the nation entire, and forms a salutary control upon the measures of the holders of power, but by influencing the very atmosphere which they breathe, imparts a large share of its glorious spirit to those in possession of its reins and open to its seductions. And hence the long-continued public spirit and greatness of the British and Roman empires, and of all communities in which power has been for a long period in possession of the holders of property, and the general thought has been directed by the aristocracy of intellect.

And of the
rapid cor-
ruption of
opinion in
Democratic
states.

But all this is totally reversed when the popular leaders get themselves installed in power, and the democratic party are in possession of an irresistible preponderance in the state. The moment that this fatal change occurs, a total revolution takes place, not merely in the conduct of government, but in the vigilance with which they are guarded and watched by the great body of the people. The holders of power, and the dispensers of influence, find themselves surrounded by a host of hungry dependents, to whom necessity is law; and who, impelled by a secret consciousness that their political ascendancy is not destined to be of long duration, because they are disqualified to maintain it, strive only to make the best use of their time, by providing for themselves and their relations at the public expense, without the slightest regard to any consideration of the public advantage. On the other hand, the great body of the people, formerly so loud in their clamours against corruption, and their demand for a virtuous and patriotic administration of public affairs, now quietly pass by on the other side, and either openly and with shameless effrontery defend every species of abuse, because they profit by it, or preserve a studious silence, and endeavour to huddle up those nefarious, and to them beneficial excesses, under the cry of a reformation of the state

in some other department, or a wider extension of the power from which their leaders derive such considerable benefit. Thus, not only is the power and influence of government immediately directed to the most corrupt and selfish purposes, but legislation itself becomes tainted with the same inherent and universal vice. In the general scramble, where every one seems on the look-out for himself, no other object is attended to but the promotion of separate interests, or class elevation; the public press seldom denounces, in general cordially supports all such abuses, because their leaders and the writers in its columns are benefited by them; and, what is worst of all, public feeling becomes universally and irrevocably corrupted, because the great body of the people profit, or hope to profit, by the abuses in which the leaders of their party indulge.

Example of this difference afforded in a theatre. The clearest proofs of the truth of these principles, and of the extraordinary difference between the conduct and sentiments of mankind, when judging of the actions of others, and when acting for themselves, may be every day witnessed in the public theatres. Observe the conduct of the people, and most of all, the humblest classes of the community, when their feelings are roused by the performance of a noble tragedy, and the enunciation of exalted sentiments, clothed in the colours of poetry, and enforced by the energy or genius of theatrical representation. How loudly are generous sentiments applauded; how enthusiastic is the ardour produced by patriotic emotion; how strongly does the very air of the theatre seem impregnated with the most generous and patriotic sentiments! How many inexperienced observers have been led to imagine, when witnessing those bursts of lofty enthusiasm, and seeing how uniformly they commence with the humblest classes of society—how many have been led to conclude that human nature is at bottom virtuous and pure; that selfishness and vice are the growth only of riches and places; and that ample security for a pure and salutary administration of affairs will be found in the admission of the masses of men into the uncontrolled direction of public affairs! Follow out the assembled multitude who have been swayed by such generous emotions in the theatre, and see who they are, and what they do, when exposed to the separate influence of the sins which most easily beset them. Among the so recently generous and elevated crowd, will be found the profligate husband and the faithless wife—the hard-hearted creditor and the fraudulent debtor—the reckless prodigal and the depraved libertine—the besotted drunkard and the abandoned sensualist—the cruel enemy and the perfidious friend—the hard-hearted egotist and the rancorous foe. Among the many who but the evening before seemed animated only with the most pure and generous sentiments, will be found every form and variety of human wickedness, and by them will be practised every deed by which man can inflict misery on man. Such and so different is man when judging of others according to his reason and feelings, and man, when acting for himself under the influence of his reason, his feelings, and his passions. Hence it is, that during the worst periods of the French Revolution, the sanguinary mob who had been entranced in the evening by the noble and elevating sentiments of Racine or Corneille, arose in the morning with fresh vigour to pursue their career of selfishness and their work of blood; and hence it is, that the enthusiastic masses, whose sentiments appeared so pure, and their feelings so exalted, in the commencement of that convulsion, when declaiming against the corruptions of power, that their hearts might be thought to have opened within them the springs of heaven, became so utterly selfish, corrupt, and cruel, when

exposed themselves to its temptations, that they appeared to have been steeped in hell.

Cause of the
cruelty of
Democracy. 5. If the influences of these combined circumstances are taken into consideration, it will not appear surprising that cruelty has in so remarkable a manner been in every age the characteristic of democratic government; and that the excess of the populace in that particular has in general been the circumstance that has most contributed to the overthrow of their power. Generally speaking, cruelty is more the result, at least in civilized society, of fear, than of any settled savage disposition; men massacre others when they are apprehensive of punishment or death themselves. It is in the secret dread which a democracy always entertains that its position in power is forced and unnatural, and that it is destined ere long to fall under the government of property and intelligence, that the true cause of the persevering energy with which it attacks both the possessions and the lives of the wealthier classes is to be found. It is not that the lower classes are by nature more bloodthirsty than the higher, but that they entertain a constant apprehension of falling again under their influence, and possibly, in that event, undergoing the punishment which their crimes may have deserved. Thence the saying of Marat, which so well expressed the feelings of the Jacobins of Paris, "that there was no hope for France till two hundred and eighty thousand heads had fallen;" thence the cry, "down with the bank," which destroyed three fourths of the commercial wealth of America; and thence the clamour which, during a period of revolutionary convulsion, caused eighteen hundred thousand pounds, in three days, to be drawn out of the coffers of the Bank of England; "To stop the duke, go for gold." In all these cases it is not any absolute *pleasure* in the destruction of life or property which leads to these extreme and terrible measures, fraught with such awful results on the part of the democracy. It is the *terror* of losing a power which they are conscious they are unfit to exercise, which in reality is the motive of their proceedings. They are aware that if their opponents exist, they will in the long run fall under their government, and therefore they see no chance of safety but in their total destruction.

Want of all
responsibility in the
real rulers of
Democratic
society. 6. There is another most material point of distinction between the government of property and education and that of numbers, which is, that in the former case the persons entrusted with the direction of affairs are comparatively *fixed* and few in number, and consequently the invaluable checks of individual responsibility and public observation attach to them; while in the latter, the real ruling power is a multitude of perpetually changing persons, upon no one of whom can the responsibility of any measures originating in public opinion be fixed; and at the same time the rulers and magistrates are so continually changed, that *they* avoid also all responsibility for the measures in which they have had only a temporary share. It was long ago observed by Sallust, in the inimitable declamation against aristocracy, which he puts into the mouth of Marius, that the condition of Patricians is so prominent, and the light shining on them so bright, that even their smallest faults are perpetually exposed to the public gaze (1); and it is the consciousness of this perpetual responsibility attaching to them, which in a free community, where the opinion of the middle classes has a material weight in public affairs, constitutes the greatest check on their conduct. On the other hand, it is the obscurity which

(1) "Nam quanto vita illorum præclarior, tanto horum socordia flagitiosior. Et profecto ita si res habet, majorum gloria posteris lumen est; neque

bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur."—SALLUST, *Bell. Jug.*

numbers throw over any individual of the multitude, and the consequent, not merely impunity, but liberation from all moral control which they enjoy, which constitutes one main source of the danger of their proceedings. "In the multitude of counsellors," says Solomon, "there is safety;" "yes," said Dr. Gregory, "but it is safety to the *counsellors*, not the *counselled*; for each lays the blame upon the other." In a democratic community, the greatest measures are often *forced* upon government by an insurgent pressure from below, without any man being able to tell either who were its authors, how it was begun, or where it is to end. Thus the state may be ultimately ruined, no one knows how, or by whom. In the officers also, whether of the executive or judicial department, the jealousy of the people at any one possessing power which does not flow from and frequently revert to themselves, is such, that it very soon becomes impossible either to maintain any stable system for the public government, or to retain experienced ability for any length of time in the direction of affairs. Rotation of office is the principle on which all their appointments are rested. Hence the proverbially short duration of ministerial existence in all countries during periods of democratic ascendancy; and hence the appointment even of *judicial* officers in France during the Revolution, and in America at this time, during the pleasure of the people, or for a period only of a few years. Not the least evils of democratic ascendancy will be found to have originated from this cause, and it affords the true solution of many of the catastrophes, both social and national, which have been traced in the preceding pages.

It is an open, not a close Aristocracy which is attended with these advantages. In contrasting thus the opposite effects of an aristocratic and democratic government on human affairs, it is an *open* aristocracy that is in view; that is to say, an aristocracy blending with, and open to, the intermixture of the most prominent and deserving of the middle classes of the community. If this is not the case—if the ruling power of the state is an aristocracy, like that of Venice, which excludes all admission into its ranks of the most eminent and deserving of the inferior classes of society, and has obtained such power in the state as to be able to stifle or extinguish the voice of public opinion, experience warrants the assertion, that though the evils which have now been stated are avoided, their place is supplied by others of a different description, less acute but more lasting. Such a government is abundantly stable in its purposes and judicious in its councils; but is it equally favourable to the development of industry, the growth of freedom, or the advancing of social progress? Have the brightest pages of history arisen under its influence?

Evils of the latter species of government. Is not its invariable tendency to limit power, patronage, and office to its own order; to treat the middle and working classes of society as an inferior species of creation, and rule the state for the exclusive and peculiar advantage of its own members? Are not genius, intellect, energy in the middle ranks, studiously depressed; and talent encouraged and rewarded, only so far as it is exerted in their service, and directed by their will? Is not office chiefly bestowed upon inferior birth as the reward of servility?—is not an instinctive horror felt for independent character, and pliant ability the great object at once of search and promotion? Experience unequivocally demonstrates that these questions must be answered in the affirmative, and renders it evident, that though the evils with which it is attended are far from being of so piercing and terrible a kind as those which flow from democratic ascendancy, yet they are far more enduring in their operation, and are greatly more difficult of removal.

Contention
of Aristoc-
racy and
Democracy
in all free
states.

The ruling power in such a society, is not, as in the ever-shifting wheel of popular ascendancy, withdrawn from responsibility, but it is relieved from its effects: it is not unknown to public opinion, but it is able to set its verdict at defiance. Resting on the support of a limited class in the state, the interests of whose members are the same, it is often able to disregard entirely alike the advantage and wishes of every inferior rank in society. Of all the possessions of mankind, there is none which they at once so universally desire, and so tenaciously retain, as power. Property itself has not been found to be, in general, so vehement an object of contention; though unquestionably its advantages are more substantial, and its loss attended with greater evils. The reason is that the contest, even for these advantages, has generally taken place on the preliminary question of political influence: like the ramparts of a fortress, worthless in themselves, but commanding all that is valuable within their circuit, it is there that the deadly battle in the breach has been fought. Aristocracy has invariably been found to be to the last degree jealous of any encroachments on this its most highly prized inheritance; and if not the bloodiest, at least the most long-continued feuds which have desolated the world, have arisen from the obstinate and skilful resistance which it has invariably made to the efforts of commercial wealth or popular ambition to be admitted to a share of its influence. From the days when the contests of the patricians and plebeians convulsed Rome during three centuries, and Sylla and Marius, at the head of the military force of their rival factions, drenched the republic with blood, and disgraced it by proscriptions, to those when the whole world was involved in the conflict of the Tiers-État of France with the property of Europe, and the British empire was shaken to its centre by the fierce conflict of the aristocratic and democratic parties on the arena of parliamentary reform, this has been the most lasting object of contention among mankind. And so vehement has been the discord which it has occasioned, and so furious the passions developed during its continuance, that England is the only example recorded in history in which they have not led quickly to the total destruction of freedom, either by the despotism invariably following on democratic triumph, or the binding fetters which proclaim the victory of aristocratic power.

Great effects and brief endurance of combined Aristocratic direction and Democratic vigour.

It was the plaintive conclusion of the Roman Annalist, that liberty is slow of growth, difficult of maintenance, quick of decay. Subsequent experience has added fresh proofs of the observation of Tacitus, and yet illustrated not less forcibly the incomparable energy which is communicated to mankind during the brief period which elapses between the first expansion and last triumph of democratic vigour. The Roman Empire in ancient, the British in modern times, have for ever demonstrated this important truth. The first conquered the world by its arms, and humanized it by its wisdom; the second subjected the waves to its dominion, and spread along its shores the light of knowledge, the institutions of civilization, the blessings of religion. But it is but a brief period of such transcendent brightness which Providence allows to any nation. Its advent marks the efflorescence of civilization, and is generally contemporary with the highest point of national fortunes; its decline is followed by a total decay of social vegetation, and a speedy termination of national existence. This is not a mere fanciful analogy suggested by the oft-observed resemblance between individual and national growth, but a part of that mysterious unity of design which runs through every part of the crea-

tion, and unites in one harmonious system the minutest object in the material and the grandest revolutions in the moral world.

Reasons of
this moral
law.

Nor is the reason difficult to be discerned which has led to the establishment of this moral law. Such is the surpassing force of the power which during this brief period is brought to bear on human affairs, and such the energy which during its continuance it communicates to mankind, that it is inconsistent with the independent existence of nations. Democratic vigour guided by aristocratic direction is invincible. If to any nation were given, for a series of ages, the combined wisdom and energy of Rome, from the days of Hannibal to those of Gracchus, or of England, from those of Chatham to those of Wellington, it would infallibly acquire the empire of the world. As Providence therefore, in its wisdom, has established the diversity of nations, and allotted to each the performance of its appropriate part on the general theatre, it has wisely ordained that to none an immortal existence should be assigned; but that each, after its part has been performed, should be removed from the scene, and make way for its destined successors on the stage. National vanity, social partiality, may contest this progress, and contend on the principle of perfectability for the perpetual endurance of particular communities; but experience gives no countenance to these ideas, and probably an attentive observer of the signs of the times in those nations where such expectations are most generally indulged, will discover no unequivocal indications of its approach to the common charnel-house of mortality.

To what
cause is this
general
tendency to
decay in
mankind to
be ascribed?

Observation readily suggests the cause to which the invariable tendency to decay in human institutions is owing. In this, as in many other cases, we see the operation of the same principle in the path of private life as the general fate of nations. It is sin which has brought death to nations as well as individuals. It is the multiplication of selfish desires, artificial enjoyments, indolent or luxurious habits, consequent upon the increase of wealth and the long continuance of civilization, which proves fatal to the virtue, patriotism, and self-denial which are essential to national prosperity. Wealth accumulates in immense masses, fatal to its possessors, on the one hand, and indigence multiplies with fearful rapidity, destructive to public security, on the other. The state becomes poor, and its members rich; selfish opulence ceases to be patriotic, destitute misery becomes ungovernable. "Pro his nos habemus luxuriam atque avaritiam; publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam; laudamus divitias, sequimur inertiam; inter bonos et malos nullum discernimus; omnia virtutis præmia ambitio possidet (1)." Happy the nation which sees in its internal conditions none of the effects of greatness which Cato observed and Sallust has recorded! Such a state may anticipate prolonged, possibly immortal existence; but where are we to find it, amidst the passions, the vices, and the follies of the world?

Increased
principle
of vitality
in modern
nations.

That the religion and institutions of modern times have given a much longer lease of life to the nations of Europe than were enjoyed by those of antiquity, must be obvious to the most superficial observer.

Nothing is so remarkable or so uniform in every age as the rapid corruption of victorious and barbarous nations, when they are first brought in contact with the enjoyments of opulence. In Asia, the vigour of the chief who seizes the diadem rarely descends to his successor who inherits it; and

(1) Sall. de Bel. Cat.

even the hardihood of a new race of northern conquerors is found, after a few generations, to be irrecoverably merged in the effeminacy of their subjects. Hence the extraordinary facility with which they are overturned, and the perpetual alternation of external conquest and internal corruption which marks every age of Asiatic history. In Europe, on the other hand, it is at once evident that a more durable order of things has been induced with the free spirit which, from the days of Agamemnon, seems to have been the distinctive mark of the race of Japhet; and that though the seeds of evil are not less generally implanted in them than elsewhere among mankind, yet they are combated with a vigour, and counteracted by a salient principle of life unknown in any other quarter of the globe. This was apparent in the glorious achievements, immortal genius, and long duration of the Grecian and Roman republics; and it is still more conspicuous in the states of modern times, which have already attained, without any decisive symptoms of decrepitude, a length of existence exceeding that allotted even to the enduring fortitude of ancient Rome.

But they still have the seeds of decay in their bosom. But nothing warrants the assertion, that these superior powers of vitality have extinguished the seeds of mortality, or that the communities of Europe have attained such a degree of stability as to be able to defy alike the shock of external disaster and the mouldering of internal decay. The strife of faction, the growth of luxury, the private wealth, the public poverty, the selfishness of the few, the profligacy of the many, which were marked as the premonitory symptoms of decline in the states of antiquity, are equally conspicuous in modern times. The southern states of Europe appear to be irrevocably entangled in the meshes of private enjoyment; possibly the northern are not yet fully immersed, only because they were longer of tasting its sweets. There is nothing in the civilization around us which authorizes either the belief or the wish that it should be perpetual; and this may at least with confidence be affirmed, that length of life is given to us, equally as to our predecessors, just in proportion to the duration of public and private virtue; and that the only elixir of life which can be given to empires, is to be found in the virtue and resolution of their inhabitants.

Final cause of war among men. Its apparently unmitigated evils. And this illustrates the final cause of a peculiarity in the condition of the species, which has long been the subject of mistake or lamentation. This is the universal prevalence of WAR among mankind. If the effect of war in itself be considered upon the immediate happiness or misery of the human race, it must appear the most unmitigated evil which the justice or wrath of Heaven has let loose upon guilty men. If we reflect that its object is to train mankind up to mutual slaughter, and direct the whole energies and powers of the human mind to the destruction of the species, it is impossible to deny that it appears at first sight in no other light than a devastating scourge. Philosophers and philanthropists, accordingly, have concurred from the earliest times in regarding it in this light; in deprecating mutual hostility and national passions as the most dreadful evils which can afflict the world, and earnestly endeavouring by all means in their power to diminish the frequency of this dreadful scourge of humanity. Sanguine hopes were entertained at the commencement of the French Revolution, that a new era in this important particular had opened upon the species; that former wars, stimulated by the ambition of kings and the rivalry of ministers, would cease; and that, by the accession to power of the class who were the principal sufferers by hostilities, the disposition to wage them would at once be terminated. It had come to pass as a general axiom, that war was the consequence of monarchical and aristocratic governments,

and would disappear with their removal; and general applause followed the humane sentiment of the poet—

“ War is a game, which, were the people wise,
Kings would not play at.”

But when the matter was put to the test, experience soon demonstrated what had long been known to the few observers of historical facts, that these expectations were entirely illusory, and that not only was the tendency to war no ways diminished, but it was fearfully increased by the augmentation of popular power. Angry passions, it was now found, came to agitate not only the rulers, but the masses of men; the interests of whole classes in one community came to be arrayed against those of the corresponding ones in another; and the *multis utile bellum* was found to meet with innumerable advocates in a period of revolutionary excitement and distress. Accordingly the warlike passions never appeared so strong as in the newly-emancipated French people; and the longest, the bloodiest, and the most devastating war recorded in modern annals, was the immediate consequence of the pacific dreams of the authors of the French Revolution.

Necessity of war for the purification of mankind. If this world were the final resting place of man; if it were intended to be the seat of unbroken happiness, and the human mind was so innocent, and so deserving, as to be capable of enjoying unmixed felicity, such a marked and irretrievable tendency in human affairs might well be a subject of unmingled regret. But if the real condition of mankind be reflected on, and the necessity of suffering to the purification of the human heart taken into consideration, the observer will take a very different view of the matter. That war is an unbounded source of human suffering to those engaged in, or affected by it, can be doubted by none; and if any were disposed to be sceptical on the subject, his hesitation would probably be removed, by a consideration of the wars that followed the French Revolution. But is not suffering necessary to the purification of the human heart? It is not in that ordeal that its selfishness, its corruptions, and its stains are washed out? Have we not been told by the highest authority, that man is made perfect by suffering? Is not misfortune, anxiety, and distress, the severe but salutary school of individual improvement? And what is war—but anxiety, distress, and often agony to nations? Its great and lasting effect is, to counteract the concentration of human interests upon self, to awaken the patriotic and generous affections, to rouse that general ardour, which, spreading from breast to breast, obliterates for a time the selfishness of private interest, and leads to the general admission of great and heroic feelings. Peace exhibits the enchanting prospect of rich fields, flourishing cities, spacious harbours, growing wealth, and undisturbed tranquillity; but beneath that smiling surface are to be found the rankest and most dangerous passions of the human breast. There it is, that pleasure spreads its lures, and interest its attractions, and cupidity its selfishness. There are to be found the hard-hearted master and the reckless servant, the princely landlord and the destitute tenant, the profligate husband and the faithless wife, “*et corrumpere et corrumpi seculum vocatur.*” Amidst war are to be seen the ravaged field and the sacked city, the slaughtered multitude and famished group, the tear of the widow and the groans of the fatherless; but amidst all that scene of unutterable wo, the generous and noble affections often acquire extraordinary force; selfishness gives place to patriotism, cupidity to disinterestedness, luxury to self-denial, and heroic virtue arises out of suffering. Even

the poignancy of individual distress is alleviated by the numbers who simultaneously share it. Misery ceases to be overwhelming when it is no longer solitary; individual loss is drowned in the feeling of common sympathy. Peace may give men a larger share of the enjoyments and comforts of this world, but war often renders them fitter for a future state of existence; and it is by the alternation of both that they are best fitted for the duties of the one, and destiny of the other.

Striking example of this which the history of the Revolutionary war affords. Whoever has surveyed, either in the annals of mankind or in the observation of society around him, the effects of peace, opulence, and long-continued prosperity upon human character, and the heroic virtues which are called forth in mankind by the advent of times pregnant with disaster and alarm, will probably have little doubt of the truth of these observations. But they are demonstrated in a way that must bring conviction home to the most incredulous, by the result of the French Revolution. At the commencement of the period, selfishness, irresolution, and cupidity, distinguished all the measures of cabinets; languor, inertness, and proneness to delusion, characterised the people; mildness and toleration were daily becoming more prevalent in the administration of government; and a general pacific spirit characterised the age. Thence it was that Gibbon then lamented that the world would never again see the vast convulsions, the moving incidents which had occurred in ancient times, and which furnished so many subjects for the immortal historic pencils of Greece and Rome. But amidst all this seeming philanthropy and happiness, selfishness, that grand source of human corruption, was daily extending its influence through every rank; and the human mind, enervated by repose, was losing its manly virtues amidst the unbroken spread of enjoyments. We may judge of the subtle poison which was then debasing European society, and especially the boasted centre of its civilization in France, from the corresponding evils which we now, from a similar cause, see around us. And the effect of it appeared in the clearest manner in the measures alike of government and the people over all Europe: for self-aggrandizement and selfishness characterised them all.

Universal selfishness at the commencement of the French Revolution. The selfishness of the French aristocracy first induced the evils which brought about the Revolution: the selfishness of the privileged classes postponed till it was too late that equalization of public burdens which might have averted its evils; the selfishness of the Church, that just and beneficent system of religion which could alone have combated its horrors. Nor was the influence of the same evil principle less evident in the conduct of all the nations who were successively called into the field to combat the powers of wickedness. Great Britain, from a selfish passion for economy in her people, was in the beginning powerless at land to maintain the conflict: the forces she did put forth were wasted in the prosecution of "British objects" at Dunkirk, when they might, by co-operating with the Allies, have marched to Paris, and crushed the hydra in its cradle: Prussia starved the war on the Rhine, and at length withdrew from the alliance to prosecute her schemes of ambition, and secure her ill-gotten gains in Poland: Austria abandoned Flanders, the gate of Europe, to France, in order to concentrate her force in Italy, and obtain in the spoliation of Venice a compensation for the surrender of Belgium: Russia halted her armies on the Vistula, and stained her standards by the massacres at Prague, when they might have been ennobled by the capture of Paris. In all these instances, each of which singly was attended with disastrous effects to the cause of freedom, and which, taken together, induced unheard-of calamities, it was

the selfish interests of the different classes of society, or nations who were successively called on to make sacrifices for the public good, which was the secret spring that induced the evil: and such is ever the tendency of man in prosperous and pacific times.

Noble and
generous
deeds of all
classes and
nations
during the
war.

Turn now to the deeds of heroism and disinterestedness which have for ever signalized the annals of the French Revolution, and say whether or not it is good for nations, as well as individuals, to be in affliction. Where was the selfishness of the French nobility when they were led out to the scaffold by the Jacobins? where the corruptions of the court, when Louis XVI was immured in the Temple? Can the annals of humanity exhibit more glorious deeds of devotion, heroism, and magnanimity, than were exhibited even by the corrupted circles of Paris during the Reign of Terror, or by the clergy of France, both dignified and rural, in the days of their suffering? What would the democratic party over the world give to be able to tear the deathless pages of la Vendée out of the volumes of history? The selfishness of Prussia, punished by the disaster of Jena and six years of bondage, was gloriously expiated by the resurrection of 1813 and triumph of the Katzbach; the ambition of Russia by the carnage of Borodino, and the devotion of Leipsic. Can peace, with all its charities, produce so sublime an instance of generous spirit as that which fired the torches of Moscow? or so illustrious an example of patriotic fervour as manned the ramparts of Saragossa? Even nations the most calculating, and empires the most stable, caught the generous flame, and were in the end dignified by deeds of heroism, to which nothing superior is to be found in the annals of mankind. Who could recognize the tenacious rule of the Austrian aristocracy in the devotion of Aspern, or the money-seeking German mountaineer in the enthusiasm of Tyrol? If Great Britain blasted the prospects of European deliverance by the niggardly parsimony of former times, which paralysed her efforts in the commencement of the war, and the selfish direction which she so long gave to her efforts, she washed out her national sins by suffering; and the annals of the world cannot present so glorious an example of generous ardour, and persevering constancy, as was exhibited by all classes in the British islands before its termination. Thus, while the subtle poison of human corruption spreads with fatal rapidity during the tranquillity and enjoyment of peace, the manly feelings, the generous affections, are nursed amidst the tumult and horrors of war; and although the actual agents in it may become habituated to bloodshed and rapine, a compensation, and more than a compensation, arises in the noble and disinterested feelings which are generally drawn forth in the community. Perpetual war would transform men into beasts of prey—perpetual peace reduce them to beasts of burden; the alternation of both is indispensable to the mixed tendencies to good and evil which exist in mankind; and mutual slaughter may be dispensed with when the seeds of corruption are extirpated from the human breast, but not till then.

Remarkable
physical
conforma-
tion of Asia,
and its
difference
from
Europe and
America.

It is observed by Montesquieu, that the great peculiarity of the physical conformation of Asia is, that the steppes or deserts which must for ever form the abode only of pastoral nations, are brought into close proximity with the alluvial plains, which speedily become the scenes of agricultural riches and the abode of commercial opulence; and that this is the true reason of the violent revolutions, not merely of dynasties but of empires, which, in every age, have distinguished the history of that great portion of the globe. There can be no doubt that the observation is well founded; and, it may be added, that another peculiarity,

not less important, is to be found in the vast extent of those pastoral districts; and the consequent facility of transporting large bodies of men from one part of the continent to another, how distant soever. This circumstance at once provided for the easy dispersion of the nomad races of mankind, even from the confines of China to the shores of the Atlantic, in early ages, and the occasional accumulation of their armed forces under popular leaders, at later times, in such multitudes, and animated with such fervour, as to be altogether irresistible.

Europe and America, again, have an entirely different physical conformation. No arid deserts there retain the children of Japhet in every successive generation in the rude habits and mingled virtues and vices of their fathers: no table-lands or boundless steppes bring the warriors of the desert into close proximity with the cities of the plain, or the riches and vices of civilization. The level face of the greater part of the country renders it susceptible of the labour of agriculture; mineral riches at once invite and reward the toils of the artisan: the deep indentations of the coast, and numerous inland seas, let in, to the very heart of the continents, the wealth and interests of commerce. The savage exists, but he is only the feeble and isolated hunter of the forest, who flies and perishes before the advance of civilization. External danger, therefore, is comparatively unknown: the riches of civilization need no longer fear the rapine of the desert; the contests of nations lead only to mutual improvement in the military art, and a more decided superiority over the other families of mankind; boundless facilities for the multiplication and extension of this race are afforded; and the race of Japhet can securely perform its destined mission of overspreading and subduing the earth.

Effects of this difference in the continual regeneration of the Asiatic states. Historians in all ages have exerted their powers in painting the dreadful devastations produced by the periodical irruptions of the Tartar tribes into the smiling plains of southern Asia; the pyramids of heads which marked where their sabre had been, and the sack, conflagration, and ruin, which have ever attended their footsteps. But admitting the terrible nature of the whirlwinds which have thus passed over the earth, it is the height of error to consider them as pernicious in their ultimate effects; they resemble the tempest, which is often necessary to restore the purity of the physical atmosphere, or the wintry storms which clear away the decayed riches of summer vegetation; and, accordingly, it was ever under the powerful though transient vigour of northern dynasties, that society under the Asiatic rule has risen to greatness, or passing felicity been communicated to mankind. All its great nations, the Medes, the Persians, the Assyrians, the Parthians, the Monguls, have sprung from the intermixture of barbarian energy with civilized opulence; and when greatness had corrupted even the majesty of Rome, “the giants of the north,” in Gibbon’s words, “broke in and amended the puny breed.” Either a physical or moral regeneration seems necessary in the later stages of civilized life in all countries; if no means for producing the former, from internal energy or virtue, exist, the latter is necessary. And the reflecting observer, who has witnessed the innumerable evils which have followed in the wake of riches and long-established civilization, even with all the means of combating them which a purer religion and the free spirit of Europe have afforded in modern times, will probably hesitate to characterize even the inroads of Timour or Genghis Khan as unmixed evil, and doubt whether they are not the severe but necessary means of purifying and reforming mankind, when corrupted

by the vices of a society which has no salient and living principle of energy within its own bosom.

Which was unnecessary in Europe and America, from the internal effects of the Democratic principle.

It is the existence of this spirit which essentially distinguishes, and has ever distinguished, European from Asiatic society, and perhaps rendered unnecessary, and certainly less frequent, in the nations of its family, the awful catastrophes which have always in the East preceded the regeneration of nations. Europe has, and has ever had, its commotions, and often have they terminated in bloodshed, devastation, and ruin; but they have in general proceeded, not from external conquest but internal energy; the moving principle which has occasioned them has been not the lust of foreign rapine but the passion for internal power. The annals of the French Revolution, and the wars to which it has given rise in Europe, may well suggest a doubt whether the latter principle is not sometimes productive at the time of devastation as widespread, and misery as acute, as the most terrible inroads of barbarian power; but the effect of it has been to revive the energy of the species from the restoration of internal strength, not the infusion of extraneous valour; and it brings hardy poverty into action, not from the fields of northern conquest, but the workshop of laborious industry. Whoever has studied the working of the democratic principle in human affairs, cannot entertain a doubt that, with whatever evils it may be followed when it acquires the mastery of the other interests of society, it is at least attended with this important effect—that it produces a degree of energy in all classes, while it subsists in vigour and is duly coerced, to which there is nothing comparable under other forms of government; and that it infuses the elements of strength and vitality into the social system, to such a degree as to prolong to a period much beyond that assigned to it, in ancient times, the life of nations.

Democracy is the great moving power among mankind.

But it is not only by its effect upon the social system within the state, that democracy is one of the most important elements which works out the progress of the moral world and general government of Providence; consequences equally important, and still more lasting in their effects, flow from its tendency to produce the dispersion of mankind. It is in truth the great *expansive power* of nature. Under various forms, it has produced the chief migrations and settlements which have occurred in the history of the species. The Cimbri, the Celts, and the Goths, who at successive periods, commencing with the first dawn of authentic profane history, spread from central Asia to the furthest extremities of Europe, were impelled from their native seats by this insatiable passion. Equality appeared even in the days of Tacitus in the woods of Germany; and the free spirit of our Gothic ancestors has produced the whole peculiar features and glories of modern society. In southern Europe it has appeared in a different but not less important character. Spreading there, not from the energy of the desert, but the turbulence of the forum, it diffused the republican colonies of Greece, Tyre, and Carthage over the whole shores of the Mediterranean. Rome itself sprang in its infancy from emigrants; enterprize was nourished in its maturity by colonial wealth; and its extension around the shores of that inland sea, clearly demonstrates from what element the strength of the empire had been derived.

And the principal cause of the dispersion of the human race.

In modern times the marvels of this expansive power have been not less conspicuous. From the republics of Genoa and Venice, the democratic spirit again penetrated, with their mercantile establishments, as far as the waters of the Mediterranean extend; from the shores of Holland it drove an industrious brood into the eastern archipelago;

with the fervour of the Puritans it implanted the Anglo-Saxon race in a new hemisphere. Amidst the wilds of America, it unceasingly impels the hardy woodsman into the solitudes of the Far West. England itself is now in the midst of a similar parturition; amidst the mingled wealth and misery, glory and shame, hope and disappointment of the last fifteen years, nearly a hundred thousand active citizens have annually migrated from the British isles to the western or southern hemispheres; attempted political regeneration, producing terror in some classes, disappointment in others, restlessness in all, has greatly strengthened this inherent tendency; and the augmented vehemence of the democratic faction in the heart of the empire, has uniformly appeared in an enlarged stream of ardent emigrants, which it has sent forth to people the distant places of the earth. Great Britain may well be in travail; for a new world is springing from her loins.

Manner in
which this
change is
effected.

The manner in which the democratic spirit brings about this transplantation of the human race is very apparent. It is the combination of visions of perfectability with realities of degradation, which effects the object. The mind, warmed by boundless anticipations of elevation and improvement to be effected by social or political innovation, feels insupportable disappointment at the failure of its long-cherished projects, and the increasing indigence and profligacy of the great body of mankind, amidst all the efforts made for their elevation. In disgust, numbers leave the abode of ancient corruption, and seek the realization of their visions amidst the supposed innocence of early society, and the real advantages of plentiful employment. A general passion for change seizes all classes; and such anticipations are formed, and often realized, of the advantage to be derived from a change of situation, as effectually extinguishes in great numbers the love of home, in other circumstances one of the strongest affections of the human heart. It is this principle which, in every age, has prompted civilized men to forego all the pleasures of home and kindred, to sever all the bonds of filial or patriotic love, and seek in distant lands those means of elevation which the contracted sphere of their native seats will not afford. The love of power, the desire of distinction, the passion for wealth, envy of superiors, jealousy of equals, contempt of inferiors, combine, in these circumstances, to raise such a tempest in the human breast, as roots man up from his native seats, obliterates his oldest recollections, extinguishes his strongest attachments, and sends forth the burning enthusiast, ardent for the equality of rights and the regeneration of society, into distant lands—where his expectations are too often blasted by the stern realities of his new situation, but from whence return is impossible—where he implants his seed in the soil, and leaves behind him in the wilderness the foundation of an extended and prosperous society (1).

Aristocracy
is the con-
trolling and
regulating
power.

As democracy and the lust of conquest are the moving, so aristocracy and attachment to property are the steadying powers of nature. Without some counterbalancing weight to restrain and regulate the violence of this expansive force—this moral steam power—it would tear society in pieces, and counteract by its explosion the whole ends of the social union. This counteracting weight is found in the influence of property, and the desires with which it is attended. The habits it induces, the foresight and self-denial which it awakens, the local attachments to which it gives rise, constitute the steadying power of nature, and the great counterpoise to the moving power of democracy. Society appears in its most favour-

(1) Alison on Population, i. 31.

able form, the progress of improvement is most rapid, the steps of the human race are the greatest, when the energy of the moving and expanding is duly regulated by the steadying and controlling power. To restrain it altogether is often impossible, always pernicious; to give it free scope is to expose society to utter ruin, and defeat the very objects for which it was implanted in the human breast. Its due direction and effectual regulation is the great desideratum. At particular periods, and by a mysterious agency, extraordinary force is communicated to the moving power; a restless desire for change becomes universal; old and important interests are overthrown; society at home is convulsed; the human race is violently impelled abroad, either in the channels of pacific colonization, or the inroads of ruthless conquest; and, in a short time, a vast change in the condition and destinies of mankind is effected. But such violent ebullitions are ever of short duration; the explosion of revolution, though often as devastating in its course, is as brief in its endurance as the eruption of the volcano; and the central heat, according as it is, or is not, regulated by the direction of property, and restrained by the principles of religion, becomes the beneficent central force which impels light and civilization to the desert places of the earth, or the source of the fiery lava, which, after consuming whatever it has touched, is itself cooled down by external influence, and leaves a track which can be discerned only by the foul devastation which it has made.

Constant
action and
reaction in
the Euro-
pean com-
munities.

The external balance of nature in the physical world is almost entirely preserved by the counteracting impulse of opposite forces, either simultaneously acting in opposition to each other, or mutually succeeding when their separate agency is required. It is the same in the moral world: action and reaction is the universal law of human affairs, and the chief instrument of the Divine government of men. In the Asiatic Empires, as there is no internal spring giving rise to this alternation, it is provided for by foreign conquest: in Europe—at least in modern times—the source of it is found in the prevailing impulse, which, under opposite circumstances, is communicated to the human mind. The provision made for this in the original constitution of man consists in two principles, which will be found to be of universal application: viz. that the great bulk of men blindly follow any impulse which is communicated to them by minds of superior intelligence, or the force of individual interest; and that really original thinkers, the lights of their own, the rulers of the next age, almost invariably exert their powers in direct *opposition* to the prevailing evils with which they are surrounded. Hence it is that the strong intellects in a despotic community are almost always loud in praise of popular institutions and the principles of self-government, and those in democratic states equally decided in support of the principles of order and the control of property; that freedom of opinion constituted the grand deliverance for which the religious reformers of the sixteenth century contended; and unity of religious faith has become the object of devout aspiration in the nineteenth. The reason is obvious: creative minds in both periods were impressed with the evils with which they were brought in contact; and in both, instead of yielding, strove to counteract them. The great majority in every age go with the stream, and think they are enlightened when they are merely impregnated with the mental atmosphere with which they are surrounded; the thinking few at once break off from the multitude, and, for good or for evil, give a new direction to the current of thought. A generation must, in general, descend to its grave before the conversion takes place: but though slow, the effect is not the less certain. “Show me what one or two great men in the solitude

of their chambers are thinking in this age, and I will show you what will be the theme of the orator, the vision of the poet, the staple of the hustings, the declamation of the press, the guide of the statesman, in the next."

Example of
this from
the Reforma-
tion and
French
Revolution.

The two great convulsions of modern times, the religious Reformation and French Revolution, demonstrate in the clearest manner the agency of the opposite powers of action and reaction on general thought, and, through it, on the fate of nations. When the Catholic church, strong in the consciousness of universal power, and tainted by the belief of supposed infallibility, revolted the growing intelligence of mankind by the open prostitution and sale of indulgences, the giant strength of Luther arose, and, Samson-like, threw down the pillars of the corrupted edifice. The Protestant nations fondly anticipated the total destruction of the papal power from the shock, and the rapid progress of the Reformation at its commencement seemed in a great measure to justify the expectation. But human passion and ambition, as usual in such cases, got possession of the stream : crimes and violence were committed by the popular party ; intellect and interest combined their efforts to resist it ; the torrent was rolled back in southern Europe as rapidly as it had advanced ; and for two subsequent centuries the frontiers of the opposite opinions have been observed in northern Christendom, without any sensible advantage being gained on either side. The abuses of the Catholic church, the selfishness of the noblesse, the extravagance of the monarchy, induced, in a subsequent age, the terrible convulsion of the French Revolution ; the force of genius, the powers of intellect, the weapons of ridicule, were directed for half a century to the emancipation of thought ; and an interminable era of progress and felicity was anticipated, from the liberation of mankind from the fetters which had hitherto restrained and directed them. Here again, however, human wickedness soon obtained the mastery of the current ; selfishness, ambition, rapacity, veiled under the successive names of liberty, patriotism, and glory, directed the movement : Europe was deluged with blood ; the original devil was expelled, but straightway he returned with seven other devils more wicked than himself, and the last state of that nation was worse than the first. Humanity sunk and wept in silence, philanthropy trembled at the prospect of the race during that long night of suffering ; but all this time the salient energy of thought was unceasingly in activity. Reaction arose out of suffering, heroism out of calamity ; and the successive overthrow of the democracy of France and the power of Napoléon has afforded an eternal monument, at once of the justice of the divine administration, and the system in human affairs by which, through the acts of free agents, the mighty deliverance was accomplished.

The revoca-
tion of
the edict of
Nantes was
the remote
cause of
the French
Revolution.

The revocation of the edict of Nantes was the chief remote cause of the French Revolution ; and the terrible evils it brought upon the nobility and the government, the natural consequence and just retribution of that abominable act of religious oppression. Though the overthrow of the nobility was the grand object, when the contest was fairly engaged, to which the popular efforts were turned, it was not there that the revolutionary passion commenced, nor was it to a liberation from temporal restraints that the first advances of thought were directed. It was spiritual dominion which was the real incubus sought to be thrown off : it was the fetters of the church which intellect strove to strike from the human soul. In the writings of Voltaire, there is little to be found on change of institutions, amendment of laws, the blessings of self-government ; but much on spiritual tyranny, the arts of priests, the benighting of superstition. Even Rousseau was not a political reformer ; his visions of per-

fectability and the social contract had no practical bearing on existing institutions; it was still the chains of the Roman Catholic church which he endeavoured to remove, by the antagonist principle of original and primeval innocence. Whence was it that these giants of thought so vehemently directed their efforts against a religion, which in England had so long been supported by the greatest and most profound intellects? Simply because the revocation of the edict of Nantes, while it sent eight hundred thousand innocent citizens into exile, had removed all restraint on the established church in France; because spiritual tyranny had in consequence become insupportable, and spiritual intolerance universal; because religion, confident in the support of government, had disdained the aid of intellect; and patrician selfishness, engrossed with self-aggrandizement, had seized upon the church as its own appanage, not the patrimony of the poor. These evils not only were the principal circumstances which originally stirred up the mental ferment which brought about the Revolution, but they paralysed the only power which could successfully combat it; for they deprived order of the aid of principle, religion of the support of mind, and the poor of the only bond which could unite them with property.

Ultimate
danger
which
threatens
to destroy
this vital
principle.

The ultimate danger which threatens France, and every country that embraces revolutionary principles, is the annihilation of the only elements out of which a durable free constitution can be constructed. Little as this peril may be considered by the popular party in the days of their success, it is by far the most durable evil with which they have to contend; and it may safely be affirmed that their complete triumph renders it irremediable. It is this which has rendered the formation of a free constitution impossible in France, and blasted the whole objects for which the popular party so long and strenuously contended. There are but two ways by which mankind in the long run can be governed—by the influence of property or the will of a sovereign; the third method, so much the object of desire to the advocates of democracy all the world over, viz.—by self-government, is soon found to be impracticable. The difficulty which proves fatal to it, is the impossibility of getting proper functionaries elected by the multitude, and the ungovernable passions which spring up in the human heart with the enjoyment of uncontrolled power. But if property has been destroyed by previous convulsions, and the influence of aristocracy in consequence is at an end, there remains no alternative but the appointment to all offices, and the entire direction of affairs, by the executive. This was what took place in Rome from the destruction of the old patricians during the civil wars of Sylla and Marius, and in France from the confiscations of the Revolution; and, accordingly, the frame of subsequent government which necessity imposed upon both these countries, has been extremely similar, and has remained unaltered through every subsequent change of dynasty:—the institutions of the Roman emperors are substantially the same as those of Napoléon's government; and the French people, since the termination of democratic rule in 1793, have never, except during the weakness of the Restoration, enjoyed a larger practical direction of affairs than the populace did in ancient times in the Byzantine empire.

Substitution
of govern-
ment of
functionaries
for that of
property.

The consequences flowing from the substitution of the government of functionaries for that of property, deserves the serious consideration of every reflecting mind; because it is the evident issue in which the revolutionary fervour of modern Europe is to terminate. Experience has now abundantly proved what reason *a priori* might have anticipated, that the unavoidable effect of the overthrow of the

influence of property is, after a brief period, during which the theory of self-government is weighed in the balance and found wanting, to establish universally the system of government functionaries. That this system is productive of a much more regular and orderly, and in some respects beneficial administration, than any modification of popular election, is evident from this consideration, that all nations have taken refuge in it to avoid the intolerable evils of real self-government. But it is by no means equally apparent that it is as favourable to the development of mental energy, or the training of the human mind to its highest character or its noblest duties.

Government functionaries are all stamped with one image and superscription: they all move, like automats, by the direction of one hand: original thought, independence of character, are unknown among them. That such public servants are, in general, in the highest degree useful, nay, that they are often more serviceable in their several departments than those whose more lofty qualifications render them less manageable, may at once be admitted. But what is the destiny of a nation which has the easy meshes of a vast net of government functionaries thrown around it, and in which original thought in all departments is chilled, if persisted in, by the certainty of neglect? Prussia and France—in the former of which monarchies the whole system, not merely of government, but of education, both civil and religious, is in the hands of the *employés* of administration; while in the latter, a hundred and thirty-eight thousand civil functionaries, appointed by the Tuileries, carry on the whole internal direction of the state (1)—may convince us how vast a machine for the government of mankind is provided in such a state of society; and how inextricable may be the fetters of a despotism, which, instead of opposing the spread of education or injuring the security of property, carefully supports the former and maintains the latter, and strives only to confine the attention of the people to their private affairs, by at once guiding their thoughts and attending to their interests.

Good government depends upon the due intermixture, in public functionaries, of government appointment, aristocratic influence, and popular control. Irreparable evil is only to be apprehended when one of these interests has destroyed the others: for so long as the interests remain entire, they will, in the end, force their way into a due share in the direction of affairs. But when, by the triumph of democracy, the aristocracy is destroyed, or by the victory of aristocracy the democracy is overthrown, or by the dexterity of the crown both are debased, the balance essential to good government is at an end, and it becomes impossible to preserve the equipoise of freedom. It is by the destruction of the property of the aristocracy, and consequent ruin of their influence, either by actual violence or the pacific working of equal succession, that this lamentable change is most certainly effected; and, accordingly, Montesquieu long ago observed, that “the most durable and debasing despotisms recorded in history, have arisen upon the ruin of aristocratic power through the triumph of revolutionary principles.” Hence it is that democratic ambition—the most keen and searching element which is known in society, productive of so much good when duly coerced, of such irreparable evil when unrestrained—will ever be the object of such jealousy and apprehension to the real friends of liberty; for in its triumphs the far-seeing mind anticipates the destruction of the very elements of freedom, and the enclosing the

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(1) Tocq. i. 209.

whole energies of the human mind in the inextricable fetters of a centralized despotism.

Great sin of the French Revolution. The great sin of the French Revolution was the confiscation of the estates of the church and the aristocracy; it is that which has produced effects which can never be repaired. It is commonly said, indeed, in regard to individual violence, that restitution can be made of property, but who can restore human life? But the aphorism does not hold good in communities: wasted life is repaired by the vivifying powers of nature, but divided property can never be restored. A new generation will supply the place of that which has been destroyed; new smiles will arise on young cheeks, and banish the tears of former days; but who can replace ancient possessions alienated, colossal estates divided, old influences extinguished? The transference of property, and with it political influence, to a different class of society, supplants the old by new dominant powers; another balance is thus induced in the state, unalterable save by a fresh revolution. Power never yet was yielded up but to force. Had Cromwell confiscated the estates of the church and divided those of the nobility, the whole subsequent history of England would have been changed; for how could our tempered constitution have existed without political weight attached to property and religious impressions prevalent among the people? The great moral lesson to be deduced from every page of the French revolution is, that the destruction of these classes by the early triumphs and unbridled excesses of the democratic party, has proved for ever fatal to the reconstruction of freedom, by destroying at once the moral influence which might supersede the necessity of despotism, and the balance of power which might restrain its excesses.

Great sin of the reformation. The great sin of the Reformation was the confiscation of so large a portion of the property of the church for the aggrandizement of temporal ambition, and the enriching of the nobility who had taken a part in the struggle. When that great convulsion broke out, nearly a third of the whole landed estates in the countries which it embraced, was in the hands of the regular or parochial clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. What a noble fund was this for the moral and religious instruction of the people, for the promulgation of truth, the healing of sickness, the assuaging of suffering! Had it been kept together, and set apart for such sacred purposes, what incalculable and never-ending blessings would it have conferred upon society! Expanding and increasing with the growth of population, the augmentation of wealth, the swell of pauperism, it would have kept the instruction and fortunes of the poor abreast of the progress and fortunes of society, and prevented, in a great measure, that fatal effect, so well known in Great Britain in subsequent times, of the National Church falling behind the wants of the inhabitants, and a mass of civilized Heathenism arising in the very heart of a Christian land. Almost all the social evils under which Great Britain is now labouring, may be traced to this fatal and most iniquitous spoliation, under the mask of religion, of the patrimony of the poor on occasion of the Reformation. But for that robbery, the state would have been possessed of lands amply sufficient to have extended its religious instruction for any possible increase of the people; to have superseded the necessity of any assessment for parochial relief, or general instruction; and to have provided, without burdening any one, for the whole spiritual and temporal wants of the community. When we reflect on the magnitude of the injustice committed by the temporal nobility in the seizure at that period of so large a portion of the funds of the church, and observe how completely all the evils which now

threaten the social system in Great Britain would have been obviated if that noble patrimony had still been preserved for the poor, it is impossible to avoid feeling that we too are subject to the same just dispensation which has doomed France to oriental slavery for the enormous sins of its Revolution; and that, if our punishment is not equally severe, it is only because the confiscation of the Reformation was not so complete, nor the inroads on property so irretreivable.

Example
this affords
of moral
retribution. This is but another example of the all-important truth, which a right consideration of history so uniformly demonstrates, that communities and nations are subject to moral laws; and that, although inconsiderable deviations from rectitude may be overlooked as unavoidable to humanity, yet outrageous sin and irreparable evil never fail to bring upon their authors condign punishment even in this world. Individuals have souls to receive retribution in a future state of existence, but nations have no immortality; and that just retribution which, in the former case, is often postponed, in appearance at least, to another world, in the latter is brought down with unerring certainty upon the third and fourth generation. How this mysterious system is worked out by Supreme Power, and yet the freedom of human action, and the entire moral responsibility of each individual are preserved, will never be fully understood in this world. Yet that there is no inconsistency between them is self-evident, for every one feels that he is free; and the history of every nation, as well as the general progress of mankind, demonstrate the reality both of the moral retribution of nations, and a general system for the direction of human affairs. And without pretending entirely to solve the difficulty, the mysteries of which, in all its parts, is probably beyond the reach of the human faculties, a very little consideration must be sufficient to show what in general is the system pursued, and how the divine superintendence is rendered perfectly reconcilable with justice to individual men and nations.

Agency
by which
this admin-
istration
of affairs
is effected. The method by which this mysterious system is carried into execution, and yet rendered consistent with the perfect freedom of human actions, is this. The active propensities of men—that is their desires and passions—are so calculated and adapted to the ever-varying current of human affairs, that in acting upon the whole in conformity with them, the individual free agents are made unconsciously to forward both the general plan of the divine administration, and the separate justice dealt out to particular men and nations. When Shakespeare put into the mouth of Lear the striking sentiment—

The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices
Make whips to scourge us—

he did but express the conviction of mankind, founded alike upon observation and experience, that how agreeable and enticing soever the paths of sin may be in the outset, they terminate alike to communities and individuals in disappointment and ruin. Providence in the end is found to be just; and the early and often long-continued triumph of wickedness, is but the ordeal appointed for the trial and purification of virtue, and the preparation, in the very success of the unjust, for their final and deserved retribution. And the means by which this dispensation is effected, is not the special interposition of the avenging angel, so much as the natural effect of the triumph of wickedness, in the indignation it excites, the misery it occasions, the reaction to which it gives rise. The laws of providence have

doomed signal wickedness, whether in individuals or nations, to ultimate and condign punishment, and the reality of the existence of these laws may be clearly discerned in the calamitous consequences which invariably, in the end, attend any flagrant violation of the rules of virtue: but it is not the less apparent that the agents in this retribution are men themselves; that it is in their feelings that the moving power in this vast and complicated machine is to be found; and that the long-continued delay which often takes place in the chastisement of the wicked, arises from the protracted period during which the reaction is preparing, in the increased suffering, enlarged experience, or aroused indignation of mankind.

And its
consistency
with the
perfect
freedom of
mankind.

Nor is there any thing in this agency inconsistent with the perfect freedom of human actions, and the entire responsibility of every individual by whom it is conducted. There is a difficulty, doubtless, in discerning how a general system, at once of progress and retribution, is conducted by the voluntary acts of a multitude of detached individuals; but this is only one of the many instances in which the human intellect, with all its power, is shattered against the simplest cases of the agency of Supreme Mind upon terrestrial affairs. It is just as difficult to tell how a plant grows, or an infant is formed, or the vital spark communicated, or a stone falls to the ground, or the system of worlds coheres by the mutual attraction of an infinity of particles. And although each individual mind, in the vast system, is a free agent, yet is there nothing in the whole administration inconsistent with such unrestrained agency, or, in the general result, incompatible with the simultaneous operation of a multitude of actors. Every one feels that he is master of his own actions; yet these actions upon the whole, and on an average of men, lead to certain known results; and the great social functions connected with individual existence, the continuance of the species, the coherence of society, and the progress of the world, are securely provided for by the independent actings of an innumerable multitude of separate agents, each obeying the impulse of his active propensities, directed by his free choice. Moreau expressed a fact of general application, explained according to the irreligious ideas of the French Revolution, when he said, that "Providence was always on the side of dense battalions;" but he forgot to add, what experience soon taught his country, that it is the moral laws of nature which, in the end, determine on which side the dense battalions are to be found.

Vast effects
of the
French Re-
volution in
the spread of
the Christian
religion.

No more striking instance is to be found of the manner in which the ultimate effects of the actions of men are made to deviate from, and sometimes defeat, the original intentions of their authors, than in the final result of the French Revolution upon the progress of the Christian faith. It was begun to throw off the fetters of the Roman Catholic religion, with which its deluded leaders confounded the whole precepts and doctrines of Christianity; and its first triumphs were accordingly signalized by the entire confiscation of the property of the Church, and overthrow of the institutions and even forms of religion in the whole of France. What were its final effects on the grand object of philosophic ambition, utilitarian industry, and Jacobin revenge? They were to give an impulse to Christianity, unknown since the days when it mounted with Constantine the throne of Rome, to diffuse its blessings over an extent unparalleled in any former age; to extend the gospel in a purer form, and under brighter auspices over the remotest parts of the earth; and rear up two powers, each irresistible on its own element, whose forces, specially adapted to the theatres on which they were destined to act, have now given

it an irresistible ascendancy in human affairs. Voltaire said that "he was tired of hearing how twelve men had established the Christian religion, and he was resolved to show that one could pull it down;" but no man, since the days of the apostles, has done so much, without intending it, for its establishment and propagation, as Voltaire himself.

By the colonies of England. The great effect of the wars of the French Revolution was the aggrandizement of the colonial empire of England, and the territorial conquests of Russia. If we contemplate the manner in which, during the early years of the contest, the strength of England was paralyzed by the miserable parsimony which had starved down its military and naval forces in former years, we may well feel astonishment at the blindness of the democratic principle which had occasioned so lamentable a result. But though this circumstance unquestionably protracted the war for eighteen years after it might have been otherwise terminated, and added at least six hundred millions to the national debt, its effect upon the extension of the British empire into the remote parts of the world was immense. During the course of this long-continued struggle, the colonies of all the European states successively fell into the hands of England: the British navy obtained a decisive supremacy in every sea, and British commerce gradually acquired an extension unparalleled in any former age of the world. The effect of this prodigious expansion, unobserved during the dangers and animation of the conflict, appeared in the most decisive manner on the termination of hostilities. British commerce, the object of jealous rivalry and anxious exclusion to all the continental states, was forcibly turned into new channels, in spite of all the erroneous policy of government, which aimed, by the reciprocity system, at the extension of the markets of the old world; colonization, invigorated alike by the riches, the poverty, the virtues, the vices, the ambition and luxury, the enjoyments and sufferings of the mother country, went on with the steps of a giant; the great development of the democratic principle consequent on a long course of pacific extensions impelled the British race, in prodigious multitudes, alike into the western and the southern hemispheres; and a hundred thousand emigrants (1) now annually leave the British islands, to carry into distant lands the power of European art and the blessings of Christian civilization. No such migration of mankind has taken place since the Goths and the Huns overthrew the Roman empire; no such step in the spread of civilization and the diffusion of the Gospel has been made since it first appeared on the shores of Palestine. To such marvellous and unforeseen results has an overruling Providence conducted the convulsions consequent on the scepticism of Voltaire, the changes emanating from the dreams of Rousseau!

And the conquests of Russia. But the British navy can reach only maritime shores; British colonization can people only the desert, or the forest inhabited by the savage or the hunter. Great as its powers, when suffered to develop themselves, undoubtedly become, they have need of peace for their extension, and they would at once perish before the efforts of semi-barbarous valour. England may call a new world into existence in the woods of America or the isles of Australasia; but pacific colonists would speedily perish under the sabre of the Tartar: her descendants will never effect a settlement in the interior of Asia. But here, too, the irreligion of the French Revolu-

(1) In the year 1841, the British emigrants amounted to 106,000—*Lord Stanley's Speech, Feb 9th, 1842, Parl. Deb.*

tion has developed a power as irresistible at land as the British navy is at sea, and which, perfectly adapted to the element on which it was intended to prevail, has given to the arms of civilization a decisive superiority in Asia over the forces of barbarism. The military strength of Russia, long restrained by the unwieldy extent of its empire, acquired a surprising extension during the wars of the French Revolution; but it was the invasion of Napoléon, the flames of Moscow, which gave it its full development. When the forces of irreligion had reached the Kremlin, the last hour at once of European infidelity and Mahometan supremacy had struck. Rolled back with unheard-of rapidity from the Moskwa to the Seine, Revolutionary infidelity perished with the overthrow of its leader: overwhelmed by the might of civilized energy, the squadrons of the crescent ere long fled before the soldiers of the cross. Turkey and Persia now drag on a precarious dependent existence, solely at the pleasure of the Moscovite autocrat: combated with its own lances, trod down by its own cavalry, the forces of Asia now recoil before the ascending might of Russia. Placed on the frontiers of Europe and Asia, this vast empire unites the forces of both hemispheres; for it has the solid infantry, military skill, and enduring valour of Europe, joined to the powerful multitudes, incomparable horse, and enthusiastic daring of Asia. And both of these great powers which have sprung up from the effects of the French Revolution, are in the clearest manner adapted to the giant task they are called to perform in the advance of mankind; for British democracy and colonization could have effected nothing against the Asiatic sabres, and Russian despotism and conquest would have turned aside of necessity from the sterile and uninviting fields of Transatlantic and Australian settlement.

Simultaneous rise of steam navigation.

Contemporary with this great development of civilized energy, this awful heave of the human race, has arisen a new power communicated to man, calculated, in an immeasurable manner, to aid the extension of civilization and religion through the desert or barbarous portions of the earth. At the moment when Napoléon's armies were approaching Moscow, when Wellington's legions were combating on the Tormes, STEAM NAVIGATION arose into existence, and a new power was let into human affairs, before which at once the forces of barbarism and the seclusion of the desert must yield. In January 1812, not one steam-boat existed in the world; now, on the rivers beyond the Alleghany mountains alone, there are five hundred. Even the death-bestridden gales of the Niger will in the end yield to the force of scientific enterprise, and the fountains of the Nile themselves, emerge from the solemn obscurity of six thousand years. The great rivers of the world have now become the highways of civilization and religion. The Russian battalions will securely commit themselves to the waves of the Euphrates, and waft again to the plains of Shinar the blessings of regular government and a beneficent faith: remounting the St.-Lawrence and the Missouri, the British emigrants will carry into the solitudes of the far west the Bible and the wonders of European civilization. Such have been the final results of the second revolt of Lucifer the Prince of the Morning. Was a great and durable impression made on human affairs by the infidel race? No! It was overruled by Almighty Power; on either side it found the brazen walls which it could not pass. In defiance of all its efforts, the British navy and the Russian army rose invincible above its arms; the champions of Christianity in the East, and the leaders of religious freedom in the West, came forth like giants refreshed with wine from the termination of the fight. The infidel race which aimed at the dominion of the world, served only by their efforts to augment the strength of its destined

rulers; and from amidst the ruins of its power emerged the ark which was to carry the stream of religion to the western, and the invincible host which was to spread the glad tidings of the Gospel through the eastern world (1).

General conclusion. How sin first came into this world, or the creatures of the Divine bounty were permitted to deviate from his precepts and incur his justice, will for ever remain a mystery to finite beings. But taking man as he is, variously compounded of great and noble, with base and selfish propensities, with a natural tendency to evil and yet a perpetual desire to regain his more elevated destiny, the system of the Divine administration is very apparent, and nowhere more conspicuous than in the history of Europe during the French Revolution. It clearly appears that, resting on this basis, assuming as its agents those mingled virtuous and vicious propensities, using the moving power of the active passions and desires of men, there is a system established for the moral government of the world. Provision is made both for the righteous retribution of nations and the general advancement of the species; and it is evident that, while signal wickedness or strenuous performance of duty seldom fail, even in this world, to work out their appropriate reward or punishment, the Great Architect of the universe overrules both to the ultimate good at once of the individual, the nation, and the species; and builds up alike from the wisdom and folly, the virtues and vices, the greatness and weakness of men, amidst the chastisement and reward, the elevation and destruction of nations, the mighty fabric of general and progressive improvement. Distrusting all plans of social improvement which are not founded on individual reformation, recognizing no hope for man but in the subjugation of the wicked propensities of the human heart, acknowledging the necessity of Divine assistance in that herculean task, the reflecting observer will not, even amidst the greatest evils arising from general iniquity, despair of the fortunes of the species; he will recognize in these evils, the provision mercifully made for the extirpation of sin by an early experience of its effects; he will observe that there is established in the consequences of these iniquities an unseen agency destined for their ultimate removal or punishment, and acknowledge that, amidst the infinite maze of events, the only sure guide which can be followed, is that which is founded on the eternal principles of Supreme Wisdom, human Corruption, spiritual Regeneration, and Christian Charity.

(1) Alison on Population, i. 526, 527.

